

DISCUSSION PAPER 30

SKINNING THE SKUNK – FACING ZIMBABWEAN FUTURES

Edited by Mai Palmberg and Ranka Primorac

Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 2005

Indexing terms

National identity

History

Cultural identity

Political development

Social development

Future studies

Diaspora

Zimbabwe

*The opinions expressed in this volume are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the views of Nordiska Afrikainstitutet*

Language checking: Elaine Almén

ISSN 1104-8417

ISBN printed version 91-7106-552-0

ISBN electronic version 91-7106-553-9

© the authors and Nordiska Afrikainstitutet

Printed in Sweden by Blomberg & Janson, Bromma 2005

Contents

Foreword	5
<i>Terence Ranger</i> The Uses and Abuses of History in Zimbabwe	7
<i>Stanley Nyamfukudza</i> To Skin a Skunk: Some observations on Zimbabwe's intellectual development.	16
<i>Beacon Mbiba</i> “Zimbabwe’s Global Citizens in ‘Harare North’: Some preliminary observations”	26
Notes on the Contributors	39

Foreword

On May 24–26, 2004 the Nordic Africa Institute arranged an international conference in Uppsala called “Looking to the Future: Social, Political and Cultural Space in Zimbabwe”. The aim was to look at various aspects of the present Zimbabwean political, economic and social crisis with a long-term view. We wanted to look at historical roots, analyse the present, and reflect on future alternatives.

The conference was organised by a committee of three researchers at the Nordic Africa Institute, who had been engaged in research on Zimbabwe: Amin Kamete who co-ordinates a research programme on gender and age in African cities; Henning Melber who is research director and runs a programme on “Liberation and Democracy in Southern Africa”; and Mai Palmberg who co-ordinates a research project on “Cultural Images in and of Africa”. Each researcher was responsible for one session within his/her thematic framework. We have decided to publish some of the papers as a contribution to the current debate on the state of the nation and on possible future trends.

This Discussion Paper contains three important conference contributions on cultural currents, all of them revised after the conference. Professor Terence Ranger, who rightly is seen as the most influential and also the most productive historian on Zimbabwe, in his keynote speech at the conference aired his grave concern at the “patriotic history”, which replaces consensus and unity with confrontation and exclusion.

Another plenary speaker whose contribution is reproduced here is Stanley Nyamfukudza, one of Zimbabwe’s most interesting writers. He is the author of the politically controversial *Non-Believer’s Journey*, which was published in the first year of independence, and also of short stories in *Aftermaths* and children’s stories. One of the themes in his speech was the misguided policy of avoiding discussing problems openly – described with a Shona saying, “To Skin A Skunk”, which has given the name to this collection of papers. In this context he also discusses the need in Zimbabwe for an intellectual and non-partisan forum for discussion.

The third paper included here discusses and presents data about a growing category of Zimbabweans, who often are, but should not be, ignored in current discussions on Zimbabwe, the diaspora. Beacon Mbiba here looks at the Zimbabweans in London, “Harare North”, gives us interesting details, and feeds in some suggestions on a more constructive role for the Zimbabweans abroad.

In the first publication from the conference Sarah Chiumbu wrote about media and identity in the redefining of the national agenda, and Dumisani Moyo wrote on broadcasting policy and political control in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe. With an

introduction by Henning Melber these papers appear in *Media, Public Discourse and Political Contestation in Zimbabwe* in the Nordic Africa Institute series Current African Issues (No. 27, 2004).

Suzanne Dansereau, and Mario Zamponi are the authors of *Zimbabwe – The Political Economy of Decline*, in the Nordic Africa Institute series Discussion Papers (No. 27, 2005). Both this and the media analysis mentioned above are available for downloading via the Internet.

The session of culture included additional material, partly available.

Praise Zenenga presented a chapter on the contestation for space in theatre in Zimbabwe for his ongoing Ph.D. thesis in Theatre Arts at Northwestern University in the United States.

Mai Palmberg's paper "Music in Zimbabwe's Crisis" on subtle and open protest in different popular music genres has been published in *Sounds of Change – Social and Political Features of Music in Africa*, Side Studies, No. 12.

Robert Muponde presented an original analysis of the speeches of president Robert Mugabe and his opponent, Morgan Tsvangirai (not yet published). The images relied on are examined and unsettling questions are asked about where the differences lie.

Lene Bull Christiansen's paper at the conference is part of a larger manuscript, which has been published by the Nordic Africa Institute under the title *Tales of the Nation – Feminist Nationalism or Patriotic History? Defining National History and Identity in Zimbabwe* (Research Report No. 132, 2005, also available for downloading via the Internet). Here Lene Bull Christiansen compares the nationalism of political leaders with the writings of Yvonne Vera, and also compares her early and later writing to explore very different nationalisms.

Uppsala April 6, 2005

Mai Palmberg

The Uses and Abuses of History in Zimbabwe

Terence Ranger

Introduction

I am a historian and I am talking tonight about history and historiography. Nevertheless I shall focus on the very recent past, the last few months in fact. This is because two books have recently been published which provide a full background to recent events in Zimbabwe (Hammar et al. 2003, Ranger 2003) and I do not want merely to repeat what is in these books. And I especially do not want to repeat the material in my paper “Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: The Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe”. I wrote this article in November 2003 and even before publication it has had a very vigorous *samizdat* life.¹ So what I want to present tonight is material which has come to hand since November 2003 and which amplifies and extends my argument in that paper about the creation and propagation of “patriotic history” in Zimbabwe.

In November 2003 I wished to make two main points. The first was that the Zimbabwe crisis was not merely a ruthless struggle for wealth and power. It was also an ideological combat, partly powered by and partly reflected in ideas. In this lecture I want to illustrate the recent development of these ideas.

At this week’s Zimbabwe Conference,² some delegates, favouring a more structural analysis, have deplored the general fascination with what they call the “third-rate ideas” of Robert Mugabe or of his Information Minister, Jonathan Moyo. But here I come to my second point. These ideas have to be taken seriously because such a sustained attempt is being made to propagate and enforce them. Everyone engaged in any sort of education process in Zimbabwe is under pressure to teach what has recently come to be called Mugabeism. And at the core of Mugabeism is a version of the past – called by the regime and its publicists “patriotic history”.

In what follows I will seek to illustrate these points – the enunciation of Mugabeism, its historiographical content, and the thoroughness and persistence of the attempts being made to propagate it. First, though, let me very rapidly review the argument of my November 2003 paper. I argued there that “patriotic history” was very different from the older “nationalist historiography” and even more different from the more recent “historiography of nationalism”. “Nationalist historiography”

1. Hundreds of people read the paper on the Internet. The article has now been published in the *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 30, no. 2, June 2004, pp. 215–233.

2. *Looking to the Future: Social, Political and Cultural Space in Zimbabwe*, an international conference held at the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, 24–26 May 2004.

proclaimed the nationalist movement as inclusive and even non-racial. It depicted nationalism as emancipatory (see, for example, Ranger 1967 and 1970). By contrast, “patriotic history” emphasises the division of the nation not only into races but also into “patriots” and “sell-outs” among its African population. It proclaims the need for authoritarian government in order to repress and punish the “traitors”, who are often depicted as very numerous – most of the urban population, for example, and large sections within the rural. Nationalist historiography espoused projects of modernisation and reform, extending in its radical versions to Socialist and egalitarian visions. By contrast, “patriotic history” has replaced the idea of Socialism by that of “authenticity”.

The differences with the historiography of nationalism are starker still. This seeks to raise questions about the nature of nationalism and about the course of its development; to offer alternative versions of challenges and struggles within the nationalist movement (see Ranger 1999, Alexander et al. 2000 and Ranger 2003). “Patriotic history”, on the other hand, forecloses all such questions. It offers instead a highly selective and streamlined version of the anti-colonial struggle. It is a doctrine of “permanent revolution” leaping from *Chimurenga* to *Chimurenga*. It has no time for questions or alternatives. It is a doctrine of violence because it sees itself as a doctrine of revolution.

Mugabeism in South Africa, Africa, the Diaspora and the Indigenous World

What has changed since I wrote my paper in November 2003 is the self-confidence of the Zimbabwean regime. In the editorial celebrations of this year’s Independence Day the state newspapers proclaimed that the crisis was over. A year ago the success of the Third *Chimurenga* – the re-occupation of the land – was in doubt; enemies without and traitors within were threatening to reverse it and to overthrow the regime. But now, the state papers asserted, Mugabe had come through. “Mugabeism” – a term used for the first time – had triumphed at home and was now ready to triumph abroad.

This was the argument, for instance, in Nathaniel Manheru’s article in the *Herald* on 24 April 2004 under the splendid title “Mugabe for SA presidency?” Manheru, who is widely identified as Jonathan Moyo himself under a pen name, mocked the South African Democratic Alliance for imagining that South African voters could be frightened by the display of images of Mugabe:

As it turned out, the banner worked magic for Mbeki and his ANC. ‘If uM-b-h-e-eki supports Mugabe’, reasoned the South African voter, ‘then he must be good!’

South Africa’s teeming black millions have waited impatiently by the horn’s end for the plentiful benefits promised by uhuru in 1994. Their overwhelming vote for Mbeki and the ANC was not an acceptance of the status quo, only a recognition and reward that the ANC wishes to challenge and change it.

And Mugabe personifies that no-nonsense change they yearn for and will get or wrestle sooner or later.

“Mugabe-ism”, concluded Manheru, was “an imposing outward fact in Southern African politics”.

And not only in southern – or South – African politics. On 18 April, writing in *The Sunday Mail*, Sabelo Sibanda proclaimed that “Zimbabwe sets example for Africa”. It was Zimbabwe’s 24th year of independence. But what, asked Sibanda, did independence mean? Most of Africa, in theory independent for much longer, had yet to really enjoy it. Only Zimbabwe had taken radical steps “towards the total emancipation of African people and their motherland”. Zimbabweans now “enjoy the right to take occupation of the land of their ancestors, which right a lot of their other African brothers and sisters do not yet enjoy and it is not yet foreseeable as to when they will get such a right”. Zimbabwe was setting “a new African agenda for the global African family”. Then, inevitably, Sibanda turned to history:

As we Zimbabweans weigh our role in as far as our significance to Africa is concerned, we do not only do so by looking at our present and future contribution but also to the past. Historically, Great Zimbabwe is the last of the Great African civilisations to fall and, unlike the likes of Egypt, Zimbabwe remains truly African ... What better place for us to pick up the pieces again than in Zimbabwe, where we still have a traceable history of the greatness of our ancestors in a land still truly black? Being the last to fall it is most fitting that it be the first to arise out of the mud and in turn pull the rest of the continent, and its people globally, upward.

Great Zimbabwe, concluded Sibanda, “is not a ruin as the colonisers had us believe” but “a sacred spiritual place”. Hence “to connect from it spiritually and move on up is a most significant spiritual starting point for all Africans”.

Lowani Ndlovu, writing in the same issue of *The Sunday Mail*, hailed Zimbabwe as “a lone but certainly shining African star in a dark global village”. Nor was its mission only to set an example to South Africa, or to lead Africa as a whole to true independence, or even to set an agenda for “the global African family”. Beyond that, Zimbabwe was to be the leader of a huge renaissance of “indigenous” peoples throughout the world. In the week after the anniversary of Zimbabwe’s independence the first Conference on National Liberation was organised by the Zanu-PF External Relations Committee. Delegations attended from “liberation movements” in the front-line states and from Afro-American and Afro-British support groups. But there were also delegates from the world’s “indigenous peoples” – Aborigines, Maoris. Native Americans – among them Michael Anderson of the Sovereign Union of Aboriginal Nations. The conference re-affirmed “solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe on land reform”; it emphasised “the need for the revival of pan-Africanism and nationalism”; but it also committed itself to support what it called “indigenous communities in the Diaspora”.¹

1. Walter Muchinguri, “Liberation movements conference a success”, *Herald*, 24 April 2004.

Two of the Zanu-PF intellectuals whom I quoted in my November 2003 paper (Stan Mudenge and Tafataona Mahoso) were concerned to emphasise how different this National Liberation Conference was from the days of the 1970s. Support group delegations now were all black or “indigenous”; there were no European radicals there at all. Indeed, Minister of Foreign Affairs and historian Mudenge presented a paper to the conference “on the mutation of European and North American ‘socialists’ and even some ‘communists’ from ‘progressives’ in the 1960s and 1970s to neo-liberal reactionaries today”. Tafataona Mhoso, in his weekly column in *The Sunday Mail* on 25 April 2004, seconded Mudenge. “It would have been fruitful to ask how many times the African had been betrayed by whites they believed to be radical or progressive allies in the last 200 years.” Mahoso suggested that African nationalism was being resurrected because “of the bitter sense of betrayal which the African majority felt at the hands a new breed of neoliberal African ‘reformers’ and their Western allies, the socialists and progressives of yester-year”. Mahoso’s own paper was a historical one, demonstrating “the consistently racist and reactionary framing of Africa by Western institutions, intellectuals and leaders from 1300 AD to 2004”.

Proclaiming and Teaching Patriotic History inside Zimbabwe

In May 2004 chiefs from all over the country assembled – for the first time – at Great Zimbabwe, that “spiritual starting point for all Africans”. In my November 2003 paper I described the ceremony at which President Mugabe received back the base of a Zimbabwe bird which had been repatriated from Germany. Now, on 6 May 2004, Mugabe visited Great Zimbabwe to witness the formal handing over of the bird to Chief Fortune Charumbira by the President of the Council of Chiefs, Jonathan Mangwende. Mangwende admitted that:

I did not know there were stolen birds when I was growing up not knowing that there was a person concerned about this sacred heritage. The President must be applauded as he was always after the return of the country’s stolen heritage. President Mugabe I want to thank you very much ... this bird was not the only thing that was stolen but many other things and we want that heritage back.

Charumbira said that the return of the bird symbolised the return of land. Then he handed the base over to the Minister of Home Affairs to pass on to officials of National Museums and Monuments. Mugabe himself made a commitment to the teaching of authentic history:

The President said he would personally ensure that a university named after the Great Zimbabwe Monument was established to offer subjects such as history, culture and archaeology because of the significance of the place to the history of the country.

He also said most Zimbabwean institutions had been influenced by Western culture and it was important to have a university promoting local culture.¹

The first 'pilot project' in such a rewriting was launched on May 15 in Tsholotsho district. Jonathan Moyo, who plans to stand in that constituency in the next general election, was guest of honour. It was bold of Moyo to launch a project entitled "Capturing a Fading National Memory" in Tsholotsho. The last time villagers in the district were interviewed about their memories was for the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and Legal Resources Foundation report on the killings by the Fifth Brigade in the 1980s.² It seems unlikely that these will be among the memories recalled this time. As Moyo himself said, "information history can be a power game", though admittedly he went on to stress that this project aimed to get at the experience of the many rather than that of "powerful elites".³ The meeting was attended by chiefs, by the director of the National Archives, Ivan Murambiwa, and the director of the National Gallery in Bulawayo, Addelis Sibutha. The University of Zimbabwe was "expected to play a critical role of quality controller, verifying information and providing students for research".⁴

Meanwhile steps were afoot to ensure the teaching of patriotic history. At the initial levels war veterans were expected to play a leading role. In *The Sunday Mail* of 4 January 2004 Ngugi wa Mirii – a Kenyan dramatist and activist who has spent many years in Zimbabwe – declared that:

Today the enemy from within is just as bad as the colonialists ... they are all in collusion to destroy our sovereignty and independence. I would hasten to ask the war vets to be more proactive and more organised than they are if they are to overcome these challenges. Their strategies, methods and techniques of winning people on their side need to be revisited, especially because there are very many 'born-frees' who are predominantly influenced by Western culture and unfortunately our education system was not decolonised at the time of independence. As a result, all these young people have gone through an education that has failed to intellectually arm them into recognising who they are and what Zimbabwe is.

War veterans should tell youth "inspiring stories" of the liberation war. "They must demonstrate how to become heroes in the Third Chimurenga." They should establish an ideological college in which "subjects such as African history and Zimbabwe

-
1. "Zimbabwe Bird handed over to chiefs", *Chronicle*, 7 May 2004. It is ironic that until recently the University of Zimbabwe had the strongest department of archaeology in Africa largely consisting of young Zimbabwean archaeologists trained in Uppsala. In recent months most of these scholars have left the University for institutions in Botswana and South Africa.
 2. See CCJP/LRF 1997. Every village in Tsholotsho was included in the survey. These memories are still very much alive. On 29 March 2004 *The Standard* carried a report by the Post Independence Survivors Trust, which said that "thousands of victims and survivors are still bitter at the government's failure to apologise and compensate them".
 3. The examples Moyo himself gave were "the misinformation that is given in textbooks about the construction of Great Zimbabwe and the outcome of the battle of Pupu in Lupane pitting King Lobengula's forces against Allan Wilson and his colonial regiments".
 4. "Oral History Programme launched in Tsholotsho", *The Herald*, 17 May 2004.

culture are taught” and which would also have a research section to record experiences of the war to which “the young would come and listen”. Audio-visual images would be produced so that “our children would learn how to understand our country through their national heroes”. Remember, says Ngugi, “the enemy is within and is not always visible”. But heroes and their allies should always be visible. “Perhaps the war vets can introduce new medals for the Third Chimurenga district by district”.

In fact the war veterans have not acted on so ambitious a scale. But many of them have been involved in training in the National Service Youth Training Camps. After the BBC’s Panorama programme on the camps, with its allegations of rape and violence, a parliamentary committee visited them and issued a report. The *Herald* also sent a reporter, Nelson Chenga, to Dadaya Camp. Chenga wrote a four part series on what he found. In the *Herald* of 11 May 2004 he described the training offered. Youth receive “National Orientation” lessons from 2 pm to 4.30 pm every afternoon:

Conducted in a mixture of Shona, Ndebele and English by an array of fundis in various fields who include war veterans from both former Zanu and Zapu, ex-teachers and university graduands, the National Orientation lessons are divided into 31 topics. The lessons start with an overview of the socio-political and economic set-up in the country before colonialism ... Subjects include the History of Zimbabwe that touches on such aspects as the First and Second Chimurengas; National Ethos that looks at such issues as culture, heroes and heroines, flag and national anthem; Democracy during and after colonialism ...

In my November 2003 article I noted the steps taken to make history a compulsory subject in schools and the school text-books on patriotic history produced by Aeneas Chigwedere, the Minister of Education. Chigwedere has been involved in one major episode since then – the crisis over private school fees in early May 2004. Chigwedere had many schools closed down until they had agreed to the Ministry’s strict limitations on fee increases, to accept Government nominees on their boards, etc. Several headmasters went to prison for a night or two. Course syllabi were not an explicit issue in the confrontation between the Minister and the private schools. But on 9 May Tafataona Mahoso rejoiced in the *Sunday Mail* that the “Third Chimurenga comes to education institutions”:

The first clue one gets in this struggle is the way it resembles the land reclamation struggles. The following features stand out:

1. The elitism of the school development associations resembles that of the CFU [Commercial Farmers Union] and its contempt of the peasant and worker as a prospective farmer.
2. The elitist faith in litigation as a solution to social and economic conflict is also identical to that of the CFU.
3. While there are many Africans among the elites justifying elite schools and elitist fees, the opposition to the State’s education policy is coming mainly from schools led and dominated by white parents and characterised by a white culture in opposition to the spirit and practices of the Third Chimurenga.

According to Mahoso the private schools had merely “tolerated the cultural legacy of the African liberation movement” after independence in 1980 and hid away in elite enclaves which “marginalised the revolutionary and practical education programmes deriving from the liberation struggle”. A “few children of the new African elite” were groomed “to increase their depleted ranks ideologically”.

It was an ironic feature of the school clash that when St George’s College was closed down President Mugabe’s children were sent home to State House! Nevertheless, Mahoso was able to quote Mugabe’s speech to the chiefs at Great Zimbabwe in which he denounced ‘reactionary and elitist schools’. Mahoso thought the moment of truth had arrived. The population of white children has declined; the “decline of the urban corporate sector reduced the numbers of executive parents”; the only recourse was “to hike fees endlessly in order to maintain their familiar ‘standards’.”

All this, thought Mahoso, would be in vain. A new elite is emerging “to be dominated by resettled African farmers”; this was “hostile to the neo-Rhodesian culture of the old private schools ... For the emerging elites the value lies in opening up once closed institutions in order to reflect the new dispensation”. The ideological basis of the schools will be transformed. There will no more “Rhodies in African skin”. Patriotic history would speak to the patriotism of the new, re-settled elite.¹

At the Uppsala conference I was told that Jonathan Moyo is said to be writing an A-level History text and that in the most recent A-level History examination papers there had been questions about the Third Chimurenga and the imperialist character of the MDC.

It has not been only the schools which have been at issue but also the polytechnics and universities. In my November 2003 article I noted that the Zimbabwean government had announced that courses in “National and Strategic Studies” would be introduced in all tertiary institutions. But I expressed doubts that the government would really seek, or be able, to introduce patriotic history courses into all tertiary institutions. It is becoming evident that I underestimated the thoroughness and determination of the makers and advocates of patriotic history.

On 26 March 2004, for instance, the *Independent* reported that “the Ministry of Higher Education has ordered polytechnics, teachers’ colleges and universities to make National and Strategic Studies ... compulsory”. The course had already been taught at Harare Polytechnic and examinations set. Students who refused to take the exams “face the possibility of being denied graduation in August”. The newspa-

1. See also Donald Charumbira’s article in the *Herald* of 14 May 2004 in which he called for urgent educational reform. The whole Zimbabwean educational system was still influenced by colonial assumptions. Colonialism forced “the colonised peoples to conform to the cultures and traditions of the coloniser ... Their own history, religious and educational systems would be relegated to unimportance and irrelevance ... Mental control is implemented through the school system”. Now, however, education “needs to be consistent with the gains that have been made in the Third Chimurenga. This involves mental decolonisation by cherishing our own history.”

per quoted two of the examination questions: “Which political party in Zimbabwe represents the interests of imperialists and how must it be viewed by Zimbabweans?”, and “African leaders who try to serve the interests of imperialists are called what and how do you view patriotism?”.

Pressure is being applied to the private, denominational universities to introduce the course. It will perhaps be made easier to achieve this because of the proposed amendments to the National Council for Higher Education Act reported in the *Sunday Mail* on 18 April 2004. The current Act focussed on the registration and accreditation of universities and lacked emphasis on standards and course content. The reconstituted Council would establish committees which would “consistently audit the programmes offered in institutions of higher learning”.

Conclusion

The rhetoric of Mugabeism is the rhetoric of nationalism, pan-Africanism, pan-indigeneity. It is a discourse designed to unite the oppressed peoples of the world. But it is also a discourse of division since it holds that the oppressed are riddled with traitors who have been brain-washed by the values of “bogus universalism”. As the examination questions cited above indicate, an education in patriotic history, in “National and Strategic Studies”, is designed to teach students how to recognise and deal with traitors. For this reason one of the most significant and also most disturbing of recent historical retrospects was an article which appeared in the *Sunday Mail* on 2 May 2004.

The author, Lowani Ndlovu, suggested that the only way to understand reservations about the land acquisition programme, even when these were expressed by civil servants and by Zanu-PF politicians themselves, was in the long historical sequence of betrayal:

To fully understand the treacherous mentality, you need a perspective beyond the news ... [a] perspective that is classical, with its roots in the Judas Iscariot tradition of sellouts and selling out. If Jesus Christ could not keep all his disciples in the faith and if one of the disciples could readily accept 30 pieces of silver in exchange for Jesus' head, then there's just no way the feat of keeping all the folk intact in a revolution can be achieved by lesser mortals in politics. That is why since, and even long before, the days of Jesus Christ every revolution has had its sell-outs, the Tshombes. Colonialism and slavery were made possible not only because of the sheer brutality of the force and inhumanity used by white racists from Europe and America who stole our land and hanged our defenceless leaders such as Mbuya Nehanda but also because of the local African sell-outs who gave the racist enemy an undeserved helping hand sometimes in exchange for as little as crumbs from the white slave masters' dining table.

Sell-outs pose the most troubling problem to progressives and revolutionaries. They are “elements of the liberation movement, children of the soil, who betray a common cause and forsake common values”. Sell-outs are to be found in the MDC and among their supporters but also even within the regime itself. “Zimbabweans need to stand up against sell-outs in media, business, politics, law, civil society and the whole works. We must confront the internal enemy once and for all.”¹

And so I conclude this update as I concluded my November 2003 paper. Zimbabwe needs a complex, plural historiography. It is not enough to oppose the authoritarian exclusivity of patriotic history with an indiscriminate gathering together, as an MDC letter to the *Independent* did on 19 March 2004, by saying: “We are the sweet home of all classes, ethnic groups, religions, races, gender and creed.” In addition to that, we need a history of the formation and interaction of these groupings and identities, running through the long periods of time between the flashpoints of the three *Chimurengas*.

Works cited

- Alexander, Jocelyn, JoAnn McGregor and Terence Ranger, 2000. *Violence and Memory. One Hundred Years in the “Dark Forests” of Matabeleland*. Oxford: James Currey.
- CCPJ/LRF (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace/ Legal Resources Foundation), 1997. *Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands 1980–1988*. Harare: RCJP/LRF.
- Hammar, Amanda, Brian Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen (eds), 2003. *Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business. Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis*. Harare: Weaver Press.
- Ranger, Terence (ed.), 2003. *Nationalism, Democracy and Human Rights*. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications.
- Ranger, Terence, 1967. *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896–1897. A Study in African Resistance*. London: Heinemann.
- Ranger, Terence, 1970. *The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898–1930*. London: Heineman.
- Ranger, Terence, 1999. *Voices from the Rocks. Nature, Culture and History in the Matopos Hills of Zimbabwe*. Oxford: James Currey.

Zimbabwean newspapers cited

Chronicle
The Herald
The Standard
The Sunday Mail

1. The rhetoric of treachery is increasingly used to demonise opponents. On May 2, for instance, *The Sunday Mail* carried an editorial “ZCTU irrelevant”. The May Day celebrations were greeted with “apathy and indifference.” The “real problem is that the ZCTU has allowed itself to be swallowed by the opposition MDC and does not seem to have a programme of its own. The ZCTU cannot challenge employers anymore because ideologically they are now one. This must rank as the treachery of the decade”.

To Skin a Skunk: Some observations on Zimbabwe's intellectual development

Stanley Nyamfukudza

A skunk is a common mammal, which Webster's identifies as having 'the power of ejecting an offensive odorous secretion'. Mindful of the second definition of a skunk, which is a vulgar term for 'a low contemptible person', I shall avoid specifying the precise location of the glands that perform that function.

The title "To Skin a Skunk" derives from a ChiShona idiom, *kuvhiya kadembo*, of which it is a literal translation. It refers to a process when two or more people detach themselves from the larger group to talk over a matter, which for any number of reasons discretion advises it may not be politic to discuss in public. It therefore has to do with perceptions and also consensus about views that may or may not be aired outside of a select group. Akin to the injunction not to wash dirty linen in public, it however also implies that the knotty or 'smelly' problems that are not for public address have to be properly attended to away from the public glare. Unless that happens, the appeal to discretion becomes a method of oppression, of silencing alternative views by labelling them traitorous while refusing to attend even in private to the legitimate concerns of sections of the community.

I believe the syndrome explains many factors in the context of any current discourse about matters Zimbabwean. At present it operates by way of raising a selection of emotive ideas to the status of sacred cows; ideas of national unity, of sovereignty, of the sacrifices of liberation, and of patriotism and racial solidarity. It then requires monopoly control of the means of communication to exclude any scrutiny of the detail or veracity of the ensuing arguments. It is a pervasive syndrome, which I believe to be the lost chord required to harmonise a lot of disingenuous explanations and accounts of so many events that are discordant with the truth. One might at this point do well to refer to Terence Ranger's paper on the misuse of history, which provides an examination of one aspect of this manipulation of the past and also of current realities on the ground.¹ It is difficult in such circumstances, to work out whether Zimbabweans agree not to talk of some things or if they merely lack a forum for articulating their concerns.

Let us for the moment turn the clock back to the period around 1981 when the new Zimbabwe existed in a mood of exuberant astonishment about the fact that wholesale carnage and destruction which had seemed about to engulf the country had been averted. Reconciliation was the buzzword of the time. In addition to the

1. See <http://cas1.elis.rug.ac.be/avrug/ranger.htm>

seemingly ubiquitous ‘comrades’, thousands of Zimbabweans young and old who had been in various types of exile descended on the country. Only a few, relatively speaking, had any real experience of doing the sort of jobs they now demanded and were often required to do. The bulk had paper qualifications of varying degrees of quality and authenticity and a sizeable number also possessed a valuable well developed work ethic accumulated over the process of survival in exile. Depending on the circumstances, although it was rare for anyone to say so in as many words, a crucial fact of life that one quickly discovered the closer one approached the citadels of real decision-making and power was that the beginning and end of many initiatives rested on the ability to disprove at the very least, that one had not been on the wrong side of the war of liberation. Even better was to have fought in the bush war, to have been ‘bitten by mosquitoes’.¹

That having been cleared up, one could move on to the smaller nuisances of whether or not one was a home boy.

Among the top leadership, the rhetoric of socialism was still to be heard here and there, although considerably toned down from the heyday of the armed struggle, owing no doubt to the requirements of pragmatism and reconciliation. Those with political and allied social and professional aspirations who had not already made the acquaintance of the ideas of Marxist Leninism made haste to fill in the gap. In retrospect, the astonishing thing was the extent to which, at the time, even in the public media, intellectuals, academics and experts in various fields were called upon to air their views and to give opinions on a wide variety of issues. There was an impression of cultural and intellectual ferment and a willingness to check out new ideas. Leftist scholars ejected from at the time less tolerant societies, like Kenya, played the socialist drum quite loudly in cultural and academic circles. South African revolutionaries who had drifted closer to home ground, Caribbean and a motley crowd of other exiles all contributed to the stimulating climate of being at the forefront of social change.

The levels of serious interest, understanding and cultural sophistication that were assumed from the reading public even in magazines and newspapers was much higher than is imaginable at present. Authors could write serious short stories and poems without pandering much to the popular taste and be surprised to have them published without much struggle. International magazines were easily obtainable in the bookshops at affordable prices. Publishers opened up to service the requirements of the newly liberalized society and there was an explosion in the size of the educational book sector. Much Zimbabwean and other fiction and scholarly books were also published, for instance Colin Stoneman’s *Zimbabwe’s Inheritance*, which

1. ‘Have you been bitten by mosquitoes’ was, in the early years of independence, a popular euphemism for having taken part in the armed struggle.

attempted to make an audit of where Zimbabwe stood in socio-economic terms with regard to the requirements of the newly arrived future.¹

It seemed possible by taking the trouble to consult available public information, newspapers, journals and magazines, to establish the general course and direction of the society. Zimbabwe, whatever its past, appeared to have problems that were amenable to the usual sort of needs analysis; proposed intervention and expected outcome type of planned and rational solution.

The perception that in any situation an intelligent analysis of the background to the problems and the formulation of appropriate responses to national needs assisting in giving people confidence in the institutions through which they pursue their goals. What is important is the existence of an overall consensus about what the major problems are and about what needs to be done to tackle them. The majority would also assent to generally accepted norms regarding how we do things.

One of the most tragic developments of recent times is the entrenchment of violence as a means of problem solving and political contestation. The tone and rhetoric of the public media are very belligerent, provocative and intolerant with dismissive mockery the operative method of criticism. A fundamental alteration of the Zimbabwean personality and culture appears to be on the agenda as a permanent readiness for war is substituted for the alternative that no difference is beyond discussion and negotiation. It needs to be pointed out however that we shall certainly reap the harvest of cultivating a culture where the preferred method of dealing with undigested minorities is to bash and scatter them. My own first encounter with the skunk-skinner mentality was in the run-up to the first anniversary of independence. In a largely celebratory review supplement of Zimbabwean literature in the *Herald*, Ranga Zinyemba, a respected literary academic questioned the need for the tone of suspicion, doubt and pessimism in my, at the time, recently published novel, *The Non-Believer's Journey*, a story about the liberation project and the integrity of the nationalist leadership. Why, he asked, did there seem to be a pessimistic prognosis for the future in the very first year of independence?

What I had done was simple. My story was conceived and largely written out of the disarray and disillusionment prevailing in the liberation movement in the period around 1977 when Robert Mugabe moved into the ascendancy in ZANU and displaced Ndabaningi Sithole. Aware that the struggle was mired in internecine division and confusion, the main character in the story looks back to the past, to his childhood and also the early days of the nationalist movement to see if there is a basis for being hopeful about the future. He recalls the violent persuasion used in the mid-1960s by activists to mobilise support and whip dissenters into line which was also part of the struggle between the two nationalist parties after the split between ZANU and ZAPU. He had also noted the way personal and private agen-

1. Colin Stoneman, *Zimbabwe's Inheritance*, Macmillan, London 1981.

das were at times instrumental in identifying who was to be called an enemy of the people. He wonders if there would be violence again in the future, in the name of fighting for and defending freedom. Not to dwell on the issue, I would like to make just two points. The first is that there was an angry reaction from some ex-combatants to my book. Did I fight in the war? So who was I to presume to write about it? And anyway, why did I want to talk about negative things like that now? The second is that I was taken aback at the intolerance of anything other than unambiguous and unconditional praise. I had written about a civilian's position during the war but I was often pushed onto the defensive and quickly realised the occasional wisdom of silence and anonymity as discussions frequently threatened to extend beyond the merely verbal.

When your chosen road towards something like the truth is through fictive means, it is necessary that your readership keeps open a speculative scepticism about what they regard to be the facts. Without that, the reading and writing of fiction becomes an extension of the consumption and manufacture of propaganda and, in a certain view, an attenuation of the field of war into the battlefield of the mind. If violence is the means by which certain ideas may be driven underground if not quite out of existence, then those expressing these ideas are regarded as fair game, and such an outlook we can only describe as fascist.

On a lighter note, when the draft programme of this conference was first sent to me, I was designated Prof. Stanley Nyamfukudza. I was quick to point out the error and to insist that it be put right, not because I particularly mind being mistaken for a professor. In fact it does have a pleasant ring in my ear. But professors do have to be professorial, I prefer to be as disorderly as I like and avoid references and quotations to arrive at my approximation of reality and the truth, as long as at the end, my reader or in this case hearer, feels that I have justified my use of his time. It is important, in my view, to be worthy of the name, for professors and social scientists to avoid the intellectually dishonest practice of skinning skunks in public so as to ingratiate themselves with the powers that be, which now threatens to become a major Zimbabwean growth industry.

It might here be useful to revisit the intellectual climate in which Zimbabweans lived in the years before 1980. There were huge efforts by the Rhodesian regime to control the reading material in circulation with very active searches to track down and destroy any remotely liberal cultural, social and political information and of course, pornography, as part of the propaganda crusade to defend western civilisation against the communist onslaught. Extended lists of banned books and magazines were regularly published by a hyperactive Censorship Board.

The information embargo appeared so successful that it was generally not possible for the majority of black people to have anything but the vaguest information about what was really going on at the war front, until the guerrillas themselves burst on the scene 'live' so to speak. It later became clear when the decisive phase of the

guerrilla war started with the opening of the North Eastern front that despite the pervasive intelligence and informer network, the police had completely outdone themselves and failed to get wind of the massive security breach that had been widely known for many months on the alternative African grapevine. Then, as now, fortunately, information embargoes appear to be impossible to fully implement.

There was at that time of independence an awareness in some sectors, in private industry, sections of the civil service and a variety of other institutions that they had not been on the side of the people's struggle. It was felt in many cases that to make amends would be politic in order to alter public perceptions although there were certainly also many cases of resistance to change. The publishing industry stood on the verge of reaping significant profits on the back of the huge expansion under way in the education sector. And even though little money was to be made from doing it, local literature was now to be published in a serious way as an indication of publishers' newfound sense of corporate responsibility to the new nation. Then and now, Zimbabwean fiction does not sell in anything like the large numbers of school textbooks. Work could then be found as editors with publishers who were keen to handle titles in ChiShona, English and SiNdebele. At the time also, government ministers, top civil servants and academics trod a well beaten path to the doors of publishing houses laden for the most part with indigestible academic theses they had compiled and accumulated in exile. Some of them did see the light of day as published books and for some time there was enthusiasm for publishing general books though many had to be written off as publishing investments as reality asserted itself and it quickly became clear that Zimbabweans generally do not buy and read books unless they have to.

Many of these circumstances contributed to an environment where intellectual endeavour was seen to be relevant, respected and even politically correct. The traditional Zimbabwean respect for book learning which seemed at times to be somewhat exaggerated appeared to be vindicated in the number of degrees the country's Prime Minister was reputed to have. A widely read and cultured man like that had to be the match of any man of whatever race anywhere. Meanwhile, Zimbabwean writers began to win awards and to make an impact in the field of African writing.

The slogan "Free primary education for all" seemed to strike the keynote for a new age of enlightenment. Schools were expanded and it was not permitted to deny a child of school-going age a place so that 12 and even 14 stream schools came into existence where two or at the most three had been the norm. It was mostly a numbers game and it would have been branded reactionary to ask too loudly about quality. Thus for many years Zimbabwe could lay claim to spectacular successes in education as one of the major achievements of the post-independence era. But things were not quite what they seemed and here too, the underlying reality has finally surfaced. Much water has passed under the bridge and this is not quite the place to examine the detail of what went wrong with the education sector. The sad

incident detailed below must suffice to indicate something of the current reality for the majority of the rural people.

I was invited in mid-2003 to a secondary school maybe thirty kilometres from the capital as guest speaker at the launch of a branch of the Budding Writers Association. Before delivery of my homily about how lots and even more reading was the key to becoming a writer, I asked to have a look at the school library. It should not have been called a library. There were fewer than twenty books that were not textbooks in that unfurnished storeroom in which the tattered books were arranged in untidy piles on the dusty floor. Of these, half a dozen or so were saddle-stitched Shona paperback novels donated by a major publisher. The rest were old detective novels in English published in the 1940s and 1950s that had been donated to the school, probably superannuated stock discarded from a city library.

What would I be saying to them if I suggested that the sure way to become a writer was to read widely? What kind of education were these kids getting with just the basic textbook as the resource for both teachers and pupils? I had to begin by alienating them. I explained how lucky and privileged I had been to attend a school with such a good library that for four years I did not stop reading whenever I could, yet I had come nowhere near to exhausting the number of books I still wanted to read. You must read everything you can lay your hands on, I urged them and they clapped politely when I was done. I was burdened and depressed when I departed.

These children were only minutes from the bright lights of the capital whose glow brightens up their horizon every night. I asked myself if in fact we had not all been complicit in a major exercise in mass deception. In the educational sector itself, awareness exists that book based education is not suitable for any but a relatively small percentage of the population, which fact is not exceptional to Zimbabwe. Fitful but unconvincing attempts were made at various times to shift the system onto a more vocational basis. But the huge expense of doing it properly, particularly in current economic circumstances, is impossible to contemplate. In fact, minimal provision of adequate numbers of the basic textbook is itself now beyond the reach of most rural and some urban schools, with reports of pupils sharing one text book among ten. But it is not considered politically correct to suggest that simply increasing the numbers without the learning resources was a big con.

A brief experience of teaching in the early 1990s proved to me that no one was really fooled for long. At that time, secondary schools had up to a dozen streams and only the first four or so genuinely benefited from an academic curriculum. Among the teaching staff it was accepted that pupils from about the fourth stream downwards were a waste of time.

And very little serious teaching was undertaken in those classes. The students themselves knew nothing much was expected of them, resented it and as far as they could, retaliated. They were aggressive, rude and a mammoth disciplinary headache. Everyone in the system knew it except, one can suspect, a minority of the parents,

but no one mentioned it. Poor parents struggled to buy uniforms and books and pinned their hopes for the future on children who were going to school just to pass the time for 4 years. When exam results were published, the bulk of the students had the mark U (ungradeable). It might have seemed like a private tragedy in numerous homes, but this was truly a national disaster.

Only in 2003 did the Ministry of Education admit that 60 per cent of those who sat for 'O' level examinations failed. Eventually, everyone realised free education is a big joke. Year after year thousands of kids unfit for any sort of work without training from scratch, barely literate and incapable of self-evaluation are tipped onto the streets. And year after year politicians have mouthed off about education being one of the major achievements since independence. However, the phenomenal growth of the private education sector indicates that people know the reality. This is the background against which recent battles between the Minister of Education and private schools struggling to survive hyperinflationary times must be seen.

The health scene also abounds in untold truths. Hypocrisy, denial and lies surrounding the response to HIV and AIDS are an example of the humbug that often determines the fate of millions of people. An example was the refusal to discuss in rational terms the reality of the issue of homosexuality, in spite, for example, of common knowledge among the citizenry of the unacceptably predatory behaviour of the former incumbent of the highest office in the land, until a brazen murder in a soccer stadium made the issue unavoidable. Then the skunk had to be savagely torn to pieces before the bemused gaze of the nation.¹

One of the disturbing black holes on the Zimbabwean social-cultural scene, which appears to absorb and completely obliterate all intellectual light, has been the longstanding absence of a serious non-partisan forum for discussion of cultural, social and even political and other issues. It is a situation that enlarges on and panders to our society's capacity for living comfortably with contradictions, lies and even deliberate mystification of perfectly explainable social phenomena.

1. The case refers to Rev. Canaan Banana, who was professor of theology and a largely ceremonial president of Zimbabwe 1980-87. The story surfaced when his former aide, Jefta Dube, stood trial for killing a policeman during a music festival at Gwazura stadium, who Dube claimed called him "Banana's wife". Banana was arrested in 1996 and his story was unveiled during the three years of the legal process. 63-year-old Banana's sentence of 10 years for sodomy and sexual assault was reduced in May 2000 to one year because of his age. Homosexuality had already become a public issue in 1995 when Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe, GALZ, were barred from taking part in the Zimbabwe International Book Fair in a simultaneously vehement denial of the existence of homosexuality and horrified moral condemnation of the gay men and women involved. In a statement from GALZ on 26 November 1998 they say that their vision is a Zimbabwe where all people in Zimbabwe enjoy full and equal rights including lesbians, gay men, bisexuals and transgendered men and women, while they, in reference to the Banana case, "deplore any abuse of power and the forcing of individuals to commit involuntary sexual acts. Behaviour of this nature cannot be condoned in any court and must be totally condemned." (Editor's note, MP)

For a while it seemed a development capable of filling the gap had arrived in the form of *The Zimbabwe Review*. But it was too arty-farty, expensive, overly concerned with beautiful photography of architecture and sculpture. It failed to attract serious articles from a sufficiently varied field of contributors and sadly, died what appeared to be a premature death. In this context of a lack of platform or forum, one wonders exactly what intellectual developments to refer to. How and in what form does intellectual endeavour manifest itself? Of course academics will always be involved in the perennial quest for publication which is the key to recognition and professional advancement. Their sort of publishing, in professional journals and scholarly books largely unavailable within the country is not really what can fill the paradoxically noisy intellectual vacuum which now resounds to the government sponsored cacophony of hate-filled and salacious jingles.

Zimbabwe after 25 years of independence appears to me a dull, provincial intellectual ghetto in some ways reminiscent of pre-1980 Rhodesia, overly dominated by one sycophantic government owned print and electronic media institution and almost completely closed to international influences.

I do not believe, for example, that present day Zimbabwe in the early 21st century would be capable of conceiving and passing the Age of Majority Act which was enacted in the early years of independence. The fact that an indigenous Zimbabwean could become legally married without anyone having to pay lobola was a social and legal innovation in my view quite inconceivable in today's Zimbabwe where the government is so concerned with bribing every identifiable opinion group to retain its grip on power. The act went so completely against the premises of tradition and was founded on an idealistic purpose to liberate women that was pushed through against the howls of indigenous African culture purists. The fact that the lobola clause was only optional should not detract from its social significance. The fact that it has largely been ignored in practice might arguably be an indicator of how far ahead of its times it still is even today.

It has been suggested that one of the best ways to hide information in Zimbabwe is to publish it in a book. Certainly, to judge by the sales of non-mandatory – i.e., non educational books – that Zimbabwean publishers achieve, it would appear to be so. However, the matter requires proper investigation. Why do Zimbabweans buy only 1000 copies at most of locally produced fiction per annum? Is it possible people want to read and in fact do read more escapist foreign books whereas indigenous authors tend to be too deadly serious, as if they in imagine that their books could solve the problems of the country and the world? How much of what precisely is actually read and by whom? It all appears to be guess work based on limited fact finding.

Certainly, as an individual writer, without claiming any scientific validity for these impressions, I am always amazed at the numbers, range and varied location of people who appear to be acquainted with my work. It forces careful consideration of

what relation the numbers of books that are sold have to the number of readers; is it possible one privately owned copy of a book is read by even up to 50 people before it finally disintegrates? However, what can be said without much fear of contradiction is that far too many people do not read at all. Too few people enjoy reading or are capable of doing so with the efficiency to make enjoyment and sustainability possible. For that, the Zimbabwe Book Development Council suggests, in addition to poor provision of suitable reading material for the young, we must in part also blame poorly trained teachers who do not themselves enjoy reading and do not know how to teach it properly. In other words, the fault is of the educational environment as a whole.

How then can we tie some of the foregoing strings together? First, the possibility of accessing different views in any argument disappears if there is no platform for non-partisan analysis and debate. So how can solutions to our problems be envisaged if we deny the very possibility of a non-partisan argument, as appears to be the case at present? It is one thing to make one's argument and to repeat it *ad nauseam* and as noisily as possible in the expectation that repetition might create credibility. But when repetition is accompanied by obliteration of all alternatives, then the objective clearly is not to solve problems but to deny them, even in the face of overwhelming realities. We know how much good that did the proverbial ostrich. As the deluge of evidence mounts that the current Zimbabwean experiment is an escalating politico-socio-economic disaster of massive proportions, sober and reasoned objection to the mad screech of hysteria emanating from the monopolistic state media is needed. It is the present, and not history, which is a roomful of fact you cannot get out of, as Linton Kwesi Johnson suggested.

This problematic situation needs urgent address. There has to be an accessible forum wherein the public can seriously engage with ongoing developments in the various socio-cultural sectors. It is not a function that can properly be carried out by Zimbabwean newspapers in their current form. Furthermore, newspapers cannot, given the regulated and restrictive playing field and the polarised political atmosphere of present day Zimbabwe provide exposure to a sufficient variety of perceptions. In the prevailing media situation, regardless of the existence of contrary platforms, the main victim consistently appears to be balance, complexity and – to suggest a contentious concept – the truth. Blatant and dishonest oversimplifications have become the stock in trade and sometimes the cacophony of strident vituperation lacks simple, everyday decency, as if absolutely anything goes and the propaganda war must be won by any means necessary.

Yet surely, the experience of recent times, exploding and burning so furiously before us in the world media; and the record of Zimbabwe's recent past – the corruption, violence, dishonesty and hollowness at the heart of much that we are self-servingly urged to be proud of and to defend with patriotic zeal – shows clearly that you always have to be mindful of the methods that are used. Many years later, after

the war of liberation has receded into what appears to be a safe, distant and sanitised past, ex-combatants feel able to write honestly about the true complexity and mixed nature of some of the motives and methods that were used to win the war, and also of the consequences, as for example, A. Kanengoni's brutally violent story, rare for having been written by a liberation war ex-combatant.¹ Now we can talk and even write hard hitting and moving stories about these things. The skunk, it seems, has on this one issue, truly and finally lost its smell. The tragic irony is that, although history really never repeats itself, some vicious aspects of history can revive, or can be deliberately ratcheted up and revived and also return to haunt the present in a new way.

In this context, a striking observation was made to me by writer-poet and ex-combatant Freedom Nyamubaya when the land invasions started a couple of years ago. She noted that ex-combatants had been demobilised or disbanded but they had not been decommissioned and re-integrated into civilian life.² She noted that many of those who had been traumatised by their liberation war experiences had to find help individually and to this day, some are still engaged in psychological battles that have never come to an end. Meanwhile other wars and other battles are now being fought. And while the median age of the liberation war foot-soldier might be well past fifty by now, that revolution stubbornly threatens never to come to its logical end. Although never is perhaps quite an exaggeration.

1. Alexander Kanengoni, "Things we'd rather not talk about", a short story in *Echoing Silences*, Harare, Baobab, 1993.

2. See Freedom Nyamubaya's story in *Writing Still*, I Staunton (ed.), Harare, Weaver Press, 2003.

Zimbabwe's Global Citizens in 'Harare North': Some preliminary observations

Beacon Mbiba

Introduction

This paper arises from a limited exploratory study of Zimbabwean immigrants to the UK – dubbed “Harare North” by those in Zimbabwe. The ongoing study looks at those migrants who are part of the wave that ‘stormed’ the UK from the late 1990s into the new millennium. The purpose of the study is to provide a sketch of this new group of migrants and compare their experiences with those of other groups. It is hoped that a more detailed analysis will eventually help to identify measures that may be taken to enhance the contribution of this new experience to the livelihoods of the migrants themselves, as well as their communities in Zimbabwe and the UK host communities.

The paper seeks to underscore a link between the unresolved Zimbabwean social, political and economic crisis, and the roles played by Zimbabwe's global citizens during this crisis. Global citizens (the diaspora or so-called international brain drain) are currently the major providers of emergency and development aid to Zimbabwe.¹ They can play, will play and should be given the space to play a constructive role in the revival of Zimbabwe, especially in areas of human capital development skills, education, health, trade, investment and international trade. Compared to the overvalued role of traditional donors and aid agencies, the role of global citizens is largely absent from development discourse. In the context of Zimbabwe, it needs to be located along an understanding of the ‘crisis’ and the lived experiences of Zimbabwe's global citizens. The Zimbabwean crisis has demonstrated that Zimbabwe's social, economic and political spaces are not confined to the territorial or geographic space within Zimbabwean borders. In the present context, a global perspective is more helpful than a narrow outlook focusing only at Zimbabwe itself.

1. The term “global citizen” is here used in an effort to imagine and bring into being a person whose social, economic and political life is not bound by the confines of a single country's political boundaries. He/she can settle and contribute to the welfare of any place on the globe, and make a home anywhere without restrictions. In reality, legal and social prejudices often constrain the development of this kind of citizen, but the term is used here as a way of stressing the dignity and the positive contribution of displaced Zimbabweans, and in order to endow the paper with a forward-looking inflection. The term “diaspora” implies that those who have moved should return and do not have full citizenship in the places where they have settled. The derogatory connotations of this term are made clearer if it is remembered that it is not commonly used to refer to Europeans who have settled in Australia, New Zealand, Southern Africa and North America.

A consensus that “all is not well in Zimbabwe” emerged soon after the parliamentary elections of 2000 leading to increased use of “crisis”, “anarchy”, “melt-down”, “chaos”, “point of no return” and other doomsday terminologies. However, there is less agreement on the nature of the crisis, its causes, starting point and what needs to be done to resolve it. Although experts like the CDR (2002) are right when they say “the crisis is neither rooted in a single historical event nor is it simply about a single issue – land”, one has to reiterate that history matters and that historical injustices to do with land and identity are central to resolving the crisis. A programme of land reform is therefore crucial to the resolution of the problem. The Crisis Coalition in Zimbabwe (2003a, b, c) correctly depicts the Zimbabwe crisis as multi-layered. At the core of these layers are what one can see as fundamental structural dimensions of the crisis: the long-term obstacles with significant historical or global roots. Land and historical injustices, and the constitution and global structural economic imbalances are the three stem roots of the Zimbabwe crisis. Other dimensions of the crisis (political and electoral violence, food security, fuel crisis, rule of law, “brain drain”, the media crisis) are symptoms of the core problems. However, in discussions of the international and humanitarian aspects of the crisis, little is said about those Zimbabweans who have left for other countries in the region and globally. Abuse of their human rights at the hands of host communities and officials, for example, is a subject hardly discussed at international forums. There is an urgent need for intellectual analysis and reformulation of the crisis generally and the position of global citizens in particular.

Recently, there has been a shift in the Zimbabwe government's perception of global citizens: from ridicule to encouragement.¹ Speaking in South Africa on the occasion of the celebration of ANC's resounding election victory, President Mugabe called on Zimbabweans, as loyal citizens, to assist the country through remittances and to be “good citizens and residents here” (in South Africa).² What role should be given to and can be played by Zimbabwe's global citizens in the revival of the country? What programmes can they be engaged in that link with the needs of the home country? An adequate response to these questions will require us to capture the experiences, perceptions and circumstances of those global citizens. In many respects, Zimbabwe's global future is here, unfolding before us in the daily struggles of Zimbabweans wherever they are.

-
1. See The President's Independence Day Speech, “Mugabe calls on exiles to return”. Online: <http://www.newzimbabwe.com> 18th April 2004, and “The Great Trek to London: Behind the Words”, *The Mirror*, Thursday, January 2002. Online: <http://www.africaonline.co.zw/mirror>
 2. See “Clean-up will continue, says President” *The Herald*, Tuesday 27th April 2004. Online: <http://www.herald.co.zw/>

Conceptual and methodological frameworks

A contested process, migration is a sensitive topic to research. This paper is based on an ongoing, self-financed study undertaken by a group of Zimbabwean researchers based in the UK, co-ordinated by the present author. The study confirms the inappropriateness of survey methods that use postal and self-completion questionnaires. The researchers used snowball methods to identify potential respondents: contacts from everyday life (work, church, educational institutions, etc.) were used to identify migrant Zimbabweans and build a pool of potential respondents. When a degree of familiarity between researcher and potential respondent was established, the respondent was introduced to the research project and invited to participate by completing a questionnaire. Despite all these measures, only 20 per cent of the questionnaires left for self completion or posted for completion were returned or completed. In contrast, it was possible to complete all questionnaires attempted through telephone and face-to-face interviews. Candidates who did not complete the questionnaire “felt uncomfortable” writing down responses, although during conversations they were prepared to talk about almost all of the issues in the questionnaire. This paper is based on a sample of 25 completed questionnaires.¹

Although the design of the questionnaire had a quantitative dimension, this paper does not use statistics and prefers to summarise life stories told by respondents. These experiences and testimonies bring out the integrated nature of the migration experience that is lost in the use of figures alone. Furthermore, a small sample is only useful as a source of suggestive insights rather than broad generalisations. Insights were also obtained through discussions where no questionnaires were completed as well as through participant observations.

Conceptually, this study relies on migration systems theory (see Harris 1995). This conception takes migration as a micro-macro process rather than a single event. It recognises both national and international as well community and individual linkages. At the macro level, economic and historical structures such as colonial influence, institutional harmony, languages, communication links and regulatory regimes are significant factors affecting migrant dynamics. Thus for Zimbabwe, its history as a former British colony partly explains why the UK has been a primary European destination for immigrants. At the micro level are the individual, family

1. These respondents had left Zimbabwe between 1998 and 2002 and had settled largely in London and the South East. 66% were female, aged between 28 and 40 at the time of the interviews; the male respondents were between 29 and 45. At the time when they left Zimbabwe, 80% of the respondents had a job there; 70% had a solid educational base (a university degree, a college level diploma, or an ‘O’ level qualification). Once in the UK, 80% of the respondents had enrolled in an educational institution or a training course. Before leaving Zimbabwe, 40% of the respondents had no property there; the rest owned various types of rural and urban properties. At the time of the interview 13% of the respondents had purchased property in the UK.

and community dynamics where cultural and social capital is deployed to support livelihoods. Households and families are seen as dynamic multi-located institutions that make short-term decisions in order to survive now and in the future: decisions made in one place influence and are influenced by processes in distant and diverse places.

Writing in a UNHCR refugee journal, Wilkinson (2003: 12–17) provides statistics on displaced people in Africa. Figures show that Africa's contribution to the global refugee pool is the largest; the bulk of them remain as internally displaced people within their own countries and in Africa. Although written in 2003, the article clearly misses out on migration within and to Southern Africa.¹ This is largely to do with the legal status and terminology used to categorise migrants; the result is that Zimbabwean crisis-related migrants in places like South Africa and the UK remain outside official attention. As Wilkinson's statistics show, Zimbabwe does not feature at all as a place where tens of thousands of people have been on the move both internally and internationally. For example The Independent UK reported that up to 400,000 Zimbabweans were then living in the UK (half of them illegally) and that at least 300 were leaving Zimbabwe daily to join friends and relatives in the UK.² This was before Zimbabwe was categorised as a visa country in November 2002. At that rate, it means over 100,000 Zimbabweans would have come to the UK annually. It is doubtful that the figure of 300 new arrivals a day could be sustained consistently over a long period. Not all travellers from the country would be coming to stay – many do go back – but there is no system in the UK to monitor this.

In 2002, The United Nations Development Programme contracted SIRDC (Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Centre) to conduct an analysis of the cause and effect of the brain drain in Zimbabwe. They established that there were “479,348 Zimbabweans in the diaspora ... mainly in the United Kingdom, Botswana and South Africa”. The report (2003) admits that this figure is low and that it underestimates the number of Zimbabweans in South Africa. However, it also states that it cannot agree with the claims of a phenomenal exodus made by newspapers (SIDRC 2003: 42). The difficulty is that official statistics only report breadwinners and not dependents and, as noted earlier, there is no system to track return migration.

1. See the “Claims of Zimbabwean refugees ‘flooding’ South Africa and up to 125,000 Zimbabweans enter Botswana every week”. BBC On-Line at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2709829.stm> Zimbabwe migrants ‘flood’ neighbour, 17th December, 2003.

2. The Independent, UK, 18th January 2003.

Zimbabweans in Britain: Some preliminary observations

What kind of Zimbabwean is in the UK? Zimbabwean community members are likely to have better academic qualifications than other African communities in the UK. This is largely to do with the general investment they put in education as the route to progress as well as the higher level of literacy achieved by the ZANU-PF government in Zimbabwe in the 1980s. Coupled with this, migration to the UK is an expensive exercise afforded only by those from middle and upper class families who happen to be better educated as well. Thus prior to 2000, Zimbabweans were a favoured (and preferred) group with regards to UK employment. In addition to their higher education and perceived positive work ethics, until November 2002, Zimbabweans did not have visa restrictions that applied to most African nationals coming to the UK. Employers had fewer hurdles to deal with if they employed a Zimbabwean, compared to the situation with “visa nationals”.

As political and diplomatic tensions between Harare and London worsened, the numbers of Zimbabweans refused entry into the UK increased. Zimbabwean experiences at the hands of immigration officers have been described by respondents as “traumatic”, “demeaning”, “frustrating” and “utter human rights abuse”. In the UK, one of the groups that made a lot of noise regarding ill-treatment of passengers was the Zimbabwe Association. However, as an asylum-focused organisation, it did not articulate broader human rights issues but sought to highlight alleged dangers faced by refused asylum seekers on return to Zimbabwe.

Unlike some immigrant communities that are concentrated in specific regions and inner city areas of large cities, Zimbabweans appear in every corner of the UK. Settlement in a particular place appears to be dependent on a combination of factors such as Zimbabweans’ general perceptions of class, access to employment opportunities, access to services especially education colleges, access to good schools for children and availability of affordable housing.

For most Zimbabweans, settlement in a low-density residential neighbourhood is considered an ideal indicator of success (in colonial Zimbabwe, these were whites-only residential areas). They have no qualms at settling in places such as London’s Eltham, Bromley, Bexley and Kent that other African communities refer to as “those racist places” (interview with Nigerian lawyer, New Cross). The health and care industry (old people’s homes) and warehouses are major sectors where Zimbabweans have found employment in the 1997–2004 period. Consequently, they have ended up in locations where old people are concentrated or wherever care services are needed. Southend-on-Sea (a former fishing industry node) is one such area with an ageing British population in need of care, hence the presence of a thriving Zimbabwean community there. All over the country in small and remote agricultural towns chances are that a black person one comes across may be Zimbabwean. Cleaning toilets and care work (derogatorily labelled “BBC” – “British bottom

cleaning” – by Zimbabweans back home) is something most people would not want to be identified with in Zimbabwe. So those doing such work initially sought employment in remote places where there was a low risk of meeting travellers likely to report this back home.

Industrial areas where “order pickers”, sorting and packing workers and bakery workers are needed have also attracted Zimbabweans. Those who shun care work (mostly men) are concentrated in these kinds of jobs. London’s areas along the lower Thames, such as Greenwich, Woolwich, Belvedere and Erith, have such employment opportunities and Zimbabweans have settled within easy travelling distance of these areas.

The above patterns appear to be repeated in other metropolitan areas of the UK such as the Birmingham-Coventry-Wolverhampton area, the Manchester, Leeds, Sheffield and Doncaster areas as well as Glasgow. Zimbabweans are also concentrated in the Slough area (now referred to as “kwaChirau” – an area in Mashonaland West province of Zimbabwe, whose name rhymes with the pronunciation of “Slough”). Reading, Luton, Leicester and Bedford are other areas with significant concentrations. After initially settling in London, Zimbabweans with families have often opted to move to these smaller towns where house rentals are lower, but which still allow them access to major cities and to London.

Exclusions

Beyond the legal immigration conditions that plague many immigrants (a respondent has told us: “You have to prove legality at every stage”), Zimbabweans in Britain often experience exclusionary forces that operate in the job market. These have to do with unwritten codes of practice, preferences and behaviours. A respondent captured this feeling using a combination of proverbs and emotional recollections:

My life here has taught me that you have to understand the British ... To know what is happening to you, you have to understand their language. When I say language I do not mean English. I do not mean that you have to know how to speak English. Of course you do. What I mean is ... that language which is not written, the signs and symbols, which they use to communicate among themselves. When they don't want you to know, they will always find a way to exclude you.

Even those with decent jobs often feel frustrated at work and consider moving elsewhere. A recently graduated nurse reflected:

Frustration ... maybe go to America? But then although there is good money there, there are problems as well. It is far from home but the most critical issue is the litigation culture. For a nurse you have to consider this seriously. Again, you are already settled here so moving may not be the best ... greener pastures are not always green when you get there.

Traditionally, migration in Zimbabwe was a male-led and male-dominated process whatever phase one looks at, be it migration to South Africa’s gold mines in the

1800s or colonial day migration to cities such as Bulawayo and the then Salisbury and to mining towns, plantation towns or South Africa in the 1970s. Recently, Dobson (1998) has confirmed that migration to South Africa is still male-dominated. However, the 1990s saw a transformation of industry in Europe: consolidating the move of labour away from extractive sectors such as agriculture towards less intensive labour sectors. Associated with it has been the rise of female labour coupled with the casualization of labour. Women now dominate in most service sectors while at the same time no job is permanent. In this environment, the rights and social support of workers, especially migrants, have been eroded. This in part, is the context within which female nurses and teachers were the favoured recruits to the service sector of the UK: sectors such as the “BBC” and teaching. Women whose incomes were much lower in the home country may thus find “emancipation” in the new economy.

For Zimbabwe, the exodus of nurses to the UK became significant around or soon after 1996 when the economy, salaries and working conditions of civil servants declined dramatically. As with teachers, the role of recruiting agencies was significant (although no agency-recruited nurses were interviewed for this study). Two broad trends can be identified: (a) school leavers and other non-health professionals who came to the UK to enrol on nursing courses and (b) qualified nurses who only needed to do a short “conversion” course that enabled them to work as full professionals in the NHS. There was also a large group of workers who came in to work as carers with training given on the job. Given the bias towards female recruitment into nursing in Zimbabwe as well as the female preference for jobs such as care assistants, the recruitment of nurses from Zimbabwe into the UK could be described as a process that further expanded “the feminisation of labour” and migration.

Until 2002, unlike for other college courses, there were no fees to pay on nursing courses in the UK. In fact nursing students were paid a £500.00 monthly stipend and allowed to work. Given their status as trainee nurses, they got a higher hourly pay than other “unqualified workers” working as casual care assistants. But recent policy changes mean that nursing is no longer attractive although it remains the major route to a livelihood in the UK. In 2002, the no fee policy was abolished for non-EU citizens. The UK government argued that Zimbabweans in particular were “misusing the system” as a way to get work permits and to make money.

According to one respondent, the second major change had to do with regulation of nursing homes and care agencies. Since 2002, hospitals have been restricted in their use of nursing agencies. Similar regulations have affected care homes. The impact has been a reduced demand for agency staff and closures of nursing homes. The regulations for nurses have also been changed for those with work permits (non-EU nationals): they can now only work for one hospital or institution i.e. the institution that supported their application for a work permit. In practice, they now

can no longer offer their services to nursing agencies even during their free time. Thus, for Zimbabweans, the potential for raising money in a short time is now constrained. It has not yet disappeared, but as the respondent put it, “We are bonded into slavery” (respondent Changamire).

The recent changes in the employment of nurses are already the norm for most workers who get work permits to work in the UK. They cannot change employment without the consent of the employer. Our respondents felt that this undermines their ability to assert employee rights in circumstances of perceived unfair treatment by the employer. Castles (2000: 11) reminds us that historical precedents to this “tied labour” include slavery, indentured labour and systems of control of foreign labour pioneered by Germany before the first world war. In colonial Rhodesia and South Africa, there existed a similar system that tied an African worker to a particular “baas”. Thus, in a subtle way, “Harare North” workers find themselves bound by structures reminiscent of colonial Salisbury.

After a period of settlement and when most of the major home concerns are taken care of, migrant labourers become aware that their position is one of abuse and exploitation. They become more aware of their confinement to the “3D” jobs (Castles, 2000: 11) – dirty, difficult and dangerous (eg. cleaning, factory and security guard work). “Tinokuvara nebasa” was how respondent Mudiki put it referring to “back-breaking” shift work he has to do in order to survive and meet remittance expectations back home.

Relegation to the “3Ds” is not a phenomenon exclusive to Zimbabwean workers. Elam and Chinouya (2000) and the Relief Line’s Croydon Study (2003) both reaffirmed that this affects all African immigrant communities. The reports suggest that this affects even the more educated men including those with PhDs. These studies observe that the situation is traumatic and accelerates the increase in ailments such as depression, high blood pressure and stress among immigrant men – ailments proportionately lower in the home communities of these migrants.

Alternative livelihoods

Although the migration process has been portrayed as a “brain drain”, it appears to offer opportunities for potential “brain gain”. There is a growing range of entrepreneurs who are going into business and self-employment and creating opportunities to employ others in a range of sectors.

An example of this is ZIMNAT in Plumstead, South-East London. Located close to a railway station along a regional highway where public transport is abundant, and operating from 11:00 am to midnight every day, the “market” is known

and patronised by many Zimbabweans.¹ It sells music cassettes and discs, Zimbabwean food such as dry meat, *matemba* (a type of dried fish), cereals, and drinks such as *Mazowe* (a Zimbabwe-produced cordial). *Sadza*, the traditional staple Zimbabwean meal is prepared and sold at lunch times. The premises are very basic; a six by three-metre room on the ground floor with a separate outside door that leads to a flat used as accommodation by the proprietors. At least three adults – a man and two women – are involved in running the shop. Other examples of similar enterprises are the *Mau Mau* shop at Southend, East London, and *Zambezi Foods* in Luton.

Other Zimbabweans are engaged in brokering money transfers and offering financial services. This requires few start up costs – a telephone, a fax machine, a bank account in the UK, and, on the Zimbabwe side, a similar set of inputs plus large sums of ready cash in Zimbabwe dollars. To send money to Zimbabwe, a client is requested to deposit cash into the UK account and show proof of deposit to the UK financial broker. An exchange rate is agreed prior to the deposit. Once the deposit is confirmed, the UK broker sends a fax or telephones the Zimbabwe broker giving details of the amount deposited and the beneficiary of the transaction in Zimbabwe. Cash in the Zimbabwe dollar equivalent is then transferred or deposited into the beneficiary account for collection. Depending on the urgency of the matter and social capital existing between the client and the brokers, the Zimbabwe-based beneficiary can receive cash within 12 hours. There also exist less formal financial service providers – what respondent *Mudiki* characterised as “*maBureaux de Change eChivhanu*” – very elementary *Bureaux de Change*. In this case an individual in the UK uses personal networks to identify a person with local currency cash in Zimbabwe. They agree an exchange rate after which the UK person deposits money in the UK account of the contact in Zimbabwe, who in turn deposits the local currency equivalent in the Zimbabwe bank account of the person in the UK. In other circumstances the local currency is passed to a nominated person in Zimbabwe in order to pay bills or other commitments of the person in the UK. The transaction is based on trust and no paperwork is involved. There are no offices and no employees.

One place where Financial Services, Brokers and Agencies are concentrated is *Sydenham*, South London. We shall call these the “*Sydenham Syndicate*”. At least four offices are allocated to Zimbabwean entrepreneurs. Each of these offices has a number of “*desks*”, each devoted to one service but all integrated so as to give clients a package. Money transfer, funeral insurance, property buying and mortgage services, travel agency and employment agency are key components of the package. The *Sydenham Syndicate* is significant in that it illustrates how some of the main UK business portfolios are extensions of Zimbabwean companies who, as a key inform-

1. Although patrons and respondents referred to it as a market, in fact it is a shop.

ant remarked, have “followed money to the UK”. Some of them are Zimbabwe-registered companies that market their services in the UK but are not registered in the UK.

The “Sydenham Syndicate” includes companies such as Intermarket Building Society that helps UK-based Zimbabweans to open bank accounts in Zimbabwe and processes mortgages for house purchase in Zimbabwe. In partnership with estate agencies and built environment firms, it can facilitate the purchase of land, construction of property and tenant management.

Another company, the MEC Consultancy, has a UK company registration number and works in conjunction with Moonlight Funeral Services to provide funeral insurance and services including “elite” graves through a Zimbabwean subsidiary Mashfords Funeral Services that has “land banked” graves in cities such as Harare. UK subscribers with sufficient funds deposited with Moonlight Funeral Services can nominate beneficiaries in Zimbabwe who will be given access to burial service packages provided by some of Zimbabwe’s elite funeral parlours. The subscriptions can also be used to transport to Zimbabwe for burial the subscribers themselves or their nominee in the event of death in the UK. The minimum cost of such service is estimated at £1,900. In addition to business brochures, MEC produces and distributes a magazine “Zimbabwe Connection” in which many Zimbabwe-based companies advertise.

In search of security

Remittances from global citizens have become a major source of direct investment for developing countries in Asia, Latin America and, increasingly, Africa. In 2003 Mexicans sent home close to \$13 billion. In the late 1990s, Eritrea was sustained by remittances of close to US\$300 million per year (Koser et al. 2000). Such is the importance of remittances that the Eritrean government has put in place a range of schemes to capture as much as possible of this resource. These include land auctions to global citizens, three to ten-year bonds at a cost of US\$300 to US\$1,000, one-off payments of fixed sums as needs arise and agreed levies of 2 per cent of annual income (Koser et al. 2000). Ghana and Nigeria also have similar schemes. As for Zimbabweans, only recently did the government realise the importance of remittances. Not surprisingly, this alternative development path has attracted the interest of the IMF, The World Bank and agencies such as UK’s DFID all of whom are seeking to investigate and understand this phenomenon.

Preliminary observations on remittances among global Zimbabweans indicate that those with insecure legal and economic status in the UK send proportionately more money back home than professionals with indefinite leave to remain and in stable economic positions. With insecurity, investment in the UK is not an option, hence the urgency to do as much as possible back home before time runs out. Those

with children or spouses still in Zimbabwe send proportionately more than those with complete nuclear family units in the UK. Also, women appear to be sending more money more frequently than their male counterparts. But the greatest deciding factor is perceived need.

Education and housing are the two main areas where Zimbabweans invest their hard-earned cash. Diaspora remittances to fund housing development have kept afloat the property market in Zimbabwe: while the rest of the economy has shrunk, the housing market has remained buoyant. Companies in Zimbabwe have teamed up to offer packages that help those outside to build, purchase or manage real estate back home.

Prior to coming to the UK, respondent Mudiki's income as a sales person was too low to get him on the first rung of the property ladder. On moving to London in late 2001, he was helped out by in-laws with initial accommodation and college fees for the first year. Working in the "3Ds", he continues to study at Diploma level. Between January 2002 and December 2003, his remittances have enabled him to buy three properties in Zimbabwe – complete houses in secondary towns within 50 km of the capital Harare and then a vacant piece of land in a Harare suburb. Mudiki's "task is now to build enough reserves so as to develop this piece of land". In the last 12 months, he sent home remittances of between £3,000 and £4,000: most of this went into the purchasing of the properties. Few would have managed this on a Zimbabwean salary even in the 1980s when the economy was at its peak. Thus, although the young man is a tenant who pays £300 per month rent in a shared two-bedroom flat and has "nothing to show" in the UK, back home he is now a person of substance.

It appears that the majority who have invested in property back home are those that had nothing at the time they left or those who feel that their UK employment is precarious. In Harare, as in other towns, distinct districts have been developed largely on remittance income. An area in the low density high income Mt. Pleasant suburb of Harare developed this way is now nicknamed "Machembere" on the assumption that the incomes used to develop it were earned by Zimbabweans (mainly former nurses) working as carers in UK's old people's homes. Machembere is the local equivalent of "old people", in this instance used in a derogatory way by those seeking to devalue the progress made by their compatriots in the diaspora.

For many Zimbabweans, the major constraint to entry into the UK housing market is lack of the required 10 per cent cash deposit. Key workers with government support are the ones who have managed to overcome this hurdle. Those coming out of universities have qualified for 100 per cent mortgages. In both cases, the condition of a secure, well-paying job has been critical. However, with time, even those with 100 per cent mortgages have encountered difficulties, as some mortgage lenders have refused to lend to foreign nationals. The limited choice has meant purchasers have ended up taking the more expensive mortgages. Recent legal regimes

demanding monitoring of foreign-national banking transactions appear to discourage mortgage lenders from dealing with foreigners.

However, the process of finding security can be easy at times. For key worker respondent Venus and her sister, mortgage support was easily available when they qualified as nurses. They opted for a joint mortgage and bought a cosy flat close to central London. With few commitments, they have enjoyed life and work, travelling abroad on holidays. Sending money home is not a regular chore for them since there are others senior to them who have to worry about that. Buying property in Zimbabwe is also not a priority as they feel secure where they are now in the UK. Yet as for Mudiki and others, their early years in the UK were years when they got financial support and accommodation from relatives.

Some conclusions

This paper has set out to provide an outline of preliminary observations from an ongoing study on Zimbabwe's global citizens. The themes covered are not exhaustive. For example, left out are important topics such as political participation and the cultural, social and civic activities of these citizens. Our interrogation of concepts like the shifting "migration gender contracts" is just beginning. This is an attempt to move away from restrictive conceptions associated with 'refugees and asylum seekers', though these too are valid categories.

The paper has attempted to show that a migration sub-culture is emerging among Zimbabweans with its own rules, language, territory and vibrancy. Like most migrants, Zimbabweans desire to pursue a decent and honourable life through legal means. However, as the regime of controls and costs increases, it is not surprising to see an increase in the number of those involved in 'illegal transactions'.¹ Contributions from Zimbabweans to the host community are great. They have stretched the limits of social diversity into areas previously shunned by most black communities. They have invested in themselves, especially through education and training. They have also helped prop up the British National Health Service through quality professionals - nurses, doctors and care assistants. With experience gained in these sectors, Zimbabweans are slowly crafting their own institutions to create jobs. Zimbabweans also boost the British economy through tax contributions. In relative terms, few receive welfare benefits and those who work are not eligible for family tax credits, child care support or child benefits until such time they acquire indefinite leave to remain, or become British citizens. At the same time their remittances have helped to keep Zimbabwe's economy afloat.

1. See "Zim asylum seeker stole passport" New Zimbabwe.com On-line:
<http://www.newzimbabwe.com> 21st January, 2004.

There is still a lot that needs to be established regarding global Zimbabweans in the UK. In addition to numbers, a clearer demographic profile is needed; we need more research and publications on the role of remittances at a level that matches up to the importance and contribution they make to livelihoods of people in Africa. In Zimbabwe, impacts on real estate, health, education, business, democracy and culture need to be investigated further. The analysis of the experiences and roles of Zimbabwe's white global citizens needs to be included in the ongoing work as well. The space for Zimbabwe's future is now global and researchers need to make an effort to tap into it more fully.

Works cited

- Bolling, M, 1997. "Contested Places: Graves and Graveyards in Humba Culture", *Anthropos*, vol. 92, no. 1-3, pp. 35-50.
- Bush, R, 2003. "Zimbabwe Out in the Cold? Editorial", *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 98, no. 30, pp. 535-537.
- Castles, S, 2000, *Ethnicity and Globalisation*. London: Sage Publications. CDR, 2002, "Zimbabwe Crisis". An Issue Paper from the Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen, Copenhagen. www.cdr.dk
- Crisis Coalition Zimbabwe, 2003a. "Sovereignty through Democracy: The Commonwealth and Zimbabwe's Multilayered Crisis". Harare.
- Crisis Coalition Zimbabwe, 2003b, "Slouching towards Transition? An Update of the Zimbabwe Situation-April/May 2003". Harare.
- Crisis Coalition Zimbabwe, 2003c, "Mastering Patience... or Mastered by Apathy? An Update on the Zimbabwe Situation, July/August 2003". Harare.
- Dobson, B, 1998, "Women on the Move: Gender and Cross-Border Migration to South Africa". *Migration Policy Series Paper 9: Southern Africa Migration project (SAMP)*. Cape Town: The University of Cape Town.
- Elam, G. and Chinouya, M., 2000, "Feasibility Study for Health Surveys among Black African Populations Living in the UK: Stage 2 - Diversity among Black African Communities". Draft paper prepared for Department of Health. London: National Centre for Social Research, the Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, and the University College.
- Harris, N, 1995, *The New Untouchables: Immigration and the New World Worker*. London: I.B. Tauris/Penguin.
- Koser, K., Black, R. and Al-Ali, N., 2000, *Mobilisation and Participation of Transnational Exile Communities in Post-Conflict Reconstruction*. Research Report, Migration Research Unit. London: University College London.
- Relief Line, 2003, "Croydon Ethnic Minority Study: Survey Report". Paper presented (by Robert Egwea) at the *Relief Line Conference on African Voices in Regeneration*, Braithwaite Hall, Croydon, 19th March 2003.
- SIRDC, 2003, "An Analysis of the Cause and Effect of the Brain Drain in Zimbabwe". Report for the UNDP. Harare: Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Centre.
- Wilkinson, R, 2003, "Africa on the Edge: The human toll has been appalling, but is the light at the end of the tunnel a little brighter?" *Refugees* vol. 2, no. 131 Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Notes on the Contributors

Beacon Mbiba is from Zimbabwe, and is a chartered town and country planner and has worked as a university lecturer and researcher most recently at University College London, Birkbeck College and the University of Reading. He has contributed as Research and Policy Analyst for the Secretariat to The Commission for Africa.

Stanley Nyamfukudza is a writer and editor, with a degree from Oxford. He has written one novel, *The Non-Believer's Journey* (1980), short stories (*Aftermaths, If God was a Woman*), and children books, and has begun to work with film scripts. He runs an editorial consultancy firm in Harare.

Terence Ranger is Emeritus Professor at St Antony's College, Oxford. He has written on Zimbabwe's political, social and religious history. He is currently writing a social history of Bulawayo between 1893 and 1960.

Recent issues in the series are available electronically for downloading free of charge

www.nai.uu.se

1. Kenneth Hermele and Bertil Odén, *Sanctions and Dilemmas. Some Implications of Economic Sanctions against South Africa*. 1988. 43 pp. SEK 100,- ISBN 91-7106-286-6
2. Elling Njål Tjønneland, *Pax Pretoriana. The Fall of Apartheid and the Politics of Regional Destabilisation*. 1989. 31 pp. ISBN 91-7106-292-0 (OUT OF PRINT)
3. Hans Gustafsson, Bertil Odén and Andreas Tegen, *South African Minerals. An Analysis of Western Dependence*. 1990. 47 pp. ISBN 91-7106-307-2 (OUT OF PRINT)
4. Bertil Egerö, *South African Bantustans. From Dumping Grounds to Battlefronts*. 1991. 46 pp. SEK 100,- ISBN 91-7106-315-3
5. Carlos Lopes, *Enough is Enough! For an Alternative Diagnosis of the African Crisis*. 1994. 38 pp. SEK 80,- ISBN 91-7106-347-1
6. Annika Dahlberg, *Contesting Views and Changing Paradigms*. 1994. 59 pp. SEK 100,- ISBN 91-7106-357-9,
7. Bertil Odén, *Southern African Futures. Critical Factors for Regional Development in Southern Africa*. 1996. 35 pp. SEK 80,- ISBN 91-7106-392-7
8. Colin Leys and Mahmood Mamdani, *Crisis and Reconstruction – African Perspectives*. 1997. 26 pp. SEK 100,- ISBN 91-7106-417-6
9. Gudrun Dahl, *Responsibility and Partnership in Swedish Aid Discourse*. 2001. 30 pp. SEK 100,- ISBN 91-7106-473-7
10. Henning Melber and Christopher Saunders, *Transition in Southern Africa – Comparative Aspects*. 2001. 28 pp. SEK 100,- ISBN 91-7106-480-X
11. *Regionalism and Regional Integration in Africa*. 2001. 74 pp. SEK 100,- ISBN 91-7106-484-2
12. Souleymane Bachir Diagne, et al., *Identity and Beyond: Rethinking Africanity*. 2001. 33 pp. SEK 100,- ISBN 91-7106-487-7
13. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, et al., *Africa in the New Millennium*. Edited by Raymond Suttner. 2001. 53 pp. SEK 100,- ISBN 91-7106-488-5
14. *Zimbabwe's Presidential Elections 2002*. Edited by Henning Melber. 2002. 88 pp. ISBN 91-7106-490-7 (OUT OF PRINT)
15. Birgit Brock-Utne, *Language, Education and Democracy in Africa*. 2002. 47 pp. SEK 100,- ISBN 91-7106-491-5
16. Henning Melber et al., *The New Partnership for Africa's development (NEPAD)*. 2002. 36 pp. SEK 90,- ISBN 91-7106-492-3
17. Juma Okuku, *Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratisation Process in Uganda*. 2002. 42 pp. SEK 90,- ISBN 91-7106-493-1
18. Yul Derek Davids, et al., *Measuring Democracy and Human Rights in Southern Africa*. Compiled by Henning Melber. 2002. 50 pp. SEK 90,- ISBN 91-7106-497-4
19. Michael Neocosmos, Raymond Suttner and Ian Taylor, *Political Cultures in Democratic South Africa*. Compiled by Henning Melber. 2002. 52 pp. SEK 110,- ISBN 91-7106-498-2
20. Martin Legassick, *Armed Struggle and Democracy. The Case of South Africa*. 2002. 53 pp. SEK 110,- ISBN 91-7106-504-0
21. Reinhart Kössler, Henning Melber and Per Strand, *Development from Below. A Namibian Case Study*. 2003. 32 pp. SEK 90,- ISBN 91-7106-507-5,
22. Fred Hendricks, *Fault-Lines in South African Democracy. Continuing Crises of Inequality and Injustice*. 2003. 32 pp. SEK 90,- ISBN 91-7106-508-3
23. Kenneth Good, *Bushmen and Diamonds. (Un)Civil Society in Botswana*. 2003. 39 pp. SEK 90,- ISBN 91-7106-520-2,
24. Robert Kappel, Andreas Mehler, Henning Melber and Anders Danielson, *Structural Stability in an African Context*. 2003. 55 pp. SEK 110,- ISBN 91-7106-521-0
25. Patrick Bond, *South Africa and Global Apartheid. Continental and International Policies and Politics*. 2004. 45 pp. SEK 90,- ISBN 91-7106-523-7
26. Bonnie Campbell (ed.), *Regulating Mining in Africa. For whose benefit? 2004*. 89 pp. SEK 110,- ISBN 91-7106-527-X
27. Suzanne Dansereau and Mario Zamponi, *Zimbabwe – The Political Economy of Decline*. Compiled by Henning Melber. 2005. 43 pp. SEK 90,- ISBN 91-7106-541-5
28. Lars Buur and Helene Maria Kyed, *State Recognition of Traditional Authority in Mozambique. The nexus of Community Representation and State Assistance*. 2005. 30 pp. SEK 90,- ISBN 91-7106-547-4
29. Hans Eriksson and Björn Hagströmer, *Chad – Towards Democratisation or Petro-Dictatorship?* 2005. 82 pp. SEK 110,- ISBN 91-7106-549-0
30. *Skinning the Skunk – Facing Zimbabwean Futures*. Edited by Mai Palmberg and Ranka Primorac. 2005. 40 pp. SEK 90,- ISBN 91-7106-552-0