Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa
Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa


Tor Sellström

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List of Acronyms

AAC  All-African Convention (South Africa)
AAM  Anti-Apartheid Movement (United Kingdom)
AAPC  All-African Peoples’ Conference
ABF  Workers’ Educational Association/Arbetarnas Bildningsförbund (Sweden)
AET  Africa Educational Trust (United Kingdom)
AGIS  Africa Groups in Sweden/Afrikagrupperna i Sverige
ANC  African National Congress (South Africa)
ARM  African Resistance Movement (South Africa)
CANU  Caprivi African National Union (Namibia)
CCHA  Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance (Sweden)
CD  Christian Democrats (Sweden)
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency (United States)
COD  Congress of Democrats (South Africa)
CODESA  Convention for a Democratic South Africa
CONCP  Conference of Nationalist Organizations in the Portuguese Colonies/Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas
COREMO  Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique/Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique
COSATU  Congress of South African Trade Unions
COSEC  Coordinating Secretariat of ISC
CP  Centre Party (Sweden)
CPC  Coloured People’s Congress (South Africa)
CPSA  Communist Party of South Africa
CPSU  Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSA  Church of Sweden Aid/Lutherhjälpen
CSM  Church of Sweden Mission
CUF  Centre Party Youth League (Sweden)
DFFG  United FNL Groups/De förenade FNL-grupperna (Sweden)
ECA  UN Economic Commission for Africa
EEC  European Economic Community
EFTA  European Free Trade Association
ELCIN  Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia
ELCZ  Evangelical Lutheran Church of Zimbabwe
ELOK  Evangelical Lutheran Ovambo-Kavango Church (Namibia)
EU  European Union
FNLA  National Front for the Liberation of Angola/Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola
FPLN  Patriotic Front of National Liberation/Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional (Portugal)
FPU  Liberal Party Youth League (Sweden)
FRELIMO  Mozambique Liberation Front/Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
FROLIZI  Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
GRAE  Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile/Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio
ICFTU  International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SACP</td>
<td>South African Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACTU</td>
<td>South African Congress of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Swedish Employers’ Confederation/Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAIC</td>
<td>South African Indian Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAUF</td>
<td>South Africa United Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Students Development Fund (Sweden)</td>
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<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (Sweden)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>Students for a Democratic Society (Sweden)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECO</td>
<td>Swedish Union of Secondary School Students/Sveriges Elever Centralorganisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFS</td>
<td>Swedish National Union of University Students/Sveriges Förenade Studentkårer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>Socialist International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sida</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SKP</td>
<td>Communist Party of Sweden</td>
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<tr>
<td>SKV</td>
<td>Left Association of Swedish Women/Svenska Kvinnors Vänsterförbund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLU</td>
<td>Rural Youth League (Sweden)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOMAFCO</td>
<td>Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College (ANC/Tanzania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRANC</td>
<td>Southern Rhodesia African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSAK</td>
<td>Swedish South Africa Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSU</td>
<td>Social Democratic Youth League (Sweden)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUL</td>
<td>National Council of Swedish Youth/Sveriges Ungdomsorganisationers Landsråd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWANLIF</td>
<td>South West Africa National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWANU</td>
<td>South West Africa National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWANUF</td>
<td>South West Africa National United Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAPA</td>
<td>South West African Progressive Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West Africa People’s Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAPO-D</td>
<td>SWAPO-Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWASB</td>
<td>South West African Student Body</td>
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<tr>
<td>TANU</td>
<td>Tanganyika African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCO</td>
<td>Central Organization of Salaried Employees/Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation (Sweden)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCRS</td>
<td>Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trades Union Congress (United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UANC</td>
<td>United African National Council (Zimbabwe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDENAMO</td>
<td>National Democratic Union of Mozambique/União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>United Democratic Front (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Rhodesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGEAN</td>
<td>General Union of Students from Black Africa under Portuguese Colonial Domination/União Geral dos Estudantes da África Negra sob Dominação Colonial Portuguêsa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>African National Union of Independent Mozambique/União Nacional de Moçambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEA</td>
<td>National Union of Angolan Students/União Nacional dos Estudantes Angolanos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNETPSA</td>
<td>UN Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIN</td>
<td>United Nations Institute for Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIP</td>
<td>United National Independence Party (Zambia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola/União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPA</td>
<td>Union of the Peoples of Angola/União das Populações de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAY</td>
<td>World Assembly of Youth</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFDY</td>
<td>World Federation of Democratic Youth</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFTU</td>
<td>World Federation of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VUF</td>
<td>Left Party Youth League (Sweden)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>World Council of Churches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUS</td>
<td>World University Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANC</td>
<td>Zambia African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People’s Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIPA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe People’s Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZWT</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Welfare Trust</td>
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Preface and Acknowledgements

The 1994 elections and the constitution of an ANC-led government in South Africa marked an end to the protracted struggles for majority rule and national independence in Southern Africa. Sweden was closely associated with this cause, extending political and humanitarian support to the liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. This book is the first in a two-volume study on Sweden and the Southern African nationalist struggles.

The study forms part of a wider research project on National Liberation in Southern Africa: The Role of the Nordic Countries, initiated at the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala, Sweden, in August 1994. Studies on Denmark, Finland and Norway are also to be published. The Nordic undertaking was largely inspired by Dr. Ibbo Mandaza and the Southern Africa Regional Institute for Policy Studies in Harare, Zimbabwe, which in 1992 launched a research project on The History of the National Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa. The Nordic studies will hopefully assist this important initiative by shedding light on the liberation movements’ international relations.

The Nordic project would not have been possible without generous support from the Nordic Africa Institute and the governments of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. In the case of the present study, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency not only provided the initial funding, but showed on more than one occasion both patience and confidence by granting additional resources. Sida and the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs also granted unrestricted access to their unique archives. I would, in particular, like to thank Lennart Wohlgemuth, Sten Rylander and Jan Cedergren for their personal support and encouragement, and through them their colleagues at the Nordic Africa Institute, Sida and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Preparing the study, I incurred debts to such a large number of individuals and institutions that it is impossible to mention them all. Those to whom I am most indebted are acknowledged in the Introduction. The archives consulted are indicated in the introductory text. At all of them I was assisted by obliging, interested and well-informed documentalists. Pieter van Gylswyk at the Nordic Africa Institute kindly and ably arranged a considerable number of the documents collected.

More than eighty interviews were carried out for the study. Those who helped me to arrange the appointments and struggled to transcribe the recordings are collectively acknowledged. Their individual contributions are noted in the accompanying interview volume published under the title Liberation in
Southern Africa: Regional and Swedish Voices. A special thanks should, however, be addressed to professor Carl Fredrik Hallencreutz, who on my behalf conducted a number of interviews in Zimbabwe. Naturally, my most sincere thanks also go to all the persons who found the time and agreed to be interviewed. Their contributions have not only been invaluable to the present study, but should constitute important references for further research.

Ulla Beckman made an important input. Studying SIDA’s annual audited accounts for the period from the mid-1960s until 1995, she made it possible to establish the amounts actually disbursed—not only committed—to the Southern African liberation movements. Karl Eric Ericson, Susanne Ljung Adriansson and Sonja Johansson at the Nordic Africa Institute, as well as Johanna Vinter-sved in a freelance capacity, dedicated a lot of time and patience to the manuscripts.

I am, in addition, greatly indebted to Elaine Almén, who language-checked the original texts and professionally corrected my linguistic blunders and grammatical inconsistencies.

Last and most of all, I am deeply grateful to Annelie Borg-Bishop and Charlotta Dohlvik, who assisted me with the project. Throughout the often tedious phase of archival search and data collection, they were always supportive and good-humoured. In the final stages, Ms. Dohlvik not only contributed with informed comments on the manuscript—spurring me on when the light in the tunnel seemed vaguely discernible—but willingly assumed and executed a number of burdensome administrative tasks. More than anybody else, she made the study possible.

The book is dedicated to my son Erik, who from a tender age in Southern Africa became close to the liberation movements. He showed a remarkable degree of understanding and support when we lived, studied and worked together in Uppsala.

Uppsala, August 1998

Tor Sellström

Introduction

Background

In April 1969, the United States President Richard Nixon initiated a comprehensive review of US policies towards Southern Africa. Prepared in great secrecy by the staff of security advisor Henry Kissinger, National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39) concluded that “the whites are [there] to stay” and that “the only way that constructive change can come about is through them”. The classified memorandum added that “there is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the Communists”.1 Based on this dictum, the Nixon administration quietly improved US relations with apartheid South Africa, eschewed pressuring Portugal regarding independence for its colonies, modulated American statements on Southern Africa at the United Nations and—to balance these moves—increased aid to the independent African states.

At the same time—in May 1969—the Standing Committee on Appropriations of the Swedish parliament took an opposite stand, endorsing a policy of direct official humanitarian assistance to the national liberation movements in Southern Africa (and in Guinea-Bissau). Such assistance, it declared,

"can not be allowed to enter into conflict with the rule of international law, which lays down that no state has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another. [However], with regard to liberation movements in Africa, humanitarian assistance and educational support should not be in conflict with the said rule in cases where the United Nations unequivocally has taken a stand against oppression of peoples striving for national freedom. This [is] deemed to be the case [with regard to] South West Africa, Rhodesia and the African territories under Portuguese suzerainty. Concerning assistance to the victims of the policy of apartheid, such support can inter alia be motivated by the explicit condemnation by the United Nations of South Africa’s policy".2

Following this interpretation,3 the Swedish government initiated official support to MPLA of Angola, FRELIMO of Mozambique, SWAPO of South

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3 From the mid-1960s, UN General Assembly resolutions on questions relating to decolonization, national self-determination and majority rule in Southern Africa regularly urged the member states
West Africa/Namibia, ZANU and ZAPU of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and ANC of South Africa. These movements—all of them eventually leading their peoples to majority rule and independence—were in the Cold War period shunned by the Western governments as ‘Communist’ or ‘terrorist’. In marked contrast, during most of the Thirty Years’ War in Southern Africa an increasing proportion of their civilian needs was covered by the government of Sweden, a small industrialized country in northern Europe. Until the 1994 democratic elections in South Africa, a total of 4 billion Swedish Kronor (SEK)—in current figures—was channelled as official humanitarian assistance to Southern

to render moral and material assistance to the peoples of the region in their quest to achieve freedom and independence. Mainly as a result of increasing influence of the Afro-Asian states, such calls were from 1965 normally included in resolutions on Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), the Portuguese colonies (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe) and South West Africa (Namibia) and, from 1966, on South Africa. Towards the end of the 1960s, the calls were often made in support of the national liberation movements. Usually, the member states were asked to coordinate the requested assistance with the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In September 1969, the OAU Ministerial Council resolved that “no assistance should be rendered to liberation movements that have not been recognized by the [organization]”. Sweden generally voted in favour of these resolutions. However, where the text—explicitly or implicitly (v.gr. ‘by whatever means’)—made reference to armed struggle or military assistance, Sweden would not support them, stating that only the Security Council—not the General Assembly—according to the UN Charter could take decisions regarding the use of violence. This often led Sweden to abstain or vote against resolutions on Southern Africa where it otherwise supported the core issue of national liberation and majority rule. Such abstentions would provoke strong reactions in Sweden, although the reasons—as illustrated by the interviews carried out for this study—were normally understood by both the OAU and the Southern African liberation movements.

1 As well as to PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. In fact, the close contacts established between Sweden and PAIGC largely explain the position taken by the parliament. PAIGC was the only liberation movement mentioned in the 1969 statement. The wider context of the proposed humanitarian assistance to the liberation movement in Guinea-Bissau was also explicitly stated: “Practical possibilities are being explored how to extend [Swedish] humanitarian and educational assistance to the victims of the struggle conducted under the leadership of PAIGC to liberate Portuguese Guinea from Portugal’s suzerainty. The committee is [...] positive to such assistance if the practical problems can be overcome, assuming that [the government] will utilize the possibilities that may appear” (Swedish Parliament 1969: Statement No. 82/1969, p. 24). Ironically, the committee that made the historic pronouncement was headed by Gösta Bohman, who the following year became chairman of the conservative Moderate Party, the only traditional party outside the broader Swedish partnership with the nationalist forces in Southern Africa. For the full names behind the acronyms, see List of Acronyms. In the text, the liberation movements are mentioned without the definite article.

2 Particularly in the United States, the Southern African nationalist movements were commonly depicted as ‘terrorist’. A whole branch of academia was preoccupied with the subject. See, for example, Yonah Alexander (ed.): International Terrorism: National, Regional and Global Perspectives, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1976. See also The Role of the Soviet Union, Cuba and East Germany in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1982 (two volumes). In Great Britain, Tory governments likewise regularly presented the nationalist movements as ‘terrorist’. In June 1995, i.e. fifteen years after Zimbabwe’s independence, the former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher—referring to ZANU’s Robert Mugabe and ZAPU’s Joshua Nkomo—stated, for example, on CNN television “I got the two terrorist leaders in Rhodesia together to negotiate” (The Herald, Harare, 24 July 1995).


4 Figures given in the text refer to current amounts. A conversion table between the Swedish Krona (SEK) and the United States Dollar (USD) during the period 1950–1995 is attached as an appendix.
Africa. Of this amount, not less than 1.7 billion—over 40%—was under bilateral agreements disbursed directly to the six liberation movements.\(^1\)

Although geographically and culturally poles apart, a close relationship would over the years evolve between Sweden and the Southern African movements. In a tribute to the late Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, the ANC leader Oliver Tambo—who from 1961 regularly visited Sweden and perhaps more than any other Southern African politician contributed to the partnership—characterized in 1988 the unusual North–South dimension as follows:

> There has [...] emerged a natural system of relations between Southern Africa and Sweden, from people to people. It is a system of international relations which is not based on the policies of any party that might be in power in Sweden at any particular time, but on the fundamental reality that the peoples of our region and those of Palme’s land of birth share a common outlook and impulse, which dictates that they should all strive for the same objectives.\(^2\)

The government of Sweden was the first in the industrialized West\(^3\) to extend direct official assistance to the Southern African liberation movements. Nevertheless, although Sweden—subsequently joined by the other Nordic countries\(^4\)—was a major actor and factor in the Southern African struggle, only scant reference to the involvement can be found in the international literature.\(^5\)

At best, popular studies as well as scholarly dissertations mention in passing that Sweden, or the Nordic countries, supported the nationalist movements, without asking why, in what way, with how much and what role the support may have played.\(^6\) As the American scholar William Minter has pointed out, among the few exceptions are Thomas G. Karis’ article ‘Revolution in the Making: Black Politics in South Africa’ in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 62, 1983/84 and E.S. Reddy’s booklets *International Action against Apartheid: The Nordic States and Nigeria*, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 1986 and *Contributions of the Nordic States to Oppressed People of Southern Africa and Frontline States*, Mainstream Publications, New Dehli, 1986. See also E.S. Reddy (ed.): *Liberation of Southern Africa: Selected Speeches of Olof Palme*, Vikas, New Delhi, 1990. Reddy was for twenty years the head of the UN Centre Against Apartheid in New York.

\(^1\) Based on disbursement figures according to SIDA’s annual accounts, established by Ulla Beckman for this study.


\(^3\) But not—as is often stated—in the Western world. From independence in 1947, India led the Western-oriented Third World countries’ opposition to apartheid South Africa.

\(^4\) In strict terms, the Scandinavian countries are Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The Nordic countries include Finland and Iceland.


\(^6\) As will be seen from the accompanying studies, there were—particularly in the 1970s—clear differences between the Nordic governments’ support to the Southern African liberation movements. Following Sweden, Norway decided in 1973 to embark upon direct official support. Substantial Norwegian assistance to FRELIMO, SWAPO, ZANU and ZAPU started in 1974 and to ANC and PAC in 1977. A smaller contribution was granted in 1977 to Bishop Muzorewa’s African National Council of Zimbabwe. Also Finland decided in 1973 to cooperate directly with the liberation movements. The amounts involved were modest and limited to Namibia and South Africa, although a cash contribution was extended to FRELIMO in October 1974. The Finnish government supported SWAPO from 1974 and ANC from 1978. In 1983, a contribution was also given to PAC. Denmark, on the other hand, did not extend any direct official support to the
"volumes of ink [have been] spilled on the East–West geopolitical involvement in the region, [while the] history of [the Nordic participation] has attracted only marginal attention from either scholars or journalists". Thus, in the 1980s, the international right wing was fond of labelling SWAPO and ANC as ‘Soviet-backed’. In empirical terms, the alternate, but less dramatic, labels ‘Swedish-backed’ or ‘Nordic-backed’ would have been equally or even more accurate, especially in the non-military aspects of international support.1

In addition to Cold War blinkers, language has kept international students away from the subject. Accessible documentation on Sweden’s relations with the liberation movements—such as public records, periodicals, newspaper articles etc.—is mostly available in the insular Swedish language, with which very few outside the Nordic countries are at ease. However, considering the depth and width of the relationship with Southern African nationalist movements, there are also very few studies in Swedish. The most informative have been sponsored by the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), the government agency which over the years administered the official support.2 The absence of major studies is conspicuous, particularly as many of the active opinion makers on Southern Africa were prominent and prolific writers and journalists.3

Reminiscences by and biographies of leading Swedish politicians close to the Southern African struggle are equally surprisingly silent on this significant

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1 William M. Minter: Review of The Impossible Neutrality by Pierre Schori in Africa Today, No. 43, 1996, p. 95. One of the very rare studies in which Swedish support to the Southern African liberation movements is discussed is the Soviet scholar Vladimir Bushin’s Social Democracy and Southern Africa, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1989. Sympathetic to the liberation struggle and containing an abundance of references, it is, however, also a product of the Cold War. It is primarily a study of the Socialist International, discussing whether it is “a friend or foe” and assessing the possibilities of joint action between its members and the Communist movement towards Southern Africa.


3 In 1976, Wästberg—whose role will be evident throughout the study—published a personal account of his contacts with the liberation movements and his travels in Southern Africa in Afrika—Ett Uppdrag (Wahlström & Widstrand, Stockholm), translated into English in 1986 as Assignments in Africa (The Olive Press, London). In 1995, he published I Sydafrika: Resan mot Friheten (‘In South Africa: The Journey towards Freedom’, Wahlström & Widstrand, Stockholm), which—also in a very personal way—contains useful information on his involvement with and Swedish assistance to the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (IDAF).
chapter in contemporary foreign policy. Comprehensive studies on the major non-governmental solidarity organizations working with the liberation movements also remain to be written. As the 1994 elections in South Africa in many respects marked an end to an era of popular solidarity which promoted and sustained Sweden’s official policies, it is hoped that their respective contributions will be properly recorded.

What largely explains the absence of more comprehensive studies on Sweden and the struggle for national liberation in Southern Africa—whether purely narrative or analytical—is that the support was treated confidentially, at the official as well as at the non-governmental level. However, the regional liberation struggle came to an end with the elections in South Africa in April 1994. With the end of the Cold War, there should no longer be any security grounds for keeping archives closed or pens idle, although the extensive documentation held at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and at the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency at the time of writing remained restricted.

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1 There are anecdotal accounts here and there. For example, in the memoirs by the former secretary of the Social Democratic Party (1963–82) and Minister for Foreign Affairs (1985–91) Sten Andersson (I De Lugnaste Vatten.../’In the Quietest Waters...’, Tidens Förlag, Stockholm, 1993) and in those by Sverker Åström, former head of the Political Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (1956–64), Swedish representative to the United Nations (1964–70) and Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1972–77) (Ögonblick: Från Ett Halvsekel i Ud-tjänst/’Moments: From Half a Century in the Foreign Service’, Bonnier Alba, Stockholm, 1992). However, only Pierre Schori, former international secretary of the Social Democratic Party (1967–71 and 1977–1982), Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1982–91) and in 1994 Minister of International Development Cooperation, has published a more comprehensive account of Sweden’s policies towards the liberation movements—particularly under Prime Minister Olof Palme—in his Dokument Inifrån: Sverige och Storpolitiken i Omvälvningarnas Tid (’Documents from Within: Sweden and Major Politics in the Era of Upheavals’), Tidens Förlag, Stockholm, 1992. As The Impossible Neutrality—Southern Africa: Sweden’s Role under Olof Palme, the chapter on Southern Africa was published in English in 1994 by David Philip Publishers, Cape Town.

2 A short factual account of the Swedish trade unions’ support to South Africa was published in 1996 by Solveig Wickman as Sydafrika: Fackligt Bistånd (’South Africa: Trade Union Assistance’), Förlaget Trädet/SIDA, Stockholm. The history of the Church of Sweden Aid’s first fifty years, written by Björn Ryman, was published in 1997. The book—Lutherhjälpens Första 50 År/’The First 50 Years of the Church of Sweden Aid’ (Verbum Förlag, Stockholm)—contains chapters on Namibia and South Africa. The text on Namibia was reproduced in 1997 in a special issue of Svensk Missions Tidskrift/Swedish Missiological Themes, dedicated to the Church of Sweden Aid 1947–97 (No. 2/1997).

3 In 1995, the Swedish International Development Authority, with the acronym in capital letters, became the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, with the same acronym in small letters. As this study discusses events before 1995, the upper case version—i.e. SIDA—will be used.

4 Public administration in Sweden differs from that in most countries through the constitutionally guaranteed right of access to information and documents kept by public authorities. Access is the general rule, secrecy the exception. However, the Official Secrets Act states that documents concerning “the security of the state and its relations to another state or an international organization” may be confidential, normally for a period of 30 years. The rule was generally applied by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and SIDA to Sweden’s humanitarian assistance to Southern Africa.
Objectives

This two-volume study will discuss the origins, developments and dimensions of Sweden’s involvement with the struggles for national independence, majority rule and democracy in the five Southern African countries where a peaceful process of decolonization and change was blocked by an alliance of Portuguese colonialists, Rhodesian settlers and the South African apartheid regime—largely supported by the major Western powers—that is, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. The main objectives are to document and analyse the involvement by the civil society and government from the modest beginnings in the 1950s until the ANC electoral victory in 1994.

A study on international solidarity and humanitarian assistance, it focuses on that aspect of the Swedish involvement which in an international perspective appears as most particular and least known, that is, the direct, official relationship with the liberation movements, including their allies and other nationalist forces. Closely related issues, such as Sweden and Southern Africa at the United Nations or in other international fora; Swedish development assistance to the independent states in the region; or the South African sanctions debate in the 1980s can be studied in open sources or are documented
elsewhere.\textsuperscript{1} They will play a secondary role and only feature to the extent that they are significant to the core subject, or as explanatory backdrops.

For the purpose of the study, a national liberation movement is defined as a) a political organization which b) strives to attain independence and form a government for c) a colonized or otherwise oppressed people and which d) is recognized by the United Nations and/or the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as representing that people.

A priori, the concept does not have an ideological connotation. It merely represents the organized, political expression of a non-recognized nation moving to liberate itself from foreign occupation or domestic exclusion. The means chosen to achieve the objective, or its political programme, do not define a national liberation movement. Nor does its social composition. Whether the social base was predominantly rural (such as ZANU’s) or urban (such as that of ANC) is subordinate to the question of its national character and representativity. Nevertheless, within themselves the movements harboured various social forces and different political projects, from socialist to capitalist, or pro-Communist and pro-Western. Between these forces and projects there were ‘struggles within the struggle’. One aspect of the study is to assess the roles played in this connection by the Swedish government and the non-governmental organizations. Were political pressures or other conditions applied and, if so, in favour of which political forces and projects?

Layout and Scope

The study is divided into two volumes. Volume I covers the formative period until the close of the 1960s, when the Swedish parliament endorsed a policy of official, direct support to the Southern African liberation movements. It begins with an overview of some features and characteristics of the Swedish political system, economy and society at the time when a broader involvement with Southern Africa began. The eclectic introduction—chiefly included for the benefit of the non-Swedish reader—also presents some of the principal actors that feature in the text. The main subject is then introduced in South Africa and will in subsequent chapters be followed via Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola and

\textsuperscript{1} On Sweden and the decolonization question at the United Nations in the period from 1946 to 1969—i.e. until the decision to extend direct assistance to the Southern African liberation movements—see Bo Huldt: Sweden, the United Nations and Decolonization: A Study of Swedish Participation in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly 1946–69, Lund Studies in International History No. 5, Esselte Studium, Stockholm, 1974. In addition to a number of official documents, the sanctions’ issue was over the years extensively covered in publications by the Swedish solidarity movement, the trade unions, the churches and the business community. See also Ove Nordenmark: Aktiv Utrikespolitik: Sverige—Södra Afrika, 1969–1987 (‘Active Foreign Policy: Sweden—Southern Africa, 1969–1987’), Acta Universitatis Upsalienses No. 111, Almqvist & Wiksell International, Stockholm, 1991. In spite of the title, this doctoral dissertation in political science does not study Sweden’s general policy towards the region, but the Swedish political parties and the three main sanctions laws adopted in 1969 (against Rhodesia), 1979 (South Africa and Namibia) and 1987 (South Africa and Namibia).
Mozambique. The order roughly reflects the sequence of the historical encounters between Sweden and the liberation movements during the initial, re-active period of Swedish response in the 1960s.

Volume I attempts to identify the circumstances and actors behind the encounters. It is mainly concerned with the formation of the public and political opinion that in 1969 led to the historic decision by the Swedish parliament, for each country following the events until the time when formal assistance to a liberation movement was granted. Guided by an ambition to make the individual country presentations comprehensive (thereby running the risk of being repetitive), the process—starting with individual anti-apartheid voices in the 1950s and ending with official support to ANC in 1973—was, however, interactive and cumulative. The involvement in a particular country can thus not be seen in isolation.

Volume II covers the increasingly pro-active and interventionist period which began around 1970 with direct official assistance to the liberation movements and continued until independence and majority rule. The main focus here is on the actual support extended by Sweden, principally by the government, but also by the non-governmental organizations. As in the first volume, but in reverse order, it contains separate chapters on Mozambique and Angola (until independence in 1975), Zimbabwe (1980), Namibia (1990) and South Africa (1994). In each case, the narrative leads to the point where the liberation movement assumed state power. Where the new state became a sanctuary to regional liberation movements still struggling to achieve their goals, the presentation goes further.

This is, first and foremost, a study of Sweden’s relations with the Southern African liberation movements from a Swedish perspective. It is based on the premise that the main events and developments in the Southern African region are generally known. Nevertheless, for the benefit of the reader they will on occasion be summarized to place the discussion in a proper context.

It is not a study of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. The history—or rather, histories—of this important chapter in contemporary world affairs must primarily be written by scholars from the region. It is against this background gratifying to note that a number of archives in the Southern African countries are being arranged and opened for research and that different initiatives have been taken to study the Thirty Years’ War from an African perspective.

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1 Sweden’s involvement with PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde will be presented in Volume II.
2 The essential role of the Southern African Frontline States is, for example, yet to be studied.
3 In March 1996, the official ANC archives were opened at the University of Fort Hare, South Africa. Important ANC documents are also held at the Mayibuye Centre for History and Culture in South Africa, University of the Western Cape.
4 As noted in the Preface, in 1992 the Southern Africa Regional Institute for Policy Studies (SARIPS) in Harare, Zimbabwe, launched a regional research project on ‘The History of the National Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa’.
theless, as the study discusses aspects of the nationalist movements’ international relations, it may contribute to Southern African historiography by shedding some light on the questions of liberation, diplomacy and external support. In the case of Sweden, the political relations eventually established with the different movements discussed were largely the outcome of active efforts by the victorious liberation movements themselves. While benevolent paternalism and humanitarian concern were initial responses, they did from the outset openly state and without compromise defend their objectives and methods. At a very early stage, ANC, FRELIMO, MPLA, SWAPO, ZANU and ZAPU paid serious attention to international diplomacy, managing to build an external support base where competing voices faltered. Although domestic political and armed pressure in the final event proved decisive, humanitarian and diplomatic support did have an impact on the home front. Volume II will address this question, trying to assess the significance of the support.

The study is primarily addressed to the general reader interested in Swedish policies towards Southern Africa. Mainly narrative and empirical, often impressionistic and sometimes bordering on the anecdotal, it does not claim to break academic ground. Nor does it have any particular methodological ambitions. History—including the reconstruction of contemporary events—is always a story, or a combination of developments and plots. The past is not discovered or found, but “created and represented [...] as a text”. The sequencing and presentation of events in the past, or what forms historical knowledge, is never truly objective, but “always [carries] the fingerprints of [the] interpreter”. This said, the study does attempt an intelligible presentation of empirical data, events and plots, largely based on unresearched primary sources. It should, hopefully, be of use for future studies, for example, on Sweden’s foreign policy in the Cold War period and on the Southern African liberation movements’ international relations.

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1 There are few studies on the diplomacy of the Southern African liberation movements, including ANC and SWAPO. This lacuna was highlighted by Peter Vale and John Daniel in a paper discussing the foreign policy options of the ‘new South Africa’, presented in 1993 (‘“Upstairs-Downstairs”: Understanding the ‘new’ South Africa in the ‘new’ World’). In 1996, Scott Thomas published his doctoral dissertation on ANC with the title *The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the African National Congress Since 1960*, Tauris Academic Studies, I.B. Tauris Publishers, London and New York. Thomas’ understanding of ANC’s relations with the Nordic countries is based on general, official documents by the UN and other international bodies and therefore limited. In a book dedicated to the memory of Oliver Tambo, he concludes that “although the Nordic states gained a progressive international image because they supported African liberation movements and the economic goals of the Third World, this perception is inaccurate” (p. 190). In their—very critical—*Namibia’s Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword* (James Currey, London and Ohio University Press, Athens, 1995), Colin Leys and John S. Saul acknowledge that “little is said [...] about SWAPO’s diplomatic accomplishments”, adding that “this is an intriguing theme that deserves more research” (p. 3). In their study, there is only one reference to Sweden and it concerns the little known ‘Swedish Free Church’.


3 Ibid., p. 8.

4 The academic debate on Sweden’s active foreign policy is reflected in a great number of publications. Naturally, the role of Olof Palme and the issue of Vietnam are prominent, while there are few studies on Sweden and Africa. However, within the project ‘Sweden during the Cold War’
One question has more than others guided the inquiry in Volume I: What made Sweden—a small, industrialized nation in northern Europe, without a direct colonial heritage and largely isolated from Third World affairs—become involved on the nationalist side in Southern Africa? Various dimensions of this central question—ranging from theoretical discussions regarding global systemic change\(^1\) to more earthly explanations of human decency \(^2\)—have been suggested. Individual, often quite personal and diverse, answers by Southern African and Swedish protagonists are given in the interviews carried out for the study.

Representatives of the discipline of international politics normally agree that the parameters for a nation’s foreign policy are determined by three basic objectives, namely a) national security (the search for peace in a given global order), b) ideological affinity (the quest for common values and understanding) and c) economic opportunity (the pursuit of welfare for the nation and its citizens). These objectives are given varying weight by different domestic actors. To strive for a broad national understanding of the foreign policy therefore becomes of the essence, to the extent that d) public legitimacy (acceptance by the domestic opinion) in itself is often seen as a fourth objective.\(^3\) Failing that, the public opinion may react to the chosen international path and force a foreign policy reorientation. In the text, different Swedish views of the security aspects of apartheid and colonialism; economic interests in Southern Africa; issues of racism, exclusion and the right to self-determination; and—prominently—the Southern African and domestic voices raised on these matters will be discussed for the five countries under study. Examining the developments, they will in a concluding note be summarized with the above mentioned policy objectives in mind. Hopefully, the present volume will shed some light on the question why Sweden became involved in Southern Africa. Volume II will then discuss how the involvement was expressed.

Sources

I have—perhaps too strictly and excessively—chosen to follow academic norms and requirements regarding references. I am aware that a vast apparatus of

\(^{1}\) Immanuel Wallerstein: ‘The Art of the Possible, or the Politics of Radical Transformation’ in Hadjor (ed.) op. cit., pp. 38–45.

\(^{2}\) For example, interview with Bengt Säve-Söderbergh, 14 January 1997.

footnotes often disturb the general reader. A major objective of the study is, however, to document Sweden’s involvement in the liberation process in Southern Africa. Instead of long reference lists at the end of the texts, it is hoped that footnotes may more directly assist those interested in a particular aspect and facilitate further enquiry. In addition, explanatory notes on Swedish personalities, organizations and events are called for in an international context. Finally, as the study is largely based on hitherto unresearched primary source material, transparency requires that the sources are properly accounted for. This is, naturally, also the case with direct quotations, statistics and other quantitative data, as where the views expressed may appear as contradictory or controversial. Nevertheless, in order to separate the narration from the documentation, an attempt has been made to present the study in such a way that the main text can be read without too disrupting dips into the notes at the bottom of the page.

The background documentation consists to a large extent of non-published primary material, such as reports, memoranda, minutes, letters, pamphlets etc. Public records by the Swedish government and parliament are also central. In addition, I have relied to a great extent on periodicals and newspaper articles, the latter mainly found at the press archive of Uppsala university. Articles from the Norwegian press were studied at Oslo university library. The main archives consulted are those of the Africa Groups in Sweden (referenced below as AGA), the Church of Sweden Mission (CSA), the Isolate South Africa Committee (ISA), the Labour Movement Archives and Library (LMA), the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI), the Olof Palme International Center (OPA), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SDA) and the Archives of the Popular Movements in Uppland County (UPA). I have also studied selected ANC files at the Mayibuye Centre of the University of the Western Cape in Cape Town, South Africa (MCA), as well as documents held at the Historical Archive of Mozambique in Maputo (MHA).

A number of individuals have been extremely helpful and given me copies of documents and private letters, as well as written replies to inquisitive questions. In addition to the interviewees mentioned in the appendix, I would particularly like to record the contributions by Tore Bergman, Anders Ehnmark, Thorbjörn Fälldin, Bertil Högberg, Joachim Israel, Anders Johansson, Ola Jämtin, Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu, Paul Rimmerfors, Roy Unge, David Wirmark and Per Wästberg. Above all, Anders Johansson and Joachim Israel have opened their private files. Due to the number of documents in their collections, they are referenced as (AJC) and (JIC), respectively.

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1 CSA, ISA, NAI and UPA are in Uppsala, while the others are located in Stockholm. The ISA documents are held at the Nordic Africa Institute.
2 In Portuguese, Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique.
To get firsthand, personal views from both Southern Africa and Sweden, more than eighty interviews have been conducted with leading representatives of the Southern African liberation movements, prominent regional actors and Swedish politicians, administrators and activists. A list of the people interviewed appears in the bibliography. The interviews have been tape-recorded, transcribed and submitted for comments. They are published together with this study for further research into the Swedish—and Nordic—involvement in the Southern African liberation struggle.

Dramatic news during the phase of data collection underlined that the study is far from conclusive. In September 1996, the former South African death squad commander Eugene de Kock stated in the Pretoria Supreme Court that the apartheid regime had been behind the assassination of the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme. Palme was killed in February 1986, one week after appearing with Oliver Tambo at the Swedish People’s Parliament Against Apartheid.1 Less dramatic, but highly significant, was that Birger Hagård, a Swedish Moderate MP, in November 1996 requested the standing Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution to retrospectively examine whether Sweden’s official assistance to the anti-apartheid struggle over the years had been compatible with constitutional principles.2

A Personal Note

Transparency demands a comment on my personal relation to the subject. I lived and worked in Southern Africa between 1977 and 1983 and, again, from 1986 until mid-1994. For most of the time, I was involved with humanitarian assistance to the liberation movements. During my first two years in the region, I was employed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Angola, working, in particular, with SWAPO of Namibia, but also with ZAPU of Zimbabwe and ANC of South Africa. I revisited Angola as an election observer with European Parliamentarians for Southern Africa (AWEPA) in 1992.

Joining SIDA in 1979, I followed Zimbabwe’s process towards independence as an official with the Swedish embassy in Zambia, also observing the 1980 elections in that capacity. In Zambia, I was in close contact with SWAPO and

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1 Desmond Tutu, Chairman of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, presented in August 1998 documents indicating a South African involvement in the plane crash in which the Swedish UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld and fifteen others—among them nine Swedes—were killed outside Ndola in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) in September 1961. The circumstances behind the disaster have never been convincingly established, although several investigations over the years concluded that the crash was due to a navigation error. The documents unearthed by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission would, however, confirm the suspicions that the crash was the result of an operation carried out by Western interests to assassinate Hammarskjöld (Svenska Dagbladet, 20 August 1998).

2 Dagens Nyheter, 6 November 1996.
ANC. The relations were maintained when I was posted to the embassy in Mozambique from 1982 to 1983. In 1984–85, I co-ordinated Swedish assistance to SWAPO and ANC at SIDA’s headquarters in Stockholm, a responsibility which I also had in the field during the following five years with SIDA in Zimbabwe. After Namibia’s independence, I was invited to join the Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit (NEPRU) in Windhoek from 1991 until mid-1994. I, finally, witnessed the demise of white minority rule in the region as an AWEPA observer during the elections in South Africa in 1994.

With regard to Swedish assistance—in particular to SWAPO and ANC—I have, thus, from the late 1970s been a direct participant, albeit at a subordinate level. It may be argued that it disqualifies me from being a credible interpreter. I leave this judgement to the reader. It is, evidently, difficult to take a step back and critically examine events close to one’s own life. I would, however, like to underline that the Swedish involvement in the liberation struggle in Southern Africa has been so rich and varied that only the opportunity of archival studies into its many constituent parts eventually revealed its broader significance to me. Some may find the narrative unexpected or controversial. Others may feel unduly left out. In either case, I hope that those who disagree or feel offended will react by shedding further light on the subject of Sweden and the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. It constitutes a unique chapter in contemporary Swedish foreign relations and merits many more studies than the one that follows.

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1 Sweden’s relations with Vietnam during the period 1965–1975 have also been characterized as unique. (See, for example, Yngve Möller: Sverige och Vietnamkriget: Ett Unikt Kapitel i Svensk Utrikespolitik (‘Sweden and the Vietnam War: A Unique Chapter in Swedish Foreign Policy’, Tidens Förlag, Stockholm, 1992). For several years, Vietnam overshadowed Southern Africa. A whole generation was mobilized against the war and the stand taken by the government made the United States sever relations with Sweden, bringing the tensions of the Cold War directly into Swedish homes. However, the National Liberation Front (FNL) was exclusively an object—a remote symbol—with which both the solidarity movement and the Swedish people at large never entered into contact. In Southern Africa, particularly with regard to SWAPO and ANC, there was direct government and non-government involvement with the liberation movements through a number of projects, personnel and also private companies. The relations with the Southern African movements had a prominent element of ‘people-to-people’ cooperation and direct sharing of experience. In addition, the relationship was never unilateral. From the early 1960s, resident representatives of the Southern African organizations participated actively in the Swedish solidarity movement and debate. This contributed to the fact that the support never became divisive.
Sweden after the Second World War

Two Political Blocs

The Swedish political party system was from the early 1920s until the late 1980s characterized by unique stability. In the 1921 parliamentary elections—the first by universal suffrage—only five parties managed to capture seats and not until the 1988 elections was the quintet joined by a newcomer in the form of a Green Party.¹ Three years later, the Christian Democrats and the ‘protest party’ New Democracy passed the 4% barrier for representation in the riksdag. For most of the time covered in the study, the situation was, thus, straightforward. Five traditional political parties, divided into a socialist and a non-socialist—or ‘bourgeois’—bloc, together held all the parliamentary seats.

Political parties have played a more central role in the political landscape of Sweden than in most countries. The nomination of eligible candidates is made by the party organizations and, as a rule, people vote for a party programme and not for a person. In addition, Swedes vote to a high degree according to social class. Around two thirds of the workers traditionally vote for the Social Democratic Party and a similar proportion of the farmers support the Centre Party.²

The traditional parties in the socialist camp are the ex-Communist Left Party (LPC)³ and the reformist Social Democratic Party (SDP), while the Centre Party (CP), the Liberal Party (LP) and the Moderate Party (MP) have formed the non-socialist bloc. With around one fifth of the national vote, the Liberal Party was the biggest non-socialist party from the mid-1940s until 1968, when it was overtaken by the Centre Party. The ex-agrarian Centre Party,⁴ originally representing the rural electorate, cooperated in the 1950s with the Social Democrats, joining the government between 1951 and 1957. In the 1960s, it moved towards the right, coordinating policies with the Liberal Party within a ‘cooperation of the middle’. A Centre-Liberal union was seen as a more realistic non-socialist alternative than a tripartite coalition with the conservative Moderate Party. Nevertheless, such a coalition became a reality in 1976, when the three non-socialist parties joined forces to break the more than four decades’ long Social

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¹ In Swedish, Miljöpartiet de Gröna, founded in 1981.
³ In 1967, the Communist Party of Sweden changed its name to the Left Party Communists. The addendum ‘Communists’ was dropped in 1990.
⁴ Until 1958, the Centre Party was called the Farmers’ League (Bondeförbundet).
Democratic reign. The Centre Party chairman Thorbjörn Fälldin led the coalition, becoming the first non-Social Democratic Prime Minister since 1932.¹

The traditional parties of the Swedish bourgeoisie are the Liberal Party and the Moderate Party. As the name indicates, the Liberal Party² has its origins in European liberal thought, advocating demands such as free trade, individual rights and universal suffrage. With a strong following among civil servants and private business people, it is mainly a party of the middle classes. More heterogeneous than the other traditional parties, it has been the political home of both a non-conformist religious and a temperance faction. Of relevance for the study is that some of the biggest and most influential Swedish newspapers, such as Dagens Nyheter and Expressen, have been closely connected to the Liberal Party. The Moderate Party, finally, grew out of a conservative tradition, over the years representing the political right.³ Close to ‘big business’—in particular export interests—often supporting positions held by the Swedish Employers’ Confederation (SAF) and in marked contrast to the Liberal Party, it never formed part of the broader solidarity movement towards Southern Africa. Between 1948 and 1970, its share of the electorate fluctuated around 15%. Among the bigger national newspapers, Svenska Dagbladet has traditionally supported the Moderate Party.

The electoral strength and the parliamentary position of the Swedish political parties between 1950 and 1994 are presented in an appendix. Until the 1991 elections, the Social Democratic Party regularly received well over 40% of the national vote. While such a stable and strong vote by comparison with other European multi-party systems was quite remarkable, it did not give the Social Democrats a majority to govern on their own. To realize their objectives, they largely depended on the small Communist vote, which during the period discussed was between 4 and 6%.

Contrary to the Centre Party, the Communist (Left) Party was never invited by the Social Democratic Party to join the government. During the post-war period the Social Democrats pursued firm anti-communist policies, in particular within the organized labour movement—where Communists were competing for political influence—but also in the domain of foreign affairs.⁴ In addition to the ideological division between socialists and non-socialists, the five traditional parties have thus been characterized as either ‘democratic’ or ‘non-democratic’. Only the Left Party was considered ‘non-democratic’ and as such not represented on the parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs or on the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance, two

¹ In 1936, the Farmers’ League under Axel Pehrson-Bramstorp was in government for 100 days.
² In Swedish, Folkpartiet, or the People’s Party. In 1990, the addendum Liberalerna (Liberals) was attached.
³ The Moderate Party (Moderata Samlingspartiet/Moderaterna) was until 1969 named the Party of the Right (Högerpartiet).
⁴ Seen as unreliable, several hundred Communists were during the Second World War rounded up and detained in labour camps or held in special military units.
bodies that played a central role for the official relations with the Southern African liberation movements. Nevertheless, the party was among the first to advocate support for these movements and its members were from the beginning active in various solidarity organizations.

It was only with the irruption on the political scene of popular manifestations against the war in Vietnam and the 1968 youth revolt that the Social Democratic Party and the Left Party were challenged by a non-traditional New Left movement. Contrary to the situation in Denmark and Norway—where Socialist People’s Parties had already been created around 1960—in Sweden the traditional workers’ parties remained hegemonic. In a study of the European New Left, the journalist Alvar Alsterdal set out in 1963 to identify corresponding currents in Sweden, but had to conclude that “in this respect one can only repeat what the old geography book [says] under the heading ‘Elephants in Greenland’: There are none.” However, the Communist Party was not immune to critical influences. Under the new party leader, C.H. Hermansson, it changed name in 1967 to the Left Party Communists to mark a more independent course vis-à-vis Moscow. The dominance of the Social Democrats was at the same time underlined when the 1968 elections to the parliamentary second chamber resulted in their biggest success in the post-war period, exceptionally giving the ruling party over 50% of the national vote.

Swedish Model and People’s Home

Under consecutive Social Democratic governments, Sweden rapidly evolved from an agrarian to a highly industrialized country between the 1930s and the 1960s. After winning the 1932 elections, Per Albin Hanson, the leader of the Social Democratic Party, became Prime Minister. During a parliamentary debate in 1928 he sketched a vision of a social democratic ‘people’s home’, in which an equitable society would be built by “breaking down all the social and economic barriers that now [divide] our citizens into privileged and underprivileged, rulers and dependents, rich and poor, wealthy and impoverished, plunderers and plundered”. An ambitious programme to achieve the objective was presented. Due to the Depression and the outbreak of the Second World War, its implementation was, however, postponed.

1 In both countries, this was largely a result of popular feelings against membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Sweden was not a member of NATO.
3 In 1970, the Swedish two-chamber parliament was replaced by a unicameral riksdag, comprising 350 (later 349) members.
4 In Swedish, *folkhem*.
As during the First World War, Sweden managed to stay outside the conflagration of 1939–45. The industry and infrastructure were kept intact and, as a result, the economy was well equipped to profit from the international economic post-war recovery, for the following twenty-five years showing sustained and spectacular growth. During the 1950s and the 1960s, it annually averaged 3.5% and during the first half of the latter decade not less than 5%. The growth was largely based on skills-intensive industrial processing of domestic raw materials. While traditional export products, such as iron ore, timber and paper products, remained important, it was the manufacturing industry—including rapidly expanding automobile factories (Volvo and Saab-Scania)—that assumed a leading role in foreign trade. In a traditionally trade-dependent economy, engineering products increased their share of exports to over 40% by the early 1960s. At the same time, Swedish companies rapidly established themselves outside the national borders. At the end of the Second World War, there were an estimated 300 Swedish-owned subsidiaries abroad. By 1962, the number had increased to around 1,100, with a total foreign employment of over 150,000. At the beginning of the 1960s, some of the major companies—such as the ball-bearing manufacturer SKF, the telephone company L.M. Ericsson and Swedish Match—had a majority of their employees in foreign countries.

Through Stockholms Enskilda Bank, several of the larger export companies were controlled by the Wallenberg family. It has during the 20th century held a uniquely powerful position. In 1963, the Wallenberg family controlled 15% of total industrial production and over 7% of all private employees worked in companies in the Wallenberg sphere of ownership. Significantly, a majority of the Swedish manufacturing companies established in South Africa at the time of the first sanctions’ debate in the 1960s were part of the ‘Wallenberg empire’.

1 Although Sweden formally remained neutral during the war, there was a high degree of collusion with Nazi-Germany. For example, Hitler was allowed to import high quality Swedish iron for the war industry and in 1941 a fully equipped German infantry division was given the green light to transit the country from Norway to the front in Finland. Swedish official and private interests—not least the Wallenberg group—were also involved in the profitable, covert, trade with gold and other assets stolen by the Nazis from Jewish victims (see, for example, ‘Vem tjänade pengar på andra världskriget?’ /’Who made money out of the Second World War’ in Dagens Nyheter Kultur/Special, 21 October 1997).

2 Hadenius op. cit., p. 70.


5 Ibid., pp. 119 and 300. In the electro-technical industry Wallenberg’s control was almost two thirds of the production.

6 Alfa-Laval, SKF, Electrolux, Atlas Copco and ASEA. The Wallenberg family itself was closely connected to its economic interests in South and Southern Africa. Peter Wallenberg, for example, was managing director of Atlas Copco Rhodesia between 1959 and 1962.
With the growth of the industrial sector, the demographic and social landscape rapidly changed. The internal migration from the rural areas to the cities which had begun in the 1930s accelerated through the 1960s. Industry’s demand for labour also had dramatic effects from a gender point of view. Between 1950 and 1973, the share of women in the labour force increased from 20 to 46%.\(^1\) At the same time, the image of Sweden as an ethnically homogeneous country was radically transformed. During the first half of the 1960s, around 170,000 immigrants from Finland, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and elsewhere were added to the 7.5 million inhabitants. Without this addition to the labour force, the record-breaking years of economic performance would not have been possible. In turn, the increasing proportion of immigrants exposed the Swedes to the world at large as never before.

The post-war economic boom prepared the ground for the implementation of the social democratic pre-war vision of a ‘people’s home’. It was, however, not Per Albin Hansson who was to oversee the “harvest time”\(^2\) from around 1960 until the mid-1970s. He died in 1946, and was succeeded by Tage Erlander as leader of the Social Democratic Party and Prime Minister.\(^3\) Erlander’s first years in office have been characterized as a “great period of reforms”,\(^4\) during which comprehensive welfare legislation was adopted, *inter alia* regarding old-age pensions, child allowances, health insurance, subsidized housing and education. Facing stiff opposition from the non-socialist parties—led by the Liberal Party chairman Bertil Ohlin and strongly supported by professor Herbert Tingsten, chief editor of *Dagens Nyheter*—the Social Democrats’ proposals for a drastic change in the rules of the game, such as nationalization of the larger commercial banks and certain key industries, were not carried through. Instead, under Ernst Wigforss—the highly experienced and influential Minister of Finance\(^5\)—the government extended state control by preserving and using part of the extraordinary war-time regulations over the manufacturing and service industries. Above all, the control mechanisms were combined with redistributive taxation to achieve a higher degree of economic justice.

At the beginning of the 1950s, the foundation had been laid for a socio-economic dispensation which internationally was to be known as ‘the Swedish model’, based on growth with equity. It was a middle way, neither capitalist nor socialist. Or both, production being the responsibility of the private sector and distribution the domain of the state. Having abandoned its nationalization plans, the social democratic concept of a mixed economy and an egalitarian

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\(^1\) de Vylder, op. cit., p. 21.
\(^2\) Hadenius op. cit., p. 98.
\(^3\) Erlander retired in 1969 and was succeeded by Olof Palme.
\(^4\) Ingvar Andersson and Jörgen Weibull: *Swedish History in Brief*, The Swedish Institute, Stockholm, 1985, p. 60.
\(^5\) Wigforss held this position between 1932 and 1949. More than anybody, he was the architect behind the ‘Swedish model’. Wigforss and the ANC leader Oliver Tambo shared the platform at the Labour Day demonstrations in Gothenburg in 1962.
welfare state based on solidarity gained widespread acceptance in Sweden, well outside the ruling party. The basic tenets of the ‘strong society’ were not broadly questioned until the end of the 1980s, when the economy started to decline and a combination of factors—domestic as well as international—brought the ‘model’ to an end.¹

A central social democratic objective was to create the necessary economic conditions for full employment. Here again, the post-war governments were by international comparison successful. Insignificant throughout the 1940s and the 1950s, the rate of unemployment never exceeded 2.7% in the twenty years from 1961 to 1980.² In turn, this made it possible to make organized labour accept rather harsh measures, such as rapid industrial rationalization, fiscal discipline and policies making workers move from stagnating to expanding sectors and regions.

Peace on the labour market—both a cause and effect of the ‘Swedish model’—was largely based on an early voluntary agreement between the blue-collar workers’ Trade Union Confederation (LO)³—whose members were collectively affiliated to the Social Democratic Party—and SAF, the employers’ confederation. The famous 1938 Saltsjöbaden agreement between LO and SAF drew a line between political and labour market concerns by stressing both parties’ resolve to handle potential disputes without state intervention. To this end, a Labour Market Council was set up as a national negotiating body. Compromise rather than conflict characterized the labour market.⁴

Trade Unions and the Co-operative Movement

By international standards, trade unionization has been exceptionally high in Sweden. During the post-war period, well over 80% of the wage earners belonged to a union, according the movement a high degree of legitimacy and responsibility. This was, furthermore, the case for both blue- and white-collar workers. In the 1960s, LO represented between 90 and 95% of the workers, while TCO—the Central Organization of Salaried Employees⁵—counted over

¹ See de Vylder op. cit. p. 16: “The key watershed can be dated to 1973–74, when the collapse of the old Bretton Woods system and the stable exchange rate regime, accompanied by a surge in international inflation, rising oil prices, an international energy crisis and declining growth in most OECD countries, exposed the trade-dependent Swedish economy to a series of external shocks”.
² de Vylder op. cit., pp. 21 and 27.
³ In Swedish, Landsorganisationen i Sverige.
⁴ However, in December 1969, a spontaneous (‘non-authorized’) strike involving some 5,000 workers broke out on the state-owned iron mines in Lappland in northern Sweden. It lasted for nearly two months. For the first time, massive criticism of the ‘Swedish model’, the Social Democratic Party and the established trade unions was expressed by organized workers refusing to follow their elected leaders.
⁵ In Swedish, Tjänstemännen Centralorganisation.
90% of the public civil servants and around 70% of the private professional employees in its ranks.\(^1\) In 1963, LO and TCO had a combined membership of around 2 million, corresponding to more than 25% of the Swedish population and over 40% of the electorate. More than four out of ten members of parliament belonged to one of the two confederations.\(^2\) In 1977, LO and TCO joined forces to coordinate Swedish international trade union assistance—not least to Southern Africa—in setting up a Council of International Trade Union Cooperation.\(^3\)

LO often features in the study. Its members were collectively affiliated to the Social Democratic Party. Internationally, it belonged to the pro-Western International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). LO’s chairman, Arne Geijer, held the presidency of ICFTU from 1957 to 1965, during the time when it broadened its activities towards Africa and called for a limited boycott of South African goods. LO also became involved in extra-union activities. In 1956, it purchased the two Stockholm-based newspapers *Stockholms-Tidningen* and *Aftonbladet*. The former did not survive the competition with the established liberal and conservative morning papers, but the evening tabloid *Aftonbladet* went on to score major successes. Together with the Malmö-based *Arbetet*, it became the most influential Swedish social democratic newspaper.

The cooperative movement has early roots and is well developed. While producer cooperatives—as elsewhere in Western Europe—mainly emerged in the agricultural sector, it was the extraordinary growth of consumer cooperatives from the late 19th century that firmly placed this form of ownership and service among the ‘popular movements’, together with the temperance movement, the free church movement and others. Cooperatives developed in close collaboration with organized labour and the influential apex organization—the Swedish Cooperative Union and Wholesale Society (KF)\(^4\)—was set up in 1899 with support from LO and the Social Democratic Party. In 1963, not less than 1.3 million Swedes belonged to KF-affiliated societies, corresponding to 25% of the electorate. With over 30% of the members of parliament, KF had an even stronger indirect parliamentary representation than LO.\(^5\)

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\(^{2}\) Ibid., Table 6, p. 210.

\(^{3}\) In Swedish, LO-TCOs Biståndsnämnd.

\(^{4}\) In Swedish, *Kooperativa Förbundet*.

\(^{5}\) Elvander op. cit., Table 6, p. 210. The overwhelming majority were Social Democrats.
Organization-Sweden

Due to the high profile and influence of the major non-governmental organizations, the Swedish social formation has been described as corporatist. Next to Norway, Sweden should according to one study display the highest degree of corporatism in the Western world,\(^1\) with a significant degree of inter-class understanding and cooperation, for example, between LO and SAF. In addition, at the commanding heights of the major political centres there has been a remarkable integration of the elites, such as between LO and the Social Democratic Party or SAF and the Moderate Party. Foreign observers have seen "a closed circle of private interest groups involved in public decision-making"\(^2\) as a characteristic of the ‘Swedish model’.

Another characteristic has been the extraordinarily active participation of the citizens in popular movements and in a wide variety of non-governmental organizations, such as study circles, language courses, consumer cooperatives, farmers’ unions, religious’ associations, cultural clubs and solidarity organizations. The expression ‘Organization-Sweden’ has entered the Swedish language. Good membership data from the 1960s is deficient, but an indicator of the involvement in voluntary organizations is that on average every adult Swede in 1992 was a member of 2.9 different associations, that 51% of the population regarded itself as ‘active’ and 29% held some kind of elected position in one or several non-governmental organizations (NGOs).\(^3\)

Prominent in the decision to join a voluntary organization has been the search for knowledge. Mandatory primary education was introduced in Sweden as early as in 1842, and at the end of the century the adult literacy rate was just a fraction below 100%. Nevertheless, within the labour, liberal and farmers’ movements, people were encouraged to join study circles to further their general political and cultural frames of reference and deepen their knowledge about more immediate concerns. Based on British and American examples, the concept of a study circle was developed at the beginning of the 20th century. A circle normally organizes up to ten persons, who in a planned and regular way—with or without outside expertise—get together to discuss a particular subject. Study circles—often around a book—played an important role in the development of a generalized and popularly rooted understanding of the issues in Southern Africa.

Although far from an exclusive domain of the Social Democrats, this education form was in particular developed by the labour movement. As such, it would later form a central part in the trade union assistance to Southern Africa. The most important organization in this field is the Workers’ Educational

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\(^1\) Petersson, op. cit., p. 151.


\(^3\) de Vylder op. cit., p. 13.
Association (ABF).\(^1\) In 1987/88, ABF alone organized over 100,000 study circles for some 850,000 people, corresponding to more than 10% of the population.\(^2\)

Church and Missions

Internationally, the role of the churches in Sweden is seldom mentioned and little known. Church relations have, however, played a major role in bringing Sweden closer to Southern Africa, cementing support for the cause of the liberation movements. Several influential activists in the solidarity movement with Southern Africa had a background in the church\(^3\) and some of the most important support organizations—such as the Emmaus’ groups and Bread and Fishes\(^4\)—had a religious origin or base.

Since the 16th century Reformation, Sweden has been a Lutheran-Evangelical monarchy with the Church of Sweden as the official church. Contrary to the situation in many European countries, state and church were not separated. Although the demand for freedom of religion was raised by both the liberal and the labour movements, it was not until 1951 that the principle was legally guaranteed.\(^5\) Against this background, it is not surprising that almost 90% of the population is born into the Church of Sweden. However, at the beginning of the 1990s, only 2% of its members regularly attended public worship,\(^6\) indicating that Sweden was a secular country. The church itself had become largely secularized. For example, most of the 28,000 employees of the Church of Sweden belonged to a trade union.\(^7\) Nevertheless, religious issues have played an important role in national politics, partly due to the fact that the churches for a long time were ‘over-represented’ in parliament in relation to their popular following. For example, in 1969—the year when the decision to give direct assistance to the liberation movements was taken—not less than 32%...

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1. In Swedish, *Arbetarnas Bildningsförbund*.
3. This is, for example, the case with Anders Johansson, active in the formation of the first-generation South Africa Committees in the 1960s, and with Hillevi Nilsson, influential in the development of the second-generation Africa Groups in the 1970s. Both of them came from the free churches, Johansson with a Free Baptist and Nilsson with a Baptist background (see interview with Anders Johansson, Eskilstuna, 19 November 1996 and interview with Hillevi Nilsson, Stockholm, 4 February 1997). Åke Magnusson, who started as a student politician and later advocated support for a ‘new strategy’ opposed to sanctions, had a similar background. His grandfather was a missionary director of the Swedish Alliance Mission in Zululand (interview with Åke Magnusson, Stockholm, 27 January 1997).
5. In 1994, the highest decision-making body of the Church of Sweden, the General Synod, approved new membership regulations applicable from January 1996. Since then no Swede is born into the Church of Sweden. Baptism is the normal way to join.
7. Ibid., p. 20.
of the members of the second chamber were active in the Christian parliamentary group set up by professing members of all the parties.¹

The Liberal Party has by tradition a strong religious faction. Less known is that the social democratic movement includes an important religious branch, the Brotherhood Movement²—or the Christian Social Democrats—a member of the International League of Religious Socialists (ILRS). With the university students, it was among the first social democratic branches to condemn apartheid. On 1 May 1959, the Brotherhood Movement demonstrated in Stockholm under the banner ‘Fight against Racial Hatred’, and at its congress in Helsingborg in August the same year it called for government action against South Africa.³ Generally more open and critical than other social democratic branches, the Brotherhood congresses have traditionally served as fora for radical statements on international issues. It is, for example, significant that Olof Palme as acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in July 1965 gave his first major speech against the war in Vietnam at the Brotherhood congress in Gävle. Similarly, when Palme in August 1976 launched a political offensive against apartheid South Africa, he chose the Brotherhood congress in Skövde as the appropriate occasion.⁴

Religious considerations were behind the formation in 1964 of a new political party, the Christian Democratic Union (CD).⁵ With a strong following in the ‘bible belt’ around Jönköping in southern Sweden, it stated its opposition to traditional left-right political divisions, instead emphasizing Christian concepts and values. However, not until 1991 did the party exceed the 4% threshold to parliament. It then joined the non-socialist government coalition (1991–1994), where the chairman, Alf Svensson, became Minister for International Development Cooperation. As such, he was politically responsible for assistance to ANC and the wider anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. In a sense, it could be said that the Swedish involvement with the struggle against apartheid started and ended with a church connection.

¹ Magnus Hagevi: ‘Riksdagsledamöternas religiositet’ (‘The religiousness of the members of parliament’), Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, University of Gothenburg, 1997, p. 10.
² In Swedish, Broderskapsrörelsen.
⁴ In an interview in 1996, C.H. Hermansson, the former chairman of the Swedish Communist Party / Left Party Communists, emphasized the general influence of the churches on the formation of the early anti-apartheid opinion in Sweden. According to Hermansson, the Brotherhood Movement “always took a very progressive stand on international problems”, which in his opinion explains why Olof Palme for tactical reasons often presented radical and controversial international policy positions to the Social Democratic movement via the Christian Social Democrats rather than, for example, via LO: “[T]here he had support at once. It would have been much more difficult for him to get support at the party or trade union congresses” (interview with C.H. Hermansson, Stockholm, 22 November 1996).
⁵ In Swedish, Kristen Demokratisk Samling. The party later changed its name to the Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna).
The Church of Sweden has longstanding relations with Southern Africa. Through a unique act of parliament,\(^1\) the Swedish Mission Board \(^2\) was founded in 1874 to spread the gospel to non-Christian peoples. Two years later, the Church of Sweden Mission (CSM) sent its first missionaries to Zululand in South Africa (and to India). In 1903, the missionary field was extended to Zimbabwe. There were several reasons for selecting South Africa. One was the general knowledge about the country through early scientists and travellers. Another was the influence of the Swedish Moravian leader Hans Peter Hallbeck at Genadendal, the oldest mission station in South Africa. A third motive was the guidance of the London Missionary Society and some of its leading members, such as John Philip, Robert Moffat and David Livingstone. Most important were, however, the examples set by Norway and Finland. The Norwegian Missionary Society—the oldest of the three official Nordic societies in Southern Africa—had already started to work in Zululand in 1849, while the Finnish Missionary Society was established in Ovamboland in northern Namibia in 1870.

The significance of CSM’s presence in Southern Africa will be discussed below. In the meantime, it could be mentioned that a cousin of the Zulu King Cetshwayo was one of its first—and few—converts. Baptized as Joseph Zulu in Helsingborg in 1879, he studied and worked in Sweden for the next six years. Upon completion of his studies, Zulu returned to South Africa, where he was active as an evangelist at various CSM mission stations. In 1901, he came back to Sweden to be ordained by the Archbishop in Uppsala Cathedral, making him the first African priest in the official Church of Sweden.\(^3\) Although a strong current of paternalism was dominant in CSM, it was from the outset far removed from the structural racism propagated by the South African Dutch Reformed Church.

As an Evangelical-Lutheran faith community, the Church of Sweden maintains close relations with other Lutheran churches. The Lutheran World Federation (LWF)—of which the Church of Sweden is the largest member—was founded in Lund in 1947. It would be closely involved with the nationalist movements in Southern Africa.\(^4\) To assist LWF, the Church of Sweden Aid (CSA)\(^5\) was also established in 1947. In addition, the Church of Sweden has a long ecumenical history. On the initiative of Archbishop Nathan Söderblom,

\(^1\) CSM is the only missionary society in the world set up through an act of parliament. Its missionaries were encouraged to receive university training, usually at the University of Uppsala. The links existing between CSM, the state and the academic world largely explain why members of CSM have been influential in shaping Swedish opinions on Southern Africa and why so many of them have made valuable academic contributions on a number of African issues.

\(^2\) In Swedish, Svenska Missionsstyrelsen.

\(^3\) Zulu remained active at various Swedish mission stations in South Africa until his death in 1927. See also Bert Schroeder: *Joseph Zulu*, Shuter & Shooter, Pietermaritzburg, 1991.


\(^5\) In Swedish, Lutherhjälpen.
an international ecumenical peace conference on ‘Life and Work’ was, for example, held in Stockholm in 1925. More importantly, at the forth assembly of the World Council of Churches (WCC) in Uppsala, a decision was taken in 1968 to set up a Programme to Combat Racism (PCR). Through PCR, the member churches of WCC channelled direct support to the Southern African liberation movements from 1970.

Sweden has, finally, a large number of independent, or free, churches. Several, such as the Mission Covenant Church of Sweden,1 the Swedish Alliance Mission2 and the Holiness Union,3 are offshoots of 19th century revival movements within the Church of Sweden, while others, such as the Pentecostal Movement4—the largest free church, with a membership of around 90,000 at

1 Svenska Missionsförbundet.
2 Svenska Alliansmissionen.
3 Helgelseförbundet.
4 Pingströrelsen.
the beginning of the 1990s—the Baptist Union of Sweden\textsuperscript{1} and the United Methodist Church,\textsuperscript{2} trace their roots to British and North American revival movements. Together, the free churches had some 350,000 followers in 1992.\textsuperscript{3} Their combined membership has, however, declined. Due to increased immigration, the Roman Catholic Church and most of the Orthodox and Eastern churches have instead shown rapid growth.

In addition to CSM, several free churches embarked upon missionary work in Africa at an early stage. In 1959, there were around 1,000 missionaries on the continent, of which 160 were from CSM. Outside Southern Africa, the main areas of concentration were Ethiopia, Tanganyika (Tanzania) and the two Congos. The Church of Sweden, the Alliance Mission, the Free Baptist Union,\textsuperscript{4} the Holiness Union and the United Methodist Church were all active in South Africa.\textsuperscript{5} Their different—often controversial—positions towards apartheid will be discussed below. In the meantime, it could be noted that the major missionary societies in the early 1950s were invited by the Social Democratic government to actively shape Sweden’s international development policies, not least in the field of humanitarian assistance.

The Swedish journalist and writer Anders Ehnmark, himself influential in the formation of the early solidarity opinion towards Southern Africa, has described the popular dimension and role of the missionary ventures in Africa compared to the more established relations with Europe and the United States. In Ehnmark’s words,

\begin{quote}
Africa, as America, is close. The upper class in Sweden has [traditionally] turned itself towards the European great powers, [such as] Germany, France or England, but the people has turned to America, due to the emigrants, and to Africa, due to the missionaries. There has always been an aunt Eleonora in America and a cousin Agnes working for the mission in Congo. The upper class [has been] turned to the South [and] the people to the West, but also to the South, although with their eyes set beyond our continent. That is the old pattern\textsuperscript{6}.
\end{quote}

The Sami and Apartheid

The issues of race and racism were of paramount importance for the Swedish stand on Southern Africa. Until the large immigration waves in the 1960s, Sweden was an ethnically, linguistically and culturally homogeneous nation. It

\textsuperscript{1} Svenska Baptistsamfundet.
\textsuperscript{2} Metodistkyrkan.
\textsuperscript{3} Wikström op. cit., p. 27.
\textsuperscript{4} Fribaptistsamfundet.
\textsuperscript{5} Margit Wohlin (ed.): Bragd och Broderskap: En Bok Om Pionjärinsatser i Afrika (‘Feats and Brotherhood: A Book about Pioneer Contributions in Africa’), Natur och Kultur, Stockholm, 1961, Appendix.
was, however, also the motherland of a minority, the Sami, in the past derogatorily referred to as 'Lapps'. The position of the Sami was often compared to that of the African populations in Southern Africa by the defenders of apartheid and the detractors of humanitarian assistance. For example, in October 1960 the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs, Eric Louw, used the plenary debate at the General Assembly of the United Nations to turn against Sweden and Norway. He stated:

The press of those two countries—particularly Sweden—has with one or two exceptions been carrying on a vindictive and malicious campaign against [South Africa]. I should say that the press campaign carried on there is one of the worst of any country in the world. [...] I put the question, have the Swedish and Norwegian delegations, whose governments are sponsors of the complaints against South Africa, come to this assembly with clean hands? Can these delegations, in all sincerity, say that discrimination is not, in fact, practised in respect of the small Lapp minorities in both their countries?"1

The statement—‘substantiated’ with quotations from the local Swedish newspaper *Nordvästra Skånes Tidningar*2—was subsequently expanded in a circular letter from the South African government to the UN delegations.

As if two wrongs make a right, the apartheid regime would over the years compare the situation of the African majority in South Africa to that of the Sami minority in the Nordic countries. It was a question that now and again also surfaced in the Swedish debate. For example, criticizing Sweden’s support to ANC the industrialist Peter Wallenberg—a leading member of the powerful Wallenberg family—said in an interview as late as in March 1992: “I wonder what we would think if someone was busy giving out a lot of money to the Lapps so that they could create a large number of problems for the Swedish government. [...] I guess that it would provoke incredible outcries”.3

The Sami are the original inhabitants of northern Scandinavia, Finland and the Russian Kola Peninsula. At the beginning of the 1990s, their number was estimated to 60,000, most of them living in Sweden and Norway. The Sami heartland in Sweden—the territory where they traditionally breed reindeer—covers the northern third of the country. Here, some 10,000 Sami form part of a

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1 UN General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, 905th Plenary Meeting, 14 October 1960, Official Records, p. 727. The future South African Minister for Foreign Affairs, Roelof ‘Pik’ Botha, served as a young diplomat with the South African embassy in Stockholm from June 1956 until January 1960. During his stay in Sweden, Botha “made a study of the Lapps. Some of them even came to see me. They brought facts and figures on their treatment, which I found unacceptable” (interview with Roelof Botha, Cape Town, 12 September 1995).

2 This newspaper from southern Sweden was at the beginning of the 1960s particularly spiteful towards the mounting anti-apartheid movement, openly siding with the South African government.

total population of approximately 350,000.\(^1\) Historically, the nomadic Sami have been pushed out of their pastures and hunting grounds by a powerful combination of private settlers and state interests.

It would hardly be correct to say that the Swedish state has acted with benevolence towards the Sami population. Conservative and paternalistic policies have throughout the centuries been the rule and assimilation with the Swedish population the objective. It was not until 1993 that the demand for a democratic Sami assembly—*Sameting*—was accepted by the Swedish parliament. In addition, Sweden has not ratified the International Labour Organization’s convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries. However—as in Finland and Norway—the Sami have always enjoyed the same democratic rights as all citizens, including the right to vote and to be elected to the national parliament. This fundamental point was conveniently overlooked by the South African regime.

Foreign Affairs and Economic Relations
with Southern Africa

Non-Alignment

Through diplomacy and pragmatism—but also a mix of compliance and fortune—Sweden managed to stay outside the armed conflicts during both the First and the Second World Wars. As a result, Sweden has enjoyed unbroken peace since 1814, a unique situation in modern world history. Although the roots of neutrality go back to the early 19th century, it was with the division of Europe into two blocs after the Second World War that the guiding foreign policy principles of non-alignment were laid down, commonly expressed as ‘non-participation in alliances in peacetime, aiming at neutrality in the event of war’. Once established, they were supported by the traditional parliamentary parties and followed during the period covered in the study. It was not until the demise of the Soviet Union and Sweden’s membership of the European Union—effective from 1 January 1995—that the basic tenets were questioned and altered.

Determining Sweden’s post-war policy of non-alignment was its geographical and strategic position as a medium-sized country in northern Europe. From an economic point of view, Sweden was closely integrated with the West. Geo-politically, it was at the same time situated at the crossroads between major strategic super-power interests and in the immediate proximity of areas of vital demographic, economic and military importance to both the West and the East. As stated by the Swedish diplomat Sverker Åström,

being so situated, it stands to reason that Sweden should have two aims, [namely] to avoid coming under the influence of the nearby super-power [and] avoid becoming the menacing outpost of the other.

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2 In a speech to the congress of the Swedish Metal Workers’ Federation in August 1961, Prime Minister Erlander rejected proposals for Swedish membership of the European Economic Community—the forerunner of the European Union—on the grounds that it was incompatible with a credible Swedish policy of neutrality. The speech set the tone for the following three decades. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the parliament endorsed a proposal in December 1990 that Sweden should apply for full membership of the EC/EU. After a referendum in November 1994—in which 52.3% voted in favour and 46.8% against—the newly elected Social Democratic government led Sweden into the European Union from 1 January 1995.
In turn, Sweden’s strategic position was a consequence of different Nordic experiences during the Second World War and of separate post-war realities. In 1948, Finland signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. At the same time, Sweden took the initiative to a defensive alliance with Denmark and Norway. However, whereas Sweden insisted that the alliance should be independent of the super-powers, Norway—which like Denmark had been occupied by Nazi-Germany during the war and had fought on the side of the Western powers—desired a formal link with the West. The initiative fell through when Denmark and Norway in 1949 opted to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while Sweden decided to remain outside. Iceland also became a member of NATO. As a result, Sweden was formally\(^1\) the only alliance-free state in the Nordic area. Consequently, it also had more room—or fewer limitations—than the other Nordic countries when going its own way or following others, for example vis-à-vis Southern Africa.

Sweden’s *non-alignment*—in contrast to Switzerland’s strict *neutrality*—did not preclude active participation in the United Nations or clear stands on divisive issues in the Cold War. The bounds of activism would, however, be interpreted differently, both within the Social Democratic Party and, in particular, by the Social Democrats on the one hand and the Moderate Party on the other. Questions relating to the activation of the foreign policy and the permissible degree of activism will be illustrated in the narrative sections and discussed in the concluding parts below. At a lecture in 1976, Sverker Åström, ambassador to the United Nations from 1964 to 1970, summarized a broadly shared opinion as follows: “We refuse to relinquish [...] the right to [...] criticize phenomena that are contrary to our democratic principles and to basic human rights [and our right] to demand respect for international law, [including] the interests of small nations.” He added:

> [W]e obviously have no reason for nervously weighing the force and frequency of our criticism of phenomena in different foreign countries in the East and in the West. From the neutrality point of view, [what is] essential is that we act with consistency and according to firm principles over a long period of time.\(^2\)

The Foreign Service

In the 1950s, Sweden would under Foreign Minister Östen Undén\(^3\) follow a cautious and conservative course in international matters. Until the end of the

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\(^1\) ‘Formally’, because Sweden was always part of the Western community. During the post-war period, Sweden developed close ties with the NATO countries and “Swedish and Western intelligence services cooperated in ways hardly reconcilable with strict neutrality” (Hadenius op. cit., p. 162).

\(^2\) Åström op. cit., p. 12.

\(^3\) Undén, a professor in law and former vice-chancellor of the University of Uppsala, served as Minister for Foreign Affairs as early as in 1924–26. His second term covered the critical post-war period from 1945 to 1962.
decade, foreign policy questions did not play an important part in the political debate outside the student and youth movements. The Swedes were, in general, little concerned or involved with global issues and the traditional political parties only occasionally discussed foreign questions in the riksdag.¹ Sweden was largely insulated from the world and Undén “managed […] foreign policy almost as a one-man business”.² Questions that in the 1960s deeply engaged the public were settled without major objections or debates. For example, when the Swedish government in 1953 refused to allow resident members of an Estonian government in exile—set up in the Norwegian capital Oslo—to carry out political activities, this was criticized by the Liberal Party leader Bertil Ohlin, but did not otherwise provoke indignation or protests. Explaining the position taken by the Social Democratic government, Undén stated in February 1953:

> It is, in fact, an old rule that political refugees, arriving in the country of asylum laden with political preoccupations, political resentment and political complaints against the country from which they have had to flee, should not air their complaints in the country of asylum. They arrive here and asylum is granted to them, but we do not wish to have all their political problems thrown in as issues amongst [the] Swedish public opinion”.³

Ten years later, Olof Palme, Sten Andersson and other Social Democrats of a new generation were to share public platforms with resident political refugees from Southern Africa. By demanding sanctions against the Pretoria regime, the exiles used the occasions to raise issues which the Swedish government was not yet ready to tackle, but the public opinion forcefully embraced.⁴

A more active interpretation of the policy of non-alignment was for many years opposed by the traditionally conservative, largely aristocratic,⁵ corps of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. At the beginning of the 1950s, a more or less open campaign against the Social Democratic government had been conducted

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² Möller op. cit., p. 22.


⁵ ”No ministry, no organization, no company can display as many more or less famous families as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Enskilda Banken is beaten by a very broad margin” (Åke Ortmark: Maktspel i Sverige: Ett Samhällsreportage (‘The Swedish Power Game: A Social Report’), Wahlström & Widstrand, Stockholm, 1968, p. 90). See also interview with Bengt Säve-Söderbergh, Stockholm, 14 January 1997.
at the ministry.\footnote{See Karl Molin: \textit{Omstridd Neutralitet: Experternas Kritik av Svensk Utrikespolitik} (‘Disputed Neutrality: Experts’ Criticism of Swedish Foreign Policy’), Tidens Förlag, Stockholm, 1991.} Almost twenty years later, the political commentator Åke Ortmark concluded that “the darkest reactionary attitude to social issues may not be represented at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as often as in the past, but it is still evident that an overwhelming majority of [its] civil servants have other fundamental value opinions than those of the [ruling] Social Democratic Party.”\footnote{Ortmark \textit{op. cit.} p. 91.} This situation—of increasing concern to a new Social Democratic generation—will be illustrated below.

The conservative atmosphere in the foreign service was in the mid-1960s echoed by people who later represented more radical positions. For example, in May 1965—during the build-up to the crisis in Rhodesia—the Swedish embassy in Dar es Salaam forwarded a request by the Zimbabwean liberation movement ZAPU to visit Sweden. The UN Decolonization Committee had just met ZAPU and ZANU and the Security Council had discussed the situation in Rhodesia during six meetings at the beginning of the month.\footnote{\textit{Yearbook of the United Nations: 1965}, Office of Public Information, United Nations, New York, pp. 119 and 121.} Nevertheless, in June Anders Forsse,\footnote{Forsse served as Director General of SIDA from 1979 to 1985.} acting as Secretary General of the Agency for International Assistance (NIB),\footnote{In Swedish, \textit{Nämnden för Internationellt Bistånd}.} replied in the negative, questioning whether “official or semi-official contacts between Swedish authorities and [ZAPU were] appropriate [as] the objectives of the exiled political organization evidently are contrary to the policies of the Rhodesian regime, which formally falls under British sovereignty”.\footnote{Letter from Anders Forsse to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 9 June 1965 (MFA).}

The Swedish embassy in Dar es Salaam was at the time often visited by representatives of the various Southern African liberation movements based there. As late as in December 1966, the chargé d’affaires Knut Granstedt wrote to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm, asking if it was interested in documents from, or reports on, the movements. ZANU and ZAPU of Zimbabwe, as well as SWAPO of Namibia, were explicitly mentioned, together with “the South African liberation organizations”.\footnote{Letter from Knut Granstedt to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam, 5 December 1966 (MFA).} Again, the reply was negative. Despite the fact that ZANU’s National Chairman Herbert Chitepo, ZAPU’s National Secretary George Nyandoro and SWAPO’s President Sam Nujoma had already held discussions with the Swedish government in Stockholm, Jean-Christophe Öberg—at the time closely involved in secret negotiations with the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam—\footnote{Möller \textit{op. cit.}, p. 71. Öberg played a prominent role for Sweden’s relations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. He later served as chargé d’affaires (1970–72) and ambassador (1972–74) to Hanoi.}
responded that “hardly constructive statements by often less representative exile organizations are of little interest [to the ministry] and do not deserve the work that the reporting would require”.¹ Visiting Portugal on a fact-finding mission for the Socialist International in early 1967, Pierre Schori, the future Social Democratic Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Minister of International Development Cooperation, similarly had “an encounter with Swedish diplomacy that did not [leave] a good memory”.² In possession of a complete list of the political prisoners in Portugal, he asked the embassy in Lisbon to send the unique document to Amnesty International. Arguing that it was “against the instructions by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs” and giving the impression that it was “improper to mix with revolutionaries”,³ the embassy, however, refused the request.⁴

Such attitudes were more representative of the contradictions within the Foreign Ministry than of the government’s stand. Leading representatives of the Southern African liberation movements had from the beginning of the decade been officially received by the Social Democratic government. The ANC leader Oliver Tambo had, for example, met Prime Minister Tage Erlander in August 1962. Nevertheless, the examples illustrate a pervasive conservatism in the foreign service that would linger on until the end of the 1960s⁵ when a radical change took place.

Of importance for the change was that a separate Department for International Development Cooperation was formed in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1970. As was already the case with SIDA—set up in 1965—the recruitment to the department differed markedly from earlier traditions.⁶ It was to a large extent staffed by younger people of ‘the 1968 generation’, and soon created a profile of its own, not only in general matters concerning develop-

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¹ Letter from Jean-Christophe Öberg to the Swedish Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Stockholm, 14 December 1966 (MFA).
² Schori (1992) op. cit., p. 223.
³ Schori’s main contact was Mário Soares, the future Prime Minister and President of Portugal.
⁴ Schori (1992) op. cit., p. 223. Eventually, Schori left Portugal with the document concealed in his underwear.
⁵ In an interview with Per Wästberg, one of the leading Swedish opinion makers on Southern Africa, he recalled that “the difficulty in the early years was that we were so unused to meeting [the representatives of the liberation movements] on a formal basis. There was much hush-hush so as not to disturb the Portuguese embassy, the British or the South Africans. [For example,] on his visits [the FRELIMO leader Eduardo] Mondlane was taken by [Olof] Palme and others to different restaurants or to my place, because they just could not be seen inside the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. This was also true of others. They were never let in officially. SIDA was a bit easier, generally. Of course, SIDA was separate from the ministry” (interview with Per Wästberg, Stockholm, 28 February 1996). Similarly, Palme’s close collaborator Pierre Schori has said that they “always went a bit further than the Ministry for Foreign Affairs” in their statements on Southern Africa (interview with Pierre Schori, Stockholm, 28 June 1996).
ment assistance, but in particular regarding support to national liberation movements in Southern Africa and elsewhere.

Sweden and the United Nations

Sweden joined the United Nations in 1946. Active membership of the world organization developed into one of the cornerstones of foreign and security policy. Nevertheless, the UN membership was initially viewed with a certain amount of caution due to the failure of the previous collective security system under the League of Nations\(^1\) and, above all, to the possible implications for Sweden’s non-aligned policy.

If so decided by the Security Council, the UN Charter obliged all members to participate in military or economic sanctions against an offending country. This was seen as problematic. Since all the permanent members of the Security Council had to agree on such actions—a right of veto which was not present in the League of Nations’ system—it was, however, felt that UN membership was compatible with a policy of neutrality. Before joining the world organization, Undén, the newly appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated in parliament in October 1945 that “we are willing to join a common security organization and in the event of a future conflict abstain from neutrality to the degree that its Charter requires. However, if [...] a tendency for the great powers to divide into two camps manifests itself [...] our policy must be to avoid being drawn into any bloc or group.”\(^2\)

The mandate of the Security Council became crucial in the Cold War period. As the two opposing super powers had to be in agreement to decide on military or other sanctions, there was no risk of being ordered to declare war on either of them. In the absence of other security arrangements, the council thus had the function of a protective shield for Sweden’s policy of neutrality and its mandate should be strictly respected and upheld. It is against this background that the Swedish position on sanctions against South Africa and Portugal in the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s—that they could only be decided by the Security Council according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter—should be seen.\(^3\)

At the lecture quoted above, Åström explained in 1976

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\(^1\) Östen Undén had a wide experience from the League of Nations. Working closely with Prime Minister Hjalmar Branting, he served as Sweden’s representative on the League’s council during his first period as Foreign Minister (1924–6) and was a delegate to the League’s assembly almost without interruption between 1921 and 1939.

\(^2\) Wahlbäck op. cit., p. 77. This stand was tested when the Korean war broke out in 1950. The Soviet Union was then boycotting the Security Council and China was represented by the Formosa (Taiwan) regime, not by the People’s Republic. In the UN, Sweden condemned North Korean aggression, but refused the request by the rump Security Council to send troops to South Korea or to brand China as an aggressor. On the latter question, Sweden was the only Western country to abstain.

\(^3\) See interview with Lena Hjelm-Wallén, Stockholm, 14 January 1997.
that we—without departing from our policy of neutrality—can participate in sanctions decided by the Security Council is one thing. Another question is if we can, unilaterally and without a decision of the Security Council, impose sanctions on a state which acts in contravention of international law and of whose policies we strongly disapprove. The answer to that question is, in principle, in the negative.1

However, in 1979—after years of popular demands—a Liberal Party minority government under Prime Minister Ola Ullsten, supported by the Social Democratic opposition, imposed sanctions against apartheid South Africa in the form of an investment ban.

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1 Åström op. cit., p. 14. From December 1981, Åström chaired a committee appointed by the government to review the Swedish legislation on prohibition of investments in South Africa and Namibia, introduced from 1 July 1979. It presented its recommendations on tighter legislation in June 1984. A new act was passed by parliament the following year.
Dag Hammarskjöld and Congo

Beginning with Folke Bernadotte in 1948,1 a number of Swedes have over the years made important contributions to the United Nations, particularly in the fields of mediation, arbitration and peace-keeping.2 Most prominent among them is Dag Hammarskjöld,3 appointed UN Secretary General in April 1953. His eight years at the helm of the United Nations coincided with the decolonization debate regarding the British, French and Portuguese colonies in Africa, which was followed with increasing interest in Sweden. Hammarskjöld’s active involvement in the Congo (Zaire)4 crisis from 1960, his death in a plane crash outside Ndola in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) in September 1961 and the fact that he in December 1961 posthumously shared the Nobel Peace Prize with Chief Albert Luthuli, President-General of ANC of South Africa, contributed to bringing events in Central and Southern Africa closer to the Swedish public.

More than anything, it was Sweden’s participation in the United Nations operations in Congo from July 1960 to June 1964 that brought the complexities of the decolonization process in Africa into Swedish homes. Not less than 6,300 Swedes participated in the military operations and 18 of the 185 UN soldiers who died in battle were Swedes.5

The Congo conflict would, to a large—and lasting—extent also divide the Swedish political parties and public along ideological lines. The Swedish UN contingent was primarily deployed to crush the secession of Katanga province, led by Moise Tshombe and backed by Belgian and French officers, as well as by an important number of international—including South African and Rhodesian—mercenaries.6 The secession received support from Belgian, French, Portuguese and other international interests. When the UN action was initiated in September 1961, propaganda offices in Brussels, Paris, London, Lisbon and New York described it as an attempt to “spread Communism in Central

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1 In May 1948, Count Bernadotte was appointed United Nations mediator in Palestine. Four months later, he was assassinated by members of the Lohamei Herut Yisrael who saw him as the main obstacle to an Israeli annexation of Jerusalem and Jewish control of Palestine.

2 See Gunnar Fredriksson et al.: *Sweden at the UN*, The Swedish Institute, Stockholm, 1996.

3 Before leading the United Nations, Hammarskjöld *inter alia* served as Permanent Under-Secretary in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and as a Minister without Portfolio, dealing with international issues.

4 Under President Mobuto, Congo was renamed Zaire in 1965. After Laurent Kabila’s victory in the 1996-97 civil war, the name was again changed to the Democratic Republic of Congo.


6 Tshombe was, in addition, supported by Salazar’s Portugal and Franco’s Spain. During the first half of the 1960’s, Tshombe would twice be received as an exile in Spain. His military troops—the infamous *gendarmes katangais* (in Portuguese also called *fiés* (‘faithful’)) and numbering around 4,500)—in 1967 crossed the border into Portuguese Angola, where they were mobilized against MPLA in the north-eastern parts of the country.
Africa”. Senator Goldwater and the John Birch Society in the United States were among those actively defending Tshombe. In Sweden, the message was echoed by conservative and extremist circles. By 1962, a Swedish Katanga Committee had been formed and as late as in April 1963 the Moderate member Dag Edlund criticized the Swedish government’s policy and defended the cause of Katanga in parliament. Some of the Katanga lobbyists—such as Birger Hagård—would in the 1980s reappear on the scene, this time in support of UNITA in Angola.

Nordic Cooperation

For geographical and historical reasons, cooperation between Sweden and its Nordic neighbours occurs in most fields and at all levels. The Nordic Prime Ministers, Finance, Foreign and Defence Ministers regularly meet, and at the level of international organizations—such as the United Nations, the IMF or the World Bank—the Nordic countries coordinate their positions, usually appearing as a group. A more institutionalized form of Nordic political cooperation was initiated after the Second World War through the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers.

The Nordic Council was set up in 1952 by Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Finland joined in 1955, the same year as it became a member of the United Nations. Organized as a ‘parliament’, the Council has an advisory role, making recommendations to the Nordic Council of Ministers or to one or more of the Nordic governments.

The Nordic Council of Ministers has since 1971 been a forum for cooperation between the governments. Each government appoints a Minister for Nordic Cooperation responsible for coordinating affairs relating to Nordic matters in

1 Sköld op. cit., p. 228.
2 For example, the local newspaper Nordvästra Skånes Tidningar. In an editorial published on 14 September 1961 it stated that “it is almost unbelievable that the Swedish people can allow Swedish soldiers to behave as sheer bandits, running the errands of the Communists? How can [this] be possible? Well, it is partly due to [the fact] that we have to put up with a Foreign Minister [who is] as red as fire and partly to his apprentice by the name of Dag Hammarskjöld, who at times is white and at times is red, but apparently always believes that he is the master of the world” (Quoted in Arbetet, 21 September 1961).
3 Sköld op. cit., p. 189. The formation of the Swedish Katanga Committee was preceded by a public protest by fourteen Swedes against what was seen as a UN “offensive [against] civilian targets”, inter alia signed by Stig Holm, Ebbe Linde and Ture Nerman and published in December 1961 (Aftonbladet and Expressen, 18 December 1961). Among the members of the Swedish Katanga Committee were the internationally renowned naturalist Kai Curry-Lindahl, professor Birger Nerman and Birger Hagård. See Sköld op. cit., p. 229 and interview with Birger Hagård, Stockholm, 9 October 1996. It should be noted that the Soviet Union saw the UN involvement in Congo as blocking the progressive forces and that the Swedish Communist Party in December 1960 opposed Swedish participation in the peace-making operations.
4 The International Monetary Fund.
5 The three Nordic autonomous areas of Åland (Finland), the Faroes (Denmark) and Greenland (Denmark) are also members of the Nordic Council.
his or her home country and vis-à-vis the other governments. Each country has one vote on the council and unanimous decisions are binding. All members thus enjoy a right of veto.

At an early stage, the Nordic countries coordinated their positions vis-à-vis South and Southern Africa. In 1963, they backed a proposal put forward in the UN General Assembly by the Foreign Minister of Denmark, Per Hækkerup. In December 1963, the Hækkerup proposal led to the adoption by the Security Council of a resolution through which a group of experts was set up under the Secretary General to examine the situation in South Africa. More significantly, outside the UN framework the Nordic Ministers for Foreign Affairs adopted in 1978 a Programme of Action Against Apartheid. The so-called Oslo Plan was reviewed in 1985 and—following the introduction of sanctions against South Africa—updated in 1988. In addition, in 1984 a first joint meeting was held in Stockholm between the Foreign Ministers of the Nordic countries and of the Frontline States of Southern Africa. It was followed by a second meeting in Arusha, Tanzania, at the beginning of 1988.

In the field of international development cooperation, there is, likewise, a tradition of consultation and coordination between the Nordic governments. As early as 1963, the Nordic Ministerial Committee for Coordination of Assistance to the Developing Countries agreed on the joint Kibaha project in Tanganyika (Tanzania), comprising a health centre, an agricultural institute and a secondary school. In 1976, the Nordic Council of Ministers created a special committee of civil servants to facilitate aid coordination and agreed on a joint formula for financial contributions from each member country to co-financed projects. A joint Mozambique–Nordic Agricultural Programme (MONAP) was initiated. Iceland also participated in this programme.

Finally, all the Nordic countries have over the years concentrated their development assistance to Eastern and Southern Africa. According to OECD, the share of the Nordic countries (excluding Iceland) in total bilateral aid

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1 Alva Myrdal from Sweden chaired the UN Expert Group on South Africa.
2 An initial agreement on measures against South Africa was reached at the meeting of the Nordic Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Helsinki, Finland, at the beginning of September 1977. The ministers responsible for the historic decision were K.B. Andersen (Denmark), Einar Augustson (Iceland), Knut Frydenlund (Norway), Karin Söder (Sweden) and Paavo Väyrynen (Finland). At the time, Sweden had a non-socialist government. Mrs. Söder represented the Centre Party.
3 Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Lesotho was also represented at the meeting in 1984.
4 The original intention was that the assistance to Tanzania should be jointly administered by the Nordic countries. However, Sweden—which had particularly close relations with Tanzania through an important missionary presence and strong links between the Social Democratic Party and the governing TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) party—opted for a bilateral cooperation programme.
5 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development.
Foreign Affairs and Economic Relations with Southern Africa

Disbursements from its member states to the nine SADCC countries\(^1\) was in the five-year period 1981–85 as follows:\(^2\):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nordic</strong></td>
<td><strong>29.9%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the beginning of the 1980s, the Nordic countries provided almost one third of total Western aid disbursements to the SADCC countries. All in all—adding allocations for emergencies, humanitarian support, multilateral, bilateral and regional development assistance etc.—at a time when the South African regime intensified its destabilization campaign in Southern Africa, the Nordic governments extended an amount of almost one billion US Dollars per year to the region.\(^3\) About one third of the amount was granted by Sweden.

Trade, Investments and Southern Africa

The Swedish economic expansion in the 1950s not only resulted in a sharp increase in foreign trade, but also in accelerating internationalization of the economy. Participation in different international economic organizations became correspondingly important. After joining GATT,\(^4\) OECD, the World Bank and IMF, Sweden in January 1960 was one of the founding members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) together with Denmark, Norway, Great Britain, Switzerland, Austria and Portugal.\(^5\) EFTA did not aim at political integration and membership of the association was seen as compatible with the policy of non-alignment. Due to Portugal’s membership and the situation in its African colonies, Sweden’s role in EFTA was, however, criticized from the beginning. As will be seen below, it became a hotly debated issue during the second half of the 1960s.

During the period under review, Swedish commercial trade with Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe was very limited. Furthermore, although both volumes and values rose in absolute numbers, the relative

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\(^1\) At the time, the members of the Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.


\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^4\) The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs.

\(^5\) Finland became an associate member in 1961 and Iceland joined EFTA in 1970.
weight of the five countries in Sweden’s global trade steadily decreased from 1950 to 1970. While Swedish sales to the five countries represented 1.9% of total exports in 1950, the share had in 1960 fallen to 1.3% and in 1970 to 1.1%. Corresponding figures for Swedish imports from the five were 1.5, 1.1 and 0.6%, respectively. It follows that Southern Africa was more important as an export market than as a supplier. In fact, throughout the period Sweden had a positive trade balance with the Southern African countries taken as a group.

Combining the statistics, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe only stood for 1.7% of Sweden’s foreign trade in 1950. Ten years later, their share had fallen to 1.2%, and in 1970 to 0.7%. During the prolonged post-war period of sustained economic growth and internationalization, the five countries became progressively less important to Sweden’s economy. This was particularly true for the two Portuguese-speaking countries and for Namibia and Zimbabwe, who together represented a share of 0.5% of Swedish foreign trade in 1950. Twenty years later, it had fallen to an insignificant 0.1%.

Only South Africa—including Namibia—played a certain role in Sweden’s foreign trade, particularly as an export market. South Africa’s share of Sweden’s global trade was in 1950 1.2%, but fell to 0.7% in 1960 and further to 0.6% in 1970. However, while imports from South Africa in those years only represented 0.7, 0.3 and 0.2%, respectively, sales to that country stood for 1.8, 1.0 and 0.9% of total Swedish exports in 1950, 1960 and 1970. In 1970, the total value of exports to South Africa amounted to 765 million SEK. Traditional export commodities were timber, pulp, paper and machinery. Imports from South Africa were largely in the form of agricultural products—such as fruits and wine—as well as coal.

While Swedish companies established marketing subsidiaries in all the five countries, it was only in South Africa that manufacturing companies were set

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1 For 1950 and 1960, the Swedish foreign trade statistics do not separate data for Zimbabwe (Rhodesia/Southern Rhodesia), Malawi (Nyasaland) and Zambia (Northern Rhodesia). For reasons of comparison, data for Malawi and Zambia have been included for 1970 to illustrate the down-going trend. However, as Zambia—relatively speaking—was a major trading partner throughout the period, the relative, combined weight of the five countries was even less than indicated. Without Zambia and Malawi, in 1970 Swedish exports to the five only represented 1.0% of total exports and the imports an almost insignificant 0.2%. Zambia’s relative importance is due to the fact that Sweden traditionally imported a lot of copper from the country. On the export side, Swedish deliveries to Zambia financed out of development aid partly explain its role. Sweden imposed sanctions on Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) following Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1965. However, direct trade with Rhodesia was extremely marginal. For 1950, it can be estimated that Rhodesia received 0.06% of Swedish total exports and that its share of Swedish imports amounted to around 0.01%.


3 Until 1971, the Swedish foreign trade statistics did not separate data for Namibia. Exports to and imports from Namibia are included in the figures for South Africa. Sweden’s trade exchange with Namibia was, however, almost non-existent. In 1971, the total value amounted to 1.6 million SEK, corresponding to less than 0.5% of the trade with South Africa (Memorandum from the Ministry of Trade, Stockholm, 16 March 1972) (MFA).
up through direct investments. With total assets of 72 million SEK in 1960, South Africa ranked fifteenth among the countries in the world with Swedish investments. In 1970, the assets had increased to 242 million, but South Africa now only ranked nineteenth. In this respect too, South Africa became less important to the Swedish economy during the 1960s. However, ownership in South Africa represented 1.6% of total Swedish overseas assets in 1970. It could, therefore, be said that South Africa—the only Southern African country of any economic significance to Sweden—was comparatively more important as an investment than as an export market.

1 Åke Magnusson: *Swedish Investments in South Africa*, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1974, p. 12. South Africa’s importance for Sweden in a continental perspective can be illustrated by the fact that in 1970, 77% of the ‘African assets’ of Swedish companies were located in South Africa and that 82% of the ‘employees in Africa’ worked in plants situated there.

2 Particularly as a reasonable share of the exports to South Africa was in the form of semi-manufactured goods from Swedish parent companies to South African subsidiaries.
Decolonization and Beginnings of Swedish Aid

Limited, but Changing Views

Without colonies or a colonial past, Sweden was in the post-war period situated far from the political awakening of the colonized peoples in Africa and Asia. The decolonization debate at the United Nations and in other international fora was certainly followed with increasing interest in the media and, in particular, by the student and the youth movements. Before 1960, no Swedish political party had, however, in its programme taken a stand on questions concerning national liberation or economic development in the Third World. During the 1950s, foreign policy questions did not play a prominent role in the Swedish parliamentary debate, and the ruling Social Democratic Party did not present any international visions corresponding to the domestic ’people’s home’. Attention was concentrated on the United Nations and issues related to national security in a divided, bi-polar world.

Not everybody in the Social Democratic leadership was happy with this situation. As early as December 1950, the international secretary Kaj Björk warned against a lack of popular participation and political understanding of foreign policy matters in the social democratic journal *Tiden*, arguing that it opened space for Communism:

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1 During a brief period in the middle of the 17th century Sweden broke into the West African slave trade. The Swedish Africa Company established and held Carlsborg fort near Ghana’s present capital Accra in 1650–58 and 1659–61. About a thousand slaves were sold during this colonial adventure, but this was—as stated by Lasse Berg in his fascinating book *När Sverige Upptäckte Afrika* (‘When Sweden Discovered Africa’, Rabén Prisma, Stockholm, 1997, p. 60)—“thanks to a mixture of luck and incompetence” not more. In the West Indies, Sweden held the island of Saint-Barthélemy from 1784 to 1878, when it was sold to France. Noting Sweden’s non-colonial past, it should be remembered that many Swedes were employed by the European colonial powers and directly or indirectly contributed to their conquests, particularly in Africa. For example, a majority of the more than 800 Scandinavians who during the last two decades of the 19th century served the Congo Free State were Swedes. A number of them were directly employed by the Belgian King Leopold II as officers in his infamous Congo Free State Army. On Swedes in the Congo Free State, see Lars Ericson: *Svenska Friwilliga: Militära Uppdrag i Utlandet under 1800- och 1900-talen* (‘Swedish Volunteers: Military Missions Abroad During the 19th and 20th Centuries’), Historiska Media, Lund, 1996, pp. 176–184.

2 SDP’s political programme from 1944 did not mention the situation in the colonial world. At its founding congress in 1951, the Socialist International demanded “national sovereignty and independence” for the colonies.
We do not have an active democratic participation in foreign policy. [...] If we want to create guarantees against a Communist recovery during coming international tensions, much larger doses of education and opinion-making [...] are needed.¹

Nevertheless, in the 1950s the Social Democratic Party played a passive and subordinate role among its sister parties in the Socialist International, particularly vis-à-vis the British Labour Party. As late as in 1960, an editorial in Tiden stated that

it is quite natural that the British labour movement [...] must take the lead regarding the realization of socialist internationalism, helping the less developed countries and creating correct and forward-looking relations with them. The tasks for our country in high politics are, of course, limited.²


Reflecting the changing times, such positions soon met strong opposition within the labour movement itself. The chairperson of the Social Democratic Women’s League, Inga Thorsson, indicated a new course in May 1962, declaring that

the [socialist] parties in the [...] European NATO-affiliated countries have in their practical policies [...]functioned rather as support troops for a conservative order than as clear alternatives to both the Communist and the capitalist ideology. [...] The political stands and resolutions taken by the [Socialist] International are, altogether, so influenced by NATO and imbued with the atmosphere of the Cold War that the organization to my mind at present does not constitute a useful instrument for cooperation between generally radical-socialist parties in the world. [...] The Swedish [Social Democratic] Party has [...] on the whole abstained from taking an active role in the formulation of decisions and declarations within the Socialist International. [...] The question now posed is whether the party should repair its international machinery, more forcefully dedicate energies to [...] contributions over the borders and do so following a Swedish, independent course.¹

Thorsson outlined policies that would be followed by the Social Democratic Party under Olof Palme in the 1970s. Important foreign policy changes had, however, taken place around 1960. In a surprising turnabout,² Sweden had as the first Western country in December 1959 voted in favour of Algeria’s right to self-determination in the UN General Assembly. In addition, on the First of May 1960—shortly after the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa—the Social Democratic Labour Day marches in Stockholm included for the first time a separate international section. Demonstrating under banners of ‘Brotherhood over the Borders’ and ‘Freedom for Africa’, it was led by Kanyama Chiume, a prominent leader of the Malawi Congress Party³ and a member of the Steering Committee of the All-African Peoples’ Conference (AAPC). Both Prime Minister Erlander and Chiume addressed the meeting and proceeds from the sales of the traditional First of May pins—a modest amount of 5,000 SEK—went to “the African liberation movement”, or AAPC.⁴ As far as can be established, it

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² See Demker op. cit.
³ At the time, the Malawi Congress Party—born out of the banned Nyasaland African Congress in September 1959—was one of the more militant nationalist organizations in Southern Africa.
⁴ Stockholms Arbetarekommun 1960: ‘Verksamhetsberättelse’ (‘Annual report of the Social Democratic Party district in Stockholm’), p. 11 (LMA) and Dagens Nyheter, 2 May 1960. The first All-African Peoples’ Conference (AAPC) was convened by Ghana’s President Kwame Nkrumah in Accra in December 1958. Invitations were extended to nationalist organizations, political parties and trade union movements throughout Africa. Representatives from some twenty-eight countries participated, among them Kamuzu Banda (Nyasaland-Malawi), Kenneth Kaunda (Northern Rhodesia-Zambia), Patrice Lumumba (Congo-Zaire), Tom Mboya (Kenya), Ezekiel Mphahlele (South Africa), Joshua Nkomo (Southern Rhodesia-Zimbabwe), Holden Roberto (Angola) and Chiume. The conference agreed inter alia to “mobilise world opinion in support of African liberation and to formulate concrete means and methods to achieve that objective” (Ronald Segal: Political Africa: A Who’s Who of Personalities and Parties, Stevens & Sons, London, 1961, p. 292). In May 1960, Chiume represented the AAPC Steering Committee in London. In his memoirs he writes: “At the end of April [1960], I flew to Stockholm to address the May Day Rally of the Social
was the first Swedish donation to the nationalist struggle in sub-Saharan Africa.¹

In 1960—declared ‘Africa Year’ by the United Nations—important international resolutions heralded a new era. Following an initiative by the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, the UN General Assembly adopted in December 1960 the so-called Decolonization Declaration, which represented a watershed in respect of colonialism and the right to self-determination of the world’s colonized peoples. Through the declaration—adopted by 89 votes to 0, with 9 abstentions ²—the assembly declared that

- the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights. [It] is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation;
- all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development; and
- inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.³

The following year, a special United Nations committee—the Decolonization Committee (also known as the Committee of 24)—was established to monitor the implementation of the declaration and inform the Security Council of developments which in this context threatened international peace and security. For a believing UN member such as Sweden, the declaration was to guide overall

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¹ At the meeting in Accra, AAPC set up a Freedom Fund to assist the liberation movements. The Swedish National Union of (University) Students (SFS) had from 1950 extended support to black university students in South Africa and the Swedish Fund for the Victims of Racial Oppression, founded in September 1959, channelled legal support through the British Defence and Aid Fund.

² Those who abstained were Australia, Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, United Kingdom and United States.


Democratic Party. We led a colourful procession through the streets of Stockholm, with an African drummer at our head. Thousands of Swedish people joined in the procession and there must have been no less than thirty thousand people gathered [...] in the end. [...] Tage Erlander mixed freely with us all, without flaunting his position [...]. I took the opportunity to discuss the possibility of Nyasaland students studying in Sweden. Some went immediately [after] we formed a government” (Kanyama Chiume: Kwacha: An Autobiography, East African Publishing House, Nairobi, 1975, p. 137). Chiume became Minister for External Affairs in Malawi upon independence in July 1964, but broke with President Banda within two months. He went into exile and later led the moderate opposition group Congress of the Second Republic. It should be noted that Signe Höjer—who at the time lived in Ghana—was present at the Accra conference and also addressed the meeting (although the sequencing of events is wrong in her I Ett Vaknande Afrika /’In an Awakening Africa’, LTs Förlag, Stockholm, 1983, p. 107). Höjer joined the Swedish South Africa Committee in 1961 and was instrumental in setting up the very first Swedish project in South Africa co-financed with public funds, namely the Arts and Crafts Centre at Rorkes’ Drift in Natal in 1962. She chaired a working group on Swedish humanitarian assistance for the important Government Bill No. 100: 1962 on Swedish development cooperation.
policies towards the Portuguese-speaking territories in Africa, South West Africa and Rhodesia.

In addition, in 1960 alone not less than seventeen new African states were admitted as members of the United Nations. The enlargement of the world organization affected the balance in the General Assembly in favour of the Afro-Asian group. From 1960, Sweden would increasingly coordinate its positions with the emerging bloc of newly independent states.

As a sign of the new times, the Swedish traditional parties—except the Moderate Party—included around 1960 for the first time declarations on decolonization, peoples’ right to self-determination and development aid in their political programmes. This was the case with the Centre Party in 1959, the Communist Party in 1961 and the Liberal Party in 1962. The political programme of the ruling Social Democratic Party, adopted in 1960, was in this respect quite explicit:

The order under which a small minority of industrialized states exercised factual world domination has been shaken in its foundations and the peoples who were suppressed now conquer political independence at a high pace. The Social Democratic Party greets the emancipation with satisfaction and sympathy. [...] In the relations between rich and poor countries, social democracy must uphold the ideas of equality and solidarity which have always guided its struggle in the developed countries. For this reason, the Social Democratic Party wants to actively contribute to the uplifting of the peoples of the poor countries from hunger, disease and ignorance.¹

Compared with the party programme of 1944, the emancipation of the working class was in 1960 replaced by international solidarity. To the post-war East–West security concerns was added a global dimension, where the North–South economic and social divisions were seen as potential threats to world peace.

Finally, from 1961 Prime Minister Erlander’s advisor Olof Palme coordinated preparations for the Swedish government’s bill on international development cooperation. The bill—to emphasize its significance introduced by the Prime Minister himself—was passed in May 1962. It soon became an important reference for the increasingly active Swedish foreign policy under Torsten Nilsson, who succeeded Undén in 1962.

Beginnings of Swedish Aid

A Department of Technical Assistance had been created at the Swedish Institute² in 1946, but the beginnings of Sweden’s cooperation with the developing countries took place within the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA), which began in July 1951. EPTA was financed

¹ Cited in Demker op. cit., pp. 64–65.
² The Swedish Institute was set up by the government after the Second World War to disseminate knowledge about Sweden abroad.
through voluntary grants by the UN member states and Sweden was one of the initial contributors.

Proposals for a national aid organization that could develop a bilateral development assistance programme were at about the same time put forward by a number of non-governmental organizations. Under the aegis of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, a Central Committee for Swedish Technical Assistance to Less Developed Areas (CK) was created in September 1952. It was largely an expression of ‘Organization-Sweden’. Its membership was made up of more than forty NGOs and included LO, TCO and SAF; ABF and other education associations; the National Council of Swedish Youth (SUL); the National Union of (University) Students (SFS); organizations in industry, trade and commerce; consumer and producer cooperatives; the major missionary societies; etc.

CK was in the beginning limited to technical assistance, but it was soon proposed that a few conventional development projects should be carried out in Africa and Asia. The only independent countries in sub-Saharan Africa at the time were Ethiopia and Liberia. Due to old Swedish links with the former, it was decided to set up a building college in Addis Ababa. Pakistan was chosen as the recipient country in Asia and a vocational training school was started outside Karachi. The projects were financed by the Swedish government, but the amounts involved were small. During CK’s entire existence from 1952 until 1961 the total expenditure only amounted to 4 million USD.

Partly in response to mounting pressure from student and youth organizations, the Social Democratic government started to take a closer interest in international development issues from the mid-1950s. A special Minister for Development Assistance, Ulla Lindström, was appointed in 1954 and a national fund-raising campaign under the slogan ‘Sweden Helps’ was organized the following year. The campaign was “not so much [in] response [to] a need for increased funds as a way of taking the temperature of the Swedish people with respect to its attitude to development assistance”. In the early 1950s, the Swedish people had shown little interest in international affairs and CK was in 1953 given the task to “make the Swede an internationalist”. Sixten Heppling, CK’s Executive Secretary, has described how the “campaign [...] had to [...] turn the average Swede around so that he would look out across the borders and begin to understand the interplay between all parts of the globe, which so profoundly affected his life, too”.

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1 In Swedish, Centralkommittén för Svenskt Tekniskt Bistånd.
2 Swedish missions had been active in Ethiopia since the 1860s. The plight of Ethiopia had in addition aroused great sympathy in Sweden during Mussolini’s invasion in the 1930s. After the Second World War, Swedish civil servants and military advisors were invited by Emperor Haile Selassie to assist with the development of the country.
3 Frühling (ed.) op. cit., p. 7.
4 Sixten Heppling: ‘The Very First Years: Memories of an Insider’ in Frühling (ed.) op. cit., p. 25.
5 Ibid., p. 24.
6 Ibid.
It required some effort. Despite the absence of a colonial past—and although the Swedish working class had given practical proof of international solidarity during the Spanish Civil War 1936–39; Sweden had made Finland’s cause its own during the Fenno-Russian winter war of 1939–40; and Swedish homes had been opened to refugees from Denmark, Norway and the Baltic countries during the Second World War—it could be assumed that the general perception of the developing world was no different from that in other European countries. For example, the generation that grew up during the 1950s had in elementary school learned that

the negroes [...] do not possess the intelligence and the willingness to work of the white race, but they do have good corporal strength and endure working in the heat and humidity of the tropics, which the white man seldom does. [...] The white man is the master of Africa, but without the work of the negro he cannot benefit from the rich natural resources of the land.3

While such crude expressions of racism were carried forward from elementary school to adulthood in some political milieus, they were, however, at the end of the 1950s far from dominant. The non-formal schooling through educational associations, study circles etc. played an important role in this context, as did the above mentioned government-sponsored campaign. More importantly, the cooperative movement, as well as both the blue and the white collar workers’ confederations, also carried out national information and aid campaigns, with significant amounts of money collected for various projects in the developing

1 The Swedish solidarity movement with the Spanish Republic against Franco was among the strongest in the world. A national Swedish support committee was set up in October 1936 and no fewer than 431 local committees were eventually organized all over the country. The campaign was supported by Social Democrats, Communists, Syndicalists and by leading intellectuals, such as Herbert Tingsten, while the Conservatives supported Franco. Of the estimated 88 million SEK collected for the Republicans world-wide, some 6 to 8 million were raised in Sweden. 520 Swedes joined the International Brigades in Spain and 164—almost a third—died there. See Richard Jändel: Kämpande Solidaritet: Mötet med Svenska Spaniefrittilliga (‘Struggling Solidarity: Meetings with Swedish Volunteers to Spain’), Arbetarnas Kulturhistoriska Sällskap/Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv och Bibliotek, Stockholm, 1996.

2 During the winter war between Finland and the Soviet Union, thousands of Finnish children were received in Swedish homes and when Norway was attacked by Nazi-Germany on 9 April 1940 a stream of refugees began to flow into Sweden, eventually totalling around 50,000. Likewise, when the Nazi pogroms against Danish Jews began, approximately 7,500 found asylum in Sweden. During the confrontation between the Soviet Union and Germany, some 35,000 people from the Baltic countries made their way to Sweden. Finally, towards the end of the Second World War, Count Folke Bernadotte managed to secure the release of around 30,000 Jews and political prisoners from the German concentration camps and transport them to Sweden.


4 For example, by Svensk Tidskrift, a theoretical conservative journal close to the Moderate Party. In an editorial defending European colonialism in Africa, Svensk Tidskrift wrote in mid-1961: “There is reason to keep in mind that if the Europeans had not come to Africa [...], many peoples there would probably still have been eating each other and [would have] sold their children as slaves while their kings [...] continued to amuse themselves by building pyramids of human skulls” (Svensk Tidskrift, No. 5, 1961, p. 270).
Globalizing Sweden: The LO chairman Arne Geijer (left) and the TCO director Valter Åman jointly raising funds for the developing countries, Stockholm, January 1960. (Photo: Pressens Bild)

world. In 1958, KF embarked upon the campaign ‘Without Frontiers’, which during the following years raised an annual amount of about 0.5 million SEK for education programmes through the International Cooperative Alliance. Similarly, in 1959–60, the white collar workers’ confederation collected 1.2 million SEK under the slogan ‘TCO Helps’. The money was channelled through the ICFTU Solidarity Fund for trade union education in Asia, Africa and Latin America, including the ICFTU school set up with Swedish support in Kampala, Uganda, in November 1958.1 Finally, in 1960 LO conducted the campaign ‘LO-Help across the Borders’, which raised not less than 7.5 million SEK.2 These funds were also channelled via ICFTU for educational purposes.

Against the background of this national effort, it was no major surprise that an opinion poll conducted before the general elections in 1960 showed that 56% of the Swedish voters were positive to increased development aid, even if it would translate into slower economic growth.3 The opinion of the Social Democratic voters was close to this figure, while the Liberal voters were more

1 The first director of the ICFTU school in Kampala was Sven Fockstedt from TCO.
3 Bjereld and Demker op. cit., p. 269. 22% of the voters were against increased aid.
positive and the Communists the most negative. The Swedish people had largely been ‘turned around’ and the pressure was now on the government. In 1960, Ulla Lindström, the Social Democratic Minister for Development Assistance, wrote in her characteristic, direct way that

the public opinion [...] is impatient with those paltry collection boxes at meetings about Congo refugees, lepers in Ethiopia and what-have-you. Why, it wonders, doesn’t the government give substantial aid, enough to really help? For years I have spoken and written to arouse opinion on these issues and the response has come from an ‘upper crust’ of intellectuals and idealists within the popular movements. The resonance among the rank-and-file, among the people, has been mute. Now this is changing, and in the face of such change, should the government just stand there, cautious, lukewarm? I should hope not! The government has been sowing the wind. I have been sowing the wind. Soon we shall reap the storm.¹

A storm would eventually come. It would not primarily be directed against the qualitative principles of Swedish aid, but against the quantitative amounts allocated for the purpose. The Socialist International had in 1956 recommended the industrialized countries to set aside 1% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for development aid.² The recommendation was adopted in 1961 by the UN General Assembly. It won broad acceptance within and outside the Social Democratic Party and was confirmed in the Government Bill 100: 1962, although no time-table was given. The ‘one-per-cent-target’ would throughout the 1960s and beyond play a prominent part in the Swedish political debate, mobilizing increasing numbers of groups and leading to quite spectacular popular manifestations. The Social Democratic government was, however, not easily convinced. In fact, failing to secure substantially increased budgetary allocations for development aid, Lindström resigned after repeated clashes with Finance Minister Gunnar Sträng at the end of 1966.³

¹ Cited in Andersson in Frühling (ed.) op. cit., p. 30.
² As a student politician, Olof Palme advocated the 1% target as early as at the beginning of the 1950s: “Twenty years ago I suggested something which at that time gave me the reputation of being a madman. I called for the allocation by each industrialized country of 1% of its gross national product to be used to aid the less developed countries. This idea was considered scandalous, but it was accepted in the end” (interview with Olof Palme in Le Monde, 19 July 1972, reproduced in The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs: Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy: 1972, Stockholm, 1973, p. 53).
³ Lindström has in her memoirs described the clashes with the Finance Minister. It is a fascinating account of intra-government tensions between Social Democratic ‘nationalists’ and ‘internationalists’. Just before her resignation, Lindström quotes Sträng as follows: “I have my ideas”, he said in a suddenly confiding tone, opening the doors to his inner self. “The developing countries have to go through [their nation-building period] as we once did, [with] hunger, rebellions and war. You’ll see, they will eventually cope. As we did. China has managed this well, at the price of dictatorship. India with her cows should learn from China. The Nigerian Minister of Finance was thrown into a ditch. He lay there pleading for his life, promising those who threatened to murder him all the money he had stashed away in Switzerland. Pitiful! Such as they are, the developing countries just can’t be helped. Believe me, Ulla” (Ulla Lindström: Och Regeringen Satt Kvar!: Ur Min Politiska Dagbok 1960–1967 (‘And the Government Remained!: From My Political Diary’), Bonniers, Stockholm, 1970, p. 333).
At the beginning of the 1960s, the Swedish aid budget was only 0.1% of GDP. By the end of the decade, it had passed 0.4%. As the first OECD member, Sweden reached the initial target of a net disbursement rate of 0.7% of GDP in 1975 and the Swedish objective of 1.0% in 1982.¹ Thus, official Swedish assistance to the Southern African liberation movements—financed out of the aid budget and initiated in 1969—started when the aid appropriations were still comparatively low.

The 1962 Aid Bible

The background preparations for Government Bill No. 100: 1962 were coordinated by a working group led by Olof Palme, then Head of Division in the Cabinet Office. It included officials who from the mid-1960s were to play prominent roles regarding Swedish development aid. Among them were Ernst Michanek, later Secretary General of NIB (1964–65) and Director General of

¹ Due to budgetary cuts in the 1990s, the appropriations for development aid decreased from 1993. A relinquishment of the established target of 1% was introduced in 1996.
SIDA (1965–79), and Lennart Klackenberg, who in 1970 became Under-Secretary of State in the newly created Department for International Development Cooperation in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Palme, Michanek and Klackenberg would in their respective capacities from 1969 largely shape Sweden’s policies towards the national liberation movements in Southern Africa.

The bill has been dubbed ‘the bible of Swedish development aid’. It laid down a number of remarkably lasting principles for Sweden’s official relations with the developing countries.¹ Most important was the affirmation that economic assistance needed no other justification than moral duty and international solidarity:

> The growing sense of solidarity and responsibility across the borders is an expression of a deeper understanding that peace, freedom and prosperity are not national concerns, but increasingly universal and indivisible. The idealistic motives behind development assistance are thus at the same time highly realistic.²

In addition, the bill underlined that Swedish international development cooperation was an integral part of Sweden’s foreign policy and, accordingly,

> should be determined against its objectives and means. An important [foreign policy] objective is to contribute to [economic] equality and a greater understanding between peoples and, thus, to further international solidarity and peaceful developments in the world. Our active support to the United Nations is part of this policy. Swedish development assistance should be in harmony with these efforts.³

In this context, it was argued that Sweden’s policy objectives of non-alignment and neutrality not only were shared by the newly independent countries, but that they also could be supported and protected by them. In addition to moral duty and international solidarity, there was an important element of strategic self-interest in development assistance:

> Among the peoples in Asia and Africa who recently have won, or shortly will gain, full independence, there is a strong ambition to stay outside big power influences and conduct what they themselves often call a policy of neutrality. Although the policy of these countries and the Swedish line to a large extent differ on account of both origin and form, they do, however, have so much in common that a mutual interest and willingness to cooperate can develop. [...] To seek to maintain and consolidate an understanding of Sweden as a neutral and progressive country, willing and capable to make efforts in support of peaceful cooperation between the peoples of the new states in Asia and Africa—who in spite of their economic and mili-

¹ For a comprehensive presentation and discussion of the bill, see Stokke op. cit.
² Government Bill No. 100: 1962, pp. 5–6.
³ Ibid., p. 5.
tary weakness exercise a growing political influence—must [therefore] be considered a not insignificant Swedish interest.¹

This—as expressed in the bill—“parallelity of interests” largely explains the motives behind Sweden’s involvement with the national liberation movements in Southern Africa (and elsewhere), that is, with peoples who eventually would gain full independence and were expected to follow a non-aligned course outside the opposing power blocs.

CK had cautiously embarked on Swedish development projects in Ethiopia and Pakistan, two countries that could hardly be regarded as progressive. In reaction, the authors of Government Bill No. 100: 1962 wrote that it seems reasonable to try to direct our aid so that it contributes, as far as we can determine, to development in the direction of political democracy and social equality. It would contradict both the motives and the aims of Swedish aid if it were to help conserve a reactionary social structure.²

The selection of bilateral partner countries would become controversial. It played an important part in the Swedish debate during the 1960s and the 1970s.³

CK was dissolved in 1962 and replaced by the Swedish Agency for International Assistance (NIB). NIB took an opposite direction from CK, rapidly increasing both the number of projects and recipient countries. It thereby created a “sprinkler effect”,⁴ difficult to handle from an administrative point of view. NIB too was therefore dissolved and the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) set up from 1 July 1965. Its Director General, Ernst Michanek, demanded concentration of authority at home and an end to the sprinkling abroad. He was granted both by the government. In the process, a new beginning was made. Swedish aid entered another, more lasting phase.

A major shift towards Southern Africa was one of the outcomes of the new policy. In turn, it was influenced by popular political mobilizations and pressures on the government, but was also a consequence of Sweden’s adherence to appeals by the United Nations. The situation in apartheid South Africa and the general denial of human rights in the Southern African region played in both instances decisive roles.

³ Stokke op. cit. gives a good account of the Swedish political parties and their preferred choice of recipient countries.
Humanitarian Aid and the 1964 Refugee Million

When Government Bill No. 100: 1962 was adopted in May 1962 there were already organized expressions of solidarity with Southern Africa in Sweden. In addition, refugee students from the region had through the Swedish university and secondary school organizations been granted scholarships to study in the country. However, the popular concern had at the level of government not yet been translated into concrete policies in favour of the victims of apartheid and white minority rule.1

The aid bill was cautious and conservative concerning humanitarian assistance. A working group led by Signe Höjer and mainly composed of representatives from the major missionary societies had studied the issue. It approached the concept of humanitarian aid from a traditional angle, primarily viewing it in response to emergency situations, such as natural disasters, and not in reaction to man-made political tragedies, such as apartheid. Nevertheless, the group proposed that Swedish humanitarian assistance should be increased and that public funds for the purpose could be channelled via “experienced non-governmental organizations”, that is, primarily the missionary societies.

Under mounting pressure from the solidarity movement—which in March 1963 launched a consumer boycott of South African goods and forcefully demanded concrete actions by the government—Foreign Minister Nilsson announced in October 1963 to the UN General Assembly that Sweden was “prepared [...] to give the young people from the majority population of South Africa and South West Africa scholarships for higher education [in preparation] a new era of full democracy”.2 The commitment was reflected in the government’s budget proposal for the financial year 1964/65,3 submitted in January 1964. Under the heading ‘Humanitarian Assistance’, it stated that political refugee situations in Africa are also created by the policy of apartheid. Racial discrimination in South Africa, as well as in South West Africa and in certain other not yet self-governing areas, provokes departures and flights of an increasing number of young Africans. The need for scholarships for subsistence and education of these refugees in the countries of asylum, particularly in the free parts of Africa, is growing every year. [...] Means for refugee scholarships of this

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1 Although Ulla Lindström, for example, had been actively involved in assisting the first refugee students from Southern Africa, inter alia by facilitating their travel to Sweden and their entry into the country.


3 During the period covered in this study, the Swedish financial (or budget) year ran from 1 July until 30 June.
kind could be accommodated under [the present vote]. An amount of 1,000,000 Kronor is provisionally estimated for the purpose.\footnote{Statsverkspropositionen (’Budget proposal’) 1964: Bilaga 5: Utrikesdepartementet, p.63.}

The budget proposal was adopted by parliament in May 1964 and entered into force from 1 July. The allocation—popularly known as the ‘refugee million’—had far-reaching consequences for Sweden’s relations with Southern Africa. It was “greeted with joy” by the Swedish anti-apartheid movement, which, however, favoured an independent stand regarding both decisions on and administration of the allocation. Gathered in Jönköping for an informal conference, in June 1964 the national South Africa Committee and the five local committees of Jönköping, Lund, Stockholm, Uppsala and Västerås wrote to Minister Lindström underlining “the importance that the body which will administer the distribution of the refugee allocation is given an autonomous and independent position. It is in our view [moreover] necessary not to take any diplomatic or other official considerations in order to utilize these funds in the most appropriate way”.\footnote{Letter to Ulla Lindström, dated 14 June 1964 and signed by Claes-Adam Wachtmeister, Anders Johansson, Ulf Agrell, Ulla Lovén, Tom Nässbjer and Kurt Sjölin for the respective South Africa Committees (AJC).}

The views were largely accommodated by Ulla Lindström. With an open mandate to advise the government on the utilization of the allocation, she appointed a Consultative Committee on Education Support to African Refugee Youth\footnote{In Swedish, *Beredningen för studiestöd till afrikansk flyktingungdom*. In 1969, the committee was renamed the Consultative Committee on Education Support and Humanitarian Assistance to African Refugees and National Liberation Movements (*Beredningen för studiestöd och humanitärt bistånd till afrikanska flyktingar och nationella befrielserörelser*). Its mandate was enlarged in 1978 and the committee was from then on called the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance (*Beredningen för humanitärt bistånd*). The short version will normally be used in the text, abbreviated as CCHA. It should be noted that Minister Lindström possibly was guided by the example of Norway when the decision was taken to form the committee. A similar body, the Norwegian Special Committee for Aid to Refugees from Southern Africa (in Norwegian, *Utvålet for hjelp til flyktninger fra det sørlige Afrika*), had already been set up by the government of Norway in June 1963. (A corresponding committee was later formed in Denmark. It held its first meeting in January 1966.)} on 13 August 1964. It was chaired by the Secretary General of NIB, Ernst Michanek, and had—in addition to representatives of government and organizations such as LO, TCO and the General Export Association of Sweden\footnote{In Swedish, *Sveriges Allmänna Exportförening*. Jonas Nordenson, a former Moderate MP and member of the SIDA Board, represented in the beginning the Export Association on the consultative committee.}—influential anti-apartheid activists and opinion makers on South and Southern Africa as experts. Per Wästberg was a full member from the start, while, for example, Lars-Gunnar Eriksson, Sven Hamrell, Gunnar Helander and Anders Thunborg—all members of the Swedish South Africa Committee\footnote{It is significant that Per Wästberg was appointed by the government to represent Sweden at the UN International Seminar on Apartheid in Brasilia, Brazil, in August-September 1966 and, again, at the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, Switzerland, in February 1967.}—were substitute members. To a large extent, the consultative committee...
was in a very Swedish fashion a forum for deliberation between the government and the popular movements. According to Michanek,

the composition [...] was carefully thought out. [...] Within its own ranks, the government administration had very little experience of this kind of activity. [...] Since we were dealing with matters that were not necessarily well looked upon by the governments in the countries concerned, [Lindström] wanted almost all the so-called grassroot organizations in Sweden to be involved. The committee should represent a cross-section of the Swedish society. A good deal of the work had to be undertaken under different degrees of secrecy. Against this background, it was important that the leaders of, in particular, the youth movements were knowledgeable about the work, without at the same time having the right to publicly speak about it.

It was through the ‘refugee million’ that Swedish public funds were channelled to future political leaders and institutions close to the Southern African liberation movements, preparing the ground for a direct, bilateral relationship from 1969. In the case of FRELIMO of Mozambique, it could be argued that the direct relationship started in 1965 when 150,000 SEK was disbursed to the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam. However, the institute was formally a Tanzanian institution, and it was made clear that the contribution was extended under that status and not to the liberation movement which actually exercised control and management.

In addition, it was through the ‘refugee million’ that the Swedish government entered into direct relations with public institutions in Botswana (then Bechuanaland), Lesotho (Basutoland), Swaziland and Zambia. All of them would upon independence receive Swedish development assistance, but it was the humanitarian assistance to refugees from Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe that paved the way for the support.

The educational assistance to refugee students from Southern Africa which started in 1964 was a modest beginning to a massive effort. Over the following years, Sweden would not only be the principal contributor to the various Southern African scholarship and training programmes set up by the United Nations, but also—and perhaps more importantly—to the main international organizations specialized in this field, such as the Africa Educational Trust (AET), the International University Exchange Fund (IUEF) and the World University Service (WUS). Significant Swedish contributions would also be made to different regional educational programmes coordinated by the Com-

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1 “On some occasions, I got the impression that officials in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs understood ‘aid’ as helping helpless Swedes in far away countries to get home. Speaking about aid, they thought of Swedes coming to the embassies to look for assistance...” (interview with Ernst Michanek, Stockholm, 19 March 1996.)

2 Ibid.

3 The director of the Mozambique Institute was Janet Rae Mondlane, the wife of the FRELIMO President Eduardo Mondlane. It was for all practical purposes a FRELIMO school.
monwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC) and the World Council of Churches. The support led to close links and Swedish assistance to the OAU Bureau for Placement and Education of African Refugees (BPEAR), established in 1967.

NIB—from 1965 SIDA—was to implement the humanitarian assistance programme and Michanek was keen to carry out the preliminary investigation outlined in the budget proposal as soon as possible. The Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance (CCHA) held its first meeting on 21 August 1964. It was decided that the secretary, Thord Palmlund, should travel to Southern Africa to identify education institutions that could accommodate refugee students and administer Swedish funds. Palmlund visited the region in November. Based on his report, it was recommended by the committee and decided by the government to utilize the ‘refugee million’ under three main headings, namely a) individual scholarships to South Africans, South West Africans (Namibians), Rhodesians (Zimbabweans) and Angolans, mainly in collaboration with IUEF in Leiden, Holland, and WUS in Geneva, Switzerland; b) institutional support to schools in the independent African countries of Congo (Zaire), Tanzania and Zambia together with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and/or local humanitarian organizations; and c) support to educational institutions in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS). During the financial year 1964/65, a total amount of 985,000 SEK was disbursed out of the million. Of this amount, 270,000 was used for

1 Together with the other Nordic countries, Sweden actively sought to convince the Western governments about the need to support these organizations. The response was poor. In a speech at a conference on ‘Peace and Development in the Frontline States’ in London in June 1988, the Swedish Minister for International Development Cooperation, Lena Hjelm-Wallén, stated: ‘I am sure that many of you are not aware that the Swedish share of the financing of most of these organizations exceeds 50%. Many of us—for our part—are indeed surprised to learn that these excellent organizations, most of which are based in London, still receive very minimal official contributions from the United Kingdom and other OECD countries’ (Statement by Lena Hjelm-Wallén, London, 9 June 1988) (MFA).
3 Mozambican refugee students were to be assisted via the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam.
4 The International University Exchange Fund (IUEF) was set up in Leiden in November 1961 by the International Student Conference (ISC) to handle scholarships, university exchanges and related matters. The Norwegian Øystein Opdahl served as IUEF’s director until 1966, when he was replaced by Lars-Gunnar Eriksson from Sweden. After revelations in 1967 that ISC to a large extent had been financed by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), it was dissolved in 1969. However, it was decided to continue IUEF’s operations. The fund re-established itself in Geneva, Switzerland, and was for the following ten years to receive most of its resources from Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Holland and Canada.
5 The origin of the World University Service (WUS) goes back to 1920, when it was established to relieve the needs of students and academics suffering the effects of the First World War. In 1950, it was decided to enlarge its activities to Africa, Asia and—later—Latin America, where WUS promoted the university’s social role and embarked upon educational programmes for refugees, returnees and displaced persons. It works through national WUS committees and has its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland.
individual scholarships, 433,000 for schools in the independent African countries and 282,000 for educational institutions in the still British BLS territories.1

Most of the individual scholarships outside Africa were granted for studies in Great Britain, Switzerland and France, although some of the students were also received by Swedish universities. During the first year, 23 Southern African refugee students were given the opportunity to pursue higher studies under the programme. Two years later, the number had increased to 54.2 Looking at the list, one is struck by the high number of prominent Zimbabweans from ZANU that were included. Among the first Zimbabweans students financed by Sweden were Henry Hamadziripi,3 Didymus Mutasa4 and Sydney Sekeramayi,5 the latter—in a SIDA memorandum described as an “exemplary” student6—studying and working in Sweden for more than ten years. Namibian students also benefited from the programme. One of them was Charles Kauraisa from SWANU. He had come to Sweden already in 1960 and stayed there for almost twenty years.

The support to universities and secondary schools in Congo (Zaire) targeted Angolan secondary school students. In Tanzania, it was channelled to the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS) for a settlement project in favour of refugees from Southern Africa, to the Kivukoni College and, above all, to the Mozambique Institute, which with an allocation of 150,000 SEK was the largest single recipient under the ‘refugee million’. Swedish assistance in Zambia was mainly extended to South Africans, Zimbabweans and Angolans through the International Refugee Council of Zambia (IRCZ), where the Norwegian Cato Aall was the secretary of the refugee managing committee. In that capacity, he was actively involved in helping politically exposed Southern African refugee students to Zambia for further placement at relevant institutions in Africa or in Europe.7

The assistance to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland was directly implemented by NIB. It was mainly motivated by a large number of South African refugees, but also by the fact that the UN Decolonization Committee on 2 November 1964, that is, at the time of Palmlund’s mission to Southern Africa, requested the Secretary General “to intensify [...] programmes of economic,

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1 Memorandum by Anna Wieslander, SIDA, Stockholm, 26 July 1965 (SDA) and SIDA: ‘Svenskt Flyktingbistånd’ (‘Swedish Refugee Assistance’), [no date or place] (SDA).
2 Memorandum (‘Bilateral stipendiering och bidragsgivning’/‘Bilateral scholarships and support’) by Thord Palmlund, SIDA, Stockholm, 30 April 1967 (SDA).
3 Hamadziripi served as ZANU’s Secretary for Finance in the 1970s. He was detained in Mozambique and dropped from the ZANU leadership in 1977.
4 Mutasa was appointed Deputy Secretary for Finance of ZANU in 1978. In 1980, he became Speaker of the House of Assembly in independent Zimbabwe.
5 Sekeramayi was appointed Deputy Secretary for Health of ZANU in 1978. At independence, he became Minister for Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development.
6 Memorandum by Anna Wieslander, SIDA, Stockholm, 26 July 1965 (SDA).
7 Considerable amounts—over the years totalling not less than 2 million SEK—were in addition disbursed to the Kenya Science Teachers’ College in favour of Southern African refugee students.
technical and financial assistance to these territories [and encourage] ways and means of ensuring [their] independence vis-à-vis the Republic of South Africa.\(^1\) It was explicitly expressed that national educational institutions should be assisted. Thus, from 1965 Swedish support was extended to the Swaneng Hill School in Botswana and to several secondary schools in Lesotho and Swaziland. Support was also given to the University of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (UBBS), situated at Roma outside Maseru (Lesotho) and jointly administered by the three territories from 1 January 1964. At the time, UBBS had less than 200 students. However, more than one third were South Africans and Zimbabweans, which was the main reason for the Swedish assistance. In addition, in 1961 the national WUS committees of Denmark, Norway and Sweden had carried out a joint campaign to finance a university building and a health centre at the Pope Pius XII University, as UBBS was then called.\(^2\)

**Increased Education Support and Legal Aid**

The 1964/65 allocation was doubled the following year and in 1966/67 an amount of 2.9 million SEK was disbursed.\(^3\) As the programme expanded, it became necessary to comprehensively study various aspects of the refugee problems in Africa and on that basis establish general guidelines for the consultative committee, SIDA and the Swedish government.\(^4\) Following an initiative by substitute member Sven Hamrell, at the time acting director of the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies,\(^5\) an international seminar on ‘Refugee Problems in Southern and Central Africa’ was organized at the University

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3. The following amounts were disbursed from Sweden during the second half of the 1960s in favour of the refugee education programme: 1964/65: 1 million SEK; 1965/66: 1.8 million SEK; 1966/67: 2.9 million SEK; 1967/68: 3.2 million SEK; and 1968/69: 5.8 million SEK (Ernst Michanek and Kerstin Oldfelt: ‘Beredningen för studiestöd och humanitärt bistånd till afrikanska flyktingar och nationella befrielserörelser med förslag till program under budgetåret 1969/70’/‘The consultative committee on education support and humanitarian assistance to African refugees and national liberation movements with proposals regarding programmes during the financial year 1969/70’, Stockholm, 29 June 1969) (SDA). The Swedish support was substantially increased in the 1970s.
4. Interview with Sven Hamrell, Uppsala, 10 April 1996.
5. A Nordic Africa Institute was proposed in Government Bill No. 100: 1962 and established in Uppsala in mid-1962. For a long time known in English as the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, the correct translation of *Nordiska Afrikainstitutet*—also covering Finland and Iceland—is the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI). This translation has generally been used from the beginning of the 1990s. Jointly financed by the Nordic governments, NAI is an independent research, documentation and information centre on contemporary Africa for the Nordic countries.
of Uppsala in April 1966. Around fifty representatives from different organizations active in the field of refugee work and African political movements took part in the seminar, which confirmed the importance of concentrating the assistance to Southern Africa. Except for smaller amounts channelled through UNHCR in favour of refugee students from Rwanda and Sudan, the initial focus of the Swedish programme was therefore maintained during the 1960s and the 1970s.

A major conference on ‘Legal, Economic and Social Aspects of African Refugee Problems’ was also held in Addis Ababa in October 1967, co-sponsored by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in Uppsala, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), UNHCR and OAU. It drew up plans for a more coordinated handling of African refugee matters and further helped the consultative committee to define its guiding principles. One of the main conclusions was that individual scholarships to African refugee students as far as possible should be given in favour of studies in Africa, a principle that the Swedish government had followed from the beginning. Out of a total of 325 Southern African refugee students bilaterally funded by Sweden in 1969, more than 240 pursued studies on the African continent. However, as a number of students wished to study in Sweden, it was also deemed necessary to establish a policy in this regard. It became both strict and clearly political. In June 1969—shortly after the Swedish parliament had pronounced itself in favour of official support to the Southern African liberation movements—CCHA laid down that scholarships for studies in Sweden

as far as possible should be restricted to persons with a particular connection to African liberation movements. The committee wishes to emphasize the importance of persons within this category being offered the possibility of studying in Sweden

1 The seminar proceedings were subsequently published. See Sven Hamrell (ed.): Refugee Problems in Africa, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1967. Among the participants at the seminar was Z.K. Matthews, a prominent leader of ANC of South Africa, professor of law and former Africa secretary in the Division of Inter-Church Aid of the Refugee and World Service of the World Council of Churches. He later became ambassador of Botswana to the United Nations.

2 Hamrell had in 1967 become the director of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in Uppsala, established in 1962 in memory of the late UN Secretary General. The purpose of the foundation is to organize seminars, conferences and courses on issues facing the developing world. Since 1972, the foundation publishes Development Dialogue, a journal of international development cooperation.

3 CCHA: ‘Beredningen för studiestöd och humanitärt bistånd till afrikanska flyktingar och nationella befrielserörelser med förslag till program under budgetåret 1969/’70’ (‘The consultative committee on education support and humanitarian assistance to African refugees and national liberation movements with proposals for programmes during the financial year 1969/’70’), Stockholm, 29 June 1969 (SDA)

4 Invited by SFS and the Swedish solidarity movement, several students from Southern Africa had already begun university studies in Sweden at the beginning of the 1960s, i.e. before the official programme was set up. In some cases, their studies would from the mid-1960s be sponsored by NIB/SIDA. That was, for example, the case with Billy Modise of ANC of South Africa, Charles Kauraisa of SWANU of Namibia and Sydney Sekeramayi of ZANU of Zimbabwe. According to a survey carried out by SIDA, there were in 1970 some 175 African students at Swedish universities and other tertiary institutions (CCHA: ‘Föredragningspromemoria’/‘Agenda memorandum’, Stockholm, 10 November 1970) (SDA).
and that—when their study results are being judged—consideration is given to the information activities they perform”.

In the case of studies in Sweden, it was thus established at the close of the 1960s that the diplomatic role of the Southern African students who represented national liberation movements was as—if not more—important for support through SIDA as their academic performance. Through the humanitarian programme in favour of Southern African refugee students, the Swedish government would—although with small amounts—at the beginning of the 1970s contribute to the costs for the official representatives to Sweden of ANC of South Africa, MPLA of Angola, PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau and SWAPO of Namibia.

In addition to the bilateral educational programme under the ‘refugee million’, the Swedish government was the main contributor to the different multilateral Southern African training programmes established by the United Nations. The UN Special Educational and Training Programme for South West Africa had been set up in 1961. A similar programme for the territories under Portuguese administration started in 1962 and a programme for South Africa in 1965. On a Swedish initiative, the programmes were in 1967 consolidated into the UN Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa (UNETPSA), which for the first time also benefited Zimbabweans. The UN Trust Fund for South Africa, which covered legal aid to political detainees in South Africa, but also education support to the victims of apartheid and general assistance to refugees from South Africa and Namibia, was set up in 1965. Sweden held the chairmanship of the fund from its inception. Together with the other Nordic

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1 CCHA: ‘Beredningen för studiestöd och humanitärt bistånd till afrikanska flyktingar och nationella befrielserörelser med förslag till program under budgetåret 1969/70’ (The consultative committee on education support and humanitarian assistance to African refugees and national liberation movements with proposals for programmes during the financial year 1969/70), Stockholm, 29 June 1969 (SDA).

2 See, for example, interview with Ben Amathila, Stockholm, 19 May 1995.

3 Lyttleton Sobizana Mngqikana (CCHA: ‘Protokoll’/’Minutes’, Stockholm, 27 December 1971) (SDA). It should be noted that the Swedish government contributed to the costs of a resident ANC representative well over a year before the final decision to extend official assistance to the South African liberation movement was taken.

4 António Alberto Neto (MPLA), Onésimo Silveira (PAIGC) and Ben Amathila (SWAPO). (CCHA: ’Finansiell ram för verksamheten 1972/73: Tillgång, behov och fördelning’/’Financial frame for the activities in 1972/73: Available resources, needs and allocations’, Stockholm, 7 April 1972) (SDA). It could be mentioned that President Nyerere of Tanzania according to the Swedish diplomat Göran Hasselmark once advised a visiting African delegation: “To Scandinavia you should [as your representative] send an unobtrusive, intellectual person, if possible literary active. That makes a deep impression on the Nordic peoples. Avoid at all costs a bombastic orator who spreads slogans around. They could be sent to Southern Europe” (Letter (’Neto och MPLA’/’Neto and MPLA’) from Göran Hasselmark to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam, 8 August 1974) (SDA). As a rule, both the early, informal student representatives and the later, officially appointed representatives of the Southern African liberation movements in Sweden fell within the first category. They were, in addition, upon independence often appointed to important positions in their respective home countries.
countries, Sweden was also among the main contributors to the UN Fund for Namibia, created in 1970.

Finally, to the original ‘refugee million’ in January 1965 the Swedish government added a similar amount for legal assistance to political prisoners in South Africa and maintenance of their families. The decision followed an appeal by the UN Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid (also known as the Committee against Apartheid, or Anti-apartheid Committee)\(^1\) in October 1964. Sweden was the first Western country to respond to the appeal, granting 100,000 USD for legal aid through the London-based Defence and Aid Fund\(^2\) and a similar amount for assistance to family members of political prisoners via the World Council of Churches. The allocation was followed in December 1965 —immediately after Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) —by a similar contribution to dependants of political prisoners in Zimbabwe through the Church of Sweden Aid and the World Council of Churches. Via Christian Care and IDAF, the support was later extended to include the political prisoners themselves.

\(^1\) The UN Anti-apartheid Committee was established by the General Assembly in November 1962.
\(^2\) The British Defence and Aid Fund was set up by Canon John Collins in the 1950s.
The humanitarian Southern Africa programme embarked upon by the Swedish government from 1 July 1964 had far-reaching consequences. Through the programme, CCHA, SIDA and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs entered into direct contact with the political realities of the region, gathering important insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the different nationalist organizations.

Aid to Southern Africa

SIDA was set up in 1965. The following year it was decided to concentrate Swedish official bilateral development assistance to six priority countries, namely India and Pakistan in Asia and Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Tunisia in Africa. The choice was made among the countries with which cooperation was already ongoing. However, SIDA’s Director General Michanek had in September 1965 entrusted Thord Palmlund with the task of preparing a proposal for assistance also to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, to be implemented in cooperation with the United Nations.\(^1\) For reasons of foreign policy—to strengthen their independence vis-à-vis South Africa\(^2\)—the government decided in 1966 to make an exception to the concentration principle and include the BLS countries among the recipients of Swedish aid, although the amounts involved were modest and the assistance was mainly to be channelled through the UN. At the same time, Zambia became a recipient of Swedish bilateral support.

Until 1975—when Angola and Mozambique became independent—Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zambia were the only countries in Southern Africa proper to which official Swedish assistance was extended. In the case of the BLS countries, it was motivated by their exposed situation vis-à-vis apartheid South Africa. In the case of Zambia, it was, similarly, due to its stand against UDI in Rhodesia and the costs it had to incur for observing the United Nations sanctions against its southern neighbour. Sweden’s assistance was, thus, largely motivated by UN declarations and facilitated by the cooperation initiated with the four countries through the humanitarian support. With respect to Zambia, political relations had, in addition, been established in the early 1960s with Kenneth Kaunda and his UNIP party. Several prominent Zambians had studied in Sweden before independence in October 1964, among them Rupiah Banda\(^3\) and Alexander Chikwanda.\(^4\) Their broad contacts with

\(^{1}\) Letter from Palmlund to Michanek, Stockholm, 19 January 1966. (SDA)
\(^{2}\) Botswana and Lesotho became independent in 1966 and Swaziland in 1968. Zambia had become independent in October 1964.
\(^{3}\) Banda studied at the University of Lund. After independence, he was appointed Zambia’s ambassador to Egypt. He was Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1973 to 1978.
\(^{4}\) Chikwanda also studied at the University of Lund. Between 1973 and 1980, he was Minister of Health, Minister of Planning and Finance, and Minister of Agriculture.
Swedish society largely contributed to the fact that the Centre and Liberal parties were particularly active in advocating support for Zambia.

Sweden’s politically motivated presence in Southern Africa is further underlined by the fact that bilateral aid was never considered in the case of Malawi, although the liberation process in that country had received attention in the Swedish media and the Social Democratic Party had established links with the ruling Malawi Congress Party in 1960. The reason was, simply, that Malawi under President Kamuzu Banda upon independence in July 1964 took a unique course among the African states, establishing close relations with South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal. A Swedish diplomatic mission was never opened in Malawi. The few contacts between the two countries were conducted via the Swedish embassy in Lusaka.

It is in this context significant that the aid relations with Swaziland were phased out after King Sobhuza’s death in 1982 and the ensuing South African dominance there. In a letter from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Swedish embassy in Maputo—responsible for Sweden’s relations with Swaziland—it was emphasized in January 1983 that “we have [now] more grounds than in the past to question Swaziland’s policy in a wider Southern African context. I am particularly thinking of the attitude to ANC and the questionable, dubious contacts with South Africa [...]. Developments in Swaziland have simply gone in the wrong direction with regard to the overriding objectives of our foreign and aid policy in Southern Africa”.

Last, but far from least, the role of Tanzania should be underlined. From geographical, cultural or historical points of view, Tanzania does not form part of Southern Africa. Under President Julius Nyerere, it would, however, from independence in 1961 take a pronounced and principled stand in support of the liberation struggle in the southern part of the continent. In recognition of Tanzania’s role, the newly founded Organization of African Unity (OAU) decided in 1963 to locate its Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (known as the Liberation Committee) in Dar es Salaam and at the beginning of the 1960s practically all the Southern African liberation movements opened offices there. Several were granted military training facilities. Tanzania was also a founding member of the Frontline States’ group, set up by the OAU to handle the problems of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, and of the economically oriented Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

The Nordic countries had agreed in 1963 to set up the joint Kibaha project outside the capital Dar es Salaam. Behind the decision were old relations with

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1 Together with Malawi, Swaziland is the only Southern African country where a resident Swedish diplomatic representation was never established.
3 Tanganyika became independent in 1961 and Zanzibar in 1963. They were federated in 1964.
Tanzania through the Church of Sweden Mission,¹ but above all the close relations established between Julius Nyerere and the Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander and his advisor Olof Palme during a visit to Sweden by the Tanzanian leader in 1961.² This marked the beginning of direct links between the Swedish Social Democratic Party and Nyerere’s TANU, which in turn created a special relationship between, at first, Sweden and Tanzania and later all the Nordic countries. In 1962–63, SSU and the Young Falcons,³ the youth and juvenile branches of the Swedish labour movement, organized a fund-raising campaign in favour of TANU’s Youth League called the ‘Fund for the Youth of Tanganyika’ or the ‘Tanganyika Action’. Not less than 330,000 SEK was raised for the construction of a TANU Youth Centre outside Dar es Salaam.⁴ Several future prominent Swedish Social Democratic government ministers, among them Ingvar Carlsson,⁵ Thage G. Peterson⁶ and Lena Hjelm-

¹ The Swedish Alliance Mission and the Swedish Pentecostal Revival Mission (Pingstväckelsens Mission) were also active in Tanzania.
² History is full of fortuitous encounters. Such was the meeting in 1961 between Nyerere and Erlander. Nyerere was in London for independence negotiations with the British and had some days off. He then called his old friend Barbro Johansson in Stockholm. A CSM missionary and a member of Nyerere’s TANU party, Johansson was at the time on leave in her native country. She invited Nyerere to Sweden for a private visit. Before his arrival, Johansson told Prime Minister Erander—an old acquaintance from university days in Lund—about the visitor and he, in turn, invited the nationalist leader to the Prime Minister’s summer residence at Harpsund. This was at the time of the preparations for Government Bill No. 100: 1962 and at Harpsund Erander, Palme and Nyerere shared views on the decolonization process in Africa and the possible role of Swedish aid to Tanganyika. It was during these discussions that the idea of the Nordic Kibaha project was formed. More importantly, it was Nyerere’s private visit to Sweden that prepared the ground for the relations between the Swedish Social Democratic Party and TANU, as well as the close personal contacts between Palme and Nyerere. (See Bengt Sundkler & Per-Åke Wahlström (eds.): Vision and Service: Papers in Honour of Barbro Johansson, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1977, and Barbro Johansson/Anna Wieslander: Hem till Tanzania: Boken om Barbro Johansson Berättad för Anna Wieslander/ ’Home to Tanzania: The Book about Barbro Johansson as Told to Anna Wieslander’, Raben & Sjögren, Stockholm, 1989). Barbro Johansson played an important role for Sweden’s early relations with the Southern African liberation movements and for the growth of the Swedish solidarity movement in general. Known as ‘Mama Barbro’, she had a remarkable life. She came to Tanganyika as a Swedish missionary in 1946. Becoming close to Julius Nyerere in the mid-1950s, she joined TANU and was elected to Tanganyika’s Legislative Council for the West Lake Region (Bukoba) in January 1959 and, again, in July 1960, this time for Mwanza. In 1962, she became a Tanzanian citizen, and as such she combined teaching with politics, always in close contact with Nyerere. She led Tanzania’s delegation to the Commonwealth Conference in Kingston, Jamaica, in 1964 and was in December 1970 appointed Counsellor at the Tanzanian embassy in Stockholm—covering the Nordic countries—where she served for three years.
³ In Swedish, Unga Örnar (which literally translates as Young Eagles).
⁵ Carlsson was chairman of SSU 1961–67. He became Minister of Education in 1969, Minister of Housing in 1973, Deputy Prime Minister in 1982 and served as Prime Minister during the periods 1986–91 and 1994–96.
⁶ Peterson was vice chairman of SSU 1964–67. He entered the Swedish government as Minister without Portfolio in 1975 and became Minister of Industry in 1982, Minister of Justice in 1988 and Minister of Defence in 1994.
Wallén,¹ were involved in the campaign, visited Tanzania and also met youth representatives from the Southern African liberation movements there.² Tanzanian institutions—such as the Mozambique Institute—were on this basis naturally included among the organizations to which Swedish humanitarian assistance was extended under the 1964 ‘refugee million’. Tanzania itself was one of the four African countries which in 1966 were selected as priority countries for Swedish development assistance, eventually becoming the principal recipient of Swedish bilateral aid in the world. As of 30 June 1995, a total of 20.3 billion SEK (in 1995 fixed prices) had been disbursed to Tanzania.³

¹ Hjelm-Wallén was active in the Social Democratic student and youth organization Laboremus in Uppsala between 1962 and 1965 and visited Tanzania on a study tour with SSU in 1967. She became Minister without Portfolio in 1974, Minister of Education in 1982, Minister of International Development Cooperation in 1985 and Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1994.

² The Fund for the Youth of Tanzania was replaced in 1963 by a SSU International Solidarity Fund, out of which disbursements were made from mid-1964. Among the organizations supported by the Swedish Social Democratic Youth League during the first year (1964–65) were the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the United Kingdom, SWANU of Namibia and ANC of South Africa (Frihet, No 5, 1965, p. 5).

During the period covered in this study, about half of Sweden’s global bilateral development aid was directed to Southern Africa. The concentration on the region was such that a frustrated Laotian official trying to argue the case for increased aid to his country expressed to his Swedish counterpart: “If only [Laos] was in Southern Africa!”¹ The general focus on Southern Africa is important for the presentation below. So is the fact that Tanzania and Zambia—the two countries that until 1975 served as the main sanctuaries for the Southern African liberation movements—could count on broad parliamentary and popular support in Sweden. In the case of Tanzania, the ‘African socialist’ path chartered in the Arusha Declaration of 1977 was, in particular, defended by the ruling Social Democratic Party, while Zambia’s ‘humanism’ was closer to the Centre and Liberal parties. Both Tanzania and Zambia—although ruled under one-party systems—were in the global Cold War context seen as democratic, non-aligned and concerned partners, and the opinions of Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda carried much weight in Sweden.

Furthermore, at an early stage Sweden established diplomatic representations in Dar es Salaam and Lusaka through which political and aid relations were developed with the host countries, as well as with the liberation movements. With the establishment of Swedish embassies in Gaborone, Maputo, Luanda, Harare and Maseru, the Swedish government was in the unique situation of being able to assess, coordinate and implement both development assistance and humanitarian aid to the various regional players in a comprehensive way. No other country in the world—East or West—had a similar, parallel and regional, relationship with the independent governments and the governments-to-be, i.e. the national liberation movements. And in no other region in the world did Sweden have such a broad involvement.

It is, finally, far from irrelevant that Sweden in January 1969—that is, just before the parliamentary statement in favour of direct support to the Southern African liberation movements—was the first Western country to recognize the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and that official Swedish development assistance from the beginning of the 1970s was extended to the government in Hanoi, as well as to Cuba,² Chile,³ Laos and, later, Nicaragua. In addition, humanitarian assistance was channelled through the Red Cross to the National Liberation Front of (South) Vietnam (FNL), the National United Front of Cambodia (FUNK) and to the Patriotic Front of Laos (Pathet Lao). Sweden was thereby widely identified with progressive, anti-imperialist forces in the Third World. Although it did not abandon its non-aligned policy, “it certainly had an impact on how this policy was interpreted, by Sweden herself and by

¹ Palmlund in Frühling (ed.) op. cit., p. 119.
² The assistance to Cuba was phased out by the non-socialist coalition government after 1976.
³ The assistance to Chile was suspended after the military coup against the government of President Allende in September 1973.
In the eyes of the Southern African nationalist leaders, the assistance to, in particular, Cuba and Vietnam served to create a dependable relationship with Sweden.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Palmlund in Frühling (ed.) op. cit., p. 115.

\(^2\) See, for example, interview with Kenneth Kaunda, Lusaka, 15 July 1995, interview with Lúcio Lara, Luanda, 16 April 1996 and interview with Marcelino dos Santos, Maputo, 3 May 1996.
Forerunners of a Popular Opinion

The Student Movement

Heading the Swedish aid agency (NIB/SIDA) and chairing the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance between 1964 and 1979, Ernst Michanek was more than any other government official involved with Sweden’s assistance to the Southern African liberation movements. Even so, in an interview in March 1996 he asserted that

it was not the government that took the political initiative in these matters. Even less so in the case of matters of a controversial nature. The whole build-up of the Swedish public opinion on Southern Africa came from below. The thinking that developed in the student movement was, for example, very important in this regard.¹

The Swedish government was from the early 1960s pushed by an increasingly active solidarity opinion towards the nationalist movements in Southern Africa. How did the opinion emerge? The question will be addressed below, discussing the involvement in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique during the 1960s. Some of the more important institutional and individual actors who appeared on the scene in the 1950s should, however, first be introduced, starting with the student and youth movements.

As Swedish society in general, the students at the universities of Gothenburg, Lund, Stockholm and Uppsala were largely isolated from the colonized world until after the Second World War. Organized within the National Union of Students (SFS),² they then became involved in the Cold War division of the international student movement, which to a high degree was provoked by competition for the voice of the non-European students. At the same time, SFS established direct links with the organized South African students. Both the wider international involvement and SFS’s early contacts with South Africa were important for Sweden’s future relations with the nationalist forces in Southern Africa. In addition, they largely shaped the world views of Olof Palme, who chaired SFS’s international committee from 1949 to 1951 and served as president of the national student body between 1952 and 1953.

¹ Interview with Ernst Michanek, Stockholm, 19 March 1996. Michanek had been the first Nordic ombudsman of the Swedish National Union of Students (SFS) in the 1940s.
² In Swedish, Sveriges Förenade Studentkårer.
SFS and NUSAS

One of the first apartheid measures implemented by the Nationalist Party after coming to power in South Africa in 1948 was to withdraw state scholarships to black students at the racially open, English-speaking University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg.1 The decision provoked strong reactions. The non-racial National Union of South African Students (NUSAS)2 responded by launching a national campaign for a scholarship fund to make it possible for black students to continue their studies. NUSAS also appealed for international support. The call received a positive response from Swedish university students, who through SFS contributed more than 25,000 SEK to the scholarship fund between 1950 and 1958.3

In the very beginning, the Swedish students raised money partly through blood donations. Olof Palme participated actively in the campaign. He later described it as his “first political act”.4 One of the beneficiaries of the action was Eduardo Mondlane, the future leader of FRELIMO of Mozambique.5 He had obtained a scholarship to study at the Witwatersrand University, but when Malan’s Nationalist Party came to power he was—with a characteristically nonsensical apartheid expression—dismissed for being “a foreign native”. Palme and Mondlane did not know that their paths had indirectly crossed around 1950. Fifteen years later—when Mondlane in 1965 paid one of his first visits to Sweden—they established the fortuitous fact.6

Despite the distance, SFS representatives also travelled to South Africa for discussions with NUSAS. In 1956, Olof G. Tandberg—who played an important

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1 In 1948, only two out of eight universities in South Africa accepted black students. They were the English language universities of Cape Town and Witwatersrand, referred to as ‘open’ universities.

2 NUSAS was formed in 1924, but it was only in 1945 that it welcomed the black Fort Hare University College. Inspired by anti-fascist sentiments of the war years, NUSAS then adopted a constitution which advocated “the rights of all to the free expression of opinion [and] equality of educational and economic opportunity” (cited in Rob Davies, Dan O’Meara and Sipho Dlamini: The Struggle for South Africa: A Reference Guide to Movements, Organizations and Institutions, Volume II, Zed Books, London, 1984, p. 382). NUSAS’s non-racial, liberal stance and its opposition to apartheid led to increasing conflicts with the Nationalist regime after 1948.

3 Jan Stiernstedt: ‘Sveriges Studenter—och Sydafrikas’ (‘Sweden’s Students—and South Africa’s’) in Studenten, No. 4, 1959, p. 12. Studenten was the official organ of SFS. The responsible publisher in 1959 was the SFS president Lennart Bodström, who became Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1982 to 1985. Sven Hamrell, later a member of the South Africa Committee and of the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance, was the editor. In the same issue of Studenten there was an article by Per Wästberg (‘Möte med Sydafrika’/Meeting with South Africa’) on apartheid and the universities in South Africa.


5 Aftonbladet, 2 August 1966.

role in the build-up of the Swedish anti-apartheid movement\textsuperscript{1}—made a study trip to the union. On his return, he wrote a study on 'Higher Education in South Africa' and, above all, five long articles in the Social Democratic newspaper \textit{Stockholms-Tidningen}, published between November 1956 and January 1957.\textsuperscript{2} His full-page reports complemented the earlier important contributions by Ivar Harrie in \textit{Expressen} and Herbert Tingsten in \textit{Dagens Nyheter}, giving the broader Swedish labour movement a vivid account of the political realities in apartheid South Africa. Tandberg’s first article opened with the statement:

One leaves the Union of South Africa with a bitter taste in the mouth [...], ashamed of one’s white skin colour. Racial prejudice has never played such a dominant role as [in South Africa] today. In the course of a few years, a white police state has been created, which in the name of ‘Christian nationalism’ cold-bloodedly implements a premeditated exploitation of the non-white population groups.\textsuperscript{3}

His last article concluded: "When apartheid’s festering boil bursts, the inhabitants of the country will face an appalling reckoning. That an insurrection will come is inevitable. The question is only when."\textsuperscript{4} These words would to a large extent set the tone for the early anti-apartheid debate in Sweden, dominated by the themes of racism and the inevitability of a violent explosion in South Africa.

Tandberg’s visit took place shortly after the Congress of the People at Klip-town outside Johannesburg had adopted the Freedom Charter in June 1955 and just before the apartheid regime charged more than a hundred nationalist leaders with high treason in December 1956. The African National Congress was against this background debated in South Africa, and it was Tandberg who introduced the congress movement to the Swedish university students and the public at large.\textsuperscript{5}

A first Swedish expression of solidarity towards black university students in South Africa—at the time the only country in Southern Africa offering university education—thus began in 1948. It was followed ten years later by a second effort, similarly provoked by harsh apartheid measures against academic freedom and followed by international appeals from NUSAS. In 1959, the South African government passed the Extension of the University Education Act and the University College of Fort Hare Transfer Act, which conclusively marked the introduction of apartheid into the institutions of higher learning. According to the former act, no black student could register at a racially open university without permission from the Minister of Education. It

\footnotesize{
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1} Instrumental in the forming of the Swedish South Africa Committee in 1961, Tandberg later served as international secretary of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences.
  \item \textsuperscript{2} \textit{Stockholms-Tidningen}, 19 November 1956, 27 November 1956, 5 December 1956, 11 December 1956 and 2 January 1957.
  \item \textsuperscript{3} Olof G. Tandberg: ‘Polisstaten Sydafrika’ (‘The police state of South Africa’) in \textit{Stockholms-Tidningen}, 19 November 1956.
  \item \textsuperscript{4} Olof G. Tandberg: ‘De förtrycktas styrka’ (‘The force of the oppressed’) in \textit{Stockholms-Tidningen}, 2 January 1957.
  \item \textsuperscript{5} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
}
became a criminal offence, punishable by a maximum of six months imprisonment, for any white person to attend classes at black institutions of higher learning and for any black student to register at the former open universities. Through the University of Fort Hare Transfer Act, control of the prestigious black university at Alice in the Eastern Cape\textsuperscript{1} was at the same time transferred to the Minister of Bantu Education. In practice, this meant that non-white students were barred from qualified tertiary education in South Africa.

The few black students already registered at a university were, however, allowed to continue their studies. Aware of this fact, SFS made an appeal to the Swedish universities in late 1958 to boost their contributions to the NUSAS scholarship fund in order to finance a complete scholarship for one black stu-

\textsuperscript{1} The University College of Fort Hare was the \textit{alma mater} of Southern African nationalist leaders such as Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo (ANC), Robert Sobukwe (PAC), Robert Mugabe (ZANU of Zimbabwe) and many others.
dent, estimated to cost 30,000 SEK over six years. The response was positive. The student bodies at the four universities in Sweden committed themselves to jointly raising an annual amount of 7,500 SEK until 1964. In addition, the students at Lund university decided to finance another scholarship. In this way, two black South African university students were financially supported by their Swedish colleagues.

Through active lobbying, SFS also managed to influence the Swedish government. In 1959, it convinced Foreign Minister Undén of the urgency of raising the issue of "the worsening situation of the coloured students in the Union of South Africa" in his annual address to the United Nations General Assembly, conveying a request by SFS for UN action. It was the first time that Sweden actively brought the matter of apartheid to the attention of the world organization.

Despite the early involvement, the Swedish student movement never formed a distinct solidarity organization with South or Southern Africa. This was in contrast to Norway, where the national student union (NSS) in September 1959 set up a preparatory South Africa Committee "to organize information activities around South Africa; internationally oppose the South African government's oppression of the coloureds; organize fund-raising campaigns for the victims of apartheid; and explore the possibilities of a boycott of South African goods". These demands would in Sweden be raised by broader anti-apartheid organizations, largely inspired by individuals outside the student movement.

It was with support from the official aid agency NIB and SFS that a number of Southern African students as a direct or indirect consequence of the racial university laws in South Africa were received in Sweden from 1960.

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2 Several contacts with South African students initiated by SFS in the 1950s were from the mid-1960s taken up by the Swedish government. Thus, official Swedish assistance was at an early stage extended both directly and via IUEF to NUSAS, via WUS to the South African Committee for Higher Education (SACHED) and—also through WUS—in favour of African medical students in Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town.
3 At the time, the term 'coloured' (in Swedish, 
färgad
) was synonymous with black or, more generally, non-white.
5 In Norwegian, Norsk Studentsamband.
6 Resolution of 12 September 1959, with letter from Mariken Vaa to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 24 October 1959.
7 Billy Modise of the ANC, a member of the national executive of NUSAS, was offered a scholarship at the University of Lund and settled there at the beginning of 1961. He became deputy director of SIDA’s training centre in Uppsala in 1972. After more than ten years as assistant director of the UN Institute for Namibia in Lusaka, Zambia, Modise returned to Sweden as ANC chief representative between 1988 and 1991. See interview with Billy Modise, Johannesburg, 15 September 1995.
8 This was the situation for an important group of Namibians from the SWANU leadership. The first to come to Sweden were Uatja Kaukuetu and Charles Kauraisa, who arrived in October 1960.
studying—in particular—at the universities of Lund and Stockholm. They would play important roles in the formation of an organized solidarity movement with Southern Africa. In addition, many of them established far wider connections with Swedish society than normal academic studies entailed. Little known is, for example, that the future Centre Party leader and Prime Minister Thorbjörn Fälldin already in the mid-1960s established close relations with resident university students from both Africa and Asia. It would, in a significant way, add to the legitimacy of the nationalist cause in the Swedish non-socialist political centre.

To make life easier for the Third World students, the Centre Party Youth League (CUF)\(^1\) took the initiative in the early 1960s to invite them to Swedish families over the Christmas and New Year holidays. Fälldin, a member of parliament and a farmer in Ramvik outside Härnösand in northern Sweden, volunteered to receive a first Christmas guest in December 1964. The guest was Alexander Chikwanda from Zambia, a country which had become independent only two months earlier.\(^2\) Chikwanda was a leading member of Kenneth Kaunda’s ruling United National Independence Party and a member of Zambia’s parliament. At the time, he had a NIB scholarship for pre-university studies at Gränna high school and would later study economics in Lund. Returning to Zambia, he served as Minister of Health, Planning and Finance, and Agriculture. At an early stage, the future Swedish Prime Minister and the future Zambian Finance Minister became close friends, remaining in contact from that moment on.\(^3\)

Personal contacts such as these largely explain why the Centre Party, which otherwise kept a low profile on international matters, became a strong proponent of Swedish development assistance to Zambia and—together with the Liberal Party—an early advocate of official support to the Southern African liberation movements, in particular ANC of South Africa, SWAPO of Namibia and ZANU and ZAPU of Zimbabwe. Sydney Sekeramayi from Zimbabwe—who studied and worked in Sweden between 1964\(^4\) and 1975 and at inde-

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1 In Swedish, Centerns Ungdomsförbund.
2 The visit was highlighted by the local newspaper *Nya Norrland*, which wrote about Fälldin’s “exotic” Christmas guest, describing him as “a lively African, with coffee-coloured, silk-shining skin, a mind open for impressions and a tongue willing to share his young wisdom with his hosts. [...] With young men such as Alexander B. Chikwanda at the helm”, the Social Democratic paper concluded, “we believe in a brightening future for the people of Zambia” (*Nya Norrland*, 28 December 1964). See also Thorbjörn Fälldin: *En Bonde Blir Statsminister—Samtal med Arvid Lagercrantz* (*A Farmer becomes Prime Minister—Conversations with Arvid Lagercrantz*), Albert Bonniers Förlag, Stockholm, 1998, p. 222.
3 Letter from Thorbjörn Fälldin to the author, [no place], 15 April 1996. As Minister of Lands and Agriculture, Chikwanda paid an official visit to Sweden in mid-1978. Fälldin was at the time Prime Minister, leading the non-socialist coalition government formed after the 1976 elections. Chikwanda and his wife spent the Swedish midsummer as Fälldin’s private guests in Ramvik.
4 After "a few problems", Sekeramayi came to Sweden from Czechoslovakia in June 1964. His placement at Gränna high school and, subsequently, at Lund university was facilitated by Rupiah Banda, at the time international secretary of the Zambia Students’ Union (interview with Sydney Sekeramayi, Harare, 27 July 1995).
pendence became a prominent member of government—later underlined the importance of the relations for the broadening of ZANU’s contacts with the Swedish political establishment as well. In 1995, he emphasized the role of resident Zambian students such as Chikwanda—"a very good friend of Thorbjörn Fälldin’s"—for the recognition of ZANU in the non-socialist milieus in Sweden. In April 1996, Fälldin himself stated that "the close relations established during the times I and my wife spent together with these young persons were, evidently, of great importance for [my] views on the events in Africa." Many of the Swedish student representatives who in Gothenburg, Lund, Stockholm or Uppsala were involved with the decade-long support to NUSAS or administered scholarships to the Southern African students would, finally, join the foreign service and occupy central government positions at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs or SIDA. By far the most important among them was the future Prime Minister Olof Palme.

ISC, COSEC and Olof Palme

In 1946, the International Union of Students (IUS) was formed as a global student body with headquarters in Prague, the capital of Czechoslovakia. SFS took an active part from the beginning. After the 1948 Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, IUS was, however, increasingly seen as a Soviet Cold War tool and together with most Western student bodies SFS eventually withdrew from the organization. Olof Palme was in close contact with this process, which greatly contributed to both his anti-Communism and his anti-colonialism.

After a private visit to Prague in 1949, Palme returned there as a studentdelegate to the IUS congress in August 1950. In his report to SFS, he subsequently wrote: "Only the most innocent can now deny that [...] IUS is a political

1 Interview with Sydney Tigere Sekeramayi, Harare, 27 July 1995.
2 Letter from Thorbjörn Fälldin to the author, [no place], 15 April 1996. Chikwanda was the first Christmas guest in Ramvik. During the following years, the Fälldins entertained students from Pakistan, Kenya and Liberia.
3 Among them were, for example, Göran Hasselmark, Thord Palmlund and Anna Wieslander.
4 After Palme’s first visit to Prague, he wrote an article in June 1949 (‘Demonstrationen i Prag’/‘The demonstration in Prague’) in the conservative newspaper Svenska Dagbladet. The article was noted by the leadership of SFS, who recruited him to its international committee. Born in Stockholm in 1927, Olof Palme came from an upper-class family with a cosmopolitan background. His mother was of German–Latvian nobility and his maternal grandfather a landed proprietor and professor in Latvia, who eventually lost everything to the Soviet Union. During his school days, Palme often spent the summers in Latvia. On his father’s side, Palme was related to Rajani Palme Dutt, a founding member of the Communist Party of Great Britain and for several decades its chairman. Palme Dutt was a first cousin of Palme’s father. Speaking English, French, German and a little Russian, Palme matriculated at the exceptionally early age of seventeen. Then, in two terms in 1948, he took a BA in political science at Kenyon College in Ohio, USA. During his stay in the United States, he was deeply impressed by the radicalism of the New Deal. Palme joined the Swedish Social Democratic Party in 1951, at the age of twenty-four.
organization stage-managed by Cominform. Its objective has, in brief, been to strengthen the inner front in the Eastern states [and] to conduct Communist propaganda among the thin layer of students in the colonial countries. In the same report, he added: "The freedom aspirations of the colonial peoples are ruthlessly exploited for the purposes of Communism, which are hostile to liberty. IUS has been one of the prime weapons of Cominform in the struggle for the key group in the colonies, i.e. the intelligentsia." As early as 1950—at the age of 23—Palme was thus aware of the freedom aspirations of the colonial peoples and of the political force they represented in a divided world. This awareness was consolidated after a visit to South and South-East Asia in 1953, at a time when he had become the president of SFS.

After the break with IUS, the Nordic student unions, the British National Union of Students and the Scottish Union of Students set out to find alternative forms for international cooperation. Palme was deeply involved in the discussions. In his words, the debate between the Western student organizations was whether "we [...] should create an organization which was dependent upon 'the free world' and rapidly would become a tool in the hands of the Americans or [...] an association which truly represented the university students and, in particular, was devoted to the Third World." Those who—like Palme himself—supported the formation of an international student body outside the Cold War divide eventually prevailed.

In 1950, some twenty national student organizations met in Stockholm to form what ultimately was called the International Student Conference (ISC). Palme served as the conference secretary. The majority of the delegates wanted to avoid further schisms in the international student world and opposed the conception of ISC as a rival to IUS, although—as Palme later explained—"it was out of the question to let the Communists have some sort of monopoly over the relations with the students of the Third World." ISC was given a loose form. Instead, a Coordinating Secretariat (COSEC) was set up, based in Leiden, Holland. COSEC was to coordinate the policy decisions taken by the conference and it was at the level of COSEC that the new student international had its centre. Palme—who only joined the Social Democratic student club in Stockholm at around this time, thus becoming a party member—was elected to chair COSEC’s most important structure, the executive committee.

The new student international grew quickly and impressively. By the mid-1950s, over fifty national student bodies participated in ISC/COSEC, out of

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1 Cominform was the name given in the West to the information office of the international Communist movement. Set up in 1947, it was dissolved in 1956.
which more than half represented colonized countries. In Southern Africa, NUSAS was one of the early members and in 1962, for example, the pro-FNLA National Union of Angolan Students (UNEA) also joined ISC/COSEC. The MPLA-aligned General Union of Students from Black Africa under Portuguese Colonial Domination (UGEAN) was already affiliated to IUS.

With a huge budget for technical assistance, education and student exchange, ISC/COSEC became the pacesetter for international student politics. As the organization grew, the students of the colonized world pressed harder for political stands on issues such as colonialism, decolonization and racism. It thereby caught the eye of United States intelligence. Through various bogus foundations, the US National Student Association—more or less knowingly and willingly—was used as a conduit for Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) activities to abort anti-colonial aspirations and divert ISC/COSEC’s attention to non-political issues concerning ‘students as such’. Nevertheless, it was not until 1967 that the US magazine *Ramparts* revealed the extent of CIA’s penetration of ISC/COSEC, as well as that of other Western youth organizations involved in Southern Africa, such as the World Assembly of Youth.

Although Palme did not have a political base in the Swedish labour movement, he was in 1953 handpicked by Prime Minister Erlander as his personal assistant. The task absorbed most of his energies and after leaving SFS and ISC/COSEC the same year, Palme would for the rest of the 1950s mainly dedicate himself to domestic issues. However, just before starting to work in the Prime Minister’s Office, he spent almost three months touring India, Ceylon

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1 In Portuguese, União Nacional dos Estudantes Angolanos. UNEA was set up in March 1962 by a group of Angolan students meeting in Lucerne, Switzerland, under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi. The students initially supported Holden Roberto’s FNLA, but most of them joined Savimbi’s UNITA in 1966.

2 In Portuguese, União Geral dos Estudantes da África Negra sob Dominação Colónial Portuguesa. UGEAN was formed in Rabat, Morocco, in September 1961 on the initiative of MPLA. Unlike UNEA, it was not an exclusively Angolan organization, but represented—as its name implies—students from all the Portuguese colonies in Africa.

3 Several Swedes involved with official aid to Southern Africa were engaged by ISC/COSEC. This was, for example, the case with Thord Pamlund, the future secretary of the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance, in the early period 1961–62. Above all, Lars-Gunnar Eriksson became in 1966 the director of ISC’s International University Exchange Fund, serving in that capacity until 1980, when it was dramatically revealed that the organization had been infiltrated by South Africa.

4 And many other organizations. See, for example, Sol Stern: ‘NSA and the CIA: A Short Account of International Student Politics and the Cold War with Particular Reference to the NSA, CIA, etc.’ in *Ramparts*, Volume 5, Number 9, March 1967, pp. 29–39; Pax Lexikon (‘Pax Encyclopedia’), Bind 3, Pax Forlag, Oslo, 1979, p. 214; and David Wirmark: ‘WAY in the 50s and 60s’, Draft manuscript, October 1997. Cf. Palme’s account: “Later on [COSEC’s] activities were terminated as it had been infiltrated by CIA. To my knowledge, nothing of the sort happened during my time [at COSEC]” (Palme op. cit., p. 14).

5 In 1955, Palme became study director (studiossekretær) in the Social Democratic Youth League (SSU). Although an increasingly prominent assistant to Prime Minister Erlander, he retained this comparatively subordinate appointment until 1961. He became Minister without Portfolio in 1963, Minister of Communications in 1965, Minister of Education and Cultural Affairs in 1967 and—succeeding Tage Erlander as chairman of the Social Democratic Party—Prime Minister in 1969.
Palme often came back to his Asian trip. In an interview with the French journalist Serge Richard, he explained in 1976 that it was in Asia that I concretely experienced what colonialism was. [...] In Singapore, I spent ten days in a university compound where Chinese, Malays and Indians lived. The silent contempt they all displayed for [...] ‘white supremacy’ made a strong impression. Self-confident [and] convinced that victory sooner or later was theirs, they patiently waited for racism to disappear [and] the oppressors to leave. They even showed a certain indulgence towards the excesses of the colonial class.

This was at the time when the French were fighting their last battles in Vietnam and John Foster Dulles, the American Foreign Minister, threatened Vietnam with massive retaliation, at the same time as he presented himself as a defender of democracy and morals. I discussed all this with my friends from Singapore. [...] It was easy to discuss [with them.] We did not only have the same value opinions, but we also shared the will to take practical steps. We wanted to reform the world. [...] Basically, all the discussions ended with the same idea: The folly of imperialism must be defeated and the poor peoples must themselves be allowed to form their destiny.1

In the same interview, Palme summarized his early views on nationalism and development in Africa and Asia as follows:

The only way to really assist the Third World is to act as an ally of the nationalist movements. [...] Nationalism is above all a return to dignity. [...] The nationalist struggle for independence is inextricably linked to social and economic liberation. The dream of a decent existence is behind all revolutionary movements. We must not only learn to live with this desire of independence, but also for it. [...] This is where socialism comes in: It binds us to make common cause with the oppressed and to fight on their side against the forces that exploit them. [...] I do not want to advocate armed struggle, which we by all means try to avoid, but I do understand it. When peoples who aspire to peace and progress only are met by brutal oppression and cynical exploitation, they quite naturally resort to violence, if only to defend themselves.2

Thus, "the Cold War map that Palme had used in Europe did not really work in Asia."3 He formed his own views on national liberation in the colonized world, far from those prevailing in the political party that he had joined two years earlier, as well as in Sweden in general. As stated by one of Palme’s biographers, Sven O. Andersson, chief editor of the social democratic newspaper Stockholms-Tidningen, "the times and the labour movement were not yet ready for the awareness that Olof Palme had already gained at the beginning of the

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2 Ibid., pp. 16–19.
The moment to publicly state his basic views and the commitment from student days would only come more than ten years later, when Palme addressed the growing concern of a new generation. As acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, he held his first major speech against the war in Vietnam in July 1965, stating the oft-quoted words:

To think that demands for social justice can be met with violence and military force is an illusion. It is extremely difficult to win people by promises of defending their freedom, which in actual fact they have never experienced. This easily leads to the question: Why did we not gain our freedom when it was not yet necessary to defend it?  

Palme’s speech—significantly held at the Christian Social Democrats’ congress in Gävle—dramatically broke with cautious Swedish traditions of passive neutrality. It has come to represent the beginning of Sweden’s policy of active non-alignment.

Nevertheless, during the 1950s Palme would in his political work as a lecturer at conferences and study circles put his radical international views into words. As early as in November 1953, he gave a lecture on the subject ‘National Independence Movements in Asia and Africa’ at a conference attended by various Swedish political student and youth associations at the course centre of Sånga-Säby outside Stockholm. Little known, Palme’s draft manuscript has been kept for posterity. It begins as follows:

It can be stated that the most important fact in contemporary world politics is the social revolution brought about through the slow discovery by one and a half billion people, i.e. the two thirds of the world’s population who for centuries have lived in poverty and hunger, that destitution is not inevitable. [...] This social revolution has largely received its political expression through the national independence movements.

Palme went on to discuss the historical background of colonialism, with an analysis of British, Dutch and French history. The Central African Federation—set up by the British the same year to keep Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland under continued control by ‘white’ Southern Rhodesia—was quoted as an example. He concluded:

The Second World War started a process which cannot be stopped. Political brilliance is to adapt to the inevitable. Freedom for the colonial peoples is a matter of course. It is a question of honestly adapting to it and honestly working for it.

1 Andersson in Huldt and Misgeld (eds.) op. cit., p. 96.
3 Olof Palme: ‘Nationella självständighetsrörelser i Asien och Afrika’ (‘National independence movements in Asia and Africa’), Draft manuscript, November 1953 (LMA)
In an interview with the French newspaper *Le Monde*, Palme explained in July 1972 that when he discussed the war in Vietnam in 1965 at the congress of the Brotherhood Movement in Gävle, “I used, practically unchanged, whole pages of another speech [which] I had made in 1953.” What he could only express to a closed group of students in 1953 had been held in reserve for a wider national and international audience until 1965. Only with the conflict in Vietnam did Palme find the time ripe to deliver the Social Democratic Party from its Cold War outlook. After his death in 1986, the Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland commented that

> the active support given by Olof Palme and Sweden to the liberation movements in the 1960s is probably one of Palme’s most important political contributions to further North–South dialogue. [Today,] this [...] may seem obvious. We must remember, however, that in the 1960s the liberation movements were considered of a dubious nature in the Western world, even far into the social democratic movement. Olof Palme took the lead in supporting [...] liberation and freedom of those Third World countries that did not benefit from peaceful decolonization within the UN framework. In the 1960s, Palme’s political leadership was in this context courageous and [of] far-reaching consequence.

Representing a Southern African opinion, the former Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda—who for the first time was invited to Sweden by the Social Democratic Party in May 1962—similarly stated in 1995 that

> it was Olof Palme who led the Nordic countries in this process. It was his contribution which aroused the interest and the feelings of the other Nordic countries. They also made very wonderful contributions, there is no doubt about that. But I am merely being factual when I say that it all started with Sweden.

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1 Ibid. The last sentence is in English in the original.
2 ‘Interview with the Prime Minister in *Le Monde*, 19 July 1972’ in The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs: *Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy: 1972*, Stockholm, 1973, p. 54. In the interview, Palme went on to say that “my attitude has not changed. It is tragic if a democracy identifies itself with a colonial power or with a policy of a colonial type.”
3 In earlier public speeches, Palme did, however, often mention the liberation struggles in the colonized world. Appearing in Bollnäs in northern Sweden on 6 June 1961, i.e. the Swedish national day (‘Day of the Swedish Flag’), he directed—according to a contemporary press report—“the thoughts to the countries where a hard and often sanguinary liberation struggle is going on”, stating that “it is our duty to help those who lack practically everything considered the bare necessities of life” (‘Sverige, ett lyckligt land, bör hjälpa de nödlidande’/ ‘Sweden, a happy country, should help those in want’ in *Ljusnan*, 7 June 1961).
4 See Elmbrant op. cit., p. 62 and Andersson in Huldt and Misgeld (eds.) op. cit., pp. 96–101. Palme was not a member of the executive committee (VU) of the Social Democratic Party until he became the party leader in 1969.
The Algerian Connection

The Algerian liberation struggle received increasing attention at Swedish universities towards the end of the 1950s. To large sections of the youth and students, Algeria represented at the end of the decade what Vietnam would stand for ten years later, that is, internationalist awakening, criticism of the prevailing world order and active solidarity.¹

The war in Algeria started in November 1954, but it was not until evidence of torture by the French was presented in 1957 that the students and political youth organizations forcefully expressed support for Algeria’s independence and the National Liberation Front (FLN).² Once the stand had been taken, there was, however, a rapidly growing pro-FLN opinion among the Swedish youth, driven by the Communist, Social Democratic, Centre and Liberal youth leagues. The Social Democratic and Liberal youth were particularly active, and in Uppsala, for example, the local student associations of Laboremus,³ Verdandi and Studenternas SLU⁴ lobbied the government. In June 1957, the Nordic Social Democratic student associations requested their political parties to defend the right of the Algerian people to self-determination. In addition, they demanded that the Nordic universities should be opened to Algerian students blocked from higher education by the French. When the French government in 1958 banned the Algerian students’ union, a number of students were received in the Nordic countries, particularly in Norway and Sweden.

In December 1959, Sweden became the first Western country to vote in favour of Algeria’s right to self-determination in the UN General Assembly. Until December 1957, the government had held the opinion that the conflict in Algeria was primarily an internal French matter and in December 1958 Sweden had abstained from voting on the issue. The position taken in 1959 represented a radical shift. The Algerian question is in the context of this study of importance for various reasons.

¹ Cf., for example, Ehnmark op. cit., p. 9: “The French hypocrisy, in particular, made an enormous impression upon my generation. The war in Algeria made us awaken, as the war in Vietnam would for a later generation. The suspicion that human rights perhaps really were only French or English or Belgian, [or], in other words, that the bearing values of our civilization were not universal, but only applicable within walls, constituted the centre of the commitment”.

² The Social Democratic Youth League had already demanded independence in 1952 for the colonies in North Africa. At the time, the focus of attention was on the situation in Tunisia. Morocco and Tunisia became independent in March 1956.

³ Laboremus organized both students and workers. This Social Democratic “association of intellectual and manual workers” was founded in Uppsala in 1902. As will be seen below, Laboremus was from the early 1960s actively involved with the issue of national liberation in Southern Africa. Many future prominent Social Democratic politicians and academics were introduced to international politics through the association. In 1962, Laboremus published the book Förändringens Vind: Socialdemokratiska Perspektiv på Världspolitiken (The Wind of Change: Social Democratic Perspectives on World Politics’, Rabén & Sjögren, Stockholm), edited by Ulf Himmelstrand, Enn Kokk, Torsten Nilsson and Lars Rudebeck and with a foreword by Osten Undén.

⁴ In Swedish, Svenska Landsbygdens Ungdomsförbund, or the Swedish Rural Youth League, i.e. the youth of the Farmers’ League (Centre Party). In 1962, it became the Centre Party Youth League (CUF).
By far the most important is that the Swedish government already under Foreign Minister Undén at the end of the 1950s—that is, before the United Nations had passed the Decolonization Declaration and more than five years before Palme’s Vietnam speech in Gävle—sided with a non-European people against its European colonizer. As stated by the Swedish political scientist Marie Demker, “the war in Algeria was something of an ‘alarm clock’ for the leadership of [the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. […] After the war in Algeria, Sweden was to pay attention to colonial conflicts in a new way and look upon them from an ideological/moral and democratic perspective, in addition to [arguments of] international law”.¹ A transition towards a more active, non-aligned foreign policy had already been set in motion around 1960 and thus not abruptly introduced in the mid-1960s, as conventionally upheld.²

Secondly, just before the Swedish turnabout in December 1959 Undén stated in an internal Foreign Ministry memorandum that “the Swedish opinion would not understand [if] Sweden voted against [Algeria’s right to self-determination]”.³ Although the Swedish Third World opinion at the time was limited and primarily voiced by a privileged elite in the student and youth movements—as well as by increasingly concerned press voices—Undén’s memorandum suggests that the Social Democratic government was sensitive to popular demands in the traditionally exclusive domain of foreign policy. A first indication appeared when Undén—only two months before the vote on Algeria’s independence—in his annual speech to the UN General Assembly raised the issue of black students in South Africa on behalf of SFS. As noted, it was the first time that Sweden on its own initiative brought the matter of apartheid to the United Nations.

As the war in Algeria continued, the movement beginning as a student and youth opinion would, in addition, from 1960 reach the Swedish political parties and, eventually, parliament. The wider issues of decolonization, the right to self-determination and the legitimacy of the struggle for national liberation entered the established political fora. Against French protests, the Swedish government—which in 1953 had refused political activities by an Estonian government-in-exile—welcomed the Algerian Chérif Sahli to Sweden as the official representative of FLN/GPRA in May 1960.⁴ Six months later—in November 1960—thirty MP’s, representing all the parliamentary parties, requested Prime Minister Erlander to “actively promote a peaceful solution of the conflict in Algeria”.

² Cf., for example, the following extract from Prime Minister Erlander’s First of May speech in 1961: “Congo, Laos, Cuba, Algeria and South Africa are some of the crisis centres that dominate the headlines of the newspapers. […] If the poor peoples are blocked from gaining their freedom and if we do not manage to jointly support them we must look ahead to a future characterized by deepened gulls between rich and poor nations, perpetual crises and growing risks of a global catastrophe” (Dagens Nyheter, 2 May 1961).
³ Memorandum by Östen Undén, 4 November 1959, cited in Demker op. cit., p. 91.
⁴ GPRA, or Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne, i.e. the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. Ferhat Abbas was the President of GPRA.
Algeria through [...] a referendum which can give the Algerian people the possibility to determine its destiny on its own.\(^1\) Erlander’s personal assistant Olof Palme was one of the signatories. When Algeria’s independence was eventually declared on 1 July 1962, he was the official Swedish representative at the celebrations.

It was also around the war in Algeria that the governing Social Democratic Party and others—in particular influential members of the Liberal Party—entered into direct contact with the governments and various political forces in Morocco and Tunisia. At the same time as close relations were established with the future Frontline States’ Presidents Nyerere of Tanzania and Kaunda of Zambia, a dialogue around the liberation of Africa was initiated with Algerian leaders such as Ferhat Abbas, Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Chérif Belkacem, the Moroccan El Mehdi Ben Barka and the Tunisian President Habib Bourgiba.\(^2\) All of them actively supported the liberation movements in Southern Africa—in particular ANC of South Africa and MPLA of Angola\(^3\)—and the contacts with the North African politicians served as bridges between Sweden and the nationalist movements in the southern parts of the continent. It is in this context not without significance that Sweden had long-standing relations with Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia.\(^4\) When the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was founded in Addis Ababa in May 1963, it was seen as “one of the most remarkable demonstrations of regional cooperation, [...] worthy of our deep respect and admiration” in the 1963 address to the UN General Assembly by Torsten Nilsson, the new Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs.\(^5\)

Finally, more than any other previous non-European issue it was the war in Algeria that from the late 1950s increasingly engaged both the Swedish media and a wider popular opinion, albeit centred in the student and youth movements. The war ended in March 1962. Two years earlier, the apartheid government had drenched the South African nationalists’ protests in blood at Sharpeville and one year before MPLA had in response to similar developments started the Angolan—and regional—war of liberation. Both events were taken up in Sweden by a popular opinion awakened by the struggle in Algeria. Leading this process was the organized youth, in turn paving the way for a more popularly based Swedish solidarity movement with South and Southern Africa.

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3. CONCP (see below) set up a permanent secretariat in Rabat, Morocco, in 1961 and ANC opened offices in Rabat and Algiers, Algeria, in 1962.
4. As Crown Prince Ras Tafari Makonnen, Haile Selassie paid his first official visit to Sweden in the mid-1920s.
The Youth, SUL and WAY

That Swedish university students during the 1950s became increasingly engaged in international affairs was in the post-war context far from exceptional. They represented, however, a privileged elite, with few links to the broader popular movements. Nevertheless, from the beginning of the 1950s, a plethora of popularly based Swedish youth organizations—indeed representing ‘Organization-Sweden’—was through the National Council of Swedish Youth (SUL)1 exposed to the wider world in general and to the issues of decolonization, national liberation and development aid in particular. More than any other organization, SUL and its international umbrella, the World Assembly of Youth (WAY), brought the younger Swedish public into contact with the struggle for national liberation and democracy in Southern Africa. It was SUL that responded to ANC’s call for a boycott of apartheid South Africa, launching a national campaign from 1 March 1963. And it was in support of SUL’s campaign that the first local Swedish solidarity committees were formed.

At the beginning of the 1960s, SUL had a membership of around 60 national organizations, representing more than 1.4 million young people.2 The dominating member organizations were the youth leagues of the Swedish political parties and the major political university organizations, but the national body of the Swedish secondary school pupils, the youth wings of most of the Swedish free churches, young farmers’ organizations, boy and girl scouts as well as the young temperance movement were also represented. So were more exotic and marginal organizations, such as the National Association for the Promotion of Skiing and Outdoor Life and the Youth Section of the Swedish Chess Association.

After the war, there was “a tremendous surge and desire for international contacts among young people [in Sweden]”.3 As a result, in 1952 SUL became a founding member of the Central Committee for Swedish Technical Assistance (CK). In addition to the early debate on development aid, SUL and its member organizations were thus involved in the important national information campaigns regarding the non-European world. Through its president, David Wirmark from the Liberal Party Youth League (FPU),4 SUL presented a number of radical proposals to the executive board of CK. The most controversial was the so-called Mohn Plan—named after its original author, the Swedish diplomat Paul Mohn—proposing that a thousand young persons from Africa, Asia and Latin America annually should be invited to Sweden to study issues related to local government and democracy. Other youth leaders were favourably disposed to the plan, among them the SFS president Olof Palme. Due to

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1 In Swedish, Sveriges Ungdomsorganisationers Landsråd.
3 Wirmark op. cit.
4 In Swedish, Folkpartiets Ungdomsförbund.
opposition by “the older generation”, the proposal was eventually shelved. It took, however, several sessions before CK reached that decision. The discussions around the Mohn Plan have been described as “the first major development assistance debate in Sweden”.2

SUL had after the Second World War become a member of the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), formed in London in November 1945. In a process similar to that of the international student movement, WFDY was, however, after the 1948 Prague coup seen as Communist-controlled. Together with most Western youth bodies, SUL withdrew from WFDY, actively participating in the preparations leading to the formation of the alternative World Assembly of Youth (WAY) in Brussels in August 1949. WAY adopted the UN Declaration on Human Rights as its basic guiding principle, but went further than the United Nations regarding membership. Not only members from independent countries were welcomed, but also youth organizations from the colonized territories, all with one vote. WAY’s charter further established the objective “to support and encourage national youth movements of non-self-governing countries in their struggle for the attainment of self-government”.3 The Assembly held its first general meeting at Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, in 1951 on ‘Youth and Human Rights’.

David Wirmark—later president of SUL—represented the Swedish youth at the 1951 WAY meeting, participating in the commission dealing with racial discrimination.4 For the young Wirmark, it marked the beginning of a lifelong involvement with WAY and the Southern African struggle. He was between 1954 and 1958 a member of WAY’s executive committee and in 1958 elected secretary general, a position that he held until 1964.5 During this crucial period of the formation of the Swedish solidarity movement with South and Southern Africa, Wirmark was in close contact with SUL and via SUL with its various member organizations.

Naturally, Wirmark conveyed his views on the situation in Southern Africa to the Liberal Party, which he was to represent in parliament between 1971 and 1973 and, again, from 1976 to 1979. In this context, it is of significance that as early as in August 1958 at a WAY meeting in New Delhi, India, he became close to the Zimbabwean nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo, at the time President

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1 Interview with David Wirmark, Stockholm, 20 February 1996.
2 Heppling in Frühling (ed.) op. cit., p. 18. The Swedish political youth organizations did not give up the basic ideas behind the Mohn Plan. At the beginning of the 1950s, the Social Democratic, Centre and Liberal youth all invited smaller numbers of Third World students to Sweden.
3 Wirmark op. cit.
4 Chairing the commission was the historian cum politician Joseph Ki-Zerbo from Upper Volta (Burkina Faso). Ki-Zerbo later established close relations with Sweden, in particular with the Social Democratic Party. He was awarded the Swedish ‘alternative Nobel Prize’, the Right Livelihood Award, in December 1997.
5 In 1964, Wirmark was succeeded as secretary general of WAY by the Swede Carl-Axel Valén.
General of the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC). As secretary general of WAY, Wirmark also invited Oliver Tambo of ANC of South Africa to the First Pan-African Youth Seminar in Tunis, Tunisia, in April 1960, only a few days after he had gone into exile in Bechuanaland. Wirmark managed to send him an air ticket through the future President of Botswana, Seretse Khama, then Chief of the Bamangwato.

On his first political mission as roving ambassador of ANC—a function which he would exercise for the following thirty years—Tambo arrived in Tunis, where he, in Wirmark’s words, “gave a fantastic speech about the struggle for freedom in South Africa. It was on the basis of non-violence, which was the ANC policy at that time”. The meeting between Tambo and Wirmark “laid the foundation for a friendship that went on for a very, very long time.

1 In his autobiography, Nkomo writes that the WAY meeting took place “late in 1957” (Joshua Nkomo: The Story of My Life, Methuen, London, 1984, p. 72). The correct dates are 3–20 August 1958.
2 Tambo crossed into Bechuanaland on 30 March 1960, a week after the Sharpeville massacre and the same day as the South African government declared a state of emergency. ANC and PAC were banned on 8 April 1960. In Bechuanaland, Tambo was put up in a Lobatse hostel for visiting chiefs by the British Resident Commissioner. (Ronald Segal: Into Exile, Jonathan Cape, London, 1963, pp. 280–284.) Invited to Denmark, Tambo addressed the Labour Day demonstrations in Copenhagen and Aarhus on 1 May 1960.
3 Interview with David Wirmark, Stockholm, 20 February 1996.
Until the end. I saw him about one month before he died. Wirmark also established warm friendships with Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda at an early stage and was invited to the independence celebrations in Tanganyika in December 1961 and in Zambia in October 1964. As a curiosity, it could be noted that he in connection with a trade union seminar in Algiers in July 1962 also met Nelson Mandela.

WAY took a number of initiatives on Southern Africa in the early 1960s. South Africa featured prominently in this connection, but also Angola, where MPLA and FNLA in February–March 1961 had initiated the war for national liberation. In May 1962, WAY sent a mission to Congo to assess the general refugee situation and present proposals for concrete actions in favour of the Angolan nationalists. A representative from SUL participated in the mission. Presenting the mission report, in September 1962 WAY announced its support for the creation of a front between MPLA, UPA and PDA. The recommendation was similar to MPLA’s proposal for a united Angolan national front.

With regard to South Africa, WAY and SUL were close to ANC. At the beginning of the 1960s, WAY and ANC co-published a guide for action against apartheid called *What Can I Do?*. In Sweden—where the future Liberal Prime Minister Ola Ullsten became an influential board member in October 1961—SUL supported the South Africa Committee, invited Chief Luthuli to Sweden in connection with his journey to Norway for the Nobel Peace Prize and co-arranged Oliver Tambo’s visit to Sweden in August 1962.

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1 Ibid. Oliver Tambo died in April 1993.
3 Conversation with Wirmark on 20 February 1996. Mandela was smuggled out of South Africa in January 1962 to rally support for ANC and attend the conference of the Pan-African Freedom Movement of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA) in Addis Ababa in February. For almost seven months, Mandela travelled widely in Africa, meeting with nationalist leaders. With Oliver Tambo, he also paid a visit to London in June 1962, where he met Hugh Gaitskell and Jo Drummond, leaders of the Labour and Liberal parties. On 5 August 1962—i.e. shortly after his return to South Africa—Mandela was arrested (see Nelson Mandela: *Long Walk to Freedom*, Macdonald Purnell, Randburg, 1994, pp. 277–303).
6 Ibid., p. 307. Wirmark—who at an early stage befriended the FNLA leader Holden Roberto—was later in favour of official Swedish support to both MPLA and FNLA.
7 ANC/WAY: *What Can I Do?: A Guide to Action against Apartheid* [no place or date].
8 Luthuli never visited Sweden as the South African government refused to extend his travel document.
Above all, it was on SUL’s direct initiative that the general assembly of WAY in Aarhus, Denmark, in July 1962 responded to ANC’s call for an isolation of South Africa, urging its national members to “bring all possible pressure to bear on their governments to apply effective economic and diplomatic sanctions and to impose an arms embargo on the Republic of South Africa”, as well as to “support by all conceivable active measures an international boycott of South African goods”. A Swedish boycott campaign was launched on 1 March 1963. The main address on this historic occasion was given by Duma Nokwe, Secretary General of ANC.

The 1962 Afro-Scandinavian Youth Congress

The Swedish university students and the wider youth movement coordinated their international activities closely with the other Nordic countries. As early as 1961, for example, the WUS committees in Denmark, Norway and Sweden launched a joint fund-raising campaign in support of the Pope Pius XII University in Basutoland. Promoting the campaign, they also published a book on Africa with contributions by the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld and the British journalist and historian Basil Davidson.

A particularly important example of Nordic coordination was the Afro-Scandinavian Youth Congress held at the University of Oslo, Norway, during two summer weeks in August 1962, less than a year after Luthuli had received the Nobel Peace Prize in the Norwegian capital and only one month after the WAY assembly in Aarhus recommended a boycott against South Africa. Despite the name, the congress was a joint venture by the political youth and student organizations in all the five Nordic countries, including Finland and Iceland. In the history of direct Nordic-African cooperation, it represents a major pioneering, non-sectarian initiative, setting an example for future regional initiatives in the fields of development aid and foreign policy.

Following a major organizational effort, 225 representatives attended the congress, out of whom 125 were from Africa and 100 from the Nordic countries. There were delegates from practically all the African nations, according to the Norwegian conservative daily Aftenposten “epitomizing a world drama

1 ANC first called for an international boycott at the All-African Peoples’ Conference in Accra in December 1958.
2 ANC/WAY op. cit., p. 42.
3 In Sweden, the campaign was supported by the WUS committee, SFS and SACO (Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation), i.e. the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations.
5 The documentation on the congress is from Afro-Scandinavian Youth Congress/Congrès Afro-Scandinave de la Jeunesse, Oslo, 10–31 August 1962: “Report”, edited by Ådne Goplen, Oslo, 1962 (below referenced as ‘ASYC Report’). The Norwegian newspapers Aftenposten, Arbeiderbladet and Dagbladet have also been consulted. Of the 100 Nordic participants, almost 70 were from the host country, 10 from Denmark, 4 from Finland, 2 from Iceland and 16 from Sweden.
which the movies, papers and news cables only faintly can express. Their mere presence provokes excitement”.¹ Not less than one fourth of the Africans were from Southern Africa (including Tanzania and Zambia), either representing student organizations or nationalist movements. All the major political currents were, in addition, represented. In the organizing committee, there were representatives from both the Norwegian Communist and Conservative Student Leagues.² Observers from IUS and ISC/COSEC, as well as from WFDY and WAY, were also in attendance. The congress thus represented a break with the Cold War divisions of the 1950s.³ At the same time, it reflected the support socialist ideas enjoyed among the youth. In spite of a strong presence by Nordic independents, liberals and conservatives, in the elections to the congress presidency all three Nordic positions went to socialists.⁴ The three African representatives elected were Rupiah Banda from UNIP of Zambia, Raymond Kunene from ANC of South Africa and Blaise Mobio from the Ivory Coast, representing the Federation of Students from Black Africa in France (FEANF).⁵

The general objective of the congress was to “strengthen the bonds of friendship between [Nordic] students on the one hand and African students on the other”.⁶ The organizers had for this purpose engaged a number of prominent Norwegian lecturers to talk about ‘The Individual and the Community in Scandinavia’, ‘Social Welfare Institutions in Scandinavia’, ‘Organisational Life in Scandinavia’ and similar topics. The effort to present a Scandinavian, or a Nordic, model of society preceded later Swedish initiatives vis-à-vis SWAPO and ANC regarding post-apartheid Namibia and South Africa by some twenty-five years. The African delegates were also treated to a reception by King Olav

¹ Aftenposten, 10 August 1962.
² The official Swedish delegation comprised 1 independent, 1 from SFS, 1 from DU (Demokratisk Ungdom, i.e. the Communist Youth), 1 from the socialist Clarté Association, 4 from the Social Democratic youth, 3 from the Liberal youth and 4 from the Conservative youth. In addition, David Bromberg from WAY participated as an observer.
³ Of the 125 African delegates, 20 were at the time residents of Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic or the Soviet Union, while 8 lived in Sweden.
⁴ Björn Kumm of the Swedish Social Democratic Students, Torild Skard of the Norwegian Socialist Students’ League and Jern Stage of the Social Democratic Students of Denmark. Writing for the Social Democratic evening paper Aftenbladet, three years later Kumm eluded the South African security police and published a series of important articles on South Africa (as well as Namibia and Zimbabwe). Reportedly as the first international journalist ever, he interviewed Winnie Mandela in her home in Orlando outside Johannesburg, presenting the situation of both Nelson and Winnie Mandela to a wide readership (Aftenbladet, 16 July 1965). In his memoirs, the former South African security agent Gordon Winter has described how Kumm “took the South African government for a massive ride” (Gordon Winter: Inside BOSS, South Africa’s Secret Police, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1981, pp. 82–83).
⁵ In French, Fédération des Étudiants d’Afrique Noire, France.
Presidency at work: Raymond Kunene of ANC (seated in front) and Björn Kumm of the Swedish Social Democratic Student Union (seated at the back) during the Afro-Scandinavian Youth Congress in Oslo, Norway, August 1962.
(Courtesy of Anna-Greta Leijon)

and Crown Prince Harald,¹ introduced to the workings of the Norwegian parliament² and after the congress invited on a week-long tour of the western parts of Norway.³

For the assembled Nordic youth,⁴ the congress would from the outset represent something entirely different from the inoffensive, friendly discussions

¹ *Aftenposten*, 16 August 1962. At the time, Martin Legassick of ANC—representing NUSAS at the congress—was a fellow student of Crown Prince Harald at Oxford, England.

² *Aftenposten*, 22 August 1962.


⁴ And the Norwegian press. The local newspapers covered the congress extensively—often on the first page—but also presented it as “conducted by students from Moscow and Prague” (Anna-Greta Leijon: *Alla Rosor Skall Inte Tuktas!* (‘All Roses Shall Not Be Pruned!’), Tiden, Stockholm, 1991, p. 73). Cf. ‘Skandinavene er helt utmanøvrert’ (‘The Scandinavians are completely outmanoeuvred’) in the Social Democratic newspaper *Arbeiderbladet*, 20 August 1962.
expected by many. Despite the unitary approach, the proceedings got off to a “tumultuous [and] chaotic start”\(^1\) when a majority of the African delegates—“clearly indicating that [they] had not come to see the Norwegian fjords”\(^2\)—opposed a ruling by the organizing committee that no political resolutions were to be adopted. Supported by the Nordic socialist and liberal representatives, the African position prevailed. By an overwhelming majority, the congress gave itself the power to pass resolutions on the topics discussed.\(^3\) In reaction, about thirty conservative Nordic delegates decided to abstain from partaking in any resolutions.\(^4\)

In spite of the boycott by the Nordic conservative representatives, it was the contemporary political problems of Africa and the world\(^5\) that dominated the discussions. The encounter between the future leaders of Africa and the Nordic youth resulted in a number of important guidelines for common action. They were, in turn, facilitated by the quite outstanding political representativity and intellectual quality of the African lecturers the organizers had managed to invite. El Mehdi Ben Barka from Morocco gave a lecture on ‘Political Trends in Africa’, while Oliver Tambo from South Africa addressed the congress on ‘Racial Problems in Africa’.\(^6\) In his lecture, Tambo strongly backed the recommendations made a month earlier at the Aarhus WAY meeting, advocating “boycott of South African goods, application of economic and other sanctions on South Africa and enforcement of a strict embargo on the supply of arms and military weapons and equipment to South Africa. ”My problem”, the ANC leader said to the African and Nordic youth,

in calling for pressures on South Africa is to convince the youth to convince their governments and people that it is not the South African goods that are cheap, but the forced labour of the Africans. [...] The enemies of Africa are those devoted

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2. Ibid.
3. After the vote, Rupiah Banda from UNIP of Zambia—at the time studying sociology and international economics at the University of Lund in Sweden and an elected member of the congress presidency—commented that “the Nordics must be prepared to hear what we want to say and the conservatives [among them] should give us their views instead of withdrawing” (Cited in Aftenposten, 16 August 1962).
4. ASYC Report, p. 141. The first abstaining participants represented the Conservative Students of Bergen, Norway (BKSF), the Conservative Students of Oslo, Norway (DKSF), the Christian People’s Party Youth of Norway (KFUF), the Conservative Students of Copenhagen, Denmark (KS), the Liberal Students of Åbo (Turku), Finland (LS), the Conservative Students of Sweden (SKSF), the Conservative Students of Trondheim, Norway (TKSF), the Conservative Youth of Norway (UH) and the National Youth of Iceland (ÆSI). They were later joined by six delegates from the national student unions in Denmark (DFS), Iceland (SHI), Norway (NSS) and Sweden (SFS).
5. Thus, the congress passed a resolution which characterized the European Common Market (EEC/EU) as ”a new form of neo-colonialism” (ASYC Report op. cit., p. 142).
6. Nelson Mandela was arrested on 5 August 1962. Following the arrest, Tambo led an emergency meeting of the ANC external mission in Dar es Salaam. From there, he proceeded to Oslo.
friends of apartheid and racial discrimination—governments, countries or concerns—which have trade agreements with South Africa.¹

Tambo’s call was reflected in the resolutions adopted. The main resolution on South Africa demanded “the imposition of total economic, diplomatic and cultural sanctions [against South Africa] as called for by the African people in the [United Nations] and [...] unreserved material and moral support for the liberation movements in South Africa”.²

With eight delegates and supporting members from NUSAS,³ ANC was strongly represented at the congress. Its call for isolation of South Africa was, in addition, supported by Uatja Kaukuetu⁴ and Charles Kauraisa from SWANU of Namibia.

The IUS-affiliated UGEAN—the student organization representing the Portuguese colonies in Africa—had an even stronger presence. Formed as recently as in September 1961 and politically aligned with MPLA of Angola, PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau and—from its founding in June 1962—FRELIMO of Mozambique, UGEAN had sent not less than nine representatives to Oslo. Among them were such prominent youth leaders as Henrique ‘Iko’ Teles Carreira, the future Defence Minister of independent Angola,⁵ Joaquim Chissano, the future Minister of Foreign Affairs and President of Mozambique⁶ and Manuel Pinto da Costa, the future President of São Tomé and Príncipe.⁷ The UGEAN dele-

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² Ibid. p. 143. PAC was invited, but did not attend (ASYC Report op. cit., p. 167).
³ Billy Modise, for example, represented both ANC and NUSAS.
⁴ Kaukuetu does not appear on the official list of participants. He did, however, attend. See Dagbladet, 22 August 1962.
⁵ Carreira was at the time based in Rabat, Morocco. A member of the same anti-colonial cell as Amílcar Cabral and Lúcio Lara—and after deserting from the Portuguese air force in 1961—he had to leave Portugal and was smuggled to France in a group together with Joaquim Chissano in July 1961. In December 1962, four months after the Oslo congress, Carreira became a member of the MPLA executive committee at the movement’s first national conference in Léopoldville, Congo, being responsible for security matters (see ‘A Última Batalha do General Iko Carreira’/’The Last Battle of General Iko Carreira’ in Revista Expresso, No. 1251, 19 October 1996, pp. 37–61). In 1996, Carreira published his political memoirs under the title O Pensamento Estratégico de Agostinho Neto: Contribuição Histórica (‘The Strategic Thoughts of Agostinho Neto: An Historical Contribution’), Dom Quixote, Lisbon.
⁶ Representing UGEAN, Chissano—who at the time was a medical student in Poitiers, France—was also the President of the National Union of Mozambican Students (União Nacional dos Estudantes Moçambicanos; UNEMO). After the Oslo meeting, he returned to Africa, where he settled in Dar es Salaam and attended FRELIMO’s first congress in September 1962. Chissano’s participation at the Oslo congress was his “last job to [...] promote the liberation struggle in Europe”. In an interview in May 1996, Chissano recalled that during his stay in Scandinavia he met the future Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson (interview with Joaquim Chissano, Maputo, 2 May 1996).
⁷ Pinto da Costa studied economics in Leipzig in the German Democratic Republic. In September 1960, da Costa was among a group of Sântomean students who formed the first modern nationalist organization on the islands, the Liberation Committee of São Tomé and Príncipe, CLSTP (Comité de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe). In 1972, the organization was reconstituted as the Liberation Movement of São Tomé and Príncipe, MLSTP. Pinto da Costa was elected Secretary General. He became the country’s first President at independence in July 1975.
gation was behind a long resolution passed on the Portuguese colonies. It appealed to “all peoples and governments working for peace and liberty […] to give concrete and effective help to the nationalists […] and to press the Portuguese government [to] act according to the will of the people in its colonies [and accord] them immediate and unconditional liberty”. ¹ Thirty years later, Chissano recalled that the Nordic students’ engagement for Southern Africa was very strong. Actually, they were very alert and knew what was going on. Not so much in the Portuguese colonies, because they were mainly discussing matters related to apartheid and racialism in South Africa. There was a big discussion about whether to support an armed struggle, a violent revolution, or not. It was very interesting, because in Mozambique we were still trying to see if we could fight peacefully for independence, although we could already see that the armed struggle was an alternative.² There was also the question whether a struggle for liberation in South Africa was viable without the independence of Mozambique. […] We had very interesting discussions.³

Deliberations on the independence struggles in Central Africa⁴ were introduced by influential members of UNIP from Zambia, such as Rupiah Banda and Emmanuel Chalabesa—both studying in Sweden⁵—while Simbi Mubako ⁶ and his colleagues from ZAPU ⁷ represented the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe. The congress proclaimed its full solidarity with the people[s] of Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia in their courageous struggle for full independence of their nations, which implies the elimination of the Central African Federation imposed by the European minorities, the establishment of the principle of universal suffrage in each country [and] the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination.⁸

The participants also appealed for support to the Rhodesia Campaign launched in favour of Kenneth Kaunda and UNIP in Sweden two months earlier.⁹

Although the congress covered the whole of Africa, the main focus was clearly on the southern parts of the continent, including the little known Portu-
Sympathetic profiles on 'Iko' Carreira from Angola and Joaquim Chissano from Mozambique were, for example, published by the Norwegian press. In addition, when the African delegates at the end of the two weeks arranged a well attended public meeting in Oslo, they were represented by three speakers from Southern Africa, namely Raymond Kunene from ANC of South Africa, Agrippa Mukahlera from ZAPU of Zimbabwe and Henrique de Carvalho Santos ('Onambwe') from UGEAN and MPLA of Angola.

It was also the situation in Southern Africa that primarily attracted the attention of the Swedish representatives. The future cabinet member Anna-Greta Leijon represented the Swedish Social Democratic students at the congress. In her memoirs, she underlines that the young Social Democrats “established particularly good relations with the youth from Southern Africa [and that] the contacts [we] made in Oslo were used back in Sweden”. Together with other young Social Democratic women, Leijon would soon become an influential member of a new, internationalist generation around Olof Palme. It is in this context not without significance that during the Oslo congress she became close to ANC’s London representative Raymond (Mazisi)

1 The situation in Angola was, however, quite well known. In Sweden, the liberal evening paper Expressen had in mid-1961 carried out an important fund-raising campaign in favour of the Angolan refugees in Congo. In addition, student organizations in Finland, Norway and Sweden had in October 1961 invited the Portuguese nationalist Henrique Galvão on a lecturing tour which was largely dedicated to Angola.
2 Dagbladet, 18 August 1962.
3 Dagbladet, 21 August 1962.
4 The host country, Norway, was a NATO member together with Portugal.
5 The meeting took place at Oslo’s Main Square ('Stortorget'). Although held in the early afternoon on a mid-week summer’s day, it attracted over a thousand people. The Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet—which co-sponsored the event— noted that “long after the meeting had ended, many in the audience remained at the square to talk to the young Africans, with the result that several were late for the service at Oslo cathedral” ('Rasehat og imperialisme rene djevelskapet’/’Racial hatred and imperialism pure devilry’ in Dagbladet, 24 August 1962).
6 ‘Onambwe’ studied at the time in Heidelberg in the Federal Republic of Germany. He was elected to the MPLA central committee at the Inter-Regional Conference in September 1974 and to the political bureau of the ruling MPLA-Workers’ Party (MPLA-PT) in December 1977. One of the top leaders of Angola’s feared security organization DISA in the late 1970s, he later served as Minister of Industry.
7 Dagbladet, 24 August 1962.
8 According to Chissano, “the Swedes already had a full vision about the whole issue” (interview with Joaquim Chissano, Maputo, 2 May 1996).
9 At the age of thirty-four, Leijon entered the Swedish government as Minister without Portfolio in 1973. She became Minister of Labour in 1982.
10 Leijon op. cit., pp. 73 and 74.
11 Many socialist women in the 1960s were influential in the formation of the Swedish solidarity opinion towards the liberation struggles in Southern Africa and elsewhere. Together with Sara Lidman, Leijon was among the first to publicly denounce the war in Vietnam. Birgitta Dahl, Lena Hjelm-Wallén and Anna-Greta Leijon had in the early 1960s become internationally concerned—largely through the Social Democratic Laboremus association in Uppsala—and they were all actively involved with South and Southern Africa. Dahl entered the Swedish parliament in 1969 and the government in 1982; Hjelm-Wallén in 1969 and 1974, respectively; and Leijon in 1973.
Kunene. In February 1963, he was invited to Sweden by SUL and the political student organizations in Uppsala. More importantly, in the summer of 1963 Leijon worked for some time with Tambo and Kunene at the ANC office in London, deepening the relations between the Swedish Social Democratic youth and the South African liberation movement.

The 1962 Afro-Scandinavian Youth Congress was important in many respects, one of them being that it brought many future African and Nordic political leaders closer together, consolidating a process which had begun through SFS, ISC/COSEC and WAY. The contacts also offered political openings at a higher level. In connection with his lecture at the Afro-Scandinavian Youth Congress, the ANC Deputy President-General Oliver Tambo was thus received by the Norwegian Social Democratic Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen. From Oslo he proceeded to Stockholm—where he had already been in April 1961—for talks with Gerhardsen’s Swedish colleague Tage Erlander and his assistant Olof Palme. From there he continued to Copenhagen to meet Prime Minister Viggo Kampmann. The Danish capital was also familiar to Tambo. In fact, Denmark was the first European country to receive the ANC leader. Barely one month after going into exile, Tambo had been invited by the Danish trade union confederation (LO) to address the Labour Day celebrations in Copenhagen and Aarhus on 1 May 1960.

Swedish Writers and African Voices in Sweden

Of particular importance for the formation and growth of the Swedish solidarity opinion with South and Southern Africa was that influential political journalists, such as Ivar Harrie and Herbert Tingsten, visited South Africa at an early stage and in strong terms denounced apartheid. Harrie and Tingsten were chief editors of the two biggest national Swedish liberal newspapers—Harrie of

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1 A prominent poet and academic authority on African art and literature, Kunene had settled in London in 1959.
2 In her memoirs, Leijon writes that “I should not deny that it [was] partly Raymond Kunene that personally attracted [me to London]” (Leijon op. cit., p. 76).
3 Perhaps as important was that it brought young African nationalists from different countries together.
4 Tambo’s visit to Sweden was well covered in the press (See Aftonbladet, 23 August 1962, Dagens Nyheter, 24 August 1962 and Upsala Nya Tidning, 24 August 1962). The conservative newspaper Svenska Dagbladet gave a positive portrait of Tambo, describing him as “a good representative of the leading layer of the educated Africans. He speaks in a cultivated and modulated way. He is calm and logical and presents his points of view without once showing a hint of fanaticism” (Svenska Dagbladet, 24 August 1962).
5 Christopher Morgenstjerne: ‘Denmark and National Liberation in Southern Africa’, Draft, Copenhagen, January 1998. Lindiwe Mabuza later recalled: [W]hen he left South Africa in 1960, [Tambo] went straight to Denmark, at the invitation of the Social Democratic Party. I remember him telling me what a fantastic experience that was. Arriving in Copenhagen, [...] the streets were paved with Danes with the Danish flag to welcome him” (interview with Lindiwe Mabuza, Bonn, 14 March 1996).
the evening tabloid Expressen and Tingsten of the morning paper Dagens Nyheter—and their opinions carried a lot of weight, particularly in the political centre. As early as 1949, Harrie wrote a number of major critical articles under the heading ‘Encounter with South Africa’ in Expressen and between December 1953 and February 1954 Tingsten published not less than twenty pieces on South Africa in Dagens Nyheter. In 1954 they were published as a book, which the following year appeared in English. It also played a role in Southern Africa.

The contributions by Harrie and Tingsten should not be underestimated. Forty years later, the former South African Foreign Minister Roelof ‘Pik’ Botha—who served as a young diplomat at the South African embassy in Stockholm from June 1956 until January 1960—recalled how his arrival in Sweden

became a very sudden introduction into a [...] critical world. [...] The Swedish media at the time were very critical and even hostile towards the South African government. [...] Very much so. [...] Professor Tingsten was the editor of Dagens Nyheter and Dr. Harrie was the editor of Expressen. I even remember the names till the present moment. That was forty years ago, so you can conclude that their attitude, and the Swedish media’s attitude, towards South Africa must have caused a stir in my soul, a turbulence in my own thinking.

Botha also remembered the anti-apartheid articles in the liberal newspaper Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning by Gunnar Helander, who had served as a CSM missionary in Zululand and Johannesburg between 1938 and 1956. Helander—who was close to the ANC President Albert Luthuli—started to denounce the apartheid system while he was in South Africa, partly through a number of novels published in both English and Swedish. His first novel, Zulu Meets the White Man, was published by the Church of Sweden publishing house in 1949.

During the following ten years, Helander would through the same publisher on average distribute one anti-apartheid novel per year.5 Sketches at the Volcano was published in 1953.6 In the opinion of Herbert Tingsten, who later that year made his fact-finding mission to South Africa, a “better introduction to the large subject [of apartheid South Africa] would be impossible to find”.7 In 1961, Helander contributed a chapter on ‘The Ideology of Hatred—and Love: South Africa Facing a Choice’ in Feat and Brotherhood: A Book about Pioneer Contrib-

1 Harrie was the chief editor of Expressen from 1944 to 1960 and Tingsten held the same position at Dagens Nyheter from 1946 to 1960. With a daily edition of about 350,000 copies, Dagens Nyheter had in the 1950s more than twice as many readers as the conservative Svenska Dagbladet and the Social Democratic Stockholms-Tidningen.


3 Interview with Roelof ‘Pik’ Botha, Cape Town, 12 September 1995.


5 Helander’s novels had by 1995 been published in nine languages.


7 Cited from the cover of Helander’s Sydafrikansk Rapsodi.
butions in Africa,\textsuperscript{1} which also contained a presentation of Julius Nyerere by CSM’s Bengt Sundkler.\textsuperscript{2} This important early anthology in Swedish on missionary activities in Africa was primarily addressed to a religious readership. In that light, it is noteworthy that the foreword unequivocally stated that “in Sweden we follow the liberation struggle of the black peoples with excitement and deep sympathy”.\textsuperscript{3} Among Helander’s more important contributions should, finally, be noted \textit{A South African Rhapsody},\textsuperscript{4} a collection of some of his earlier writings with a provoking additional chapter entitled ‘Keep Silent on South Africa?’, published by the Church of Sweden in 1963. Helander was at the time vice-chairman of the Swedish South Africa Committee. Published when the consumer boycott of South African goods was launched in Sweden, it found an important readership outside the church and was recommended for study circles by the emerging anti-apartheid movement.\textsuperscript{5}

Dean Helander was a co-founder of the Swedish South Africa Committee in March 1961, becoming one of the most prominent anti-apartheid activists in Sweden. He worked closely with the much younger Per Wästberg, who in late 1958 had been given a scholarship by Rotary International to study at the recently opened University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in Salisbury (now Harare). Wästberg soon sided with the nationalists and after publishing what the Rhodesian authorities considered unfavourable reports in \textit{Dagens Nyheter},\textsuperscript{6} he was declared \textit{persona non grata} and asked to leave. He subsequently spent some time in South Africa before returning to Sweden as a committed opponent of apartheid and racial discrimination, launching the Swedish Fund for the Victims of Racial Oppression in September 1959. The following year he published his first two political accounts on Southern Africa, \textit{Forbidden Territory} about Zimbabwe and the Central African Federation and \textit{On the Black List} about South Africa, both of which were translated into several foreign languages, including Russian.\textsuperscript{7}

Wästberg’s two books—the first eventually published in 90,000 copies and the second in just under 80,000 copies in Sweden alone\textsuperscript{8}—represent a water-
shed in Swedish reporting on Southern Africa and would for a long time be read and discussed in study circles all over the country.\(^1\) In 1961, Wästberg also published *Africa Narrates*,\(^2\) an important anthology through which he introduced over fifty African writers to a wide Swedish public. Among them were several South Africans and the Angolan poets Mário de Andrade and Agostinho Neto, both leaders of MPLA. The book Wästberg published in 1962 together with Anders Ehnmark, a journalist at *Expressen*, under the title *Angola–Mozambique* had an equally great impact.\(^3\) It was the first political account in book form by Swedish observers on the situation in the Portuguese colonies in Southern Africa. It was translated into English and partly into Russian in 1963.\(^4\)

Finally, around 1960 the interested public started to get direct access to the writings of Southern African nationalist leaders in the Swedish language. *African Nationalism* by the future ZANU leader of Zimbabwe, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, was issued by the publishing house of the Swedish Mission Covenant Church in 1960, only a year after it was first published in Cape Town.\(^5\) It was, likewise, through the publishing houses of the church that the autobiography of the ANC leader Albert Luthuli, *Let My People Go*\(^6\) and of the future Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, *Zambia Shall Be Free*,\(^7\) were published in Swedish in 1962 and 1963. Luthuli’s book was available in Swedish the same year as it appeared in English, while the translation of Kaunda’s auto-

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\(^1\) Fifteen years after the original, *Forbidden Territory* was in 1975 published in an updated edition, numbering 10,000 copies (Per Wästberg: *Förbjudet Område*, Wahlström & Widstrand, Stockholm, 1975).

\(^2\) Per Wästberg: *Afrika Berättar*, Cavefors, Malmö, 1961. The anthology was eventually published in 16,000 copies and also translated and published in Denmark, Finland and Norway in a total of 10,000 copies.

\(^3\) Anders Ehnmark & Per Wästberg: *Angola–Moçambique*, Studentföreningen Verdandi, Uppsala; Cavefors, Malmö and Prisma, Stockholm, 1962. Ehnmark wrote the part on Angola and Wästberg the study on Mozambique.


\(^5\) Ndabaningi Sithole: *Ge Oss Vårt Afrika* (*Give Us Our Africa*), Gummesson, Stockholm, 1960. It was translated by Jan-Erik Wikström, who was active in the Swedish Mission Covenant Church Youth and had visited South Africa in 1959, publishing a series of critical articles in *Expressen* in November of that year. In one of the articles (*Sydafrika mot katastrof* /’South Africa towards catastrophe’), he gave a sympathetic presentation of PAC—founded only six months before—based on an interview with Robert Sobukwe. In the article, Sobukwe stated that PAC was of the opinion that ANC was not “sufficiently anti-Communist”, but welcomed a boycott of South African goods (*Expressen*, 19 November 1959). Wikström became a Liberal MP in 1970, serving as Minister for Education from 1976 to 1982.


biography appeared one year after the original English text. It could, in addition, be noted that it was the Swedish Mission Covenant Church which in 1966 published Nelson Mandela’s *No Easy Walk to Freedom*—with a foreword by Ruth First—the year following its publication in English.¹

Outside the church—but still within the established political centre—other important initiatives were taken in the early 1960s to familiarize the Swedish public with the Southern African liberation movements and their leaders. In March 1961—immediately following the outbreak of the Angolan war of liberation and at the height of the Congo crisis—*Expressen* started a series of full-page articles under the title ‘Africa from within’, with the stated objective ‘to broaden the Swedish debate and give a clearer presentation of African opinions’.²

Edited by Anders Ehnmark, the series of original contributions especially written for the liberal newspaper would for the first time introduce the Angolan and Mozambican nationalists to a wider Swedish readership. After a presentation of the different forces at play by the Goanese nationalist João Cabral, Assistant Secretary General of the CONCP alliance,³ in June 1961 Mário de Andrade, President of MPLA and of CONCP, presented his movement’s views on the situation in Angola.⁴ The future FRELIMO leader Marcelino dos Santos, then Secretary General of CONCP and a leader of UDENAMO of Mozambique, gave a similar account of the Mozambican struggle.⁵ Parallel to this publication effort, *Expressen* launched an important fund-raising campaign—‘The Angola Help’—in favour of MPLA, paving the way for similar activism by other Swedish newspapers later in the 1960s.

Several of the original contributions which in 1961 appeared in *Expressen* were expanded the following year and published in the book *Africans on Africa*, edited by Ehnmark and Sven Hamrell.⁶ It was the first political anthology in Swedish through which the voices of the leading African nationalist leaders could be directly heard. In addition to contributions by Patrice Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere, it contained presentations by leading Southern Africans such as Mário de Andrade (MPLA), Kenneth Kaunda (UNIP), Albert Luthuli (ANC) and Marcelino dos Santos (UDENAMO/CONCP).⁷ At


⁵ Marcelino dos Santos: ‘Striden blir svår’ (*The struggle will be difficult*) in *Expressen*, 28 June 1961.


⁷ Albert Luthuli’s presentation (*Om Jag Var Sydafrikas Premiärminister’*/*If I Were the Prime Minister of South Africa*)—originally published by the South African magazine *Drum* in December 1961—had a particular appeal in Sweden as the ANC President stated that “a form of government
the same time, *Dagens Nyheter*'s editorial writer Sven Öste—specializing in foreign affairs and one of the first Swedish journalists to critically examine the war in Algeria—published his important *The Face of Africa* with in-depth profiles of twelve African leaders based on personal interviews. Among the leaders were Hastings Banda of Malawi, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Joshua Nkomo of Zimbabwe and Holden Roberto of Angola.

Through translations of books published in foreign languages; a number of in-depth newspaper series, novels and political accounts by Swedish authors; as well as original presentations by African nationalist leaders, there was already at the beginning of the 1960s an important source of information on the struggle in Southern Africa available in the Swedish language to an increasingly interested public opinion. The material was to a great extent used in study circles organized by the popular movements all over Sweden and not limited to an intellectual elite. In addition, far from being produced by activists on the political left, the early effort to publicize the Southern African struggle was primarily due to renowned liberal authors, newspapers and publishers, as well as to members of the church.

The fact that actors in the political centre at an early stage disseminated sympathetic accounts of liberation movements such as ANC and MPLA—internationally soon to be demonized as ‘Communist’ or ‘terrorist’—largely explains why the solidarity movement did not experience the ideological left–right rift commonly experienced elsewhere vis-à-vis the Southern African nationalist organizations. On the contrary, in Sweden it was mainly liberal personalities who acted as forerunners, and it was with firm support in the political centre that the Social Democratic government from 1969 embarked on direct cooperation with the liberation movements. Furthermore, in the cases of ANC of South Africa, SWAPO of Namibia and ZAPU of Zimbabwe it was at the beginning of the 1970s the Liberal and Centre parties that pushed for Swedish support, while the Left and Social Democratic parties mainly paid attention to the nationalist organizations in the Portuguese colonies. Thus, after submitting a joint parliamentary motion in 1971 in favour of increased support to the liberation movements in general—and explicitly to ANC, as well as to MPLA and FNLA of Angola—the following year the Liberal and Centre leaders Gunnar Helén and Thorbjörn Fälldin repeated their demand, stating that

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2 Öste—representing the liberal newspaper with the biggest circulation in the Nordic area—was denied entry into South Africa.
3 The conservative Moderate Party never formed part of the anti-apartheid movement.
the Swedish support to the liberation movements has so far mainly been extended to movements in the Portuguese colonies in Africa. Considering the successes achieved by the resistance movements in Mozambique, Angola and, above all, in Guinea-Bissau, on the whole we endorse this priority. [...] Taking into account that the United Nations in its resolutions has requested the member states to [...] support resistance movements in Namibia, Rhodesia and South Africa, we[,] however[,] find it important that the movements in these [countries also] receive Swedish assistance, even if their successes so far have been modest. Even smaller contributions may here have a greatly stimulating effect.¹

It is, finally, relevant to note that it was only in the mid-1970s that the re-organized, post-Vietnam, Swedish solidarity movement with Southern Africa decided to recognize ANC as the leading liberation movement in South Africa. In the cases of Namibia and Zimbabwe, the hesitancy vis-à-vis SWAPO, ZANU and ZAPU was even more persistent.

Sweden in South Africa

A Necessary Background

Until the beginning of the 1960s, Southern Africa was in Sweden largely synonymous with South Africa (including South West Africa/Namibia), one of the very few non-European territories with which Sweden over the centuries developed close and diverse links. It was around the struggle for democracy and human rights in South Africa and Namibia that the Swedish solidarity movement for Southern Africa was formed. While Swedish historical relations with the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique were virtually non-existent and later connections to Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) primarily were limited to the activities of the Church of Sweden Mission, Swedes had since the establishment of a Cape settlement by the Dutch East India Company in 1652 played an important part in South Africa’s cultural, social and economic history. This also influenced the Swedish South Africa debate.

It falls outside this study to discuss the early relations between Sweden and South Africa. As they are incomparably broader and deeper than the connections between Sweden and the other countries in the study—forming a distinctly more complex background to the involvement on the side of the nationalist movement—they do, however, merit a slight deviation.

In his pioneering study on Scandinavians and South Africa, the US historian Alan Winquist concluded that “in many respects, at least prior to 1900, Scandinavians were the fifth (after the British, Dutch, German and French) most significant European group in South Africa. [...] What amazed the researcher is

1 The early history of Sweden’s second biggest town and chief seaport, Gothenburg (in Swedish, Göteborg), is closely linked to Holland and to the Dutch East India Company. The construction of the port was directed by the Dutch and the first Gothenburg City Council in the 1620s consisted of not less than ten Dutch, one Scot and only seven Swedes. Against this background, it is not surprising that many Swedes—particularly from the south-western parts of the country—were recruited by the company, eventually ending up in the Cape. The first Swede at the settlement was the soldier Elias Giers, who arrived in December 1653 and died there in 1660 (Berg op. cit., pp. 32–33).

that there is hardly an occupation or historical event where some significant Scandinavian contribution is not evident".¹ In the case of Sweden, there was a small, but steady emigration to South Africa from the mid-17th century and several prominent Afrikaner (or Boer) families—such as, for example, Trichardt² and Stockenström ³—were founded by Swedes. The emigration from Sweden (and the other Nordic countries) peaked in the period 1890–1910. At the end of the period, the estimated number of South Africans born in the Nordic countries was between 4,000 and 5,000, in more or less equal proportions coming from Denmark, Norway and Sweden, with a smaller group of mainly Swedish-speakers from Finland.⁴

This period also witnessed the increasing conflict between British and Afrikaner interests, culminating in the Second South African Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902. There was an active Swedish and Nordic involvement on both sides. In Sweden—where the conflict was well documented through military observers and war correspondents—opinion was divided, "although a large number of the common people viewed the Afrikaners as a brave and God-fearing folk, worthy of the highest respect and admiration".⁵ There was also direct assistance. A volunteer Scandinavian Corps and Ambulance Unit consisting of 113 men and 4 women was organized in Sweden and in the other Nordic countries.⁶ Dispatched to fight on the Boer side, it participated in the siege of Mafeking and in the battle of Magersfontein, where 27 Scandinavians were killed and many more captured on 11 December 1899.

The permanent Swedish emigrants were over the centuries assimilated into either the Afrikaner or the British European population group and their links with the motherland soon faded away. This was also the case with the scores of Swedish sailors, adventurers, artisans, navvies etc., who after the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley in 1867 and gold at the Witwatersrand in 1886 were lured to South Africa by economic opportunities not easily encountered in Sweden. More lasting imprints on the bilateral relationship were instead made by natural scientists, explorers, missionaries and businessmen. Some of the

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¹ Winquist op. cit., pp. 2 and 10.
² The Afrikaner hero Louis Trichardt was of Swedish descent, his grandfather, Carl-Gustav Trädgårdh (original Swedish spelling), emigrating from the southern Swedish town of Angelholm in the service of the Dutch East India Company in 1742. In 1835, Louis Trichardt was the first voortrekker to break away from the British administration in the Cape Colony.
³ The founder of the South African Stockenström (still spelt with Swedish umlaut) family was Anders Stockenström, who emigrated from the mid-western town of Filipstad—also through the Dutch East India Company—in the 1790s. Making his Cape career in the British administration, Stockenström was appointed landdrost of Graaff-Reinet in 1803. His son, Andries Stockenström, was in 1815 also appointed to this position. Like his father, he was heavily involved in the border wars between the British and the Xhosas.
⁴ Winquist op. cit., p. 77.
⁵ Ibid., p. 4. The Swedish Social Democrats strongly supported the Boers against the British.
⁶ Ibid., p. 163. 45 were Swedes, 25 Danes, 22 Finns (mostly Swedish-speaking), 13 Norwegians, 7 Germans, 3 Dutch, 1 Russian and 1 Italian. The Corps was led by Johannes Flygare, son of a Church of Sweden missionary and the only member born in South Africa. On the Scandinavian Corps, see also Ericson op. cit., pp. 44–54.
scientists and, in particular, the missionaries would at an early stage raise their voices against the treatment of the indigenous people at the hands of the European settlers.

More than any other category, it was naturalists who made South Africa known in Sweden. The long series of Swedish scientific expeditions to the region dates back to the mid-17th century, when Nils Matson Kiöping, an employee of the Dutch East India Company, collected animal and plant specimens for the University of Uppsala. His main account in Swedish—Description of a Travel through Asia, Africa and Many Other Heathen Countries—"became a veritable bestseller and was printed time and again during the following centuries". Another early, notable Swedish explorer employed by the Chamber of Seventeen was the colourful Olof Bergh from Gothenburg, the progenitor of the prominent South African Afrikaner Berg family. Between the 1670s and the 1720s, Bergh served for longer periods in the Cape and managed—in addition to his geographical explorations—to be imprisoned on Robben Island, marry a daughter of Batavian slaves and become the owner of the famous Groot Constantia estate outside Cape Town in 1716.

It was, however, through Carl Linnaeus, the famous 18th century botanist and originator of the modern scientific classification of plants and animals, that the Cape became a concentration area for natural scientists from Sweden. As professor of medicine and botany at the University of Uppsala, Linnaeus sent several of his pupils to South Africa. Outstanding were Anders Sparrman and Carl Peter Thunberg, who travelled extensively in the Cape in the 1770s and recorded their findings in publications which not only influenced academic circles in Sweden, but also played a major international role. Thunberg has been called ‘the father of Cape botany’. A similar pioneering role in South African ornithology and zoology was played in the mid-19th century by Johan August Wahlberg, who—sponsored by the Swedish Royal Academy of Sciences—travelled in Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal in the 1840s and in South West Africa and Bechuanaland in the 1850s. At the same time, the Swedish explorer and ornithologist Charles John Andersson began his travels and ad-

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1 Kiöping: Beskrifning om en Resa genom Asia, Africa och Många Andra Hedna Länder.
2 Berg op. cit., p. 11.
4 Anders Sparrman: A Voyage to the Cape of Good Hope, towards the Antarctic Polar Circle and round the World, but Chiefly into the Country of the Hottentots and Caffres from the Year 1772–1776, which was first published in 1782. Carl Peter Thunberg: Travels in Europe, Africa and Asia Made Between the Years 1770 and 1779, published in Uppsala 1788–93.
ventures in South West Africa,\(^1\) attracting a considerable number of Swedes to this little known part of Southern Africa.\(^2\)

South Africa also occupies a special place in Swedish missionary history. The official Swedish Mission Board was founded in 1874 and two years later the Church of Sweden Mission (CSM) sent its first missionary to South Africa, Reverend Otto Witt. He landed in Durban to work in the same area in Zululand where the Norwegian Missionary Society had been active since 1849. In 1878, CSM bought a farm at Rorke’s Drift on the Natal side of the Buffalo river, founding the first mission station there. It was called Oscarsberg in honour of the Swedish King Oscar II. The choice of name reflected the close ties between the church and the state in Sweden. During the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, the mission was the scene of the famous battle of Rorke’s Drift and laid in ruins. Rebuilt after the war, Oscarsberg became the centre of CSM’s activities in Zululand, housing the Lutheran Theological College.\(^3\)

The Church of Sweden Mission in South Africa had a sluggish start, but gained momentum in the 1890s when twenty-two missionaries were employed in Natal and Zululand. Permission to carry out missionary work in Zululand had been granted by the Zulu King Dinizulu in 1882. The following year, CSM founded the Ekutuleni mission station. Other stations were opened at Dundee, Appelsbosch, Emtulwa, Ceza and—later—in Doornfontein, Jabavu and other places outside Johannesburg. The earlier Swedish missionaries exhibited a strong sense of paternalism towards the Zulus, but over the years CSM embarked on a course allowing the indigenous people to take up leadership positions, at the same time as a policy of unification of the Lutheran communities in Natal and Zululand was pursued. The early example of Joseph Zulu—the cousin of the Zulu King Cetshwayo; ordained in the Uppsala Cathedral in 1901—has been mentioned. The policies of Africanization and unification culminated in the 1960s. The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Southern Africa—Southeast

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\(^1\) Charles John Andersson was born in Vänersborg in western Sweden. He arrived in South Africa in 1850 and became in 1853 the first European to reach Lake Ngami—discovered by David Livingstone in 1849—from a westerly direction. He discovered the Okavango river on what is today the Angolan border and made numerous journeys into various regions of South West Africa/Namibia during the period 1850–67. He was not only an explorer and a first rate ornithologist, but had also economic, colonialistic and political ambitions. In 1857, he was appointed superintendent of the Walvis Bay Mining Company; in 1858, he founded the town of Omaruru (which became the residence of a number of Swedes) and in 1864, he was proclaimed/himself Supreme Chief of the Damara (i.e. the Herero) in the war against the Nama. Andersson, who died on the Namibian–Angolan border in 1867, published a series of books, such as *Lake Ngami: Explorations and Discoveries during Four Years’ Wanderings in the Wilds of South Western Africa* (1856), *The Okavango River: A Narrative of Travel, Exploration and Adventure* (1861) and *Notes of Travel in South Africa* (1875).

\(^2\) Most important was Axel Wilhelm Eriksson, who also came from Vänersborg. Influenced by Andersson’s exploits, he arrived in South West Africa in 1866. He soon became an influential trader, based in Omaruru, specializing in long distance trade between southern Angola and the Cape. Until his death in Grootfontein in 1901, Eriksson opened up and mapped the trade routes in the western parts of Southern Africa. He was also an important landowner in Transvaal and a prominent ornithologist, donating a unique collection of Namibian birds to the museum in his native Vänersborg.

\(^3\) The college was later moved to Umpumulo.
Region was set up in 1961 with Helge Fosséus of CSM as the first bishop. He was succeeded by an African, Paulus B. Mhlungu, in the late 1960s.

Several Swedish free churches also embarked upon early missionary work in South Africa. The Holiness Union started in Natal in 1891, the Free Baptist Union in Natal in 1892 and the Alliance Mission in Natal and Transvaal at the beginning of the 20th century. Around 1960, there were some 150 Swedish missionaries in South Africa, of whom almost 60 represented CSM.¹

Finally, Swedish immigrants started commercial enterprises in South Africa. Combining private business careers with promotional activities on behalf of Sweden, some of them—such as Jacob Letterstedt²—exercised considerable influence with regard to the early regular trade relations between South Africa and Sweden.

A number of major South African enterprises were founded by Swedes.³ This is, for example, the case with South African Breweries, created in 1956 through a merger of various breweries in which Ohlsson’s Cape Breweries—founded by Anders Ohlsson⁴ in the late 1880s—was the most important. It is also the case with the Lion Match Company, resulting from an amalgamation with the Rosebank Match Company founded by the Swede Karl Lithman in Cape Town in 1887, and with Irving & Johnson—South Africa’s largest fishing company—set up in 1910 by the Scottish immigrant George Irvin and the Swede Charles Johnson.

Some of the more successful businessmen represented Swedish—and Norwegian⁵—consular interests in South Africa and later returned to Sweden. Many maintained strong links with their home country and were instrumental

² Letterstedt was Sweden’s “earliest nineteenth century emigrant success story in South Africa” (Winquist op. cit., p. 82). Born Jacob Lallerstedt outside Norrköping, he emigrated to the Cape in 1820, soon becoming one of the wealthiest and most influential citizens. He founded several businesses, among them Mariedal Brewery in Newlands and one of South Africa’s first commercial banks, the Cape of Good Hope Bank. In 1841, Letterstedt was appointed Swedish–Norwegian consul in Cape Town and in 1857 Swedish–Norwegian consul general to South Africa. In these positions, he maintained close contacts with Sweden and encouraged Nordic businessmen, scientists and explorers to come to South Africa. Through a huge endowment, the Letterstedt Society for Industry, Science and Art was set up in 1875. Still active in the Nordic countries, it has published Nordisk Tidskrift (‘Nordic Review’) since 1878 and supports inter-Nordic scientific activities.
⁴ Ohlsson, who emigrated to South Africa from Malmö in southern Sweden in the early 1860s, was initially in partnership with Axel Eriksson in South West Africa and later with Jacob Letterstedt in the Cape. He was one of the wealthiest persons in South Africa, probably becoming the most influential Scandinavian in the whole country at the end of the 19th century. In 1882, he was appointed consul for Sweden and Norway and in 1884 he entered Cape politics, elected to the legislative assembly for Cape Town, a seat he held until 1893.
⁵ Sweden and Norway were joined in a union between 1814 and 1905. Foreign policy—including consular services—was conducted by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. From the 1880s, there were increasing Norwegian demands for an independent Norwegian foreign service, which, however, were refused by Sweden. This led the Norwegian parliament to unilaterally establish Norway’s own consular services and, eventually, to the dissolution of the Swedish–Norwegian Union in 1905.
in convincing Swedish companies to establish subsidiaries on the South African market, a process which began with the ball-bearing manufacturer SKF in 1914. The commercial links between Sweden and South Africa were facilitated by the early establishment of a regular shipping service. In 1904, the Swedish Transatlantic Steamship Company started a joint service to South Africa with the Danish East Asiatic Company, organized together as the South African Trading Company. In 1911, they were joined by the Norwegian South African Line. The cooperation came to an end during the First World War, but the Gothenburg-based Transatlantic Shipping Company resumed the service after the war, establishing an office in Cape Town in 1927.

Sweden’s involvement in South Africa during the first half of the 20th century was primarily economic. The Swedish manufacturing companies Alfa Laval and Electrolux started production there before the Second World War, ASEA, Atlas Copco, Fagersta and Sandvik immediately after the war and Avesta and SKF at the beginning of the 1960s. The value of Sweden’s exports to South Africa steadily increased between 1920 and 1948, except for 1930–32 and during the Second World War. In 1948, South Africa’s share of Swedish total exports peaked at 2.3%. In that year, the country occupied third position among Sweden’s non-European trading partners, behind the United States and Argentina. However, from the peak in 1948 South Africa’s share of Swedish exports decreased continuously throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, only representing 1.0% and 0.9% in 1960 and 1970, respectively.

1 In Swedish, Rederi AB Transatlantic.
2 Alfa Laval was established in South Africa in 1920, producing cream separators, milking machines etc. at Mbeni outside Durban.
3 Electrolux started its South African operations in 1926, with vacuum cleaners and refrigerators as main products. It set up a factory at Alberton near Johannesburg in 1951.
4 ASEA began making deliveries to South Africa as early as in 1911. In 1947, Asea Electric South Africa was established and two years later it inaugurated a cable factory in Pretoria, also producing transformers and isolators. With important sales to ISCOR, South Africa’s first and largest steel works, ASEA was in the 1960s and the 1970s the leading Swedish company in South Africa.
5 Atlas Copco, producing compressed air equipment for the mining industry, was established in South Africa as Delfos & Atlas Copco in 1946. It was the second largest Swedish company in South Africa behind ASEA.
6 Fagersta (Fagersta Steels) established itself on the South African market in 1948, producing steel drills for the mines.
7 Sandvik, specializing in cemented carbide and special steels, was also established in 1948.
8 Avesta Ironworks set up its South African subsidiary, Transalloys, in 1962.
9 The ball bearing manufacturer SKF (Svenska Kullagerfabriken) established a South African subsidiary as early as in 1914 and set up a production plant at Uitenhage in the Eastern Cape in 1963.
11 Winquist Ph.D. p. 484.
Although Swedish imports from South Africa throughout the period remained below 1% of the total, Sweden was from a South African point of view an important market, particularly for agricultural products. In 1948—when the Nationalist Party came to power—Sweden was the second largest buyer of South African fruit behind Great Britain. Of significance for the upcoming boycott debate was that Sweden at the time was the largest consumer of South African apples, the second largest of pears and grapes and the fourth largest of oranges in the world.¹

Friendly Relations and Dissenting Voices

Sweden has not had as close and continuous relations with any other non-European area outside North America² as with South Africa from the mid-17th until the mid-20th century, that is, over three centuries. Through a network of contacts established by sailors, emigrants, internationally renowned scientists and explorers, priests, doctors and teachers in the various missions, adventurers and an increasing number of businessmen, South Africa was at the beginning of the 20th century relatively familiar to broad segments of Swedish society.³ It is against this background not surprising that people in both Sweden and South Africa until the 1950s were reading sympathetic newspaper accounts of each other, that diplomatic relations were friendly and directed towards the promotion of mutual commercial and cultural links and that a broad interchange developed between the two. It was not uncommon that Swedes who could afford the trip visited South Africa as tourists or for health reasons. For example, suffering from arthritis, Albert Engström, the popular author, artist and member of the Swedish Academy, was in 1936 invited to spend a couple of months in the country as a guest of the Transatlantic Shipping Company.⁴

Rarely—if ever—were any voices raised against the fact that the overwhelming majority of the South African population was excluded from the basic democratic right to vote. On the contrary, even people who in the Swedish debate spoke out in favour of the disadvantaged and defended positions on the left of the political spectrum often praised South Africa. As an example, in the book Negroland, the prominent author Artur Lundkvist⁵—who under the

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¹ Ibid., p. 501.
² Between 1840 and 1900, not less than 850,000 Swedes emigrated to North America. As a comparison, at the turn of the century the total Swedish population stood at 5.1 million.
³ The close contacts between Sweden and South Africa left imprints on the Swedish language. For example, a non-armed conscript is in Swedish known as a malaj, a direct transmission of the fact that the so-called Cape Malays—in common with other non-whites—were not allowed to carry arms while doing South African military service.
⁴ Engström’s impressions were published in 1937 in the book Med Kaaparen till Afrika (‘With the Kaaparen to Africa’), Albert Bonniers Förlag, Stockholm.
⁵ Lundkvist entered the Swedish Academy in 1968.
Banner ‘Freedom for Africa’ in 1960 led the Labour Day marches in Stockholm with Prime Minister Erlander and Kanyama Chiume from Malawi—summarized in 1949 his impressions from travels in Africa as follows:

A particular position is occupied by South Africa, a country which is strongly self-conscious from a civilizing point of view [and] ready to take over the burden of culture from the effete Europe together with America. Unfortunately, South Africa has only a couple of million whites; in the whitest country in Africa, the whites only constitute one fifth of the population! However, South Africa tries purposefully to increase the white population, primarily by inducing immigration. But the desired doubling of the number of whites would require the establishment of new industries and the investment of new capital on an enormous scale. This means: Capitalists, welcome to South Africa!

Important contacts were maintained in the 1950s between the Afrikaans-speaking white population group in South Africa and Sweden in the cultural field. In their quest for a distinct identity, the Boers had, significantly, after the defeat by the British in the Anglo-Boer War turned to the ‘Germanic’ Scandinavians to develop an Afrikaner folklore as a cultural complement to their secretive political organization around the Afrikaner Broederbond. As a result, many Afrikaner folk songs were based on Swedish melodies. One generation later, the situation was completely reversed. White Afrikaner folk dancing groups and choirs no longer visited Sweden for ideas and inspiration. Instead, Swedish musical groups took up black South African traditional hymns and freedom songs, performing in the African languages and impressing South African visitors. The direct cultural interchange with the South Africa of the majority started in 1959, when several members of the visiting musical group The Golden City Dixies sought and were granted political asylum in Sweden. It was a small, but significant, indication of both the image of Sweden held by the non-white majority and of a new Swedish attitude towards South Africa.

From being close and friendly towards white South Africa, the Swedish opinion started to change during the 1950s. What provoked the change was, of course, the extreme Afrikaner nationalism of Prime Minister Daniel Malan’s Nationalist Party and the passing of a series of draconian apartheid laws in 1948, bringing to mind the recent horrors of Nazi-Germany. In quick succession, the apartheid regime passed the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act in

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1 Artur Lundkvist: *Negroland* (‘Negroland’), Albert Bonniers Förlag, Stockholm, 1949, p. 268.

2 The Afrikaner Broederbond, a highly influential, exclusively Afrikaner secret society, was formed in 1918 to secure and maintain Afrikaner control in important areas of government, culture, finance and industry.

3 Such as ‘Boemfaderalla’. See Winquist Ph.D., p. 521.

4 Cf. interview with Walter Sisulu, Johannesburg, 15 September 1995.

5 Cf. interview with Roloef ‘Pik’ Botha, Cape Town, 12 September 1995. As a curiosity, it could be mentioned that Billy Modise of ANC and Rupiah Banda of UNIP of Zambia in the early 1960s appeared as *Billy and Banda* among university students in Lund.
1949, the Immorality Amendment Act, the Population Registration Act, the Suppression of Communism Act and the Group Areas Act in 1950, the Natives (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act in 1952 and the Separate Amenities Act, the Bantu Education Act and the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act in 1953.

This battery of discriminatory and oppressive racist laws against the non-franchised majority was strongly repudiated by influential Swedish opinion makers, such as Ivar Harrie, chief editor of Sweden’s largest evening paper, the liberal *Expressen*, and Herbert Tingsten, chief editor of the largest morning paper, the likewise liberal *Dagens Nyheter*. Harrie travelled widely in South Africa in 1949 and published a series of feature stories between March and May of the same year, describing “the great fear of miscegenation” by the white population in “a country without faith in the future”. His abhorrence of apartheid and the degrading living conditions of the blacks—exemplified by the Zulu rickshaw ‘boys’ in Durban—were, however, not matched by any deeper appreciation of the non-white majority. Presenting it as “South Africa’s great spectre”, Harrie warned against “idealization of any of the non-European groups”. According to him

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1 The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act imposed a ban on marriages between whites and members of other races, nullifying mixed marriages by South Africans abroad.
2 The Immorality Amendment Act extended the 1927 Immorality Act, making all sexual relations between white and other races illegal.
3 The Population Registration Act entered the South African population on a central register, classifying it as white, native or coloured. The coloureds were subdivided into different groups, including Indian, Griqua, Cape Malay and Chinese.
4 According to the Suppression of Communism Act practically any person or organization hostile to the government’s policy could be defined as Communist and be banned. There was no right of appeal.
5 The Group Areas Act gave the government powers to segregate the entire country by allocating separate areas to the different population groups (“The paramountcy of the white man and of Western civilization in South Africa must be ensured”...). To implement the policy, the Act provided for forced removals and resettlement.
6 Following the introduction of the Natives (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act, black males over the age of 16 were required to carry a passbook and present it to the police on demand. Apart from personal details, the book contained information on employment, poll tax and influx control.
7 The Separate Amenities Act separated whites and non-whites in public places and on trains, buses etc. It also stipulated that public amenities could be of different quality.
8 The Bantu Education Act set down rules governing black education, making an inferior curriculum compulsory. The Minister for Native Affairs could close black schools not adhering to the curriculum.
9 The Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act made strikes by black workers illegal.
10 Ivar Harrie: ‘Landet utan framtidstro?’ (‘The country without faith in the future?’) in *Expressen*, 7 April 1949.
11 Ivar Harrie: ‘Chocken i Durban’ (‘The shock in Durban’) in *Expressen*, 11 May 1949. Harrie was, in his own words, “shocked” by the conditions of the Zulu rickshaw runners. One of the first Zulu-drawn rickshaw fleets in Durban was started by the Swede Charles Johnson, the founder of Irving & Johnson, towards the end of the 1890s.
the Cape coloureds are without doubt careless and lack ambition. The natives are primitive and the hindus thrifty and generally unscrupulous. In none of the groups is there anything at all that corresponds to the cultural ambitions and results of the negroes in the USA.¹

Harrie continued to write critically about developments in South Africa throughout the 1950s. It was, however, his colleague at Dagens Nyheter, professor Herbert Tingsten,² who qualitatively changed the debate by not only presenting a penetrating indictment of white supremacy, but also introducing the anti-apartheid opposition, including the Communist Party of South Africa and the African National Congress. Tingsten visited South Africa at the end of 1953, that is, after the passing of the major apartheid laws and the year following the Defiance Campaign launched by ANC and the South African Indian Congress. In his memoirs, he later wrote that the visit developed into “an emotional involvement which sometimes grew into nausea and exasperation, being one of my strongest experiences during [my] time at Dagens Nyheter”.³ Between December 1953 and February 1954, Tingsten published not less than twenty major feature articles in Dagens Nyheter, which in 1954 appeared as a book. It was translated into English in 1955 as The Problem of South Africa.

Tingsten’s writings had a remarkable reception in Sweden and would over the following years be read and quoted as an authoritative statement on apartheid in particular and South Africa in general. According to the Swedish media researcher Lars-Åke Engblom, “Tingsten, more than anybody else, called the attention of the Swedes to the apartheid system. [His] articles [...] had an enormous impact at a time when there was no television and no active radio journalism was [...] carried out”.⁴ They constitute an important turning point for the Swedish perception of South Africa and a reference point for the broader anti-apartheid opinion, covering the socialist left as well as the non-socialist centre. It was upon these forces that the organized solidarity movement with South Africa was built at the beginning of the 1960s.

The Problem of South Africa was also read in South Africa, where it impressed black students and made them aware of distant Sweden. For example, according to the Namibian Charles Kauraisa, later Chairman of SWANU’s External Council, it was discussed by the Cape Peninsula Students’ Union and contributed to his choice of Sweden when he in 1960 was forced into exile.⁵

Tingsten’s overall impression of South Africa was

¹ Ivar Harrie: ‘Sydafrikas stora spöke’ (‘South Africa’s great spectre’) in Expressen, 5 April 1949.
² Tingsten was professor of international affairs at the Stockholm School of Economics between 1935 and 1946, when he joined Dagens Nyheter.
⁵ Conversation and interview with Charles Kauraisa, Windhoek, 20 March 1995.
even darker than I had imagined in advance. Everywhere are the traces of fear, suppression and brutality. I do not think that I have ever before seen so many unnecessary conflicts, so much meaningless pain. The five or six peoples thrown together here live in a family hell of gigantic proportions. But it is the whites who rule and they who carry the responsibility.¹

Tingsten was, thus, far from Lundkvist’s faith in the civilizing and cultural mission of the whites. On the contrary:

‘White’ [in South Africa] is only a new word to express the oft-repeated belief in the superiority of one’s own race. One is persuaded of no great positive achievement, no contribution to human progress—such as one finds in the national illusions of other countries—but the permanence and the expansion of one’s own power. [...] Liberalism is the evil, as it is for Fascists, Nazis and Communists. [...] Nowhere so much as in South Africa have I met prejudice as a way of life. It is compact, aggressive [and] accepted even where it is logically impossible. Nowhere have I found prejudice fortified by such strong walls of self-confidence, ignorance and aversion to discussion. It is the same whether you meet educated or uneducated people. [...] This refers first and foremost to the attitude of the whites in regard to the suppressed black groups of the population.

[...]
The really fantastic thing is that these people know nothing about the racial groups, the characteristics of which they describe with great emphasis and unanimity. They can’t speak a native dialect. They have never seen the slums where the black people live—except possibly a kraal in the distance during a motoring journey. They have never had a talk with an educated Negro, Indian or Coloured. [...]

Their ideas and opinions are clichés which they have been taught and which they have accepted in their youth. They never question them, any more than you scrutinize small change or bus tickets.²

As professor in political science, Tingsten, naturally, analyzed the ideology of apartheid and the various political forces in South Africa. What he found in the liberal camp made him quite disappointed:

Certain representatives of the liberal line draw near to Nationalist ideas when it comes to the ultimate aim. The professors of SABRA (South African Bureau of Racial Affairs)³ in Stellenbosch talk about total territorial separation between the races, total apartheid, [and] liberal professors in Witwatersrand and Pietermaritzburg speak of the partitioning of South Africa into federal states based on different racial groups.⁴

² Ibid., pp. 30–31, 22, 51 and 52–53.
³ The South African Bureau for Racial Affairs (SABRA) was established by the Broederbond in 1947 to hammer out a broad policy framework for the Afrikaner nationalist movement.
⁴ Tingsten op. cit., p. 113. As late as in the mid-1960s, conservative circles in Sweden advocated territorial separation between the races as a ‘solution’ to the South African question. See Svensk Tidskrift, No 2, 1964 and No 9, 1965.
For Tingsten, the solution did not lie in separation, but in racial equality. He found the newly formed Liberal Party\(^1\)—with intellectual leaders such as Alan Paton and Leo Marquard—attractive, although he was not too optimistic concerning its possibilities of becoming a viable political alternative. Tingsten was a staunch and outspoken anti-Communist. Against that background, it is interesting that he not only wrote positively about the Communist Party of South Africa, but saw it as a liberal force: “The Communist Party”, he wrote, has been banned,\(^2\) but it

worked more or less as a liberal organization [...]. [It] used to be the only [political structure] which welcomed members from all racial groups, forming trade unions among the natives and demanding total equality. A Communist in South Africa is often, according to the general usage of the word, a liberal. Many people, therefore, are inclined to regard liberals as Communists. That is an important consideration, especially when it comes to giving an idea of the oppressed racial groups.\(^3\)

Tingsten also described ANC in a positive light, presenting it as “an organization which unites the great majority of the more educated [Africans], with strong support from the black industrial population”.\(^4\) Although he did not mention it in his articles or in the book,\(^5\) during the visit Tingsten met Dr. A.B. Xuma, ANC’s President-General between 1940 and 1949, together with the Swedish missionary Gunnar Helander in Xuma’s house in Sophiatown outside Johannesburg.\(^6\) This and other contacts with black South African politicians gave him “the definite impression that the will to compromise is still strong, but that resentment increases daily through the measures of the government”.\(^7\) However, as early as in 1953 Tingsten foresaw that continued intransigence by the apartheid regime would bring the oppressed population groups together:

The white population no longer follows the watchword of ‘divide and rule’. The whites believe themselves to be strong enough to carry out a programme of total and overall suppression. The result is that the oppressed begin to unite and a common front against white rule appears for the first time as a possibility in South African politics.\(^8\)

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\(^1\) The Liberal Party was formed in June 1953. Though intended to be multiracial, it advocated a qualified franchise (dropped in 1960). Its initial appeal to blacks was therefore limited.

\(^2\) The Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) was formed in 1921. It was outlawed through the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950. The Central Executive Committee then decided to disband. Most members, however, remained active within the trade union movement, and in 1953 the party was reorganized underground as the South African Communist Party (SACP).

\(^3\) Tingsten op. cit., p. 116.

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 119.

\(^5\) Probably for reasons of security, Tingsten only said that he had “contacts with leaders of [ANC and the People’s Convention]” (Ibid., p. 125).

\(^6\) Interview with Gunnar Helander, Västerås, 12 February 1996.

\(^7\) Tingsten op. cit., p. 125.

\(^8\) Ibid.
Finally, just as Tingsten’s anti-Communism in the South African context did not restrain him from a positive opinion of the Communist Party, during the visit he also shelved his well known anti-clericalism as a result of favourable impressions of missionary work. The Swedish missionaries, he concluded, “though not politically active, [...] constitute the largest liberal group in South Africa”.

Tingsten visited a number of CSM stations in Johannesburg, Natal and Zululand, summarizing his opinion thus:

> [F]rom the point of view of democratic humanism (Christian or not), an overwhelmingly great aim has been and is being achieved. [...] Between the oppressed peoples and the master race, which now in the name of white and Christian civilization carries out oppression, stand a few thousand missionaries as barriers and mediators. Their work has no limit in this land, divided and tortured by prejudice, hate, bitterness, poverty and sickness. They have staked their cause on faith and goodness in an environment which is so difficult that living sympathy turns into perpetual pain. [...] Whichever way the future may show, these men and women can feel sure that they have fulfilled a mission in South Africa.

In his memoirs, Tingsten acknowledges the effect the encounter with the CSM missionaries had upon him and his wife: “After the travels in South Africa [...] we were converted from a quite common disbelief—not to say a common contempt among radical intellectuals—towards missionaries, to appreciation, admiration and, in a number of cases, affection.” It later led the Tingstens to address religious groups in Sweden on the subject of apartheid South Africa, which in turn had a major impact on the Swedish opinion.

One of Tingsten’s hosts in South Africa was the CSM missionary Gunnar Helander. Ordained as a priest, Helander volunteered for the Church of Sweden Mission and started to work in Natal/Zululand in 1938. He became close to Chief Luthuli and through him came into contact with ANC. Helander was the first Swede to actively raise his voice against apartheid, writing in local South African newspapers such as *The Natal Mercury* and sending articles to Swedish

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4 Tingsten (1964), p. 146 and interview with Gunnar Helander, Västerås, 12 February 1996. With a strong reputation as an anti-clerical, Tingsten’s reactions to the missionary work was a positive surprise to his CSM hosts. Helander has, for example, described how Tingsten after attending a service in a Lutheran church in Johannesburg contributed one thousand Swedish Kronor to the collection. He noted: “[It was] not a bad collection. I wrote in the collection book: ‘Contribution from Swedish heathen: 1,000 Kr.’” (Gunnar Helander: *Bestämda Artiklar: Helanders Bästa* (‘Definite Articles: Helander’s Best’), Wennbergs Bokhandel AB, Västerås, 1995, p. 23.)
5 As a Methodist church leader, Luthuli had in 1938 attended the International Missionary Conference in Tambaram, India. He was elected chairman of the Natal Missionary Conference by his white colleagues—among them Helander—in 1941. Luthuli and Helander served as board members of the Institute of Race Relations in Natal. Chief Luthuli became a member of the ANC provincial executive in Natal in the mid-1940s and was elected President-General of ANC in 1952. Through Christian Social Democratic members of the Swedish parliament, Helander campaigned at the end of the 1950s for the granting of the Nobel Peace Prize to Luthuli, an effort which was crowned with success in 1961.
newspapers as early as in 1941, that is, during the Second World War. His first attempts to publicly criticize racism in South Africa were, however, not successful. The Swedish newspapers "did not believe that an ally of Britain which was fighting against Nazi-Germany could be racist [and] my articles were sent back". Nevertheless, Helander eventually managed to have one article published in a smaller newspaper. It was noticed by the Church of Sweden and the CSM mission director "warned me that I was spoiling the cause of the mission if I angered the South African authorities. I should shut up!".

Helander did not. Instead, he started to express his opinions through a series of novels, the first of which—Zulu Meets the White Man—appeared in Swedish in 1949. Newspapers in Sweden then gradually began to accept his often very outspoken—and witty—articles, and in the 1950s he became a regular contributor to the Gothenburg-based liberal morning paper Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning. Tingsten’s interest in South Africa was partly a consequence of Helander’s articles. They also attracted the attention of the South African government. When Helander after a visit in Sweden in 1957 applied for a return

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1 Interview with Gunnar Helander, Västerås, 12 February 1996.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
visa, it was refused. He subsequently remained in Sweden, serving as a vicar in Karlskoga and later as dean of Västerås cathedral.1

A prolific writer and an indefatigable activist, Helander would during his first years in Sweden fight an often lonely battle to create broader awareness of the situation in South Africa. He constantly wrote in various national and local newspapers and was in great demand as a lecturer: "People phoned me from everywhere, asking me to come and speak about apartheid. Folk high schools, university clubs, churches and so on. Social Democratic and Liberal organizations asked me to come and speak. I gave a tremendous lot of speeches, sometimes two a day".2 This provoked strong reactions by the South African legation in Stockholm, which in collusion with Swedish extreme right organizations and through methods far from falling within the established diplomatic protocol mounted a veritable persecution campaign against him. It distributed stencilled hand-outs to the people in Helander’s congregation in Karlskoga, accusing the vicar of being a Communist agent employed by the Soviet Union to undermine the Christian civilization in South Africa.3 After being refused by all the national papers, the legation had letters in the same vein published in the extreme local newspaper Nordvästra Skånes Tidningar in southern Sweden.4 They were signed by an organization calling itself the Swedish–South African Association,5 with links to extreme right circles, stating that the day is perhaps not so distant when the Swedish public will see the consequences of defaming and spreading false propaganda against a friendly disposed nation. If the government of South Africa gets tired of these perpetual calumnies and terminates its trade relations with Sweden, what shall we then do with the goods worth 147 million Kronor that South Africa buys from us each year? No, while there is still time, let us stop malevolent persons from damaging Sweden’s reputation among the South African people!6

The legation in Stockholm—where the young ‘Pik’ Botha as Third Secretary worked with information and press matters—recorded Helander’s lectures and sent a tape to the Foreign Ministry in Pretoria, which in turn convoked resident Swedish businessmen to listen to it, asking them to use their influence to stop

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1 Helander was not allowed to re-enter South Africa until 1991, 35 years after he had left for a holiday in Sweden.
2 Interview with Gunnar Helander, Västerås, 12 February 1996.
3 Interview with Gunnar Helander, Västerås, 12 February 1996: “They tried to make life difficult for me, but I sent the papers to the [Swedish] Ministry for Foreign Affairs and they spoke to the South African government. The ministry gave them a good telling off and they stopped it. I do not think that anybody believed them in Karlskoga, but they did their best”.
4 Nordvästra Skånes Tidningar, 31 December 1958 and 1 January 1959. This was the newspaper quoted by South Africa’s Foreign Minister Eric Louw in his attack on Sweden (and Norway) in the UN General Assembly regarding the treatment of the Sami population in October 1960.
5 In Swedish, Svensk–Sydafrikanska Föreningen (SSAF).
6 Nyheterna, 11 May 1959.
the criticism. This initially met some sympathy even at the level of the Swedish diplomatic representation. In mid-1959, the outgoing Swedish envoy Alexis Aminoff gave a farewell speech to Scandinavian businessmen in Johannesburg in which he said that he had told Prime Minister Verwoerd that the Swedish people did not understand the South African situation and that the critics should not be taken seriously. Not surprisingly, Tingsten and his colleagues in the Swedish press corps fumed and several papers demanded the dismissal of Aminoff. The Social Democratic Aftonbladet headlined an article ‘Swedish minister makes a stupid statement’. Soon thereafter—probably encouraged by the attitude of the representative of the Swedish government—some forty Swedish businessmen got together in Johannesburg to set up a Swedish Public Relations Association in South Africa.

Towards the end of the 1950s and in the early 1960s, the South African government was almost pathologically preoccupied with the attitude of the Swedish press in general and Helander in particular. In public speeches and through diplomatic channels, the Pretoria regime repeatedly denounced the two, conveying an image of the innocent not fathoming why the historically close and friendly relations with Sweden all of a sudden were being questioned. For example, when Aminoff’s successor as Swedish envoy to South Africa, Eyvind Bratt, in January 1960 had his first conversation with the South African Foreign Minister Eric Louw, it was dedicated entirely to this question. Louw stated that the Swedish press coverage of South Africa was the most spiteful in the world, accusing Reverend Helander of that state of affairs. According to Louw, the individual consumers in South Africa had been so offended by the attitude of the Swedish press that they no longer wanted to buy Swedish products. At the same time, the South African newspapers started to regularly publish negative articles about Sweden. In February 1960, for example, the newspaper Die Burger strongly turned against the Swedish press in an article entitled ‘Venom in Sweden toward South Africa’.

The South African government eventually gave up the attempts to silence or counter the critical press voices in Sweden. The issue was discussed in the

1 Kyrkans Presstjänst (The Press Service of the Church of Sweden): ‘De sydafrikanska angreppen på kyrkoherde Helander’ ('The South African attacks on vicar Helander') [no date].
2 Serving as Sweden’s envoy to South Africa from 1954 to 1959, Aminoff then became ambassador to Portugal. He stayed in Lisbon from 1959 to 1963, i.e. at the time when the liberation war in Angola started.
3 Aftonbladet, 17 September 1959.
4 In October 1960, South Africa’s Foreign Minister stated in the UN General Assembly that “the press of [Sweden and Norway], particularly Sweden, has with one or two exceptions been carrying on a vindictive and malicious campaign against [South Africa]. I should say that the press campaign carried on there is one of the worst of any country in the world”.
5 Louw also said that the South African government could prove that Helander had been a member of a Nazi party and that he had been “an often seen guest at the night-clubs in Johannesburg”.
6 Letter by Eyvind Bratt to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 20 January 1960 (MFA).
7 Die Burger, 10 February 1960.
South African House of Assembly in June 1965, where Dr. Moolman, a member of the opposition United Party, asked the Minister of Information Waring “why his [ministry] does nothing in regard to the Scandinavian countries? Surely, they are one of our countries of origin [and] should be close to us”. In his reply, Waring said that

Scandinavia has not become a priority and I will tell [...] the reason why. We know the atmosphere in Scandinavia. [It] is such that we say: Why should we open up [information] offices where the possibility of success is small? [...] Quite frankly, our attitude is that [...] we do not consider it advantageous from our point of view to establish an office in the Scandinavian countries.¹

In the 1950s, Herbert Tingsten, Gunnar Helander and a few other intellectuals² forcefully broke the silence surrounding South Africa in Sweden, effectively contributing to the development and the broadening of an anti-apartheid opinion in the student and youth movements.³ That they represented liberal and church interests largely explains why the opinion from the very beginning was broadly anchored in the political centre. In addition, Tingsten and, above all, Helander⁴ presented ANC in a positive light, contributing to a generally accepted view that it was ANC that represented the black majority and constituted an alternative in South Africa. It is in this context significant that neither Tingsten nor Helander depicted ANC as dominated or controlled by the South African Communist Party.⁵ In Sweden, ANC’s alliance with the Communist Party did not narrow popular support, which was, on the contrary, broaden by the leadership under Chief Luthuli to include important liberal and church constituencies. That ANC from December 1961 embarked upon armed sabotage only marginally affected this situation.

The strong reactions by the South African government and press against influential opinion makers such as Tingsten and Helander contributed to the development of the Swedish anti-apartheid opinion,⁶ due to the non-conven-
tional methods used—particularly against Helander—and through the attacks on Swedish society in general. Publicizing the Swedish viewpoints, the public statements made against Sweden by representatives of the Pretoria regime and the anti-Swedish articles in the South African newspapers had the opposite effect of bringing the South African opposition closer to Sweden.

Nevertheless, the early Swedish anti-apartheid voices encountered resistance in milieus that in the late 1950s did not find any reason to criticize the situation. This was first and foremost the case with Swedish business interests in South Africa, but also with conservative representatives of the Swedish foreign service and the churches. Raising his voice from the largely secluded ecclesiastical world, Helander was, for example, criticized by his CSM colleagues and—above all—by some of the Swedish free churches active in South Africa.

In South Africa, Helander never held back his anti-racist views or his criticism of missionary paternalism towards the African population. It caused him a rebuke by the CSM director at the beginning of the 1940s. Forced to remain in Sweden from 1957, Helander was in a position to openly denounce the apartheid system and its constituent parts, among them the Dutch Reformed Church, by him characterized as the ‘Much Deformed Church’. Helander’s anti-apartheid activism was, however, not looked upon with entirely positive eyes by the CSM missionaries in South Africa. In a confidential letter to the mission director in Uppsala, Helge Fosséus—later in the year consecrated bishop—worriedly wrote in March 1958 that

> the hounding of South Africa in Sweden is about to crush our work out here. [...] What Helander has to say about the racial relations [...] is correct. It is just that he does not help the situation through his activities. He makes it worse. [...] [H]is attacks against the Dutch Reformed Church have appeared as dismally unreliable and it is perhaps mostly the diatribes against this church and the boer people which have hurt [the South Africans] so deeply. One would therefore like to calm him down a bit—if possible?3

At about the same, Lars Vitus, a medical doctor working for the Swedish Alliance Mission in South Africa, turned against the Swedish press and Helander. In widely published statements, he said that the newspapers in Sweden had presented a wrong picture of the situation and that credit should be given to the South African government for the money spent on black education. He particularly criticized Helander and gave as his opinion that "we missionaries feel that we do not want to sit as judges over the policy conducted

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1 Helander: "You can have pets and treat them very well. Like you do with dogs. But, you do not want a dog to vote" (interview with Gunnar Helander, Västerås, 12 February 1996).
by the [South African] government regarding the racial question”.¹ The debate within and between the Swedish missions would continue well into the 1960s. It *inter alia* concerned the Lutheran doctrine of the two kingdoms, teaching that citizens must be obedient to their secular rulers as they represent the will of God. Primarily in the Church of Sweden Mission this stand was, however, to change due to the Africanization of the Lutheran church in South Africa and to the impossibility of remaining impartial—a position shared with the other major churches in South Africa—after the Sharpeville massacre in March and the banning of ANC and PAC in April 1960.

¹ *Morgenbladet*, 9 April 1958. Helander replied in the same newspaper the following day. Cf. also the editorial ‘Missionären och Sydafrika’ (‘The Missionaries and South Africa’) in *Dagens Nyheter*, 10 April 1958.
Reactions to Apartheid

Relief and Boycott

The years 1959–61 saw the emergence in Sweden of expressions of organized solidarity with the oppressed majority in South Africa in the form of a fund-raising campaign, a consumer boycott and a national committee to coordinate and strengthen the various initiatives undertaken to raise awareness about apartheid. A number of influential South African politicians started at this time to visit Sweden and exiled students were received by Swedish universities. Following the SFS campaign against the Extension of the University Education Act, in September 1959 the Swedish government raised the issue of black South African students in the UN General Assembly and from 1960 the ruling Social Democratic Party began to pay attention to the situation in South Africa at the traditional Labour Day rallies.

The first organized expression of solidarity outside the student movement was the Fund for the Victims of Racial Oppression in South Africa,1 set up by the writer and journalist Per Wästberg together with Gunnar Helander in September 1959. Wästberg2 had been a Rotary scholar in Rhodesia. Writing a series of articles for Dagens Nyheter, he was asked in mid-1959 to leave the country, subsequently spending some time in South Africa. It was at the time of the Treason Trial. More than any previous Swedish observer, Wästberg would during his short stay not only contact a number of leading cultural personalities, such as Nadine Gordimer, the future Nobel literature laureate, but the political opposition in general and ANC in particular. The contacts resulted in informative presentations of the Congress and its allies in Dagens Nyheter and other fora,3 describing both the strength and the precarious situation of the

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1 In Swedish, Fonden för Rasförtryckets Offer i Sydafrika.
2 Wästberg was closely involved with the developments in Southern Africa from the late 1950s. With Gunnar Helander, he was among the first members of the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance. In 1963, he was a co-founder—later vice-president—of the Swedish branch of Amnesty International. Wästberg was thus involved with the local Amnesty group which in 1965 adopted the Zimbabwean ZANU leader Robert Mugabe as a political prisoner. From the beginning of the 1960s, Wästberg was also an active member of the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF). Between 1976 and 1982, he served as editor-in-chief and cultural editor of Dagens Nyheter. A prominent novelist—a trilogy published in 1968–72 sold one million copies in the Nordic countries—he was the president of the Swedish PEN Club from 1967 to 1978 and the president of International PEN between 1979 and 1986 and, again, between 1989 and 1990. In 1997, Wästberg became a member of the Swedish Academy.
movement. He also introduced a number of ANC leaders to the Swedish public, such as Albert Luthuli, Duma Nokwe, Walter Sisulu, Oliver Tambo and Lilian Ngoyi. The articles were expanded in 1960 and included in Wästberg’s important book On the Black List. Like Tingsten, Wästberg did not find any objectionable Communist influence over ANC and the Communists he met—among them Joe Slovo and Ruth First—were given sympathetic portraits, noting that “many of the admirable people one meets [in South Africa] turn out to be either Christian or Marxists. They are often the only ones who dare to practise as they preach”.2

Interviewed in 1996, Wästberg explained that “my view when I returned from Rhodesia and South Africa in 1959 was quite narrow. I wrote a great number of articles simply because I was so upset. At the time [...], my only experience of any Swedish commitment was Herbert Tingsten’s book on South Africa [and] I had also read one of Gunnar Helander’s books”.3 Coming home as a committed opponent of apartheid and racial discrimination, he, however, took the initiative of establishing the Fund for the Victims of Racial Oppression, launched through an appeal in Dagens Nyheter on 20 September 1959. The appeal stated that

the rights we consider self-evident for all human beings are being violated on a daily basis in South Africa. The African is cut off from political influence, denied the right to strike and his life is curtailed by a whole array of decrees that turn existence into a form of imprisonment. He may not settle where he wishes. He may not visit his friends or travel to his parents at a different locality without a permit. Male African urban residents are on average detained once a year. A continuous, bitter and moving, struggle is, however, being waged against all of this. Many of those, white or black, who strive for equality between the races have been deported, ruined or accused of high treason.

[...] We live far away from Africa, but through economic assistance we can still achieve something. [...] Silence descends over South Africa, [O]ur assistance can demonstrate that the conscience of the world is awake to the developments there. By assisting the victims of racial oppression we show them that they do not stand alone in their protests against the superior power.4

Financial assistance was envisaged in the form of legal, social and educational aid. It thus paved the way for future official Swedish humanitarian support in these fields:

1 Wästberg: “In actual fact, the African National Congress is as anti-Communist as one can expect” (Dagens Nyheter, 8 August 1959).
2 Per Wästberg: På Svarta Listan (’On the Black List’), p. 76.
3 Interview with Per Wästberg, Stockholm, 28 February 1996.
4 Dagens Nyheter, 20 September 1959. Some questioned an action exclusively centred on South Africa. Victor Vinde, chief editor of the social democratic Stockholms-Tidningen, commented: “Those who are horrified by racial oppression in South Africa should feel the same strong indignation when they get reports about torture in Algeria and the police reign in Nyasaland. [...] [T]he action regarding the South African question should only be seen as a beginning. No racial oppression may leave us indifferent” (Stockholms-Tidningen, 29 September 1959).
We can arrange legal aid to those who have been exposed to legalized racial persecution and assist in bringing the political mass trials in South Africa before the eyes of the civilized world. We can give social aid to families where the children have been left alone because the parents have been imprisoned or banished to another place. [And] we can help young people who have not had the same opportunities as the whites to receive Western education to take correspondence courses at foreign schools or [we can] deposit the amount [of money] needed to get [them] a passport to go abroad.\(^1\)

The original appeal was signed by fifteen leading Swedish political and cultural personalities. Among them were the chairman of the Liberal Party, professor Bertil Ohlin, the former Social Democratic Minister of Finance, Ernst Wigforss, and the chief editors Ivar Harrie, Herbert Tingsten and Victor Vinde, the latter at the social democratic *Stockholms-Tidningen*. The academic world was represented by the vice-chancellor of Uppsala university, professor Torgny Segerstedt, the church by bishop Gert Borgenstierna, Gunnar Helander and Åke Zetterberg,\(^2\) while the prominent writers Eyvind Johnson and Harry Martinson\(^3\) together with Wästberg represented the field of letters.\(^4\) To the extent that the signatories were active in party politics, they were from the Liberal and Social Democratic parties. Wästberg later recalled that we were extremely energetic in trying to have signatures of leading Swedes from all over the political spectrum. I regret to say that the only person that could be regarded as conservative [...] was the bishop of Karlstad, Gert Borgenstierna. Otherwise, all the conservative politicians and all the people from the business sector refused to sign. [...] As opinion makers we were all the time suffering from the fact that the conservatives were so reluctant to take sides. I think that they thought that the struggle—especially after Sharpeville—was led by too many lefties.\(^5\)

The Fund for the Victims of Racial Oppression was inspired by the British Defence and Aid Fund, which had its roots in an appeal made in 1953 by John Collins, chairman of Christian Action, to help the South Africans convicted for participating in the 1952 Defiance Campaign. Canon Collins and Christian Action also provided legal aid for the accused in the 1956 Treason Trial, setting up the Treason Trial Defence Fund, which in 1959 became the British Defence and Aid Fund. After the formation of various national committees and extending the operations into South West Africa and Rhodesia, the International

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\(^1\) *Dagens Nyheter*, 20 September 1959.

\(^2\) Zetterberg, a Social Democratic MP, was a leading member of the Brotherhood Movement.

\(^3\) Johnson and Martinson were members of the Swedish Academy. They shared the Nobel Prize for literature in 1974.

\(^4\) The remaining signatories were Reverend Eric Grönlund, Mrs. Signe Höjer and the editor Arvid Svärd.

\(^5\) Interview with Per Wästberg, Stockholm, 28 February 1996. Allan Hernelius, chief editor of the conservative daily *Svenska Dagbladet*, was the only representative of a major Swedish newspaper refusing to sign the appeal (conversation with Per Wästberg, Stockholm, 28 February 1996).
Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (IDAF) was formed in June 1964.¹ Wästberg visited Canon Collins in London in the autumn of 1960. It marked the beginning of a close personal relationship between Wästberg and Collins² and a lasting political understanding between Sweden and IDAF.³

The Swedish chapter was in the beginning coordinated by a small secretariat, with Eyvind Johnson as chairman, Gunnar Helander as vice chairman and Per Wästberg as secretary.⁴ Monies were raised through donations, activities in Swedish schools, street and church collections etc. From 1961, that is, after Wästberg’s visit to London,⁵ the bulk of the funds was remitted to the British Defence and Aid Fund. After the creation of the Swedish South Africa Committee at the beginning of 1961 and, above all, the launch of the SUL consumer boycott in March 1963, the contributions increased. In total estimated at some 140,000 SEK,⁶ they remained, however, small until October 1964, when the Swedish government following an appeal by the UN Anti-apartheid Committee became the first industrialized Western country⁷ to channel public funds to IDAF in London, donating an amount of 100,000 USD. From then on, Sweden would be by far the largest contributor. The Fund for the Victims of Racial Oppression was at about the same time reorganized as the Swedish National Committee of IDAF.

At IDAF’s final conference in London in May 1991, it was announced that over the years not less than 100 million British Pounds (GBP) had secretly been channelled into South Africa for the purposes of legal defence and welfare.⁸ Approximately half of the amount had been directly donated by the Swedish government and another 20% via the UN Trust Fund for Southern Africa.⁹ The total official contribution to IDAF from Sweden¹⁰ between 1964 and 1991 thus amounted to around 70 million GBP. Norway and Holland were also important contributors, while the major Western countries showed little or no interest in the humanitarian activities.¹¹ This was, above all, the case with the host coun-

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¹ The aims of the British Defence and Aid Fund were “to a) aid, defend and rehabilitate the victims of unjust legislation and oppressive and arbitrary procedures; b) support their families and dependants; c) assist in the development of a non-racial society based on a democratic way of life; and d) keep the conscience of the world alive to the issues at stake”. Its international successor, IDAF, was banned in South Africa under the Suppression of Communism Act in March 1966.  
⁴ Anna-Lena Wästberg, Ernst Michanek and Olof G. Tandberg later joined the Swedish fund.  
⁵ Canon Collins visited Stockholm together with ANC’s Robert Resha in 1961.  
⁶ Letter from Gunnar Helander to Ulla Lindström, Karlskoga, 3 May 1965. (MFA).  
⁷ India was the first country to support IDAF.  
¹⁰ Swedish NGOs also made important contributions to IDAF. For example, Save the Children (Rädda Barnen).  
¹¹ The role of IDAF can not be overstated. Over the years, it assisted hundreds of thousands of people in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. It provided funds for legal representation of
try, Great Britain. Ernst Michanek, who after leaving SIDA in 1979 served as chairman of IDAF’s board of trustees, has stated that “they contributed absolutely nothing. Well, I remember that John Collins once said that the British government had given IDAF five thousand or five hundred pounds or something like that. It was tragic all through.”\(^1\) Gunnar Helander, IDAF’s vice-chairman for many years, was even more outspoken in an interview in February 1996: “[A]ll that we did in the Defence and Aid Fund was strongly opposed by the British government. We did not even get a penny from them, [but], of course, now [when apartheid is gone] they try to take some credit for what they did not do”.\(^2\)

As early as in 1959—before the Sharpeville massacre—the Swedish university students had launched a campaign in favour of black students in South Africa; the government had raised the issue of apartheid at the United Nations; the Christian Social Democrats had demonstrated against racism; and a number of influential personalities had started the Fund for the Victims of Racial Oppression in South Africa, later to develop into one of contemporary Sweden’s most significant commitments to human rights and democracy. The prime movers behind the early anti-apartheid expressions—on the political scale anchored in the liberal centre—represented an intellectual elite without a broad social base. However, in 1960 the Trade Union Confederation (LO) and the Cooperative Union and Wholesale Society (KF) declared a boycott against South African goods. The issue of South Africa was thereby for the first time directly brought to the Swedish workers and the public at large.\(^3\)

In December 1959, ICFTU—led by Arne Geijer, the chairman of Swedish LO—passed a resolution recommending its members to organize a boycott of South African consumer goods in protest against the fact that black workers in South Africa were not allowed to form trade unions or strike. The timing of the action was to be decided by the ICFTU on the basis of information given by the member organizations.\(^4\) The decision was in line with ANC’s policies. The movement had often used the boycott weapon in its political campaigns in

\(^1\) Interview with Ernst Michanek, Stockholm, 19 March 1996.
\(^2\) Interview with Gunnar Helander, Västerås, 12 February 1996.
\(^3\) Both LO and KF had huge memberships. In the 1960s, LO represented between 90 and 95% of the Swedish workers and well over a million Swedes belonged to cooperative societies affiliated to KF.
\(^4\) LO: ‘Landssekretariats berättelse för år 1959’ (‘Report for 1959’), Representantskapets årsmöte, 13 April 1960, p. 88 (LMA). It was explicitly stated that the boycott was to be directed against “consumer goods” and not generalized.
South Africa, and in December 1958 it called for an international boycott of the apartheid regime at the All-African Peoples’ Conference in Accra, Ghana, an appeal repeated by Albert Luthuli in April 1959, during the last ANC annual conference before it was banned.1

While the ICFTU members were discussing the solidarity boycott, shots that echoed around the world were fired at Sharpeville, a township outside Vereeniging in Transvaal. The Sharpeville massacre of 21 March 1960—when the South African police fired at a peaceful demonstration against the pass laws, killing 69 and wounding more than 200 people—was a turning point in the international community’s consideration of apartheid. It had a great impact in Sweden. Per Wästberg later recalled that “great dividing point [...]. I think that Sharpeville—more than anything else—started a kind of demonstration culture [...] in Sweden, which later flowered with the Vietnam movement”.2

Popular manifestations against South Africa were organized all over the country and the trade unions held spontaneous meetings in factories and at building sites. The Swedish workers thus joined the international protests, at the local level often adopting formal resolutions condemning the apartheid regime.

LO had at the end of January 1960 decided to carry out the boycott during April and May, asking its members not to buy any South African products during these months.3 The decision was supported by KF, which in turn agreed not to purchase, distribute or sell any goods from South Africa during the period. At the time, KF purchased between 10 and 20% of all South African fruit imported to Sweden. In the case of oranges, the share was even higher, or between 20 and 30%.4 The solidarity action by the cooperative movement was, thus, significant. The Sharpeville massacre further convinced LO and KF that a two-month action was not enough, and it was eventually agreed to implement the boycott from 1 April until 31 August 1960, that is, over a period of five months. The experiences from the first Swedish5 boycott action against South Africa were

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1 In his autobiography, Luthuli stated in 1962: “I shall not argue that economic ostracism of South Africa is desirable from every point of view. But I have little doubt that it represents our only chance of a relatively peaceful transition from the present unacceptable type of rule to a system of government which gives us all our rightful voice” (Albert Luthuli: Let My People Go, Fontana Books, London, 1962, p. 186). In response to Luthuli’s appeals, a number of organizations in the UK formed a Boycott Movement in 1959, sponsored by leading personalities from the Labour and Liberal parties, as well as from the Trades Union Congress (TUC). In March 1960, i.e. the month before the start of the Swedish boycott, it organized a one-month long campaign under the slogan ‘Boycott Slave-Driven Goods’. After the shootings at Sharpeville, the Boycott Movement changed its name to the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM).

2 Interview with Per Wästberg, Stockholm, 28 February 1996. At the same time, the Swedish Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons (Kampanjen Mot Atomvapen—KMA) mobilized increasing numbers in extra-parliamentary demonstrations.

3 Expressen, 1 February 1960 and Dagens Nyheter, 2 February 1960.


5 The boycott recommended by ICFTU was mainly followed by the trade unions in Scandinavia, West Germany, Great Britain and the United States, although declared in around 30 countries. It was, for example, less adhered to in Finland than in Denmark, Norway or Sweden.
'Against Racial Prejudice—Freedom to South Africa': Per Wästberg addressing a protest march against the Sharpeville shootings, Malmö, 25 March 1960. (Photo: Pressens Bild)

later used by friends and foes alike during the debate in the 1960s. As a solidarity expression, the campaign was undoubtedly a success. It not only kept the issue of South Africa alive in Sweden, but broadened the awareness of apartheid and racism in the labour movement and among the general public. LO concluded that

although it was not expected, the boycott exposed the South African apartheid policy to strong domestic criticism on economic grounds. It deserves in particular to be mentioned that the boycott opened the eyes of many to the fact that different value opinions of peoples is not compatible with the idea of equal dignity of all human beings. It can therefore be said that the boycott was an educational effort as much as an international means of pressure.1

The boycott was greatly helped by the fact that the social democratic movement on 1 May 1960 for the first time highlighted the liberation struggle in Africa at the Labour Day marches in Stockholm, led by Prime Minister Erlander, and that it took place parallel to LO’s nationwide campaign ‘LO-Help across the Borders’.2 Almost without exception, the 600 Swedish cooperative societies supported the central decision by KF. It mainly affected fruit imports from South

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2 Oliver Tambo was at the same time invited by the Danish LO to address the First of May celebrations in Copenhagen, “appealing to [the] workers to support protest actions against South Africa and expressing [the] hope that contacts [between ANC] and the labour movements in the Western world could be established” (Morgenstierne op. cit.).
Africa. For example, imports of South African oranges decreased between 1959 and 1960 from 10,500 to 7,800 tonnes, or by 25%.\(^1\) Nevertheless, as private importers and retailers continued to handle South African fruit, it showed that an effective boycott must be comprehensive. Some voices were against this background raised in favour of legalized economic sanctions, a position which, however, did not find echo at the level of the government. On 30 March 1960—after the Sharpeville shootings, but before the launch of the joint LO-KF boycott—Foreign Minister Undén expressed his views on the competence of the UN with regard to South Africa in the Swedish parliament, stating that

> action in the UN has been limited to declarations of opinion. No other means of bringing pressure to bear [upon South Africa] are provided by the United Nations Charter in cases of this kind. Nor does the boycott initiated by the labour movements of many countries intend to be anything more than a declaration of opinion. This can be inferred from the fact that it was limited beforehand to cover a certain period only. It can hardly be expected that the purely economic pressure created by this action can evoke a new policy. We must fix our hopes on the steady pressure of public opinion.\(^2\)

In the main, Undén’s lack of confidence in economic pressures changing the situation in South Africa would during the next decade continue to characterize the Social Democratic government. The 1960 action also made Swedish business representatives’ stand towards the boycott weapon widely known. In spite of the fact that the LO-KF campaign was only directed against consumer goods and limited in time, it was strongly condemned by leading industrialists in Sweden, in particular by those with commercial interests in South Africa. The heads of ASEA and Atlas Copco, Åke Vrethem and Kurt-Allan Belfrage, described the boycott and the leaders of LO and KF as “irresponsible”.\(^3\) Swedish businessmen in South Africa turned to the legation in Pretoria with complaints, stating that they were losing orders due to the action by the Swedish trade union and cooperative movements.\(^4\) In South Africa, the government and the press were, finally, up in arms. The *Star* newspaper in Johannesburg, for example, accused Sweden of “senseless, biased and evil propaganda”, noting that “the hostility of the Swedish people towards South Africa has been whipped to unsurpassed levels”.\(^5\) Duma Nokwe, ANC’s Secretary General, later confirmed that the violent reactions served to inform the South African opposition about friends and foes on the international arena.\(^6\)

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\(^1\) Magnusson (1974) op. cit., p. 36.
\(^3\) Liberal Debatt, No 8, 1960, p. 37.
\(^4\) Örebro-Kuriren, 30 March 1960.
\(^5\) Dagens Nyheter, 2 May 1960.
\(^6\) Dagens Nyheter, 2 March 1963.
The Fund for the Victims of Racial Oppression was launched before the Sharpeville massacre and the banning of ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC). It was primarily a fund-raising initiative for legal assistance to people persecuted within South Africa. Following the example of the British Defence and Aid Fund, it later established a small network of committed Swedish individuals who in secret corresponded with and financially supported detained South Africans and their families. However, after Sharpeville, the imposition of a state of emergency and the establishment of ANC and PAC in exile, the issues of apartheid and support to the nationalist movement placed additional demands on the emerging solidarity movement. Various new initiatives were taken in 1960, eventually converging in the establishment of a national Swedish South Africa Committee (SSAK) in March 1961.

Namibians to Sweden

One of the initiatives was taken by Gunnar Helander and Per Wästberg together with a group of younger Liberals and Social Democrats. Among them were Björn Beckman, Hans Haste, Olof G. Tandberg and Anders Thunborg, all of whom at the beginning of the 1960s were active in the Swedish solidarity movement with South and Southern Africa. Another important step was taken by Joachim Israel, at the time associate professor of sociology at the University of Stockholm and an active member of the Social Democratic Party. From the beginning of 1960, Israel committed himself to the placement of young black South Africans at Swedish universities and other educational institutions, thereby opening a significant new chapter in Sweden’s relations with Southern Africa. The students—the first of whom by sheer accident came from South

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1 PAC was formed in April 1959 by an ‘Africanist’ breakaway faction of ANC. It objected to the provision in the 1955 Freedom Charter that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white” and to the economic clauses calling for nationalization of the mines, banks, monopoly industries and large farms. PAC’s President, Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, spelled out the movement’s differences with ANC as follows: “To us the struggle is a national struggle. Those of the ANC who are its active policy makers maintain [...] that [it] is a class struggle. We are according to them oppressed as workers, both white and black. [...] We claim Africa for the Africans; the ANC claims South Africa for all”. Proclaiming ‘Africanism’ as a ‘Third Force’, PAC’s strategic objective was defined in pan-africanist terms, aiming at the creation of a ‘United States of Afrika’ and the achievement of ‘Africanist socialist democracy’ (cited in Davies et al., op. cit., p. 299).

2 IDAF worked through volunteer correspondents to carry out its welfare programme. Rica Hodgson, who set up the programme in the mid-1960s, later recalled that “the welfare work was getting so big that we could not find enough people to work as correspondents. I did not know enough people in England to do the work and we were not using South Africans for obvious reasons. So we started to spread the work. Anna-Lena Wästberg [in Sweden] was one of the early people to take on a sector. [...] Then we got people to do it in Norway. Kari Storhaug. [...] [Eventually] we had [correspondent] groups all over the world [...], but Kari and Anna-Lena were the first two. They worked through the central fund. We sent them the money to send out to the individuals [in South Africa]. They wrote the letters and forwarded the money. That was the involvement” (interview with Rica Hodgson, Johannesburg, 19 September 1995). Over the years, some 600 IDAF volunteer correspondents secretly supported a total of around 45,000 people in South Africa (Wästberg (1995) op. cit., p. 29).
Joachim Israel and his son Jonas with a recent arrival from Namibia, Hidinua Hamupunda, Bandhagen, Stockholm, August 1965. (Photo: Aftonbladet Bild)

West Africa/Namibia—would play prominent parts in and for the development of the Swedish anti-apartheid opinion and the organized solidarity movement.

Shortly after the Sharpeville shootings, Israel received a letter from a young Namibian called Uatja Kaukuetu, asking for assistance to further his education in Sweden. Kaukuetu had been admitted to the University of Cape Town in 1957, but was forced to terminate his studies due to lack of financial support. He was at the beginning of 1960 working as a clerk with a construction company in Windhoek. Cleaning his employer’s office, he had come across an American magazine containing an interview with Israel in which the Swedish sociologist condemned racial discrimination. Kaukuetu was impressed and "decided there and then to write to [Israel]". In a subsequent statement to the University of Lund, he wrote that

1 The Sharpeville massacre was preceded in Namibia by the Windhoek shootings on 10 December 1959, when the South African police killed 13 and wounded another 54, protesting against the decision to evict them from Windhoek’s Old Location and move them to Katutura, the new apartheid township north of Windhoek.
2 Letter from Joachim Israel to the author, Halmstad, 27 August 1996.
3 Letter from Uatja Kaukuetu to Joachim Israel, Windhoek, 27 March 1960 (JIC).
as an African, the commendable stand adopted by Sweden against racial discrimination and [...] oppression on a racial basis has not escaped me. It is perfectly natural, therefore, that I should have a soft spot in my heart for such a country. To one who has grown up in a choking atmosphere infested with racial dominance and bias, studying in Sweden would mean a lot, [most important] of which will be the discovery of human dignity and tolerance.1

Israel immediately replied to Kaukuetu, holding out the prospect of a place at a Swedish university, as well as financial support, including the costs of the journey to Sweden. This marked the beginning of an intensive correspondence between the two, and between Israel and various people and organizations in Sweden and abroad, eventually leading to the arrival of Kaukuetu and another Namibian, Charles Kauraisa, in Sweden in October 1960.2 It was also the beginning of a solidarity committee—the Maundy Thursday Committee against Racial Persecution in South Africa3—which later merged with the South Africa Committee.

Unbeknown to Israel at the time,4 Kaukuetu was a leading Namibian nationalist. He was not only a founding member and the President of the South West African Progressive Association (SWAPA),5 formed in 1955, but, above all, the Vice-President of the South West Africa National Union (SWANU).6

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1 Statement by Uatja Kaukuetu attached to a letter to Anna Wieslander-Kristensen, Windhoek, 15 June 1960 (JIC).
2 Hans Beukes, a Namibian student at the University of Cape Town, had through NUSAS already been granted a scholarship in 1959 by the Norwegian National Union of Students to study at the University of Oslo. His passport was, however, withdrawn by the South African authorities in June 1959. The move was condemned by the UN, considering it “an act of administration contrary to the mandate for South West Africa” (UN General Assembly Resolution No 1358 (XIV) of 17 November 1959 in Yearbook of the United Nations: 1959, Office of Public Information, United Nations, New York, p. 329). Beukes had by then managed to leave South West Africa, arriving in Norway in September 1959. Shortly thereafter, he appeared before the UN Fourth Committee. In Cape Town, Beukes had been active in OPO and he was in 1960 elected in absentia to SWAPO’s first national committee. It is noteworthy that neither Beukes’ case, nor the fact that he had been granted a scholarship to Norway, is mentioned in Kaukuetu’s extensive correspondence with Israel from March 1960 onwards.
3 In Swedish, Skärtorsdagskommittén mot Rasförföljelser i Sydafrika.
4 In late May 1960, Israel presented Kaukuetu as follows in a letter to the London-based Committee of African Organizations: “He is, according to [the] information I have received, a very gifted man and a person with great capabilities. He also seems to be a local leader who has done much for the social and educational advancement of his people” (letter from Joachim Israel to the Committee of African Organizations, Stockholm, 25 May 1960) (JIC).
5 SWAPA was a politically oriented cultural body for blacks in South West Africa/Namibia, encouraging young Namibians to further their education. A group of SWAPA members, led by Zedekia Ngavirue (who came to Sweden in early 1962) and including Uatja Kaukuetu, set up the first black Namibian newspaper, a weekly called the South West News. Although it did not run for very long, it “provided Namibians for the first time with a platform for their views” (Peter Katjavivi: A History of Resistance in Namibia, James Currey, OAU and Unesco Press, London, Addis Ababa and Paris, 1988, p. 30). Several authors give 1958 as the year when SWAPA was formed. However, early documents indicate that it was in 1955. Cf. Hitjevi Veii: ‘South West African National Union’, Windhoek [no date, but probably late 1960] (MCA).
6 SWANU was officially launched in August 1959, with Uatja Kaukuetu as President. It led to a move by the Herero chiefs’ council for re-elections to broaden SWANU’s executive committee. At a public meeting in Windhoek, a new leadership was elected in September 1959. In his absence,
launched in August 1959. Kaukuetu’s contacts with Israel would, thus, accidentally also mark the beginning of Sweden’s involvement with the Namibian liberation struggle in general and with SWANU in particular. SWANU was in the 1960s strongly represented in Sweden. Pierre Schori later observed that “the first close contact that the Swedish Social Democratic Party had with any liberation movement in Southern Africa was really with SWANU. [...] [Y]ou could say that [the SWANU students in Sweden] opened the eyes of both the party and of the public opinion to the situation in that part of the world”.1 It is in this context important that SWANU’s President Jariretundu Kozonguizi had been a member of the ANC Youth League while studying at the University of Fort Hare in South Africa in the mid-1950s and that ANC, PAC, the South African Indian Congress (SAIC)2 and SWANU from mid-1960 until the beginning of 1962 worked closely together within the South Africa United Front (SAUF), formed in June 1960.3

Upon receipt of Kaukuetu’s letter, Israel wrote to various organizations and universities to secure funding for the journey to Sweden and a study place.

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1 Interview with Pierre Schori, Stockholm, 28 June 1996.
2 SAIC was formed in 1920 as a merger between the Natal Indian Congress (founded by Mahatma Gandhi in 1894) and the Transvaal Indian Congress, with the primary objective of obtaining civil rights for the Indian community in South Africa. In 1946, the SAIC leaders Dr. Dadoo and Dr. Naicker opened up a new political road by signing with Dr. Xuma, ANC’s President, the Dadoo-Xuma-Naicker pact for cooperation between the Indian and African political organizations on issues affecting the rights of the Africans and Indians in South Africa.
3 SAUF was constituted in Addis Ababa on 19 June 1960, with the following two aims: a) “the overthrow of white domination and destruction of the myth of white supremacy, [and b)] the substitution of a democratic state based on universal adult suffrage”. The programme of the United Front was 1) to establish “information bureaus [in Accra, Ghana; Cairo, Egypt and London, UK] to disseminate information about South Africa through the press, radio etc. and to mobilize international public opinion against white domination and apartheid; 2) to canvas African independent states and other states for individual or collective action against South Africa; [and] 3) to raise funds for the pursuance of the struggle and to campaign vehemently for the immediate and unconditional release of all political leaders”. Present at the meeting in Addis Ababa were Oliver Tambo and Tennyson Makiwane of ANC, Nana Mahomo, Peter Moletsi and Vusumsi Make of PAC, Dr. Yusuf Dadoo of SAIC, Jarirerudu Kozonguizi of SWANU and the Namibian Mburumba Kerina as an independent (SAUF: ‘Minutes of Meeting Held in Addis Ababa on the 19th June 1960 at Hotel Guenet’) (MCA). SWAPO was admitted in January 1961 as a member of SAUF, but never participated and withdrew some months later (SAUF: ‘Decisions and resolutions from conference 5–19 January 1961’, London and SAUF: ‘Minutes from conference 25 August–4 September 1961’, London) (MCA).
Due to the stand shown by *Dagens Nyheter*, he proposed that the liberal newspaper should launch a fund-raising campaign to make it possible for South African—including Namibian—students to come to Sweden, which, however, was refused.¹ The initial response by the International Scholarship Foundation of Lund University was also negative. In principle sympathetic to Israel’s initiative, Thord Palmlund, at the time chairman of the foundation, wrote that it was against its regulations to cover both Kaukuetu’s travel and study costs. He, however, mentioned that the lawyer Henning Sjöström “had just paid 500 SEK for a necktie on condition that the money is used for a South African scholarship holder”, proposing that it could be used in favour of Kaukuetu.² Against this background, Israel turned to Reverend Curt Norell, director of the Christian social-educational institution Birkagården in Stockholm, who on Maundy Thursday 1960 arranged a midnight mass in the Great Church in Stockholm³ at which the collection raised was for Kaukuetu. The initiative was more successful than expected. With an additional contribution from the Fund for the Victims of Racial Oppression, the money raised was enough to cover the travel costs for two Namibians. Israel accordingly wrote to Kaukuetu, who proposed that Charles Kauraisa—also a SWANU member and a former student in Cape Town—should accompany him to Sweden. To administer the funds, Israel and Norell set up the Maundy Thursday Committee against Racial Persecution, with Anna-Greta Gustafson and Mats Kihlberg as active members.

Finally, at the end of May 1960 the Lund International Scholarship Foundation decided to grant Kaukuetu a scholarship that initially covered his expenses for one year, including the travel costs to Sweden.⁴ Shortly thereafter, Kauraisa was granted a fellowship by the University of Stockholm. The academic sponsors could, however, not arrange the necessary travel documents for the Namibians, which was the next nut to crack for Israel and the Maundy Thursday Committee. Extensive contacts with the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Socialist International, the British Labour Party⁵ and the British Foreign Office did not solve the problem. After personal assurances by Ulla Lindström, the Swedish Minister for Development Cooperation, that they could enter Sweden, Kaukuetu and Kauraisa

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¹ Sven Öste of *Dagens Nyheter* replied that “we feel that it would be unwise if the paper on its own started some sort of fund-raising campaign as such campaigns are being carried out by the student unions”. In addition, he questioned whether it was at all appropriate to invite South African students to Sweden and if such an initiative did not constitute “a mistaken kindness [as it would] close their way back to South Africa” (letter from Sven Öste to Joachim Israel, Stockholm, 25 March 1960) (JIC).

² Letter from Thord Palmlund to Joachim Israel, Lund, 11 April 1960 (JIC).

³ In Swedish, *Stockholms Storkyrka*.

⁴ Letter from Anna Wieslander-Kristensen to Uatja Kaukuetu, Lund, 31 May 1960 (JIC).

⁵ In contrast to Israel, the British Labour Party was concerned about Kaukuetu’s political beliefs. It made its own enquiries, but concluded that “there seems no reason to believe that he is a Communist” (letter from David Ennals, secretary of the International Department of the British Labour Party, to Albert Carthy, secretary of the Socialist International, London, 4 July 1960) (JIC).
decided, however, in July 1960 to start the long journey.\footnote{Ulla Lindström involved herself closely with Israel’s efforts to bring Kaukuetu and other South West African and South African students to Sweden. In the case of Kaukuetu, she wrote to the Swedish ambassador in London, Gunnar Hågglöf, asking him to contact the British Foreign Office “with a request that it informs the British authorities in Bechuanaland of Kaukuetu’s need of a travel document and [that] it gives him such a document. Once this is done, we will do the rest here in Sweden” (letter from Ulla Lindström to Gunnar Hågglöf, Stockholm, 15 June 1960) (JIC).} After decisive assistance by the CSM missionary and TANU member Barbro Johansson in Dar es Salaam,\footnote{Barbro Johansson also took a close personal interest in the fate of the South West and South African students going to Sweden, assisting them while in transit in Tanganyika. Cf. interview with Charles Kauraisa, Windhoek, 20 March 1995 and interview with Billy Modise, Johannesburg, 15 September 1995.} the two young Namibians eventually reached Sweden three months later.

Israel’s efforts to bring Southern African students to Sweden had far-reaching consequences. They were at the time also enthusiastically supported by the pioneers of the solidarity movement. In August 1960, Per Wästberg wrote to Israel, stating that he could not think of a better investment for the future of Africa and for harmony between the races than letting Africans meet other whites than those at home. At the same time, we must guard against expecting something of them. It appears to be a tremendous chance that precisely [Kaukuetu and Kauraisa] will come [to Sweden], but chance seems to be the only thing to trust in South Africa. The fact
that they are from South West Africa is also important, as this territory is the only
entry point for the UN to South Africa, something which is also being studied by
the other African states for presentation in the General Assembly this autumn.¹

Immoral Laws and the South Africa Committee

Kaukuetu and Kauraisa arrived in Sweden at a time when discussions were
being held between Helander, Wästberg and the group coordinated by them
and Israel, Norell and the Maundy Thursday Committee regarding the forming
of a national South Africa Committee. It was set up in March 1961. However,
parallel to the South Africa Committee, the Maundy Thursday Committee was
still active at the beginning of the 1960s, raising funds for the placement of
African students at Swedish universities.² The task was made easier by the
public disgust expressed when Swedish sailors in 1960-61 were sentenced to
flogging by the South African authorities for breaching the Immorality Act.
The sentences provoked an uproar in the Swedish press and were strongly con-
demned in parliament by Prime Minister Erlander.³ At the beginning of 1961,
the Immorality Act in particular and the apartheid system in general became
almost a national concern in Sweden when the popular writer Sara Lidman was
arrested in Johannesburg. The incident served to promote both the South Africa
Committee and the relations between Sweden and ANC.

Achieving national fame in the 1950s for her novels about life in the harsh
environment of her native region in northern Sweden,⁴ Sara Lidman was at the
end of the decade "concerned with the questions of treachery and the supposed
excellence of the so-called Free World".⁵ She decided to stay for a longer period
in South Africa to write a major account⁶ around these concerns and settled in

¹ Letter from Per Wästberg to Joachim Israel, Stockholm, 8 August 1960 (JIC).
² In 1961, the Maundy Thursday Committee covered the study costs in Sweden for a student from
the Portuguese colony of São Tomé and for yet another student from South West Africa.
³ Erlander stated: "As regards the present case when a Swede was flogged [in Durban] for an
offence against the South African race law, [we have] pointed out to the South African diplomatic
representative in Sweden that Swedish public opinion has been very deeply disturbed by the
punishment imposed, which is quite alien to, and incompatible with, the Swedish view on human
treatment and human rights. [...] [T]he apartheid policy is a severe violation of the UN Charter and
the Declaration on Human Rights and [...] it is incompatible with the obligations of a member state" ('Reply by the Prime Minister to a Question in the Second Chamber of the Riksdag', 6 December
1961 in The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs: Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy: 1961,
⁴ Born in a rural home in Missenträsk, Västerbotten, in northern Sweden in 1923, Lidman made her
acclaimed literary début in 1953 with the novel Tjärdalen ('Tar Valley'), which in 1955 was followed
by Hjortronlandet ('Cloudberry Country') and in 1958 by Regnspiran ('Rain Sceptre').
⁵ In Swedish, " trolöshet och den så kallade fria världens förmenta förträfflighet " (Address by Sara
Lidman, ABF, Stockholm, 1 November 1996).
⁶ In Swedish, "en större rapportbok" (ibid.).
Johannesburg in October 1960. She soon entered into close contact with ANC. The movement was then an ‘unlawful organization’ and the Treason Trial—which had opened in 1956—was still in progress. Unbeknown to Lidman, she was being watched and followed by the South African security police. In early February 1961, the police made its way into her Yeoville flat, where she was meeting a close friend, Peter Nthite, former organizing secretary of the ANC Youth League and one of the accused in the Treason Trial. Both of them were immediately charged under the Immorality Act—with a maximum penalty of seven years’ imprisonment and ten lashes—but released on bail. After strong protests from the Swedish government, Lidman was eventually allowed to leave South Africa before the scheduled trial. With one of the ‘offending’ parties out of the country, the charges against Nthite were also dropped.

The Lidman–Nthite case received big headlines in the South African newspapers. Charges under the Immorality Act were always spectacular, but normally involved a white man and a non-white woman, as, for example, in cases with Swedish sailors and female companions in South African ports. Here, a mature white foreign woman was charged with a younger black nationalist from the banned ANC, already accused of treason. In addition, Lidman strongly defended their friendship. It had an impact in the nationalist movement and made Sweden further known as a friendly country. In Sweden itself, the charges against the popular novelist and her ANC friend dominated both the national and the local newspapers, provoking an outcry against the South African apartheid regime. Per Wästberg later stated that “the tremendous commotion [created by the arrest of Sara Lidman] contributed to the sharpening of opinion”. After the news of the arrest, the typographers’ union in Stockholm, for example, pointed out that

the prominent and by many Swedes beloved authoress Sara Lidman will now be prosecuted for having conversed with a coloured intellectual in private. The coloured friend is threatened by lashes and forced labour. This incident has in a brutal way made it clear to all Swedes that there must be an end to the unparalleled terror and discrimination that the rightful indigenous inhabitants [of South Africa] are
subjected to. [...] We appeal to LO and to other Swedish mass organizations to consider actions that will contribute to forcing the South African government to stop the racial persecutions.¹

In March 1961, shortly after Lidman’s arrest, Adelaide Tambo—the wife of Oliver Tambo and a leading member of the ANC Women’s League—visited Sweden to participate in a conference organized by the Left Association of Swedish Women.² The visit by Mrs. Tambo—who had left South Africa three months before, that is, before the Lidman case—was given prominence by the Swedish press, which published her comments on the Immorality Act, her appeals for a boycott of South Africa and, in general, her militant views on the liberation struggle: “We will continue to protest”, she said, “[and] continue to be killed, thrown into jail and exiled. But we will not be silent! We hope that the

² In Swedish, Svenska Kvinnors Vänsterförbund, an independent organization founded in 1931 and working for gender equality, international solidarity and peace.
world outside South Africa shall intervene to help us". The visit took place before the end of the Treason Trial and further introduced ANC to the Swedish public. ANC’s history since its founding in 1912, the Freedom Charter and the Treason Trial were in the same month presented by Sara Lidman in a full-page article in *Dagens Nyheter*. Lidman—later stating that her “first, decisive, political schooling took place in South Africa”—continued to write about life under apartheid. In 1961, she published the highly acclaimed novel *I and My Son*, a strong protest against white oppression in South Africa, where the story takes place in Johannesburg and the fictitious black township of ‘Cassandratown’.

The Swedish South Africa Committee (SSAK) held its founding meeting in Stockholm on 6 March 1961, adopting a constitution and a programme prepared by a group composed of Hans Haste, Joachim Israel, Mats Kihlberg and Anders Thunborg. According to the constitution, SSAK was a coalition of individual persons [which] aims at coordinating and strengthening the various initiatives embarked upon in Sweden against racial oppression in South Africa and at channelling resources in favour of suitable assistance projects. Its activities are based on the views expressed in the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights. In spite of the name, SSAK’s constitution further stated that “racial oppression [...] in other parts of Southern Africa will also be the subject of attention.”

SSAK’s programme of action was extensive. In addition to the general objective “to create a strong opinion against apartheid in Sweden and to organize and strengthen the Swedish citizens’ opposition against the racial policies of the South African government”, the committee intended to

— give realistic information about the situation in South Africa;
— let the South African regime and the victims of its racial policies know the attitude [held] by the enlightened Swedish opinion;
— encourage organizations, [political] parties and Swedish authorities to take a clear stand for the human rights of the oppressed ethnical groups [...];
— assist in the organization [...] of local actions and offer information material;

3 Address by Sara Lidman, ABF, Stockholm, 1 November 1996. In her address, Lidman further said that she “made a big discovery in South Africa”, namely how the transnational companies of the so-called free world—among them Swedish companies—utilized and profited from apartheid.
5 In Swedish, *Svenska Sydafrikakommittén*.
6 SSAK: ‘Protokoll fört vid konstituerande sammanträde med Svenska Sydafrikakommittén’ (‘Minutes from inaugural meeting of the Swedish South Africa Committee’), Stockholm, 6 March 1961 (AJC).
— attempt to create study possibilities for South African youth of the oppressed ethnic groups at Swedish educational institutions or elsewhere;
— raise funds [for] legal assistance to people accused of breaking the racial laws;
— try to alleviate the misery created by the racial laws through humanitarian assistance; [and to]
— encourage the study of South Africa’s racial problems¹ and of racial conflict and racial prejudice in general²

Thus, the programme of action was essentially humanitarian and re-active. Despite the fact that ANC had called for economic isolation of South Africa and that LO and KF had carried out a consumer boycott against South African goods the previous year, the pro-active demand for economic pressure did not form part of SSAK’s initial agenda. After the establishment of direct links with the South Africa United Front in April 1961 and, above all, with the involvement of the youth and student movements during 1962, the boycott demand would, however, feature prominently.

Gunnar Helander and Per Wästberg were active promoters of the Swedish South Africa Committee, subsequently appearing as its principal spokesmen. The founding meeting³ did not appoint a chairperson. Instead, it elected four persons to a working committee with the task to coordinate the activities until a proper annual meeting was held. Björn Beckman of the Liberal Student Union, Joachim Israel and Mats Kihlberg from the Maundy Thursday Committee and Anders Thunborg, secretary to the national board of the Social Democratic Party, made up the committee.⁴ Israel was later—in August 1962—elected the first chairman of the solidarity organization. He was in March 1964 succeeded by Helander.

At the founding meeting in March 1961, it was decided to “invite a number of known [Swedish] personalities to sponsor the activities of the committee”. An appeal was addressed to “interested writers, academicians, artists, journalists, politicians, clergymen and representatives of organizations”.⁵ The response was positive. In addition to already committed Swedes, such as Signe Höjer, Eyvind Johnson, Sara Lidman, Torgny Segerstedt, Herbert Tingsten and Victor Vinde, the well known writers Per Anders Fogelström and Ivar Lo-Johansson agreed, for example, to act as sponsors. So did, more importantly,

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¹ Sara Lidman—who spent some time in Tanganyika after leaving South Africa—greeted the founding of the South Africa Committee, but opposed the expression “racial problems”. In a letter to the committee, she expressed the opinion that it was “an apartheid term” and that only the whites in South Africa saw the existence of various races as “a problem” (letter from Sara Lidman to the Swedish South Africa Committee, Moshi, Tanganyika, 11 April 1961) (JIC).
² SSAK: ‘Programförklaring för Svenska Sydafrikakommittén’ (‘Program declaration by the Swedish South Africa Committee’), Stockholm, 6 March 1961 (AJC).
³ Helander and Wästberg were not present at the founding meeting on 6 March 1961.
leading Liberal and Social Democratic politicians, among them professor Bertil Ohlin, chairman of the Liberal Party, and professor Gunnar Myrdal and Inga Thorsson of the ruling Social Democratic Party. As was the case with the 1959 appeal in favour of the Fund for the Victims of Racial Oppression, no leading member of the Moderate Party lent his or her name in support of the aims of SSAK.

Although addressing an “enlightened” opinion, the aims of the South Africa Committee were supported by broad segments of the Swedish labour movement. At the start, the committee published an information folder on the trade union situation and the conditions for the black workers in South Africa. During SSAK’s first year it also received small, but significant financial contributions from more than twenty national and local Swedish trade unions.

The co-leaders of the South Africa United Front (SAUF), Oliver Tambo (ANC), Nana Mahomo (PAC) and Jariretundu Kozonguizi (SWANU of Namibia), visited Stockholm at the end of April 1961. It was the first of many visits to Sweden for both Tambo and Kozonguizi. Mahomo had, however, already introduced SAUF to the Swedish public in October 1960. The South Africa Committee used the visit to present its planned activities, inviting interested persons to a reception for the nationalist leaders at the restaurant Gyllene Cirkeln in Stockholm on 29 April 1961. This marked the beginning of a close cooperation between SSAK and SAUF. After a long tour through Europe and North Africa, Mahomo wrote to Israel in June 1961, thanking the solidarity committee for the “tremendous welcome you gave us during our stay in Stockholm. We

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1 Myrdal had in 1944 published his famous study An American Dilemma about the situation of the black minority in the United States. He served as Minister of Trade in the Social Democratic government between 1945 and 1947. An internationally renowned economist, in 1974 Myrdal was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics.
2 Thorsson was at the time chairperson of the Social Democratic Women’s League. As a political advisor in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, she would at the beginning of the 1960s be closely involved with Africa and also publish a number of articles on the continent in the social democratic newspaper Arbetet. Thus, in April 1963 she wrote a revealing factual account of the socio-economic conditions of the black majority in South Africa. See Inga Thorsson: ‘Sydafrika: Rashatets högborg’ (‘South Africa: The stronghold of racial hatred’) in Arbetet, 7 April 1963.
5 Mahomo joined Robert Sobukwe’s breakaway from ANC and became PAC Secretary for Culture and Propaganda in April 1959. He left South Africa to represent PAC abroad on 21 March 1960, i.e. the day of the Sharpeville shootings, settling in London. A founding member of the South Africa United Front in June 1960, Mahomo was, in particular, responsible for its relations with the international trade unions and student movements. Mahomo was the first SAUF leader to visit Sweden, inter alia addressing the Social Democratic Laboremus association in Uppsala in October 1960. According to the minutes from the meeting, Mahomo represented “a South African government-in-exile, the South Africa United Front, [...] which does not want to use violence. But there must be a change, [otherwise] bloodletting will perhaps be necessary and therefore we must act now, before it is too late.” He welcomed the 1960 boycott action by LO-KF and asked for political support and financial assistance (Laboremus: ‘Protokoll fört vid internt möte’/’Minutes from internal meeting’, Västgötan Nation, Uppsala, 13 October 1960) (UPA).
6 Invitation note by SSAK’s working committee [no date] (AJC).
are all convinced that the Swedish South Africa Committee will play a vital role in assisting the liberatory struggle in South Africa.”¹ Tambo and Mahomo would during subsequent visits work closely with the South Africa Committee, and after the break-up of SAUF in March 1962 Mahomo and Israel remained in contact.

The first major public meeting organized by the South Africa Committee was held in the ABF building in Stockholm on 31 May 1961, the day the Union of South Africa left the British Commonwealth and proclaimed a republic. It was seen as a “fateful day” by the organizers, who wanted to alert the Swedish opinion to an expected worsening situation.² Around 350 people attended the meeting,³ which was addressed by a number of leading opinion makers, among them Gunnar Helander, Herbert Tingsten, Victor Vinde and Per Wästberg. In addition, Charles Kauraisa from SWANU—who had arrived in Sweden together with Uatja Kaukuetu in October 1960—appeared for the first time on a public platform in Sweden, giving a militant speech in which he called for a boycott of South African fruit and the termination of Sweden’s diplomatic relations with Pretoria.⁴

Victor Vinde, the chief editor of the social democratic morning paper Stockholms-Tidningen, was particularly outspoken. In his address, he questioned whether the leaders in Pretoria were “in full possession of their senses” and warned of “an inevitable explosion from below within months”.⁵ Vinde also demanded the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations and defined the apartheid policies as “a threat to peace in Africa and thereby to the peace in the world”.⁶ It was an important characterization as the UN Charter stipulated that the Security Council could impose mandatory sanctions when there was a threat to international peace and security. ANC had adopted the formula to exert diplomatic pressure for international economic sanctions and it would for the next fifteen years be hotly debated in Sweden. Finally, Vinde’s colleague at Dagens Nyheter, Herbert Tingsten, declared that “it is not the blacks in South Africa that should thank us [for our solidarity], but we who should thank them for the enthusiasm and anger that they inspire”.⁷

¹ Letter from Nana Mahomo to Joachim Israel, London, 7 June 1961 (JIC).
³ Letter from Per Wästberg to the author, Stockholm, 9 April 1997. Among those who attended the meeting were Per Ahlmark, chairman of the Liberal Party Youth League and later a prominent actor in the Swedish debate on Southern Africa; Anders Johansson, who in 1963 founded one of the leading local solidarity committees and later worked as the Africa correspondent of Dagens Nyheter; Barbro Johansson, who was visiting Sweden from Tanganyika (and during her stay brought Julius Nyerere into contact with Prime Minister Erlander and Olof Palme); and Sara Lidman (private notes by Anders Johansson, 31 May 1960) (AJC).
⁵ Ibid.
⁶ Ibid.
⁷ Ibid.
The aims and proposed activities of the South Africa Committee were, however, not supported by everybody. The Moderate Party did not add its voice to the condemnation of South Africa. In addition, extreme right elements actively opposed SSAK, expressing support for apartheid. Their activities against Gunnar Helander and Per Wästberg had begun at the end of the 1950s and were intensified during the following years.\(^1\) The meeting held at the end of May 1961 was also threatened by neo-Nazis, who, however, were evicted by plain-clothes police.\(^2\) The Stockholm police force itself was at the same time far from unconditionally sympathetic to the emerging anti-apartheid movement. Having already intervened against the Social Democratic Labour Day marches on 1 May 1961, it did not allow a planned march to the South African legation in Stockholm at the closing of the SSAK meeting.\(^3\)

In 1960, the traditional Social Democratic Labour Day marches included for the first time a separate international section, largely dedicated to Africa. From then on, Africa—in particular South and Southern Africa—featured prominently on the First of May. In 1962, for example, Oliver Tambo addressed the demonstrations, sharing the platform in Gothenburg with the former Minister of Finance, Ernst Wigforss.\(^4\) Several incidents indicated, however, that in the beginning the Swedish police had difficulties in adapting to the sudden internationalization of the traditionally inoffensive Labour Day marches, often taking the form of a national spring holiday. In Stockholm in 1961—on a First of May which attracted 60,000 demonstrators and was addressed by LO’s chairman Arne Geijer—the police thus confiscated a banner with the text ‘Verwoerd Commits Murder on Africa’s Soil’.\(^5\)

The banner re-appeared in 1962, but was once again seized by the police. This time, the responsible organizer of the Labour Day march in Stockholm, the future Foreign Minister Sten Andersson, was arrested together with the two women who carried the banner. They were accused of ‘disorderly conduct’ and ‘defamation of a head of state’, and brought to the Stockholm magistrates’

\(^1\) Active support for apartheid was in the early 1960s expressed by the local newspaper *Nordvästra Skånes Tidningar*, whose editor Ture Jansson published more than thirty diatribes against Helander, Lidman, Wästberg and other opinion makers on South Africa. The arrest of Sara Lidman was, for example, described by Jansson as ‘ruthless Communist propaganda and a sapping exercise’ (cited in Carl Olaf Bergström: ‘Ture Jansson och Sydafrika’/‘Ture Jansson and South Africa’ in *Nertjes Allehanda*, 11 January 1964). The neo-Nazi organization the New Swedish Movement (in Swedish, *Nysvenska Rörelsen*) was also actively involved on the side of Pretoria. In its propaganda, the South African government often quoted both *Nordvästra Skånes Tidningar* and *Nysvenska Rörelsen*, for example in *South African Digest*. Thus, in No 26/1964 of this official publication there was an article under the heading ‘Friends in Sweden’, which described how “the New Swedish Movement is actively working to put South Africa and the country’s problems in a better light” (reproduced in *Jönköpings-Posten*, 30 July 1964).


\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^4\) Charles Kauraisa from SWANU appeared on the same day with Prime Minister Erlander in Norrköping.

court.\(^1\) However, after spectacular proceedings attended by a large number of anti-apartheid activists, the case ended in anticlimax in August 1962 when the court learned that Prime Minister Verwoerd was the South African head of government, not the head of state.\(^2\) Acquitting the accused, the court further “took into consideration that Sweden at the United Nations consistently had voted in favour of the resolutions that condemned racial discrimination in South Africa”.\(^3\) The incident received a lot of attention. The South Africa Committee published an information folder with the title ’Of Course It Is True that Verwoerd Commits Murder on Africa’s Soil’\(^4\) and when SUL on 1 March 1963 launched the boycott campaign, the torch march led by ANC’s Secretary General Duma Nokwe was symbolically headed by the twice seized banner. The text itself became a rallying slogan for the solidarity movement and the banner would subsequently travel all over Sweden.

\(^{1}\) *Upsala Nya Tidning*, 16 August 1962.
\(^{2}\) Sten Andersson op. cit., pp. 164–165.
\(^{3}\) *Dagens Nyheter*, 30 August 1962.
Reactions to Apartheid

An Appeal for the Liberal Party

The South Africa Committee dedicated the years 1961 and 1962 largely to internal discussions on the orientation and content of the solidarity work, but, above all, to information activities. At a time when a great number of books and articles on the situation in South and Southern Africa by both Swedish and African authors were published—and as the war in Congo kept the Swedish people aware of the complexities of the decolonization process—the committee carried out an intensive information campaign all over the country. Helander and Wästberg were particularly active. In 1962, for example, they together gave more than 100 speeches at not less than 60 different places in Sweden, from Ystad in the extreme South to Umeå in the North. They also addressed meetings in Copenhagen, Helsinki and Oslo, appeared about 30 times on Swedish radio and television and published a similar number of articles in the national newspapers. With the parallel activation of the youth and student movements—culminating in the demand for economic sanctions against South Africa at both the WAY general assembly in Aarhus, Denmark, in July and the Afro-Scandinavian Youth Congress in Oslo, Norway, in August 1962—the foundation was laid for broad popular support to the SUL boycott campaign from 1 March 1963.

In addition, although Sweden was geographically distant the emerging solidarity movement did not remain unnoticed by the political opposition in South Africa. Representing the South Africa United Front, Mahomo of PAC had already visited Sweden in October 1960 and Tambo of ANC in April 1961. In 1961, the Liberal Party of South Africa also tried to mobilize Swedish support. The South African Liberal Party was formed in June 1953. During the first years, it followed a conservative line, and an arch-liberal such as Herbert Tingsten was not overly impressed by its prospects when visiting South Africa at the end of 1953. Intended to be multiracial, the party advocated a qualified franchise and its appeal to the black population was limited. In addition, in June 1955 it refused to participate in the Congress of the People and it strongly objected to the clauses in the Freedom Charter which called for nationalization of the South African monopolies. After the election of the prominent novelist Alan Paton to the party presidency, it, however, grew increasingly radical in

1 Planning the activities for 1961–62, SSAK decided to concentrate on a) information and b) fund-raising for the placement of South African students in Sweden. The latter point was controversial. Hans Haste, for example, found it "strange that [we] in 1961 say that the principal activity of the committee should be to arrange study [places] when the struggle in South Africa now enters a more marked political moment than ever before. The South Africans themselves say that they now mainly need assistance to conduct the political struggle and I think that if [we], for example, appeal to the trade unions for support, the response will be good" (letter from Hans Haste to Joachim Israel, Dehli, India, 23 November 1961) (IJC).
both activity and appeal, frequently joining the congress movement in various protest campaigns.

In 1959, the Liberal Party publicly supported ANC’s call for an economic boycott of South Africa, although a number of its more conservative members opposed the decision and either resigned or later joined the Progressive Party.\(^1\) The following year, it eventually adopted a policy of immediate universal adult suffrage at the same time as it expressed its belief in a ‘shared economy’ and spoke of a ‘welfare state’. Still legal, the Liberal Party, however, came under severe government attack during the wave of intensified repression after the Sharpeville massacre. Peter Brown, its National Chairman, was, for example, imprisoned for three months in 1960. In turn, both the leftward shift and the repression provoked a number of internal conflicts, the ‘old guard’ strongly resisting calls by younger members for more militant methods of opposition, such as pass-burning and civil disobedience. The conflicts produced severe divisions. In December 1961—at the same time as Umkhonto we Sizwe made its appearance—a group of mainly younger Liberals launched a secret sabotage group called the National Committee for Liberation, later named the African Resistance Movement (ARM). The group repudiated the official party position of non-violence and embarked upon acts of sabotage against government installations “in the hope”, as expressed by Hugh Lewin, one of the members, “that sabotage might shock the whites into an awareness of the conditions under which the blacks were living and, in due time, change the system”.\(^2\)

The South African government eventually exposed the involvement of Liberal Party members in sabotage activities and cracked down hard on the party from July 1964.\(^3\) Although the leadership dissociated itself from ARM,\(^4\) the involvement in violent, non-constitutional activities signalled the end of the party. The final blow came with the introduction of the Prohibition of Political Interference Act in 1968, which made multiracial political activities illegal. It became a criminal offence to belong to a political organization with a membership of different races.\(^5\) In this situation, the Liberal Party decided to disband rather than to segregate itself. The determination by the vast majority of South

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1 The Progressive Party, essentially representing the interests of the big South African corporations, was formed in November 1960. Its most influential backer was Harry Oppenheimer, the head of the Anglo-American group.


3 It was a member of the Liberal Party, John Harris, who in July 1964 planted the petrol bomb which killed one person and severely injured several others at the Johannesburg railway station. It shattered ARM’s policy of avoiding harm to people. Harris, ‘the station bomber’, was sentenced to death and hanged.


5 It was, in addition, illegal for any person to address a political meeting if the majority of the audience belonged to a race other than his or her own.
Africa’s whites to maintain white supremacy “proved incompatible with the maintenance of liberal principles”.¹

The turbulent years of 1960 and 1961 saw the Liberal Party at its height. Together with the underground Communist Party, it was the only multiracial political organization in South Africa, and after the banning of ANC and PAC in March 1960 it also came to fill a vacuum for an important number of blacks wishing to remain openly active in legal politics. By the time of its congress in July 1961, the party had over 4,000 members. More importantly, a majority of the congress delegates were blacks.² The Liberal Party had, however, lost its last seats in the South African parliament in 1959 and did not exercise any direct influence over the constitutional developments of the country.

The South African Liberal Party was decidedly anti-Communist, and it was as a non-racial democratic alternative to apartheid, Communism and “exclusive black racialism”³ that it approached the Swedish Liberal Party for support at the beginning of 1961. In so doing, it emphasized its good relations with the leaders of ANC and PAC, “although we do not support all aspects of their policies.”⁴ The links with SWAPO of Namibia were said to be particularly close.⁵ In addition, “turning to those whose ideas accord with our own”, the Liberal Party presented its political objective as “the establishment of a social democracy in South Africa, based on a liberal and radical appraisal of our political, racial and economic problems”.⁶

At the height of its influence at home and thus introduced abroad, the Liberal Party representative to Europe, John Shingler, a former NUSAS president, contacted David Wirmark, the secretary general of WAY and a leading member of the Swedish Liberal Party Youth League, as well as Thord Palmlund, who Shingler had met in connection with SFS’s support to NUSAS.⁷ This led in March 1961—that is, the same month as the South Africa Committee was formed—to contacts with Hans Blix,⁸ who from 1956 to 1958 had served as president of the World Federation of Liberal and Radical Youth and at the time was the vice-chairman of the Swedish Liberal Party Youth League, and with Per

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¹ Robertson op. cit., p. 231.
² Ibid., p. 217.
⁴ Letter from John Shingler to Hans Blix, Oegstgeest, Holland, 28 March 1961 (AGA).
⁵ “[T]here are close ties with the South West Africa People’s Organisation, which is probably the largest anti-apartheid organization in South West Africa. A number of its members have joined the Liberal Party” (Brown op. cit., p. 3). Several leading members of both SWANU and SWAPO had, however, joined ANC in the 1950s. Andimba Toivo ya Toivo of SWAPO became an ANC member in 1957.
⁷ Ibid.
⁸ Blix later served as Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1976–78 and 1979–81) and Minister for Foreign Affairs (1978–79).
Olof Hansson, a Liberal MP.\(^1\) Shingler wrote to Blix, asking for a financial contribution of 50,000 SEK per year “to pay for the employment of five organizers amongst the 1,000,000 Africans in the urban areas of the Transvaal, where a politically aware and virile group awaits the announcement of a non-racial democratic philosophy”.\(^2\) According to Shingler, this “merely indicates the fringe of what we could do [...]. If the money were available, we could make plans and carry them out in a massive programme of opposition to the tyranny of Verwoerd and, we believe, bring about his fall”.\(^3\)

Blix and Hansson suggested to Shingler that a public appeal in favour of the South African Liberal Party should be launched in Sweden. Welcoming the proposal, Shingler visited Sweden in May and, again, in October-November 1961. Robin Scott-Smith, who had been responsible for the Liberal Party’s information activities in South Africa also, came to Stockholm in October 1961. During their visits, Shingler and Scott-Smith stated that although the Liberal Party was “an absolute opponent of violent means”,\(^4\) it “could hardly change the present conditions in South Africa by parliamentary action”.\(^5\) To stop South Africa from “drifting towards a bloody catastrophe which could lead to [...] Communism”,\(^6\) it would therefore embark upon extra-parliamentary methods of struggle, such as demonstrations, boycotts and strikes.

During his visit in October 1961, Shingler was in contact with both Bertil Ohlin, the chairman of the Swedish Liberal Party, and the Social Democratic Prime Minister Tage Erlander.\(^7\) Above all, at the time of the visit a number of prominent Swedes launched an ‘Appeal for the Liberal Party in South Africa’, starting a fund-raising ‘Support Action’.\(^8\) According to the appeal, the South African Liberal Party was

the only political group with a publicly stated and clearly defined programme of action. [...] [I]t is at the present moment the only bridge [...] between the races in South Africa. [...] To maintain and strengthen its organization and to broaden its activities, the Liberal Party must get substantial support from free men and free peoples. [...] [The party] plays at the moment a significant role in South Africa [and] will—if it gets sufficient financial and moral support from abroad—during the coming years be of decisive importance. We, the undersigned, are of the opinion that we in the present situation in the best way contribute to the abolishment of the tyranny of apartheid by supporting the Liberal Party.\(^9\)

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\(^1\) Letter from John Shingler to Hans Blix, Oegstgeest, Holland, 28 March 1961 (AGA).
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^5\) *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, 3 November 1961.
\(^6\) *Dagens Nyheter*, 22 October 1961.
\(^7\) Ibid.
\(^8\) In Swedish, *Stödaktionen för Liberala Partiet i Sydafrika*.
Among the fifteen Swedes who signed the appeal were, logically, a group from the Swedish Liberal Party, headed by Bertil Ohlin. As in earlier calls for a democratic South Africa, there were no signatories from the Moderate Party. However, a number of prominent Social Democrats also signed the call, among them professor Gunnar Myrdal, Åke Zetterberg and Victor Vinde, the editor of *Stockholms-Tidningen*. More noteworthy was that three of the leading Swedish anti-apartheid activists who only six months earlier had been instrumental in the forming of the non-partisan South Africa Committee, namely Gunnar Helander, Joachim Israel and Per Wästberg, added their signatures to an appeal that singled out support to the South African Liberal Party as “the best way” to abolish apartheid.¹

However, the action in support of the South African Liberal Party did not have any direct impact on the Swedish anti-apartheid opinion. “[D]ue to the risk of acts of reprisal against the Liberal Party in South Africa”, the appeal itself was not made public, but only circulated in private,² which evidently reduced its effect. Furthermore, although the appeal was signed by the editors-in-chief of *Aftonbladet*, *Expressen*, *Dagens Nyheter* and *Stockholms-Tidningen*, that is, the major liberal and social democratic morning and evening papers in Sweden, no preferential sympathy towards the South African Liberal Party—and certainly no presentation matching the quite remarkable description given the party in the appeal—was reflected in the Swedish media. Instead, it was the banned ANC that attracted the attention of the press, the church and the emerging anti-apartheid movement when it in late October 1961—coinciding with Shingler’s and Scott-Smith’s visit and the appeal—was announced that Albert Luthuli had been granted the Nobel Peace Prize.

The divisions suffered by the Liberal Party in South Africa were, finally, not conducive to the building of a support base abroad. Although the Swedish Liberal Party at the time was arguably the most consistent political organization against apartheid in Sweden, from 1962 its South African sister party never seriously re-appeared on the Swedish scene.³ This would from then on be occupied by the black nationalist movement to such an extent that Dr. Alex Boraine, from 1974 to 1986 a member of the South African parliament for the Progressive Federal Party, later recalled how

> the Nordics were extremely suspicious of white liberals. [M]y impression was that the Nordic people only saw the possibility of ANC overthrowing the regime. It was fairly simplistic. […] [W]e had visitors, for example, from the Liberal Party of Sweden. A number of them came and a number of them were very forthright. I remember one particular evening when [a Swedish Liberal MP and future

¹ The fifteen signatories were: Per Olof Hansson, Gunnar Helander, Joachim Israel, Eyvind Johnson, Yngve Kristensson, Olof Lagercrantz, Erik Lönnroth, Gunnar Myrdal, Bertil Ohlin, Einar Rimmerfors, Kurt Samuelsson, Victor Vinde, Per Wrigstad, Per Wästberg and Åke Zetterberg.


³ In 1964, the Swedish Liberal Party invited Alan Paton to its congress, but his passport was withdrawn by the South African authorities.
Minister] said that the best thing that Sweden could do was to provide arms to ANC, which shocked a lot of my colleagues.¹

Nevertheless, the ephemeral appearance of the South African Liberal Party did have an impact of a more lasting nature by introducing a definite anti-Communist dimension into the Swedish debate. In spite of the apartheid regime’s obsession with Communism—as manifested in the sweeping Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, according to which any person or organization opposing the government could be defined as Communist and be banned—neither the early Swedish opinion makers, such as Herbert Tingsten, nor the Swedish press had before 1961 presented Communism as a possible threat or placed South Africa in the Cold War East-West divide. On the contrary, the South African Communist Party and its leaders had more often than not been described in a sympathetic light. The exclusion of non-whites from political and human rights had been seen as the fundamental issue.

Beginning with Ivar Harrie at the end of the 1940s, the Swedish press had throughout the 1950s regularly written about ‘racial hatred’, ‘racial oppression’, ‘racial persecution’ or ‘racial struggles’ in South Africa. The racial dimension was likewise dominant when the Fund for the Victims of Racial Oppression, the Maundy Thursday Committee against Racial Persecution and the South Africa Committee were formed, as well as during the LO-KF boycott action in 1960. However, the South African Liberal Party emphatically warned against Communism² and from the beginning of 1961 it became increasingly common that leading Swedish newspapers and committed anti-apartheid activists did the same. In an exclusive article for the liberal newspaper Expressen — headlined ‘Who intervenes first in South Africa: UN or Khrushchev?’—Ronald Segal, the prominent South African editor of Africa South in Exile, wrote, for example, in April 1961 that

as long as white supremacy in South Africa remains the madness that it is, an intervention by the Communist bloc cannot be dismissed as pure fantasy. Khrushchev may very well calculate with the idea that neither England nor the United States would have the guts to defend Verwoerd against an attack in the name of African freedom.³

Aftonbladet raised the same concern. Discussing the South African whites-only elections to ratify the republican constitution, in October 1961—that is, at the

¹ Interview with Alex Boraine, Cape Town, 12 September 1995.
² “Communists in South Africa, as elsewhere, have chosen to work through a tight, well-disciplined core, infiltrating key sources of resistance. [...] Communists should not be discounted as a real danger to democracy. They remain dedicated and determined to see their own variety of authoritarianism established” (Peter Brown op. cit., p. 2).
³ Ronald Segal: ‘Vem ingriper först i Sydafrika: FN eller Chrustjev?’ (‘Who intervenes first in South Africa: UN or Khrushchev?’) in Expressen, 7 April 1961. It should be borne in mind that the debate took place at the time of the Congo crisis, which to a large extent brought both the United States and the Soviet Union into direct contact with developments in Africa.
time of the visit of Shingler and Scott-Smith—the social democratic paper argued that Verwoerd through his intransigence was “giving Moscow a helping hand. [...] An explosion will soon take place [and] the door to Africa will be opened to Communism. [...] The resistance movement among the blacks in South Africa gets assistance from across the borders. Also from Moscow and Peking.”¹ Similarly, in their anthology *Africans on Africa* Anders Ehnmark and Sven Hamrell included an original contribution by Jordan Ngubane, the Vice-President of the South African Liberal Party,² with the title ‘The Western Powers and Communism in South Africa’. Ngubane maintained that

the Communists in South Africa are still too weak to want to create the chaos that is a condition for the realization of their revolution. They, however, try to strengthen their position in various ways [and] money is being brought into the country to support their cause. Both in the cities and in the rural areas they are building an extensive organization in which the African component is very important. The members are being trained to always do exactly what is demanded at a given moment. They also try to ally themselves with many former bitter enemies to be able to control and influence the underground resistance movement.³

Ideological considerations—including views on the armed struggle, Communism and the role of the Soviet Union—behind Sweden’s support to the liberation movements in Southern Africa will be discussed below. In the case of South Africa, it should, however, be noted that although conservative Swedish circles regularly raised the Communist spectre, it never grew credible enough to scare the majority away from solidarity with ANC.⁴ Early ANC representatives in Sweden contributed to this situation through active participation in the public debate and untiring information work within the solidarity movement. Shortly after his arrival in Sweden in January 1961, the South African student Billy Modise, for example, started to publish articles on apartheid and

² Ngubane was in 1944 a founder member of the ANC Youth League and later its President. Joining the Liberal Party, he soon became its most prominent black member, eventually elected to the position of Vice-President.
⁴ The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had long-standing relations with the South African Communist Party (SACP). The relations between the Swedish Communist Party and SACP were, however, for a long time only indirect and mainly conducted through the World Peace Council in Prague, Czechoslovakia. According to C.H. Hermansson, chairman of the Swedish Communist Party / Left Party Communists between 1964 and 1975, the first direct bilateral contacts were established through Ruth First during the International Conference on South West Africa in Oxford, England, in March 1966 (interview with C.H. Hermansson, Stockholm, 22 November 1996). Conversations with Hermansson and leading members of SACP indicate two possible reasons for the late relationship, namely a) that the ANC leaders who visited Sweden and also were prominent members of SACP avoided direct contacts with the Swedish Communist Party in order not to antagonize the Social Democratic, Centre and Liberal parties, and b) that the Swedish party was seen by CPSU as not entirely reliable, a view that possibly was passed on to the ‘pro-Moscow’ SACP.
the nationalist movement in the established Swedish press.1 Three years later—after ANC had embarked upon armed struggle—he argued in the information bulletin Syd- och Sydvästafrika that

it is common to call an African a Communist just because he has happened to be in Moscow for a week. Implied in [...] this is the insulting insinuation that an African is devoid of intellect or that he finds himself in an eternal state of immaturity. It can also be explained by the paternalism of many conceited Europeans. They know what is best for an African! It is therefore not surprising that even in such a clear case of racial discrimination and persecution as in South Africa, many people deliberately resort to the phrase ‘Communist threat’. [...] It shall not be denied that there might be one or another Communist in South Africa, but to assign the purposeful struggle by the Africans against apartheid to Communism is a conscious distortion of facts intended to discredit the liberation movement. [...] Whatever the freedom struggle in South Africa may be called […], the objective of the Africans is one, [namely] to have democracy in that country.

[...] Verwoerd has all along used violence. Now that the Africans have decided to pit force against force, the world should not be surprised. What really should surprise the world is that the Africans have been patient for so long. The rebellion will not be Communist inspired. You do not first have to be a Communist to know that violence is the only language understood by Verwoerd. When we fight against Verwoerd we do not do so as a service to either the East or the West, but because we believe that it is the only remaining way to obtain democracy. Our attitude towards the East or the West will not be determined by what we are called by either side or by the propaganda of the Cold War […], but by what every side, every country and every individual has done or not done to solve the present crisis. The crisis is of international significance. If the Cold War propaganda is kept away from it, we would be closer to the solution”.2

Olof Palme, in particular, would later forcefully advocate similar opinions. Commenting upon the developments in Angola, the Prime Minister wrote in Dagens Nyheter in February 1976 that “it is important to remember that the war waged in Angola is not between ‘the Free World’ and ‘Communism’ [and] that it must not in a prejudiced way be viewed on the basis of the clichés of the Cold War or from the perspective of the conflicts between the super powers. It is fundamentally a continuation of the long liberation struggle.”3

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1 For example, Billy Modise: ‘Diktaturen i Sydafrika’ (‘The dictatorship in South Africa’) in Dagens Nyheter, 2 June 1961.
Contacts with PAC

The first Swedish contacts with the exiled leadership of ANC and PAC went through the South Africa United Front. Only four months after its formation, the front’s PAC representative, Nana Mahomo, travelled to Sweden in October 1960 and six months later he was joined by Oliver Tambo of ANC and Jariretundu Kozonguizi of SWANU for his second visit. In addition to the meeting with the recently formed South Africa Committee, during the visit in late April 1961 the three leaders established contacts with the ruling Social Democratic Party. They were followed up in August 1961, when Esse Beckius, the international secretary of the party, met SAUF’s leadership\(^1\) in London, where “views were exchanged on [the] conditions in South and South West Africa and [on] the needs of the front”.\(^2\)

During the autumn of 1961, the unity of the front started, however, to disintegrate, mainly due to increasing rivalry between ANC and PAC inside South Africa.\(^3\) After an attack by PAC on ANC \(^4\) at the conference of the Pan-African Freedom Movement for Eastern, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA) in

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\(^1\) Present at the meeting were Tennyson Makiwane, Mzwai Piliso and Oliver Tambo from ANC, Nana Mahomo and Peter Molotsi from PAC, Yusuf Dadoo from SAIC and Jariretundu Kozonguizi from SWANU.


\(^3\) As well as between SWANU and SWAPO in Namibia.

\(^4\) PAC’s criticism was based on the same arguments that originally had led to the breakaway, i.e. that the ANC was dominated by whites and Communists and saw the struggle as a class struggle, not as a national struggle.
Addis Ababa in February 1962, which was attended by Nelson Mandela, the front collapsed. It was formally disbanded by the member organizations at a meeting in London in March 1962. From then on, ANC and PAC pursued their own, separate and often antagonistic, diplomatic activities.\(^1\)

In Sweden—where Mahomo on behalf of the South Africa United Front had been responsible for relations with the student movement and the trade unions—PAC initially managed to raise some support, largely due to Mahomo’s persistence and diplomatic skills, as well as to his contacts with Joachim Israel. Immediately after the break-up of the front, in April 1962 Mahomo approached the Social Democratic Party with a request for financial assistance in favour of 35 PAC refugees in Bechuanaland.\(^2\) The request was referred by the party to KF, which in turn made a decision dependent on a positive reaction by LO. At the same time, Mahomo contacted the Swedish Metal Workers’ Federation with a request for “four to five jeeps to convey refugees from Bechuanaland to Dar es Salaam, [Tanganyika]”.\(^3\) The reaction was positive, but a final decision would—again—only be made subject to approval by the Swedish Trade Union Confederation. Finally, Mahomo drew the attention of the Swedish Red Cross Society to the appalling conditions under which PAC’s President Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe was kept prisoner in South Africa.

While the Red Cross on the basis of the information submitted by Mahomo raised the issue of Sobukwe with the International Committee of the Red Cross,\(^4\) LO did not comment on the requests presented to KF and the Metal Workers’ Federation. Mahomo then raised the question with the Swedish UN delegation in New York and returned to Sweden at the beginning of November 1962, where he held a meeting with the LO chairman Arne Geijer. The meeting was inconclusive, and in a note to Israel before leaving Stockholm Mahomo stated that he “was a bit depressed after the Arne Geijer interview”, conveying his decision “to postpone any further moves”.\(^5\) At the same time, he wrote to Geijer—“in an effort to overcome the stalemate in which our negotiations to promote an emergency refugee project now seem to be deadlocked”—explaining that the original requests were “specifically and exclusively intended for [Sweden]” and that they constituted “the first comprehensive approach ever presented by any organization dealing with South Africa to meet the problem

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\(^1\) Over the next few years, the break-up of SAUF did not fundamentally affect the relations between ANC and SWANU of Namibia. In Sweden, the march at the launch of SUL’s boycott campaign in March 1963 was thus led by Duma Nokwe of ANC and Zedekia Ngavirue of SWANU. Similarly, the Swedish Labour Day demonstrations on 1 May 1965 were addressed by Oliver Tambo of ANC and Jariretundu Kozonguizi of SWANU.

\(^2\) Letter from Nana Mahomo to Arne Geijer, Stockholm, 12 November 1962 (JIC).

\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^4\) Joachim Israel also raised the issue of Sobukwe’s conditions. See, for example, Joachim Israel: ‘Cell i Sydafrika’ (‘Cell in South Africa’) in Dagens Nyheter, 18 November 1962.

\(^5\) Note by Nana Mahomo to Joachim Israel, Hotel Malmen, Stockholm [no date, but probably 12 November 1962] (JIC).
of refugees with a view towards its permanent solution’.1 Three weeks later, LO replied that “we are in great sympathy with your cause and have forwarded all information to the ICFTU headquarters in Brussels”, explaining that “you will appreciate that LO does not give any bilateral international aid, but supports the projects of the ICFTU”.2

In this situation, Joachim Israel—who in August 1962 had been appointed chairman of the Swedish South Africa Committee—intervened to “untie the knots”. After further letters from Mahomo, KF decided at the beginning of January 1963 to grant PAC an amount of 100 British Pounds “to help you to meet the immediate needs of the refugees”, adding that “it is impossible for KF to go beyond this [amount] until such time as you have reached an agreement, either with LO in Stockholm or with the ICFTU, on the matter of financing a more permanent solution [to] the refugee problem in question”.3 In addition, on Israel’s recommendation the Metal Workers’ Federation agreed later in January 1963 to purchase one Land Rover for PAC and send it to Dar es Salaam.4 Mahomo was “delighted with the news”, writing to Israel that “this is the kind of breakthrough [that] we have been waiting for, and I am certain that we will make significant strides in our struggle in the next six months or so”.5 In the same letter he, however, informed him that “the ICFTU in Brussels […] has not committed itself in any way”.6

The gift from the Swedish metal workers was a one-off affair7 and Mahomo would not appear on the Swedish scene again. Nevertheless, as far as can be ascertained it constitutes the very first direct material support for humanitarian purposes from a Swedish organization to a South African liberation movement. It is ironic that the first recipient of Swedish support to the liberation struggle in South Africa was the Pan-Africanist Congress. Although recognized by the Organization of African Unity, PAC would never receive direct official humanitarian assistance from the Swedish government, nor did it enjoy any tangible support from the NGO community in Sweden. Both at the official and at the non-official level, Swedish support was from the outset extended to ANC. Thus, after Mahomo’s diplomatic contacts from the fall of 1960 until the beginning of 1963—largely coinciding with the period of the South Africa United Front—Sweden almost became a closed area for PAC. Gora Ebrahim, PAC’s Secretary for International Affairs from 1969, noted in 1995 that “there

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1 Letter from Nana Mahomo to Arne Geijer, Stockholm, 12 November 1962 (JIC).
2 Letter from Birger Viklund to Nana Mahomo, Stockholm, 3 December 1962 (JIC).
3 Letter from J.W. Ames to Nana Mahomo, Stockholm, 2 January 1963 (JIC).
4 Letter from Per Jensell, AB Gjestvang, to Åke Nilsson, Swedish Metal Workers’ Federation, Stockholm, 22 January 1963. The value of the gift from the Swedish metal workers to PAC was 13,000 SEK (JIC). Three years later the Metal Workers’ Union donated a jeep to SWANU of Namibia.
5 Letter from Nana Mahomo to Joachim Israel, London, 30 January 1963 (JIC).
6 Ibid.
7 Letter from Joachim Israel to the author, Halmstad, 27 August 1996.
were [in Sweden] some small organizations that we were able to contact, but we never received any substantial assistance from them”.1

The main reason behind the common view regarding PAC in Sweden was its negative attitude towards white South Africans and, thus, serious doubts about its willingness to work for a non-racial society. To this should be added PAC’s “byzantine leadership intrigues and rank-and-file rebellions”2 in exile, often turning into assassination attempts, as well as its sectarian diplomacy and low level of activity in South Africa.3 Meanwhile, the sudden end to the relations established by Mahomo in Sweden had a lot to do with PAC’s military campaign and his personal fate within the organization.

Towards the end of 1961, a number of organizations embarked upon or made plans for armed sabotage activities in South Africa. Umkhonto we Sizwe, the military structure formed by ANC, SAIC and Communist Party members, made its appearance on 16 December 1961. At about the same time, the National Committee for Liberation/the African Resistance Movement (ARM), set up by members of the Liberal Party, went into action and in Cape Town a group around the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM)4 formed the Yu Chi Chan Club, a name used for the National Liberation Front (NLF).5

1 Interview with Gora Ebrahim, Harare, 22 July 1995. Norway gave direct government assistance to PAC. Swedish support to PAC was only channelled through the United Nations, IDAF, IUEF, WUS and other international organizations.
3 See, for example, interview with Gunnar Helander, Västerås, 12 February 1996: “I found PAC a bit racist, black racist. [...] If we strove for a South Africa as Luthuli and Mandela wanted it I did not think that PAC was the thing to support.”; interview with Ernst Michanek, Stockholm, 19 March 1996: “[At IDAF] we had to put an end to the support of PAC, which had developed into something rather bad, with people murdering each other even in the circles that we were dealing with. If an organization was disrupting the struggle against apartheid in the way that PAC did, then I had to be very firm. [...] I should not use any derogatory words about them, because I pitied them a great deal. But what they could do with the money that they received had nothing at all to do with the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. It was far too much to be accepted.”; interview with Pierre Schori, Stockholm, 28 June 1996: “As for PAC, we saw them as an opposition and resistance movement against apartheid, [b]ut their vision was more blurred. [...] For some reason they never tried to develop a political dialogue with us. Maybe they thought that it was a lost cause, but they did not even try. They visited Sweden a couple of times, but it was always a matter of trying to incriminate ANC.”; and interview with Per Wästberg, Stockholm, 28 February 1996: “[T]here was no question of ever supporting an organization that was more or less fraudulent and that could not take care of money. [T]he PAC as an organization was never reliable. There were infightings and they were killing each other. They were absolutely impossible”.
4 The Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM) was created in 1943 through a merger of the All-African Convention (AAC) and a coloured federation known as Anti-CAD (Anti-Coloured Affairs Department). Mainly confined to the western Cape, NEUM was for many years regarded as South Africa’s ‘Trotskyist’ movement. Some of the leading SWANÜ members who came to Sweden—such as Charles Kauraisa—had through the Cape Peninsula Students’ Union been connected to NEUM while studying in Cape Town.
5 “When we formed the Yu Chi Chan Club, the name was chosen for security reasons. The organization was in reality the National Liberation Front. We had commenced preparations for the armed struggle against apartheid as early as in 1959” (interview with Gerald Giose, Cape Town, 6 December 1995). ‘Yu Chi Chan’ stands for ‘guerrilla’ in Chinese. The Namibians Andreas Shipanga and Kenneth Abrahams were among the founders of the secret club.
MK, ARM and NLF all envisaged sabotage activities against government installations, avoiding attacks on people. When PAC towards the end of 1961 also initiated armed action, it was, however, essentially different. Its military organization, Poqo, was guided by a millenarian African outlook, and it was the first black political movement in South Africa to adopt a strategy that explicitly involved the killing of people. Poqo made its first appearance in November 1962, when 250 men armed with pangas, axes and other makeshift weapons attacked the small town of Paarl in the western Cape, killing two persons. Then, at the beginning of February 1963, five whites were killed in the Transkei. A wave of arrests followed, with up to 3,000 suspects rounded up by the police. The repression culminated between April and June 1963, after PAC’s Acting President Potlako Leballo at a press conference in Maseru, Lesotho, announced that the movement’s “155,000 members were impatiently awaiting his order to deliver the ‘blow’ which would end white South Africa.” Although isolated incidents of terror and murder continued for some time, the back of PAC inside South Africa had, however, been broken. The centre of activities shifted instead into exile, where “most of the organization’s energies were devoted to internecine conflict”. One of the political casualties of this process was Nana Mahomo.

After his contacts in Sweden, Mahomo made a tour of the United States, where he managed to raise a donation of 5,000 USD from the AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor—Congress of Industrial Organizations). At about the same time, he was responsible for negotiating an agreement with FNLA of Angola under which PAC members together with recruits from SWAPO of Namibia would receive military training at FNLA’s camp at Kinkuzu in Congo (Léopoldville). This ill-fated training scheme ran from November 1963 to May 1964, when it collapsed due to deplorable material conditions and to FNLA’s “politicomilitary improvidence and indiscipline”. Mahomo was at one stage in late 1963 reported to be in charge of PAC’s Kinkuzu office, but returned to

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1 Lodge quotes a Poqo leaflet distributed in Nyanga, Cape Town, in December 1961. It read: “We are starting again Africans. [...] [W]e die once. Africa will be free on January 1st. The white people shall suffer, the black people will rule. Freedom comes after bloodshed. Poqo has started. It needs a real man. The youth has weapons so you need not be afraid. The PAC says this” (Lodge op. cit., p. 243).
2 Ibid., p. 307.
3 Ibid., p. 310.
5 Marcum op. cit., p. 118.
London where he soon fell out with Leballo. He was suspended from PAC in August 1964 and charged with “misappropriation of funds, attempts to create personal loyalties and sources of personal operation”.¹ When Mahomo was subsequently expelled, the PAC leadership implied that he through his contacts with the American AFL-CIO had been working for the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),² a common accusation during conflicts within PAC.

It should, finally, be noted that the UN Anti-apartheid Committee at the beginning of 1969 informally approached the Swedish government regarding possible political asylum for PAC’s jailed President Robert Sobukwe, subject to agreement by the South African government.³ Arrested in connection with the Sharpeville events in March 1960, Sobukwe was originally sentenced to three years imprisonment in the Orange Free State. Following Leballo’s announcement of massive PAC warfare, he was, however, transferred to Robben Island, where under special legislation he was held in solitary confinement outside the main prison. After extending his detention year after year, the Pretoria government announced in April 1969 that Sobukwe would be set free. It was in that connection that the approach to Sweden was made. The Swedish UN representative, Sverker Åström, “found the idea worth trying”,⁴ but Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson was “somewhat sceptical”.⁵ In a letter to Åström, the Foreign Ministry wrote that

> in the first place, it is doubtful whether Sweden is the right country to ask South Africa for a favour. It would, in the second place, […] appear as not entirely clear that the opposition movement is served by […] offering the South African authorities a possibility to get rid of a resistance leader […] whose mere presence in South Africa must constitute a problem for the regime.⁶

However, the Swedish government did not have to take a formal decision on the matter, which could have been problematic vis-à-vis ANC and most probably would have given PAC a different platform in Sweden. As it turned out, Sobukwe was ‘set free’ in May 1969, but “subject to such restrictions [that] are deemed necessary for the safety of the state”.⁷ He was not allowed to leave.

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¹ Lodge op. cit., p. 309.
² Ibid., p. 319, note 50. See also Winter op. cit., p. 431, where it is said that Mahomo worked for the CIA.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Letter from Wilhelm Wachtmeister to Sverker Åström, Stockholm, 13 February 1969 (MFA).
⁶ Ibid.
⁷ Cited in the letter from Sverker Åström to Wilhelm Wachtmeister, New York, 14 May 1969 (MFA).
South Africa, but banned for five years to the town of Kimberley where he was placed under rigorous house arrest. The ban was extended in 1974 for another five years.¹

¹ Sobukwe died of lung cancer at the beginning of 1978.
ANC, Boycotts and Nascent Relations

The Nobel Prize to Chief Luthuli

Of all the contacts established between Sweden and the political opposition in South Africa, by far the most important was with the African National Congress. Its political objectives “to strive for the attainment of universal adult suffrage and the creation of a united democratic South Africa on the principles outlined in the Freedom Charter”\(^1\) were widely supported, and the movement would over the years occupy a hegemonic position in both the Swedish anti-apartheid movement and at the official level. The position was to a large extent achieved through the extraordinary diplomatic skills of Oliver Tambo and the early efforts by resident ANC members, such as—above all—Billy Modise.\(^2\)

What really brought ANC to the fore—particularly in Swedish church circles and in the non-socialist political centre—was, however, the granting of the Nobel Peace Prize to the ANC President-General, Chief Albert Luthuli, by the Norwegian Nobel Committee in December 1961. Behind the award was the leading Swedish anti-apartheid activist Gunnar Helander.

As a CSM missionary in South Africa, Helander had in the 1940s worked closely with Luthuli—both within the Natal Missionary Conference and at the secular Institute of Race Relations—becoming deeply impressed by the future national ANC leader. Refused a visa to re-enter South Africa in 1957, together with Olof G. Tandberg of SFS he conceived the idea of proposing Luthuli for the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of his stature as a Christian and a politician, since 1952 leading the non-violent resistance of the black majority.\(^3\)

No African had then received the coveted prize,\(^4\) but true to his nature Helander actively raised the proposal in newspaper articles and on the radio. As parliamentarians were among those entitled to submit proposals to the Norwegian Nobel Committee, he wrote to Evert Svensson, a Social Democratic MP and a leading representative of the Brotherhood Movement. In turn, Svensson lobbied his fellow parliamentarians and managed to get the signatures of 34 Swedish MP’s on the decisive submission.\(^5\) Luthuli’s candidature was at the same time supported by Albert Schweitzer, the famous German missionary

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2 See, for example, interview with Anders Johansson, Eskilstuna, 19 November 1996, where Modise is described as “a major source of inspiration” for the early Swedish anti-apartheid movement.
3 Interview with Gunnar Helander, Västerås, 12 February 1996.
4 Desmond Tutu, at the time General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1984. Nelson Mandela and F. W. de Klerk shared the prize in 1993. With two presidents as peace laureates, ANC occupies a unique position among national liberation movements in the 20th century. The more than three decades between Luthuli’s and Mandela’s awards also bear witness to ANC’s exceptionally long road to freedom.
ANC, Boycotts and Nascent Relations

The announcement that Albert Luthuli had been awarded the Peace Prize was made in late October 1961.\(^1\) It made big headlines in the Swedish press, which, naturally, highlighted the situation in South Africa in general and the role of Luthuli and ANC in particular. Per Wästberg wrote a full-page article in *Dagens Nyheter* in which he presented the laureate, arguing that

the peace prize falls like a weapon in the hands of the unarmed. The Africans will see it as a confirmation that the work by Luthuli and by his party to make Africa part of the world, belonging to all, constitutes work for global peace. A more worthy man could not be honoured together with Dag Hammarskjöld.\(^2\)

A number of factors contributed to the deep impact the announcement had in Sweden. The prize ceremony was, to begin with, to be dedicated to both Luthuli and Dag Hammarskjöld, the Swedish UN Secretary General who had died in Africa on a peace mission only a month earlier. Equally important was that Luthuli was personally known by Swedish missionaries from different denominations and that the churches strongly supported the decision by the Nobel Committee. In addition, the fact that ANC was an ‘unlawful organization’ and that Luthuli had been under a banning order since 1959—confining him to his Natal home in Groutville—further underlined the cruelty of the apartheid system.\(^3\) Finally, as soon as the announcement was made, a number of concerned organizations, such as the Brotherhood Movement,\(^4\) the Social Democratic Laboremus association in Uppsala\(^5\) and the National Council of Swedish Youth,\(^6\) invited Luthuli to Sweden as well. However, the South African government only granted him a travel document to Norway.\(^7\) This further raised public awareness about the situation in South Africa.

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\(^1\) The award was formally granted for 1960.


\(^3\) A couple of days before the ceremony in Oslo, a seventeen-year old Swedish sailor was, in addition, detained in Durban under the Immorality Act and flogged. His female companion was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. The young sailor stated to the press that he could “not understand that medieval ways of thinking still remain in a country where Western descendants are in power”. The social democratic *Stockholms-Tidningen* concluded: “Again and again we must bring home that flogging and racial hatred are bloody realities in South Africa. [We must] rivet this fact to every individual’s conscience, so that when he or she sees a South African fruit in a shop-front, the image of a bleeding, flogged back of a seventeen-year old will simultaneously appear” (*Stockholms-Tidningen*, 6 December 1961).


\(^5\) Laboremus: ‘Protokoll från styrelssammanträde’ (‘Minutes from board meeting’), Uppsala, 1 November 1961 (UPA).


\(^7\) Travelling to Norway, Luthuli passed in transit via Gothenburg, where his old friend Gunnar Helander joined him on the flight to Oslo. After Luthuli’s death, Helander revealed that he had asked Luthuli if he was not tempted to stay in Norway or in Sweden as a political refugee. Luthuli had brushed the idea away, stating that his place was in South Africa, among his own people (Gunnar Helander: ‘Albert Luthuli’ in *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, 24 July 1967). Returning
ANC President-General Albert Luthuli on his way to Oslo, Norway, to receive the Nobel Peace Prize, 9 December 1961. (Photo: Pressens Bild)

The Nobel ceremony took place in the Oslo City Hall on 10 December 1961, in the presence of the exiled ANC leader Oliver Tambo and other members of the liberation movement based in Europe, among them Billy Modise from Lund.\(^1\) The award was, however, not entirely uncomplicated for ANC. On the one hand, it acknowledged the movement and served as a strong political weapon, although Walter Sisulu, ANC’s former Secretary General, later conceded that “we had not, I must confess, by that time attached such an importance to the Nobel Prize”.\(^2\) At the same time, some members were worried that the award would negatively affect the movement’s relations in Africa and confirm a view spread by PAC that ANC was a moderate organization, more acceptable to whites than to blacks.\(^3\) Above all, the announcement was made when the ANC leadership around Nelson Mandela was actively preparing for the launch of armed sabotage actions. In his memoirs, Mandela writes that “the award came to South Africa, Luthuli was again placed under house arrest at his farm in Groutville, prohibited from publishing any statement, addressing any meeting or making contact with any other banned person. He died under mysterious circumstances—run over by a train—in July 1967.

\(^{1}\) Letter from Billy Modise to the author, Ottawa, 21 January 1997.
\(^{2}\) Interview with Walter Sisulu, Johannesburg, 15 September 1995.
\(^{3}\) Thomas op. cit., p. 47.
at an awkward time, for it was juxtaposed against an announcement that seemed to call the award itself into question”.¹

The decision to abandon ANC’s core principle of non-violence—upheld since the founding of the organization in 1912—and to embark upon organized violence had been reached in mid-1961. Luthuli initially resisted the idea, but ultimately agreed that a military campaign was inevitable. To protect ANC and its allies, Luthuli, however, suggested that the “military movement should be a separate and independent organ, linked to [...] and under the overall control of the ANC, but fundamentally autonomous”.² The proposal was endorsed by the congress alliance, which, in the words of Nelson Mandela

authorized me to go ahead and form a new military organization, separate from the ANC. The policy of the ANC would still be that of non-violence. I was [also] authorized to join with whomever I wanted or needed to create this organization and would not be subject to the direct control of the mother organization.³

Umkhonto we Sizwe (The Spear of the Nation)—or MK for short—dramatically made its appearance on 16 December 1961, the day after Luthuli’s return from Oslo, setting off a number of explosions at power stations and government buildings in Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Durban. At the same time, thousands of leaflets with the MK Manifesto were circulated all over South Africa, announcing the birth of the military organization and the beginning of a new era. “Units of Umkhonto we Sizwe”, it stated,

today carried out planned attacks against government installations, particularly those connected with the policy of apartheid and race discrimination. Umkhonto we Sizwe is a new, independent body, formed by Africans. It includes in its ranks South Africans of all races. Umkhonto we Sizwe will carry on the struggle for freedom and democracy by new methods, which are necessary to complement the actions of the established national liberation organizations. [I]t fully supports the national liberation movement, and our members, jointly and individually, place themselves under the overall political guidance of that movement. [...] The government has interpreted the peacefulness of the [liberation] movement as weakness. The people’s non-violent policies have been taken as a green light for government violence. [...] [However,] the time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices: submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means within our power in defence of our people, our future and our freedom.⁴

In his Nobel lecture, delivered at the University of Oslo on 11 December 1961, Albert Luthuli, obviously, spoke about non-violent methods of struggle and peaceful solutions to South Africa’s problems. He saw the award as “a tribute to

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¹ Mandela op. cit., p. 273.
² Ibid., p. 260.
³ Ibid., p. 261.
my humble contribution to efforts by democrats on both sides of the colour line
to find a peaceful solution to the race problem” and pointed out that
we [...] have chosen the path of non-violence of our own volition. Along this path
we have organised many heroic campaigns. All the strength of progressive leader-
ship in South Africa, all my life and strength, has been given to the pursuance of
this method in an attempt to avert disaster in the interests of South Africa.¹

At the same time, Luthuli, however, implied that peaceful methods of struggle
were not sufficient. After discussing the revolutionary struggle in Africa and
the massacre at Sharpeville, he stated:

[O]ur goal is a united Africa [...] in which the dignity of man is rescued from
beneath the heels of colonialism which has trampled it. This goal, pursued by
millions of our people with revolutionary zeal by means of books, representations,
demonstrations and in some places armed force provoked by the adamancy of
white rule, carries the only real promise of peace in Africa. Whatever means have
been used, the efforts have gone to end alien rule and race oppression. [...] Ours is a
continent in revolution against oppression. And peace and revolution make uneasy
bedfellows. There can be no peace until the forces of oppression are overthrown.²

The wider significance of Luthuli’s award for the development of the Swedish
anti-apartheid movement cannot be overstated. Even before his brief visit to
Oslo, Luthuli—and, by implication, the movement he was leading—enjoyed a
high and solid reputation among influential church circles in Sweden. It was
further cemented when the ANC leader in his Nobel lecture underlined the
progressive role of the missions, stating that

[t]he mitigating feature in the gloom of [the] far-off days [of slavery] was the shaft
of light sunk by Christian missions, a shaft of light to which we owe our initial
enlightenment. [...] It is fair to say that even in present day conditions Christian
missions have been in the vanguard of initiating social services provided for us.³

In addition, although he did not discuss the issue of economic isolation of South
Africa in his address, Luthuli’s calls for a boycott were well known and would
throughout the 1960s be quoted by leading members of the church, established
organizations in the political centre and by the popular solidarity movement.
To the extent that it was connected to ANC, the question of violence, finally,
ever worked against ‘Luthuli’s movement’ in the Swedish public opinion. Dean Helander, for example, later stated that he

had no objection [against that]. I admired Luthuli and his line had been ‘violence
under no circumstances’. That is why he could be nominated for the Nobel Peace
Prize. [...] But later he said: ‘I have been knocking on a closed door for year after
year. I could not use violence myself, but I cannot any longer condemn those who

Centre against Apartheid: For Freedom in South Africa: Statements by Chief Albert Lutuli on Receipt of
² Ibid., pp. 10–11 and 9.
³ Ibid., p. 12.
advocate the use of violence.’ I agreed with that. You had to defend yourself. The whites used violence all the time and I think that it was right to use violence to defend yourself. It did not horrify me at all. I very much remember that Mandela never advocated violence against persons. It was only sabotage against buildings and railways and things like that.¹

Boycott Demands and New Initiatives

By 1962, most constituent parts of the future Swedish solidarity movement with South Africa were in place. A wealth of written accounts on the situation in the country was available in the Swedish language and influential intellectuals had gone from word to action, forming the first anti-apartheid organizations. The youth, students and churches were actively involved, both at home and internationally, and the labour and cooperative movements had carried out a first boycott campaign. Prominent politicians from the ruling party and the Liberal opposition had added their names to appeals against apartheid and South Africa had become a standing feature at the traditional Labour Day demonstrations. Politically active students from South and Southern Africa had been welcomed in Sweden, direct contacts had been established with the political opposition in South Africa and ANC had come to occupy a privileged position in the Swedish opinion. However, the Social Democratic government opposed any radical initiatives towards the apartheid regime and the voice of the Moderate Party remained mute. Swedish business circles at the same time defended economic relations with South Africa, while marginal extreme right elements expressed support for apartheid.

This situation would, broadly speaking, remain unchanged until the beginning of the 1970s, when the Swedish parliament and government decided to grant direct humanitarian assistance to ANC. With regard to economic sanctions, almost another decade would lapse before a decision was taken. The change of mind was largely due to the popular pressures built up since the beginning of the 1960s.

The early Swedish anti-apartheid opinion was expressed by an intellectual and political elite and primarily re-active in character, concentrating on information activities and measures to alleviate the plight of the victims of apartheid and racial persecution. The original programme of action of the South Africa Committee did not, for example, raise the issue of boycotts against South Africa. Under pressure from the Swedish youth and student movements, this would, however, change during 1962 and, above all, in 1963, when SUL embarked upon a popular boycott campaign, the first local solidarity committees were formed and the Swedish anti-apartheid movement assumed a leading role internationally. Important milestones on the way were the WAY meeting in Aarhus in July 1962, the Afro-Scandinavian Youth Congress in Oslo in August

¹ Interview with Gunnar Helander, Västerås, 12 February 1996.
1962 and the so-called Sundsvall Appeal of December 1962. Equally important for the radicalization of the anti-apartheid movement was that Sweden in November 1962 abstained from voting when the UN General Assembly adopted the very first resolution with specific recommendations on diplomatic and economic measures against South Africa, including boycotts.

After the LO-KF boycott of 1960, only scattered voices in favour of sustained economic and/or diplomatic action against the apartheid regime were raised in Sweden. In addition to the Southern African students who had recently arrived in the country, influential opinion makers such as Victor Vinde, the chief editor of Stockholms-Tidningen, had, however, demanded the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations, and during the Lidman-Nthite case trade unions had appealed to LO for action. Still un-coordinated, these voices became more unison in 1962, largely as a result of ANC’s diplomatic efforts.

Invited to Sweden by SFS and the university-based Swedish Academic Help, in March 1962 the exiled South African author Ezekiel Mphahlele visited Stockholm, Umeå and Uppsala, where he addressed the university students’ political associations on the conditions in South Africa, particularly with regard to education. On behalf of ANC, Mphahlele—who left South Africa in 1957—had participated at the All-African Peoples’ Conference (AAPC) in Accra in December 1958 where he made ANC’s first call for a boycott of South African goods, later chairing AAPC’s boycott committee. Mphahlele repeated the call during his university tour of Sweden. It was well received. At the end of March 1962, the Stockholm students’ UN Association and the students’ foreign policy associations in Gothenburg and Uppsala appealed to the Swedish government to propose a total trade ban on South Africa to the UN General Assembly. It was one of the first domestic demands on the Swedish government for economic action against apartheid. A month later, Oliver Tambo repeated the call when he—sharing the platform with the former Social Democratic Finance Minister Ernst Wigforss—spoke at the Labour Day demonstrations in Gothenburg, addressing a gathering of 2,500 people.

After leaving South Africa in late March 1960, Tambo had established friendly relations with David Wirmark, the Swedish secretary general of the World Assembly of Youth (WAY). As already noted, in the beginning of the 1960s

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1 The Namibian SWANU students (Kaukuetu, Kauraisa, Ngavirue and others) appeared as representatives of the South Africa United Front, which—in addition to fund-raising—in 1961 concentrated its attention to a boycott and economic sanctions, as well as to the exclusion of South Africa from the British Commonwealth (SAUF: ‘Decisions and resolutions from conference 5–19 January 1961’, London) (MCA).
2 In Swedish, Akademikerhjälpen.
4 Cable from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Swedish legation in Pretoria, Stockholm, 31 March 1962 (MFA). At the same time, the student organizations requested the government to raise the question of South West Africa, demanding that South Africa’s mandate should be transferred to the United Nations.
5 Stockholms-Tidningen, 2 May 1962.
there was close cooperation between ANC, WAY and the National Council of Swedish Youth (SUL), serving as the national WAY committee in Sweden. This helps to explain that it was on the initiative of SUL\(^1\) that the fourth general assembly of WAY, held in Aarhus, Denmark, from 9 to 24 July 1962, unanimously adopted a resolution calling on all national committees to bring all possible pressure to bear on their governments to

- apply effective economic and diplomatic sanctions and to impose an arms embargo on the Republic of South Africa;
- campaign [...] to make the resolution on economic sanctions against that country binding on all member nations of the United Nations; and
- support by all conceivable active measures an international boycott of South African goods.\(^2\)

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\(^2\) ANC/WAY op. cit., p. 42.
On the basis of this resolution, SUL launched its boycott campaign on 1 March 1963. Oliver Tambo had, however, in August 1962 already raised the boycott issue with the Nordic political youth organizations, the Social Democratic Prime Ministers in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, the trade union confederations in the same countries and with the Swedish South Africa Committee.

On 20 August 1962, Tambo addressed the Afro-Scandinavian Youth Congress in Oslo, which subsequently demanded “the imposition of total economic, diplomatic and cultural sanctions [against South Africa]”, as well as “unreserved material and moral support for the liberation movements”.1 After discussions with the Norwegian Prime Minister Gerhardsen, Tambo then proceeded to Stockholm for talks with Prime Minister Erlander and his advisor, Olof Palme, and to Copenhagen, where he met Prime Minister Viggo Kampmann.2 In the meetings with the Scandinavian Social Democratic leaders, Tambo stressed that general violence was rapidly becoming a reality in South Africa, stating that “the South African government has put us in a situation where it is impossible [...] to continue agitating for resistance without violence”.3 To forestall a violent scenario, he raised the issue of economic sanctions, but principally the idea of an international conference to discuss concerted actions against South Africa.4 Such a conference, he argued, would be an important first step to create broader pressure on the apartheid regime, “since it has become evident that the UN resolutions which condemn the racial policies of the Verwoerd government have not had any tangible effects”.5 The conference should in Tambo’s view include representatives of the international trade union movement. During his visits to the Scandinavian capitals, he also met the leaders of the respective national trade union confederations.

Tambo’s visit to Stockholm in August 1962 was arranged by the Swedish South Africa Committee. During his brief stay, he managed to attend the committee’s first regular annual meeting. From a personal letter—signed ‘Oliver’—that he subsequently wrote to Joachim Israel, it transpires that the ANC leader was encouraged by the meetings and discussions held in Stockholm and the other Scandinavian capitals. He expected the Swedish solidarity movement to

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1 ASYC op. cit., p. 143.
2 Letter from Oliver Tambo to Olof G. Tandberg, London, 5 September 1962 (JIC). Tambo—who had already met Prime Minister Kampmann in Copenhagen in May 1960—was particularly happy with the reception in Denmark: “I was met at the airport by an official of the Foreign Affairs department, who took me directly to the parliament buildings where I was received by the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister. Present at this luncheon meeting were also Mr. Per Haekkerup, leader of the [Danish] United Nations delegation, Mr. Niels Mathiassen, General Secretary of the Social Democratic Party, Mr. Frode Jakobsen, MP [and] member of the United Nations delegation, and Nina Andersen, MP [and] leader of the women’s section of the Social Democratic Party” (ibid.). Due to illness, Kampmann resigned two weeks later. He was succeeded by Jens Otto Krag.
3 Cited in Aftenposten, 21 August 1962.
4 The idea to convene such a conference did not materialize until April 1964, when the Inter national Conference on Sanctions Against South Africa was held in London.
assume a leading and coordinating role at the international level. Tambo wrote that he kept

calling to mind the lively meeting of the Swedish South Africa Committee which I had the privilege to attend on August 24th, when you were elected chairman. For both you and I, the meeting had a special historic significance and I hope [that] we shall for many years hereafter recall this occasion in relation to the progress of events in South Africa. [...] There is no doubt that your organisations and people in Scandinavia are the most powerful from the point of view of embarking on action. It seems to us that you could raise the efforts in Britain and in the United States to the level of practical action by co-ordinating your plans with those of the [British] Anti-Apartheid Movement and the American Committee on Africa. [...] We would [therefore] request you to contact the other Scandinavian countries and European or other bodies with which you have contact. We shall do likewise.¹

With regard to possible government action, Tambo had, however, over the following months every reason to be disappointed with Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries. In his letter to Israel, he had expectantly written about the Appeal for Action against Apartheid, which at the beginning of September 1962 was jointly issued by Albert Luthuli and the American civil rights’ leader Dr. Martin Luther King through the American Committee on Africa. In Tambo’s words, the “campaign opens up opportunities for co-ordination of the entire movement against South Africa and for extending it to the four corners of the globe”.² It was supported by a number of prominent Americans, such as Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Hubert Humphrey and Eugene McCarthy. In a letter to the Swedish Foreign Minister Östen Undén, Luthuli and Luther King invited him to join them as a sponsor of the appeal.³ However, as it contained a call for economic sanctions against South Africa, Undén took no further action on the letter.⁴

A more important reason for disappointment was that Sweden and the other Nordic countries on 6 November 1962 abstained from voting on the first UN General Assembly resolution that requested

the member states—separately or collectively—to
— break off diplomatic relations with the government of the Republic of South Africa or refrain from establishing such relations;
— close their ports to all vessels flying the South African flag;
— enact legislation prohibiting their ships from entering South African ports;
— boycott all South African goods and refrain from exporting goods, including all arms and ammunition, to South Africa; and

¹ Letter from Oliver Tambo to Joachim Israel, London, 18 September 1962 (JIC).
² Ibid.
³ Letter from Albert Luthuli and Martin Luther King to Östen Undén, New York, 4 September 1962 (MFA).
⁴ On the original it is hand-written that “his Excellency” has seen the letter (‘vidi’) and that it should be filed (‘ad acta’).
— refuse landing and passage facilities to all aircraft belonging to the government and companies registered under the laws of South Africa.¹

During the discussions preceding the resolution, the Swedish UN representative, ambassador Boheman, explained that Sweden was in favour of condemning the racial policies of South Africa, but would “vote against the drastic sanctions that the resolution recommends, as it is clear that they neither can become effective nor enjoy full support in the UN Charter”.² The Swedish UN diplomats understood, however, that the resolution would raise a number of questions. As soon as it was adopted, Sverker Åström, acting as Sweden’s UN representative, cabled the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm, saying that perhaps it will be asked at home what Sweden will do now? The answer should be that the recommendations of the assembly are not binding on the members. [T]he states who have voted for [them] must be considered politically committed to take action accordingly, but not those who have abstained or voted against.³

For the government, it was business as usual. Even more so for the Swedish companies with interests in South Africa. Shortly after the UN resolution, it was announced that about thirty major Swedish firms were preparing an export promotion drive at the South African trade fair in Johannesburg in April 1963. On behalf of SSAK, Joachim Israel reacted to the news and wrote—”as a shareholder in the company”—to Gunnar Engellau, the head of Volvo, requesting that the car company should withdraw from the fair.⁴ Engellau replied that it seems unreasonable to me that a private company shall conduct foreign policy and abstain from doing business with a country and a market where Sweden has established both foreign and trade relations. Volvo has been conducting business with South Africa since twelve years back, and I do not consider it possible to carry out sales to South Africa unless it is done whole-heartedly.⁵

The positions of the government and the business sector would remain the same throughout the 1960s and most of the 1970s. In late 1962, they had already provoked strong criticism from the mounting Swedish anti-apartheid move-

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¹ UN General Assembly Resolution 1761 (XVII), 6 November 1962, in ‘The United Nations and Apartheid’ op. cit., p. 251. 67 states voted for the resolution, 16 against and 23 abstained. This was also the occasion when the UN Special Committee against Apartheid came into being.

² Ministry for Foreign Affairs: ‘Anförande av ambassadören Erik Boheman i FN:s särskilda politiska utskott’ (‘Address by ambassador Erik Boheman in the UN special political committee’), Stockholm [no date] (MFA).

³ Cable from Sverker Åström to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, New York, 6 November 1962 (MFA).

⁴ Letter from Joachim Israel to Gunnar Engellau, Stockholm, 21 November 1962 (JIC).

⁵ Letter from Gunnar Engellau to Joachim Israel, Gothenburg, 1 December 1962. (JIC). The question of the Swedish companies’ participation at the Johannesburg trade fair figured prominently during SUL’s boycott campaign. It was also raised by the chairman of the Swedish Communist Party, Hilding Hagberg, in parliament. Preparing a reply by the Foreign Minister, Sverker Åström turned to Gunnar von Sydow, Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Trade. In a brief, but significant, note von Sydow commented that “according to the Ministry of Trade, there is no need to give [Hagberg] a reply at all” (note from von Sydow to Åström [no date]) (MFA).
ment. The criticism would during the following years constantly increase as the movement grew in strength and scale. From 1963, many political organizations added their voices to the demands for a more active Swedish policy towards South Africa, but in 1962 it was the youth and the students who led the way with the demands raised at the WAY meeting and the Oslo congress. It was also the youth who paved the way for the local, practical initiatives which for the next thirty years were to characterize the Swedish solidarity movement with South and Southern Africa. The secondary school students at the Sundsvall high school in northern Sweden had in this respect already set an important example at the beginning of 1961.

Inspired by the Fund for the Victims of Racial Oppression and the South Africa Committee, the 900 students at the Sundsvall high school decided in the spring of 1961 to set aside one Swedish Krona each per month towards a university scholarship for a South African student. To this end, they also organized an ‘Operation Day’s Work’ in September of the same year, eventually raising a total of 14,000 SEK, or enough to cover the costs of a three-year scholarship at a Swedish university. Through the promoter of the initiative, Tom Nessbjär, a Social Democratic member of the local student council and later a prominent national anti-apartheid activist, the students contacted the South Africa Committee, which proposed that the Namibian Zedekia Ngavirue should be the beneficiary. Ngavirue—also a prominent leader of SWANU—

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1 In Swedish, Operation Dagsverke, an institution at the secondary schools, whereby students dedicate one day per year to all kinds of jobs in favour of an international project or cause. The first Operation Day’s Work took place in 1961, i.e. when the Sundsvall students set aside their proceeds for a South African student. It was initiated by SUL in cooperation with the national organization of the Swedish secondary school students (SECO) in favour of the Dag Hammarskjöld Memorial Fund after the death of the Swedish UN Secretary General. The first campaign—‘A Day for Dag’ (‘En Dag för Dag’)—raised not less than 400,000 SEK (SUL: ‘Verksamhetsberättelse för tiden 1 juli 1961–30 juni 1962’/Annual report 1 July 1961–30 June 1962’) [no date] (AIC). Operation Day’s Work soon developed into an important annual national information and fund-raising institution. On several occasions—beginning with FRELIMO’s Mozambique Institute in Tanzania in 1969—it was dedicated to the liberation movements in Southern Africa.


3 Ngavirue played a very prominent part in the early Swedish anti-apartheid movement. Attending secondary school in South Africa, he was close to ANC and in 1952 became a founder member and the first Secretary General of the South West Africa Student Body (SWASB), a forerunner of later Namibian national political organizations. Returning to Namibia in the late 1950s, he was employed by the Windhoek City Council as a social worker and active in SWAPA together with Uatja Kaukuetu. In 1959, Ngavirue started Namibia’s first black newspaper, the South West News, also chairing the constitutional committee which prepared the launch of SWANU in August 1959. Expelled from his job due to active involvement in the defiance campaign against the removals from the Old Location in Windhoek, Ngavirue left Namibia for Tanganyika in May 1961. Before leaving, he had been in contact with Joachim Israel and the Lund University, writing a letter of recommendation on behalf of Uatja Kaukuetu in April 1960 (form/confidential letter of recommendation to Lund International Scholarship Foundation, filled out and signed by Zedekia Ngavirue, Windhoek, 19 April 1960 (JIC)). In Tanganyika, he was contacted by the Swedish South Africa Committee and offered a scholarship. After appearing at the UN in New York together with his SWANU colleagues Kozonguizi, Kaukuetu and Kauraisa in November 1961—partly made possible through a financial contribution from the South Africa Committee—Ngavirue arrived in Sweden in January 1962, taking up studies at the University of Stockholm (SSAK: ‘Protokoll’/’Minutes’, Stockholm, 16 October 1961 (JIC)). During his stay in Sweden—which lasted until September
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had in turn been contacted by the South Africa Committee via Uatja Kaukuetu and Charles Kauraisa, who by then were studying in Sweden. The Fund for the Victims of Racial Oppression paid for the journey to Sweden,¹ where Ngavirue arrived at the beginning of 1962.

The initiative by the students at the Sundsvall high school set an example. Secondary schools in Härnösand, Piteå and Örnsköldsvik—all in northern Sweden—soon embarked upon similar campaigns.² The Sundsvall students, however, went further. At a general meeting in late January 1962—where it was also formally decided to 'adopt' Ngavirue—the local council called for a boycott of South African goods. The students' representative council protested against "the aggression [...] against the non-white population in the Republic of South Africa", demanding that "a firm import control [is] introduced regarding goods produced in and exported from [the republic]". Of a more immediate concern was that South African products were procured with public funds for the school kitchens. Against this background, the council strongly requested that "those who are responsible for procurement for the schools in Sundsvall from now on shall boycott South African products, such as Outspan oranges and marmalade of the KOO brand".³ When Ngavirue a couple of days later visited the school for the first time, he repeated the demand and was promised by the local coop⁴ representative that South African fruit never again would appear in the schools in Sundsvall.⁵ Ngavirue was impressed by the students. In his address to the Sundsvall high school, he said that

we have asked the United Nations for help regarding the problems [faced by] the blacks in South Africa. We have appealed to individual nations and organizations all over the world, and we have received more or less strong statements of sympathy in response. You, the youth of Sundsvall, are the first I have met who have done more than just talk. You have acted. [...] It is action that we in South Africa need. An economic boycott is the most efficient weapon just now. It hits against the boers and not against the blacks. The blacks are already enslaved and have nothing to lose.⁶

² Expressen, 29 January 1962.
⁴ In Swedish, Konsum.
⁵ Expressen, 30 January 1962 and Dagbladet-Nya Samhället, 30 January 1962. One of the arguments by the Sundsvall students in favour of an import ban against South African fruit was that it was produced under conditions of slavery. The argument—as so many others—would re-surface more than twenty years later in the sanctions’ debate of the 1980s. See, for example, interview with Sören Lindh, Stockholm, 4 February 1997.
⁶ Expressen, 30 January 1962. When Ngavirue visited Sundsvall, the temperature was minus 22 Centigrade. Overwhelmed by the reception at the school, he said that he did not know that "so much warmth [could] come from something so cold" (Expressen, 29 January 1962).
Similar local initiatives at the grassroots level were carried out all over Sweden from 1963, which could be defined as the year when the first generation\(^1\) of the Swedish anti-apartheid movement became both truly national and popular. From the first organized expressions in 1959, the movement had by then also developed from being purely re-active and humanitarian to becoming increasingly pro-active and political. In December 1962, the Swedish South Africa Committee in Stockholm—which in the words of Per Wästberg from now on rather played the role of a “small steering cabinet”\(^2\)—organized a meeting in Sundsvall together with the students’ representative council at the Sundsvall high school and the local political youth organizations of “the four democratic parties”.\(^3\) The resolution adopted at the meeting summarized the informal programme of the broader Swedish anti-apartheid movement at the time. The so-called Sundsvall Appeal—which was submitted to the government—stated:

- We support the joint Nordic boycott action against South African goods which is scheduled to be launched on 1 March 1963 by the National Council of Swedish Youth and its Nordic sister organizations, as well as by the Swedish and the Norwegian South Africa Committees;
- We appeal to the Swedish government to clearly express the opinion of the Swedish people regarding racial oppression in South Africa by declaring its solidarity with the boycott action that the majority of the UN members have adhered to;
- We request that the Swedish Export Association seriously reconsiders its planned export offensive towards the Republic of South Africa;
- We call upon Swedish companies with subsidiaries in South Africa not to utilize the prohibition against labour organizations to press down salaries. It is unworthy of Swedish companies in South Africa to use the regime’s threats of the death penalty against strikes for profit-making;
- We appeal to all Swedish organizations with international connections, such as the sports’ and the scouts’ movements, Rotary and others, to work through their international organs in favour of racial equality and to oppose the policy of apartheid as implemented within the corresponding South African organizations; and
- We appeal for economic support to the Fund for the Victims of Racial Oppression.\(^4\)

\(^1\) The Swedish anti-apartheid movement was overshadowed during the second half of the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s by the solidarity movements with the struggles in the Portuguese colonies in Africa and, above all, in Vietnam. The second generation of the movement appeared at the beginning of the 1970s around the Africa Groups in Sweden.

\(^2\) Interview with Per Wästberg, 28 February 1996.

\(^3\) In the Swedish political parlance, this meant that the Communist youth did not participate, but that the Moderates did. In this case, it probably also meant that the Communist youth was not invited. It is noteworthy that the local Moderate youth did participate, as the Swedish conservatives had chosen to stand outside the anti-apartheid movement. However, under the SUL umbrella the Moderate youth did increasingly take part in the anti-apartheid movement at the local level. It did not, however, change the position of the Moderate Party itself.

Nevertheless, these were still quite moderate demands. Against the background of increased repression in South Africa and continued passivity by the Swedish government, they would before long be strengthened. The local South Africa committees thus included “active measures to assist the African freedom movement” in their programmes of action.1 With the broadening of the solidarity movement to the whole of Southern Africa, the aim by 1965 was defined as “convincing the Swedish government, parliament and public at large to support [the] liberation movements in Southern Africa”.2 The national South Africa Committee adopted the same programmatic objective at its annual meeting in May 1965.3 In the case of South Africa, this meant ANC, with which the Swedish anti-apartheid movement had established privileged and almost exclusive relations.4 When the popular boycott campaign was launched in March 1963, it was, thus, both non-controversial and appropriate that a high-ranking ANC leader was invited to mark the occasion.

Consumer Boycott, Demands and Criticism

In accordance with the WAY resolution adopted in July 1962—and, as it was presented at the time, “on the recommendation by the South African Nobel peace laureate Albert Luthuli and his oppressed brothers”5—the National Council of Swedish Youth began a nationwide consumer boycott campaign on 1 March 1963. Representing 1.4 million young Swedes, SUL was an influential NGO and the event was given prominent coverage in the press and on radio and television.

The actual boycott launch took place at the Stockholm Concert Hall, where an audience of around 500 people was briefed about the background and the objectives of the campaign by Kurt Kristiansson,6 chairman of SUL, David Wirmark, general secretary of WAY, and Gunnar Helander, vice chairman of the South Africa Committee. The main speaker was ANC’s Secretary General Duma Nokwe, who in a militant address gave an outline of the South African struggle and explained why the world should isolate the apartheid regime. He also read out a message telephoned directly to the meeting by Oliver Tambo in London, authorized by Chief Luthuli. It included the statement that the “boy-

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1 ‘PM angående Uppsala Sydafrikakommittés verksamhet’ (‘Memorandum on the activities of the Uppsala South Africa Committee’) [no date, but probably 1964] (UPA).
2 ‘Stadgar för Uppsala Sydafrikakommitté’ (‘Constitution of the Uppsala South Africa Committee’) [no date, but probably early 1965] (UPA).
4 See, for example, interview with Anders Johansson, Eskilstuna, 19 November 1996, where he recounts how he wrote a letter to PAC for information about the struggle in South Africa, but “did not even get a reply”.
5 Stockholms-Tidningen, 1 March 1963.
6 As many others in the early anti-apartheid movement, Kristiansson later joined SIDA.
Launch of SUL’s boycott against apartheid: The ANC Secretary General Duma Nokwe (right) leading the march in Stockholm with Zedekia Ngavirue of SWANU, Stockholm, 1 March 1963. (Photo: Pressens Bild)

cott of South African goods organized by the youth of Sweden is not only a tribute to the basic humanity of the people of Sweden, but [...] an effective contribution to our just struggle for freedom in the land of our birth. [...] Time is running against us all. Let us act before it is too late”.¹

The meeting was followed by a torchlight procession through the wintry streets of Stockholm.² Led by Duma Nokwe and Zedekia Ngavirue from SWANU of Namibia—walking under the now famous banner ‘Verwoerd Commits Murder on Africa’s Soil’—it ended at the South African legation, where a deputation handed in a letter protesting against apartheid. Condemning South Africa for being “the only country in the world where racial oppression is elevated to the status of law”, it also criticized South Africa’s economic policies, stating that “we protest against the economic oppression by the whites against the blacks and against the unequal distribution of incomes [in the country]”.³

² The procession started at the corner of Sveavägen and Tunnelgatan, i.e. at the very spot where Prime Minister Olof Palme on an equally wintry night exactly twenty-three years later—on 28 February 1986—was gunned down and killed.
³ Dagens Nyheter, 2 March 1963.
Nokwe’s visit received a lot of attention and further underlined ANC’s good standing in Sweden. He gave a number of interviews, and both national and local newspapers\(^1\) described his professional and political life with a great deal of detail and sympathy, in particular how he, a barrister by profession, as the first black had been admitted to the Transvaal High Court, where he was barred from sharing an office with the white lawyers. Nokwe was one of the first eight South Africans served with a house arrest order under the recently passed Sabotage Act\(^2\) and due to appear on a charge of “furthering the aims of an unlawful organization” when he illegally left the country as late as on 10 January 1963.

Duma Nokwe, who had become ANC’s Secretary General in 1958, was together with Oliver Tambo the highest office bearer of the congress to visit Sweden. His opinions carried a lot of weight and were often quoted during the boycott campaign. It was therefore of significance that he in his interviews in Sweden discussed the nature of ANC’s struggle and how, for example, the movement looked upon the positions taken by the Swedish government and how it saw its relations with the Soviet Union. With regard to the methods of struggle, Nokwe declared that the situation in South Africa had forced ANC to abandon its policy of non-violence “and I assure you that our leader, Albert Luthuli, will not condemn that”.\(^3\) He was, in general, adamant that “there no longer [were] any peaceful ways left”\(^4\) and that the South African people would “not get its freedom without a bloody chaos”.\(^5\) Nokwe further stated that “we are disappointed with the attitude [taken by] the Swedish government on the question of South Africa at the United Nations”, explaining that the most important issue for ANC was freedom, “and to achieve [that] we accept money from everywhere. We also accept [support by] the Soviet Union, but we do not accept their ideology”.\(^6\) It was a much more militant ANC message than the Swedish people had heard before.\(^7\)

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\(^{2}\) The General Law Amendment Act—known as ‘the Sabotage Act’—was promulgated in June 1962. It prescribed the death penalty for a wide range of offences and enabled the South African government to place persons under house arrest.

\(^{3}\) *Jönköpings-Posten*, 18 March 1963. When sentences of life imprisonment were pronounced on Nelson Mandela and his co-accused in the Rivonia trial in June 1964, Luthuli issued a statement in which he pointed out that “no one can blame brave just men for seeking justice by the use of violent methods, nor can they be blamed if they tried to create an organized force in order to ultimately establish peace and racial harmony” (Statement by Chief Albert J. Luthuli to the UN Security Council, 12 June 1964 in *The United Nations and Apartheid* op. cit., p. 282).

\(^{4}\) *Stockholms-Tidningen*, 2 March 1963.

\(^{5}\) *Jönköpings-Posten*, 18 March 1963.

\(^{6}\) Ibid.

\(^{7}\) Nokwe’s militant message reflected the circumstances at the time of his visit. After preliminary discussions by members of the ANC leadership (in which Nokwe participated), the decision to embark on organized violence was reached in mid-1961. Umkhonto we Sizwe started its sabotage campaign on 16 December 1961. During his trip to the independent African countries in the first
Eager to mark its difference from the ‘liberal’ and ‘bureaucratic’ anti-apartheid opinion of the 1960s, the post-Vietnam Swedish solidarity movement with Southern Africa—formed around 1970 by “anti-imperialist working groups” on Africa, or the Africa Groups—later described the SUL campaign as inspired by the United States and not by ANC. A presentation by the Stockholm Africa Group, written in English for international information, asserted, for example, in 1973 that

[WAY]—financed by the CIA—proposed an international boycott of South African goods. In Sweden, this campaign was taken over by the National Council of Swedish Youth, the bureaucratic coordination committee of the established youth organizations. [...] The ideology of the [Swedish] anti-apartheid movement was close to that of the US economic and ideological offensive in Africa [...] after the Second World War. The aim of the [...] movement was to show Africans that there was an anti-racist opposition in the Western ‘democracies’, so that they did not turn to the Soviet bloc.1

Opposed by members who had been active at the beginning of the 1960s, such as Björn Beckman,2 this view of the first generation of an organized Swedish anti-apartheid opinion—and, by implication, of ANC3—was officially adopted

half of 1962, Nelson Mandela managed to secure military training facilities for MK cadres. The first group—led by Johnny Makatini, who later became the head of ANC’s international department—arrived in Tanganyika in July 1962. From Tanganyika it continued to Morocco, Ethiopia and Algeria for training, and was soon joined by others. Mandela was arrested in South Africa in August 1962. In October, ANC held a conference in Lobatse, Bechuanaland, with participants from the underground leadership in South Africa and the external mission under Oliver Tambo. At the conference—where a ‘military wing’ for the first time was explicitly linked to ANC (Mandela op. cit., p. 325)—the delegates discussed the creation of a guerrilla force which would operate in the rural areas separately from the sabotage units in operation for almost a year. Arthur Goldreich, a member of SACP and of the MK Johannesburg Regional Command, discussed the plans with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during a visit to Moscow in January 1963. The Soviet side was, however, anxious to establish direct contacts with ANC and invited Oliver Tambo to the Soviet Union. Tambo paid his first visit to Moscow in April 1963, accompanied by Nokwe and Moses Kotane, the General Secretary of SACP and a leading ANC representative. According to Shubin, “during the discussions in Moscow in April 1963, the ANC leadership [...] singled out sending activists abroad for military training as a very urgent task. The aim was to train up to a thousand fighters by the end of 1963. [...] Tambo envisaged [...] not just isolated acts of sabotage, but working out the strategy and tactics of the revolutionary war [and a] reply by armed uprising to armed repressions of the government. The overthrow of the government by the armed struggle was named a goal. [...] Tambo [...] requested from the USSR training facilities, arms and equipment [and] these requests were favourably received by the Soviet side” (Vladimir Shubin: ‘Forging the spear: The materials on the first years of Umkhonto we Sizwe’, Paper to the Conference on the Beginnings of the Armed Struggle in South Africa, Mayibuye Centre, University of the Western Cape, 1 December 1995, pp. 14–15). Launching the Swedish consumer boycott, Nokwe was, thus, on his way to Moscow to prepare a major military operation in South Africa. It did not take place, due to the arrest of the ANC leadership/the MK National Command at Rivonia outside Johannesburg in July 1963, but from 1963 to 1965 hundreds of Umkhonto fighters went to the Soviet Union to be trained in Moscow, Odessa and Tashkent.

2 Dick Urban [Vestbro]: ‘Motion till extrakongressen angående programmet’ (‘Motion to the extraordinary congress regarding the programme’), Stockholm, 27 September 1975 (AGA).
3 For a long time, the Africa Groups adopted a critical attitude towards ANC. A book published in 1972 described, for example, how ANC was influenced by Gandhi’s pacifism and how the leadership put emphasis on diplomacy rather than armed struggle, intimately cooperating with the Soviet
by the Africa Groups in Sweden\textsuperscript{1} in the mid-1970s and would for a long time form part of the historiography of the solidarity movement.\textsuperscript{2} It represents, however, ideology rather than history. In reality, launched the same year as Alsterdal’s search for New Left currents in Sweden led to the conclusion that they were as absent as elephants in Greenland, the SUL campaign set in motion popular forces that far from being inspired by the United States prepared the very ground for the radical Swedish anti-imperialist opinion of the late 1960s, both at the NGO and at the official level. Several leading Vietnam activists—among them Sköld Peter Matthäus, the future chairman of the Swedish United FNL Groups\textsuperscript{3}—had a background in the South Africa Committees and the boycott movement against apartheid.\textsuperscript{4} The 1963 South Africa campaign preceded the Vietnam movement and the appearance on the political arena of the 1968 New Left generation. It not only radicalized important sectors of the liberal centre,\textsuperscript{5} but, above all, the Social Democratic Party. Exposed to mounting external and internal pressures, the ruling party was during the 1960s pushed to abandon its cautious foreign policy approach. Under a new generation of leaders around Olof Palme, it eventually channelled the pressures into official cooperation with the Southern African liberation movements.

The Swedish youth campaign aimed at a voluntary boycott of South African products. It targeted both individual consumers and shops offering such products, mainly fruit, wine and cigarettes. No time limit was set for the action, which in addition to the boycott comprised dissemination of information on the conditions in South Africa and fund-raising for the Fund for the Victims of Racial Oppression. With active assistance from SSAK and senior anti-apartheid activists such as Helander and Wästberg, an impressive amount of public information material was put together and distributed through local action groups. Not less than 210 such groups, formed by local branches of SUL’s member organizations, were during the first months of the campaign set up all over Sweden.\textsuperscript{6} Contacts were also established with ANC and the international anti-apartheid movement. In September 1963, representatives from SUL’s local

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\textsuperscript{1} In Swedish, \textit{Afrikagrupperna i Sverige: Afrika: Imperialism och Befrielsekamp} /‘Africa: Imperialism and Liberation Struggle’, Lund, 1972, pp. 84–86).
\textsuperscript{2} ‘Afrikagruppernas program’ (‘The programme of the Africa Groups’), Afrikagruppernas skriftserie No. 1, Gothenburg, June 1974, p. 10 and AGIS: ‘Program för Afrikagrupperna i Sverige, antaget vid kongressen i Åseda den 5–7 juni 1976’ (‘Programme of the Africa Groups in Sweden, adopted at the congress at Åseda, 5–7 June 1976’ (AGA)).
\textsuperscript{3} In Swedish, \textit{De Förenade FNL-grupperna – DFFG}.
\textsuperscript{4} Matthäus was an early member of the Stockholm South Africa Committee, together with Lars-Gunnar Eriksson and Bernt Carlsson from the Social Democratic youth. As chairman of the socialist Clarté Association, he was one of the pioneers of the solidarity movement with Vietnam. Matthäus organized demonstrations against the US embassy in Stockholm as early as in the autumn of 1964 and was in April 1966 elected chairman of DFFG.
\textsuperscript{5} See, for example, interview with Pär Granstedt, Stockholm, 3 June 1996.
\textsuperscript{6} SUL: ‘Sydafrikakampanjens pressinformation No. 8’ (‘Press information on the South Africa campaign, No 8’), Stockholm, 16 August 1963 (AJC).
action groups held a conference outside Mariefred at which Raymond Kunene from the ANC office in London, Abdul Minty from the British Anti-Apartheid Movement and Billy Modise participated.1

The SUL campaign soon developed into a much more comprehensive national manifestation than a voluntary consumer boycott. At the end of April 1963, the important retail trade organization ICA, representing around 9,000 shops in Sweden, decided to stop imports from South Africa and the department store chains of EPA and Tempo later followed this example. Above all, after an interim decision in April the Cooperative Union and Wholesale Society (KF) formally decided in August 1963 to join the campaign. KF had together with LO carried out the first boycott action against South Africa in 1960, but in 1963 no time limit was set. KF’s boycott would continue until September 1969, or for more than six years. That the Swedish cooperative movement, with close links to the Social Democratic Party, well over a million members and a significant indirect parliamentary representation, boycotted South Africa during most of the 1960s played an important role for the anti-apartheid opinion in Sweden. In 1963, LO did not, however, back SUL’s appeal, nor its request for financial support. In a letter to the youth council, the Trade Union Confederation explained that a prerequisite for participation was a formal endorsement by the international trade union movement. In addition, any financial contribution had to be channelled via ICFTU.2

Within the broader labour movement there was, nevertheless, a lot of sympathy towards the campaign. This was, in particular, evidenced by a spontaneous solidarity action by the stevedores in Gothenburg. At the beginning of July 1963, Danish dockworkers in Copenhagen and Aarhus3 refused to discharge South African goods from the Transatlantic-owned Swedish ship Lom- maren, which was re-routed to Gothenburg. Supported by local anti-apartheid activists, the Swedish stevedores also refused to handle the South African cargo. The actions were declared illegal in both Denmark and Sweden and the workers were threatened with prosecution.4 In turn, this led the Scandinavian Transport Workers’ Federation to issue a firm statement to the Nordic governments and trade union confederations, ICFTU and the International Transport Workers’ Federation. The statement underlined that

the consumer boycott has been of […] great importance in the efforts to assist the coloured population in South Africa. We also want to emphasize that it in a […] good way has realized, and is realizing, the objective of directing the attention of

2 Letter from LO to SUL, Stockholm, 20 March 1963 (MFA). LO contributed a symbolic amount of 500 SEK to the Social Democratic Party Youth League, “to be used in connection with the boycott action”.
3 Oliver Tambo had on 1 May 1960 addressed the workers in the ports of Copenhagen and Aarhus, calling for isolation of South Africa.
4 The disputes were eventually settled out of court and the charges dropped.
[...] mankind towards developments in South Africa. However, experience shows us [...] that the consumer boycott must be expanded to include actions that will hit harder. [...] We therefore propose [...] comprehensive boycott actions in the form of an end to oil deliveries, refusal to buy South African gold, an end to all shipping to and from South Africa and a termination of diplomatic relations. [We] are of the opinion that if these measures are adopted, the apartheid policies of the Verwoerd regime will end.¹

The transport workers were not alone in demanding more comprehensive measures against South Africa. In 1963, the national youth leagues of all the Swedish parliamentary parties except the Moderates requested action in accordance with the UN General Assembly resolution adopted in November the previous year. In the case of the Social Democratic youth, this was done in connection with the constitution of the League of Nordic Social Democratic Youth² in Malmö in June 1963. The chairman of the Swedish Social Democratic Youth League, the future Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson, was elected to lead the new Nordic body, which in a statement declared that "we concur with the recommendations made to the governments of the Nordic countries to take a firmer stand vis-à-vis South Africa, inter alia by imposing a trade boycott as decided by the UN General Assembly".³

The statements by the Centre and the Liberal youth went further. In addition to general compliance with the UN resolution, the Centre Party Youth League—meeting shortly after the action by the stevedores in Gothenburg against Lommaren—appealed to the government to introduce legislation "which recognizes the right to refuse morally degrading labour, such as discharging or loading of goods from countries subject to boycotts by the UN".⁴ The declaration by the Liberal Party Youth League, co-signed by its chairman, the future Minister for Foreign Affairs Ola Ullsten, and its secretary, the future Director General of SIDA Carl Tham, deplored that the Swedish government had abstained from voting on the UN General Assembly resolution in November 1962, requesting that "Sweden breaks the diplomatic relations with South Africa; that the Swedish government [...] effectively prevents public authorities from procuring South African goods; [and] that Sweden closes its ports for vessels flying the South African flag".⁵

As Nokwe had already done, ANC representatives expressed disappointment over Sweden’s stand at the United Nations. Visiting Sweden in November 1963 together with John Collins—the founder and chairman of the British

² In Swedish, Förbundet Nordens Socialdemokratiska Ungdom.
³ Stockholms-Tidningen, 4 June 1963.
⁵ FPU: 'Uttalande' ('Statement') [no date, but received by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on 4 October 1963] (MFA).
Defence and Aid Fund—to raise funds for legal assistance to Nelson Mandela and his co-accused in the Rivonia trial, Oliver Tambo’s close associate Robert Resha, for example, stated that “the South African people knows of and appreciates the Swedish boycott action against South African goods and the sympathy and solidarity which have been shown by Swedish organizations, not least by the students. On the other hand”, Resha said,

people in South Africa have difficulties in understanding the ‘neutral’ and negative attitude that Sweden officially has taken at the UN on the issue of sanctions against the South African regime. We believe that there is a contradiction, of which I hope to get a better explanation during my meetings here.2

An explanation was given by Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson in the Swedish parliament on 3 December 1963. In this important statement on Sweden’s position towards South Africa, Undén’s successor pointed out that

the line which Sweden has followed [...] has been [that of] criticism and censure of [South Africa’s] racial policy as the basis of its support for the body of opinion which wants to persuade the Nationalist government to change its course. We have characterized apartheid as being incompatible with the UN Charter and with the Declaration of Human Rights, [but] we do not want [...] to have a re-echo of what happened in the thirties, when the League of Nations made a half-hearted attempt to intervene in the crisis in Ethiopia and achieved as its only result a falling-off in its own prestige. In other words, we do not want the world organization to lose its ability to bring a positive influence to bear on events.

[...] The measures which in South Africa’s case would really make themselves felt presuppose cooperation on the part of certain leading trading nations, otherwise there is a risk that they might remain an empty threat. But it has turned out that, for various reasons, these nations do not wish to participate in comprehensive sanctions in the UN. They condemn apartheid, but they do not consider that, unlike injustices in other countries, this particular form of internal oppression is currently a threat to international peace. They thus have not found that the UN has a right to have recourse to sanctions [and] Sweden has taken it for granted that in the first instance the Security Council should deal with the question of sanctions.3

Nilsson reminded the parliamentarians that the value of Swedish exports to South Africa amounted to 130 million SEK. In 1963, there were, however, already voices in both the Centre and the Liberal parties that advocated unilateral sanctions against South Africa. During the subsequent debate, Sven Sundin from the Centre Party, for example, commented upon the statement by the Foreign Minister, maintaining that the minister had pointed out that

1 A member of ANC’s National Executive Committee, Resha was for many years a chief diplomat of the liberation movement. He visited Sweden on several occasions.
2 Stockholms-Tidningen, 17 November 1963.
there might be different political reasons behind the fact that certain states have opposed sanctions. Let me then observe that the minister [...] did not refer to other reasons than political for the corresponding negative stand by the Swedish government. One must, of course, attach some importance to barely one per cent of our exports, but [...] is it not petty by the welfare state [of] Sweden to emphasize this [fact] in comparison with the atrocious conditions that the coloureds in South Africa presently experience?¹

Ola Ullsten, the chairman of the Liberal Party Youth League, characterized the statement by the Foreign Minister as "defence by a hypocrite". In an editorial in the league’s organ Liberal Ungdom, he asserted that

radical Swedish measures would not only influence Verwoerd, but also those states whose cooperation is needed for an efficient economic blockade on South Africa. The cover by the Foreign Minister behind the leading trading nations [...] is a hypocrite’s defence as long as the Swedish government itself lacks the minimum of political courage [...] required to act.²

A Nordic UN Initiative

Together with the other Nordic countries, Sweden had in the meantime raised an alternative to economic sanctions for discussion by the UN member states. Agreement on the so-called Nordic initiative was reached by the Nordic Foreign Ministers at a meeting in Stockholm at the beginning of September 1963³ and introduced in the UN General Assembly by the Danish Foreign Minister Per Hækkerup later that month. Hækkerup pointed out that "a policy of sanctions alone [...] may well defeat its own ends, aggravate the present state of tension [...] and bring the possibility of tragic events closer". Instead, Hækkerup stated,

we must face the fact that the great majority of the European population in South Africa wrongly assume that abandonment of white domination means abandonment of their own existence. It is our duty to prove to them that this is not so. It is our duty to demonstrate that there is an alternative to catastrophe and that the only way towards this alternative is through the abolition of apartheid. [...] It is high time for the [General] Assembly to give thought to the positive policy to be pursued in South Africa and to the role which the United Nations should play in coming developments. Careful studies to this end should be initiated now.⁴

A major aim of the initiative was to create space for white confidence in a non-apartheid future through a UN sponsored dialogue between South Africa and its main trading partners, that is, Great Britain and the United States. With its

³ Svenska Dagbladet, 7 September 1963.
⁴ Statement by Mr. Per Hækkerup, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark, UN General Assembly, 25 September 1963 in The United Nations and Apartheid, op. cit., p. 266.
emphasis on dialogue as an alternative to pressure and its concern for South Africa’s white population group, the initiative was thus—as pointed out in an editorial in *Dagens Nyheter*—"a recipe for misunderstandings". And misunderstood it was. The South African government immediately extended an invitation to the Nordic Foreign Ministers to visit South Africa. It provoked intensive contacts between the five Nordic capitals before similarly worded answers to decline the invitation were conveyed. In late September 1963, the Swedish government replied to the South African chargé d’affaires in Stockholm that

the government of Sweden is of the opinion that this invitation has to be viewed against the background of the responsibilities of the United Nations regarding the problem of racial policies in South Africa. Accordingly, [it] feels that the Minister could only undertake the journey if it would serve the purpose of furthering progress towards a solution in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, which, in the opinion of the government of Sweden, regrettably does not seem to be the case at the present time.2

The replies infuriated the Pretoria government. In a major speech, Prime Minister Verwoerd called the Nordic governments “discourteous” and “afraid”, saying that the South African government

offered them the opportunity of going where they would, of seeing what they would and of speaking to whom they would, because South Africa has nothing of which it needs to be ashamed and nothing to hide away. [...] The reason why the five ministers are afraid is that they are scared to come and see the real conditions and also that they [...]—just as is the case with the majority of other foreign countries—are courting the black states of Africa. [...] [T]hey do not want to know the truth. They rather choose to stay far away, so that they can say what they like and pretend that they know.3

The exchange with the South African government and the announcement by Foreign Minister Nilsson in the UN General Assembly on 1 October 1963 that Sweden would make scholarships available for students from South and South West Africa—that is, the 1964 ‘refugee million’—restored some of the prestige lost with the Afro-Asian states,4 but the initiative in its original version was no

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3 ‘Utdrag av anförande av premiärminister H.F. Verwoerd’ (‘Extracts from address by Prime Minister H.F. Verwoerd’), Heidelberg, 28 September 1963 (MFA). Reacting to Verwoerd’s speech, the Social Democratic newspaper *Aftonbladet* addressed an open letter to the South African Prime Minister, offering to send a reporter and a photographer to South Africa to study the situation, on condition that they were guaranteed unlimited freedom and access to leaders of the African opposition (*Aftonbladet*, 2 October 1963). Two years later, *Aftonbladet*’s Björn Kumm secretly visited South Africa.
4 Sekou Touré, the President of Guiné-Conakry, sent, for example, a cable to the Swedish King on 14 October 1963, unexpectedly thanking the Swedish people and government for their efforts to “eliminate apartheid from Africa’s soil” (cable from Sekou Touré to His Majesty Gustaf Adolf, Conakry, 14 October 1963 (MFA)).
longer a viable proposition. One important idea, however, survived, namely “to establish a small group of recognized experts to examine methods of resolving the present situation in South Africa”.\(^1\) It was in December 1963 accepted by the UN Security Council. Alva Myrdal\(^2\) of Sweden was appointed chairperson of the UN Expert Group, which, however, was denied entry to South Africa or any other facilities by the Pretoria regime. Nevertheless, it held extensive consultations\(^3\) and on 20 April 1964—the same day as Nelson Mandela made his famous statement during the Rivonia trial—the group submitted its report to the UN Secretary General U Thant for consideration by the Security Council.

The report contained five main recommendations, namely a) the establishment of a national convention, which should be fully representative of all the people of South Africa and convened by the South African government in consultation with the United Nations before a given date; b) amnesty to all opponents of apartheid, whether under trial, in prison, under restriction or in exile, to make the convention fully representative; c) application of mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa in the case of the government not convening the national convention by the stipulated date; d) urgent examination by the UN Security Council of the logistics of sanctions pending the reply by the South African government; and e) establishment of a UN South African Education and Training Programme.\(^4\)

In spite of Myrdal’s role, the report did not receive much attention in the Swedish debate.\(^5\) Its fate at the United Nations could also have been better.

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2 Myrdal had in 1949–50 served as principal director of the UN Department of Social Affairs in New York. She was thereafter director of UNESCO’s Department of Social Sciences in Paris (1950–55) and Sweden’s ambassador to India (1955–61). A prominent member of the Social Democratic Party, Myrdal served as Minister without Portfolio from 1967 to 1973. Internationally known as a leading expert on disarmament questions, she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1982.
3 Presenting the report of the UN Expert Group in the conservative Swedish newspaper *Svenska Dagbladet*, Alva Myrdal wrote: “We have during our committee work been filled with respect for the democratic moderation the resistance movement in South Africa has shown throughout all these fifty years of fruitless struggle. Its awe-inspiring leaders have constantly emphasized that the society they desire will grant equal rights to all. Not only Luthuli says so, but also Mandela, who now is threatened with the death penalty” (Alva Myrdal: ‘Sydafrikafrågan inför FN’/’The question of South Africa before the UN’ in *Svenska Dagbladet*, 27 May 1964).
5 ANC and other opposition organizations in South Africa had for decades demanded the convening of a truly representative national convention. In the light of the process leading to the establishment of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in December 1991, cf. the following paragraph from the report by the UN Group of Experts almost thirty years earlier: “The question of the form and composition of a national convention is open for discussion. It is a question which should be for South Africans to decide. There are many different processes and patterns which might be adopted. Once a convention has set the general course to be followed and made a new start in constructive cooperation, it might decide to create a constituent assembly charged with the task of drawing up a detailed constitution, thus opening the way to the election of a representative parliament. For a constituent assembly, elections might well be required, perhaps undertaken with United Nations assistance and supervision. But these are questions which should
With the crucial exception of a specific date for the convening of a national convention, the main recommendations were, however, adopted by the Security Council in June 1964. At the same time, it was decided to set up another expert committee, composed of representatives of all members of the Security Council, to undertake ‘a technical and practical study [...] as to the feasibility, effectiveness and implications of measures which could be taken by the Council under the Charter of the United Nations’.¹ The committee submitted its report in March 1965, but ‘thereafter the Security Council fell asleep’, as Alva Myrdal later described the situation.² In fact, the sanctions report was never discussed.³ What is more, in spite of the deteriorating situation in South Africa during the latter part of the 1960s, the UN Security Council did not revert to the question of apartheid until July 1970. Coupled with the silence of the graveyard which followed the crushing of the South African opposition in 1964-65,⁴ it contributed to the isolation of ANC.⁵

Reactions to the Boycott and Exceptional Contacts

As in 1960, the SUL boycott resulted primarily in a marked fall in the importation of South African oranges, which were easy to target and to a large extent symbolized the campaign. Sweden was a major importer of citrus fruits from South Africa. Oranges and fresh fruit in general were traditionally transported from Cape Town on ships owned by the Gothenburg-based Transatlantic Shipping Company. Operating a regular line between South Africa and Sweden, Transatlantic was therefore singled out by the more active campaigners. Regular demonstrations and information activities were staged in connection with arrivals of the company’s seven vessels by anti-apartheid activists in Stockholm, Gothenburg and other ports in both Sweden and the other Nordic

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¹ Ibid., p. 24.
² Letter from Alva Myrdal to Per Wästberg, Stockholm, 1 September 1976 (LMA).
⁴ In the words of ANC: ‘By mid-1965, not only MK, but also the ANC, had effectively been destroyed within South Africa. It was to be another eight years before there was significant reconstruction of an ANC underground and eleven years before the resumption of armed activity inside [the country]’ (ANC: ‘Statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’, Marshalltown, August 1996, p. 47).
⁵ The resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly, however, formally recognized the South African liberation movement. In 1968, the anti-apartheid opposition was thus presented as ‘the liberation movement’ and in 1969 the General Assembly recognized ‘the legitimacy of the struggle by the oppressed population in South Africa [for] its inalienable right to self-determination [...] and majority-rule on the basis of universal suffrage’ (The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs: Förenta Nationerna och Problemen i Södra Afrika (‘The United Nations and the Problems in Southern Africa’), P.A. Norstedt & Söner, p. 39; translated from the Swedish text). It was upon these resolutions that Swedish official assistance was extended to ANC.
countries. Together with the major Swedish manufacturing companies established in South Africa—ASEA in particular—Transatlantic came to represent Sweden’s economic links with apartheid.

The 1960 LO-KF boycott led to a decrease in the imports of South African oranges to Sweden from 10,500 tonnes in 1959 to 7,800 tonnes in 1960. In 1961—when no boycotts were in force—the imports reached a record figure of 11,200 tonnes. As a result of the SUL campaign, the volume then fell drastically, reaching only 3,050 tonnes in 1964. The response by the Swedish public to ANC’s call for economic isolation of South Africa was, thus, significant. It was further underlined by a general fall in the value of the South African imports during the first years of the campaign. Imports from South Africa represented in 1963 a total value of 41.8 million SEK. During the first full boycott year of

'We Demand a Blockade against South Africa': Activists from the local South Africa committee distributing leaflets in the Stockholm harbour area, October 1963. (Photo: Pressens Bild)

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1 The action by the Danish and Swedish dockers in July 1963 was directed against Transatlantic’s Lommaren. The first ship to be boycotted by the Finnish Seamen’s Union in October 1963 was Transatlantic’s Vingoren (Timo-Erkkki Heino: Politics on Paper: Finland’s South Africa Policy 1945–91, Research Report No. 90, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1992, p. 31). And in November 1963, the Norwegian anti-apartheid movement demonstrated in Oslo against Transatlantic’s Sunnaren, loading paper for South Africa (Expressen, 21 November 1963).

2 Magnusson (1974) op. cit., Table 8, p. 36.

3 Ibid., Table 10, p. 43.
ANC, Boycotts and Nascent Relations

...cott year of 1964, it fell to 37.4 million, a decrease by approximately 10%. However, the Swedish consumers did not exercise any influence over exports from Sweden to South Africa, which at the same time increased in value from 154.5 million SEK in 1963 to 180.3 million SEK in 1964, or by 16%. While the SUL campaign affected South African exporters of fruit and wine—as well as Transatlantic and Swedish importers—it did not have an impact on Swedish exporters of paper, pulp and various industrial products to South Africa.

As in 1960, Swedish export interests were, nevertheless, up in arms over the boycott, launched at a time when they were preparing a promotion drive in South Africa. Particularly incensed were leading representatives of ASEA, who not only turned against boycotts as political manifestations interfering with private economic transactions, but strongly spoke out in defence of South Africa. Director Åke Vrethem, for example, asserted in a television debate in October 1963 that

> if one wants to create a bloody chaos in South Africa; if one wants to destroy enormous material values; if one wants to risk the lives and the security of a white population which is about half [the size] of the Swedish population; [and] if one wants to ruin the most distinguished outpost and supporting pillar of civilization in Africa, then one should conduct propaganda [based on] hatred [and carry out] boycotts.\(^3\)

This extraordinary statement by the leading ASEA executive provoked a wave of protests. *Expressen* concluded that “it is frightening if industrialists with such opinions towards the racial question shall build Swedish industries [...] in the developing countries”.\(^4\) Only a couple of months later, however, another ASEA representative, Dr. Ragnar Liljeblad, published an article with the title ‘A word to the Swedish youth on the question of South Africa’ in the neo-Nazi paper *Fria Ord*, in which he asserted that blacks could not be considered human in the same way as whites.\(^5\) Through racist statements such as these, ASEA was soon to be targeted among the Swedish companies represented in South Africa by both the South African liberation movement and the domestic anti-apartheid opinion. Visiting Sweden in December 1963, Arthur Goldreich, a founder member of Umkhonto we Sizwe who had recently left the country, described Vrethem’s statement as “grotesque”.\(^6\) And in May 1965, for example, the South Africa Committee in Skinnskatteberg demonstrated against ASEA’s head office

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1 SUL: (‘Statistics over Swedish imports from and exports to South Africa 1963 and 1964’) [no date] (AJC).
2 Ibid.
3 Roland Hjelte and Karl-Axel Sjöblom: ‘För eller emot bojkott?’ (‘For or against boycott?’), transcript from TV programme sent on 15 October 1963 (MFA).
4 *Expressen*, 18 October 1963.
5 Per Jändel: ‘Negerhatare med maning till ‘Sveriges ungdom” (‘Negro-hater with counsel to the ‘youth of Sweden”’) in *Smålands Folkblad*, 18 January 1964. Significantly, Liljeblad also published his article in *Nordvästra Skånes Tidningar*.
in Västerås under the banner ‘A Black Dead is ASEA’s Bread’ and ‘ASEA Helps Verwoerd to Commit Murder in South Africa’. When ASEA three years later joined an international consortium for the proposed Cabora Bassa scheme in Mozambique, the protests against the company engaged a whole generation and developed into a prominent national political question.

Finally—again as in 1960, but this time more vehemently—the boycott campaign unleashed a storm of protests in South Africa itself. Almost immediately after the launch the Nationalist newspaper *Die Transvaal* replied by exhorting the South African public to initiate an ‘anti-boycott’ and abstain from buying Swedish goods. Exceptionally, South African companies also terminated supply contracts with importers of Swedish products. For example, at the beginning of May 1963 the Durban-based private company Natal Timbers wrote a letter to its South African supplier of Swedish products, protesting against

the repeated accusations [...] being made against this country by responsible people in Sweden, and also [by] members of the Swedish government. We must naturally, therefore, look to other countries for the supply of our machinery in the future, unless this continual nonsense is brought to an end.

The South African Minister for Foreign Affairs, Eric Louw, was perhaps the most outspoken proponent of a boycott of Swedish products. In a parliamentary debate in Cape Town on 5 June 1963, he went as far as saying that “I would not have a Volvo motor car [even] if it was given to me as a present, in view of the violent campaign being conducted against South Africa by Sweden”. The statement provoked the South African Volvo dealer, Drakenstein Motors in Bloemfontein, to address a private letter to Louw in which the directors and staff of the company—after expressing their “unwavering support”—conveyed that they “humbly objected to the fact that you mentioned the name Volvo, thus doing considerable harm to our product”. Two weeks later Louw replied by a long letter

I realize that you feel annoyed at the mentioning of your particular product, but my attitude is still the same as it was when I made the remark in Parliament. [...] I do not know how long your company has had connection[s] with Volvo, but I would like to point out that it is quite a number of years since Sweden started her bitter attack and boycott campaign on South Africa, [initiated] by the press and several trade unions and supported by the Swedish government. [...] I presume that your company was well aware of this situation when accepting the Volvo agency.

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3. Letter from Natal Timbers (Pty) Ltd. to Seligson & Clare Ltd., Isipingo Rail, 3 May 1963 (MFA).
4. Extract from Hansard attached to letter from Eyvind Bratt to Sverker Åström, Cape Town, 20 June 1963 (MFA).
[...] I cannot remain indifferent to the threats originating in Sweden, [which are] supported by the Swedish government, against our country. [...] I consider it my duty to protect our country against these boycotters, [because] when they are supported by their government—as in the case of Sweden—the result can be of [a] very serious nature. I am of the opinion that the only way to bring Sweden to her senses is to make her realize that her trade balance will be seriously affected, should she persist [with] the boycotts. I sincerely regret that an Afrikaans firm should be involved with Volvo, being fully aware of Sweden’s attitude. I must, however, put the interests of our country before any private concern, be it Afrikaans or not.1

The Swedish diplomatic representation in Pretoria was in the early 1960s firmly embedded in white South Africa and primarily concerned with economic and consular questions. In spite of the Sharpeville shootings, the banning of ANC and PAC, the launch of Umkhonto we Sizwe and the Rivonia trial, only intermittently did the legation comment in its reports to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs upon the black opposition. Following the ‘codes of conduct’ set by the apartheid regime, it did not invite non-whites to official receptions2 and, judging from the correspondence with Stockholm, it did not have any black political contacts. However, as a result of the progressive image of Sweden indirectly conveyed through the attitude of the South African government and press—and perhaps directly by ANC representatives in exile—the legation in 1963 would enter into quite spectacular contacts with the politico-military underground. The first concerned a plan to get Nelson Mandela out of prison and the second an attempt to smuggle a freedom fighter from Cape Town to Sweden.

Mandela and an Aborted Escape Plan

Shortly after returning to South Africa from his African tour, Mandela was arrested on 5 August 1962 in Natal and charged with incitement and leaving the country without a passport. Held at the Johannesburg Fort, he was transferred to Pretoria and sentenced to five years imprisonment on 7 November 1962.3 With Chief Luthuli under house arrest and leaders such as Walter Sisulu in detention, it was a tremendous setback to the liberation movement. It had just launched Umkhonto we Sizwe’s sabotage campaign and was at the time planning ‘Operation Mayibuye’, that is, rural-based guerrilla operations by

1 Letter from Eric Louw, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Norman Doubell, Drakenstein Motors, Cape Town, 25 June 1963 (MFA).
2 On a direct question from the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm, the legation in Pretoria replied in February 1963 that “no coloured [i.e. non-white/TS] has been invited to an official reception; only [to] private arrangements” (cable from Eyvind Bratt to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 23 February 1963) (MFA).
3 The sentence against Mandela was passed the day after the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 1761 (XVII), which for the first time specifically recommended diplomatic and economic measures against South Africa, including boycotts. Mandela referred to the resolution in his statement to the court.
cadres trained outside South Africa. Chairing the MK High Command, Mandela was the key person for the intensification of the armed struggle.

In his autobiography, Mandela mentions that a plan for his escape from prison was conceived by ANC and communicated to him by Joe Slovo, the future General Secretary of the South African Communist Party. Slovo was at the time Mandela’s legal adviser, but also a member of the High Command of Umkhonto we Sizwe. Mandela “carefully considered the plan, [but] concluded that [...] the likelihood of its failure [was] unacceptably high [and] suggested that [it] be postponed”.\(^1\) Little is known about the escape plan and even less about the fact that it envisaged possible assistance from the Swedish government. However, on 23 March 1963 ”a white man [...] saying that he was delegated by [...] the opposition circles around the native lawyer Nelson Mandela, former secretary of the now banned political organization African National Congress”, contacted Carl Gustaf von Platen, first secretary at the Swedish legation, in his home in Pretoria.\(^2\) Considering that ”the Swedish government had a positive attitude towards the struggle by the indigenous South African population against the racial oppression of the Nationalist government”, the visitor ”wanted to enquire whether a connection could be established with the [...] government through [the] legation”. If the reaction was positive, the visitor would ”at a later meeting present the Swedish government with certain concrete proposals”.\(^3\)

The unscheduled meeting presented von Platen with a number of difficult decisions. He could not disregard the possibility that the visitor—who did not give his name and in the subsequent correspondence was called Mr. X—was an impostor or that he was sent by the South African security police. His impression was, however, that the visitor was bona fide. With the head of the Swedish legation, Eyvind Bratt, in Cape Town, von Platen was, however, also uncertain how to respond. In July 1960, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs had issued an instruction to the legation in Pretoria with regard to ”questions concerning internal activities directed against the South African government”.\(^4\) von Platen’s reply to the anonymous visitor was in the main in accordance with that instruction. He thus explained that ”the members of the [Swedish] legation were accredited to the present South African government, with which [it] had to maintain official and correct relations”, concluding that ”the legation for reasons founded on principle probably could not act in the way proposed”. Nevertheless, he also said that he would raise the question with Bratt. The visitor and von Platen agreed to a new meeting on 1 April 1963, ”in the lobby of a major Johannesburg hotel”.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) Mandela, op. cit., p. 310.
\(^2\) Letter from Carl Gustaf von Platen to Sverker Åström, Pretoria, 23 March 1963 (MFA).
\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^4\) Ibid., with reference to letter from Lewenhaupt to Bratt, Stockholm, 7 July 1960.
\(^5\) Ibid.
The same day, von Platen sent a letter about the meeting to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm, explaining that he “on his own could not give [the visitor] a direct refusal”. Asking for instructions before the meeting on 1 April 1963, he added that “a contributory cause to [my position] has been the idea that if a revolution takes place in this country, it is precisely people like Luthuli and Mandela that may—and should—come to power”. Apparently without knowledge of the contacts established a year previously between Oliver Tambo and the Swedish government, von Platen pointed out that “it would against this background appear that an early connection with these people should be of interest to Sweden”.1

As agreed, the second meeting took place on 1 April 1963. von Platen then informed Mr. X that the legation in accordance with the correct diplomatic rules of the game was obliged to abstain from establishing relations with groups that worked for the overthrow of the present South African government, to which the members of the legation were accredited.2

With these arguments, von Platen had to convey Stockholm’s decision that the legation could not serve as a communication channel between the liberation movement and the Swedish government. Mr. X “expressed disappointment at the message [and] we agreed that no further contact between the two of us should be made”. Before parting, von Platen, however, said that he personally was curious as to why Mr. X and his colleagues had wished to establish contacts with Sweden. Mr. X then continued the conversation and informed him that “his organization had made plans to set Mandela free from the prison in Pretoria and [that] it was for this project it had wanted Swedish cooperation”. von Platen did not ask for details, but wrote in his memorandum that he thought that the organization wanted to use the legation for political asylum for Mandela or its cooperation “to smuggle Mandela out of South Africa, perhaps on board a Swedish ship”.3

Independent of the Swedish position, Mandela himself had in the meantime called off the plans made for his escape. It is, however, interesting that the liberation movement did contact the Swedish legation in this connection, although the true identity behind Mr. X may never be established. Rica Hodgson, the wife of Jack Hodgson, at the time a member of MK’s Regional Command in Johannesburg assisting the High Command, later affirmed that “I do recollect that someone from Sweden was involved in the plot”.4 That was Carl Gustaf von Platen, who many years thereafter served as Chief Master of Ceremonies at

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1 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Letter from Rica Hodgson to the author, Johannesburg, 4 December 1996.
the Royal Swedish Court. In a letter to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, von Platen wrote in September 1963 that Mr. X most probably was “the much mentioned opposition man Arthur Goldreich. Both my wife and I have recognized the mysterious visitor from photos now published in the press”.2 Goldreich himself has, however, denied that he had any contacts with the Swedish legation regarding the plan to set Mandela free.3

Also of interest is the image of Nelson Mandela conveyed by Mr. X via von Platen to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Mandela was described as a person whose participation in a future South African government was absolutely indispensable. In spite of some radical statements, [he] was a man of peace and progress, who—naturally on an equal basis—wanted cooperation between all races in South Africa. [...] [Finally], Mandela [...] was the only native opposition man who enjoyed authority among all tribes and organizations. The other [...] leaders [...] were more busy with ‘cutting each other’s throats’ than efficiently opposing the apartheid policies of the Nationalist government.4

Invited by the ruling Social Democratic Party, ANC’s Deputy President-General Oliver Tambo had already on 1 May 1962 addressed the Labour Day demonstrations in Gothenburg and in August 1962 he again visited Stockholm for meetings with Prime Minister Erlander. Against this background, it is, indeed, noteworthy how and with what arguments the Ministry for Foreign Affairs rejected the proposition by the liberation movement to establish relations via the Swedish legation, even before the purpose of the proposed contact was known. The rejection was, however, representative of the attitude of the Swedish foreign service towards the Southern African liberation movements in the early 1960s.

1 von Platen held this position between 1988 and 1995.
2 Letter from Carl Gustaf von Platen to Sverker Åström, Pretoria, 11 September 1963 (MFA). Goldreich, who later settled in Israel, was a founder member of MK, forming part of the Johannesburg Regional Command. In the 1940s, he fought with Palmach—the military wing of the Jewish National Movement—in Palestine. Goldreich was a leading member of SACP and it was through him that Tambo’s visit to Moscow in April 1963 was arranged. A white man, designer by profession, in 1961 Goldreich was posted as the official tenant of the farm Liliesleaf at Rivonia north of Johannesburg, where Mandela lived in the domestic worker’s cottage and which served as the headquarters of the MK High Command. When Mandela was already imprisoned on Robben Island, the police raided the farm on 11 July 1963, arresting Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Ahmed Kathrada, Arthur Goldreich and others. “In one fell swoop, the police had captured the entire High Command of Umkhonto we Sizwe” (Mandela op. cit., p. 336). One month later, Goldreich and Harold Wolpe managed to escape from detention. Disguised as priests, they left South Africa at the end of August. Arriving in London in mid-September, Goldreich was at the beginning of December 1963 invited to Sweden by the South Africa Committees in Lund and Jönköping. He also addressed meetings in Västerås and Stockholm.
3 Telephone conversation with the author in February 1997 [exact date not recorded].
Double-Crossing on a Swedish Ship

Nevertheless, due to the early anti-apartheid opinion in Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries they were seen as friendly and trustworthy by the South African opposition. Indres Naidoo, one of the first Umkhonto we Sizwe volunteers,\(^1\) has recounted that

> when we were forming our MK group we discussed the possibilities of running away from the police in case we were being looked for. One of the things we always said was that we must choose countries that were friendly towards us. Here, of course, the Scandinavian countries were on top of the list. They were countries where we possibly could go to the embassies and ask for asylum. [...] This was the position of Umkhonto we Sizwe in the beginning.\(^2\)

Naidoo came from South Africa’s Indian population group. He was an active member of the Transvaal Indian Youth Congress in the Johannesburg area and had met Sara Lidman before she was arrested and declared \textit{persona non grata}.\(^3\) His views could have been influenced by the Swedish writer and the excitement around the Lidman-Nthite affair. Similar opinions and ideas were, however, at the same time in the minds of others in South Africa who at the beginning of the 1960s were contemplating armed struggle. In Cape Town, Gerald Giose, belonging to the Coloured population group, born into the Communist Party and a founder member of the National Liberation Front—also known as the Yu Chi Chan Club—was, thus, around 1962

> specifically mandated [by the leadership] to make contact with the Swedish government [as] the international support that we were receiving for the anti-apartheid struggle during that period brought to our attention the role which was played by Sweden and the other Nordic countries. [...] Sweden was regarded, and indeed was, the Frontline State of our liberation in Europe.\(^4\)

Giose’s contacts with Sweden would lead to betrayal, torture and misery. His story illustrates the conservative legalism with which the foreign service in Stockholm looked upon persecuted members of the South African liberation movement in the early 1960s. Above all, it shows the community of interests then existing between private Swedish companies and the apartheid state.\(^5\)

In accordance with his beliefs and following recommendations by the leadership of the National Liberation Front, Giose—also known as Gumbilomzamo de Guise—made friends with the Swedish envoy to South Africa, minister

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\(^1\) Naidoo was arrested in April 1963 following an attempted sabotage of a railway signal box. He was sentenced to ten years in prison, with most of the time spent on Robben Island. See Indres Naidoo: \textit{Island in Chains: Ten Years on Robben Island as Told by Indres Naidoo to Albie Sachs}, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1982. In 1994 Naidoo was elected to the South African senate for ANC.

\(^2\) Interview with Indres Naidoo, Cape Town, 7 December 1995.

\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^4\) Interview with Gerald Giose, Cape Town, 6 December 1995.

\(^5\) For the full story, see interview with Gerald Giose, Cape Town, 6 December 1965.
Eyvind Bratt. According to Giose, Bratt was “very understanding [of the political situation], possibly because of the seriousness [at that time] and because he represented the Swedish government and the Swedish people’s sympathetic policy”.1 Thus, “when I explained the situation to Dr. Bratt, he listened attentively and pledged support [by] the Swedish government to our cause”.2 The friendship with the Swedish envoy became a matter of life and death in July 1963, when the South African security police—at the same time as the raid against the MK High Command at Rivonia—after uncovering the Yu Chi Chan Club/the National Liberation Front cracked down on its leading members. Eleven of them—including Dr. Neville Alexander, Reverend Don John Davies and Dulcie September3—were rounded up and in April 1964 sentenced to between five and ten years imprisonment. Giose, in the meantime, had managed to escape the police, taking refuge at Bratt’s official residence in the capetonian suburb of Constantia,4 where he enquired about the possibilities of political asylum in Sweden.

Bratt was sympathetic to Giose’s inquiry and cabled the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm that he, “if authorized by the Ministry, [could] grant [Giose] a vacant domestic worker’s room at the residence for a shorter time, until a possibility of escape out of the country presents itself and [on condition that he] binds himself to abstain from [any] illegal activity”.5 Already staying at Bratt’s residence, Giose eventually felt compelled to make a formal request for political asylum at the end of August 1963.6 Referring to treaties of international law, the Ministry in Stockholm, however, instructed Bratt that Giose could not be granted asylum, at the same time advising him not to give Giose fictitious employment as a gardener.7 The Swedish envoy took note of the message,8 but

1 Interview with Gerald Giose, Cape Town, 6 December 1995.
2 Bratt represented the Swedish government in South Africa during the crucial years from 1960 until the end of 1963. His correspondence with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm bears witness to an increasing frustration. In May 1963—i.e. two months before accommodating Giose at his residence in Cape Town—Bratt wrote to Foreign Minister Nilsson as follows: “Developments are in the longer term heading towards a catastrophe, which must hit against both the whites and the blacks in the country, as well as against foreign interests. [...] To witness—inactive and powerless—the drift of a society, which in many respects is blooming, towards what appears as an inevitable catastrophe, in the process carrying along lots of innocent and ignorant people, is not an edifying experience” (letter from Eyvind Bratt to Torsten Nilsson, Cape Town, 17 May 1963) (MFA).
3 September started her political career in the Cape Peninsula Students’ Union, an affiliate of the Non-European Unity Movement. She was sentenced in April 1964 to five years’ imprisonment, after which followed a five year banning order. She left South Africa in 1974 to study in Great Britain. Joining ANC, September was subsequently posted to Lusaka, Zambia, where she worked in the treasury department and in close contact with SIDA. In 1984, she was appointed ANC Chief Representative to France, Switzerland and Luxembourg, based in Paris. Opening her office, she was on the morning of 29 March 1988 gunned down and killed. The assassin was never caught.
4 According to Giose, he contacted Bratt and was “invited to his official residence off Broomersvlei Road” (interview with Gerald Giose, Cape Town, 6 December 1995).
5 Cable from Eyvind Bratt to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 22 July 1963 (MFA).
6 Cable from Eyvind Bratt to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 27 August 1963 (MFA).
7 Cable from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Eyvind Bratt, Stockholm, 28 August 1963 (MFA).
8 Cable from Eyvind Bratt to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 29 August 1963 (MFA).
—possibly disappointed with the negative Swedish position conveyed to Mr. X four months earlier, as well as feeling generally “inactive and powerless” in South Africa—allowed Giose to remain in hiding at the residence, where he stayed until the end of January 1964.1

Bratt left South Africa in the autumn of 1963.2 Before leaving, he made arrangements for Giose’s escape to Sweden on board a Swedish ship.3 Disguised as a stevedore, at the end of January 1964 Giose was smuggled on board Transatlantic’s *Sunnaren*, the first ship of the season to carry grapes and apples to Sweden.4 According to Giose, “the advice from Dr. Bratt was to wait until we were outside South Africa’s territorial waters and then I should report to the captain”.5 When Giose left his hiding-place and presented himself to captain Lars Saltin,6 the latter was, however, far from understanding. Initially demanding money from Giose, he consulted a South African representative of a Cape Town shipping company on board the ship and decided to inform the South African authorities about Giose’s presence. Feeling threatened, Giose “cited the anti-apartheid resolutions of the United Nations [...] and told the captain that [I] was claiming protection”. Saltin, however, “said that the United Nations had no jurisdiction on his boat. I then asked for protection in the name of His Majesty King Gustaf of Sweden, [but] [h]e asked what King Gustaf had to do with me being a stowaway. [...] I [finally] said that he must kindly make contact with the Swedish embassy in South Africa. [However,] the South African man said that I should not bring the Swedish embassy into [the picture]”.7

Giose was taken to a small room and locked up.8 *Sunnaren* called at Walvis Bay on 30 January 1964, whereupon Giose was handed over by captain Saltin to

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1 Interview with Gerald Giose, Cape Town, 6 December 1995.
2 Bratt had been appointed Swedish ambassador to Iran and Afghanistan.
3 “Dr. Bratt had given me the schedule of the Swedish ships, as they would be leaving. There was the *Sunnaren*, the *Hallaren* and others. [...] I was given instructions how to get on board the ship” (interview with Gerald Giose, Cape Town, 6 December 1995).
4 *Syd-och Sydvästafrika*, No 3, March 1964, p. 11.
5 Interview with Gerald Giose, Cape Town, 6 December 1995.
6 In the interview with Giose, he says that he “subsequently was told by the security police that it was a captain Nilsson” (interview with Gerald Giose, Cape Town, 6 December 1995). The name of the captain was, however, Lars (’Lasse’) Saltin. According to Staffan Algotson, third mate on *Sunnaren* during the voyage, Saltin was “not friendly towards blacks” (telephone conversation with the author, 21 March 1996). Efforts to locate the journal from *Sunnaren*’s voyage have failed. Interestingly, it is not included in the Transatlantic collection at the relevant archives in Gothenburg (Landsarkivet i Göteborg) and has according to the now defunct shipping company’s former inspector, Rolf Lindahl, “probably been thrown away” (letter to the author from Rolf Lindahl, Möln达尔, 23 February 1996).
7 Interview with Gerald Giose, Cape Town, 6 December 1995.
8 Giose’s detailed story has been confirmed by Olof Lychnell and Staffan Algotson, second and third mates on *Sunnaren* at the time (letters from Rolf Lindahl to the author, Möln达尔, 15 and 23 February 1996). Both Lychnell and Algotson clearly remembered Giose more than thirty years after the event. How he was dressed as a stevedore, asked for political asylum and cited the Swedish king. Algotson, in particular, recalled how Giose was handed over to the police and said that he had often wondered what had happened to him after seeing him leaving the gangplank in Walvis Bay.
a major Coetzee and two other members of the South African security police. Giose did not know that *Sunnaren* on this particular journey was to call at Walvis Bay,¹ but the South African police knew. Above all, “they knew very well who [Giose] was”.² They took him to Cape Town, where Giose was assaulted, drugged and tortured in an attempt to turn him into a state witness in the trial against his colleagues in the National Liberation Front. Major Coetzee also “wanted to know who had arranged for me to be on board the *Sunnaren*”,³ but Giose kept this secret. He was never charged, nor sentenced, but eventually taken to the Valkenberg mental hospital in Cape Town, where he on orders of the security police was held for four years, or until the end of January 1968.⁴

*Sunnaren*, in the meantime, had continued to Gothenburg, where on 19 February 1964 the ship was received by anti-apartheid activists from the local South Africa Committee, demonstrating against the importation of South African fruit.⁵ The demonstrators were not aware of the drama on board the Transatlantic ship a fortnight earlier. Inspired by the energetic journalist and activist Anders Johansson, the Gothenburg South Africa Committee, however, soon started to study the interests behind Sweden’s fruit imports from South Africa in general and the role of Transatlantic in particular.⁶ It discovered a close relationship between the Swedish private shipping company, Sweden and the South African state. Not only was the Swedish vice-consul in Cape Town the assistant director of Transatlantic’s South African subsidiary, the Transatlantic Shipping Agency, but South Africa’s consul-general in Gothenburg, the Swede Lennart Parkfelt, was also a member of the board of Transatlantic.⁷ Captain Saltin thus represented interests close to those from which Giose, with well intentioned assistance from Bratt, had tried to escape.

¹ According to Algotson, Giose had “a maximum of bad luck” as *Sunnaren* normally did not call at Walvis Bay. Otherwise, Algotson said, “he would have made it” (telephone conversation with the author, 21 March 1996).
² Ibid.
³ Interview with Gerald Giose, Cape Town, 6 December 1995.
⁴ Ibid. After the 1994 elections, Giose became an officer in the new South African National Defence Force. Interviewed in Cape Town in December 1995, Giose told the author that he was considering the forming of a South African–Scandinavian Friendship Association. Asked how this was humanly possible after all that he had gone through, he said that “well, the Scandinavian countries stand out as role models for socio-economic development. They are also the countries which consistently supported us, while countries like the United States, Britain, France, West Germany and Italy were voting against the United Nations resolutions [on South Africa]” (interview with Gerald Giose, Cape Town, 6 December 1995).
⁵ *Dagens Nyheter* and *Göteborgs-Posten*, 20 February 1964.
⁶ Letter from Anders Johansson to Örjan Wikander, Gothenburg, 1 October 1964 (AJC).
⁷ Letter from the Gothenburg South Africa Committee to Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson, signed by Peter Dencik and Anders Johansson, Gothenburg, 22 October 1964 (AJC).
Referring to a general instruction by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for
Swedish consular representations abroad—according to which they should
promote “knowledge about Sweden and Swedish conditions”—the Gothenburg
committee argued that commercial representatives of Transatlantic and other
Swedish companies in South Africa were in a conflict of loyalties, making them
unsuitable as consuls to the country. They could not at the same time promote
their companies’ interests and represent a broad Swedish anti-apartheid opin-
ion in favour of economic boycotts. A letter to that effect was sent in October
1964 to Foreign Minister Nilsson, demanding “appropriate measures to sepa-
rate [such consular representatives] from their tasks".¹ The issue was later raised within the Social Democratic movement. In February 1965, for example, the national Social Democratic Students’ Association demanded that all Swedish consuls in South Africa should be dismissed with immediate effect.²

Questions relating to trade promotion by official Swedish representatives in South Africa formed part of the wider issue of economic sanctions. They had particularly come to the fore in connection with the Swedish companies’ participation at the Rand Easter Show in April 1963. At the time, it was reported that the Minister of Trade, Gunnar Lange, instructed the Swedish legation in Pretoria not to be involved with the fair.³ Throughout the 1960s, however, both the legation in Pretoria and the consular representations in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and East London would with the Swedish government’s tacit blessing continue to promote Swedish commercial interests in South Africa, as well as trade between the two countries. Thus, in a strictly confidential memorandum by the recently appointed Swedish envoy to South Africa, Carl Johan Rappe—written as late as in November 1970 and approved by Foreign Minister Nilsson—he summarized his instructions concerning trade as follows:

With regard to trade between Sweden and South Africa, I am authorized to conduct a certain number of export promotional activities, but it should be done in such a manner that those circles and news media in Sweden that oppose an increase of the Swedish-South African trade exchange will not be alarmed.⁴

¹ Ibid.
² Stockholms-Tidningen, 26 February 1965.
From Popular Solidarity to Official Support

Emergence of Local Solidarity Committees

In response to the SUL campaign, locally constituted South Africa Committees emerged at the beginning of 1963. Taking the boycott question further than formal demands and statements, they abandoned SUL’s exclusive concentration on the youth, broadened the base of the solidarity movement and placed the anti-apartheid struggle on the national political agenda through active mobilization and lobbying. They also widened their scope of action, increasingly paying attention to the rest of the Southern African region. The committees reached their height in 1966, but were then rapidly overshadowed by the Vietnam movement. However, some of them—such as the Lund committee—survived the turbulent years of the late 1960s and would at the beginning of the 1970s form the nucleus of a second generation solidarity movement with Southern Africa, reorganized as the Africa Groups in Sweden (AGIS).

The first local South Africa committees were formed in Lund and Jönköping in southern Sweden. Both were set up in support of the SUL campaign, but had different origins. The Lund committee was mainly formed by students, who could build upon a long involvement with South Africa at the local university and to a large extent were inspired by resident Southern Africans. Billy Modise from ANC played a prominent and active part in the committee’s work from the very beginning, later joined by students from Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Jönköping committee, on the other hand, was almost exclusively the brainchild of one person, Anders Johansson, a young journalist.

2 Interview with Billy Modise, Johannesburg, 15 September 1995.
3 With Gunnar Helander, Joachim Israel and Per Wästberg, the much younger Anders Johansson played a decisive role for the development of the Swedish solidarity movement with South Africa. As a journalist cum activist, he was instrumental in the broadening of the movement at the local level and in the widening of its scope to other countries in Southern Africa. Joining Dagens Nyheter in 1965, Johansson travelled extensively in Africa, establishing close contacts with the Southern African liberation movements. In February 1968, he was the first international journalist to visit the liberated areas in northern Mozambique. As Dagens Nyheter’s first resident Africa correspondent, Johansson was in the second half of the 1970s stationed in Lusaka, Zambia. Seen as a radical, he was not active in Swedish party politics. Introducing himself to the chief editor of the social democratic newspaper Stockholms-Tidningen, he wrote in March 1965: ‘I am not a member of any political party and I do not intend to become one, as freedom and the highest possible [degree of] independence in my opinion are […] essential to a journalist. I do not want any fixed political opinions, tied to
working at the local newspaper *Jönköpings-Posten*. In common with many others in the Swedish bible belt around Jönköping—often called ‘the Jerusalem of Sweden’—Johansson was brought up in a free church home with missionary links to Southern Africa.1 His general interest in African affairs started through childhood contacts with the mission, but was later diverted to South Africa and to the ethico-political issue of apartheid. Doing non-armed civic service outside Stockholm,2 he visited the capital for the first time. During the visit, he attended the public meeting on 31 May 1961 organized by the recently formed South Africa Committee, listening to anti-apartheid activists and opinion makers such as Helander, Kauraisa, Tingsten, Vinde and Wästberg. He later worked closely with Helander in the reorganized national South Africa Committee, serving as its secretary in the mid-1960s.

Before the launch of the boycott campaign, Johansson attended one of the preparatory meetings and decided to set up a local support committee in the Jönköping-Huskvarna region. Originally called the Committee of the Southern Lake Vätter Region for Youth South Africa Action,3 it was formed on 20 February 1963. The Namibian Zedekia Ngavirue was the guest speaker at the committee’s first public rally.4 Inspired by SUL and falling under its umbrella, it was constituted by the local branches of the youth leagues of all the Swedish parliamentary parties and by the students’ representative councils at the secondary schools in the area. In February 1964, the committee was, however, reorganized, welcoming individual and adult members. It was a small, but politically important departure from SUL’s centralized and youth-oriented approach, making it possible to enrol three local members of the Swedish parliament. Johansson was at the same time re-elected chairman of the committee, while the school teacher Siewert Öholm5 was confirmed as vice-chairman. The

1 Johansson was brought up in a home inspired by the small Free Baptist Union (*Fribaptist-samfundet*). The free baptists carried out missionary activities in South Africa, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Mozambique. When Johansson and the Jönköping South Africa Committee in 1964 initiated a discussion with the Swedish churches represented in South Africa, requesting them to publicly denounce the apartheid regime, the Free Baptist Union refused to do so. Johansson then broke with his church, later declaring: “I lost my faith [...] over South Africa” (interview with Anders Johanson, Eskilstuna, 19 November 1996).

2 The free baptists were pacifists and refused to do military service. Not without “contradictory emotions”, Johansson would, however, be one of the most active proponents of support to the Southern African liberation movements on their own conditions, including the use of armed force. He later facilitated the publishing of accounts by leading members of Umkhonto we Sizwe, among them Joe Slovo, in *Dagens Nyheter* and wrote internationally acknowledged articles on FRELIMO’s military campaigns in Mozambique.

3 In Swedish, *Södra Vätterbygdskommittén för Ungdomens Sydafrika-Aktion*. With the broadening of its mandate, it was later called the South Africa Committee of the Southern Lake Vätter Region. Based in Jönköping, it will be referred to as the Jönköping Committee.


5 When Johansson in mid-1964 moved to Gothenburg, Öholm was elected chairman of the committee. Years later, he became a well known talk-show host on Swedish television.
constitution, programme and objectives were also revised, as well as extended to cover Namibia. The committee should actively and in all permissible ways [...] distribute information about the conditions in South Africa and South West Africa; support the forces that strive for the realization of democracy in [these countries]; and convince the Swedish government, parliament and general public to [do the same].

The Jönköping committee was from the beginning particularly active. From his vantage point at Jönköpings-Posten, Johansson could closely follow both the events in South Africa and the national boycott campaign, regularly publishing articles in his own and in other regional newspapers. Downplaying his personal role, he later stated that "I just happened to be a curious, stubborn young man at the right place at the right time. [...] Not many activists were in the same privileged position, which [I] perhaps [used] somewhat questionably by [today's] journalistic ethics".

Linking up with SSAK and the Lund committee, within its first year of existence the Jönköping committee staged public meetings with Gunnar Helander, Zedekia Ngavirue and Charles Kauraisa from SWANU, Billy Modise from ANC and Arthur Goldreich from MK. Through the secondary schools in Jönköping and Huskvarna, it also raised the respectable amount of 40,000 SEK for the placement of black South African students in Sweden. In addition, the committee started the first ever news bulletin on South Africa by the Swedish solidarity movement. The modest publication—entitled Sydafrika—was issued in 79 stencilled copies on 21 November 1963, dedicating most of its three pages to the recent visit to Sweden by ANC’s Robert Resha and to the forthcoming tour by MK’s Arthur Goldreich. It was the forerunner of the bulletin Syd- och Sydvästafrika, which at SUL’s request was published in Lund as a joint venture between the Jönköping and Lund committees and appeared for the first time on 15 January 1964. In turn, Syd- och Sydvästafrika—reflecting the widening of the

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3 Letter from Anders Johansson to Göran Ravnsborg, Göteborg, 21 September 1964 (AJC). A number of fund-raising campaigns to sponsor black South African students at Swedish universities and other tertiary institutions were carried out by secondary schools and trade unions in Sweden in the early 1960s. The example of the Sundsvall high school mentioned. In 1963, the students at the Vällingby high school in Stockholm similarly collected 8,000 SEK for a student from Cape Town (Vår Kyrka, No. 1, 1964, p. 5). Zedekia Ngavirue, himself sponsored by the Sundsvall high school, later recalled that it was relatively easy to raise funds in Sweden for students from Southern Africa: "[W]hen we had to increase the number of Namibian students in Sweden, we would appeal to a trade union for bursaries. [...] We got that, for example, for Moses Kaljiungua and Godfrey Gaoseb" (interview with Zedekia Ngavirue, Windhoek, 17 March 1995).
6 Anders Johansson from Jönköping and Ulf Agrell from Lund were the driving forces behind Syd- och Sydvästafrika, produced in Lund. The first, similarly stencilled, issue was printed in 700 copies.
solidarity movement’s attention— was changed in 1967 into Södra Afrika Informationsbulletin and in 1975 to Afrikabulletinen, the official organ of the Africa Groups in Sweden.¹

Above all, the Jönköping committee would through investigations into the economic relations between Sweden and South Africa² take a number of ini-

¹ The bulletin was published without interruption for thirty years, its name reflecting the changing focus of attention from South Africa to South and South West Africa, Southern Africa and Africa. It was until 1974 produced by the South Africa Committee/Africa Group in Lund, playing a crucial part in the re-activation of the post-Vietnam solidarity with Southern Africa. Dick Urban Vestbro, from 1968 a member of the editorial staff and a leading representative of AGIS, has ventured the opinion that “if the bulletin had not survived [the late 1960s], the question could be raised whether the Africa Groups would have been formed at all” (Dick Urban Vestbro: ‘30 år med Afrikabulletinen’/’30 years with Afrikabulletinen’) in Afrikabulletinen, No. 5, 1993, p. 29). After a short break in 1993–94, the Africa Groups’ monthly information bulletin soon reappeared with the title Södra Afrika (‘Southern Africa’).

² An article in Aftonbladet stated in September 1964: “The industry bosses in the country tremble before a 22-year old from Jönköping, Anders ‘The Mole’ Johansson, chairman of the [Jönköping] South Africa Committee. He systematically digs up and reveals companies that are friendly to South Africa” (Aftonbladet, 11 September 1964). In his search for information, Johansson corresponded with the UN Special Committee against Apartheid and with a number of anti-apartheid activists in Sweden and abroad. Together with Ulf Agrell and Lars-Erik Johansson of the Lund South Africa Committee, he formed a bogus ‘South African Information Service’ through which
tatives and embark upon actions which went further than the SUL campaign. It soon led to a conflict with SUL’s leadership. As early as in January 1964, that is, less than a year after the launch of the SUL campaign, the committee strongly criticized the National Council of Swedish Youth for running the boycott campaign in “a remarkably unsatisfactory manner”, not only protesting against its “lack of interest and ability to take initiatives”, but also against its “wanting commitment to the South Africa action”. ¹ Seeing SUL as too passive, bureaucratic and youth-oriented to represent “the real interests of the Swedish public”, the Jönköping committee wanted to extend the campaign to the national political parties, trade unions, women’s organizations etc., calling for a “reorganization [of the campaign set-up] and the formation of a wider coalition, such as the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Great Britain”. ² The committee itself was reorganized accordingly in February 1964, inviting individuals and adults to become members.

In addition to the Jönköping and Lund committees, similar groups were formed in 1963 in Stockholm, Uppsala and Västerås.³ They all supported the criticism of SUL, as well as the proposal to create a new national anti-apartheid organization. Coordinating their positions, they liaised with the existing, but at the time not very active, national Swedish South Africa Committee (SSAK), led by Gunnar Helander as chairman and Claes-Adam Wachtmeister as vice-chairman. SSAK welcomed the initiative and a first, “informal”, national conference they obtained information from official sources in South Africa and—later—Rhodesia (interview with Anders Johansson, Eskilstuna, 19 November 1996). A curious detail is that the South African Department (i.e. Ministry) of Information—excited about Swedes interested in the ‘real South Africa’—politely responded to their English letters in Swedish.

¹ Letter from [Jönköping] South Africa Committee to SUL, Jönköping, 14 January 1964 (AJC).
² Ibid. SUL’s opposition to a reorganization along the lines proposed by the Jönköping committee was defended by influential members of the Social Democratic and Liberal youth organizations in Stockholm, who considered that individual membership and participation in the South Africa campaign outside SUL’s control could lead to ‘Communist infiltration’. A confidential report by Ingvar Kindblad and Bo Kuritzén, respectively representing the Social Democratic and the Liberal youth in the capital, asserted that “the South Africa question should be led by [SUL]. Local committees should be formed by the member organizations of SUL and by the students’ unions. [...] Only democratic [tendencies] may in the interest of the South Africa campaign be allowed to participate [...]. A national organization for the South Africa question led by Communists or infiltrated by Communists must, of course, be prevented” (Ingvar Kindblad and Bo Kuritzén: ‘Rapport från sammanträdet för attilda en ny Sydafrikakommitté i Stockholm’ /’Report from the meeting to form a new South Africa Committee in Stockholm’, Stockholm, 6 March 1964 (AJC). A similar opinion was asserted by Olle Wästberg, a member of the Liberal Party Youth League and a leader of SECO, the national organization of the Swedish secondary school students. His message to the supporters of the SUL boycott campaign was: “Continue boycotting South Africa to save the country from Communism!” (Jönköpings-Posten, 12 February 1964). Olle Wästberg—not to be confused with his brother Per—would later appear as a strong supporter of FNLA in Angola.
³ The first chairman of the Stockholm committee was Lars-Gunnar Eriksson, who in 1965 became international secretary of SFS and in 1966 director of IUEF. Other members of the committee were Bernt Carlsson and Sköld Peter Matthias. Carlsson would have a high-profile political career as international secretary of the Social Democratic Party (1970–76), general secretary of the Socialist International (1976–83) and UN Commissioner for Namibia (1987–88). He was killed in the Lockerbie air disaster in December 1988. Casten von Otter was the chairman of the Uppsala committee and Kurt Sjölin of the Västerås committee. Local South Africa Committees were formed in Gothenburg in 1964 and in Skinnskatteberg in 1965.
between the local and the national South Africa Committees was held in Jönköping in June 1964, where a discussion was initiated on the organization and aims of a broader anti-apartheid movement. This was a first attempt to form such a movement. It did not lead to the constitution of a formal national organization with a common programme and objectives—that would only happen eleven years later with the formation of the Africa Groups in Sweden in May 1975—but to the reorganization of SSAK and important clarifications concerning the role of the solidarity opinion vis-à-vis the South and Southern African liberation struggle.

A second conference was held in Västerås in January 1965, at which representatives from the newly formed Gothenburg South Africa Committee and from action groups in Helsingborg, Sundsvall and Umeå participated. The main subject was the re-activation of the South Africa campaign. Held shortly after the first Swedish popular demonstrations against the United States’ military involvement in Vietnam, it discussed the question of street demonstrations as a means of “pressure and propaganda” and whether the solidarity movement could support ANC’s armed struggle. The conference also decided to invite Oliver Tambo to Sweden.

An important result of the Västerås meeting was that SSAK agreed to coopt representatives of the local South Africa committees to its working committee. It was a first formal step in the reorganization of the older South Africa Committee, which on the local committees’ initiative finally adopted a new constitution and a new programme of action at its annual meeting in May 1965. The constitution and programme reflected the activist approach of, in particular, the Gothenburg, Jönköping and Lund committees, who advocated support to the South African liberation movement on its own conditions and a widening of the scope of action to the whole of Southern Africa. Following the reorientation initiated by the Jönköping committee in February 1964, the objectives of the reorganized Swedish South Africa Committee were defined as follows:

— to distribute information about liberation movements in Southern Africa;
— to oppose apartheid and other racial legislation, and support liberation movements in Southern Africa; and
— to attempt to convince the Swedish government, parliament and public of support to liberation movements in Southern Africa.

1 Ulla Lovén and Håkan Arvidsson: ‘Anteckningar förda vid informell konferens i Jönköping’ (‘Notes taken at informal conference in Jönköping’), Jönköping, 14 June 1964 (AJC).
2 Vestmanlands Läns Tidning, 1 February 1965.
3 ‘Protokoll fört vid konferens med representanter från aktionskommittéer beträffande Sydafrika-kampanjen’ (Minutes from conference with representatives from action committees regarding the South Africa campaign) [no date] (AJC).
4 Letter from Anders Johanson to Claes-Adam Wachtmeister, Nol, 1 February 1965 (AJC).
5 ‘Stadgar för Svenska Sydafrikakommittén antagna vid årsmöte den 19 maj 1965’ (‘Constitution of the Swedish South Africa Committee adopted at annual meeting on 19 May 1965’), attached to
SSAK’s original re-active and purely humanitarian view had, thus, under the sway of popularly based local committees been replaced by a more pro-active and militant approach. It was no longer the victims of apartheid and racial oppression that were the centre of attention, but the liberation movements. The question of violence as a legitimate method of struggle played an important role in this connection. It had increasingly been raised by the anti-apartheid activists. To find a possible common platform, Wachtmeister was mandated to draft a position statement on the issue. His proposal pointed out that “major violent actions were not particularly probable [in South Africa]. However, should [such actions] due to the desperate situation break out, they are in principle fully justifiable from a moral point of view”. 1 The statement was—also “in principle”—approved by SSAK, but for tactical reasons not made public. 2

At the annual meeting in May 1965 it was, finally, decided to build the future Swedish solidarity movement around individual members: “Membership can be applied for by each and every one who declares [him- or herself] in solidarity with the [...] objectives [of the committee]”. 3 The prog amme and form of organization marked a definite break with SUL’s centralized campaign, which soon fell into oblivion and eventually withered and died. 4 Pushed back by the rapidly mounting Vietnam movement 5—to which the organized opinion for South and Southern Africa lost a number of leading activists—SSAK would later share this fate. 6 Before leaving the stage, it would, however, be involved in several important campaigns and actively contribute to the fact that the issue of South Africa definitely entered the Swedish parliament in 1965.

One of the most important campaigns was directed towards the churches. It was provoked by a number of statements in support of racial segregation and apartheid by Swedish free church missionaries. In November 1963, for example,

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1 ‘Förslag’ (Proposal) by Claes-Adam Wachtmeister, Uppsala, 12 January 1965 (AJC).
2 ‘Protokoll fört vid Svenska Sydafrikakommittén årsmöte’ (‘Minutes from annual meeting of the Swedish South Africa committee’) [no date] (AJC).
3 ‘Stadgar för Svenska Sydafrikakommittén’... (‘Constitution of the Swedish South Africa Committee’...).
4 The relations between SSAK and SUL were, however, not antagonistic. SUL’s secretary general, Annie Marie Sundbom from the Social Democratic Youth League, participated as an observer at the annual meeting of the South Africa Committee in May 1965 and SSAK would continue to actively support the consumer boycott campaign.
5 The ‘Vietnambulletin’ started to appear in the spring of 1965, published in a couple of hundred copies. The organ of DFFG would eventually reach the remarkable figure of 140,000 per edition (Möller op. cit., p. 19).
6 In December 1967, Anders Johansson wrote to E.S. Reddy, Chief of Section for African Questions at the United Nations in New York: “Unfortunately, the Swedish South Africa Committee is not very active nowadays. There are some local committees, but they are in the same dilemma as the ‘big’ committee: lack of money and interested people. Most of the time and energy of all the many individuals who took part in anti-apartheid activities a few years ago [are] now ‘consumed’ by committees on Vietnam. [...] The [Swedish South Africa] Committee has had no annual meeting for over a year” (letter from Anders Johanson to E.S. Reddy, [no place], 31 December 1967) (AJC).
Knut Svensson, missionary director of the Swedish Alliance Mission, stated that “miscegenation between blacks and whites is a misfortune” and that “it would be best for both parties if they could live separately.” Such statements were often coupled with attacks on the former CSM missionary Gunnar Helander, seen as too involved in earthly matters, while “missionaries should leave politics aside.” Based in the ‘Jerusalem of Sweden’, the Jönköping South Africa Committee was in March 1964 asked by SSAK to contact the Swedish churches represented in South Africa, requesting them to publicly declare their position vis-à-vis apartheid and the South African government. The focus of attention was the South African government’s financial contributions to schools and hospitals run by the missions. After studies into the various Swedish missions and their South African relations, the Jönköping committee invited them to a conference. The official Church of Sweden Mission declared its opposition to racial segregation and welcomed the invitation. However, the Swedish Alliance Mission, the Holiness Union and the Free Baptist Union refused to participate and the conference had to be cancelled.

Particularly the Alliance Mission—with some 15,000 members and around thirty missionaries in South Africa the biggest of the three—refused to denounce apartheid, which provoked harsh criticism from the solidarity movement and a major feud between churches and missionaries. Not only Gunnar Helander participated in the debate, but also church people connected to national politics. For example, the well known free church pastor and chief editor Lewi Pethrus, a leading personality behind the formation of the Christian Democratic Union in 1964, defended the Alliance Mission and criticized what he called “the barking against the Verwoerd government.” Although the idea to organize a conference failed, the debate served the purpose of clarifying the respective positions of the missionary societies, demonstrating to the Swedish public the differences in approaches to the South African question.

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1 Värmlands Folkblad, 15 November 1963.
2 Ibid.
3 ‘Protokoll fört vid sammanträde med Svenska Sydafrikakommittén ; årsmöte den 23 mars 1964’ (‘Minutes from meeting of the Swedish South Africa Committee; the annual meeting of 23 March 1964’) [no date] (AJC).
5 For CSM’s road to this position, see Hans Engdahl: ‘Miraklet: Sydafrikas Väg till Försoning och Fred’ (‘The Miracle: South Africa’s Road to Reconciliation and Peace’), Verbum, Stockholm, 1996.
7 Arbetet, 3 July 1964.
8 See Expressen, 2 July 1964, where the Jönköping South Africa Committee stated that the Alliance Mission was “bribed” by the apartheid regime.
9 See, for example, Christina Jutterström: ‘Gunnar Helander: Helgelseförbundets politik i Sydafrika är skandalös’ (‘Gunnar Helander: The policy of the Holiness Union in South Africa is scandalous’) in Örebro-Kuriren, 4 July 1964.
10 Expressen, 10 July 1964.
public that Luthuli’s ideals were not shared by some of the small, but locally influential, free churches.1

By this time, there was a massive anti-apartheid opinion in Sweden. This was demonstrated by the remarkable response to the appeal issued by the London-based World Campaign for the Release of South African Political Prisoners during the Rivonia trial against Mandela and his co-accused. The campaign was carried out by SUL, SSAK, the Swedish UN Association and the local South Africa Committees. By the end of the campaign in June 1964, not less than 470,500 Swedes had signed the appeal.2 In the absence of official economic measures against South Africa, the demands for isolation of apartheid at the same time gained support at the local government level. In response to requests by the Jönköping South Africa Committee, the second-tier, popularly elected regional council3 of the administrative district of Jönköping 4 declared a boycott in June 1964, deciding not to procure any South African goods for the hospitals, schools and other public institutions within its jurisdiction. In Western Europe, a similar decision had only been taken by the city council of Aberdeen in Scotland.5

Encouraged by the stand taken by the Jönköping regional council, SSAK decided in August 1964 to ask Anders Johansson to contact all the regional councils in Sweden.6 This was a success. The regional council of Malmöhus decided in October 1964 to follow the example of Jönköping7 and by June 1965 no less than 20 of Sweden’s 24 regional councils had decided to refuse South African goods. Only two had formally voted against.8 At the same time, 139 out

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1 The general image of politically progressive Swedish churches was in South Africa itself strongly contradicted by the Swedish Lutheran congregation in Johannesburg. As late as in 1965, there was a massive opposition from the members of the congregation—most of them Swedish citizens resident in South Africa—against even the idea of inviting a black representative to address the subject of ‘Christians and the Racial Question’. Reverend Sydhoff had made this modest proposal. However, at a meeting attended by the Swedish envoy to South Africa, Hugo Tamm, the majority of the church council opposed what they considered “interference in South Africa’s domestic politics” and “a challenge to the laws of the land”, rejecting the proposal as an affront to “the general opinion, which is against ‘mixed’ meetings”. Sydhoff’s proposal was defeated and it was decided to arrange a meeting on the subject in the Swedish church in Johannesburg, but without a black speaker (‘Protokoll fört vid sammanträde med kyrkorådet i svenska församlingen i Johannesburg den 15 augusti 1965’/’Minutes from meeting with the church council of the Swedish congregation in Johannesburg, 15 August 1965’) (MFA).

2 Cable from the Swedish news agency TT, 10 June 1964 (AJC) and Magnusson (1974) op. cit., p. 26.

3 In Swedish, landsting.

4 In Swedish, Jönköpings län.

5 Syd- och Sydvästafrika, No. 2–3, April 1965, p. 2.

6 ‘Protokoll fört vid sammanträde med Svenska Sydafrikakommittén den 21 augusti 1964’ (‘Minutes from meeting of the Swedish South Africa Committee on 21 August 1964’) [no date] (AJC).

7 The Moderate Party in Malmöhus not only opposed the decision, but argued that it was unconstitutional and brought it to the attention of the Supreme Administrative Court (regeringsrätten). However, the court rejected the complaint in September 1965 (Sydsvenska Dagbladet, 13 October 1965).

8 Aftonbladet, 30 June 1965. The regional councils which opposed a boycott were Göteborgs och Bohus and Östergötland.
of 384 members of the Swedish parliament—more than a third—expressed sympathy with the boycott campaign now jointly coordinated by SUL, SSAK and the local South Africa Committees. Out of these, 83 belonged to the Social Democratic Party, 22 to the Centre Party, 20 to the Liberal Party, 10 to the Communist Party and 4 to the Moderate Party.  

With a de facto public boycott in force through the regional councils and with increasing parliamentary support for economic isolation of South Africa, the national South Africa Committee wrote to Prime Minister Erlander, requesting “the government to reconsider its position regarding a boycott of South African goods”.  

The government, however, maintained its opposition to any unilateral action, which, in turn, provoked mounting criticism from, in particular, the Centre and Liberal parties, but also from within the ruling Social Democratic Party itself.

South Africa Enters National Politics

The criticism came to the fore in connection with the International Conference on Economic Sanctions against South Africa in London in April 1964. Convened by Ronald Segal and the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, it was supported by a number of heads of state and government in Africa and Asia, among them Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. Professor Gunnar Myrdal of Sweden appeared as one of the sponsors of the conference, which was attended by official and NGO representatives from around 40 countries. Representatives from Sweden included Lars-Gunnar Eriksson from SFS, Bengt Liljenroth from SUL, Jakob Lindberg and Claes-Adam Wachtmeister from SSAK, Billy Modise from the Lund South Africa Committee and Sven Hamrell from the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Daniel Wiklund from the Liberal Party, Ola Ullsten from the Liberal Party Youth League, Anna-Greta Leijon and Ulf Agrell from the Swedish Social Democratic Students’ Association and Jonas Åkerstedt from the Communist Democratic Youth represented their respective political organizations.

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1 SUL: ‘Pressmedelande’ (‘Press communiqué’), Stockholm, 12 March 1965 (AJC). Not less than 43% of the MP’s of the ruling Social Democratic Party were in favour of the boycott campaign. The corresponding figure for the other parliamentary parties was: Communist Party 100%, Centre Party 40%, Liberal Party 29% and Moderate Party 7%.

2 Letter from Gunnar Helander and Claes-Adam Wachtmeister to Prime Minister Tage Erlander, Stockholm, 19 March 1965 (AJC). On behalf of the Young Falcons, Aina Erlander, the wife of the Prime Minister, had in September 1963 already expressed support for SUL’s boycott campaign against South Africa (Unga Örnar, No. 6, September 1963).


4 Syd- och Sydvästafrika, No. 4, May 1964, p. 11.
No representative from the Swedish government, the Social Democratic Party or LO attended the conference, which—as the title denotes—was convened to discuss the issue of economic sanctions against South Africa.¹ This was seen by the solidarity movement as a sign of “indefensible passivity by the Swedish official authorities.”² A number of articles in the Swedish press denounced the absence of leading representatives from the government or the ruling party.³ Particularly critical was the Liberal Party, which was represented at the conference by the MP Daniel Wiklund and the youth chairman Ola Ullsten. After the conference, Ullsten—future Foreign and Prime Minister—wrote a strongly worded article in Dagens Nyheter in which he stated that “the conduct by the Social Democrats created a manifest irritation and disappointment among the African and Asian participants”, adding that “to let the Communists alone side with the Afro-Asian bloc on the question of South Africa is a tactical blunder in view of the importance given by these states to the policies of apartheid”.⁴ It was a statement that could have been made by Olof Palme, at the time still waiting behind the scenes. Only a couple of days later, Palme would, however, as a young Minister without Portfolio make his first public speech on apartheid, addressing a crowd of 9,000 during the 1964 Labour Day demonstrations in Kramfors in northern Sweden together with Charles Kauraïsa from Namibia.⁵

¹ According to one account—quoting Ronald Segal—the idea behind the conference came from Prime Minister Erlander (Jakob Lindberg: ‘Rasförtryckets allierade finns i väst’/‘The allies of racial oppression are in the West’ in Aftonbladet, 19 April 1964). ANC’s Oliver Tambo had, however, in 1962 already proposed a broad international conference on sanctions.
³ For example, Jakob Lindberg: ‘Sydafrika väntar inte, men vad väntar socialdemokraterna på?’ (‘South Africa does not wait, but what do the Social Democrats wait for?’) in Aftonbladet, 24 April 1964 and Jonas Åkerstedt: ‘Värpå grundar sig svenska regeringens negativa politik i Sydafrikafrågan?’ (‘On what is the negative policy by the Swedish government regarding the question of South Africa based?’) in Ny Dag, 29 April 1964.
⁵ Västernorrlands Allehanda, 2 May 1964. Palme’s First of May speech in Kramfors was significant from various points of view. In his memoirs, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sten Andersson, has described the problems faced by the Social Democratic Party in changing racist attitudes even in the Swedish labour movement. At the beginning of the 1960s, he discussed the First of May arrangements with the local party organization in the traditionally socialist district of Ädalens—where Kramfors is situated—infor ming them about the decision to include internationalist demands. The local organization was “very receptive to the new [approach], except on one point: ‘We do not want any damned nigger up here!’” (Sten Andersson op. cit., pp. 163–164). In 1964, Palme appeared in Kramfors together with Charles Kauraïsa from SWANU of Namibia. In his militant speech on the subject of solidarity over borders, he addressed “the crass and degrading ideology of the supremacy of the white race”, which should be relegated to “the lumber-room of history”. He illustrated his speech with examples from South Africa, where the eight accused in the Rivonia trial—i.e. Nelson Mandela and the ANC leadership—were facing death sentences “due to the colour of their skin”. Apartheid, he said, had driven the blacks in South Africa to desperation and “desperation calls for violence”. In contrast to the official position of the Social Democratic Party and the Swedish government, Palme regarded apartheid and racism as a threat to international peace and warned against a division of the world between rich and white, poor and black. Such a development must be stopped, he said, adding that solidarity was fundamental to the Social Democratic Party, which “must not betray its ideals and visions” (Olof Palme: ‘Första Maj i
The issue of economic isolation of the apartheid regime entered the Swedish parliament shortly after the London conference. It was, unexpectedly, raised by the Centre Party, whose members as the first parliamentary group demanded in April 1964 that "the Swedish government take an initiative in favour of a common Nordic position on further measures against the apartheid policies of South Africa, whereby an international trade blockade as well as other such means should be considered". In addition, the leaders of the five traditional Swedish political parties and the newly formed Christian Democratic Union found it necessary to state their position on South Africa before the parliamentary elections in September 1964. In January 1965, the Communist Party and the Centre and Liberal parties, finally, introduced parliamentary motions requesting sanctions. ANC’s call had ceased to be a concern primarily for the Swedish youth and the solidarity movement, and had become a political question on the national agenda.

The apartheid question reached its initial height in the Swedish political debate between 1963 and 1966. It played a prominent part in official statements by the Swedish government at home and abroad. A study of Swedish official critical statements against other states during the period between 1947 and 1966 shows that the Soviet Union was the principal target of protests, with South Africa occupying second place. Of the critical statements made by the government in its declarations on foreign policy to the Swedish parliament and in its addresses to the UN General Assembly, 32% were directed during the period against the Soviet Union and 21% against South Africa. Sweden’s criticism of the Soviet Union was, however, concentrated to the post-war period, while South Africa dominated from the beginning of the 1960s. South Africa also occupied a central place in the Swedish press in the mid-1960s. The thirteen largest Swedish newspapers published a total of 951 editorial articles on South Africa during the period 1964-1966. It was during this period that the press made South Africa a central issue in Swedish political and social life.

1 Ung Center, No. 7, 1964.
2 SUL: ‘Pressmeddelande’ ('Press communiqué'), Stockholm, 6 September 1964 and Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning, 9 September 1964. Prime Minister Erlander stated that “I personally refuse to accept South African goods and I find it difficult to believe that anybody can do so with a good conscience.” Together with the leaders of the Centre, Liberal and Moderate parties he was, however, against the idea of unilateral, comprehensive Swedish sanctions and against breaking off diplomatic relations with South Africa. C.H. Hermansson, the leader of the Communist Party, stated quite cautiously that “the voluntary boycott […] must be supplemented by public boycott measures”, adding that “if these shall be effective it is, however, [of] decisive [importance] that they are strongly supported by the Swedish general public”.
3 The motion by the Communist Party was introduced by its leader C.H. Hermansson and other members. The Centre Party and the Liberal Party introduced similarly worded motions in the first (CP) and second (LP) chambers, signed by Sven Sundin for CP and by Ola Ullsten, Daniel Wiklund, Ingemar Mundebo and others for LP.
Africa from 1960 to 1969. Out of these, not less than 569—well over half—appeared between 1963 and 1966.¹

The South Africa debate became more acrimonious from 1964. At the same time as it was reported that major Swedish companies—such as Volvo² and Avesta Ironworks³—were increasing their investments in South Africa, a number of South African opposition representatives visited Sweden and called for sanctions. It was, for example the case with Lionel Bernstein,⁴ who paid a visit in October 1964,⁵ and with his wife, Hilda Bernstein, who was invited by the local South Africa Committees in April 1965.⁶ This was above all the case with Oliver Tambo. On 1 May 1965, he addressed the Social Democratic First of May demonstrations in Örebro, where he in a quite spectacular manner shared the platform with Prime Minister Tage Erlander. Invited as a guest speaker by the Social Democratic Party, Tambo “stood under the Prime Minister’s very nose and stated that the time had now come for Sweden to [introduce] official sanctions against South Africa”.⁷ In his speech—translated by Gunnar Helander—the ANC leader said:

My message to you today is that Sweden and the Nordic countries should introduce definitive measures against apartheid. I address myself to the Swedish government with a request to apply sanctions, if it is convinced [...] that it is a question about humanity. I thank you for what has been done already, particularly [by] the youth organizations, [but] Sweden and the Nordic countries have a leading role to play in the efforts [against apartheid].⁸

After the speech, Erlander was asked if the government would heed Tambo’s request. Pointing out that in 1964 it had allocated one million SEK as humanitarian aid in favour of refugees from South and Southern Africa, his reply was negative.⁹ The contradictory situation did not escape the media. It was, in addition, strongly criticized within the social democratic movement, where voices in reaction to the government’s opposition to unilateral sanctions were increasingly raised in favour of direct support to the liberation movement, including support for the armed struggle. Commenting upon the ‘divided plat-

² The South African publication Report from South Africa stated in December 1964 that “the Swedish concern Volvo will soon begin making engines and spare parts in South Africa in conjunction with Lawson Motors of Johannesburg”.
³ Together with the South African Anglo-American Corporation, Avesta Ironworks had in 1962 set up the company Transalloys in Witbank. It started production of chrome alloys in May 1964.
⁴ ’Rusty’ Bernstein was a leading member of the South African Communist Party and Umkhonto we Sizwe. He was arrested during the Rivonia raid, but later found not guilty of sabotage and discharged. He left South Africa in August 1964.
⁵ Dagens Nyheter, 24 October 1964 and Aftonbladet, 28 October 1964.
⁶ Smålands Folkblad, 24 and 27 April 1965 and Jönköpings-Posten, 27 April 1965.
⁷ Örebro-Kuriren, 3 May 1965.
⁸ Ibid.
⁹ Ibid.
Divided opinions: Prime Minister Tage Erlander, Annie Marie Sundbom, secretary general of SUL, Oliver Tambo of ANC and Gunnar Helander, chairman of the Swedish South Africa Committee, in Örebro on First of May 1965. (Photo: Nerikes Allehanda)

form in Örebro’,¹ the local social democratic newspaper Örebro-Kuriren stated, for example, in an editorial that a labour party [...] in a government position can hardly in the longer term treat the [anti-apartheid] opinion in the way which now is the case. Indeed, Sweden is one of the few countries that assist families in Africa who have been victims of racial legislation [with] humanitarian and economic [assistance]. We also give more [than others]. [...] [But] the present situation cannot continue for much longer. It is not possible to treat honest opinions in whatever way. It is not possible to simultaneously encourage the opinion against South Africa [by] offering platforms and listening to it, only to neglect it. [...] Where is the collective execution of such a clear opinion as the one we saw on First of May, brought together and organized by the party in government? In any case not within the government. [...] A minimum [requirement] is [...] that the government [appoints] a commission [into the effects of sanctions]. That is a demand of intellectual decency on the Prime Minister who in Örebro shared the platform with the Nobel laureate Luthuli’s closest colleague.²

This was not a marginal viewpoint by a provincial newspaper. A similar concern was expressed by the party’s official journal Tiden. An editorial entitled ‘The Social Democrats and South Africa’, published in May 1965, openly recognized that “South Africa and South West Africa begin to constitute a problem for the Social Democratic Party” and that “a difference is appearing between a

¹ In Swedish, delad, meaning both ‘divided’ and ‘shared’.
radical opinion, heavily exploited by young members of the Liberal Party, and the policy of the Social Democrats”\(^1\). The opening rift, the editorial continued, appeared, for example, on the First of May, when a large number of representatives of the oppressed in the two African states\(^2\) fortunately enough had been invited to address the demonstrations. Their speeches, which recommended an official Swedish trade boycott, were too obviously in contrast with the more cautious stand on drastic trade policy measures presented from the same platforms by the Swedish Social Democrats. It is essential for the opinion-making process [...] that the government better explains why it considers that it cannot follow the line recommended by those who consider themselves the most radical. It is essential that the party clarifies why its position does not coincide with that of the invited guests. A very unpleasant situation will otherwise be created soon enough.\(^3\)

During Tambo’s visit, he also pointed out that a policy of passive resistance no longer was viable in South Africa.\(^4\) The LO-owned social democratic newspaper Stockholms-Tidningen not only expressed understanding for this position, but also raised the question of support to the armed struggle. In an editorial, it asserted that

> those who deny the Africans their right to use violence place themselves in practice—consciously or unconsciously—on Verwoerd’s side in the conflict. [...] Should we [then] give our support to the South African freedom movement even if it begins to use violence? Should we organize collections for the resistance organizations if we know that they will buy weapons for the money? To answer these questions in the negative would be tantamount to accepting eternal slavery for the [blacks] in South Africa. There is no longer any possibility to liberate South Africa from apartheid with peaceful means.\(^5\)

With the government under heavy and increasing criticism by the solidarity movement, leading intellectuals\(^6\) and the political opposition—particularly the Liberal Party Youth League—the frustration reflected by the editors of Örebro-Kuriren, Tiden and Stockholms-Tidningen was soon expressed within the ruling party itself. At the end of 1965, the vice-chairman of the Social Democratic Youth League, Thage G. Peterson, summarized three years of active campaigning for a boycott of South Africa as follows in SSU’s organ Frihet:

\(^{1}\) ‘Socialdemokraterna och Sydafrika’ (‘The Social Democrats and South Africa’) in Tiden, No. 5, 1965, p. 319.

\(^{2}\) The international section on the First of May 1965 was primarily dedicated to Namibia and a large number of SWANU representatives addressed the demonstrations all over Sweden.


\(^{4}\) Sydsvenska Dagbladet, 3 May 1965.

\(^{5}\) Stockholms-Tidningen, 30 April 1964.

\(^{6}\) Sara Lidman was very active in the Swedish South Africa debate in the mid-1960s. See, for example, ‘Svenskarna och deras hövdingar’ (‘The Swedes and their chiefs’) in Dagens Nyheter, 17 October 1964 about Swedish investments in South Africa and ‘Smulor i mörkret’ (‘Scraps in the darkness’) in Dagens Nyheter, 27 March 1965, a dramatized discussion on the sanctions question.
The idea of a boycott gained a hearing among the Swedish youth for mainly two reasons, namely that a boycott both would provoke the domestic opinion to protest against the violence and aggression by the whites against the [black] population and become an instrument of pressure against the Verwoerd regime in favour of common sense. The [method] chosen has, however, not even managed to convince the Swedish government, the political parties or Sweden’s big industry to actively give their support. [...] In today’s situation we must, simply, in the name of honesty recognize that the different boycott actions [carried out] around the world have not had any particular significance on South Africa’s economy. [...] If we declare ourselves in solidarity with the oppressed South Africans in their liberation struggle [then] we must, of course, also take the consequences of this stand. In a situation where the possibilities of the UN to influence South Africa, USA and England prove non-existent, we must be ready to give the South African freedom movement the weapons that it needs to protect the lives and limbs of their fellow countrymen.¹

These were not mere words. In 1964, the Social Democratic Youth League had already donated the modest, but significant amount of 3,000 SEK to ANC “to be used in an appropriate way in the struggle against the Verwoerd regime”.² As far as can be ascertained, the contribution from SSU’s international solidarity fund—set up in 1963 as a continuation of the Fund for the Youth of Tanzania—represents the first direct financial support to ANC by any Swedish political organization.

Steadfastly maintaining that only the UN Security Council could impose sanctions on South Africa and unable to constructively respond to the mounting internal criticism, the old guard of the Swedish Social Democratic Party was on its way in 1965 to losing substantial support over the South Africa question, as well as over the emerging issue of Vietnam. The seriousness of the situation was underlined in June 1965 in an editorial in the party’s theoretical journal Tiden under the title ‘The Opposition to the Left’. It pointed out that there is a risk that the idealism in favour of the poorer countries and the indignation vis-à-vis regimes such as the South African may be utilized by a left socialist party, as well as by certain liberals. A social democratic policy of the more energetic kind that is recommended by the younger forces of the party will be required if the initiative in these questions will not be taken over by Communists and Liberals.³

Against this background, the executive committee of the national board of the Social Democratic Party decided to present the motives behind Sweden’s policy regarding South Africa in a more comprehensive way, giving the party’s former

² ‘SSU’s Internationella Solidaritetsfond’ (‘SSU’s International Solidarity Fund’) in Frihet, No. 5, 1965, p. 5.
³ ‘Oppositionen till Vänster’ (‘The Opposition to the Left’) in Tiden, No. 6, June 1965, p. 324.
international secretary Kaj Björk the task to prepare such a statement. It was subsequently published as a booklet entitled *South Africa and Us*, which appeared in October 1965. Restating the well-known position that “Sweden [...] for a long time has maintained that every decision on economic sanctions against South Africa must be taken by the UN Security Council”, it again rejected the idea of unilateral actions. A number of objections were raised against a boycott of a country “only to demonstrate disapproval of [...] the regime and [its] general politics”, concluding that unilateral action was “rather likely to make the implementation of effective international sanctions more difficult”. On behalf of the board of the ruling party, Björk also addressed the emerging demand for support to the armed struggle in South Africa, stating that

one does not have the right to condemn people who out of desperation take to violence when they do not find any other ways to fight against oppression. But it must be out of the question for the peaceful [country of] Sweden to consciously foment armed racial struggles in a far away country, however strongly we do sympathize with the victims of the oppression.

The booklet issued by the Social Democratic Party did not satisfy the broad opinion in favour of unilateral sanctions. A host of critical articles against the publication and its arguments were published during the following months in the Swedish press. Gunnar Helander was particularly incensed, describing South Africa as Sweden’s “ideological lap-dog” in a strongly worded article in February 1966. “It is”, Helander wrote,

extremely difficult to get a grip of where Swedish social democracy stands with regard to the South Africa question. There is a remarkable contrast between the strength of the opinion and the weakness of the action, between blazing First of May appeals against Verwoerd and the big economic and diplomatic hug to the same Verwoerd. One million [Swedish Kronor] is set aside for the victims of racial oppression, but its originators are left in peace. [...] At any price [they] want to avoid taking the lead in the struggle against apartheid. Kaj Björk almost breaks his neck trying to excuse foreign policy submissiveness. He wants to put the burden upon the individuals, who are asked to boycott and fight. [...] Kind housewives avoid buying South African oranges, but the big companies increase their procurement of leather and other raw materials. [...] But what if the Swedish opinion feels let down? What if the idealism has been underestimated? If the idealistic capital is

1 Björk was the international secretary of the Social Democratic Party between 1947 and 1955. He was an expert at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs when he wrote *South Africa and Us* and appeared in the mid-1960s as the Social Democratic Party’s spokesperson on South and Southern Africa.


3 Ibid., p. 35.

4 Ibid., p. 40.

Towards Official Support to the Liberation Movements

By this time, Olof Palme had made his dramatic entry on the Swedish foreign policy scene. Acting as Foreign Minister in Torsten Nilsson’s absence, on 30 July 1965 he had addressed the Christian Social Democrats’ congress in Gävle, holding a principled, ideological speech in which the struggle of the oppressed peoples for national and social liberation was the leading theme. This famous speech, in which Palme for the first time publicly discussed the war in Vietnam, represented a clear break with the Social Democratic Party’s cautious foreign policy stands and has often been identified as the point of departure of Sweden’s policy of active non-alignment.

Palme did not underestimate the strength of idealism. Nor did he disrespect the Swedish labour movement’s loyalty to international brotherhood. On the contrary, what gave his speech its explosive force was that he recognized the international idealism expressed by a broad opinion vis-à-vis South Africa and Vietnam, not as a threat, but as an asset, guiding it towards a principled policy of solidarity between Sweden and the peoples struggling for liberation. In his watershed speech, Palme thus stated that

the efforts to achieve liberation set their stamp on the world of today. They fill the air around us. They are rapidly gaining ground [and] we must learn to live with them, perhaps also for them. [...] What we are hearing are the same demands for liberty and equality for the great mass of the population as kindled the hopes and stimulated the belief in the future of the emerging workers’ movements in the countries of Europe. The only difference is that the present demands are at least partly directed against us.

[...] It is an ill-advised approach in a time of social change to seek friends among those who would be the first to lose their privileges. He who is the friend of the privileged can easily [appear as] the enemy of righteousness. It is not easy to induce people to renounce what they regard as just claims because their problem has happened to become the strategic focus of a Great Power conflict. How to combine peace and liberation is a grave dilemma in the present-day world. Th[e] task is not solved by simple slogans or theoretical moves [...] under a cover of objectivity. What is required is good sense as well as moral [values] as a basis for action. [...] The fundamental moral [values] of democratic socialism [...] make it our obligation to stand on the side of the oppressed against the oppressors, on the side of the poor and the distressed against their exploiters and masters.2

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Palme did not discuss the specific question of sanctions against South Africa. His call for solidarity with the oppressed against the oppressors would, however, pave the way for direct official Swedish assistance to the Southern African liberation movements. As a sign of the break with the cautious re-active past, a new generation of Social Democratic politicians would from 1965-66 actively seek contacts with these movements and lead the Swedish opinion in this respect. Pierre Schori, who from 1965 was attached to the national board of the Social Democratic Party and became its international secretary in 1967, was instrumental in the reorientation. While Kaj Björk, the Social Democratic spokesperson on South and Southern Africa, as late as in August 1966 expressed principled objections against Swedish support to liberation movements waging armed struggle and, in general, against interference in the domestic affairs of other states, Schori would as a matter of course exactly one year later positively point out the importance of such support in the party’s official organ *Tiden*.2

Paraphrasing Björk’s booklet on South Africa, in the autumn of 1968 Schori published an article in *Tiden* entitled ‘The Liberation Movements and Us’, in which he made an overview of the contemporary national liberation struggles in Africa, Asia and Latin America and, more importantly, presented an outline of the ruling party’s policy towards the liberation movements. In his important contribution, Schori pointed out that the Social Democratic Party programme, adopted in 1960,

does not place any obstacles in the way of support to struggling, even revolutionary, freedom movements. [The programme] emphasizes solidarity with the objectives of international movements, not the methods they choose in their struggle: “In its quest for the realization of a socialist social transformation at home, Swedish Social Democracy feels affinity with all the forces in the world that fight for the ideas of democratic socialism.” The same basic view is reflected in the constitution of the international solidarity fund of the party. Practice also shows that [the Social Democratic Party] shares a community of interests with such national and social freedom movements which do not profess adherence to socialism, although most of them do. [...] The experiences from our cooperation with liberation movements in the whole world show that we hardly can adopt a prescriptive doctrine which [would] serve as a general rule for our policy. We must without prejudice pragmatically find our way and be open for new contacts [...] when laying the basis for our future policy regarding these vital questions. Vital, because in peoples’ liberation lies the hope for a better world.4

These ideas would guide the Social Democratic Party’s relations with the liberation movements in Southern Africa and in other parts of the world. Shortly

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2 Pierre Schori: ‘Portugal’ in *Tiden*, No. 8, 1967, where the author stated that “our support to the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies can be increased” (p. 495).
after the publication of Schori’s article, they would, in the main, also become official Swedish policy. The new policy was indicated by Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson, who in a historic statement in December 1968 pointed out that Sweden is among the states that have urged [for] greater efforts to terminate South Africa’s policy of racial discrimination and Portugal’s out-of-date and crudely provocative colonial policy. But, as everyone knows, we cannot [...] count on any steps being taken in the near future to remedy these abuses. What, then, can we do as visible proof of the solidarity we feel with those oppressed peoples? [...] Sweden has for a long time made financial contributions for the education of refugees from Southern Africa. Moreover, for a number of years we have helped to pay for legal aid for those charged with offences under the so-called ‘apartheid laws’ in South Africa. We have [also] maintained dependants of people who have been imprisoned or detained under those laws.

[...] These contributions have been made in support of the oppressed peoples of Africa who have [...] not obtained their freedom. The struggle is still continuing and we are in touch with a number of the leaders of the African liberation movements. Some of them have asked us for assistance. We are prepared to help [...], in the same way as we help the liberation front in South Vietnam with drugs and medical supplies. Educational assistance to the members of the liberation movements via their organizations would also be conceivable. It is humanitarian aid that is in question. [A]id that puts the members of these movements in a better position to continue their struggle for the liberty of their people.1

Nilsson’s announcement was greeted with appreciation by the stalwarts of the Swedish anti-apartheid movement. Per Wästberg wrote in Dagens Nyheter that “behind [the statement] is a working opinion, [but] those who have thought that the Swedish government often has been too prudent should [now] in fairness appreciate what has taken place”. With regard to the old demand for sanctions, Wästberg added: “It is possible that the freezing of the relations with the racial regimes in Southern Africa, which I believe we should strive for, now will follow naturally”.2

The Social Democratic Party was not alone in advocating support for national liberation movements. The Left Party had since 1967 introduced motions to that effect in the Swedish parliament, mainly in favour of the movements in the Portuguese colonies. More significant in an international perspective was that the Liberal Party at its congress in 1968 approved a proposal by Per Ahlmark, Gustaf Lindencrona and David Wirmark to draw up guidelines for support to “resistance movements of various kinds”.3 A working group chaired by Wirmark was appointed in November 1968, that is, just before Foreign

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Minister Nilsson’s statement.\(^1\) It submitted its report—entitled *Support to Resistance Movements*—in May 1969. This important document, which subsequently was approved by the board of the Liberal Party, defined the principles that should guide the party’s policy, relations and support to what it called ‘resistance movements’.

The Liberal point of departure was that “[s]olidarity must not stop at the borders of the nation. [...] [I]t is natural [...] to openly and critically oppose regimes who do not work for a democratic and social development [and] [w]e cannot accept the idea that our sentiments of sympathy should be tied to some sort of diplomatic prudence or deference to trade relations”.\(^2\) The report went on to discuss different opposition movements in undemocratic countries, concluding that from a liberal point of view

> it is evident that the most valuable movements must [be those] which in spite of the overriding goal of the resistance struggle do not lose sight of the wish to further the development of the individual on the basis [...] of equality and in democratic forms. On the other hand, with regard to resistance movements it is not possible to take a

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\(^1\) At the time, Wirmark held the position of secretary of the Liberal Party. In addition to Wirmark, the following persons participated in the working group: Per Ahlmark, Ingemund Hägg, John Kraft and Daniel Wiklund. Hans Blix was consulted as an expert on international law.

\(^2\) Folkpartiet: *Stöd åt Motståndsrörelser*, p. 5.
A resistance movement which can be expected to start and conduct the desired development process deserves our sympathy and merits a priori our support, whether it calls itself liberal, progressive, socialist, revolutionary or national [as long as] it has or can be expected to receive widespread popular support. [...] It is [similarly] evident that it must be seen as positive that a movement primarily has the intention to try non-violent methods, such as passive resistance. [However,] we unfortunately know that those methods in certain cases do not lead to positive results. It is then clear that [we] cannot be negative towards [resistance] movements solely on the grounds that they have the intention to gain power through violence.1

After establishing the Liberal Party’s general principles towards liberation movements, the Wirmark report presented the criteria which ought to govern official Swedish assistance to such movements.2 It was a question which would be intensively debated over the years, with strong criticism expressed both from the political right and from the solidarity movement. Basically, however, the Liberal position coincided with that of the parliamentary majority, anticipating the criteria later laid down by the government. "Military engagement and armed assistance by the state", the report said, "is out of the question" and "unspecified official financial support must [similarly] not [be extended]".3 Instead, the general orientation of official Swedish support to liberation movements was outlined as follows:

The state should be able to give contributions [...] within a wide framework. Official contributions should be channelled to assist in the humanitarian-civilian field and could, for example, be extended in the form of educational assistance, administrative aid [including] transport means, medical equipment and medicines, etc. Humanitarian-civilian support of this kind could without restrictions be extended to a party, or parties, in an armed conflict, [although it] naturally could mean that the resistance movement [thereby] would [be in a position] to free additional resources for the armed conflict.4

Finally, the report proposed that official Swedish humanitarian and civilian assistance should be given to liberation movements in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola and South Africa, as well as in Guinea-Bissau.5

As the Left Party had already advocated support for the liberation movements6 and the Centre Party coordinated its positions with the Liberal Party,
there was in 1968–69 an overwhelming parliamentary majority in favour of such support. It represented 85% of the Swedish electorate. Only the Moderate Party did not form part of this foreign policy orientation. There was, furthermore, a remarkable consensus between the major political parties regarding their views on the liberation movements and the framework within which official assistance could be granted. Both the Social Democratic position expressed by Schori in *Tiden* and the Liberal stand in the Wirmark report emphasized that the ideological label of a liberation movement was of secondary importance and that it, at any rate, should not exclude Swedish support. Nor should its methods of struggle. A pragmatic approach was instead recommended. In turn, the fundamental agreement across the domestic ideological divide between socialists and liberals had a lot to do with the way in which the Swedish solidarity movement with South Africa had been formed and developed.

Against a backdrop of increasingly militant and recurrent youth demonstrations concerning Southern Africa, parliamentary motions in favour of official support to the liberation movements were at the beginning of 1969 submitted by the Left, Social Democratic and Liberal parties. It was on the basis of these submissions that the parliamentary Standing Committee on Appropriations in May 1969 issued the historic statement which paved the way for official assistance to the Southern African movements. In the case of ANC, it was, however, not until the beginning of 1973 that the first grant was extended.

demanded Swedish economic sanctions against South Africa in a parliamentary motion in 1965, and in spite of the fact that many individual party members were active in the different South Africa Committees, it was not until late 1967 that the Left Party through its youth league started to get acquainted in earnest with the Southern African nationalist actors. In November 1967, the Greater Stockholm district of the Left Youth League (*Vänsterns Ungdomsförbund*—VUF) set up a ‘Working Group for the Liberation Movements in Southern Africa’ (*Arbetsgruppen för Afrikas Befrielsesrörelser*), which met every week to discuss the questions of “political and material support to the African liberation struggle (and which) together with other likeminded groups [shall] contribute towards the strengthening of the solidarity movement with [this] struggle. [It shall also] see to it that this struggle is placed in its right context, namely the worldwide anti-imperialist struggle, which [...] is part of our own struggle to crush the Swedish capitalist society” (VUF: ‘Information sheet’ [no date]) (AGA). In 1967–68, the group issued a series of presentations of the major Southern African liberation movements. Formed at a time when the Maoist-dominated Vietnam movement was formulating its ‘focus theory’ (*brännpunktssteori*), according to which the anti-imperialist solidarity opinion should concentrate all its efforts on Indochina, the VUF working group was instrumental in keeping the issues of Southern Africa on the agenda of the Swedish left, greatly contributing to the revival of the solidarity movement with Southern Africa at the beginning of the 1970s.

1 Passive in 1969, the Moderate Party later clarified its position. In 1972, for example, it stated in the parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs: “To actively support revolutionary movements [...] is not in agreement with the international legal principle of non-intervention, nor with the Swedish policy of neutrality. [...] Considerable international doubts [...] exist with regard to the idea of [extending] assistance to the African population in the form of support to a certain liberation movement. Particularly a state which wishes to conduct a credible policy of neutrality should desist from designing its assistance in this way” (cited in Stokke, op. cit., p. 17).

2 The Båstad demonstrations—involving Zimbabwe—took place in May 1968 and the issue of ASEA and Cabora Bassa—involving Mozambique—mobilized large sections of the Swedish society from mid-1968 until the early autumn of 1969.

3 For the text of the statement, see the introduction above. The sanctions law against Rhodesia—Sweden’s first legislation of its kind—was similarly passed by the Swedish parliament in May 1969.
It is ironic that the first Southern African liberation movement with which Sweden entered into contact, that for many years occupied almost a hegemonic position in the Swedish liberation debate and largely determined the overall Swedish involvement with Southern Africa was the last to receive official assistance. A combination of factors contributed to this situation. During the second half of the 1960s, it was the nationalist cause in Namibia and Zimbabwe and, above all, the struggle in the Portuguese colonies that dominated events in Southern Africa. By mid-1965, ANC had been largely crushed inside South Africa and it would not be effectively reconstructed until around 1973. Coupled with a general concentration on Vietnam, this led to a marginalization of the South Africa question in the Swedish debate and to decreasing contacts with ANC.

Reduced Contacts

Swedish policies vis-à-vis South Africa were during the 1960s formulated in Sweden and at the United Nations, with very little input from the Swedish legation in Pretoria. Instructed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs not to maintain contacts with “groups that worked for the overthrow of the South African government”, the legation was, as noted, firmly embedded in the official, white South Africa. The deference by the Swedish legation towards the apartheid government often surpassed that of other countries. According to Pretoria’s protocol, foreign governments accredited to South Africa should, for example, desist from inviting non-whites to diplomatic functions, as “it was normal diplomatic practice” according to Prime Minister Verwoerd “that an ambassador should observe the customs and traditions of the [host] country”.\(^1\) The American and British embassies did not observe the apartheid protocol, but the lower ranked Swedish legation did. Not only the solidarity movement and the Swedish press\(^2\) condemned the submissive posture, but on several occasions over the years the Ministry for Foreign Affairs also pointedly asked the Swedish envoy if invitations had been extended to non-whites.\(^3\) It was, however, only in 1966 that minister Hugo Tamm could “respectfully report” to Stockholm that my wife and I on 9 March 1966 held a cocktail-party at the head of mission’s residence ‘Morgenster’, Constantia, to which guests had been invited from all the leading racial groups in Cape Town, whites, coloureds, Indians and Africans. […] No representative from the government or the administration had for natural

\(^1\) The Cape Times, 24 April 1964.

\(^2\) For example, Aftonbladet, 8 July 1965.

\(^3\) For example, cable from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Swedish legation in Pretoria, Stockholm, 22 February 1963 (MFA).
reasons been invited, as [they] do not have the right to participate at racially mixed parties.\footnote{1}

The only contacts that the Swedish legation had with ANC in South Africa were those with Albert Luthuli, towards whom Sweden generally felt an affinity and a responsibility ever since he was honoured with the Nobel Peace Prize. They were, however, important contacts. Although banned to his smallholding in Groutville, Chief Luthuli was still the President-General of ANC and his words carried a lot of authority. The South African government tried for the same reasons to make any contact between the legation and Luthuli impossible, but a communication channel was established through the Church of Sweden Mission.

Receiving reports about Luthuli’s deteriorating health, the Gothenburg South Africa Committee requested in November 1964 the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to contact the ANC leader through the Swedish legation in Pretoria. Minister Tamm met Luthuli and reported that his health situation was better than earlier reports had indicated.\footnote{2} Some time thereafter, it transpired that the South African security police after Tamm’s visit to Groutville had questioned Luthuli about the meeting.\footnote{3} Concerned about his general situation, the Social Democratic Party branch in Stockholm\footnote{4}—at the time chaired by Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson—decided to invite Luthuli to Sweden. An appeal to that effect was addressed to the South African government. In a remarkable letter of refusal, the South African envoy to Sweden, Anthony Hamilton, replied in June 1965 that the Nobel peace laureate during his

light restrictions [...] [had] continued meeting with Communists and well-known agitators, both openly and in secret. He abused the privileges accorded to him and defied and provoked the authorities and the government at every turn. Mr. Luthuli has therefore only himself to blame for the restrictions and prohibitions still imposed on him. These are unavoidable if all the peoples of South Africa are to be protected against the violence which would accompany a Communist-inspired coup d’état. The restrictions on Mr. Luthuli have been imposed only as a last resort. [...] In the past, when passport facilities were granted to Mr. Luthuli, the promises he gave were not fulfilled. Since his last visit abroad,\footnote{5} there has been no change in his attitude. In the circumstances, the South African government cannot, therefore, allow Mr. Luthuli to undertake the proposed visit.\footnote{6}

\footnote{1 Letter from Hugo Tamm to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 10 March 1966 (MFA). The experiment was apparently successful. Tamm wrote that “the atmosphere was good and the guests seemed to appreciate the reception”.


\footnote{3 Letter from Hugo Tamm to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 11 March 1965 (MFA).

\footnote{4 In Swedish, Stockholms arbetarekommun.

\footnote{5 That is, to Oslo in December 1961.

\footnote{6 Letter from the South African minister A.M. Hamilton to the Secretary, Stockholms Arbetarekommun, Stockholm, 3 June 1965 (MFA). See also Aftonbladet, 19 June 1965.}
‘Why Can’t He Come?’
Chief Luthuli’s portrait on a symbolic coffin, First of May, Stockholm, 1965.
(Photo: Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv och Bibliotek)

Before the Social Democratic Party’s invitation to Chief Luthuli, three Swedish Nobel Prize winners—Per Lagerkvist, George de Hevesy and Arne Tiselius—had in cooperation with the Swedish section of Amnesty International addressed an appeal to the South African government “to restore to Albert Luthuli his freedom of speech and movement in accordance with the UN Declaration of Human Rights”.¹ In his letter to Amnesty International, Hamilton replied on 15 June 1965 that

it is evident that neither your organization nor the distinguished Nobel prize-winners [...] are properly informed on the implications of [Mr. Luthuli’s] chairmanship of the African National Congress, or of the subversive character of this body and its threat to peace and order. Your communication can therefore carry no weight.²

¹ Appeal by Per Lagerkvist, George de Hevesy and Arne Tiselius, Copy of letter to Professor Natta, Stockholm, 16 February 1965 (AJC).
² Letter from Hans Göran Franck to the Nobel Prize winners who signed the appeal for Albert Luthuli, Stockholm in July 1965 (AJC).
Invitations and appeals via the South African government were effectively blocked and it was not until the beginning of July 1967—shortly before his mysterious death in a train accident—that a Swedish newspaper managed to interview Chief Luthuli.\footnote{Marie-Anne Jansson: ‘De vita gör allt för att knäcka honom, men lyckas aldrig!’ (‘The whites do everything to break him, but they never succeed!’) in Aftonbladet, 3 July 1967.} By that time, the Nobel laureate—who more than anybody else had represented the calls for sanctions and the growth of the anti-apartheid opinion in Sweden—was, however, an old and tired man, while ANC in exile had firmly embraced the armed struggle.\footnote{When ANC in alliance with ZAPU of Zimbabwe in August 1967 crossed into Rhodesia, the MK force was in honour of the former President-General—and Nobel Peace Prize winner—named the ‘Luthuli Detachment’.} Nevertheless, the news of his death was given prominence by the Swedish press and several newspapers published a long letter by the Church of Sweden Mission in South Africa on Luthuli and the African National Congress.\footnote{For example, Östersunds-Posten, 8 August 1967.}

At the funeral in Groutville on 30 July 1967—attended by more than 5,000 people, but without any representatives from the South African government other than security police—the governments of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, as well as the Norwegian Nobel Committee, laid wreaths in their respective national colours.\footnote{Letter from Eric Virgin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 4 August 1967 (MFA). Among the speakers at the funeral services were Alan Paton and Chief Gatsha Buthelezi.} During a visit to Sweden in June the following year, Oliver Tambo announced that ANC was planning to honour Chief Luthuli’s memory by forming a foundation to support education of black South Africans, as well as research and information. The Swedish government declared its willingness to take part in the plans.\footnote{‘Press release’, 19 June 1968, in The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs: Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy: 1968, Stockholm, 1969, p. 108.} Although indirect, it was a first official aid commitment to ANC. When the Luthuli Memorial Foundation was eventually constituted in 1970, the Swedish Minister without Portfolio and former chairperson of the UN Expert Group on South Africa, Alva Myrdal, became one of the five sponsors.\footnote{The other sponsors were Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and the Secretary General of the OAU, Diallo Telli (letter from W.Z. Conco, Chairman of the Luthuli Memorial Foundation, to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, London, 12 June 1972) (SDA).} It was, however, not until August 1972 that the first Swedish contribution to the foundation—amounting to 30,000 SEK—was disbursed.\footnote{Letter from Sune Danielsson to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, London, 7 August 1972 (SDA).}

ANC’s contacts with Sweden became less frequent during the second half of the 1960s. Nevertheless, some of the anti-apartheid pioneers, such as Gunnar Helander, Anders Johansson, David Wirmark and Per Wästberg, maintained their relations with Oliver Tambo and the ANC leadership in exile, through IDAF—as in the case of Helander and Wästberg—or via correspondence. Helander remained a prolific contributor to various Swedish newspapers and...
Johansson and Wästberg were influential at *Dagens Nyheter*. In a situation where the Swedish media and the solidarity movement became increasingly silent regarding South Africa, they continued to write about apartheid and ANC.1

Via the ANC office in Dar es Salaam, Anders Johansson—who in 1965 worked as a political editor at the social democratic evening paper *Aftonbladet* before joining the liberal *Dagens Nyheter*—received articles and manuscripts from leading members of Umkhonto we Sizwe which he managed to publish in his own or in other newspapers.2 In addition to contributions by the internationally recognized journalist Ruth First,3 such prominent representatives of MK and the South African Communist Party as Ronnie Kasrils4 and, above all, Joe Slovo were via Johansson—unbeknown to both the newspaper editors and the Swedish readers—thus directly and indirectly given access to the Swedish media.5

Kasrils—who kept up a regular and personal correspondence with Johansson from Dar es Salaam and London from the beginning of 1965 until mid-1966—published, for example, short articles on South Africa’s Freedom and

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1 See, for example, Per Wästberg: ‘Frihetslexikon för södra Afrika’ (‘Liberation dictionary for Southern Africa’) in *Dagens Nyheter*, 29 August 1967. Also Anders Johansson: ‘Gerilla i Södra Afrika’ (‘Guerrilla in Southern Africa’) in *Liberal Debatt*, No. 6, 1968, where the author—somewhat exaggeratedly—stated that “the underground organization inside South Africa has been rebuilt in spite of the staggering blows against the former leadership, in spite of the many political trials and in spite of South Africa’s efficient security police” (p. 25).

2 In a letter to Kasrils, Johansson wrote in August 1965: “[D]on’t talk about it to persons with close contacts in Sweden, because I am not allowed to write for other newspapers. We have to work in secret” (letter from Anders Johansson to A.N.C. Kumalo, Handen, 15 August 1965) (AJC). Cf. interview with Anders Johansson, Eskilstuna, 19 November 1996.


4 Kasrils—who in 1983 became ANC’s head of military intelligence and in 1994 Deputy Minister of Defence in South Africa—was an early member of the Natal Regional Command of Umkhonto we Sizwe. He left South Africa in October 1963. After military training in Odessa, Soviet Union, in 1964, he returned to Tanzania, where he stayed until August 1965. Based in London, he worked closely with Dr. Yusuf Dadoo, Jack Hodgson and Joe Slovo to develop underground activities in South Africa (see Ronnie Kasrils: ‘Armed and Dangerous’: My Undercover Struggle against Apartheid, Heine-mann, Oxford, 1993). It was Kasrils who initiated the correspondence with Johansson, introducing himself in March 1965 as A.N.C. Kumalo, “a student-refugee working on *Spotlight*”, i.e. the ANC newsletter published in Dar es Salaam (letter from A.N.C. Kumalo to Anders Johansson, Dar es Salaam, 11 March 1965) (AJC). During the following year, Kasrils sent a number of articles to Johansson for publication in the Swedish press. Johansson was delighted, but wanted Kasrils to be more to the point: “Not so many great words, but more figures, examples, quotations and so on. The majority of the Swedish people is quite[e] against the Verwoerd regime and need[s] no more fervent appeals and slogans, but more real information about [...] the situation inside South Africa and what the liberation movement want[s] and is doing” (letter from Anders Johansson to A.N.C. Kumalo, Handen, 28 June 1965) (AJC). It was not until November 1965 that Kasrils in connection with a bank transfer revealed his true identity to Johansson: “Actually, brother Johanson, I can trust you and tell you that I am R. Kasrils. [...] In the political movement, I have been given the name of Kumalo. Please carry on calling me Kumalo as all freedom fighters do” (letter from A.N.C. Kumalo to Anders Johansson, London [no date, but stamped 10 November 1965].) (AJC).

5 Interview with Anders Johansson, Eskilstuna, 19 November 1996.
Women’s Days under his MK pseudonym A.N.C. Kumalo in *Aftonbladet* in June and August 1965. He also forwarded reports and manuscripts from the South African opposition which Johansson published. A more ambitious proposal by Kasrils to regularly contribute “a fortnightly series on the lines of ‘Sketches from South Africa’” in the Swedish press did not, however, materialize. Nor did his wish to publish poetry. Slovo contributed background texts and inputs into a full-page feature story on Umkhonto we Sizwe’s military campaign in Zimbabwe, published as “extracts from a MK fighter’s diary”, in *Dagens Nyheter* in August 1969.

The relationship also worked the other way around. Johansson—who as an active member of the Swedish South Africa Committee towards the end of 1964 had raised concerns for Chief Luthuli’s situation—kept the ANC office in Dar es Salaam informed about Swedish contacts with the ANC President-General. Some of the information was through Kasrils published in ANC’s newsletter *Spotlight*. Johansson and Kasrils never had the opportunity to directly meet and

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2 For example, a series of articles by Harold Strachan on his prison experiences in South Africa, published in *Aftonbladet*, 9, 10 and 11 August 1965.


4 Letter from A.N.C. Kumalo to Anders Johansson, Dar es Salaam, 14 June 1965 (AJC). Kasrils’ poetry would, however, more than ten years later appear in Swedish. A selection of his works was in 1978 under the nom-de-plume of A.N.C. Kumalo included in an anthology of South African poetry edited by Barry Feinberg and published as *Dikter om Frihet* (‘Poems about Freedom’) by Bo Cavelors Bokförlag, Kristianstad. The book had a foreword by Sara Lidman. During his exile in London, Kasrils’ interest in poetry largely influenced the formation of an ANC cultural group, *Mayibuye*, which performed poems and songs of the South African struggle. Pallo Jordan, who in 1994 was appointed Minister of Posts, Telecommunications and Broadcasting in South Africa’s first democratic government, was a member of the group. Kasrils and Jordan toured with *Mayibuye* in Sweden in March 1976, visiting Gothenburg, Borås, Uppsala, Stockholm and Umeå. The group also appeared on Swedish television (see ‘Mayibuyes sånger ANCs röst’/’Mayibuyes songs ANCs voice’ in *Afrikabulletinen*, No. 33, May 1976, p. 15).

5 ’Sårad gerillaman lämnar första dagboksrapporten’ (‘Wounded guerrilla gives the first diary report’) in *Dagens Nyheter*, 3 August 1969.


and exchange views,\(^1\) but their correspondence also proved useful on a more personal level. In addition to remuneration for his articles, Kasrils—who in the early autumn of 1965 had moved to London—needed “to show the British authorities that I can support myself as a freelance journalist in order to stay here.”\(^2\) On the basis of his publications in *Aftonbladet*, Johansson could supply him with a letter to that effect.\(^3\)

ANC Requests

ANC started to approach Sweden for material and financial assistance from the mid-1960s. In May 1966, for example, David Wirmark met Oliver Tambo in Dar es Salaam. Tambo informed him about the problems ANC was facing regarding transports between Zambia and ANC’s provisional headquarters in Morogoro, 

\(^1\) Johansson and Kasrils later attended the January 1969 Khartoum conference, but “when he at the very end, just before our departure, told me that he was A.N.C. Kumalo, there was no time to discuss” (letter from Anders Johansson to the author, [Eskilstuna], 26 April 1998.


\(^3\) Letter from A.N.C. Kumalo to Anders Johansson, London, 8 October 1965 (AJC).
Tanzania, and asked Wirmark for help to get four Land Rovers. Wirmark—who by then had left the World Assembly of Youth—forwarded the request to the Swedish Fund for the Victims of Racial Oppression, arguing that "assistance to [Tambo] [...] would strengthen his [...] position in ANC vis-à-vis other tendencies. Tambo is, as you know, a whole-hearted democrat and ANC [is] in my opinion the most efficient of the South African nationalist organizations". The Fund was, however, not in a position to meet the request. As a sign of the community of interests existing in Sweden with regard to South Africa, Wirmark, a member of the Liberal Party, then approached the international secretary of the Social Democratic Party, Anders Thunborg, asking him to "secure [financial] contributions from the trade unions for one or a couple of Land Rovers". However, as far as can be ascertained, neither was the Social Democratic Party in a position to satisfy Tambo’s requirement.

Tambo’s request for material assistance reflected ANC’s desperate need for funds during its desert journey in the mid-1960s. The situation became even more difficult after the launch of joint military operations between ANC and ZAPU in August 1967. Needing more than the military support it received from the Soviet Union and its allies, ANC therefore appealed to the OAU Liberation Committee, which on behalf of the African states was mandated to assist the recognized liberation movements. The response was far from satisfactory. Reportedly, the Liberation Committee only granted ANC a paltry 4,000 USD in the first six months of the financial year 1967/68. The ANC external mission was against this background called upon to intensify its fund-raising efforts. A ‘Statement to External Offices’ published as a supplement to the ANC journal Sechaba underlined in September 1967 that "we urgently need funds and every available thing. We need to be strong and self-sufficient".

Shortly thereafter, Robert Resha, a member of the National Executive Committee (NEC), and Raymond Kunene, ANC’s representative in Great Britain, approached the Swedish embassy in London with a request to prepare a visit to

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1 The 2,000 kilometre long road from Lusaka to Dar es Salaam was not yet tarred. The journey between the two capitals was commonly called 'the hell run'.
2 Letter from David Wirmark to Per Wästberg, Jakobsberg, 2 July 1966.
4 The timing of Tambo’s request for Land Rovers coincided with ANC’s preparations for the joint military campaign with ZAPU of Zimbabwe. Joe Modise—who in 1994 became Minister of Defence in South Africa—had in 1965 been appointed Commander of Umkhonto we Sizwe. He embarked on a plan to open a trail back to South Africa for the several hundred MK trainees in ANC camps in Tanzania or undergoing military training in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and other countries. Modise based himself in Zambia in 1966 to plan joint operations between MK and Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU. The military operations—called the Wankie campaign with reference to the north-western area of Zimbabwe where they took place—were launched at the beginning of August 1967. Oliver Tambo accompanied the MK fighters to the Zambian bank of the Zambezi river together with Thomas Nkobi, then ANC’s representative in Zambia. Among the members of the MK Luthuli Detachment who fought in the Wankie campaign were Chris Hani, who in 1982 became MK’s Political Commissar and in 1991 General Secretary of SACP.
5 Thomas op. cit., p. 90.
Sweden by Resha and Joe Matthews, also a member of NEC.1 The ANC delegation wished to meet the leaders of the Social Democratic Party and, possibly, representatives of other political parties, as well as officials at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to discuss “the situation in South Africa, ANC’s request for financial assistance and scholarships for South African refugee students”.2 Resha and Matthews were subsequently invited to Sweden by the Social Democratic Party. Their visit took place at the end of January 1968, and during their stay in Stockholm they met Alva Myrdal and Olof Palme, the latter at the time Minister of Education.

It was the first time that ANC approached the Swedish government with a request for more comprehensive financial assistance. As the visit took place more than a year before the Swedish parliament took a positive stand on official assistance to liberation movements, Resha and Matthews, however, had to leave Sweden empty-handed. Nevertheless, in South Africa the news of their visit provoked near hysteria. The South African envoy in Stockholm, ambassador Taljaard, immediately requested a meeting with the Swedish Foreign Minister, demanding to know “for what reason and on what grounds members of the Swedish government allowed themselves in their official capacity to receive crooks and bandits, who in addition publicly recognized their Communist-inspired objectives?”.3 “It could be no secret”, Taljaard continued, “—not even for the Swedish government—that [...] the two African Communist leaders and, furthermore, terrorists [...] had violence and racial discrimination on their programme”.4 And when news of the visit reached the South African media, the paper Dagbreek en Landstem wrote on the first page under the heading ‘Two South African Communists announce offensive: Sweden gives money for terror regime’ that “it has transpired that a movement has been formed in Sweden to educate guerrilla fighters from South Africa in sabotage methods”.5

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1 Matthews was together with Joe Modise closely involved in the planning of the Wankie campaign. A former member of the South African Communist Party, he was appointed chief executive officer of the Inkatha Freedom Party in December 1992.
2 Letter with memorandum from Gunnar Fagrell, Swedish embassy in London, to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, London, 3 November 1967 (MFA). The ANC delegation also asked the Swedish Social Democratic Party to arrange visits to Denmark, Finland and Norway.
4 Ibid. In his reply, Foreign Minister Nilsson retorted: “What [is] meant by the word Communist when used by a South African representative?” He further said that “he took it for granted that the ambassador did not want to question the right of Ministers Myrdal and Palme to meet with the persons who they themselves wanted [to see] in Sweden. Indeed, the two Africans were invited to Sweden by the Swedish labour party. Both of them were members of Luthuli’s party and, as far as the Minister knew, nobody outside South Africa had wanted to brand the peace laureate a Communist. [The] African National Congress was a movement with which Swedish social democracy had many bonds.” Taljaard replied that he “personally never had understood how [anybody] got the idea to grant the poor Luthuli a peace prize, but there was, on the other hand, a lot of things in Scandinavia these days that made [him] wonder” (Ibid.).
In fact, the ANC leadership was deeply disappointed with Sweden’s lack of response to its financial predicament. In a meeting with E.S. Reddy of the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid, Oliver Tambo complained in June 1969 “that ANC had sent a delegation [...] to Sweden to contact the Social Democratic Party, as well as the youth, student[s] and other groups. He had himself [also] visited Sweden.\(^1\) But the response was only one donation of 1,500 GBP from one group”.\(^2\)

Ironically, at a time when the solidarity movement very actively mobilized support for the nationalist struggles in the Portuguese colonies and both the ruling Social Democratic Party and the opposition Liberal Party were defining policies for humanitarian assistance to the liberation movements, the issue of South Africa no longer occupied the prominent place it used to in the Swedish debate. ANC and its demands had largely been relegated to the background. While the thirteen largest Swedish newspapers in 1963 published not less than 225 editorials on South Africa, the corresponding figure for 1968 was 48 and for 1969 a mere 21.\(^3\) Furthermore, while the information bulletin *Syd- och Sjövist-Afrika*—from 1967 entitled *Södra Afrika*—from the start regularly contained articles on ANC, it was from mid-1966 until mid-1970, that is, for four years, silent on the nationalist movement, although it now and again published material on South Africa. As subsequently pointed out by Dick Urban Vestbro, a leading member of the editorial board, “the shifting focus by the public opinion from South Africa to the Portuguese colonies and the development of the solidarity movement from anti-apartheid to anti-imperialism [...] influenced [our] policy”.\(^4\) In the case of the Africa Groups, the hesitancy vis-à-vis ANC would remain until the middle of the 1970s. In a critical reflection on the Swedish solidarity movement and the struggle in South Africa,\(^5\) Vestbro later wrote:

> The discussions often concluded that the liberation struggle seemed to be at a standstill [...] due to [the fact] that the movements were not anti-imperialist or revolutionary. [...] [O]ur reluctance to embark on activities in favour of ANC hampered for at least six years the cooperation with ANC. Clearly expressed self-

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\(^1\) Tambo visited Sweden for a meeting with the UN Anti-apartheid Committee in Stockholm in June 1968. See the interview with Tambo (‘Sydafrika redo för revolj’ / ‘South Africa ready for uprising’) in *Dagens Nyheter*, 17 June 1968.

\(^2\) [A.S. Reddy: ]’Notes on discussion with Mr. Oliver Tambo in London, 13 June 1969’ (MFA).

\(^3\) Magnusson (1974) op. cit., Diagram 3, p. 22.

\(^4\) Dick Urban Vestbro: ‘Förslag om AGIS’ förhållande till ANC’ (‘Proposal regarding AGIS’ relations to ANC’), Stockholm, 21 December 1974 (AGA). Vestbro, a leading member of the Swedish solidarity movement, was one of the few Swedes who at the end of the 1960s discussed the situation in South Africa and—critically—presented ANC’s views. Staying in Tanzania and in close contact with the liberation movements, he regularly published articles on the Southern African struggle in the socialist weekly *Tidsignal* in 1969. Among his larger articles on South Africa and the liberation movement were ‘Sydafrikas frihetsdag’ (‘South Africa’s freedom day’) in No. 26, 1969; ‘Historien om PAC’ (‘The story of PAC’) in No. 27, 1969; ‘Nya kampformer i Sydafrika’ (‘New forms of struggle in South Africa’) in No. 29–30, 1969; and ‘ANC klargör sitt program’ (‘ANC makes its programme clear’) in No. 35, 1969. The last two articles discussed ANC’s Morogoro conference.

\(^5\) As well as in Namibia and Zimbabwe.
criticism and concrete work for ANC were needed to gradually grant us the position as one of ANC’s closest friends.\(^1\)

It is against this background that the decision taken in September 1969 by the Swedish Cooperative Union and Wholesale Society to call off the six year long consumer boycott of South African products should be seen. In a situation, KF argued, where the government had not introduced official economic sanctions and the general public was showing an increasing loss of interest in South Africa, it was no longer reasonable to uphold the “private sanctions” initiated in 1963.\(^2\) As the boycott had been launched in response to ANC’s call for isolation of the apartheid regime and the following campaign had given rise to the popular solidarity movement, the decision symbolized more than anything else ANC’s marginalization in Sweden at the close of the 1960s.\(^3\) Instead, it was the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies that attracted the attention of the Swedish solidarity opinion with Africa.

ANC was the last of the Southern African liberation movements supported by Sweden to receive official humanitarian assistance, three years after ZANU of Zimbabwe and two years after SWAPO of Namibia, for example. One possible reason could be what many observers around 1970 perceived as an increasing influence by the South African Communist Party over the movement, in particular after ANC’s consultative conference in Morogoro in April 1969, where its strategy and tactics were reformulated.\(^4\) Such an explanation is not substantiated by the available documentation. On the contrary, it was the non-socialist Centre and Liberal parties that from 1970 advocated support to

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\(^1\) Dick Urban Vestbro: ‘Afrikagrupperna och betrielserörelserna: Självkritiskt om ’kritisk solidaritet’’("The Africa Groups and the liberation movements: Self-criticism on ‘critical solidarity’") [no place or date] (AGA).

\(^2\) Cited in Magnusson (1974) op. cit., p. 44.

\(^3\) KF’s decision was not uncontroversial. The board of the Social Democratic Party branch in Stockholm, for example, appealed to KF to maintain the boycott, and, according to an opinion poll taken at the time, one third of the general public was in favour of a continued boycott, while one third was against and the remaining one third undecided (Magnusson (1974) op. cit., pp. 44–45).

\(^4\) The Morogoro conference was held after the unsuccessful Wankie and Sipolilo military campaigns in Zimbabwe (1967–68). A new programme—‘Strategy and Tactics of the ANC’—was adopted, which abandoned the approach of sending armed groups into South Africa to spark off guerrilla warfare and instead emphasized political reconstruction of ANC inside the country as a prerequisite for successful development of the armed struggle. It was an important shift towards the theory of ‘people’s war’ that developed within ANC at the beginning of the 1980s. It led to the establishment of a new Revolutionary Council to coordinate political and military policy. Contrary to the National Executive Committee—ANC’s governing body, which remained open to Africans only—the Revolutionary Council was multi-racial and three non-Africans were elected to the council, namely Yusuf Dadoo, Reg September and Joe Slovo. They were also leading Communists and this fact (together with the general theoretical and strategic visions behind the new programme) gave rise to a widespread and persistent interpretation that the South African Communist Party was controlling the liberation movement. The Morogoro conference confirmed Oliver Tambo as Acting President-General of ANC, but voted to replace Duma Nokwe with Alfred Nzo as Secretary-General. The third senior position, that of Treasurer-General, was held by the General Secretary of the Communist Party, Moses Kotane and later by the SACP Chairman J.B. Marks. After Marks’ death in 1972, Thomas Nkobi was appointed Acting Treasurer-General.
ANC in the Swedish parliament. Much more significant was that ANC appeared as both weak and fraught with internal problems. To this should be added that influential Swedish interlocutors, in particular the government of Tanzania, not only expressed doubts with regard to ANC, but at a crucial stage drastically intervened against the movement.

The reports received from the Swedish legation in South Africa towards the end of the 1960s did not, in the first place, give cause for optimism. In June 1969, for example, the Swedish envoy Eric Virgin wrote to Foreign Minister Nilsson that “what strikes the observer and creates the present atmosphere is the almost total and apparently apathetic [and] resigned silence of more than four fifths of the country’s population”. In addition, on more than one occasion Canon Collins of IDAF—Oliver Tambo’s personal friend and a person with close relations to both the Swedish government and the anti-apartheid movement—conveyed his concerns about the internal situation in ANC to the Swedish embassy in London. Furthermore, in January 1970—just a couple of months after the Swedish parliament had agreed to grant official support to the liberation movements—Tanzania’s Foreign Minister Mhando called the Swedish ambassador in Dar es Salaam, Sven Fredrik Hedin, criticizing the liberation movements and questioning the Swedish assistance. According to Hedin’s report, Mhando said that the government of Tanzania “knew little about what is happening within the different liberation movements. Their representatives”, the Foreign Minister said, “were mostly sitting at the cafés in Dar es Salaam or fluttering around the world begging for weapons and money”. Asking why Sweden had decided to assist them, Mhando continued: “Do you know how much corruption and embezzlement there is within the liberation movements? Many of their leaders just get richer and richer.”

In addition to being the host of the OAU Liberation Committee, Tanzania was probably the African country with which Sweden felt most affinity.

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1 It should be noted that PAC, which appeared as strongly anti-Communist, did not enjoy any parliamentary support in Sweden and was never presented as an alternative to ANC.
4 Letter (‘Tanzanias stöd till de nationella befrielserörelserna’/’Tanzania’s support to the national liberation movements’) from Sven Fr. Hedin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam, 20 January 1970 (MFA). Mhando did not single out any individual liberation movement.
5 Ibid. At the meeting, Mhando expressed the wish to visit Sweden and discuss the support to the liberation movements. The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, however, conveyed to ambassador Hedin that “we for the moment want to avoid a visit by the Tanzanian Foreign Minister” (cable from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Swedish Embassy in Dar es Salaam, 5 February 1970) (MFA).
6 Visiting Tanzania in September 1971, Prime Minister Olof Palme said that “it is questionable whether any other country in the Third World enjoys a greater measure of goodwill among the Swedish public than Tanzania” (‘Speech by the Prime Minister at the TANU Congress, Dar es
Although Mhando’s astonishing statement was discussed and corrected at a subsequent meeting between ambassador Hedin and President Nyerere,¹ such messages were not conducive to a broader understanding of the liberation movements in the Swedish foreign service. In the case of ANC, the possible doubts were further strengthened by the fact that Tanzania was a strong supporter of PAC² and, above all, that the Tanzanian government on allegations by the PAC leader Potlako Leballo accused the ANC leadership of involvement in a coup attempt by the former Tanzanian Foreign Minister Oscar Kambona.³ This resulted in 1970 in a surprise closure of the ANC camps in the country and in the expulsion of the ANC cadres,⁴ who were evacuated to Simferopol in the Crimea and to other places in the Soviet Union.⁵ The conflict was eventually solved and the ANC cadres welcomed back, but it led the movement to transfer its headquarters from Morogoro to Lusaka, Zambia. In addition, at a very difficult time for the organization—largely marginalized by the OAU and without tangible support in the West—it signalled the crucial importance of the Soviet Union for its survival.

ANC’s loss of contacts with Sweden and its general weakness at the time came, finally, to the fore in connection with Prime Minister Palme’s state visit to Zambia in September 1971.⁶ Discussions with the ANC leadership were not on the original programme and ANC’s efforts to arrange a meeting between Oliver Tambo and Palme through the Swedish embassy in Lusaka were not successful. The ANC office then turned to Anders Johansson, who was covering Palme’s visit for Dagens Nyheter. He contacted Pierre Schori, who eventually set up a meeting between the two leaders,⁷ at which Schori and Per Wästberg participated. During the meeting, held at President Kaunda’s State House in Lusaka, Tambo spoke about the difficulties ANC was facing and—according to the Swedish notes—conceded that “it was a problem for ANC to be in the picture


¹ Letter from Sven Fr. Hedin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam, 20 January 1970 (MFA). Nyerere, on the contrary, wished that Sweden should increase its support to FRELIMO of Mozambique.

² See, for example, interview with Reddy Mampane, Johannesburg, 17 September 1995.


⁴ Interview with Reddy Mampane, Johannesburg, 17 September 1995: “In the trial, the PAC leader Potlako Leballo was the key witness of the Tanzanian government and he said that ANC was responsible for [the] attempted coup! We were expelled! Out of Tanzania! In fact, the Tanzanian government wanted us to go to a refugee camp, but our leaders refused, saying that we were not refugees, but freedom fighters. [...] Then they went to the Soviet Union and the Soviets came to Tanzania to pick us all up. We were taken to various parts of the Soviet Union while the leadership tried to negotiate a solution to the problem.”


⁶ During the visit, Palme also met the MPLA leader Agostinho Neto.

⁷ Interview with Anders Johansson, Eskilstuna, 19 November 1996.
now that so much was happening in South Africa”.¹ With regard to ANC’s internal problems, he, however, stated that he had just led a meeting where “past difficulties, contradictions due to lack of balance between objectives etc., had been talked through and straightened out”.²

Tambo also raised the question of a visit to Sweden. Two months later, he and Resha came to Stockholm to once again discuss material support to the movement. ANC was at the time in an acute financial crisis. Just before going to Sweden, Tambo explained that the movement “no longer had the means [needed even] for fund-raising travels”.³ By then, however, the prospect of Swedish assistance looked much brighter. In January 1970, Per Ahlmark and Ola Ullsten from the Liberal Party had in a parliamentary motion proposed Swedish official support to ANC⁴ and at the beginning of 1971 the demand had—as earlier noted—been repeated in a joint motion submitted by the leaders of the Centre and Liberal parties, Thorbjörn Fälldin and Gunnar Helén.⁵

Final Breakthrough

In spite of this backing and of the fact that official Swedish assistance at the time of the visit had been extended to PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau, FRELIMO of

¹ The meeting took place when the British Prime Minister Edward Heath had invited the two homeland leaders Matanzima and Buthelezi to London. In addition, the deep leadership crisis within ZAPU of Zimbabwe—ANC’s ally—was at the time at its height.

² Ministry for Foreign Affairs: Memorandum (‘Samtal med Oliver Tambo, ANC generalsekreterare i exil’ / Conversation with Oliver Tambo, ANC secretary general in exile’, State House, Lusaka, 24 September 1971), Stockholm, 1 October 1971 (MFA). The ANC meeting Tambo referred to was an extended meeting of the National Executive Committee in Lusaka in August 1971. It decided to press the OAU and the international community for exclusive recognition of ANC, i.e. non-recognition of PAC, as the legitimate South African liberation movement. The NEC warned “against the opportunistic creation outside South Africa of formations devoid of substance and intended merely to serve either the purposes of convenience for the supporters of our cause or, worse still, in the interest of favourable publicity”. At the same time, it was resolved that the efforts of ANC’s external mission should be oriented “away from [the] mere moral condemnation of apartheid [...] towards committed support for our armed struggle based on the acceptance of the ANC as the sole representative of our struggling people and as the alternative government for South Africa” (cited in Thomas op. cit., pp. 82–83).

³ Ministry for Foreign Affairs: Memorandum (‘ANC-ledaren Tambos och Reshas besök i Stockholm’ / ‘The visit to Stockholm by the ANC leader Tambo and Resha’), Stockholm, 1 November 1971 (MFA).


⁵ Per Ahlmark and David Wirmark from the Liberal Party also submitted in January 1971 a parliamentary motion in favour of Swedish official support to ANC (Swedish Parliament 1971: Motion No. 683, Riksdagens Protokoll 1971, p. 3). During ANC’s difficult years in Sweden at the beginning of the 1970s, it was, in particular, the Liberal Party which advocated support to the movement. Oliver Tambo was invited to the Liberal Party congress in Gothenburg in November 1972. As he was unable to attend, ANC was represented by Zenzile Msethu, normally based in Tanzania. The fact that Holden Roberto of FNLA of Angola attended the congress may explain Tambo’s absence and ANC’s junior representation.
Mozambique, ZANU and ZAPU\(^1\) of Zimbabwe, SWAPO of Namibia and—from March 1971—MPLA of Angola, ANC’s Acting President-General had, however, once more to leave Sweden empty-handed.\(^2\) Nevertheless, criteria and procedures for Swedish support had been clarified, and on 8 March 1972 ANC submitted a formal request for assistance to cover the needs of 220 members in camps\(^3\) in Tanzania and Zambia, particularly with regard to food and clothing, estimated at a total cost of about 280,000 SEK per year.\(^4\)

The request was discussed by the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance (CCHA) on 1 June 1972, where it was decided to

recommend SIDA to instruct the Development Cooperation Offices [in the Swedish embassies]\(^5\) in Dar es Salaam and Lusaka to gather information on the situation and needs of the ANC members, as well as on possible support from other [donors] to the ANC education camps in Tanzania and Zambia. The views of the governments of the countries of asylum on support to the ANC camps should also be established. On this basis, the committee want[s] to discuss the request anew”.\(^6\)

The replies from the local SIDA offices were positive. They underlined the needs for fresh food, medicines and clothes. They also confirmed that the assistance extended by the OAU—mainly in the form of uniforms to the male ANC members, as well as some medical supplies—was insufficient and that the governments of Tanzania and Zambia welcomed Swedish humanitarian support.\(^7\) In addition, they recommended assistance to develop agricultural activities in the camps, increasing the level of self-sufficiency regarding food supplies and, possibly, “releasing funds for ANC’s political and humanitarian work in South Africa”.\(^8\)

\(^1\) CCHA had in October 1969 “in principle” recommended a grant of 50,000 SEK to ZAPU. As the movement shortly thereafter suffered internal divisions, the contribution was never disbursed. A new decision on support to ZAPU was only taken in February 1973, at the same time as support to ANC was finalized. Together, the ANC and ZAPU allies were thus the last Southern African liberation movements to receive Swedish humanitarian assistance. The first allocation to ZAPU amounted to 50,000 SEK.

\(^2\) PAC had in mid-1969 already submitted a formal request for Swedish support. It was, however, rejected. Regular PAC requests for humanitarian support would over the following years meet the same fate. PAC was not seen as a serious organization and its activities were—according to the committee—“mainly reduced to political propaganda” (CCHA: Memorandum (‘Föredragningspromemoria’/‘Agenda memorandum’) by Stig Abelin, Stockholm, 5 June 1971) (SDA)

\(^3\) The request was for civilian ANC members and their families. However, at some of the camps—in ANC’s correspondence with SIDA called “education camps”—ANC conducted military training, for example at Kongwa in Tanzania.

\(^4\) CCHA: Memorandum (‘Framställning från African National Congress’/‘Request by African National Congress’) by Anders Möllander, 1973:1, Stockholm [no date] (SDA). Included in the original request were cigarettes for a total of 55,000 SEK.

\(^5\) The SIDA offices within the Swedish embassies were called Development Cooperation Offices (DCO’s) or Development Assistance Offices (DAO’s). They were an integral part of the embassies.


\(^7\) CCHA: Memorandum by Anders Möllander, 1973:1 (SDA).

\(^8\) Ibid.
In the meantime, in January 1973 Oliver Tambo paid another visit to Sweden—accompanied by Raymond Kunene and Martin Legassick—to discuss possible Swedish assistance for vocational training of ANC members in Tanzania and Zambia. The original request and the additional proposal were the same month discussed by CCHA, which recommended humanitarian support in the form of food supplies, but did not take a decision regarding vocational training. Finally, after years of trials and tribulations, on 2 February 1973 SIDA’s Acting Director General Anders Forsse signed what was to become a historic decision to grant direct official Swedish support to ANC. Deducting the requested amount for cigarettes and taking into consideration that “all male ANC members are supposed to receive one uniform per person and one meal a day [from the OAU] through the governments in the respective countries”, the amount allocated for food supplies was 150,000 SEK. It is, nevertheless, noteworthy that the consultative committee recommended that SIDA should inform ANC that the humanitarian assistance [...] should be regarded as a temporary measure, to be diminished as ANC members in Zambia and Tanzania gradually make themselves self-sufficient with foodstuffs. SIDA is, accordingly, interested in following ANC’s plans and measures to start agricultural production [...] in Tanzania and Zambia [and] is willing to consider [...] support [for] a feasibility study of such activities.

Far from a temporary measure, Swedish assistance to ANC would from then on be a permanent feature and continue until the democratic elections in South Africa in 1994. Support to ANC’s agricultural projects in Southern Africa played a prominent part within the subsequent bilateral cooperation programme.

Informing ANC of the decision, SIDA wrote that it would “instruct its offices in Dar es Salaam and Lusaka to work out [...] the priorities and plans for the purchase and delivery of the goods requested [together with ANC]”. ANC’s Acting Treasurer General, Thomas Nkobi, acknowledged the decision in a letter dated 2 March 1973, noting SIDA’s “sympathetic attitude towards helping the African National Congress in its plans and measures to start agricultural projects so that we become self-sufficient”. Assisted by Kay Moonsamy, Nkobi established the routines for the procurement of the food supplies with the SIDA

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2 SIDA: Decision ('Stöd till African National Congress (ANC), Sydafrika, samt Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), Rhodesia / Support to ANC and ZAPU'), Stockholm, 2 February 1973 (SDA).

3 Letter (‘SIDA humanitarian assistance to ANC members in Zambia and Tanzania’) from Marianne Rappe to SIDA Lusaka, Stockholm, 30 March 1973 (SDA).

4 Letter (‘SIDA assistance to ANC’) from Curt Ström to ANC Lusaka, Stockholm, 14 February 1973 (SDA).

5 Ibid.

office in Lusaka. This was the beginning of a long, regular and close relationship between Nkobi, Moonsamy and SIDA over the following two decades. Nkobi and Moonsamy would thus see the official Swedish assistance to ANC grow from a modest amount of 150,000 SEK in the financial year 1972/73 to not less than 127 million SEK in 1993/94. In an interview in Johannesburg in 1995, Moonsamy—then Treasurer General of the South African Communist Party—recalled how

[SIDA] began to give us aid, a very small amount at first. I know that comrade Treasurer General [Nkobi] quite often used to refer to this. He always used to take us back to 1973, saying that there was something like 150,000 Swedish Kronor given to ANC by SIDA. [...] It was a very small [amount], but, nevertheless, it was the beginning of the massive aid that was given by the Swedish government, SIDA and the people of Sweden. And, of course, when you talk about Sweden, you talk about the Nordic countries. But I think that one can say, without casting any reflection on any of the other countries, that Sweden played a pivotal role as far as aid was concerned, not only to our movement, but to the liberation movement as a whole.

Only counting the support granted directly to ANC by the Swedish government through SIDA, at the time of the 1994 democratic elections in South Africa it had in current figures reached a total of 896 million SEK. To this should be added the official support to ANC channelled via the United Nations system and other multilateral organizations, as well as—above all—through Swedish and international NGOs. The extent of the direct and indirect support—including assistance to ANC-aligned organizations and structures such as the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), the Congress of South

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1 Letter (‘SIDA humanitarian assistance to ANC members in Zambia and Tanzania’) from Bo Wilén to SIDA Stockholm, Lusaka, 18 April 1973 (SDA).

2 Nkobi died in September 1994. As ANC Treasurer General, he held one of the three highest positions in the movement for more than twenty years. He often led the ANC delegations to the annual negotiations with SIDA and maintained a modest, close and down-to-earth relationship with all the SIDA offices and officers in Southern Africa. Roland Axelsson, who on behalf of SIDA started to work with ‘T.G.’—as Nkobi affectionately was known—as early as in 1973 and from 1984 to 1990 was based in Lusaka as SIDA’s regional coordinator of humanitarian assistance, said the following about Nkobi in an interview in 1996: “Thomas Nkobi was a great and honest man. He was a person of great importance to the liberation struggle and he was a unique friend of mine. We treated each other like brothers in an open and frank manner.” After the unbanning of ANC, Nkobi invited Axelsson to South Africa to assist him with the setting up of the financial administration of the movement inside the country. Axelsson met Nkobi just before the 1994 elections: ‘I had known him for twenty years, and when I met him at our last meeting on 26 April 1994 I told him as a joke to buy a new hat ‘before you will be appointed Minister of Finance in the new South Africa’. But [Nkobi] replied: ‘No, I will keep my old hat, because I will never qualify for that governmental position’” (interview with Roland Axelsson, Stockholm, 31 October 1996).

3 Agreed minutes from consultations held in Johannesburg between ANC and SIDA, 16 November 1993 (SDA).

4 Interview with Kay Moonsamy, Johannesburg, 14 September 1995.

5 Based on disbursement figures according to SIDA’s annual accounts, established by Ulla Beckman for this study.
African Trade Unions (COSATU), the United Democratic Front (UDF) and a wealth of South African NGOs—will be discussed in the second volume of this study.
Namibia: From SWANU to SWAPO

Sweden and Namibia

Although the Swede Charles John Andersson gave Namibia the collective name of South West Africa\(^1\) and the territory in the mid-19th century attracted a remarkably high number of Swedish natural scientists, explorers, traders and adventurers,\(^2\) there remained after the First World War only weak and indirect links between the former German colony\(^3\) and Sweden. The Union of South Africa—which in 1915 had defeated the German colonial forces in the territory—was from 1 January 1921 on behalf of Great Britain mandated by the League of Nations to administer Namibia. To the extent that it was known at all in Sweden, the sparsely populated territory was until the beginning of the 1960s seen as part of South Africa. Few people outside the Church of Sweden had any contacts with Namibia or even knew where it was situated. Pierre Schori, who later worked closely with the Namibian nationalists, has recalled how the SWANU leader Zedekia Ngavirue “had to show me on the map”\(^4\).

Under the terms of the League of Nations mandate, South Africa was expected to administer Namibia as a “sacred trust of civilization”, or, more specifically, to

promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory. [...] The Mandatory shall see that the slave trade is

\(^{1}\) Katjavivi op. cit., p. 5. The name of the country was changed from South West Africa to Namibia by the United Nations in 1968. Namibia will here be used, except where South West Africa appears in quotations from original documents, in conference titles etc.

\(^{2}\) Johan August Wahlberg, Charles John Andersson and Axel Wilhelm Eriksson have been mentioned above. Among the more prominent Swedes who travelled in Namibia in the latter part of the 19th century were, in addition, the entomologist Gustaf de Vylder and the officer cum explorer Peter August Möller. Möller’s accounts appeared in 1899 with the title Resa i Afrika genom Angola, Ovambo, och Damaraland (Wilhelm Billes Bokförlag, Stockholm). It was translated into English in 1974 (Journey into Africa through Angola, Ovamboland and Damaraland, I. and J. Rudner, Cape Town). The town of Omaruru—founded by Charles John Andersson in 1858—became the residence of a number of Swedes in Namibia in the 1870s. Gerald McKiernan, an American traveller who visited Omaruru in 1874, wrote in his Narrative and Journal: “Christmas Day 1874 was celebrated at Omaruru by a dinner given by Mr Errickson [...] where we met 19 other whites. [...] The whites were of mixed nationalities, Swedish predominating. [...] Some had been sailors, some whalers, some diamond diggers, and other roving trades” (cited in Winquist op. cit., p. 70). Berg quotes a contemporary report according to which 10% of the resident whites in Namibia in the mid-1870s were Swedes employed by Axel Eriksson (Berg op. cit., p. 209).

\(^{3}\) Germany ruled over South West Africa from 1884 to 1915.

\(^{4}\) Interview with Pierre Schori, Stockholm, 28 June 1996.
prohibited and that no forced labour is permitted, except for essential public works and services, and then only for adequate remuneration.¹

This trust was betrayed from the outset. The intention of the South African government had always been to incorporate Namibia into the Union. Not only did it dismally fail to promote the inhabitants’ material and moral well-being, as well as social progress, but it “actively set about moulding them into servants of white society”.² Continuing the repressive policies of the Germans—who between 1904 and 1907 ruthlessly crushed the Herero and the Nama peoples³—as early as in 1917, that is, during the First World War, combined South African and Portuguese forces defeated the Kwanyama community under Chief Mandume in Ovamboland in the North.⁴ And when the Bondelswarts Nama in the South rebelled against the harshness of the new rulers, the South African government in 1922 deployed airborne forces and bombarded the area. Over a hundred men, women and children were killed and around five hundred wounded or taken prisoner.⁵

The Bondelswarts rebellion was brought to the attention of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, where Namibia also became of concern to Sweden as Prime Minister Hjalmar Branting⁶ was a member of the League’s Council when the findings were discussed. Branting, furthermore, acted as the Council President and reported on the matter when the final decision was taken in December 1923. Although of the opinion that the question of the rebellion and the subsequent intervention against the Bondelswarts “in

² Katjavivi op. cit., p. 13.
³ The German military campaigns against the Herero and the Nama are among the most brutal in history. In October 1904, the German General Lothar von Trotha issued his infamous Vernichtungsbefehl (extermination order) against the Hereros: “I, the Great General of the German soldiers [declare that] the Herero people will have to leave the country. Otherwise I shall force them to do so by means of guns. Within the German boundaries, every Herero, whether found armed or unarmed, with or without cattle, will be shot. I shall not accept any more women or children. I shall drive them back to their people—otherwise I shall order shots to be fired at them” (cited in Thomas Pakenham: The Scramble for Africa 1876–1912, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Parklands, 1992, p. 611). By the end of 1905, between 75 and 80% of the Herero population had been killed, reduced from 60,000–80,000 to some 16,000, out of whom 14,000 were placed in German concentration camps. The Nama people shared a similar fate. By 1911, between 35 and 50% of the population had been killed (Katjavivi op. cit., p. 10).
⁴ Chief Mandume was killed in action. His head was brought to Windhoek and displayed to show that the resistance in Ovamboland had been crushed.
⁵ Katjavivi op. cit., p. 18.
⁶ Branting was the Grand Ol’ Man of the Swedish labour movement. He became editor of the newspaper Socialdemokraten in 1886, a founder member of the Social Democratic Party in 1889 and leader of the party in 1907. In 1917, Branting entered the Liberal-Social Democratic coalition government which introduced universal franchise and in 1920 he became Prime Minister, forming the first Social Democratic government in Sweden. Resigning the same year, Branting came back as Prime Minister (and Minister for Foreign Affairs) between 1921 and 1923 and, again, in 1924. Due to illness he already had to leave government in 1925. He died the same year. Branting was deeply interested in international questions and a strong supporter of Sweden’s participation in the League of Nations. He shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1921.
certain respects [was] of a particularly serious character” and finding that “the ultimate causes of the rebellion would seem to lie in the unstable conditions prevailing among the native population, which had been subjected for years to a harsh regime”, Branting did not, however, censure the South African government.

Presenting his report, Branting concluded that “the Council of the League of Nations can not, it seems to me, express any final opinion as to the essence of the dispute”. Heavily influenced by the South African government’s version of the events, the “completely bland resolution” adopted by the Council ignored the indiscriminate aerial bombardments against civilians, noting instead, “with satisfaction, the renewed assurances given by the representative of [South Africa] of its desire to take all practical steps to restore the prosperity of the Bondelswartzs people”. At the time, the Swedish government’s attitude vis-à-vis South Africa and its administration of Namibia thus did not differ from that of the European colonial powers in the Council of the League of Nations.5

Albeit indirect, one of the few connections between Sweden and Namibia at the end of the 1950s was provided through the Lutheran churches in general and via the Finnish Missionary Society in particular. Due to the influence of the German and the Finnish missions, the Lutheran faith would during the 20th century become predominant in South West Africa.6 Together with the Nordic countries and Germany—where Lutheran communities are in a majority—Namibia is from a religious point of view mainly an Evangelical-Lutheran country. This partly explains the close relations between Namibia and the Nordic countries.

2 Ibid., p. 392.
3 UNIN op. cit., p. 89.
5 In his book The Impossible Neutrality — Southern Africa: Sweden’s Role under Olof Palme, Pierre Schori states that the “South African policy was already censured by a Swedish prime minister […] at a meeting of the League of Nations in Geneva […] in September 1924. […] Hjalmar Branting said that South Africa did not meet the requirements defined by the League for the country appointed to administer South West Africa. He demanded that the role of South Africa be called into question” (Schori op. cit., p. 3). However, in his report to the Council of the League of Nations on the work of the Permanent Mandates Commission in August 1924, Branting, on the contrary, praised South Africa and Pretoria’s cooperation: “I was much struck by the great service rendered to the Commission and, therefore, to the whole League, by the Government of the Union of South Africa in sending Mr. Hofmeyr, the Administrator of South West Africa, to represent it at the last session of the Mandates Commission. My colleagues will, no doubt, join with me in endorsing the Commission’s appreciation of this action and its hope that the example set by South Africa will in future years be followed by all the Mandatory Powers” (League of Nations: Official Journal, Minutes of the Thirtieth Session of the Council, Geneva, 29 August–3 October 1924, pp. 1400–1401). As editor of Socialdemokraten, Branting had supported the Boers against the British during the Anglo-Boer War in South Africa from 1899 to 1902, viewing the conflict as an unequal struggle between a small nation striving for its independence and British imperialism (Winquist op. cit., p.184).
While both the Norwegian Missionary Society and the Church of Sweden Mission established themselves in Zululand, South Africa—beginning their activities there in 1849 and 1876, respectively—the Finnish Missionary Society was in the 1860s asked by the German missionary Carl Hugo Hahn to spread the Word in Ovamboland in northern Namibia. The German Rhenish Missionary Society (RMS) had in the 1840s started to work in the central parts of the country,¹ eventually establishing the Gross Barmen mission station among the Herero people at Otjikango, near Okahandja, in 1844. The society decided, however, to leave the northern part of Namibia outside its area of activity, instead inviting their Finnish colleagues to work there.² The first nine Finnish missionaries arrived in Ovamboland in 1870, led by Martti Rautanen—the ‘Apostle of Ovamboland’—who stayed in the area for more than fifty years and translated the Bible into the Oshindonga language.

Hahn’s invitation proved to be of lasting importance. RMS lost their institutions after the German defeat in the First World War, while the Finnish mission—working in the most populous area of the country—established itself as a significant actor and factor, spiritually as well as socially.³ It founded the first Lutheran teachers’ training college at Oniipa in 1913 and gave increasing priority to education efforts among the Namibians, who eventually attained responsibility within the church itself. Out of the Finnish mission grew the Evangelical Lutheran Ovambo-Kavango Church (ELOK)—later the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia (ELCIN)—which became independent in 1957. With over 100,000 members, more than half the population of Ovamboland belonged to ELOK.⁴ It elected Leonard Auala as its first Namibian leader in 1960 and joined the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) in 1961. Auala was consecrated as bishop in 1963 and the same year became a member of the executive committee of LWF, “thereby [establishing] a contact point outside Namibia, which would be extremely valuable during the long liberation struggle which his people were about to face”.⁵

A number of the Finnish missionaries were from the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland⁶ and contacts between the Finnish Mission and the Church

¹ One of the first missionaries in the service of the German Rhenish Missionary Society was the Norwegian Hans Christian Knudsen from Bergen, arriving in 1842 to work at the Bethanie mission station. He compiled a legal code for the Khoi and translated part of the Bible into the Nama language.
² Hahn had previous links with the Finnish church. He was born in Riga, Latvia, and came from a pietistic environment, like the first Finnish missionaries to South West Africa (Ryman op. cit., p. 197).
³ The social impact of the Finnish mission is, for example, evidenced by the common use of Finnish names in Ovamboland, as in the case of Toivo ya Toivo.
⁵ Ryman op. cit., p. 199.
⁶ There were, for example, Swedish-speakers in Rautanen’s first group of missionaries to Ovambo-land. In an interview with Ben Ulenga, the former Secretary General of the Mineworkers’ Union of
of Sweden were established at an early stage. It was, however, via LWF—of which the Church of Sweden is the largest member—and the Church of Sweden Aid (CSA) that the Swedish church entered into direct contacts with Namibia and the nationalist movement in the mid-1960s. The first CSA project in the country was the construction of the Oshigambo High School, starting in 1964. CSA’s director Åke Kastlund visited Namibia two years later.¹ In February 1966, Carl-Johan Hellberg, the LWF Secretary for Africa in the Department of World Mission, also travelled to Namibia. He visited Ovamboland and met the SWAPO leader Andimba Toivo ya Toivo.² This was the beginning of an important relationship between Hellberg and the SWAPO leadership, bringing both the Lutheran World Federation and the Church of Sweden into direct contact with the liberation movement at a crucial moment in the nationalist struggle. By that time, exiled Namibians had, however, already built a firm base in Sweden and both SWANU and SWAPO had established links with the Swedish government. In the case of Namibia, the direct Swedish church involvement was thus comparatively late.³

Swedish trade with Namibia was almost non-existent. The statistics do not give separate data for Namibia until 1971.⁴ In that year, however, Sweden exported goods—mainly wood products—for a total value of 1.0 million SEK, while imports—almost exclusively in the form of pelts—amounted to 0.6 million SEK.⁵ The total value of Sweden’s trade exchange with Namibia corresponded at the time to less than 0.5% of the trade with South Africa—which in turn stood for 0.6% of total Swedish foreign trade in 1970—or to approximately 5% of the trade with Angola or Mozambique.⁶ From a commercial point of view, Namibia was by far the least important Swedish partner of the five Southern African countries covered in the present study. In addition, although some Swedish-owned subsidiary companies in South Africa established sales’ offices in Namibia, no Swedish investments were made in the country.⁷ Finally, Sweden maintained an honorary consulate in the capital Windhoek until Nov-

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¹ Kastlund visited Namibia and South Africa and recorded his impressions in the book *Resa genom Svart och Vitt* ('Travel through Black and White'), Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelsens Bokförlag, Stockholm, 1967.
² Hellberg op. cit., p. 94.
³ Describing the development of Swedish solidarity with Namibia, the former SWANU leader Zedekia Ngavirue said in an interview in 1995 that “the people who set the ball rolling were the members of the Swedish South Africa Committee and then came the political parties, women organizations, trade unions and the many student organizations. [...] The churches came in pretty late; I think” (interview with Zedekia Ngavirue, Windhoek, 17 March 1995).
⁴ Data for Namibia were until then included in the trade statistics for South Africa.
⁷ The National Board of Trade (Komerskollegium): Memorandum (‘Sveriges handelsförbindelser med Namibia (Sydvästafrika)’/‘Sweden’s trade relations with Namibia (South West Africa)’), Stockholm, 2 June 1970 (MFA).
ember 1966. It was closed following the UN General Assembly Resolution 2145, which terminated South Africa’s mandate over Namibia.¹

Namibia and the Early Anti-Apartheid Movement

As noted above, in the early 1960s a number of prominent members of the South West African National Union (SWANU) came to Sweden, starting with its Vice-President Uatja Kaukuetu and Charles Kauraisa, who after an adventurous journey arrived in mid-October 1960.² It was Joachim Israel who made their placement at the universities of Lund and Stockholm possible, largely through funds raised by the Maundy Thursday Committee against Racial Persecution, specifically formed for the purpose. There were, however, no particular political motives behind the assistance to the SWANU students, nor were they at the time primarily—if at all—seen as Namibians. On the contrary, Kaukuetu first contacted Israel for assistance as a young African forced to terminate his studies at the University of Cape Town who was impressed by Israel’s condemnation of racial discrimination in an article written for an American magazine. Israel, in turn, responded to a call for educational assistance from a black South West African in Windhoek, who from the letters received seemed “to be a local leader who has done much for the social and educational advancement of his people”.³ That the two former Cape Town students Kaukuetu and Kauraisa were Namibians and that they represented SWANU

¹ Cable from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Swedish UN delegation, Stockholm, 22 June 1970 (MFA).
² Like many Namibians forced into exile, Kaukuetu and Kauraisa had an arduous and eventful journey from Namibia to Sweden. They were not in possession of passports or any other valid travel documents. Nevertheless, after receiving assurances from Joachim Israel—who in turn was supported by Ulla Lindström, the Swedish Minister for Development Cooperation—that they would be allowed to enter Sweden, they decided in July 1960 to embark upon the long journey. They were in constant and close contact with Israel via cables, as well as through letters and money orders sent by Israel poste restante to post offices along the way. Before leaving Namibia, they had agreed with Israel on a coded message which would alert him to the fact that they were about to cross the border into Bechuanaland and “put our whole plan into operation” (letter from Kaukuetu to Israel, Windhoek, 13 July 1960) (JIC). The message—“Many happy returns”—was cabled under the fictitious name of von Nieswandt from Windhoek on 1 August 1960 (cable from von Nieswandt to Israel, Windhoek, 1 August 1960) (JIC). Arriving in Francistown, they were interrogated by the police, but allowed to continue the journey, which during the following month took them via Southern to Northern Rhodesia. Without money and in a precarious situation, they travelled to Ndola on the Copperbelt and considered making contact with the Swedish UN forces in Katanga, across the border. They, however, dropped the idea. In Ndola, they eventually received some money and, more importantly, air tickets to Sweden from Israel. Without valid travel documents they were, however, not allowed to fly from Ndola and therefore decided to continue overland to Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, where they met the Swedish CSM missionary and TANU member Barbro Johansson. She helped them to reschedule the air tickets and proceed to Nairobi, where they collected the necessary entry visas to Sweden from the Swedish consulate. After more than two months of uncertain wanderings across Africa, they were, finally, in a position to fly to Sweden, where they arrived in mid-October 1960 (correspondence between Kaukuetu, Kauraisa and Israel, August–October 1960) (JIC). See also interview with Charles Kauraisa, Windhoek, 20 March 1995.
was accidental and not a reason behind Israel’s and the Maundy Thursday Committee’s humanitarian initiative. Nevertheless, both their nationality and political affiliation would have a great impact on Sweden’s involvement with the Southern African liberation struggle.

Together with other SWANU students—in particular Zedekia Ngavirue, who arrived at the beginning of 1962—Kaukuetu and Kauraisa would during their first years in Sweden primarily appear and be seen as South Africans, representing the South Africa United Front (SAUF), working closely with ANC and PAC of South Africa. Only rarely did they address purely Namibian concerns. After the breakup of SAUF in March 1962, they, however, increasingly emphasized the situation in Namibia, acting as SWANU representatives. With a number of resident leaders, a firm platform in the Swedish anti-apartheid movement and close relations with the ruling Social Democratic Party, SWANU soon occupied an undisputed position in Sweden as representing the Namibian nationalist movement. This was maintained until the end of 1965, when the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) started to appear on the scene in earnest.

SWANU was a founder member of the South Africa United Front in June 1960 and the President, Jariretundu Kozonguizi, visited Sweden for the first time in a SAUF delegation together with ANC’s Oliver Tambo and PAC’s Nana Mahomo in April 1961. There were at the time close relations between SWANU...
and ANC, while the rival Namibian nationalist organization SWAPO—formed in June 1960 with Sam Nujoma as President—was largely seen as a splinter group. After appearing at the United Nations in November 1960, SWAPO was, nevertheless, admitted as a member of SAUF in January 1961. The organization was, however, never actively engaged in SAUF’s work and left the front later in the year. This created a “complicated situation” with regard to the unity of purpose sought by SAUF, and at a conference in London the member organizations strongly criticized SWAPO’s “obnoxious activities”, stating that “SWAPO in its campaign against the front generally and [against] SWANU in particular has left no stone unturned in attempting to assert itself as the only organization speaking for South West Africa”.

Although both SWANU and SWAPO would be recognized in 1963 by the OAU as genuine Namibian liberation movements, it was SWANU that at the beginning of the 1960s attracted attention in Sweden. In marked contrast to later developments, SWANU was—as pointed out by the South African political journalist and anti-apartheid activist Ruth First—considered less tribally oriented, while SWAPO was criticized for being too closely allied to the traditional Herero Chiefs’ Council under Hosea Kutako. SWANU was also seen to emphasize that “the main effort for freedom must come from the people in South West Africa”, while SWAPO was leaning on Herero-backed petitioning at the United Nations. SWANU was, finally, open to contacts with the Communist countries at a time when SWAPO was close to the West. Kozonguizi, for example, paid an early visit to China, where he expressed disappointment with the United Nations. Commenting upon the subsequent negative reaction by SWAPO, First wrote in 1963 that the

SWAPO leaders objected to Kozonguizi’s Peking speech because it was strongly anti-imperialist in tone and delivered before a Communist audience. They claim that any South West African identification with the Communist countries would damage the South West African cause throughout the West. Kozonguizi, on the other hand, argues that South West Africans must seek aid wherever they can find it and that the Western powers were shaken into a more progressive stand on South West Africa after his Peking speech.
ANC’s position vis-à-vis SWANU and SWAPO influenced the Swedish anti-apartheid opinion, but in the formative years of the Namibian nationalist movement in the early 1960s there were no major programmatic or ideological differences between the two.¹ Both strove for Namibia’s independence and, due to the country’s particular situation as a territory administered by South Africa under a League of Nations mandate carried over to the UN, SWANU as well as SWAPO put emphasis on petitioning in New York. This was both a source of strength and weakness. Strength, because the Namibian nationalist movements were close to the centre of decision making regarding their country, but also weakness, as the most experienced and able leaders² had left Namibia to dedicate their efforts to international diplomacy, rather than to the home front. According to First, “policies that should be reached after prolonged discussion and debate in Windhoek and Keetmanshoop, Ondangua and Tsumeb, [were] formulated in New York and air-freighted home”.³

Nevertheless, as stated by the Namibian historian Peter Katjavivi⁴ there was a fundamental difference between the exiled SWANU and SWAPO representations, eventually influencing their positions vis-à-vis the OAU and after the

¹ Various attempts were made to unite SWANU and SWAPO. At a conference in Accra, Ghana, Kozonguizi and Nujoma even signed an agreement to that effect in June 1962, but it was never implemented. Furthermore, in October 1963 a joint initiative by the SWANU and SWAPO executive committees in Windhoek led to the formation of a united front, the South West Africa National Liberation Front (SWANLIF), which included other Namibian organizations. However, “the SWAPO leadership abroad [was] not enthusiastic”, its Vice-President Louis Nelangeni claiming that “the whole idea of the front is unacceptable” (cited in Katjavivi op. cit., p. 51). See also interview with Ottile Abrahams, Windhoek, 16 March 1995.

² With the notable exception of the SWAPO stalwart Andimba Toivo ya Toivo. He had been restricted to Ovamboland, where he, however, continued his political work.

³ First op. cit., p. 208. Reporting to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs after a visit to Namibia, the Swedish envoy to South Africa, Hugo Tamm, wrote in July 1965: “The different groups that partly are represented abroad, [such as] ‘Swapu’, ‘Swanu’ [and] ‘Swanlif’ […] do not constitute [political] parties in the common understanding [of the word], but rather competing groups who have changed names […] merged with one another [or] disappeared. […] Only a couple of hundred of South West Africans living in the country [are] according to a well-informed source actively involved within these groups. […] The contradictions between the exiled leaders and the home front have further complicated the political activities. The exiled politicians are generally considered to have lost contact with developments in South West Africa and they have never had the backing of a strong party organization, as has been the case with the African National Congress and the Pan-African Congress in South Africa” (letter ("Politisk rapport från tjänsteresa till Sydväst-afrika/"/Political report from duty trip to South West Africa/) from Hugo Tamm to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Torsten Nilsson, Pretoria, 1 July 1965) (MFA).

⁴ A leading Namibian nationalist, Katjavivi served as SWAPO’s representative to the United Kingdom and Western Europe from 1968 to 1976. He was in 1970 elected SWAPO Secretary for Economics and Justice and in 1976 Secretary for Information and Publicity. After independence, Katjavivi was in 1991 appointed vice-chancellor of the University of Namibia.
launch of the military struggle by SWAPO in August 1966 decisively tipping the scales in SWAPO’s favour:

[SWANU’s] leadership abroad [was] an impressive team with considerable organisational experience, but they were scattered and largely based in Europe as students. [The] SWAPO leaders […] were concentrated in Dar es Salaam and other African centres and were full-time political activists.¹

In the beginning, however, the difference in leadership composition and profile worked to the advantage of SWANU in Sweden and, in general, in Scandinavia, where the emerging solidarity movement with Southern Africa was based largely among intellectuals and university students. As an example, Uatja Kaukuetu and Charles Kauraisa of SWANU attended the Afro-Scandinavian Youth Congress in Oslo in August 1962, while SWAPO was not even invited. The political platform thus established contributed to SWANU’s quite unique relationship with the Swedish solidarity movement and the ruling Social Democratic Party.

From South Africa to Namibia and the Role of SWANU

Although the question of Namibia was already raised by the emerging Swedish anti-apartheid movement in the early 1960s, it was initially seen as an extension of the apartheid problem. Demands for the country’s political independence were only advanced towards the middle of the decade.² Reacting against apartheid education and following the example set by Joachim Israel and the Maundy Thursday Committee, a number of Swedish schools and political organizations raised funds and ‘adopted’ black Namibian students for placement at universities and other schools in Sweden from 1961. Among others, the Uppsala Social Democratic Laboremus association was actively involved in such efforts.³ The result of the solidarity campaign was that six Namibians at the beginning of 1963 studied at Swedish universities and other tertiary institutions, representing about half of the Namibian students in Europe and the United States.⁴ With strong links to SWANU, it was not strange that the organization initially dominated the Namibia debate in Sweden.

¹ Katjavivi op. cit., p. 53.
² Notably from the First of May demonstrations in 1964.
³ Laboremus: ‘Protokoll fört vid styrelsensammanträde’ (Minutes from board meeting’), 25 March 1961 (UPA). The political scientist and expert on Guinea-Bissau, Lars Rudebeck, was responsible for Laboremus’ support to a student from Namibia. Laboremus eventually ‘adopted’ the SWANU student Ambrose Kandjii, who later registered at the adult education centre in Skinnskatteberg with financial support from the Social Democratic Party. As many other SWANU students in Sweden, Kandjii returned to Namibia in the late 1970s. No longer actively involved in politics, he was in 1989 employed by Sweden’s observer mission to the independence elections in Namibia.
⁴ Stockholms-Tidningen, 12 May 1963.
The UN Committee on South West Africa was in 1960 refused entry into Namibia by the South African government. The same year, the Liberian and Ethiopian governments instituted proceedings against South Africa before the International Court of Justice at The Hague, Netherlands—the highest judicial organ of the United Nations—in an effort to finally settle the legal status of the country and define South Africa’s obligations. The events brought the question of Namibia to the fore in Sweden too. For example, a meeting between the Liberal student unions of Denmark, Norway and Sweden in Stockholm in June 1961 passed a resolution which was submitted to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In the statement—signed by the chairman of the Nordic Liberal Student Council, the future Swedish Minister of Trade, Hadar Cars,1—the students proposed that “Sweden together with Denmark and Norway at the United Nations [should] work in favour of the soonest [possible] re-transfer of the South West African mandate under international control” and that “the Union of South Africa—[placed] before an ultimatum of economic sanctions—be forced to honour all the obligations of the mandate agreement”.2 In September 1961, the recently founded Swedish South Africa Committee also organized a public meeting on “the situation in South West Africa, the UN and the world opinion” in Stockholm. Charles Kauraisa—who after his arrival in Sweden had already appeared before the UN Fourth Committee in New York and the UN Committee on South West Africa in Ghana—was the main speaker at the meeting.3

The question of Namibia was soon overshadowed by the wider issue of apartheid. The Afro-Scandinavian Youth Congress in Oslo in August 1962—where Kaukuetu and Kauraisa joined forces with the ANC delegation led by Oliver Tambo4—did not make a specific pronouncement on Namibia.5 The main issue was the demand for economic and political isolation of South Africa, where the SWANU students in Sweden not only supported the call by ANC, but from the very beginning took an active and often leading part in the early boycott campaign. Kauraisa, for example, had in May 1961 addressed the first major public meeting organized by the South Africa Committee in Stockholm,

1 Cars was Minister of Trade in 1978–79, i.e. in the Liberal minority government which introduced a ban on Swedish investments in South Africa. Björn Beckman, who was actively involved in the Swedish South Africa Committee, signed the resolution on behalf of the Swedish Liberal Student Union. SWAPO initially demanded UN trusteeship for Namibia as a first step towards national independence.
2 Statement by the Nordic Liberal Students’ Council to the [Swedish] Minister for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 7 June 1961 (MFA).
3 SSAK: ‘Sydvästafrika och världopinionen’ (‘South West Africa and the world opinion’), Stockholm [no date] (AJC). The young editor Ingemar Odlander from Radio Sweden—who has dedicated himself to a thorough study of the [South West Africa] question”—addressed the meeting together with Kauraisa. Odlander served as the Africa correspondent of Radio Sweden between 1975 and 1978.
4 ASYC op. cit., p. 158.
5 Ibid. However, the congress did send a cable to the UN, calling for the “termination of the South African administration in South West Africa” (Ibid., p. 153).
calling for a boycott of South African fruit and the termination of Sweden’s diplomatic relations with the apartheid regime.

Immediately after his arrival in Sweden at the beginning of 1962, Zedekia Ngavirue joined the campaign. He was in particular instrumental in the successful boycott of South African products launched by the secondary school students in Sundsvall in northern Sweden. More than the other SWANU students, Ngavirue took an active part in the work of the Swedish South Africa Committee, where he was a member of the national board from 1962 and in addition to the boycott question increasingly raised Namibian concerns. It was largely through the influence of Ngavirue and the other Namibians in Sweden that the first Swedish solidarity bulletin on Southern Africa was entitled *South and South West Africa*. At the beginning of 1965, Kaukuetu and Ngavirue, finally, proposed a re-activation of the Namibia question by the South Africa Committee and the formation of a specific working group for that purpose. The proposal was well received and later in the year a South West Africa Committee was set up under SSAK’s umbrella.

Although the leadership of the Social Democratic Party did not favour official sanctions against South Africa, the boycott activism by Kauraisa and Ngavirue did not put them on bad terms with the ruling party. On the contrary, the resident SWANU students were from the beginning of the 1960s invited by the labour movement to address the traditional First of May rallies, where they spoke as representatives from Southern Africa and often appeared together with prominent Social Democratic leaders. On 1 May 1962—the same day as the ANC leader Oliver Tambo addressed the demonstrations in Gothenburg—Kauraisa shared the platform with Prime Minister Erlander in Norrköping and Finspång. Two years later, he appeared together with Olof Palme at the First of May celebrations in Kramfors, where Palme gave his first major anti-apartheid speech. At the same time, Bertha Ngavirue—married to Zedekia—addressed the rally in Stockholm, where Erlander was the main speaker.

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1 Of the early SWANU students in Sweden, it was mainly Kauraisa and Ngavirue who actively participated in both the solidarity movement and in the public debate. Uatja Kaukuetu, SWANU’s Vice-President, had a lower profile, although he published a number of articles on Namibia. See, for example, the interview-article: ‘Det räcker inte med ord och principdeklarationer om solidaritet’ (‘It is not enough with words and declarations in principle of solidarity’) in the social democratic youth organ *Frihet*, No. 4, 1965 and Uatja Kaukuetu: ‘Tid att handla i Sydvästafrika’ (‘Time to act in South West Africa’) in *Sydsvenska Dagbladet*, 10 May 1966.


3 During its first years, the bulletin concentrated on events in or related to South Africa. It, however, also published presentations of both SWANU and SWAPO and a profile of Jariretundu Kozonguizi. The special issue No. 5–6, 1966 was dedicated to Namibia.


5 Letter from Tom Nässbjer to Anders Johansson, Stockholm, 23 March 1966 (AJC).

6 *Östergötlands Dagblad*, 2 May 1962.

7 The rally in Stockholm on 1 May 1964 decided to send a cable to the South African government with the following text: “20,000 citizens, gathered for the May Day Rally in Stockholm, Sweden, protest against the policy of apartheid, demand freedom for all political prisoners and indepen-
By the mid-1960s, SWANU had established quite a unique relationship with the Social Democratic Party, principally through the active political work by some of its resident members, but also through visits by its President, Jariretundu Kozonguizi, who in May 1963, for example, held discussions with Prime Minister Erlander.¹ To this should be added the close personal relationship which developed between younger, influential Social Democrats around Olof Palme, such as the future international secretaries Pierre Schori and Bernt Carlsson, and Kauraisa and Ngavirue.² As already noted, Schori later observed that "the first close contact that the Swedish Social Democratic Party had with any liberation movement in Southern Africa was really with SWANU", adding that "you could say that [the SWANU students in Sweden] opened the eyes of both the party and of the public opinion for the situation in that part of the world".³ Albeit in modest proportions, the contact also took the form of material support by the social democratic movement. In 1964, the Social Democratic Youth League made a first donation to the organization of 2,000 SEK.⁴ Above all, in 1965 the Social Democratic Party financed and organized a major SWANU conference in Saltsjöbaden outside Stockholm, inviting the organization’s entire leadership to Sweden.⁵ In connection with the conference—held during the first week of May 1965—not less than fourteen SWANU representatives based in Europe, the United States and Africa addressed a total of twenty-three Labour Day rallies all over the country.⁶ Proceeds from the traditional First of May collections were partly donated to SWANU.⁷

¹ Laboremus: 'Kozonguizi' [no date] (UPA). See also Stockholms-Tidningen, 12 May 1963. Together with the Swedish Social Democratic Youth League, the SWANU Youth was actively engaged in the International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY).
² In an interview, Schori explained in 1996: "We had a very personal relationship. We were more or less of the same age and we all lived in students’ homes. When I came to Stockholm, I stayed in Bernt Carlsson’s room, on the floor. We went jogging together, Zedekia Ngavirue, Charles Kauraisa [...], Bernt and myself. They were not used to jogging, but Bernt and I told them: ‘If you are going to be guerrilla soldiers, you must be in good physical condition!’" (interview with Pierre Schori, Stockholm, 28 June 1996). The social relationship with the SWANU students was, however, never sectarian. When Andreas Shipanga, SWAPO’s representative in Cairo, was invited to Sweden in 1966 by the Social Democratic Party, he stayed in Bernt Carlsson’s apartment (interview with Andreas Shipanga, Windhoek, 20 March 1995).
⁴ ‘SSU’s internationella solidaritetsfond’ (‘SSU’s international solidarity fund’) in Frihet, No. 5, 1965, p. 5.
⁵ The invitation was extended by the National Board of the Social Democratic Party (Aftonbladet, 28 April 1964).
⁶ Among the SWANU speakers were Godfrey Gaoseb, Ambrose Kandjii, Moses Katjiuongua, Uatja Kaukuetu, Charles Kauraisa, Jariretundu Kozonguizi, Nathaniel Mbaeva and Zedekia Ngavirue (Dagens Nyheter, 30 April 1965). In addition to Kaukuetu, Kauraisa and Ngavirue, who were already staying in Sweden, Gaoseb, Kandjii and Katjiuongua would later settle there.
⁷ Aftonbladet, 28 April 1965.
The efforts of the Swedish ruling party should be seen against the background of the proceedings regarding South Africa’s mandate over Namibia at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). After four years of drawn out deliberations, they entered a final phase at the beginning of 1965. The case was widely covered and commented upon by the Swedish press.\footnote{See, for example, Per Wästberg: ‘Därför är Sydvästafrika viktigt’ (‘This is why South West Africa is important’) in \textit{Dagens Nyheter}, 14 March 1965.} The former Swedish Foreign Minister Östen Undén—himself an eminent legal expert, professor of law and for more than twenty years a member of the International Court of Arbitration\footnote{Undén was a member of the International Court of Arbitration at The Hague from 1930 to 1955.}—expressed the Social Democratic Party’s viewpoints and expectations regarding the case as follows in \textit{Stockholms-Tidningen} in April 1965:

South Africa’s position with regard to the apartheid policies in South West Africa is essentially much weaker than in the case of [its] racial policies in South Africa \cite{Undén}. […] The verdict [by the ICJ] will be legally binding [and] there is no doubt as to the competence of the [UN] Security Council to propose means of pressure against a state which is opposed to a verdict.\footnote{Östen Undén: ‘Då har FN rätt att ingripa’ (‘In that case the UN has the right to intervene’) in \textit{Stockholms-Tidningen}, 28 April 1965.}
At the beginning of 1965, the Social Democrats were optimistic regarding Namibia’s independence. It was expected that the ruling by the ICJ would go against South Africa and that a process towards independence would naturally follow under UN supervision. Should South Africa refuse to follow the verdict, it was expected that the Security Council would impose economic sanctions to force it to abandon the territory. Mandatory sanctions would also force a change in South Africa itself. Namibia was seen as “South Africa’s weak point” by the Social Democratic leadership, which underlined that it gave “the UN a formal possibility to intervene against the policies of apartheid. That possibility must be used”.¹ And—as stated by the social democratic newspaper *Aftonbladet*—“if South West Africa becomes free, it is probable that the leadership [of the country] will be taken over by the nationalist party, SWANU”.² The initiative taken vis-à-vis SWANU in May 1965 was seen as support to an organization close to the Social Democratic Party which in the not too distant future would become the ruling party in independent Namibia.³

The optimism was not entirely shared by the guests from SWANU or the ANC leader Oliver Tambo, who had also been invited to address the 1965 First of May rallies. At a time when the government opposed unilateral sanctions against South Africa, but the Swedish boycott movement was rapidly gaining ground—evidenced by the fact that 20 out of the 24 regional councils in Sweden refused South African products—the guests joined the critics of their hosts. Tambo’s sharp demands for sanctions against South Africa at the Labour Day rally led by Prime Minister Erlander in Örebro were echoed by the SWANU President Kozonguizi in Gothenburg. Sharing the platform with Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson, Kozonguizi was pessimistic about the proceedings at The Hague and appealed to the Swedish government “to demand immediate and total freedom for South West Africa and to impose a total boycott, as well as economic sanctions, against the South African government”.⁴ As earlier noted, the contradictory positions by the Swedish and the Southern African leaders were observed both within and outside the social democratic movement, eventually leading to a re-orientation of Sweden’s relations with the liberation movements.

In the meantime, the Social Democratic Party hosted the SWANU conference in Saltsjöbaden during the first week of May 1965. Bringing together SWANU’s exiled leadership, it was an important meeting where an overall strategy for the movement was drawn up and a SWANU External Council was set up to coordi-

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¹ Statement by the national board of the Social Democratic Party in *Aftonbladet*, 28 April 1965.
² Ibid.
³ Some representatives of the Swedish anti-apartheid movement were at the time very critical of the Social Democratic Party’s attention to Namibia, seen as a “smokescreen” to “create an impression of activity at the same time as the difficult question of sanctions against South Africa is avoided” (Hans Isaksson: ‘Regeringens Rökridåer’/The Government’s Smokescreens’ in *Syd- och Sydväst-afrika*, No. 6–7, 1965, p. 3).
⁴ Cited in *Stockholms-Tidningen*, 2 May 1965.
nate the work outside Namibia. Zedekia Ngavirue was elected Chairman and Charles Kauraisa Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Council, which was firmly based in Sweden. Ngavirue left Sweden for further studies in England in 1967. His position as Chairman of the External Council was taken over the following year by Kauraisa.

From SWANU towards SWAPO

Ngavirue has described SWANU’s participation at the 1965 Labour Day rallies and the Saltsjöbaden conference as a “major take-off” for the organization in Sweden. At that time, however, there were already signs that the almost hegemonic position SWANU had gained was being questioned, both within the Social Democratic Party and by the solidarity movement. At the beginning of 1965, the influential Social Democratic Laboremus association in Uppsala, for example, had decided to raise funds for both SWANU and SWAPO and later in the year SWAPO’s Secretary General Jacob Kuhangua visited Stockholm, where he met officials at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and SIDA, as well as the Swedish South Africa Committee.

Five years after the arrival of SWANU’s Vice-President Uatja Kaukuetu, the visit by SWAPO’s Secretary General in September 1965 was the first to Sweden by a leading SWAPO representative. It took place at a crucial time. Shortly

1 Interview with Zedekia Ngavirue, Windhoek, 17 March 1995.
2 Laboremus: ‘Protokoll fört vid styrelsesammanträde’ (‘Minutes from board meeting’), Uppsala, 27 April 1965 (UPA).
3 Although there was a self-appointed SWAPO spokesperson by the name of Hidinua Hamupunda in Stockholm (letter from Tom Nässbjer to Anders Johansson, Stockholm, 23 March 1966) (AJC), it was during Kuhangua’s visit that SWAPO first established relations in Sweden. It is, however, interesting to note that the Swedish representation in Léopoldville (now Kinshasa) according to Andreas Shipanga already assisted SWAPO in 1963–64. As part of the so-called Congo Alliance with FNLA of Angola, PAC of South Africa and ZANU of Zimbabwe, SWAPO was in 1963 offered military training facilities at FNLA’s Kinkuzu camp and sent a number of cadres there. When Shipanga towards the end of 1963 came to Léopoldville as the SWAPO representative, he, however, found the conditions extremely bad and that the FNLA leader Holden Roberto was withholding OAU funds from SWAPO. He therefore “began to call on foreign embassies to enlist support. Visiting the [W]estern embassies was like knocking your head against a brick wall. The British, French and Americans were convinced by South African propaganda that anyone who opposed apartheid was a [C]ommunist, and they simply refused to see anyone from [S]outhern Africa. [B]ut the Swedish [a]mbassador […] became a friend and a good supporter of SWAPO. […] The following year, when I decided that it was time to get out of Léopoldville, it was he who arranged for our flight to Dar es Salaam on a UN DC 6” (Andreas Shipanga: In Search of Freedom, The Andreas Shipanga Story as told to Sue Armstrong, Ashanti Publishing, Gibraltar, 1989, p. 70). Interviewed in March 1995, Shipanga said that the Swedish ambassador “not only provided us with food, [b]ut also […] with accommodation. When Moise Tshombe got back in power a lot of mercenaries returned to Léopoldville. The ambassador then arranged tickets to fly us out to Dar es Salaam because of the danger. That was in September 1964 [and] that is when I came to appreciate the support and sympathy of the Swedish people and government” (interview with Andreas Shipanga, Windhoek, 20 March 1995).
4 While studying in the German Democratic Republic, Emil Appolus, SWAPO’s Secretary for Information, visited Sweden in 1963. He also published his impressions from the visit in Swedish newspapers. See Emil Appolus: ‘Negrerna och självförtroendet’ (‘The negroes and self-confidence’) in Dagens Nyheter, 6 October 1963.
after the SWANU conference in Saltsjöbaden and just before Kuhangua’s visit, SWAPO had been recognized by the OAU as the only Namibian liberation movement, a fact which weighed heavily in its favour. At that time, SWAPO already had, in addition, some refugees under its care in Tanzania. Kuhangua could against this background with greater authority than the SWANU leadership raise the question of the movement’s humanitarian concerns in exile.

During the meeting at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the SWAPO Secretary General emphasized that “SWANU and a number of other South West African organizations were much too insignificant to be said to represent the South West African people” and that SWAPO had “a very big number of followers within the country.” He predicted that the forthcoming ICJ ruling would go against South Africa and was relatively optimistic regarding Namibia’s prospects of gaining national independence “in due time.”

Kuhangua did not request any assistance for SWAPO in his discussions at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but in a following meeting with SIDA he asked for support to SWAPO’s work in favour of a group of Namibian refugees at Mbeya in Tanzania. The response was that “no public support to SWAPO could be given”, but that “SIDA would be ready to consider [financial assistance] to a settlement project for [refugees] in Mbeya on condition that a suitable organization [could] administer it”. The Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS)—which from 1 April 1966 started to work among the refugees—was subsequently identified. In May 1966, SIDA decided to allocate an amount of not less than 200,000 SEK to the TCRS via the Church of Sweden Aid for the settlement project. Although not extended directly to SWAPO, the support was initiated by the liberation movement. It could thus be seen as a first expression

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1 Initially, both SWANU and SWAPO were recognized by the OAU. However, when the OAU Liberation Committee requested the two organizations to present their plans for armed struggle, SWAPO could point out that it had been training military cadres in various African countries from 1962, while SWANU declared that it was not prepared for military confrontation. This led to the de-recognition of SWANU in 1965. Cf. Charles Kauraisa: “[The OAU Liberation Committee] wanted us to make a clear statement that SWANU was embarking on armed struggle. This we could not do” (interview with Charles Kauraisa, Windhoek, 20 March 1995).


3 Ibid.

4 The government of Tanzania only allowed four representatives per liberation movement in Dar es Salaam. Other members were sent to Mbeya. In 1965, the number of refugees from Southern Africa was still very low in Tanzania. According to the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service, there were in November 1965 only 159 politically organized refugees at Mbeya. Half of them belonged to FRELIMO of Mozambique, while the SWAPO refugees amounted to 26 and the SWANU refugees to 4 (letter (‘Afrikanska flyktingar i Mbeya’/’African refugees at Mbeya’) from Knut Granstedt to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam, 7 March 1966) (SDA).

5 Thord Palmlund: ‘Bidrag till Lutherhjälpen för flyktingprojekt i Mbeya, Tanzania’ (‘Contribution to the Church of Sweden Aid for refugee project in Mbeya, Tanzania’), Stockholm, 23 May 1966 (SDA).

6 Starting a practical policy of support by Swedish NGOs, the South Africa Committee in Lund had already in early 1965 sent a consignment of clothes to the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service, thereby “killing two birds with one stone: Creating a South Africa opinion and helping refugees” (letter from Daniel Sandén to Anders Johansson, Göteborg, 6 May 1965) (AJC).

of indirect humanitarian cooperation between the Swedish government and SWAPO.

Kuhangua also met Tom Nässbjer from SSAK’s South West Africa subcommittee during the visit to Stockholm. The contacts initiated with the Swedish solidarity movement were, however, tragically interrupted when Kuhangua in December 1965 was involved in a personal fight with SWAPO’s Vice-President Louis Nelengani in Dar es Salaam. Kuhangua was badly stabbed and taken by the African-American Institute to the United States for treatment. Through the Fund for the Victims of Apartheid, the Swedish solidarity movement contributed a smaller amount. It was a kind of support that the anti-apartheid activists had not expected.

The 1966 Oxford Conference on Namibia

The first ever International Conference on South West Africa was held in Oxford, England, in March 1966. The decision to convene the conference had been taken at the International Conference on Economic Sanctions against South Africa in April 1964. Due to the pending verdict by the International Court of Justice, it received greater importance than originally envisaged. Like the sanctions’ conference, the Namibia conference was organized by Ronald Segal with assistance from the British Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Africa Bureau. It was supported by seven heads of state and government in Africa and Asia, as well as by a hundred well-known international personalities, among them professor Gunnar Myrdal of Sweden. Delegations from thirty-two countries —out of which eighteen were officially represented at government level—and seven international organizations participated. The conference was also attended by SWANU and SWAPO from Namibia, ANC from South Africa and ZANU and ZAPU from Zimbabwe.

Sweden played a prominent role at the conference. Olof Palme—at the time Minister of Transport and Communications—served as chairman and all the Swedish parliamentary parties except the Moderate Party were represented.

1 Letter from Tom Nässbjer to Anders Johansson, Stockholm, 23 March 1966 (AJC).
2 The personal fight between the SWAPO Vice-President Nelengani and the Secretary General Kuhangua had many tragic consequences. Nelengani was not found guilty of any charge by a court in Dar es Salaam due to provocation by Kuhangua. He was, however, later suspended as Vice-President of SWAPO and returned to Namibia a disillusioned man. Upon his return, he was detained by the South African police, badly tortured and made to act as a state witness in the 1967–68 terrorism trial against Andimba Toivo ya Toivo and his 36 co-accused. Kuhangua became a paraplegic, eventually leaving politics and returning to Namibia.
3 Letter from Tom Nässbjer to Anders Johansson, Stockholm, 13 March 1966 (AJC). The rather symbolic amount given by the Swedish Fund for the Victims of Apartheid was 1,000 USD.
5 The Communist Party was represented by Urban Karlsson, the Social Democratic Party by Pierre Schori and Anders Ferm (as well as by Bo Ringholm from the Social Democratic Youth League), the Centre Party by Bengt Jönnell and the Liberal Party by Per Ahlmark and Ola Ullsten. It was in
There were, in addition, representatives from LO-TCO, SFS, SUL, the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, SSAK and the South Africa Committees of Lund, Stockholm and Uppsala.\(^1\) Reflecting the importance attached in Sweden to the question of Namibia, the Swedish delegation was both the largest and the broadest. In contrast to the 1964 sanctions’ conference on South Africa—where the Social Democratic Party had been severely criticized for not attending—there was also a high degree of political understanding among the Swedish participants on the overall purpose of the conference, namely to study ways and means to end South Africa’s control over Namibia. This was symbolized by the fact that when Palme had to return to Sweden during the conference, Ola Ullsten from the opposition Liberal Party took over the chair “to summarize the results of the conference and to show a common Swedish front”.\(^2\)

In his opening statement, Palme—who in May 1964 had given his first militant anti-apartheid speech in Kramfors and in July 1965 in Gävle had dramatically spoken in favour of the struggle of the oppressed peoples for national and social liberation—underlined that “apartheid has no future. It is a disgrace to the present and it must soon become an evil of the past. That is our common responsibility [and] that is what this conference is about”.\(^3\) Addressing the specific issue of Namibia, Palme called for principled political and economic action, stating that

> the problems and the plight of the people in South West Africa are [not] something new and sudden. For over twenty years, there has been an endless row of pleas and petitions, of resolutions and recommendations, of opinions from the International Court of Justice and of reports from distinguished international commissions. [...] It has [...] all too often happened in the history of individual countries, of the world powers [and] of the international community that they for years have seen a situation arise and inevitable developments take their course. In this respect, they have unwittingly acted as bystanders. And when the issue has burst wide open, it has seemingly come as a shock and [a] surprise. Action has then become blunt, haphazard, sometimes panicky, and with disastrous consequences. [...]

> If we believe that reason and facts can appeal to the minds of men, [then] this conference will have strength and power. And if we believe that the emotional impact of the ideals of justice and equality can stir the imagination and the will to

\(^1\) The organizations were represented as follows: Gösta Edgren (LO-TCO), Olof Poluha (SFS), Håkan Mankefors (SUL), Sven Hamrell (The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies), Tom Nääsbjer, Anna-Lena Wästberg and Per Wästberg (SSAK), Ulf Agrell (Lund South Africa Committee), Bengt Ahlsén (Stockholm South Africa Committee) and Kerstin Lund and Ingrid Esperi (Uppsala South Africa Committee). In a capacity as ‘consultant’, Billy Modise of the ANC—who in 1976 became Assistant Director of the United Nations Institute for Namibia (UNIN) in Lusaka, Zambia—also represented the Lund South Africa Committee (Sydafrikakommittén i Lund: ‘Klubbmeddelande’ (‘Club message’), No 2, 1966, Lund, 22 April 1966) (AJC).  


\(^3\) Speech by Olof Palme, Chairman of the conference, to the opening plenary session, International Conference on South West Africa, Oxford, 23 March 1966 (LMA).
act among people everywhere, then this conference will, indeed, have influence and significance for world opinion.

[...] We want the people of South West Africa to form their own future. This is a question of political decision and political organization. But it is also a question of social and economic development. [And] that is also a common responsibility. [...] The people of South West Africa have for many years been exploited. The international community has been unable to defend their rights and their interests. It is our common responsibility that South West Africa should have the chance of a better future. Would this not really be an opportunity to show that international solidarity and common effort is a practical reality? If this shall be the case, we have no time to wait. The time for planning, preparations and constructive thinking for this international effort has already come.1 I wholly agree with President Kaunda [of Zambia] that external solutions for the problems of reconstruction and consolidation often fail. But those who are responsible for internal solutions should in crucial times not feel that they stand alone.2

At the time of the Oxford conference, the International Court of Justice had not yet passed its verdict regarding South Africa’s mandate over Namibia. Like most observers, Palme believed that the ruling would go against South Africa, expecting an intervention by the United Nations:

We are all waiting for the verdict of the International Court [and] we know that the decision [...] is legally binding. [...] We [also] know that the execution of the [...] decision—if need be—falls upon the Security Council and that the Council in that case has wide legal powers for action. We are thus aware that soon very important decisions will have to be taken in the cabinet rooms of individual governments and in the council halls of the United Nations. This conference can not take mandatory decisions binding upon governments and upon international organizations. But at this crucial stage it can fulfil the decisive function of providing the facts, the material and the documentation about [the] situation in South West Africa. And it

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1 One month later, SWAPO’s General Secretary Jacob Kuhangua circulated a proposal to various delegations at the United Nations in New York concerning the establishment of an institute for Namibians in Tanzania. According to the proposal—drafted on behalf of “the leaders of South West Africa” and not presented as a SWAPO document—“the central purpose of the [South West African] Institute [...] will be community development in South West Africa, not politics, not ideology, but concrete material progress” (circular letter from Jacob Kuhangua, New York, 23 April 1966 with attached ‘Draft prospectus concerning the establishment of an institute for the education of South West African exiles in Tanzania’ [no date]) (SDA). Inspired by the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam, the proposal did not, however, gather the necessary support. Together with UNESCO, SIDA had already explored the possibility of setting up a school for Namibians in an African country, but had found the conditions wanting (Thord Palmlund: ‘Svenskt utbildningstöd för sydvästafrikaner’/‘Swedish educational support for South West Africans’, SIDA, Stockholm, 17 February 1966) (SDA). It was only in 1976 that the United Nations Institute for Namibia (UNIN) opened in Lusaka.

2 Speech by Olof Palme op. cit. Just before the Oxford conference, the South African government banned the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF). In his opening address, Palme commented that “those who are afraid to let the accused be defended and afraid to allow humanitarian aid to the victims of a perverted justice are not strong”, announcing that the banning had “rather convinced [the Swedish government] of the necessity of continued and determined support for the activities of [IDAF]”.

can crystallise the attention of international opinion on the dreadful consequences of inaction.¹

However, four months later—on 18 July 1966—the ICJ handed down a surprise decision, refusing to judge the substance of the case. After almost six years of deliberations, the highest judicial organ of the United Nations decided to reject the claims of the Empire of Ethiopia and the Republic of Liberia on the ground that they had not established “any legal right or interest [...] in the subject matter”.² The decision came as a shock to most observers. The reaction in Sweden was strong. Popular demonstrations were staged at the South African legation in Stockholm and the Social Democratic press described the situation created as “the worst crisis of the United Nations”, immediately launching a fund-raising campaign in favour of the Namibian liberation movements.³

In a move initiated by Ghana, the UN General Assembly reacted in October 1966 to ICJ’s decision by terminating South Africa’s mandate, declaring that South Africa “has no [...] right to administer the territory and that henceforth South West Africa comes under the direct responsibility of the United Nations”.⁴

¹ Speech by Olof Palme op. cit.
² Cited in UNIN op. cit., p. 143.
³ Aftonbladet, 20 July 1966.
⁴ UN General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, cited in UNIN op. cit., p. 317. Portugal and South Africa voted against the resolution, while the United Kingdom, France and Malawi abstained.
By this historic action, the United Nations accepted its unique onus towards Namibia. At the same time, a UN ad hoc committee—chaired by the Finnish ambassador Max Jakobson—was appointed to work out concrete steps to achieve independence for Namibia. On the recommendation of the committee, a UN Council for South West Africa (from 1968, the UN Council for Namibia) was established in May 1967 “to administer South West Africa until independence, with the maximum possible participation of the people of the [t]erritory”.  

Pretoria would, however, not recognize the UN decision.

1966: The Year of Namibia

At a time when South Africa started to feature less prominently in the Swedish debate and press, Namibia—and Zimbabwe—received increasing attention. Both social democratic and liberal newspapers wrote extensively about the country in connection with the Oxford conference, which introduced SWAPO to the Swedish participants and, through them, to the Swedish public. The Liberal politician Per Ahlmark, for example, wrote a profile of the SWAPO leader Andreas Shipanga for Expressen. Following the launch of the fundraising campaign by Aftonbladet and Arbetet in July 1966 and, above all, in connection with President Sam Nujoma’s visit to Sweden in August, SWAPO would—quite undramatically—replace SWANU as the main Namibian liberation movement in the eyes of Swedish opinion.

The decision by the ICJ was seen as a miscarriage of justice by leading Swedish experts on international law. Zedekia Ngavirue, the Chairman of SWANU’s External Council, reacted to the decision by proposing the creation of a coordinated African military command against South Africa. At the same time, the OAU had not recognized the independence of SWAPO. In an interview in Aftonbladet after the ICJ decision, Ngavirue stated that “we must look at Southern Africa as a whole. Until now we have been thinking too emotionally. When the issue of Rhodesia came up, we talked about liberating [the country], [but] without being prepared. And now that South West Africa [is discussed] it is easy to say that we [...] shall fight with arms [...]. It is, however, not useful. We, the African leaders, must now become strategists and plan the struggle comprehensively. In the same way as the OAU has a political liberation committee, it should have a
time, the immediate reactions by the main Swedish political parties briefly upset the common position until then maintained on the question of Namibia. The ICJ had rejected the claims against South Africa by Ethiopia and Liberia on the grounds that they had not been members of the League of Nations, which had originally decided on the Namibian mandate. Against this background—and possibly influenced by SWANU1—the Liberal leader Bertil Ohlin proposed in an open letter to Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson that Sweden together with other former members of the League should consider a new initiative.2 Nilsson, however, found the proposal unrealistic.3

In the meantime, the ruling party supported the fund-raising campaign launched by the social democratic papers Aftonbladet in Stockholm and Arbetet in Malmö on 20 July 1966, that is, only two days after ICJ’s decision.4 The background and purpose of the campaign was explained the same day in an editorial in Aftonbladet:

After the verdict [by the ICJ], the South West Africans can hardly any longer entertain any hopes that an international action against Verwoerd’s racial regime will take place within the foreseeable future. The hopes must [...] instead be centred on the resistance organizations [and on] their ability to create a strong and efficient liberation movement. [...] The leadership and the initiative in the struggle against the Verwoerd regime are now passed on to the South West Africans themselves. By all accounts, they will have to manage this uniquely difficult and important task without any help whatsoever from the UN. It represents a fiasco for the world organization and a betrayal by the Western powers. [...] For those who do not want to be accused of participation in this betrayal, which easily may be seen as [caused] not only by the Western powers, but by the white world, there are good possibilities of practically demonstrating their solidarity with the liberation movement. Our country has already extended a certain [amount of] economic assistance to the resistance organizations SWANU and SWAPO, inter alia from the Social Democratic Party;5 but it has, evidently, been insufficient. The military command for Southern Africa. The military efforts should be directed to [the area] where we have the best chances to succeed. That is, for the moment, not in South West Africa, [but] in Mozambique. The Africans must occupy Mozambique. It must be the first objective of the Southern African movement” (Björn Kumm: ‘Frihetsledarna har lång väg att vandra’/ ‘The freedom leaders have a long way to walk’ in Aftonbladet, 21 July 1966).

1 SWANU maintained that responsibility for the Namibia question mainly should be shouldered by the members of the League of Nations—among them Sweden—who originally had decided to transfer the international mandate to South Africa (See, for example, Kaukuetu in Frihet op. cit., p. 22).
2 Open letter from Bertil Ohlin to Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson, Stockholm, 21 July 1966 (MFA).
3 Open letter from Torsten Nilsson to Professor Bertil Ohlin, Stockholm, 24 July 1966 (MFA).
4 Tom Nässbjer of SSAK’s South West Africa Committee was actively involved with the initiative. Before the launch of the campaign, he was “given an office at the Social Democratic Party headquarters in Stockholm and then [...] moved to Aftonbladet, where he had a room while the campaign was running” (interview with Sven Hamrell, Uppsala, 10 April 1996).
5 The Social Democratic Party Youth League had from 1964 given smaller cash contributions to SWANU. At the beginning of 1966, the Metal Workers’ Federation also donated a Land Rover to the organization. According to Zedekia Ngavirue, it was “until then the only donation of its kind [to SWANU] from Scandinavia, and probably from the whole of Western Europe”. It was, in addition, the “one and only proper vehicle at the disposal of the liberation movement in South West Africa” (Zedekia Ngavirue: ‘Hjälp till självförsvar’/ ‘Help to self-defence’ in Aftonbladet, 2 August 1966).
requirements will [...] now grow rapidly. Substantially increased contributions would also constitute a psychological support, [which appears as] not the least important at this moment when the white racists in South Africa are triumphant and the risk increases that a paralyzing feeling of impotence will spread among the Africans.1

According to the original appeal, the funds collected were for educational purposes and for organizational work in Namibia, but they could "be used by [SWANU and SWAPO] as they see fit".2 Both SWANU and SWAPO were considered representative Namibian liberation organizations by the Swedish political parties,3 the solidarity movement and the major newspapers, and although the fund-raising campaign was launched by the Social Democratic press, it received wide support. The Swedish South Africa Committee immediately greeted the initiative "with great satisfaction, calling on all sympathizing organizations and individuals to support the South West Africa collection".4 More significantly, the liberal Dagens Nyheter also added its support, declaring that "we share the opinion of Aftonbladet that the South West Africans today can hope for very little from the UN. They are forced to conduct their own political liberation struggle. The fund-raising campaign is [therefore] recommended".5

The campaign continued until the beginning of 1967. The total amount raised was 101,000 SEK, which was split into equal parts and given to SWANU and SWAPO, "who have the same final objective".6 Several LO-affiliated trade unions contributed to the result. For example, in October 1966 the influential Metal Workers’ Federation donated not less than 20,000 SEK.7 The trade union support had according to Sven Hamrell, who actively participated in the organization of the campaign, a wider political significance for the development of Sweden’s relations with the Southern African liberation movements. In an interview in April 1996, he was of the opinion that

since quite a lot of money came from [...] the trade union movement, it also meant that the Social Democrats became more actively involved in the Southern African

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1 Editorial: ‘Vi kan bistå de förtryckta’ (‘We can assist the oppressed’) in Aftonbladet, 20 July 1966.
3 With the exception of the Moderate Party, which was the only Swedish parliamentary party that did not attend the International Conference on South West Africa and did not show any interest in the Namibian liberation movements. When Olof Palme at the SWANU-SWAPO student conference in Uppsala at the beginning of August 1966 declared the ICJ ‘incompetent’, the Moderate newspaper Svenska Dagbladet defended the court. See comments in Örebro-Karirens, 5 August 1966. The Communist Party newspaper Ny Dag expressed the hope that SWANU and SWAPO would join forces to become an equivalent to the Vietnamese FNL (Ny Dag, 29 July–4 August 1966).
4 Aftonbladet, 21 July 1966.
5 Aftonbladet, 22 July 1966.
6 Aftonbladet, 18 March 1967.
7 Aftonbladet, 8 October 1966.
issues. It contributed to a process where the initiative, so to speak, moved from the Liberals to the Social Democrats.¹

Less than two weeks after the start of the campaign, Sweden was once again hosting an important meeting of the Namibian liberation movement, namely the South West Africa Students’ Congress, held in Uppsala between 1 and 5 August 1966. SWAPO was the driving force behind the initiative. In March 1966, Vice-President Nelengani had contacted the Swedish embassy in Dar es Salaam for support to a non-sectarian Namibian student meeting.² The objective was to bring SWANU and SWAPO students together and form a Namibian national student union. To this end, student representatives from the two organizations met under the auspices of the Swedish National Union of Students (SFS)³ over the Easter holiday in Uppsala, where they in principle agreed on a draft constitution for a National Union of South West African Students (NUSWAS) and formed a steering committee to prepare the inaugural congress.⁴ At the time, there were about 400 Namibians studying abroad, out of whom 150 at tertiary level. Only a handful of these pursued post-graduate studies.⁵

Facing an awesome challenge of trained personnel in an independent Namibia and offering a forum for joint deliberations, both SWANU and SWAPO attached great importance to the congress. The SWANU delegation was led by Zedekia Ngavirue,⁶ while the SWAPO delegation was headed by President Sam Nujoma and in addition included such prominent leaders as Solomon Mifima and Andreas Shipanga.⁷ It was Nujoma’s first visit to Sweden. As it took place shortly after the ICJ decision and the launch of the fund-raising campaign for the Namibian liberation movements, it was widely covered in both the national and provincial press, which published long interviews with

¹ Interview with Sven Hamrell, Uppsala, 10 April 1996.
³ SFS was in close contact with the Namibian organizations. Its international secretary, Olof Poluha, attended the Oxford conference in March 1966.
⁴ Arbetet, 23 July 1966.
⁵ Uppsala Nya Tidning, 2 August 1966.
⁶ SWANU’s President Jariretundu Kozonguizi had by then entered into open conflict with the External Council. He accused it of sabotage and resigned from SWANU in 1966. Gerson Veii—imprisoned on Robben Island in 1967—was in absentia voted President in 1968.
⁷ Nujoma, who left Namibia shortly after the Windhoek shootings of December 1959, had been the President of SWAPO since its formation in June 1960. Mifima was the SWAPO representative to Zambia and Shipanga held the same position in the United Arab Republic, based in Cairo. Shipanga was also the editor of the SWAPO publication Solidarity. During the SWAPO crisis in Zambia in 1975–76, Mifima and Shipanga were accused of being ‘enemy agents’. They were detained in April 1976, handed over to the Zambian authorities and eventually held prisoner in Tanzania until May 1978. After his release, Shipanga founded a new political organization, SWAPO-Democrats (SWAPO-D), in Sweden in June 1978.
the SWAPO leader and further introduced his movement to the public.\(^1\) In an interview with the social democratic evening paper *Aftonbladet*, Nujoma thanked the Swedish government for extending scholarships to Namibian students and expressed the hope that "Sweden will support our demand that the United Nations revokes [South Africa’s] mandate, takes over South West Africa and thereafter arranges general elections to give us our country back.”\(^2\)

The Swedish government also attached importance to the meeting, which took place only a couple of months after the controversial Socialist International congress in Stockholm in May 1966.\(^3\) Olof Palme, at the time Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, opened it, stating that the ICJ decision did not affect the international community’s responsibility towards Namibia and that “we must now go from intention to intervention”.\(^4\) In connection with the Namibian student congress, Nujoma and Palme also held bilateral talks, marking the beginning of a long and close relationship.

The congress brought about fifty Namibian students from ten countries to Uppsala.\(^5\) Hosted by SFS, it was supported by the Nordic student unions and financed by both the pro-Western and the pro-Eastern student internationals, that is, ISC/COSEC—where Palme had been active at the beginning of the 1950s—and IUS.\(^6\) Hans Beukes, who studied at the University of Oslo in Norway and was a member of SWAPO’s National Committee,\(^7\) chaired the discussions, which ironed out the opposing viewpoints between the SWANU and the SWAPO students and formally launched NUSWAS as a unitary national Namibian student union.\(^8\)

**SWAPO, Armed Struggle and Political Trials**

The visit to Sweden by Nujoma, Mifima and Shipanga took place just a couple of weeks before the first armed encounter between SWAPO and the South African security forces at Omgulumbashe in Ovamboland on 26 August 1966. Although completely unconnected, SWAPO’s appearance on the Swedish scene

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\(^2\) *Aftonbladet*, 30 July 1966.

\(^3\) At the SI congress, the British Labour Party had antagonized the liberation movements from Southern Africa, while the Swedish Social Democratic Party strengthened its contacts with them. The Swedish ruling party would from then on initiate direct bilateral relations with the nationalist movements (see the chapters on Zimbabwe and Mozambique below).

\(^4\) *Aftonbladet*, 2 August 1966.

\(^5\) *Upsala Nya Tidning*, 2 August 1966.

\(^6\) Ibid.

\(^7\) Katjavivi op. cit., p. 46.

\(^8\) *Arbetet*, 7 August 1966. Among the Namibians who after the congress appeared as spokespersons for NUSWA were Nora Schimming-Chase (SWANU) and Homateni Kaluenja (SWAPO).
was, thus, contemporaneous with the beginning of the armed struggle. This was not a liability. On the contrary, after the ICJ decision it was widely understood that the Namibian nationalists had "no alternative but to rise in arms and bring about [their] own liberation", as SWAPO had announced on the day of the verdict.\footnote{Cited in Katjavivi op. cit., p. 59.}

Immediately after the ruling at The Hague, SUL had together with its sister organizations in Denmark and Norway\footnote{The Danish Dansk Ungdoms Fællesraad and the Norwegian Nasjonalkomitén for Internasjonalt Ungdomsarbeid.} passed a resolution which stated that "should the South West African liberation movement [now] resort to arms, we no longer have the moral right to ask them to restrain from this [move]".\footnote{SUL: 'Resolution', Stockholm, 20 July 1966 (AJC).} Under the circumstances, SWAPO’s decision to embark upon armed struggle rather strengthened its position in Sweden,\footnote{Andreas Shipanga, who visited Sweden in August 1966 and in March 1967, said in an interview in March 1995 that he "did not come across anybody [in Sweden] who was critical about why we took [the] decision [to launch the armed struggle]. [...] We really did not have any problem, but, of course, we had to explain. [...]People understood. At least those who we could talk to" (interview}
Namibia: From SWANU to SWAPO

centration on diplomacy, conversely, marginalized the organization. As later stated by SWANU’s Ngavirue, the shift in the Swedish opinion from SWANU to SWAPO was not “a question of recognition and non-recognition, [but] I do know that SWAPO was really being seen as having the guerrilla fighters [and] doing the actual fighting”.¹

SWAPO skilfully capitalized on the situation. In the wake of the Uppsala congress, a number of SWAPO leaders visited Sweden for talks with the solidarity movement, the Social Democratic Party and the political opposition, as well as with the Swedish government. In mid-August 1966, Emil Appolus, SWAPO’s Secretary for Information, met the vice-chairman of the Social Democratic Youth League, Thage G. Peterson, in Stockholm² and at the beginning of October, Peter Mueshihange, Secretary for External Affairs, arrived to “inform [Swedish] politicians and organizations of the situation in [Namibia] and to ask for help [to] SWAPO”.³

Nujoma returned to Sweden for a second visit in February 1967. In discussions with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, he expressed the hope that the upcoming special session on Namibia by the UN General Assembly—scheduled for April 1967—would decide to dispatch UN troops to the country and that Sweden would participate.⁴ Finally, in March 1967, Appolus visited the Foreign Ministry together with Andreas Shipanga to establish whether Sweden and the other Nordic countries had prepared any particular initiative for the General Assembly meeting.⁵ At the same time, the SWAPO leadership—including Nujoma—corresponded with various Swedish solidarity organizations, asking them to mobilize support for SWAPO’s positions.⁶ In addition, from his base in Cairo Andreas Shipanga was from April 1966 in close contact with Anders Johansson, at the time secretary of the Swedish South Africa Committee. Johansson was approached by both SWANU and SWAPO to act as an intermediary concerning contacts with the Finnish government.⁷

with Andreas Shipanga, Windhoek, 20 March 1995). SWAPO was the last of the Southern African liberation movements supported by Sweden to embark upon armed struggle.

¹ Interview with Zedekia Ngavirue, Windhoek, 17 March 1995.
² Folkbladet (Östgöten), 17 August 1966.
³ The Star, 4 October 1966.
⁵ Kaj Sundberg: ‘Ang. besök av representanter för SWAPU’ (‘Re. visit by representatives from SWAPU’), Stockholm, 14 March 1967 (MFA). In the memorandum SWAPO is wrongly called the South West African People’s Union (SWAPU).
⁶ For example, letter from Sam Nujoma to the Uppsala South Africa Committee (although addressed to the ‘Anti-Apartheid Committee, University of Uppsala’), New York, 20 March 1967 (UPA).
⁷ At the time, neither SWAPO nor SWANU had established close contacts with the Finnish government. Acting on behalf of the Swedish South Africa Committee, Johansson was at the beginning of 1967 in contact with both Shipanga (SWAPO) and Ngavirue (SWANU) regarding coordinated contacts between the two and the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Shipanga wrote from Cairo that “we feel [that] this is very important and [are] ready to come over there for this purpose. [...] [T]he sooner it is arranged, the better” (letter from Andreas Shipanga to Anders Johansson, Cairo, 25 January 1967) (AJC). Similarly, Ngavirue stated that “we are still interested in making contacts
In the meantime, the reports to the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm from the Swedish diplomatic missions in New York and Pretoria were far from mirroring these developments or the general Namibia opinion in Sweden. Commenting upon the ICJ decision, Carl Johan Rappe at the Swedish UN delegation in New York—who in the 1950s had been stationed in Pretoria and was to return there in 1970—was much more concerned about the reaction by the African states for the future of the world organization than critical of the court and its verdict. In a report to Stockholm he wrote that

since the Africans feel impotent [with regard to] Rhodesia and South West Africa, it is feared that they may become all the more inclined to rancour and mischief also in other important questions where they, due to their many votes and with the support of sympathizers from other groups, can cause considerable vexation and obstruct constructive work.

Moreover, Rappe characterized the proposal to revoke South Africa’s mandate over Namibia as “a shot in the air”. In his comments on the first armed clashes between SWAPO and the South African security forces in late August 1966, the Swedish envoy to South Africa, Hugo Tamm, described in a similar vein the Namibian nationalists as a “gang of terrorists” and informed the Foreign Ministry that “the population in Ovamboland [...] is reported to be loyal and largely well disposed towards South Africa”. In a subsequent report, he uncritically conveyed the Pretoria government’s view that “the band of terrorists with which the police has clashed formed part of a Communist conspiracy and was a kind of advanced party of a major terrorist force”.

In view of the special UN General Assembly meeting on Namibia, the South African government invited in early 1967 the Swedish representative in Pretoria for an organized visit to the country. The new Swedish envoy, Eric Virgin, was, however, instructed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to decline the invitation on the grounds that the United Nations in October 1966 had revoked South Africa’s mandate over Namibia and that Pretoria thus was disqualified to act as host of an official visit. As in 1963—when the Nordic governments had declined a similar invitation to visit South Africa—the response provoked strong reac-

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1 In Swedish, ‘fätskhet och okynne’.
2 Cable from (Carl Johan) Rappe to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, New York, 22 July 1966 (MFA).
3 Letter from Hugo Tamm to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 12 September 1966 (MFA).
4 Letter (‘Terroristverksamheten i Sydafrika och Sydvästafrika’/‘The terrorist activity in South Africa and South West Africa’) from Hugo Tamm to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 30 September 1966 (MFA).
tions in the South African press. An editorial in the Nationalist Party organ *Die Transvaler* concluded that

one can hardly believe that there in this so-called enlightened century still are statesmen who rather want to persist in their ignorance than look the truth in the eyes. Rather than getting to know the truth about South West Africa, the men in Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen prefer to believe the lies. [...] One gets the impression that the last Scandinavians who were still worthy of their Viking ancestors were those who fell in battle on the side of the Boers at Magersfontein on 11 December 1899.¹

Similar reactions were expressed by the South African Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller² and his envoy to Sweden, C.H. Taljaard. In a “personal” letter to Foreign Minister Nilsson, Taljaard complained that “the Swedish authorities consistently have refused to get closer to the [t]erritory of South West Africa than New York” and—praising the policy of apartheid—stated that “self-determination [...] is a cardinal factor in South African policy in respect of the various peoples of Southern Africa”.³ The merits of a visit to Namibia were, however, at the same time decidedly brought into question by Foreign Minister Muller himself. In a debate in the South African parliament on 20 April 1967, he addressed the question “whether there [are] any limits to our willingness to invite people to South West Africa”. His reply was:

Of course, there are limits. Although we shall welcome visits to this [t]erritory, we have to go about it very judiciously and we may not throw open South West Africa to any Tom, Dick and Harry. There are certain persons whom we will certainly not allow there. [...] I must point out that we have to have regard to the disposition and the motives of the people who express the wish to go there. These will guide us in deciding whether or not we should admit them.⁴

Violating the UN General Assembly resolution of October 1966, South Africa continued to occupy Namibia, which was ruled as a fifth South African province. Following the armed encounter between SWAPO and the South African security forces on 26 August 1966, thirty-seven of the movement’s leaders and freedom fighters were rounded up and arrested. Among them were Andimba

¹ *Die Transvaler*, 14 March 1967, cited from a Swedish translation attached to a letter from the Swedish legation in South Africa to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 15 March 1967 (MFA). During the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902, the volunteer Scandinavian Corps and Ambulance Unit participated on the Boer side at the battle of Magersfontein, where 27 Scandinavians were killed and many more captured by the British. The Boer victory at Magersfontein occupies a prominent place in Afrikaner nationalist history. A memorial in Swedish granite and with epitaphs in the Nordic languages was raised at the battlefield in 1908 (Winquist op. cit. 168–174; cf. H.E. Uddgren: *Minnesskrift: Hjältarna vid Magersfonteinen* (The Heroes at Magersfontein’), Hallmans Boktryckeri, Uddevalla, 1925).

² Letter (‘Samtal med utrikesminister Muller om Sydvästafrika’/’Discussions with Foreign Minister Muller about South West Africa’) from Eric Virgin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Torsten Nilsson, Cape Town, 31 March 1967 (MFA).


Toivo ya Toivo, SWAPO’s Regional Secretary for Ovamboland, Nathaniel Maxuilili, the Acting President and John Ya-Otto, the Acting Secretary General. They were subsequently taken to Pretoria, held incommunicado under the South African Suppression of Communism Act for nine months and severely tortured. Finally, in June 1967 the South African parliament passed a new law—known as the Terrorism Act—which was made retroactive from 1962 in order to cover SWAPO’s activities since that date. The Namibians were charged under the act and brought to court in Pretoria in August 1967.¹

Before the start of the ‘Terrorism Trial,’ Sam Nujoma wrote to the Swedish government, requesting it “to bear pressure on the South African government through the United Nations in order to secure the release of [the SWAPO members]”.² The request was well received, and at the beginning of December 1967 Sweden was one of the sponsors of a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly, condemning the deportation of the Namibians, the Terrorism Act and the trial, urging that the accused should be set free.³ In addition, the Foreign Ministry instructed the Swedish legation in Pretoria to be present during the trial.⁴ Towards the end of January 1968, Foreign Minister Nilsson also made an urgent appeal to the Pretoria government, asking the South Africans to release the accused. Nilsson underlined that the trial was being followed with intense interest in Sweden. The reason for this is that [in] the Swedish [view] the accused men are fighting for certain political objectives which are looked upon with the greatest sympathy by the Swedish public. Furthermore, the charges are based on [an act] which [...] is flagrantly deficient in fulfilling the requirements placed upon penal legislation in any community founded on the rule of law. Moreover, the act is being applied in an area for which the United Nations, acting in accordance with its Charter and with the support of an overwhelming majority in the General Assembly, has assumed direct responsibility.⁵

¹ It was at the end of the 1967–68 terrorism trial that Toivo ya Toivo—elected to speak for the accused—in February 1968 gave the famous speech in which he stated: “We are Namibians and not South Africans. We do not now, and will not in the future, recognize your right to govern us; to make laws for us in which we had no say; to treat our country as if it were your property and us as if you were our masters. We have always regarded South Africa as an intruder in our country.[...] We claim independence for South West Africa. We do not expect that independence will end our troubles, but we do believe that our people are entitled—as are all peoples—to rule themselves. [...] I admit that I decided to assist those who had taken up arms. I know that the struggle will be long and bitter. I also know that my people will wage that struggle, whatever the costs” (cited in Katjavivi op. cit., p. 63). The speech was first published in Swedish—translated by Anna-Lena Wästberg—in Dagens Nyheter on 23 March 1968 and later inter alia reproduced in the social democratic journal Tiden (Toivo Herman Ya Toivo: ‘Därför kämpar vi’/‘That is why we fight’ in Tiden, No. 10, 1968, pp. 593–599).
² Letter from Sam Nujoma to the Swedish ambassador, Dar es Salaam, 9 August 1967 (MFA).
⁴ At the end of the first part of the trial in December 1967, the Swedish envoy Eric Virgin reported that “the public interest has during the last week been as little as of late. [...] In addition to the press, only observers from the American, Canadian and [the Swedish] diplomatic missions have followed the case” (letter from Eric Virgin (‘Terroristträttegången avslutad’/‘The terrorist trial finished’) to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 15 December 1967) (MFA).
More importantly, the Swedish government had since the beginning of the trial through the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF) behind the scenes contributed to the legal defence costs, in particular of the South African attorney Joel Carlson.1

The verdict by the South African court was pronounced at the beginning of February 1968. Twenty of the accused were sentenced to life imprisonment and nine, including Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, to twenty years.2 The Namibians were taken to Robben Island outside Cape Town, where they joined Mandela, Sisulu, Sobukwe and many South African leaders. The Swedish government considered the sentences “a travesty of justice” and stated in a note to the United Nations Secretary General U Thant that “it would now be appropriate for the Security Council to renew its consideration of [the question of Namibia]”.3 To make it possible for the defence to appeal against the sentences, it allocated at the same time 250,000 SEK to IDAF.4 In addition, at the end of March 1968 the government decided to grant 10,000 USD to the families of the imprisoned SWAPO members, to be paid out via the Church of Sweden Aid and the Lutheran World Federation.5

Official Support to SWAPO

Another so-called terrorism trial against SWAPO members was held in mid-1969, this time in Windhoek. Foreign Minister Nilsson again instructed the Swedish legation in Pretoria to be present,6 which from then on would regularly be the case at political trials in both Namibia and South Africa. In turn, the attendance at the trials deepened the knowledge about the liberation struggle

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2 Maxuilili and Ya-Otto were sentenced to five years imprisonment.


4 Cable from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Swedish UN delegation, Stockholm, 27 February 1968 (MFA).

5 Cable from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Swedish UN delegation, Stockholm, 21 March 1968 (MFA). In his presentation of the Church of Sweden Aid, Ryman writes that the defence in the 1967-68 terrorism trial was “supported by church organizations from outside, coordinated by the LWF” and that the families of the sentenced Namibians “received certain assistance through the Church of Sweden Aid” (Ryman op. cit., 199). The role of IDAF should, however, be noted, as well as the fact that the Swedish government—particularly through the Swedish UN representative Sverker Åström and Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson—was actively involved behind the scenes and that the money, both for the trial and the dependants, was largely Swedish public funds.

and brought SWAPO and the Swedish government closer. With SWANU dis-
appearing from the Namibian political scene, as well as becoming increasingly
marginalized in Africa, SWAPO would towards the end of the 1960s appear as
Namibia’s genuine national liberation movement in the eyes of both the Swe-
dish government and influential Swedish constituencies, such as the church.
The SWAPO leadership had in the meantime decided to appoint an official
representative to Sweden. The choice fell upon Paul Helmuth, who was to
pursue post-graduate studies at the University of Stockholm. Helmuth was
duly authorized by President Nujoma to “represent and speak on behalf of
SWAPO” in October 1967, but his introduction was postponed as it was deci-
ded to open a formal SWAPO office. Not until December 1968 was Helmuth,
who by then already lived in Stockholm, introduced as the resident SWAPO
representative. Nevertheless, apart from the special case of SWANU, SWAPO
was together with FRELIMO of Mozambique among the first Southern African
liberation movements to establish a formal representation in Sweden. Helmu-
tho—who like many other SWAPO leaders had started his political career in the
Ovamboland People’s Congress in Cape Town in the late 1950s and in 1962 was
appointed Secretary General of the short-lived South West Africa Trade Union
League (SWATUL)—came, however, into conflict with the movement at
SWAPO’s Consultative Congress at Tanga, Tanzania, in December 1969-Janu-
ary 1970. Returning to Sweden, he left SWAPO and joined the marginal South
West Africa National United Front (SWANUF) in 1971.

1 SWANU had already in mid-1967 been barred from conducting political activities in Tanzania,
since the government found that “the organization did not serve any purposes compatible with a
liberation movement” (letter from Åke Fridell to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam, 3 September 1967) (MFA).
2 Nickey Iyambo, who at the 1969/70 Tanga congress was elected SWAPO Secretary for Education
and Culture, arrived in Finland for studies in late 1964. In an interview in August 1996, he said that
he at the time had been given the responsibility by SWAPO to “inform the people in the Nordic
countries in general and [in] Finland in particular about [...] Namibia” (Iina Soiri and Pekka Pellola:
‘National Liberation in Southern Africa: The Role of Finland’, Draft, Helsinki, 12 November 1997,
p. 29). As far as can be ascertained, he, however, only made his first official visit to Sweden in
August 1969, having a meeting at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with Paul Helmuth (memorandum from Jan Romare, Stockholm, 15 August 1969) (MFA). The first SWAPO leader in the Nordic countries was Hans Beukes, who came to Norway as early as in late 1959. He was elected in 1960 in absentia to SWAPO’s first National Committee.
4 Letter from Peter Katjavivi, SWAPO representative in Great Britain, to Pierre Schori, London,
3 December 1968 (MFA).
5 FRELIMO’s first officially appointed resident representative to Sweden, Lourenço Mutaca,
arrived towards the end of 1967. UNITA and FNLA placed student representatives there in 1967
and 1968, respectively.
7 Helmuth, who was granted political asylum in Sweden and for many years worked there as a
civil servant, was in September 1971 together with Tauna Niingungo appointed SWANUF
representative (letter from Mburumba Kerina to the Foreign Minister Krister Wickman, New York,
17 September 1971). Attempting a merger between SWANU, SWAPO and other Namibian political
formations, SWANUF was established by Mburumba Kerina and Veine Mbaeva in New York in
1966. Active at the UN, but opposed by both SWANU and SWAPO and with no base in Namibia,
The Tanga congress at the turn of 1969-1970 was the first major gathering of SWAPO leaders and members in exile. It made a number of amendments to SWAPO’s constitution and restructured the movement through the formation of departments. Important changes in the leadership were also made, as well as in SWAPO’s representation abroad. The congress decided to set up an office in Stockholm to cover the Scandinavian countries, West Germany and Austria. Ben Amathila, who at Tanga had been elected Assistant Secretary of Education and Culture, was appointed SWAPO chief representative for the area. Arriving in Sweden at the beginning of 1971, his instructions were, however, “very vague” and he had to start from scratch to define what the SWAPO office was supposed to be. I really did not have any briefing on what I was meant to be doing [and] I had to seek the necessary tools to do my work, because I did not have a budget. [In general], Sweden and the [Nordic] countries were to be approached in order to help us establish that we wanted to be seen as Namibians. Our right to self-determination should be recognized. Amathila stayed in Sweden from 1971 until 1977. During this period, he managed—assisted by his wife, Libertine Amathila, SWAPO’s Assistant Secretary for Health and Social Welfare and Director of SWAPO’s Women’s Council—to establish a solid support base for SWAPO in Sweden and in the other Nordic countries. The year he arrived, the official, direct contribution by the Swedish government to SWAPO amounted to a modest 30,000 SEK. By the time

1 Although SWAPO was not formally banned in Namibia, its status was similar to that of a prohibited organization. The leaders inside Namibia were not in a position to travel outside the country.
2 At Tanga, Sam Nujoma was confirmed as President. After the expulsion of Louis Nelengani, the former Vice-President of the Caprivi African National Union (CANU), Mishake Muyongo, was elected Acting Vice-President. The post of Secretary General was abolished and replaced by that of an Administrative Secretary. Moses Garoeb was elected to that office, with Hifikepunye (Lucas) Pohamba as his assistant.
3 Amathila had his first meeting at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in May 1971 (memorandum (‘SWAPO-konferens’ / ‘SWAPO conference’) by Jan Romare, Stockholm, 12 May 1971 (MFA). Amathila was on the request of Nujoma given a SIDA scholarship.
5 Libertine Amathila (née Appolus) arrived in Sweden in 1972. A medical doctor by profession, she studied pediatrics and worked at the S:t Göran Hospital in Stockholm.
6 Amathila also covered West Germany, but “the Germans were not very easy. Occasionally, they were very forthcoming, but one got the impression that they were swapping resources for influence. It was not very pleasant. I remember a number of times when [I] had to turn down their assistance” (interview with Ben Amathila, Stockholm, 19 May 1995).
he left Sweden, it had grown to 5 million.\footnote{’Agreed minutes of discussion on cooperation between Sweden and SWAPO’, Lusaka, 2 September 1976 (SDA).} SWAPO had by then also overcome the resistance initially encountered among the Africa Groups, who at their national congress in June 1976—albeit with quite a small margin—voted to “support SWAPO in its struggle for independence”\footnote{AGIS: ’Protokoll från AGIS’ kongress’ (’Minutes from AGIS’ congress’), Björkå, 5–7 June 1976, p. 7 (AGA).}

Ironically, at the time when SWAPO established close relations with the Swedish government and the parliament pronounced itself in favour of direct, official humanitarian support to the Southern African liberation movements, SWAPO was—together with ANC of South Africa—treated with suspicion by the solidarity movement. The popular support built by the anti-apartheid movement in the mid-1960s—upon which the stand by the government rested—had during the initial turbulent period of solidarity with Vietnam largely been swept away. SWAPO’s credentials were questioned even by the very solidarity committees that had introduced it as a stronger force than SWANU.\footnote{See interview with Anders Johansson, Eskilstuna, 19 November 1996.}

In a letter to the Cuban magazine Tricontinental—copied to SWAPO—the Lund South Africa Committee expressed in December 1969 its “fraternal criticism” of the movement, based on discussions with SWAPO in Zambia and Tanzania. In the self-righteous language typical of the time, it stated that

SWAPO still seem to nourish a few illusions about [the] UN or the Western powers forcing South Africa to ‘grant’ independence to Namibia. The working style of some SWAPO comrades at the offices in Lusaka and Dar es Salaam seems to be too bureaucratic and ‘unpolitical’ to be truly revolutionary. Many Swedish progressives visiting Tanzania this year have complained about the lack of discipline and militancy among some of the SWAPO representatives in Dar es Salaam.\footnote{Letter from Dick Urban Vestbro to Tricontinental, Lund, 14 December 1969 (AGA).}

The letter, however, also stated that it ”is our conviction that SWAPO has the support of the Namibian people and that it is the only fighting liberation movement in Namibia”, adding that ”we support the SWAPO struggle and hope to continue our good relations in the future”\footnote{Ibid.}. The same month, Södra Afrika Informationsbulletin published an article on Namibia and SWAPO based on discussions held with Andreas Shipanga in Lund in September 1969.\footnote{’Kampen i Namibia’ (’The Struggle in Namibia’) in Södra Afrika Informationsbulletin, No. 6, December 1969, pp. 20–29.} In reality, however, the relations between SWAPO and the solidarity movement remained strained during the first half of the 1970s. Ben Amathila later recalled that
most of the support groups, especially the Africa Groups, were very lukewarm on Namibia [...]. Some people believed that we did not have the seriousness of movements like Guinea-Bissau’s PAIGC, Angola’s MPLA and Mozambique’s FRELIMO, because we did not have liberated territories. They were seen not only as ‘ideologically clear’ between Moscow and Beijing, but they also met the OAU criteria. I [was] a ‘newcomer’ to the politics of the outside world, who understood very little about the ideological differences of the Soviet Union and the Chinese and the imperialistic politics of the West. [...] So, it was very difficult. And I always found it very difficult to pretend [to be] what I was not. The active solidarity groups had a network and in order to work through that network you had to prove [you were] a Marxist-Leninist.

[...] However, my strategy was to use the Namibian legal position at the UN and take the resolutions of the United Nations as a way of presenting the legitimacy of the SWAPO struggle to the Swedish public. [...] We actually tapped not the mainstream, but the off-stream of the support groups. Those who looked at the UN as an authority, just as OAU was seen as an authority, SWAPO’s position gradually became clear to quite a number of people who had an option between supporting what they saw as ‘direct blood-letting activities’ and the UN endorsement of the right of the Namibian people to self-determination. It possibly also became clearer to the support groups, like the [Africa Groups]. Gradually, they began to ignore some of the things that were not acceptable to them and [...] to embrace SWAPO.1

In fact, SWAPO—as well as ANC of South Africa and ZANU and ZAPU of Zimbabwe—received official support from the Swedish government years before gaining political recognition by the reorganized, post-Vietnam solidarity movement. In the case of Namibia, it was only at the second national congress of the Africa Groups in Sweden in June 1976—that is, after independence in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique—that the post-Vietnam incarnation of the solidarity movement with a slight majority decided to “condemn South Africa’s occupation [...] and support SWAPO in its struggle for independence”.2 In mid-1977 still, AGIS described its relations with SWAPO as “weak”.3

1 Interview with Ben Amathila, Stockholm, 19 May 1995. The reluctance towards SWAPO had in addition to a perceived lack of ‘revolutionary militancy’ a lot to do with SWAPO’s relations with UNITA of Angola. The Swedish solidarity movement actively supported MPLA, while SWAPO in the latter part of the 1960s and in the early 1970s maintained a tactical alliance with UNITA. Despite this background, it should, however, be noted that SWAPO as early as in January 1969 was recognized by the Soviet-sponsored Khartoum conference as “the sole and legitimate authority” of Namibia, grouped together with ANC, FRELIMO, MPLA, PAIGC and ZAPU.

2 The decision was taken with 20 votes in favour and 13 against (AGIS: ‘Protokoll från AGIS’ kongress, 5–7 juni, i Björkå’/‘Minutes from the AGIS’ congress, 5–7 June 1976, at Björkå’) [no date] (AGA).

SWAPO representative, Hadino Hishongwa, the relations would, however, deteriorate anew. In connection with a visit to Sweden by Sam Nujoma in 1980, the Africa Groups, Bread and Fishes and the Isolate South Africa Committee jointly wrote him an unusually frank letter in which the relations between the solidarity organizations and the SWAPO representation in Sweden were characterized as having reached a “point of outright hostility”. The relationship was, however, normalized and the Africa Groups would during the 1980s substantially contribute to both the promotion of SWAPO in Sweden and to its humanitarian work in the refugee camps in Angola and Zambia.

Official Swedish support to SWAPO was extended from the financial year 1970/71. Following the statement by the Swedish parliament in May 1969 that Sweden could extend direct, official humanitarian assistance to African liberation movements, SWAPO submitted a request in September 1969 for financial support. It covered such different items as travel and accommodation in connection with the upcoming Tanga congress, purchase of an agricultural farm for the settlement of Namibian refugees in Zambia, scholarships for students in Tanzania and equipment to SWAPO’s offices. At its meeting on 14 October 1969, the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance decided to only recommend support for the procurement of office equipment. Although not strictly humanitarian, the recommendation was approved, and at the beginning of the financial year 1970/71 consignments of office equipment to the value of 15,000 SEK each were delivered to the SWAPO offices in Dar es Salaam and Lusaka.

For the following year, the committee decided in December 1971 to recommend an allocation of 100,000 SEK for the procurement of medicines, medical equipment, clothes and food supplies. These modest amounts would constitute the beginning of a broad and comprehensive humanitarian assistance programme. Not counting official Swedish support via the United Nations, other multilateral organizations, Swedish and non-Swedish NGOs, the direct

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1 Based in Stockholm, Hishongwa served as SWAPO’s chief representative to Scandinavia, West Germany and Austria from 1977 until 1983. In 1990, he was appointed Deputy Minister of Labour and Manpower Development in independent Namibia’s first cabinet. See Interview with Hadino Hishongwa, Windhoek, 15 March 1995.

2 In Swedish, *Isolera Sydafrika-Kommittén*.

3 Letter to Sam Nujoma from Sören Lindh (Africa Groups in Sweden) and Bertil Högborg (Bread and Fishes), 23 August 1980 [no place] (AGA).

4 CCHA: Memorandum (’Framställning från SWAPO’ /’Request by SWAPO’) by Kerstin Oldfeldt, Stockholm, 9 October 1969 (SDA).

5 CCHA: ’Protokoll’ (’Minutes’), Stockholm, 16 October 1969 (SDA).

6 Letter from SWAPO’s Acting Treasurer-General, Joseph Ithana, to SIDA’s Director [General], Dar es Salaam, 29 September 1970 (MFA).

7 CCHA: Memorandum (’Stöd till SWAPO’ /’Support to SWAPO’) by Anders Möllander, Stockholm, 6 June 1973 (SDA). At the time, SWAPO estimated that there were about 3,000 Namibian refugees in Zambia.
assistance disbursed by the Swedish government to SWAPO from 1970 until Namibia’s independence twenty years later thus amounted—in current figures—to a total of 669 million SEK.¹

¹ With outstanding payments honoured after Namibia’s independence, the direct support to SWAPO amounted in total to 671 million SEK. Based on disbursement figures according to SIDA’s annual accounts, established by Ulla Beckman for this study.
The Central African Federation

Swedish support to the nationalist cause in Zimbabwe was preceded by a Rhodesia Campaign, which—despite the name—was launched in June 1962 in support of Kenneth Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP) of Zambia. Zambia was at the time joined with Zimbabwe and Malawi in the Central African Federation. Little known outside the churches, it was Per Wästberg’s articles in Dagens Nyheter and, above all, his political account Forbidden Territory from 1960 that introduced the Federation and its constituent parts—Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi)—to the broader Swedish public. With the Swedish participation in the UN operations in Congo, Northern Rhodesia—bordering on the secessionist province of Katanga—would at the beginning of the 1960s become a familiar name. It was dramatically brought to the fore in September 1961, when the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld died in a plane crash outside Ndola on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt.

Both the liberal and social democratic movements had by that time entered into direct contact with the nationalist leadership in all the three federated British territories. As secretary general of the World Assembly of Youth (WAY), David Wirmark of the Liberal Party Youth League had, for example, in August 1958 already befriended Joshua Nkomo of Zimbabwe, then President-General of the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC). The Social Democratic Party had also initiated relations with Kamuzu Banda’s Malawi Congress Party (MCP), then the most militant of the nationalist movements in the Federation. Immediately after the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa, Kanyama Chiume of MCP—based in London and an influential member of the Steering Committee of the All-African Peoples’ Conference—was invited by the ruling party to represent the African nationalist movement and address the 1960 First of May rally in Stockholm together with Prime Minister Tage Erlander. As earlier noted, it was the first time that a Labour Day march in Stockholm included an international section and Chiume was the first Southern African leader to publicly address the Swedish workers.

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1 In his lecture on ‘National independence movements in Asia and Africa’, Olof Palme had as early as in November 1953 discussed the issue of the Central African Federation with various Swedish political student associations. According to his notes, Palme affirmed that “the [federated] countries belong to the indigenous [peoples]” (Ölof Palme: ‘Nationella självständighetsrörelser i Asien och Afrika’ / ‘National independence movements in Asia and Africa’ op. cit.).
During his stay in Stockholm, Chiume discussed the possibility of placing Malawian students in Sweden through the Social Democratic Party. Similar discussions had been initiated with Kenneth Kaunda’s UNIP of Zambia. In January 1960, Kaunda’s close colleague Simon Kapwepwe, General Treasurer of UNIP, had written to Joachim Israel at the Social Democratic Party headquarters in Stockholm, explaining that UNIP “may achieve self-government in [a] few months [time], [and the] immediate problem is staffing of our government departments [...] due to the shortage of trained personnel”. Against this background, Kapwepwe wrote, “we have thought it wise to write to friends like you and ask them if they could help us by offering [...] scholarships in all branches of arts and sciences”. The Liberal Party was also approached. In fact, its youth league had before 1960 invited Zambian students to Sweden and the question of training was again raised by Kaunda through Wirmark when they met at the Second Pan-African Youth Seminar in Dar es Salaam in August 1961. Such prominent UNIP leaders as Rupiah Banda, Emmanuel Chalabesa and Alexander Chikwanda would in this way come to Sweden for secondary and university studies in the early 1960s.

Kaunda, UNIP and Zambia played important parts in the early Swedish involvement in Southern Africa. This should be seen against the background of the political developments within the Central African Federation at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s.

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as it was formally called, was created by the British in 1953, mainly at the insistence of white settler interests in Southern Rhodesia wishing to tap the wealth generated by Northern Rhodesia’s copper mines in favour of a larger and more diversified Rhodesian economy. Federation with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was also seen as a promising vehicle to attain autonomous dominion status within the Commonwealth. To satisfy the British government that federation would not stall the political advancement of the African populations in the territories, the leading advocates of the federate plan—Godfrey Huggins in Southern Rhodesia and Roy Welensky in Northern Rhodesia—advanced the concept of a multi-racial ‘partnership’. It would, however, soon be described in terms of white supremacy. Huggins—who served as the Federation’s first Prime Minister from 1953 to 1956 (when he was succeeded by Welensky)—bluntly presented it as a partnership between “the rider and the horse”.

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1 Chiume op. cit., p. 137.
3 Interview with David Wirmark, Stockholm, 20 February 1996.
4 Interview with Kenneth Kaunda, Lusaka, 15 July 1995 and interview with David Wirmark, Stockholm, 20 February 1996. According to Wirmark, Kaunda “was at the very centre of events at the 1961 Dar es Salaam WAY seminar, where he gave us his inside story and vision on the political developments in Southern Africa. [...] The seminar itself soon became a call for Freedom and Independence Now!” (Wirmark (1997) op. cit.).
For fear of falling under domination by white Southern Rhodesia, the leading African organizations—particularly in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland—strongly opposed the federation plan. It was, as later stated by Kenneth Kaunda, seen as “a second South Africa being imposed on us. We objected to it and we fought against it”.

Under the federal constitution, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland retained their own laws and territorial governments, but surrendered control of foreign relations, defence and—above all—the federal budget, designed to divert the proceeds from Northern Rhodesia’s copper in Southern Rhodesia’s favour. The unequal and exploitative ‘partnership’ soon led to increasing opposition and activation of African nationalism. In the beginning of 1959—shortly after the All-African Peoples’ Conference in Ghana, where Banda, Kaunda and Nkomo together pledged to break up the Federation—riots broke out in Nyasaland and around twenty Malawians were shot dead. The colonial authorities reacted by introducing emergency legislation in all the three territories, followed by massive arrests and the banning of Banda’s Nyasaland African Congress (NAC), Kaunda’s Zambia African National Congress (ZANC) and Nkomo’s Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC). Kamuzu Banda was detained and Kenneth Kaunda rusticated. Joshua Nkomo was at the time in Europe and avoided arrest.

The wave of repression marked the beginning of the end of the Federation. It forced Great Britain to partly reconsider its Central African policies. The recently appointed Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan announced at the beginning of 1960 that Britain recognized a “wind of change” blowing over the continent. Kaunda was allowed freedom of movement in January 1960 and Banda was released the following April. Within a year of the bannings, NAC reappeared as the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), ZANC as the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and SRANC as the National Democratic Party.

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1 The opinion in Southern Rhodesia was more divided. While it was recognized that federation would lead to enhanced power for the white settlers, many saw the alternative of a closer union with South Africa as an even more unpleasant possibility. Some were therefore attracted by the fact that a small number of seats in the Federal Assembly were reserved for Africans. Joshua Nkomo, for example, unsuccessfully contested the Matabeleland seat in the first federal elections in 1953.


3 Among the projects made possible by Southern Rhodesia’s disproportionate share of the federal revenues were the Kariba hydroelectric scheme, the railway line to Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) and the university. After the dissolution of the Federation in 1963, Southern Rhodesia inherited these and other facilities, including most of the armed forces and the defence equipment.


5 ibid., p. 340.

6 The riots and the subsequent repression took place when Per Wästberg lived in Zimbabwe. The events are vividly described in the chapter ‘Operation Sunrise’ in Forbidden Territory.

7 Macmillan gave his famous ‘wind-of-change-speech’ to the South African parliament in Cape Town on 3 February 1960. Less than two months later, the Pretoria regime killed more than sixty unarmed demonstrators at Sharpeville and banned ANC and PAC.
To Zimbabwe via Zambia

While the Federation was eventually dissolved at the end of December 1963, it was, however, only the strategically less important and economically poorer Nyasaland which without major disturbances was constitutionally brought to national independence under Banda and MCP in July 1964.\(^1\)

In the case of the two Rhodesias, the road was considerably more rocky. Backed by Welensky’s federal government, the alliance of white settlers in the South and copper barons in the North was not ready to recognize any changing winds and give in to the African demands for democratic rule. On the contrary, in Southern Rhodesia a chain of repressive policies\(^3\) effectively neutralized the nationalist movement and eventually paved the way for the Rhodesian Front under Ian Smith, who became Prime Minister in April 1964.

With regard to Northern Rhodesia, the British government had in principle agreed to a negotiated process towards qualified African franchise and self-government along a similar path to the one in Nyasaland. A constitutional conference on the future of Northern Rhodesia was opened in London in December 1960. However, firmly opposing the territory’s right to leave the Federation, Welensky manoeuvred openly and behind the scenes to frustrate the process. Katanga’s secession under Moise Tshombe in mid-1960 was in this context seen by Welensky—backed by Portugal and the British and international Katanga lobbies\(^4\)—as an opening. By linking Katanga to the white citadel of Southern Africa, the nationalist aspirations in Northern Rhodesia could, it was argued, be thwarted and the rich territory kept under Salisbury’s control. Welensky and the mining companies therefore channelled support to Tshombe and the Katangese. To further weaken the Northern Rhodesian independence movement they supported UNIP’s main rival, Harry Nkumbula’s African National Congress (ANC), which maintained close contacts with Tshombe. Kaunda’s sympathies, meanwhile, lay with those opposing Tshombe and Katanga.

Between September 1961 and January 1963, the Swedish UN troops were on several occasions seriously engaged against Tshombe’s Katangese secession, confronting mercenaries from South Africa, France, Belgium and other countries.\(^5\) The developments were closely followed in Sweden,\(^6\) where Kenneth

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\(^1\) The draconian laws introduced in Zimbabwe at the beginning of 1959, notably the Unlawful Organizations and Preventive Detention Bills, were, however, to last for the following five years.

\(^2\) In a remarkable volte-face, Banda—who had led the most militant of the nationalist movements in the Federation—would upon independence turn away from his old nationalist allies and steer Malawi close to the white minority regimes in Southern Africa.

\(^3\) The National Democratic Party was banned in December 1961. This was followed by the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), formed the same month. In turn, ZAPU was banned in September 1962.

\(^4\) A Swedish Katanga Committee was formed in 1962.

\(^5\) There was severe fighting between the UN troops and the Katangese gendarmerie led by white mercenaries in September 1961, December 1961 and December 1962 (Sköld op. cit., p.239–241).

\(^6\) See, for example, Ronald Segal: ‘Vem ingriper först i Sydafrika: FN eller Chrustjev?’ (‘Who intervenes first in South Africa: UN or Krushchev?’) in Expressen, 7 April 1961; Per Wästberg: ‘Skörda storm’ (‘Reap the storm’) in Dagens Nyheter, 1 October 1961; and Per Wästberg: ‘Katanga och Nord-Rhodesia’ (‘Katanga and Northern Rhodesia’) in Dagens Nyheter, 6 August 1962.
Kaunda and the nationalist cause in Northern Rhodesia were presented with sympathy. Per Wästberg had already in 1960 given a brief portrait of Kaunda in his *Forbidden Territory*—comparing his political programme to that of “the early [Swedish] social democracy”\(^1\)—which he later followed up through articles in *Dagens Nyheter*. In October 1961, he wrote, for example, that “next to his close friend Julius Nyerere in Tanganyika, Kaunda is in my opinion the most impressive personality in Africa: A moralist rather than a politician, and a tactician”.\(^2\)

The following year, Sven Öste published an in-depth presentation of the UNIP leader, his background and beliefs, in *The Face of Africa*, an important collection of profiles of African political leaders. Finally, in May 1962—the same month as Kaunda paid his first visit to Sweden—Anders Ehnmark and Sven Hamrell released the political anthology *Africans on Africa*, with a chapter by Kaunda on ‘Northern Rhodesia’s Demands’.\(^3\)

**Zambia and the 1962 Rhodesia Campaign**

Through direct contacts with UNIP, Zambian students, newspaper articles and books, Kaunda was thus not unknown\(^4\) when he was invited in May 1962 to Sweden by the Social Democratic Party.\(^5\) The visit took place at a crucial time. As a result of Welensky’s pressures, the British government had the previous year started to backtrack from earlier positions regarding African representation in a constitutional dispensation for Northern Rhodesia. The frustration of African hopes led in mid-1961 to widespread protests and disorders, during which twenty-seven Zambians were killed and more than three thousand arrested, mainly on the Copperbelt, but also in the Northern and the Luapula provinces.\(^6\) And early in 1962—while Welensky was playing the Katangese card—the British revealed that they still hoped that Northern Rhodesia could be kept within the Federation.\(^7\) Nevertheless, despite dissensions within the Conser-

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3 Kaunda’s contribution was first published as *Black Government* (Lusaka, 1960). As noted, Kaunda’s *Zambia Shall Be Free* was published in Swedish by the publishing house of the Swedish Mission Covenant Church in 1963.
4 Learning about Kaunda’s visit to Sweden through the local Rhodesian newspapers, Eskil Forstenius at the Swedish consulate in Salisbury wrote a portrait of the UNIP leader for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm, *inter alia* expressing that “the veracity of Kaunda’s statements is perhaps not always the best” (letter ‘Mr Kaunda’s Stockholmsbesök’ / ‘Mr Kaunda’s visit to Stockholm’) from Eskil Forstenius to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Salisbury, 1 May 1962 (MFA).
7 Wills op. cit., p. 352.
rieb Party, Britain eventually confirmed that elections on separate racial rolls would be held in October 1962.

During his visit to Sweden, Kaunda asked for support to avert a possible catastrophe in Northern Rhodesia and, generally, in Central Africa. The call was taken up by the Liberal youth. After discussions with Emmanuel Chalabesa, a UNIP student at the University of Stockholm, and Reuben Kamanga, at the time UNIP’s Vice-President, Björn Beckman of the Liberal Student Union took the initiative of launching a fund-raising campaign in favour of Kaunda and the United National Independence Party. The Rhodesia Campaign, as it was called, was formally launched through an ’Appeal for Northern Rhodesia’ in Dagens Nyheter and other Swedish newspapers on 3 June 1962. It stated that

Kenneth Kaunda and his party, the United National Independence Party, pursue a convincing and impressive line of anti-violence in the struggle for the right to self-determination. The contrast with the sabre-rattling Welensky is huge. Because of that, UNIP must also be given the resources to successfully continue the peaceful road. Northern Rhodesia’s future will be determined at the elections in October. A

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1 Chalabesa was one of the first Zambian students in Sweden. As secretary of the Mufulira branch of the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress (NRANC)—out of which ZANC and, later, UNIP were formed—he had been active, detained and tried during the rolling strikes on the Copperbelt in 1956.

2 Telephone conversation with Björn Beckman, 6 April 1997.
victory for Kaunda is a victory for the peace-keeping forces in Central Africa, who wish to prevent the independence struggle from taking a violent course [and turn it into] a new Algerian tragedy.

[...]

The appeal was published by an ad hoc Swedish Rhodesia Committee. Among the first thirteen signatories were a number of prominent Swedish politicians, academics and journalists. As the initiative came from the Liberal youth, several Liberals—first and foremost the party chairman Bertil Ohlin—supported the call. So did the chief editors of the liberal morning and evening newspapers *Dagens Nyheter* and *Expressen*. As with earlier appeals against South Africa, no representative from the Moderate Party joined the call. A number of leading Social Democrats—such as Gunnar Myrdal and Inga Thorsson—were, however, among the first signatories, together with the chief editors of both *Stockholms-Tidningen* and *Aftonbladet*.

With support from leading Liberal and Social Democratic politicians, as well as from all the major liberal and social democratic morning and evening newspapers, the Rhodesia Campaign represented a broad, established and influential opinion in Sweden. It was, in addition, supported by a majority of the political youth organizations in the Nordic countries. In mid-August 1962, the Afro-Scandinavian Youth Congress in Oslo condemned "the financial assistance given by vested interests [...] with the sole aim of wrecking the coming general elections in Northern Rhodesia" and encouraged

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1. 'Upprop för Nord-Rhodesia' (‘Appeal for Northern Rhodesia’) in *Dagens Nyheter*, 3 June 1962.
2. The Rhodesia Committee was an ad hoc set-up for the purpose of the Rhodesia Campaign. It was never structured or institutionalized along the lines of the Swedish South Africa Committee. A separate Zimbabwean solidarity committee was never established in Sweden.
3. Olof Lagercrantz.
4. Per Wrigstad.
5. On the contrary, many members of the Moderate Party supported the Swedish Katanga Committee, set up in 1962 in defence of Tshombe and the secession of Katanga. This was the case with both the conservative youth and the party itself. Birger Hagård, who in 1963 became president of the Moderate Youth League, was a member of the Katanga Committee (interview with Birger Hagård, Stockholm, 9 October 1996) and—as was noted above—Moderate members defended the cause of Katanga in the Swedish parliament.
8. In addition, the following signed the original appeal: Axel Höjer, Signe Höjer, Ivar Lo-Johansson, Torgny Segerstedt, Herbert Tingsten and Per Wästberg. Signe Höjer had been present at the important All African Peoples’ Conference in Accra, Ghana, in December 1958, where Kamuzu Banda, Kenneth Kaunda and Joshua Nkomo pledged to oppose the Central African Federation.
the Scandinavian people, political parties and trade unions to support the fund-raising campaign which is being run by the Rhodesia Campaign Committee in Stockholm for assistance to Kaunda and [...] UNIP.1

It was most unusual that a public fund-raising campaign in support of a particular political party in foreign elections was organized in Sweden.2 This fact was soon noticed in both England and Southern Africa. At the beginning of July 1962, the conservative London newspaper The Sunday Telegraph speculated, for example, that it would “disturb the Anglo-Swedish relations”3 and in South Africa the Johannesburg paper The Sunday Times wrote that the campaign had “established a precedent which can be used not only against Mr. Kaunda’s party, but against Sweden herself”.4

The strongest reactions, however, came from Welensky’s government and, above all, from Swedish business interests in the Central African Federation. The Swedish consulate in Salisbury (now Harare) reported that the Federation government in mid-July had made enquiries regarding “the Swedish so-called Rhodesia Committee”.5 Later in the month, a Captain Robertson, member of the ruling United Federal Party (UFP) in Northern Rhodesia, asked Prime Minister Welensky in the Federal parliament “whether he [would] protest against this interference in the internal affairs of the Federation”.6 In his reply, Welensky stated that he was “making certain inquiries” into what he called “these deplorable practices”. If found that foreign governments were implicated, he would have “to consider what action ought to be taken to secure recognition of the proprieties of international behaviour”.7 Deeply involved in support of Tshombe’s Katangese secession, it seems that Welensky eventually was

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1 ASYC Report op. cit., p. 146. With six participants, UNIP had one of the largest delegations to the Afro-Scandinavian Youth Congress in Oslo, 10–31 August 1962. The UNIP participants were Rupiah Banda (elected to the presidency), Emmanuel Chalabesa (instrumental for the Swedish Rhodesia Campaign), Henry Matipa, Wilted Phiri, Edward Sampa and Lastone Tembo.

2 The issue of Swedish support to ZANU and ZAPU during the 1980 elections in Zimbabwe, to SWAPO in Namibia in 1989 and to ANC in South Africa in 1994 would be hotly debated.

3 Cited in Dagens Nyheter, 8 July 1962.

4 The Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 8 July 1962.


7 Ibid. It was also rumoured that the Swedish government and Kaunda colluded to get Swedish missionaries into the Northern Rhodesian government. During the same session, Mr. Simukonda, representing UFP in Kabwe, Northern Rhodesia, asked Welensky if he was “aware that the [Swedish] government [had] instructed Mr. Kaunda to put two Swedish missionaries as candidates for the forthcoming Northern Rhodesia general election [as] compensation for the money [to] the United National Independence Party”. Welensky replied that he was not aware of this, but that—if it was true—Kaunda was “welcome to them as far as I am concerned”. The rumours could possibly have been based on the exceptional situation in Tanganyika, where Barbro Johansson of the Church of Sweden Mission was a member of Julius Nyerere’s TANU party and elected to the first national legislature in 1959.
satisfied that the Swedish Rhodesia Campaign did not enjoy any official support from the Erlander government and he, therefore, let the matter rest.

Meanwhile, representatives of Swedish business interests remained upset. According to the Swedish consulate in Salisbury, Donald Chase, the head of Atlas Copco Rhodesia, complained at the beginning of August that six of the company’s clients “had been highly irritated by the Swedish action in support of the subversive elements in Northern Rhodesia”, adding that “the resistance against Atlas Copco’s products could have difficult consequences for […] the company in the whole of Rhodesia, particularly if Kaunda […] comes to power”. Eskil Forstenius at the consulate also reported to the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm that “it is perhaps understandable if people start to get irritated by the constant and not exactly constructive criticism of the conditions here in Rhodesia”.

The elections in October 1962 led to the formation of a coalition UNIP-ANC government, ending Welensky’s hopes that Northern Rhodesia could be kept within the Federation. Kaunda entered the government as Minister for Local Government and Social Welfare and immediately started to negotiate with the British for a new, less racially biased constitution. As a follow-up to the Swedish Rhodesia Campaign, he was in early May 1963 once again invited to Sweden, this time by the Liberal Party Youth League and the Swedish Students’ UN Association. When news about the visit reached the Swedish government, Kaunda’s counterpart, Sven Aspling, Minister for Social Affairs, also extended an invitation to official discussions.

Kaunda’s visit took place at the end of May 1963, immediately after he had attended the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa. Not yet leading a government and despite the fact that the process towards Zambia’s independence was still fraught with difficulties, Kaunda—described by Expressen’s Gunnar Nilsson as “the most gentle” and by Dagens Nyheter’s Sven Öste as “one of the noblest” of Africa’s leaders—was given an extraordinary welcome. He met representatives of the Swedish government, industry and the aid agency, NIB. He also appeared on radio and television and addressed a fully packed hall at the Stockholm School of Economics. The attention was largely due to the Swedish Rhodesia Campaign, but also to the

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1 Peter Wallenberg, a leading member of the younger generation of the Wallenberg family, had been Managing Director of Atlas Copco Rhodesia from 1959 until 1962. He was at the same time responsible for the company’s operations in Congo.
2 Letter (‘Svenska Rhodesia-kommittén’/’The Swedish Rhodesia Committee’) from Eskil Forstenius to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Salisbury, 6 August 1962 (MFA).
3 Ibid.
4 Cable (‘Kaundas besök’/’Kaunda’s visit’) from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Swedish consulate in Salisbury, Stockholm, 9 May 1963 (MFA).
5 Ibid.
6 Expressen, 26 May 1963.
7 Dagens Nyheter, 24 May 1963.
8 In Swedish, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm.
fact that the consumer boycott against South Africa had been launched only three months earlier, highlighting the situation in Southern Africa.

The Rhodesia Committee’s fund-raising campaign for Kaunda and UNIP resulted in the modest amount of 60,000 SEK. Nevertheless, it marked the beginning of Sweden’s assistance to Zambia. The campaign, furthermore, largely explains why the Liberal Party—together with the Centre Party—via the early commitment to the nationalist cause in Northern Rhodesia during the second half of the 1960s appeared as a strong advocate of the liberation movements in Zimbabwe, in particular of Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU, which was close to Kaunda’s UNIP. After the split between ZANU and ZAPU, Kaunda would in April 1964 publicly recognize Nkomo as the “leader of the Southern Rhodesian people”.

After new elections in January 1964—in which UNIP won 55 of the 65 contested seats—Kaunda emerged as the youngest Prime Minister in the Commonwealth. Having negotiated an agreement on full national independence for the Republic of Zambia in London in May 1964, he immediately contacted the Swedish government for assistance, sending Simon Kapwepwe, the Minister of Home Affairs, to Stockholm to “discuss [...] problems that will face our country when we become independent next October”. In a letter to Foreign Minister Nilsson in mid-May 1964, Kaunda wrote that

> Zambia, like most newly independent countries in Africa, faces immense problems in building a nation. If we are to succeed with our tasks, then we require generous assistance [from] our friends. Recalling the valuable assistance the people of Sweden gave my party in its struggle for freedom and the great kindness shown to me on my visit to Sweden, I am confident that our request for help in solving our new problems will not be in vain.

During talks in Sweden in May 1964, Kapwepwe emphasized his country’s needs in the areas of “agricultural training, cooperative societies and youth [development]”. Together with support in the fields of health and education, they would feature prominently in the future development cooperation programme between independent Zambia and Sweden.

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1 Dala-Demokraten, 11 June 1963.
2 The Liberal Party Youth League launched another Rhodesia Campaign at the beginning of 1968, this time in favour of ZAPU.
3 Cited in Pettman op. cit., p. 19.
4 Letter from Kenneth Kaunda to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lusaka, 19 May 1964 (MFA).
5 Ibid.
6 Letter from Simon Kapwepwe to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lusaka, 18 June 1964 (MFA). The areas of proposed cooperation were close to the interests of the Swedish Centre Party.
7 Swedish development cooperation with Zambia started in 1965 and Zambia was in the late 1960s included as one of the priority countries for Swedish assistance. As of 30 June 1995, a total amount of 6.9 billion SEK (in fixed prices; 1995) had been disbursed to Zambia through SIDA.
With Kenneth Kaunda as President, Zambia became independent on 24 October 1964. However, the problems of nation-building were only a year later greatly compounded by the fact that Ian Smith and his Rhodesian Front in neighbouring Rhodesia (formerly Southern Rhodesia) on 11 November 1965 announced a Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Great Britain. For the next ten years, Zambia would more than any other country suffer the consequences of this rebellion in defence of white settler interests.

The Domboshawa Indaba

The Rhodesian Front (RF) was founded in March 1962. Representing the extreme political right, it also campaigned against the Central African Federation, but with a policy of ‘Rhodesia First’, stressing the primacy of white settler interests, maintenance of land segregation and opposition to British government control. RF won the Southern Rhodesian elections in December 1962 and its President, Winston Field, became Prime Minister. Failing to get British approval for an independent Southern Rhodesia, Field was replaced in April 1964 by Ian Smith, under whose leadership the party made independence its chief cause at the same time as the repression of the African nationalist organizations was intensified.

Immediately after coming to power, Smith turned against Joshua Nkomo, who was to spend most of the following ten years without trial in various jails and prison camps. In August 1964, both ZANU and Nkomo’s PCC (ZAPU) were banned.¹ The ZANU President Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and Secretary General Robert Mugabe were at the same time detained and would, like Nkomo and hundreds of African nationalists, spend the next decade in prisons or remote detention camps without being brought before a court of law.² As a result of the sweeping arrests, there were according to the humanitarian organizations in the country in May 1965—before UDI—almost 2,000 political prisoners in Smith’s Rhodesia.³ Via SIDA, the Swedish government

¹ ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) was formed in August 1963 by dissident members of ZAPU opposed to Joshua Nkomo’s plans to set up a Zimbabwean government-in-exile. At the inaugural congress in May 1964, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole was elected President and Robert Mugabe Secretary General. The older ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union), a successor to the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (banned in February 1959) and to the National Democratic Party (NDP; banned in December 1961), was formed in December 1961. Led by Joshua Nkomo, ZAPU was in turn banned in September 1962. It was reconstituted as the People’s Caretaker Council (PCC) in August 1963, parallel to the formation of ZANU. When PCC was also banned and its leaders either detained or forced into exile, the name PCC was dropped and ZAPU re-introduced. In December 1963, the recently formed OAU Liberation Committee in Dar es Salaam recognized both ZANU and PCC/ZAPU as genuine Zimbabwean liberation movements.
² Sithole was in and out of prison until early 1969, when he was sentenced to six years on a charge of having plotted to kill Ian Smith. Mugabe remained imprisoned from August 1964 until December 1974, when he—together with Nkomo and Sithole—was released to participate in constitutional talks with Ian Smith in Lusaka, Zambia.
³ SIDA: ‘Protokoll från styrelsemöte’ (‘Minutes from board meeting’), Stockholm, 21 December 1965 (SDA).
would from the same year channel financial support to many of the families of
the prisoners.

The repression of the nationalist organizations was coupled with a policy of
revival and cooption of African chiefs and headmen in the Tribal Trust Lands
(TTLs), that is, the rural areas ‘apportioned’ to the black population and
formerly known as ‘native reserves’. A Council of Chiefs was set up in 1961 to
represent African concerns in the TTLs. The Smith regime frequently turned to
the council, both to undermine the nationalist movement and to elicit support
for its own policies. After banning ZANU and PCC (ZAPU) and jailing their
leaders, in October 1964 the government assembled some 600 chiefs and head-
men for an indaba at Domboshawa outside Salisbury in order to convince
Britain that the African population supported the demands for independence.

The convocation was not publicly announced and the area “sealed off by
military forces to avoid interference from African nationalists.” As expected, at
the end of the meeting the chiefs unanimously announced their acceptance of
the Rhodesian Front’s plans to declare Rhodesia independent from Britain.

The Domboshawa gathering took place at the same time as Zambia cele-
brated its national independence across the Zambezi and it was apprehensively
followed by the Organization of African Unity. The Swedish honorary consul in
Salisbury, Sven Bouvin, was present at the final session of the stage-managed
meeting, invited by the Southern Rhodesian Secretary for Defence and Foreign
Affairs. When Bouvin’s presence became known, it immediately provoked
severe criticism. The government of Tanzania, in particular, strongly censured
Sweden for condoning an “illegal and unconstitutional act”. In a diplomatic
aide-memoire handed over to the Swedish ambassador in Dar es Salaam, Julius
Nyerere’s government stated that “the attendance of observers from Sweden is
not the kind of action which African countries, and the United Republic of
Tanzania in particular, have come to expect”. The note contrasted the Swedish
presence with the absence of the British, “who declined to send an observer

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1 The land question was central to the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. Through the Land
Apportionment Act of 1930, the African majority was allocated a mere 20% of the land, covering the
poorer soils and divided into scattered ‘reservois’. The Tribal Trust Lands were formed in the early
1960s, fragmented into more than 160 units. The nomination of African chiefs was controlled by the
white government, which used them as paid government servants to administer the rural areas
‘according to tribal custom and tradition’.

2 Indaba is a Nguni word for ‘council’, ‘meeting’ or ‘discussion’, widely used in Southern Africa.

3 Ken Flower: Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record—Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964 to 1981,

4 R. Kent Rasmussen: Historical Dictionary of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, The Scarecrow Press, Metuchen,

5 Letter from Sven Bouvin to the Swedish legation in Pretoria, Salisbury, 18 December 1964 (MFA).

6 Letter (‘Svensk närvaro vid hövdingmöte i Sydrhodesia’/ ‘Swedish presence at chiefs’ meeting in
Southern Rhodesia’) from Knut Granstedt to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam,
26 November 1964 (MFA).

7 Aide-Memoire from the government of Tanzania to the government of Sweden [no date], attached
to a letter from Philemon Paul Muro, ambassador of Tanzania, to the Chief of Protocol of the
Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 3 December 1964 (MFA).
because they did not regard the *indaba* consultations as either representative or adequate".\(^1\) Finally, in a letter to the Chief of Protocol of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Tanzania’s ambassador in Stockholm, Philemon Paul Muro, underlined that his government wished to “remind Sweden that they should be more considerate to our African problems”.\(^2\)

Coming from a government with which the ruling Social Democratic Party maintained exceptionally close and friendly relations, it was a strong protest. The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs had no previous knowledge of the *indaba*\(^3\) and had not instructed Bouvin to attend. The Tanzanian government, however, took a firm, principled stand and did not accept any excuses. After the Swedish ambassador to Tanzania, Knut Granstedt, "repeatedly [had conveyed to the Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs] that the consul had acted entirely on his own and probably for sheer reasons of protocol", he had to "conclude that the Swedish explanation unfortunately [did] not dispel [Tanzania’s] displeasure".\(^4\)

Bouvin’s presence at the meeting was soon forgotten.\(^5\) Essentially a storm in a teacup, it nevertheless underlined independent Africa’s principled views and sensitivity to Sweden’s relations with the white minority regimes in Southern Africa. It also highlighted the importance of better coordination between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm and Sweden’s official representations in Southern Africa, in particular—as with the consular missions—where political and commercial loyalties could enter into conflict. The Swedish anti-apartheid movement had in late October 1964, that is, at the very time of the Domboshawa meeting, in a letter to Foreign Minister Nilsson criticized such a conflict in the case of Swedish consuls in South Africa, representing the Transatlantic shipping company and other Swedish business interests.\(^6\) If publicly known, Bouvin’s role could have been quoted in this context. Defending his presence at the *indaba* in a letter to Hugo Tamm, the Swedish envoy to South Africa, Bouvin insisted in mid-December 1964 that “it would [have been] most discourteous to decline the Minister’s invitation, particularly as [...] a consul should always endeavour to maintain friendly relations with [the] authorities in the countries to which he is appointed”.\(^7\) He had, however, vested interests in

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\(^1\) Ibid. Representatives from twenty countries were invited to the Domboshawa *indaba*. Those present were Australia, Austria, France, Greece, Norway, Portugal, South Africa and Sweden.

\(^2\) Letter from Muro to the Chief of Protocol, Stockholm, 3 December 1964 (MFA).

\(^3\) According to a later letter from Jean-Christophe Öberg of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Peter Wallensteen, Stockholm, 29 September 1965 (MFA).

\(^4\) Letter from Granstedt to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam, 26 November 1964 (MFA).

\(^5\) In his memoirs, Ian Smith gives the *indaba* a prominent role, stating that “eight nations”—among them Sweden—“agreed to send observers [to the meeting]” (Ian Douglas Smith: *The Great Betrayal*, Blake Publishing, London, 1997, p. 81).

\(^6\) Letter from the Gothenburg South Africa Committee to Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson, Gothenburg, 22 October 1964 (AJC).

\(^7\) Letter from Bouvin to the Swedish legation in Pretoria, Salisbury, 18 December 1964 (MFA).
keeping friendly relations with the regime and would—after the announcement of UDI and the subsequent closure of the Swedish consulate in Salisbury—openly declare his stand. In addition to representing several Swedish companies in Southern Rhodesia, Bouvin was the head of an asbestos mine controlled by the Swedish company Svenska Eternitbolaget. Interviewed by Aftonbladet just after UDI, he said that he was “staying in Rhodesia to run [his] businesses. [...] You have to be optimistic. Ian Smith has a relatively fair chance to make it. People down here do not at all react to the threat of sanctions. They do not believe in it”.1 Relieved from his consular duties, Bouvin criticized the decision to close the consulate. “The Swedish government”, he said, “has left 150 Swedes [in the country] completely hanging in the air [...], without [any] consular protection”.2

Per Wästberg in Zimbabwe

Outside the churches, Zimbabwe3 was little known by the Swedish public until Per Wästberg started to publish his impressions in Dagens Nyheter in March 1959. The country was before that “basically seen as an extension of South Africa, where the real problems and possibilities were”.4 Wästberg had been given a scholarship by Rotary International in December 1958 to study African literature and anthropology at the new University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in Salisbury. He later wrote that he at the time knew something about South Africa and Kenya, Congo and West Africa. But Rhodesia and Nyasaland were no man’s lands. Educated friends had difficulties in pointing out Nyasaland on the map and they had not heard of Bulawayo or Lusaka. [...] I was therefore happy to travel to a country which was relatively unknown and not much written about.5

Wästberg—who at the time was only twenty-five years old, although already an established writer and journalist6—arrived in Zimbabwe in early 1959 and stayed there until July. At close quarters, he witnessed the African resistance against the Central African Federation, the agitation and riots in February–

1 Aftonbladet, 24 November 1965.
2 Ibid. Almost all the Swedes were attached to the Church of Sweden Mission. At the time of UDI, there were 68 CSM missionaries in the country. Including children, the CSM community numbered 127 Swedish citizens. (CSM: ‘Press release’, Uppsala, 12 November 1965) (CSA).
3 Although the name of the country officially became Zimbabwe only at independence in April 1980, it will here be used. Southern Rhodesia, Rhodesia or Zimbabwe–Rhodesia will be used where they appear in quotations from original documents, in conference titles etc.
6 Wästberg had already made his literary debut at the age of fifteen with Pojke med Såpbubblor (‘Boy with Soap-Bubbles’) (1949), a collection of short stories.
March 1959, the banning of the nationalist movements and the subsequent mass arrests of their leaders and members in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. Through his university contacts and, above all, his friendship with the Zimbabwean journalist Willie Musarurwa—who in July 1960 became a founder and executive member of the National Democratic Party—Wästberg became close to the nationalist opposition. His stand in favour of the African majority was at the time uncommon and attracted criticism not only from whites in Zimbabwe, but also from some of the more concerned Swedish missionaries in the country. *Forbidden Territory* was, for example, in August 1960 described as “one-sided” by the Methodist missionary Lennart Blomquist, who—running a project at Headlands in favour of families of detained nationalists—was closely involved with the Zimbabwean peasant movement and had established good contacts with several African church leaders, such as the future bishop and political leader Abel Muzorewa.

Wästberg, however, replied that “only a clear stand in favour of the democratic African movements can save the whites in Southern Rhodesia. Nothing will stop the Africans from becoming free”, adding that “the missionaries play an important role in the new Africa, [but] it is important that the churches [also] take a stand in the political conflict”.

During his stay in Zimbabwe, Wästberg—who like Herbert Tingsten would become chief editor of *Dagens Nyheter*—wrote a number of major articles on Zimbabwe and the Central African Federation in the Swedish Liberal newspaper, appearing from March 1959 under the heading ‘Per Wästberg in Africa’. The articles, which were also published in the Swedish-language Finnish

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1 To protect Musarurwa, Wästberg calls him Joshua Mutsingi in *Forbidden Territory*. Musarurwa later became Public Relations Secretary in Joshua Nkomo’s PCC/ZAPU. Together with the ZAPU leadership, he was detained for more than ten years, mainly at the Gonakudzingwa camp and in the Gweru prison, before being released in December 1974.

2 The CSM missionary teacher Tore Bergman, who at the time was based in the Mberengwa area, recalled in 1997 that “there were some Letters to the Editor in the [local] papers concerning [Wästberg’s] general attitude towards the farmers and the farm workers. They did not like the way in which he fraternized with the local employees” (interview with Tore Bergman, Uppsala, 10 February 1997).


4 In an interview with Bishop Abel Muzorewa in 1996, he said that “the first white home to which I was invited to actually spend two nights was the Swedish home of Lennart Blomquist and his family. That was at Mutambara. I had been invited for a meeting on the mission station. It was very important for me. I consider the context and the attitudes of our time racially and that was the first time that I actually stayed in a white home as a guest” (interview with Abel Muzorewa, Harare, 26 November 1996).


6 Tingsten was still the chief editor of *Dagens Nyheter* when Wästberg wrote his articles from Africa. Wästberg was chief editor of the newspaper between 1976 and 1982.

morning paper *Hufvudstadsbladet*, attracted the attention of Roy Welensky’s government. Wästberg was called to the federal Ministry of Home Affairs, where he was told that the government had informed the Rotary Club in Salisbury that he had “betrayed [the association] concerning international understanding and good will”. After only six months in the country, he was asked to leave.

Returning to Sweden via South Africa, in September 1959 Wästberg set up the Swedish Fund for the Victims of Racial Oppression in South Africa together with the former Church of Sweden missionary Gunnar Helander. At the same time, he wrote *Forbidden Territory*, a political account of his experiences and impressions from Zimbabwe and the wider Central African Federation. The book, which appeared in April 1960—just after the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa—had an unprecedented impact. Eventually published in the extraordinary number of 90,000 copies in Sweden alone—and in about a quarter of a million copies worldwide—it truly entered Swedish homes. Both a very personal account and a political analysis, the book covered such different subjects as the intellectual life in Zimbabwe, the 1959 emergency, the African opposition, the work of the Swedish mission, the detention camps and the conditions for African workers on a white settler farm. In his own words written by “an observer who was surprised”, the sum total was a devastating indictment of the white minority regime.

Published six years after Herbert Tingsten’s important *The Problem of South Africa* and, similarly, widely used in study circles all over the country, *Forbidden Territory* became a turning point for a generation of Swedes. Together with his *On the Black List* about South Africa from October 1960—over the years published in just under 80,000 copies—it not only opened the eyes of the Swedish public to the oppressive conditions of the African population in Southern Africa, but, in general, contributed to a new awareness regarding the developing countries. It occupies a prominent position among the background factors and conditions that eventually led to the official Swedish involvement on the side of the Southern African liberation movements.

1 A portrait of the Prime Minister of the Central African Federation, Roy Welensky, was also published by *Berlingske Tidende* in Denmark. See Per Wästberg: ‘Sir Roy tar emot’ (‘Sir Roy receives’) in *Dagens Nyheter*, 19 April 1959; *Hufvudstadsbladet*, 19 April 1959; and *Berlingske Tidende*, 1 May 1959.
4 *Forbidden Territory* contains a chapter (‘Fängelsesöndag’/’Prison Sunday’) on a visit to the Kentucky detention camp just outside Salisbury. It was the first time that the Zimbabwean version of concentration camps was described to an international public.
6 With translations into foreign languages *On the Black List* would eventually be published in a total of around 155,000 copies (Ryberg (1973 and 1983) op. cit.).
Like Tingsten in his book on South Africa, Wästberg was "surprisingly generous"\(^1\) in his assessment of the Swedish missions. Visiting the headquarters of the Church of Sweden Mission (CSM) at Mnene in the south-western part of Zimbabwe, he

felt relieved [...] at finally meeting people for whom the work in the new country is a privilege which gives life a meaning. [...] At Mnene everything was racial harmony. The state of emergency did not reach there. The African headmaster of the school was a wise and balanced man, who supported the government because he was well off at the mission station and really could not imagine how other Africans lived. He was a cousin of Joshua Nkomo, the leader of the National Congress. [...] Mnene could become something more than the great [place] it already is. It could symbolize that cooperation between the races is possible within Rhodesia’s borders. But that would require less submissiveness to the state and more knowledge about, and understanding of, the ‘other world’ of trade unions and nationalism, dam constructions, strikes, mines and slums.\(^2\)

In 1965, the Zimbabwean journalist and ZANU leader Nathan Shamuyarira wrote in his *Crisis in Rhodesia* that "nine out of ten nationalist leaders have been educated at mission schools."\(^3\) Due to the importance of CSM for the formation of the Swedish opinion on Zimbabwe, this is far from irrelevant. It was, for example, through the church that the Swedish public at an early stage started to have direct access to the writings of the Zimbabwean leaders in the Swedish language. In 1960—the year after the English original—the publishing house of the Swedish Mission Covenant Church released Reverend Sithole’s classic *African Nationalism*. A contribution by Sithole was also included in *Africa Narrates*, a literary anthology in Swedish published by Wästberg in 1961.

Sithole was an early member of the National Democratic Party. Together with leaders such as Leopold Takawira and Robert Mugabe, he broke with Joshua Nkomo and formed ZANU in August 1963. The fact that Sithole by that time was already known in Sweden served in ZANU’s favour. As pointed out by CSM’s former Southern Africa secretary Carl Fredrik Hallencreutz, with the Swedish translation of *African Nationalism* “ready at hand, Swedes could not easily dismiss the new movement”.\(^4\) More important for Sweden’s future support to both ZANU and ZAPU was that the Church of Sweden Mission was dominant in a large, multi-lingual geographical area where the communities tended to be closely associated with the urban political movements and organizations. In a study of the Lutheran church and the liberation struggle, the Zimbabwean historian Ngwabi Bhebe—himself coming from CSM schools—

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1 Hallencreutz op. cit., p. 13.
3 Nathan M. Shamuyarira: *Crisis in Rhodesia*, Andre Deutsch, London, 1965, p. 141. Shamuyarira, however, added that “nearly all [of them] would say today that they mistrust the Church as a whole” (ibid.).
concluded that "before they were banned, ZAPU and ZANU were very strong in the missions among staff and members". The influence of the two liberation movements in the CSM missionary area would dramatically resurface during the latter part of the 1970s, bringing the Church of Sweden closer to the liberation struggle.

The Missionary Connection

Swedish missionaries were late in coming to Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, due to the influence of the mission and to the absence of other tangible Swedish interests, the church connection would for a long time constitute an almost exclusive link between the two countries and merits more than a passing comment.

A number of Swedish companies had established a presence in Zimbabwe at a relatively early stage. They were, however, primarily set up as sales' offices of subsidiary companies in South Africa, covering the combined market of British Central Africa, that is, including Malawi and Zambia (and often—as in the case of companies active in the mining sector—the Katanga province of Congo). From an economic point of view, direct trade between Sweden and Zimbabwe was, however, insignificant. As already noted, it can be estimated that Zimbabwe in 1950 received as little as 0.06% of total Swedish exports and that its share of Swedish imports amounted to around 0.01%. Zimbabwe was thus of marginal material importance and to the extent that the country was known at all in Sweden, the opinion was largely shaped by missionaries. Correspondingly, it was through contacts with the Swedish missions that people in Zimbabwe formed their first, general ideas about Sweden. Independent Zimbabwe’s first President, Canaan Banana—himself a Methodist minister—has emphasized the role of the missions for the relationship between the two countries, saying that

the missionary work played an important role and that missionaries—although they were also divided between a progressive and a conservative element—were concerned about the plight of the majority of the black people of this country. From time to time they submitted written reports to their home missions. Others wrote to magazines [...] to give the Swedish people a picture of the situation [...]. Also, do not forget that they had begun a trans-Atlantic voyage and that a few Africans who got scholarships from the mission centres were beginning to study in Europe. They became a kind of ally through which the church and the people of Sweden generally would be introduced and exposed to the nature of our struggle.


2 Interview with Canaan Banana, Harare, 3 June 1996.
The missionary influence has, likewise, been stressed by leaders such as Ndabaningi Sithole\(^1\) and Abel Muzorewa,\(^2\) although both of them—like Banana—represent religious denominations other than the official Swedish Lutheran faith. The political significance of the early missionary connection is further underlined by the fact that the first ZANU representatives appointed to Sweden were selected on the basis of previous contacts with the Church of Sweden Mission and, as such, assumed to have a basic knowledge of the Swedish society.\(^3\) In the case of the African National Council (ANC), set up in December 1971 to oppose the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposals and led by the two Methodists Abel Muzorewa and Canaan Banana, Erling Söderström, a son of the Swedish CSM missionary teacher Hugo Söderström, was even appointed as the official representative to Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries.\(^4\)

The ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo also maintained close contacts with the Swedish mission. And when Robert Mugabe—himself a Catholic—in September 1977 paid his first visit to Sweden, he included a meeting with CSM at its

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\(^1\) In July 1995, Sithole—himself a Congregationalist minister from the United Church of Christ—stated that the Swedish support to the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe began as an "involvement by the missions. Sweden had a very big mission in this country at Mnene. Incidentally, my first child was born at that mission. [...] When the struggle started, somehow the good-hearted people at Mnene sympathized with the African nationalist cause and we were able to send some of our fellows to Sweden. My own son, for instance, got into a family there. [...] My daughter also got there through a Swedish family. But it is not only my family that benefited from being kept by Swedish families during the struggle, but other families as well. [...] I was trained at Dadaya mission, two or three hundred miles away from the Mnene mission. Mnene mission was Lutheran and Dadaya was of the United Church of Christ, but we used to have inter-sports and a good number of my friends came from Mnene. [...] The missionary involvement is always very important" (interview with Ndabaningi Sithole, Harare, 25 July 1995).

\(^2\) Addressing the question why Sweden and the other Nordic countries had become closely involved in the national liberation struggle in Southern Africa in general, Muzorewa—bishop of the United Methodist Church—said in November 1996: "I have tried to think what the reasons could be. I know that they are not former colonizers, so it would not be like in the cases of Britain or France. As a Christian myself, I want to believe that their involvement [...] came from the church influence that they had [...] [and that they] wanted to share with others. But they did not only share their beliefs. They also shared their sons and daughters, who came to Zimbabwe as preachers, ministers of religion, nurses and educators. These people came as missionaries and I believe that the Scandinavian countries, so to speak, later continued to be missionaries in the social, political and economic life in this part of the world" (interview with Abel Muzorewa, Harare, 26 November 1996).

\(^3\) Interview with Ndabaningi Sithole, Harare, 25 July 1995. ZAPU also appointed representatives to Sweden with a background in CSM schools. This was, for example, at the beginning of the 1970s the case with Phineas Makhurane, who studied at the University of Uppsala. After independence, Makhurane became pro vice-chancellor of the University of Zimbabwe and later vice-chancellor of the National University of Science and Technology.

\(^4\) After attending a white school, Erling Söderström became involved in nationalist politics. Taking active part in student demonstrations at the United Theological College in Salisbury against the 1971 Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposals, he was—at the age of eighteen—expelled from Zimbabwe in March 1972. He returned to Sweden, where he continued his studies at the University of Stockholm. In spite of his young age, he was appointed representative of ANC in Scandinavia and held in that capacity several meetings with SIDA and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. See, for example, CCHA: Memorandum ("Samtal 1973 01 16 och 1973 01 19 med Sverige-representant för African National Council, ANC (Rhodesia)'/Discussions 16.01.1973 and 19.01.1973 with representative to Sweden of the African National Council, ANC (Rhodesia)') by Anders Möllander, Stockholm, 22 January 1973 (SDA).
headquarters in Uppsala, where he talked about the role of the church in an independent Zimbabwe.¹

Three different missionary ventures with Swedish connections were embarked upon in Zimbabwe in the early 20th century.² The first was the Lutheran initiative in the Mberengwa area in the south-western part of what today is the Midlands province, emanating from the Church of Sweden Mission in Zululand. The second formed part of a broader international Methodist initiative and had its centre at Old Umtali outside Mutare in the Manicaland province. The third was a Pentecostal enterprise at Gwanda in southern Matabeleland South. The Swedish Pentecostal Mission at Gwanda existed, however, only a few years before it was transferred to CSM in 1928.

There were close links between the Methodist Church in Sweden and the missionary initiative of the United Methodist Church (then the Methodist Episcopal Church) at Old Umtali. The Swedish nurses and midwives Ellen Björk-

¹ Tord Harlin: ‘Minnesanteckningar förda vid samtalen mellan representanter för den Patriotiska Frontens ZANU-grupp, Lutherska Världsförbundets svenska sektion och Svenska Kyrkans Mission’ (’Notes from the discussions between representatives of the ZANU group of the Patriotic Front, the Swedish section of the Lutheran World Federation and the Church of Sweden Mission’), Uppsala, 19 September 1977 (CSA). At the meeting, Mugabe criticized the Swedish mission for not denouncing the Smith regime in sufficiently clear terms. Hugo Söderström of CSM—the father of Erling Söderström, the ANC representative—shared this view, stating that “we have to admit that we have not done as much as the Roman Catholic church when it comes to protests against the regime in Rhodesia”. (The Catholic church is the largest Christian church in Zimbabwe, with just under half a million members. During the war of liberation, no church spoke out so publicly as the Catholic church, nor suffered as many casualties, both at the hands of the guerrillas and the security forces. Thus, one bishop, twenty-three expatriate missionaries and one local priest were killed, one bishop and eighteen missionaries deported and more than sixty mission stations, schools and hospitals closed. See Janice McLaughlin: On the Frontline: Catholic Missions in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War, Baobab Books, Harare, 1996.)

² For a good summary of the early Swedish missionary initiatives in Zimbabwe, see Hallencreutz op. cit.
lund, who came to Old Umtali in 1913 after four years at Inhambane in Mozambique, and Ruth Hansson, who joined her there in 1926, made, for example, important contributions to the mission’s health services. Both of them had close and special personal relations to bishop Muzorewa.¹ The Methodist missionary venture was, however, of a broader, international character. Its impact on the bilateral relations between Sweden and Zimbabwe could not be compared to that of the official Church of Sweden Mission, which played a dominant role in the Mberengwa-Gwanda-Beitbridge area.

In 1900, CSM decided to extend its activities north of the Limpopo,² although the year 1903—when the Mnene farm south of Mberengwa was purchased—is considered as the actual beginning of the missionary endeavour in Zimbabwe. Due to adverse conditions, it was, however, not until 1908 that a permanent CSM presence was established. The first baptism took place in 1911. During the 1920s and the 1930s, the three-pronged approach of preaching the gospel in combination with formal education and medical services rapidly bore fruit. After the takeover of the mission station at Gwanda and the extension of the missionary field to southern Matabeleland, a number of new stations were opened. To the first mission at Mnene were added Masase (1920), Gwanda (1928), Musume (1932), Zezani (1932), Manama (1938) and Masingo (1932).³ In the beginning, they were regarded as part of the Swedish Lutheran mission in South Africa, but in 1934 a local missionary committee was established in Zimbabwe. In 1959, Arvid Albertsson, who previously had developed the Manama mission, took office as the first bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Zimbabwe (ELCZ) and in 1975 Jonas Shiri was consecrated as the first African bishop.

The liberation war reached Mberengwa in 1976. All the Swedish missionaries were then withdrawn by CSM. The process was, however, reversed at the beginning of 1977, when ZAPU provoked a massive departure of more than 300 school children, teachers, nurses and even a clergyman from the Manama

¹ In his autobiography, Muzorewa refers to Miss Björklund as the nurse who saved his life after a premature birth in 1925 (Rise up and Walk, Evans Brothers Limited, London, 1978, p. 1) and in an interview in November 1996 he talked about both Sister Ellen and Sister Ruth: “[T]he first white person that I ever met, so to speak, was the Swedish nurse Sister Ellen Björklund. She was the midwife when I was born [...] I probably would have been just sand or mud—nothing—if she had not been there, because I was born a premature baby and in those days, with all due respect to my African ancestors, people did not know what to do with a premature baby, except to just put it in a pot and throw it away. But because she was there, I was saved. That was my very dramatic first contact with Scandinavia, or specifically with Sweden. Sister Björklund is buried at Old Umtali and whenever I go to the cemetery I clean up the grave and put flowers on it, because she means a lot to me. When I grew up, there was also a female Swedish nurse, Sister Ruth Hansson. She was a good friend of my parents and the last person that my wife worked for before she got married to me. I used to go to her house to see my wife-to-be. [...] I [later] had to go and see her [in Sweden], up in the mountains” (interview with Abel Muzorewa, Harare, 26 November 1996).

² For the history of the Church of Sweden Mission in Zimbabwe, see Söderström op. cit. and Bhebe op. cit.

mission to Zambia, a dramatic event that led to CSM’s direct involvement in humanitarian assistance to the liberation movement.

Over the years, the missionary field in south-western Zimbabwe would develop into CSM’s most important operation in Southern Africa, involving more Swedish missionaries, indigenous evangelists, schools, pupils, clinics and patients than in the older field in South Africa. The spiritual impact can be illustrated by the fact that well over 180,000 people out of a total population of around 350,000 in the three districts of Mberengwa, Gwanda and Beitbridge according to the 1982 Zimbabwe census claimed to be Christians. To this should be added significant social achievements in the areas of education and health. Nevertheless, dominated by pietistic ‘old-church’ values, the Swedish Lutheran enterprise was for a long time largely seen as a crusade against both heathendom and other churches, leaving little latitude for the indigenous population’s political concerns. Bhebe has commented that the Swedish missionaries [...] insisted on abstention from participating in Rhodesian politics by first emphasizing their differences of nationality from the Rhodesian white settlers and secondly by upholding the Lutheran doctrine of the two kingdoms, which taught that citizens must be obedient to their secular rulers because they represented the will of God. Swedish missionaries had therefore in the sixties and early seventies frowned upon the church employees who actively participated in nationalist politics, as that was regarded as a form of rebelliousness against, if not actual attack upon the secular rulers.

As noted by Banana, there were both conservative and more progressive missionaries. The latter would from the mid-1960s—in particular after Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence; in itself a rebellion against secular rule—become increasingly open to the political aspirations of the African majority. One of them was the CSM educationalist Tore Bergman, son of the pioneer missionary Johannes Bergman and born in Zimbabwe. He served as the first principal of the CSM secondary school at Chegato from 1957 to 1966, at the same time assisting with the establishment of the secondary schools at Musume,

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1 Paulos Matjaka Nare: ‘Education and War’ in Bhebe and Ranger (eds.) op. cit., p. 130.
2 In 1965, CSM/ELCZ was running 175 primary schools with a total of 24,000 pupils; 2 secondary schools with 400 pupils; 4 hospitals—at Mnene, Manama, Masase and Musume—treating an average of 15,000 patients annually; and 9 clinics with a corresponding figure of around 100,000 out-patients (CSM: 'Press Release', Uppsala, 12 November 1965) (CSA).
4 The Church of Sweden has never been a monolithic, homogeneous body. It contains various currents and trends, including a pietistic and a high church movement. In the case of Zimbabwe, a large number of the missionaries traditionally came from the Swedish west coast region, “where faithfulness to the Holy Scriptures and the Lutheran Confession and a deep respect for the ordained priesthood are dominant. [...] It is obvious that the strongest influence [over CSM Zimbabwe] came from the group of Lutheran Christians which in Sweden are called ‘schartauans’, or old-church people” (Söderström op. cit., 128).
6 The CSM missionary Johannes Bergman had originally worked as an agriculturalist in South Africa. He moved to Zimbabwe in the 1920s, where he developed the mission farm at Mnene.
Masase and Manama. A number of prominent future Zimbabwean nationalists passed through these schools and Bergman was at an early stage exposed to their political concerns. In an interview in 1997, he confirmed that “the general opinion among the [Swedish] missionaries was that we should not involve ourselves in party politics, and therefore not take sides for ZANU, ZAPU or any particular political movement”. At the same time, Bergman said, “we [...] tended to sympathize with the nationalist movement, although we did not speak out officially and openly [...], as maybe we should have done”.¹

In the case of South Africa, the CSM missionary Gunnar Helander had in the 1940s already publicly raised his forceful voice against racial discrimination and oppression of the African majority. Helander had, however, no Swedish counterpart in Zimbabwe and the official missionary reports from the field to the Church of Sweden Mission in Uppsala would for a remarkably long period reflect both racist and politically reactionary attitudes. Dean Arvid Albrektson— in 1959 consecrated as the first CSM bishop for Zimbabwe²—stated in the annual report for 1952 that it “is easy in a country like Sweden to definitely criticize the racial policies in countries with a mixed population. False idealism and massive ignorance about the real situation has determined much of the Swedish criticism of the racial policies in both South Africa and Kenya”.

According to the CSM missionary,

> a characteristic which, unfortunately, is very common among the Africans [is] the lack of sense of responsibility. If you don’t take the trouble to [...] penetrate the psyche of the African, trying to understand his conditions, vexation or irritation will be easily comprehensible reactions to the many daily examples of his irresponsibility. He is to a much larger degree governed by emotions than by the intellect. He literally talks about his heart as if it was a force external to himself, a rather fickle force whose whims he has to follow. [...] The African’s lack of sense of responsibility, together with his conspicuous clumsiness with regard to organization [and] his lack of system in everything he sets about to do, naturally constitute a great obstacle on his way to the desired equality with the white man.³

In later reports, Albrektson denounced the nationalist movement. In March 1959, that is, shortly after the demonstrations throughout the Central African Federation, the introduction of emergency legislation and the banning of the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress, the recently confirmed head of CSM Zimbabwe gave his views of the events, declaring that

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¹ Interview with Tore Bergman, Uppsala, 10 February 1997. In 1966, Bergman was appointed CSM education secretary in Zimbabwe, a post which he kept until 1970, when he moved to Sweden and became Africa secretary at the CSM headquarters in Uppsala.

² Albrektson had served as a missionary in Zimbabwe since 1932. According to Hugo Söderström, he had “a conservative [political] attitude, did not approve any radical or sudden changes and was inclined to point out how the African benefited from the Western civilization [...] which the colonial power supported. [...] The African Christians gave bishop Albrektson the nickname Vareva chimwe (‘He who tells only once’). For the bishop was of a strong mind and did not expect that decisions already made should be subjected to further discussions” (Söderström op. cit., pp. 120–121).

The facts now known are that extreme nationalist parties in the Central African Federation have been increasingly active, infiltrating a great number of non-political associations. They have also to a rising degree and with more and more daring insolence been keeping many of their racial kinsmen in terror through scares and threats. It is now obvious that they did not hesitate to try to achieve their objectives through open violence and that they in Nyasaland had worked out a terror plan which [...] would have [led to] the killing not only of Europeans, but also of many of their own race. It is also evident that some of the inspiration behind this policy of violence has come from outside the borders of the Federation. [However,] through a firm and well-planned intervention, the authorities managed in time to limit the fatal consequences.¹

These and similar reports from the missionary field in Zimbabwe were not censured by the Mission Board in Uppsala, but—on the contrary—published in its official yearbooks. In fact, well into the 1960s prominent representatives of the official Church of Sweden largely held the same views as those expressed by Albrektson. For example, in a book published to meet “the need of literature for reading aloud in the many [study] and sewing circles [that constitute] one of the conditions for our effort in Africa”,² bishop Bo Giertz of Gothenburg proudly wrote after visiting Zimbabwe in mid-1961 that

our missionary field in Rhodesia [...] begins down at the Limpopo. From there it reaches like a wedge which broadens [...] towards Bulawayo and Fort Victoria [...]. Within this area, the Church of Sweden has [...] been allowed to alone preach the gospel. At times, Rome has tried to insert itself between our congregations, but without any major success. [...] The remarkable has thus happened that we Swedes have been able to colonize this piece of Africa in the best sense of the word. [...] There still remain vast areas to be conquered [...], but the organization is so firm and the foundation so solidly laid that the continuation almost follows by itself.³

Giertz rejected the democratic demands of the African majority. Warning against “the two forces” that in his view could threaten the harmonious development of Zimbabwe, namely “unrepentant white conservatism [and] extreme black nationalism”, he conveyed to his church readership in Sweden that

I on several occasions have heard Africans express their conviction that universal and equal suffrage—‘one man, one vote’—at present would lead to a catastrophe. [...] A people is not really mature enough for democracy as long as the majority believes that the best way to get guidance for important decisions is to slaughter a cow and watch how the entrails are positioned.⁴

⁴ Ibid. pp. 53–55.
However, following the example of the Lutheran church in South Africa, the Mission Board of the Church of Sweden in Uppsala was by that time committed to a policy of devolution of power to the local church, combined with efforts to indigenize both the clergy and the administration of the educational institutions. CSM "clearly realized that only an indigenous church could properly fulfil her divine mission", seeing the Africanization of the church in a wider perspective and giving it high priority. This policy—which developed parallel to an increasing political polarization between the nationalist movement and the white settler interests—culminated in March 1963 with the formation of ELCZ and the subsequent transfer of the mission schools, health facilities and other properties to the new Evangelical Lutheran Church of Zimbabwe.

The Africanization of the Lutheran church and the ascendancy of the extremist Rhodesian Front, which had come to power in December 1962, soon led to a conflict between the church and the government in which both ELCZ’s Swedish parent organization and the remaining Swedish missionaries were eventually forced to take a position. In addition, ELCZ belonged to the ecumenical Zimbabwe Christian Council, which was formed in 1964 and also counted the Anglican and the African Methodist Episcopal Church among its members. Interacting with the Catholic Bishops’ Conference, the Christian Council—a member of the World Council of Churches (WCC)—would increasingly take a critical stand towards Ian Smith’s regime, particularly regarding its discriminatory land and education policies.

Two weeks after UDI, the Christian Council denounced the rebellion and declared that it regarded ‘independent’ Zimbabwe as an illegal entity. The Lutheran church had thereby taken a first political stand in the ensuing conflict. This would be further clarified through its humanitarian work within Christian Care, a welfare organization set up by the Zimbabwe Christian Council in 1967 to give relief assistance to families of detainees and political prisoners. As WCC members, both the Church of Sweden and ELCZ, finally, formed part of the decision taken at the WCC assembly in Uppsala in 1968 to launch the Programme to Combat Racism, which recognized the possibility of Christian support to liberation movements involved in armed struggle and from 1970 extended financial assistance to both ZANU and ZAPU.

The quite dramatic change by the Church of Sweden Mission after UDI was illustrated in February 1966, when Holger Benettsson, at the time in charge of CSM matters pertaining to Africa, published a booklet in Swedish entitled The

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1 The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Southern Africa—Southeast Region was formed by the Lutheran communities in Natal and Zululand in 1961, with bishop Helge Fosséus of CSM as its first leader. The Evangelical Lutheran Ovambo-Kavango Church (ELOK) in Namibia—later the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia (ELCIN)—became independent as early as in 1957.
2 Söderström op. cit., p. 132.
3 In 1962, there were 74 CSM missionaries in Zimbabwe. The number had in 1975 been reduced to 20.
Problem of Rhodesia through the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Condemning UDI and stating that “the problem of Rhodesia in the final event is a human problem which originates in the contempt of the Africans by the white race”,¹ the CSM Africa secretary gave a brief, but positive and informed account of the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe. Regretting the split between ZANU and ZAPU—“which has weakened the African opposition”²—Benetts-son’s publication marked a clear break with past missionary reports.

Few Swedish voices would after UDI question the nationalist movement’s demands for democracy and majority rule, although the conservative review Svensk Tidskrift was a notable exception. It continued to oppose “short-term political changes”, stating as late as in 1966 that the consequences of an African government “have been demonstrated in Congo. The fact is that the blacks today do not have sufficiently many and sufficiently educated administrators to maintain Rhodesia at its present high standard. In such a situation”, the Moderate ideological review concluded, “majority rule is not much to build upon”.³

¹ Ibid., p. 61.
² Ibid., p. 52.
Sweden, ZANU and ZAPU

Students and Prisoners

The first official Swedish contacts with the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe were established just before UDI. The Swedish student and youth organizations had by then already met their Zimbabwean counterparts. The future ZANU Minister of Justice in independent Zimbabwe, Simbi Mubako, had led a ZAPU delegation to the Afro-Scandinavian Youth Congress in Oslo in August 1962 and in January 1963—immediately before the launch of the consumer boycott against South Africa—the National Council of Swedish Youth had invited ZAPU’s John Chirimbani to Sweden. However, the Zimbabwean struggle was in the early 1960s overshadowed by the question of apartheid South Africa and Namibia. It was at the same time given less prominence than the Zambian quest for national independence. Not until Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1965 did the issue of Zimbabwe firmly enter the Swedish debate. From then on, however, it occupied the centre stage until the struggle in the Portuguese colonies became dominant towards the end of the 1960s.

Nevertheless, when the Swedish government through the so-called ‘refugee million’ from 1 July 1964 made funds available for refugee students from Southern Africa, it included Zimbabweans. The United Nations had set up training programmes for Namibia in 1961 and the Portuguese colonies in 1962, 1

1 Like many intellectuals and university students, Mubako joined ZANU after the split in the nationalist movement in August 1963. He studied law at Trinity College in Dublin, Ireland, with a scholarship from SIDA.

2 SUL: ‘Besök i Sverige av ledande Syd-Rhodesisk politiker’ (‘Visit to Sweden by leading Southern Rhodesian politicians’), [no date], (MFA). Like Mubako, Chirimbani was among the first Zimbabwean students to receive a scholarship from SIDA, studying economics in England.

3 After Per Wästberg’s departure, very few articles about Zimbabwe appeared in the Swedish press. However, Expressen’s Anders Ehnmark visited the country towards the end of 1963. See, for example, his report ‘Den vita fronten vacklar’ (‘The white front is tottering’) in Expressen, 20 December 1963.

4 During the eleven years from 1960 to 1970, the thirteen largest Swedish newspapers published a total of 661 editorials on the Central African Federation. The overwhelming majority were related to Zimbabwe and appeared after UDI. As a comparison, during the five years from 1966 to 1970, the same newspapers published a total of 286 editorials on South Africa (Magnusson (1974) op. cit., Diagram 3, p. 22 and Diagram 4, p. 24). The distribution of officially pronounced critical Swedish international statements in the period from 1966 to 1976 was, according to one study, as follows: 1) against South Africa 32%; 2) Portugal 15%; 3) Great Britain/Rhodesia 15%; 4) USA 13%; 5) Greece 5%; 6) South Vietnam 3%; 7) Chile 3%; 8) Cambodia 2%; and the Soviet Union 2% (Bjereld op. cit., Table 3, p. 52). At a time when Sweden—nationally and internationally—was seen as singularly preoccupied with the question of Vietnam, the Swedish government thus concentrated almost two thirds of its critical international pronouncements to Southern Africa.
but not for South Africa and Zimbabwe.\footnote{A UN training programme for South Africa was set up in 1965. On a Swedish initiative, the different programmes were in 1967 consolidated into the UN Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa (UNETPSA), which included Zimbabwe.} Complementing the UN programmes, the Swedish bilateral education support was largely directed towards African students from these two countries, both through assistance to institutions of higher learning in independent Southern Africa—primarily Zambia, but also the future BLS states—and individual scholarships in Great Britain and other European countries, including Sweden. Thus, in addition to support via WUS,\footnote{On SIDA’s behalf, WUS administered individual scholarships at the University College in Salisbury (Harare).} there were at the end of 1966 about 50 Zimbabweans who pursued university studies under the bilateral SIDA programme.\footnote{Thord Palmlund: ‘Promemoria’ (‘Memorandum’), Stockholm, 23 November 1966 (SDA).}

Among the individual Zimbabwean beneficiaries under the SIDA programme were, as noted above, several prominent ZANU members, such as Henry Hamadziripi, Simbi Mubako, Didymus Mutasa and Sydne Sekeramayi,\footnote{Other future prominent Zimbabweans who in the mid-1960s already received scholarships from SIDA were, for example, John Chirimbani (UK), Byron Hove (UK), Joyce Mutasa (UK) and Basil Muzorewa (Sweden) (SIDA: ‘SIDA-stipendiater från Rhodesia’/‘Rhodeans with SIDA scholarships’, Stockholm, 23 November 1966) (SDA).} all of them eventually establishing close relations with Sweden.\footnote{Like Robert Mugabe, Mutasa—who became the first speaker of the House of Assembly in independent Zimbabwe—was during his detention at the beginning of the 1970s ‘adopted’ as a political prisoner by a Swedish group of Amnesty International. While in detention, his family received assistance from Christian Care. In an interview in 1995, Mutasa recalled how “a young fellow called Peter Malmström [from Swedish Amnesty] used to write to me all the time. He also used to write to Ian Smith almost every month, asking him to release me or try me. That experience gave us an understanding of the Swedish people, which was very different from others. We could see that they were absolutely concerned about us and would like our situation to change. When we found that extending to the Swedish government, we realized that they must have the same heart, because with Amnesty International and the schools that were involved in sending letters and clothes, adopting children or detainees and their families, it was tremendous, absolutely tremendous” (interview with Didymus Mutasa, Harare, 25 July 1995).} In the longer term, the contacts would have consequences for the official Swedish support to the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. Of the five countries covered in the present study, it was only in Zimbabwe that Sweden extended direct assistance to more than one movement, or to both ZANU and ZAPU. And of all the Southern African liberation movements receiving official Swedish support, it was only ZANU that did not belong to the group of the so-called ‘authentic movements’ recognized by the Soviet Union, but counted among the pro-Chinese organizations together with, for example, PAC of South Africa and SWANU of Namibia.\footnote{The decisive factor was, of course, that ZANU—as opposed to PAC of South Africa or SWANU of Namibia—had a strong base inside Zimbabwe. The question of official Swedish support to the various Southern African liberation movements will be discussed below. It suffices, in the meantime, to recall that ANC of South Africa was particularly close to ZAPU. ANC/MK and ZAPU had together launched the armed Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns in 1967–68. As a consequence of its alliance with ZAPU, ANC was highly critical of ZANU. In the political report from the ANC National Executive Committee to the Morogoro conference, Oliver Tambo, for example, identified in April 1969 both PAC and ZANU as results of the imperialists’ “creation and maintenance of}
Sydney Sekeramayi—who at independence in 1980 was appointed Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development—would, in particular, during his ten years in Sweden represent his country and promote Swedish solidarity with Zimbabwe and ZANU. He thereby joined fellow students from Southern Africa, such as ANC’s Billy Modise, SWANU’s Charles Kauraisa and UNIP’s Rupiah Banda, as an influential diplomat cum activist. Sekeramayi came to Sweden in June 1964 and stayed there until mid-1975. After being expelled from secondary school in Zimbabwe, he and four other students were offered scholarships in Czechoslovakia, where they encountered “a few problems”. “At that time”, he later recounted,

Rupiah Banda, who was the International Secretary of the Zambia Students’ Union [and based in Lund], facilitated my coming to Sweden. He established a contact between myself and [SIDA], which resulted in a scholarship [...]. That is how I came to Lund. But first I had to complete my secondary education, which I did [in Gränna]. Then I came to the University of Lund, where I first studied genetics before I got into the medical school. [...] There were other Zimbabweans who I discovered a little later on. One was Claude Chokwenda, who was also a very active member of ZANU. Finally we had in Sweden about five students from Zimbabwe and we all happened to support ZANU. We started to get into contact with the groups in Sweden which were supporting the liberation struggle in general in Southern Africa. [...] The armed struggle had not yet taken off, so we were more concerned with mobilizing material support, especially to those people who were in prison or in detention.

As in the case of the first SWANU students from Namibia, there were no particular political considerations or interests behind ZANU’s initial presence in Sweden. Sekeramayi came there through the assistance of Rupiah Banda, the future Foreign Minister of Zambia, who studied at the University of Lund and represented Kenneth Kaunda’s UNIP party. After the split in the Zimbabwean nationalist movement, UNIP remained closer to Nkomo’s ZAPU than to Sithole’s ZANU, but old connections and student solidarity rather than party politics determined Banda’s intervention in favour of Sekeramayi. The early presence and the active, diplomatic work of the ZANU students in Sweden would, nevertheless, over the years influence the Swedish opinion in ZANU’s favour, in the beginning particularly among the students and within the influential South Africa Committee in Lund, but later also at the level of the ruling


1 The initial contact was established with NIB. SIDA came into operation on 1 July 1965.
2 Sekeramayi took a diploma in tropical medicine at the University of Lund and did his internship at the local hospital in Ängelholm in southern Sweden.
3 In the early 1970s, Chokwenda served as ZANU’s representative to Sweden, based in Stockholm.
5 When Sekeramayi in December 1961—at the age of seventeen—was forced to leave Zimbabwe for Zambia, he was assisted by UNIP to continue to Tanzania, where he obtained a scholarship to Czechoslovakia.
Solidarity with ZANU: Bertil Högberg of Bread and Fishes (‘Brödet och Fiskarna’) hands a cheque to Moton Malianga, Västerås, September 1975. Second from left is Claude Chokwenda, ZANU’s representative to Scandinavia, and on the right Sydney Sekeramayi. (Photo: Vestmanlands Läns Tidning)

Social Democratic Party. In addition, the fact that they maintained close relations with the Zambian UNIP students broadened their political audience to the Liberal and Centre parties. Sekeramayi’s role was in this context particularly important. He was in 1966 appointed ZANU Secretary for Scandinavian Affairs and the following year General Secretary of the Zimbabwe Students’ Union in Europe.

1 In an interview in 1995, Sekeramayi said that “whatever appeals we made through Pierre Schori and other leaders of the Swedish Social Democratic Party were disseminated to their friends in the other Scandinavian countries, and their support would come. [...] You had, for example, also the Socialist International, where we were very active. That is one platform where we were given a status which enabled our leadership to communicate with the leaders of all the Scandinavian countries. And at the UN and in other international fora we would brief the Scandinavian countries very well, because we knew that they would eloquently put our position across. [...] With the Labour parties in the lead in the Nordic countries, we would be invited to the congresses of the Swedish Labour Party, the Danish Labour Party, the Norwegian Labour Party and the Finnish Labour Party. Other representatives of independent countries, or those in the liberation struggle, also attended these congresses, so we had a platform where we would be able to spread our own message to a much larger audience” (interview with Sydney Sekeramayi, Harare, 27 July 1995).

2 From 1964, Sekeramayi studied together with Alexander Chikwanda from UNIP of Zambia at Gränna high school and at Lund university. Chikwanda became in 1964 close to the future Centre Party leader and Prime Minister Thorbjörn Fälldin.

3 When the split between ZAPU and ZANU occurred in mid-1963, it was—in addition to ethnic factors—widely explained as a breakaway by intellectuals led by Sithole, Takawira and Mugabe.
As stated by Sekeramayi, before UDI and the subsequent launch of the armed struggle, the main concern was to assist the political prisoners in Zimbabwe. Following the massive arrests from mid-1964, there were already before Ian Smith’s proclamation of ‘independence’ an estimated 1.700 African nationalists held in jails and prison camps throughout Zimbabwe, including the leaderships of both ZANU and ZAPU. More arrests were carried out before and after UDI in November 1965. Against this background, the newly established SIDA was in late 1965 approached by the two organizations to extend relief assistance to the families of the prisoners. The plight of the prisoners themselves—rounded up, sent to remote prison camps and held without trial—was at about the same time vividly described by the Swedish journalist Anders Ehnhmark in the liberal newspaper Expressen. Ehnhmark managed to visit the Wha Wha and Sikombela prison camps, but not the Gonakudzingwa camp in south-eastern Zimbabwe, where Joshua Nkomo and some 200 ZAPU members were held. At Wha Wha he met and interviewed the ZAPU leader Josiah Chinamano and at Sikombela ZANU’s President, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, who through his writings was already known in Sweden. Sithole, Ehnhmark wrote,

had built a hut out of tree branches. There he was, sitting on a tree stump, writing a memorandum to [the British Prime Minister] Wilson while the monkeys were making noises in the bush. [...] He had just come out of jail when the police drove him away to this hot and damned wasteland in southern Rhodesia. ‘There is only one thing we demand’, [he said], ‘and that is majority rule. It is no longer a question of years. We are in a hurry. We can talk about independence later. First democracy, then independence’.  

Åke Ringberg from Dagens Nyheter also published powerful accounts from the detention camps. Like Ehnhmark, he visited Zimbabwe shortly before UDI, returning to the country twice during 1966. In addition to his reports in the liberal morning paper, the following year he published his impressions in the book Rhodesia: African Tragedy. Ringberg interviewed a number of Zimbabwean nationalists, among them Sithole and ZANU’s Secretary General Robert Mugabe at the Sikombela camp, graphically describing both their degrading conditions and their unbroken resolve. The ZANU President was

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1 SIDA: ‘Protokoll från styrelsemöte’ (‘Minutes from board meeting’), Stockholm, 21 December 1965 (SDA).
2 Anders Ehnhmark: ‘Demokrati i Rhodesia—men det är bråttom!’ (‘Democracy in Rhodesia—but it is urgent!’) in Expressen, 26 October 1965.
4 According to Ringberg, Sithole was quite relieved regarding the split between ZANU and ZAPU, while Mugabe was more resigned (Ringberg op. cit., pp. 130–131 and 138–140). Ringberg himself saw the split as part of the Rhodesian tragedy (p. 143) and ZAPU as the dominant organization: ”My own impression from three visits to Rhodesia in 1965 and 1966 is that the Africans in general wholeheartedly greet Nkomo as their leader and that ZAPU is ‘the people’s party’. It is ZAPU’s name that secretly is painted on house walls and in elevators [and] it is Nkomo people talk about as the man who one day will lead [them] out of their misery towards a future of light and happiness.
already a familiar figure in Sweden, but Mugabe was not. Ringberg’s conversation with Mugabe on the background to the 1963 split with ZAPU thus served as a first introduction of the future Zimbabwean leader to the Swedish public.

In response to an appeal by the UN Anti-apartheid Committee, the Swedish government had in January 1965 allocated one million SEK for legal assistance to political prisoners in South Africa, as well as for maintenance of their dependants. It was, however, more difficult to take a similar decision in the case of Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe was formally a British responsibility and there was no corresponding recommendation from the United Nations. Nevertheless, in December 1965—immediately after UDI—SIDA decided to respond to the pleas made by ZANU and ZAPU, granting an initial amount of 150,000 SEK “in favour of the families of political prisoners [in Zimbabwe]” through the Church of Sweden Aid and the World Council of Churches. From then on, the Swedish government would during the second half of the 1960s regularly channel considerable amounts to both the Zimbabwean prisoners and their families, primarily via Christian Care and the International Defence and Aid Fund.

Mainly in favour of Zimbabwean refugees, Sweden was from the beginning also the largest contributor to the Zambian International Refugee Council, set up by the government of Zambia in June 1964. In 1965/66, Sweden granted 200,000 SEK to the council and another 75,000 SEK for scholarships to Zimbabwean students, chiefly at the University of Zambia. In turn, the humanitarian support brought SIDA and the liberation movements closer, defining the terrain of their future, direct relations. In the cases of both ZANU and ZAPU, the direct official Swedish support would on request by the two organizations in the beginning be given to alleviate the plight of the detained political leaders inside Zimbabwe.

Close and early contacts between NIB/SIDA and the Church of Sweden Mission also explain the Swedish involvement in Zimbabwe. In fact, during the financial year 1963/64—that is, before the budgetary allocation of the ‘refugee million’—not less than 540,000 SEK had already been granted to CSM/ELCZ for the secondary school at Manama and the following year an amount of

ZANU is not mentioned at all. On the other hand, it seems that Sithole’s exile organization in certain respects is more efficient than Nkomo’s” (p. 131).

1 Sithole asked Ringberg how his book *African Nationalism* was selling in Sweden.

2 SIDA: ‘Protokoll från styrelsemöte’ (‘Minutes from board meeting’), Stockholm, 21 December 1965 (SDA).

3 During its first full year in operation, Christian Care would via the World Council of Churches receive financial contributions totalling 102,000 USD. Out of this amount, not less than 50,000 USD was granted by the Swedish government, while the corresponding contribution was extended by seven church-related international NGOs and the governments of Norway (2,000 USD) and Australia (1,000 USD). (Christian Care, Rhodesia: ‘1968’, Report attached to a letter from the Swedish section of the Lutheran World Federation to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Lidingö, 13 December 1968) (MFA).

410,000 SEK was set aside for expansion of the school at Chegato.\(^1\) The support was in October 1966 evaluated by Thord Palmlund and Sven Hamrell on behalf of the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance. After a visit to the schools, they concluded that the official support constituted "one of the most important Swedish initiatives with regard to education in Southern Africa".\(^2\)

Finally, in a very significant way the Swedish NGO sector also became involved with Zimbabwe, in particular with the detained nationalists. Among the first beneficiaries was Robert Mugabe, the future President of independent Zimbabwe, a fact that would further broaden ZANU’s base in Sweden. When the split in the nationalist movement occurred in August 1963, Mugabe sided with Ndabaningi Sithole against Joshua Nkomo, becoming Secretary General of the new organization. Detained and released on bail in 1963, he was re-arrested in August 1964 and would remain under detention for the next decade, spending over ten years at the Wha Wha and Sikombela detention camps and at the Salisbury maximum security prison. His case was taken up by Amnesty International, and in 1965 Mugabe was as a political prisoner by chance allocated to a high-profile Amnesty group in Stockholm led by the journalist Eva Moberg.

In addition to Moberg, the Swedish Amnesty group No. 34 had several influential members, such as Paul Rimmerfors from SIDA, the writer Margareta Ekström and—later—Per Wästberg, who in 1963 had founded the Swedish section of Amnesty International with the lawyer Hans Göran Franck.\(^3\) In his capacity as an expert on Zimbabwean affairs, Wästberg initially acted as an adviser to the group, formally joining it in 1970.\(^4\) After setting up the Fund for the Victims of Racial Oppression in 1959 and the Swedish South Africa Committee in 1961, Wästberg was in August 1964 appointed to the official Consultative Committee on Education Support to African Refugee Youth, serving as an important link between the emerging Swedish solidarity movement and the government. His early contacts with Mugabe were in this context particularly important.

Throughout his long detention, Mugabe maintained "a close correspondence" with the Swedish Amnesty group. Margareta Ekström wrote him "innumerable letters"\(^5\) and Mugabe responded through both official letters and messages smuggled out of prison. He was, according to Wästberg, "during certain periods prohibited from studying or receiving letters, notably from Swe-

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\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) Franck was president of Swedish Amnesty 1964–70 and vice-president 1970–73. Wästberg was vice-president 1964–72.


\(^5\) Ibid. “As I was prohibited, I did not dare to write directly, but [Margareta Ekström] signed my letters” (Ibid).
den, but had, all in all, access to scientific works and reviews”.\(^1\) Above all, he “could communicate all the time [and] gave [political] orders”\(^2\) to the ZANU leadership in exile. Influential opinion makers in Sweden were thus from the mid-1960s already directly and authoritatively informed about Mugabe’s situation and his position within ZANU. In addition, the unique relationship with the future ZANU leader would at the beginning of the 1970s be extended and broadened through Robert Mugabe’s exiled wife, Sally Mugabe.

Sally Mugabe left Zimbabwe for her native Ghana when her husband was imprisoned in 1964, eventually settling in London for academic studies from 1967. In London, she was informed of the active concern for the situation of Robert Mugabe by the Swedish Amnesty group. It was, however, not until 1971 that she met its members for the first time. At that time, it was agreed with Paul Rimmerfors of SIDA’s Information Division—a member of the group—that she through SIDA should travel around Sweden and address schools and various organizations concerned with the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe.\(^3\)

It was an important initiative. Between February 1973 and May 1979, she made six nationwide tours of Sweden, propagating the cause of a future free

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\(^1\) Per Wästberg: ‘Var finns Robert Mugabe?’ (‘Where is Robert Mugabe?’) in *Dagens Nyheter*, 1 June 1975. During his years in detention, Mugabe obtained a BSc, an LLB, a BA (Admin) and a BEd through correspondence. He also spent much time teaching and tutoring other prisoners.

\(^2\) Interview with Per Wästberg, Stockholm, 28 February 1996.

\(^3\) Hallencreutz op. cit., p. 20.
Zimbabwe and establishing significant political contacts.\(^1\) For example, in June 1975, Mrs. Mugabe—who in 1978 was elected Deputy General Secretary of ZANU’s Women’s League—attended the annual conference of the women’s wing of the Centre Party and on 1 May 1979 she joined Olof Palme at the Labour Day celebrations in Stockholm. Through her contacts at the grass roots level and with the established political parties, Sally Mugabe played an important role for the development of the Swedish solidarity opinion. According to Hallencreutz, who in addition to his CSM work was a member of the SIDA board, “one person more than anybody else managed to carry home the cause of Zimbabwe and of ZANU to the Swedish public [and that was] the late Mrs. Sally Mugabe”.\(^2\)

Sweden and the Build-up to UDI

The question of Zimbabwe was for the first time brought to the attention of the UN General Assembly in June 1962, that is, before the dissolution of the Central African Federation. The world body requested the British government to immediately convene all the political parties to a constitutional conference, which on the basis of universal and equal suffrage should grant democratic rights to all the inhabitants. In addition, the colonial power should repeal the racially discriminatory laws and make sure that the political prisoners were set free. The British government, however, held the view that Zimbabwe was self-governing\(^3\) and that Britain lacked the constitutional powers to implement such decisions, a position which the United Nations had silently accepted since 1946 by, for example, never demanding any British progress reports concerning the territory.

Developments in Zimbabwe were over the following years discussed by the United Nations on several occasions. The concern by the world organization culminated in 1965, when the UN Decolonization Committee, the General Assembly and the Security Council together adopted not less than nine resolutions which, again, requested Britain to convene a fully representative constitutional conference and to take all the necessary action to prevent a unilateral declaration of independence by the white minority regime. However, as before, the British government maintained that the United Nations had “no compe-

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\(^1\) During this period, Sally Mugabe normally spent about a month each year in the home of SIDA’s Paul Rimmerfors in Jakobsberg outside Stockholm (telephone conversation with Paul Rimmerfors, 8 October 1997).


\(^3\) After the First World War, two alternatives were seen for Zimbabwe’s constitutional future, namely union with South Africa or local, responsible government. A referendum in October 1922 settled the issue in favour of the latter alternative and the country was declared a British Crown Colony in September 1923.
tence to discuss Southern Rhodesian affairs”, stating that the question had to be settled through bilateral negotiations between the British and the Zimbabwean governments.

In the tense months leading up to UDI, both the Zimbabwean nationalists and the British actively presented their positions to the Swedish government. In the case of the nationalist movement, it was ZANU that first appeared on the scene. Invited by the Stockholm South Africa Committee and the Social Democratic Party, ZANU’s Henry Hamadziripi spent two weeks in Stockholm and Uppsala in early September 1965. During the visit he was interviewed on Swedish television and addressed the anti-apartheid movement, asking for financial support for ZANU’s struggle. The Swedish solidarity groups were, however, still uncertain regarding the split between ZANU and ZAPU. In the case of the Uppsala South Africa Committee it was, for example, decided to first assess “ZANU’s position and [determine] which project we would be in a position to support” before a decision could be made. It was eventually negative. In a letter to both ZANU and ZAPU, the committee conveyed in mid-October 1965 that it had decided “not to give financial support through a fundraising campaign to any of the two liberation movements of Zimbabwe”, adding that

[w]e are sorry to say that we have not found it possible for one organization, without the cooperation of the other, to work effectively for the liberation of the country. Neither have we found the cooperation terms between the two organizations in a state that we had expected them to be. We appeal to you to solve the cooperation problems that now prevent you from performing your more important aim and duty—to liberate Zimbabwe from all kinds of suppression”.

Above all, during his visit Hamadziripi held discussions at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm, where he was received on 10 and 21 September 1965. According the Swedish notes from the first meeting, Hamadziripi stated

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2 Stockholm South Africa Committee: ‘Kvartalsrapport 16 juni–15 oktober 1965’ (‘Quarterly report 16 June–15 October 1965’), Stockholm, 15 October 1965 (AJC). The chairman of the Stockholm South Africa Committee at the time was Mats Hulth of the Social Democratic Youth League and in addition to its 139 individual members the organizations supporting the committee were all affiliated to the Social Democratic, Centre and Liberal Parties.
3 When Ndabaningi Sithole, Robert Mugabe and the other national leaders of ZANU were detained in 1964, it was lieutenants such as Herbert Chitepo, Simpson Mtambanengwe and Henry Hamadziripi who represented the organization abroad. Hamadziripi later served as ZANU’s Secretary for Finance.
4 Before coming to Sweden, Hamadziripi had attended the summer university in Oslo, Norway.
5 Uppsala South Africa Committee: ‘Protokoll fört vid sammanträde’ (‘Minutes from meeting’), Uppsala, 15 September 1965 (UPA).
6 Letter from the Uppsala South Africa Committee to ZANU and ZAPU, Uppsala, 11 October 1965 (AJC).
7 Hamadziripi’s meeting with von Celsing at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs took place the day after von Celsing had met SWAPO’s Secretary General Jacob Kuhanga. Both SWAPO of Namibia
that ZAPU was of little importance in Zimbabwe and that ZANU was “totally
dominant in 47 out of the 50 districts in [..] Southern Rhodesia”.1 Probably
adapting to the perceived opinions of his hosts, Hamadziripi said that “some
[ZANU] members earlier had undergone military training in China, but that
this was a policy that the leadership of the party no longer supported.”2 In
addition, “Moscow was not particularly active regarding support of the activi-
ties of [ZANU]”, which, according to the visitor, received its most important
financial assistance from the Organization of African Unity. Hamadziripi’s
main message was, however, that Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front regime was
“ready for anything” and that he had come to Sweden to appeal for financial
and political support from the Swedish government “due to its international
prestige”. He wanted a binding declaration from the Swedish side that the
government would not recognize a unilateral declaration of independence by
the Smith regime, in addition enquiring if “Swedish support to an armed rebel-

lion against such [a regime] could be forthcoming”.3

The official at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, ambassador Lars von Celsing,
replied that the Swedish government “in spite of its sympathies towards the
aims of African liberation [and] in accordance with its general policies could not
make any such binding statements or commitments”. The Swedish stand to a
unilaterally declared independent Zimbabwean government, von Celsing ex-
plained, would be determined by “the character of its relations with the British
mother country and, in general, with the international community; its actual
control within the country; and its attitude towards [..] international commit-
ments”. Sweden would, however, in a positive spirit follow the recommenda-
tions by the United Nations. Regarding financial support, von Celsing finally
recommended Hamadziripi to “approach those most closely concerned, [that is,
the] non-governmental organizations [in Sweden]”.4

Hamadziripi “declared that he was dissatisfied with these general answers,
since he had hoped that Sweden would not take an undecided ‘sitting-on-the-
fence’ attitude” to the question of Zimbabwe.5 Nevertheless, it was agreed that
he should come back for possible further information before leaving Sweden. A
mutually recognized communication channel was thus established between
ZANU and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Hamadziripi held his second
meeting with von Celsing on 21 September 1965. In the meantime, the Swedish

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1 Lars von Celsing: ‘Promemoria’ (‘Memorandum’), Stockholm, 10 September 1965 (MFA).
2 In reality, ZANU continued to send cadres to China for military training and Hamadziripi
himself was closely involved with preparations for the armed struggle, launched through the Battle
of Sinoia on 28 April 1966. ZANU’s first group of guerrilla trainees—led by Emmerson
Munangagwa—had already gone to China in September 1963 (David Martin and Phyllis Johnson:
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
official had cleared the statements made at the first meeting directly with Foreign Minister Nilsson.\footnote{Handwritten comment on Lars von Celsing: ‘Promemoria’ (‘Memorandum’), Stockholm, 21 September 1965 (MFA).} During the second meeting, Hamadziripi “did not hide his disappointment regarding the passive stand that the Swedish government apparently took to his efforts”, but was content to hear that it was “highly unlikely” that Sweden would recognize a unilaterally declared government in Zimbabwe.\footnote{Ibid.}

The Labour Party under Prime Minister Harold Wilson was in power in Britain in 1965. The ruling Swedish Social Democratic Party had since the beginning of the 1950s largely followed the general policies of its British sister party within the Socialist International and this would in the beginning also be the case in relation to Zimbabwe. As noted above, in 1960 an editorial in the social democratic journal \textit{Tiden} had stated that “it is quite natural that the British labour movement [...] must take the lead regarding the realization of socialist internationalism, helping the less developed countries and creating correct and forward-looking relations with them”. Although this stand during the first half of the 1960s was being increasingly questioned within the Swedish labour movement, it was still dominant during the build-up of the crisis in Zimbabwe, both within the ruling party and among the officials at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Recalling the early 1960s, the ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo writes in his memoirs that “the much-respected Swedish ambassador, Mrs. Myrdal, once sadly explained to me that her government’s sympathy was entirely with us, but they had ties going back for centuries with the British, and with the best will in the world they could not break that loyalty for our sake”.\footnote{\textsc{Nkomo op. cit.}, pp. 85–86. Later in the book, Nkomo states that “I believe that Sweden, especially through its official agency, SIDA, was the most generous of all donors of food and clothing for our refugees” (ibid., p. 181).}

Zimbabwe was until UDI in November 1965 primarily seen as a British concern and any Swedish position towards the Smith regime and the liberation movements would as a matter of course explicitly or implicitly be subject to the opinions of the British. As mentioned above, when ZAPU in June 1965 through the Swedish Embassy in Dar es Salaam made a request to visit Sweden, Anders Forsse, acting as Secretary General of the Swedish Agency for International Assistance, questioned whether “official or semi-official contacts between Swedish authorities and [ZAPU were] appropriate [as] the objectives of the exiled political organization evidently are contrary to the policies of the Rhodesian regime, which formally falls under British sovereignty”.\footnote{\textit{Handwritten comment on Lars von Celsing: ‘Promemoria’ (‘Memorandum’), Stockholm, 21 September 1965 (MFA).}}

At the United Nations, Sweden also largely followed the British line, stating, for example, at the end of October 1965 that it did not share the view of the Afro-Asian group that the situation in Zimbabwe constituted a threat to world peace, which automatically would have led to an intervention by the Security Council. Instead, the Swedish government supported bilateral negotiations
between Britain and Zimbabwe.\(^\text{1}\) This attitude provoked strong negative reactions within the broader social democratic movement, as well as within the organized anti-apartheid opinion. In a letter to Foreign Minister Nilsson, the Social Democratic Students’ Union criticized the government for “hypocrisy”\(^\text{2}\) and the South Africa Committee of Greater Stockholm\(^\text{3}\)—dominated by Social Democrats—stated that

it was seriously worried regarding Sweden’s position towards [the] oppressive regimes in Southern Africa. As presently designed, Swedish policies will [lead] Sweden to be among the states that will contribute to the provocation of a racial war in these areas. The committee is also seriously worried that Sweden will end up on the wrong side in such a racial war. The Swedish government seems to be more concerned about the white oppressive regimes in these countries than about the African majority, which is fighting for the same ideals that we embrace, namely democracy and social justice.\(^\text{4}\)

The leadership of the Social Democratic Party was in 1965 about to lose substantial political support over the question of sanctions against South Africa. The opposing views of Prime Minister Erlander and Foreign Minister Nilsson and those of ANC’s Tambo, SWANU’s Kozonguizi and other invited speakers from Southern Africa at the 1965 Labour Day celebrations had provoked an important debate. The Social Democratic youth and influential press voices had demanded Swedish unilateral action against apartheid, while the government maintained that only the UN Security Council could take such a decision. The question of Zimbabwe followed immediately upon this discussion, further threatening to distance the Social Democratic youth from the ‘old guard’ of the party. Against this background, Foreign Minister Nilsson replied to the criticism by addressing a long letter to the South Africa Committee of Greater Stockholm, dated 11 November 1965, that is, the very same day that Ian Smith announced UDI. Nilsson explained that the Swedish view was that only the Security Council—not the General Assembly—could determine if a threat to world peace was at hand, adding that

independently of the interpretation of the [UN] Charter, it appears to me that [it is] morally impossible for Sweden to participate in an appeal to Great Britain to use military violence [against the white minority regime] as long as we ourselves are not ready to take part in a similar way. That would [...] be tantamount to declaring that Sweden [is] ready to fight to the last Englishman.\(^\text{5}\)

\(^\text{1}\) The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs: Förenta Nationerna op. cit., p. 63.
\(^\text{2}\) Letter from Karin Rudebeck, international secretary of the Swedish Social Democratic Student Union (SSSF) to Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson, Uppsala, 1 November 1965 (MFA).
\(^\text{3}\) In Swedish, Sydafrikakommittén i Stor-Stockholm.
\(^\text{4}\) Letter from Bengt Ahlsén, chairman of the South Africa Committee of Greater Stockholm, to Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson, Stockholm, 1 November 1965 (MFA).
\(^\text{5}\) Letter from Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson to the South Africa Committee of Greater Stockholm, Stockholm, 11 November 1965 (MFA).
On the question whether UDI did constitute a threat to world peace or not—implying the imposition of economic sanctions—the Swedish government would, however, soon express an opinion shared by the solidarity movement, while the demands for military action by the British government on both principled and realistic grounds were discounted. Close contacts were in the meantime maintained with the British government. It had in mid-October 1965 submitted a position paper entitled ‘Planned action by the British government in the event of a Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia’, which was supported by Sweden. On 2 November 1965, the Erlander government declared that it would not recognize an illegal regime in Rhodesia; withdraw the head of the Swedish consular mission in Salisbury; refuse all aid to an illegal regime; and stop any purchases of Rhodesian tobacco. According to the British ambassador to Sweden, the declaration ”could not be more helpful.” Soon thereafter, however, the British Labour government would find reason to criticize its Swedish Social Democratic counterpart.

Swedish Reactions to UDI

UDI was declared on 11 November 1965. Condemning ”the usurpation of power by a racist settler minority” and characterizing the situation as “extremely grave”—if allowed to continue over time constituting ”a threat to international peace and security”—the UN Security Council on 20 November requested the government of the United Kingdom to ”quell this rebellion by the racist minority [and] take all other appropriate measures which would prove effective in eliminating the authority of the usurpers and in bringing the minority regime [...] to an immediate end”. At the same time, the highest organ of the world organization called upon ”all states to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products”. It was, however, only a recommendation. A year

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1 In a report to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs from the Swedish embassy in London, it was emphasized in March 1966 that “the Labour Party, remarkably, has no expressed opinion regarding the Southern Rhodesia question. The party has not at all discussed the situation created by the independence declaration by Mr Smith. [...] That British boys should die in [a] fight against other whites to secure the right to vote by coloureds in Africa seems an absurdity to the broad masses [in Great Britain]” (letter (’Labour Party och Sydrhodesia’/’The Labour Party and Southern Rhodesia’) by Gunnar Fagrell, London [no date, but received 1 March 1966] (MFA).

2 Ministry for Foreign Affairs: ‘Aide-Mémoire’, Stockholm, 2 November 1965 (MFA). Tobacco was a marginal item in the trade between Sweden and Zimbabwe. It is against this background interesting that the Swedish reply to the British position paper stated that ”as far as stopping purchases of Rhodesian tobacco is concerned, a prerequisite [...] would be that the UN Security Council would have adopted a resolution allowing for such a measure” (ibid.).

3 Handwritten comment on ibid.


5 Ibid.
later—in December 1966—the Security Council passed a resolution making selected economic sanctions against Zimbabwe compulsory. The sanctions were, finally, made comprehensive through the Security Council’s unanimously adopted resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968.

UDI provoked a chain of reactions in Sweden. While the Uppsala South Africa Committee, for example, arranged a week of street demonstrations against the rebellion combined with fund-raising activities in favour of the liberation movements,1 the government swiftly responded to the UN Security Council resolution by immediately condemning the Smith regime, closing the Swedish consulate in Salisbury and taking steps to prohibit trade with Zimbabwe. Explaining the Swedish position, Prime Minister Erlander stated on 22 November 1965 that the universal recommendation by the UN Security Council to break off economic relations with Zimbabwe was “an extremely important decision [...]. If it achieves the results intended, it will be counted as a milestone in post-war international developments”. At the same time, Erlander warned that “the pre-requisite condition for a policy of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia [...] is [that it is] generally supported [...]. It is our hope that all states, loyally and without delay, will sustain the United Nations in its endeavours”.2 As subsequent developments would show, this was, however, not to be the case. International trade with Zimbabwe continued, mainly via South Africa and the Portuguese colony of Mozambique.

From having been close and warm, Sweden’s relations with Britain and Harold Wilson’s ruling Labour Party would, on the question of UDI and the international responsibility towards the African majority in Zimbabwe, over the following weeks and months grow considerably more distant and chilly. In a public debate at Stockholm university, arranged by the African Students’ Association in Sweden at the end of November 1965, influential activists such as Anna-Greta Leijon of the Social Democratic Student Union and Björn Beckman of the Liberal Student Union, as well as Zedekia Ngavirue of SWANU of Namibia and Emmanuel Chalabesa of Zambia’s ruling UNIP, strongly criticized Wilhelm Wachtmeister from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for uncritical subservience to Britain. The future cabinet minister Leijon was particularly outspoken, stating that “we must put pressure on England to use violence in order to come to terms with Rhodesia”.3

Although principally opposed to violence as a means to solve international disputes, the Swedish government was not indifferent to the public opinion,4 soon advocating sterner actions. In mid-December 1965, the Swedish represen-
tative to the United Nations, Sverker Åström, circulated a letter to the members of the Security Council in which he made it clear that Sweden now held the view "that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to peace and that [...] the Security Council should have due cause to take mandatory decisions relating, in the first place, to economic sanctions against Rhodesia". This was far from pleasing the British government, which through its ambassador in Stockholm on 22 December protested to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that

it had caused concern in London that a serious country such as Sweden, whose voice was of weight at the UN, without previous contacts with the British government had pronounced itself in favour of such drastic measures as mandatory sanctions.

The British warned the Swedish government that a binding resolution by the UN Security Council on economic sanctions against Zimbabwe not only could "open the way for demands for military sanctions, [but] lead to a confrontation with South Africa and [to] an appeal in favour of mandatory sanctions also against [Pretoria]", which in the view of the British Labour government was seen as unacceptable. A widening gap would from then on appear between the British and the Swedish views on the events in Zimbabwe and, more broadly, in Southern Africa. In the case of Zimbabwe, this was brought to the fore during the congress of the Socialist International in Stockholm in May 1966.

In its relations with the three actors on the Zimbabwean political scene—the Smith regime, the British government and the liberation movements—Sweden would from the end of the 1960s be increasingly critical of the British stand and support the positions of the latter. The so-called Anglo-Rhodesian Settlement Proposals entered into between Sir Alec Douglas Home and Ian Smith in November 1971 were, for example, rejected by the Swedish government, describing them as "a heavy blow to the forces working for equality between the races". The opposing views between the Swedish and British governments would eventually lead to a heated diplomatic exchange before the independence elections at the beginning of 1980, when the British conservative government criticized its Swedish non-socialist counterpart for supporting Robert Mugabe’s ZANU and for undue political interference in the electoral process.

It should be noted that Sweden in accordance with the UN Security Council’s recommendation of 20 November 1965 decided two days later to impose a total ban on all trade with Zimbabwe. In the absence of a specific Swedish legal instrument on economic sanctions, a government committee was appointed to

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2 Leif Belfrage: 'Promemoria' ('Memorandum'), Stockholm, 22 December 1965 (MFA).
3 Ibid.
prepare such a document. In December 1966, the Security Council made selective sanctions against Zimbabwe compulsory. While Sweden was upholding a total trade ban against the country, the committee continued its work. It presented its final proposal in March 1968. After "extensive and at times very agitated discussions within and outside Parliament"\(^1\) the main points of the proposal were adopted at the end of May 1969, making the so-called Rhodesia Law of 1969 Sweden’s first legislation on economic sanctions.

Contacts with ZANU and ZAPU

Together with the issue of Namibia,\(^2\) the Zimbabwe question played a dominant part in the Swedish Southern Africa debate in 1966, both at the official and at the non-official level. Throughout the year, there were a number of visits to Sweden by leading representatives of the two recognized liberation movements ZANU and ZAPU. Nicholas Chitsiga, ZAPU’s representative to Europe, visited the Uppsala South Africa Committee at the end of November 1965, immediately after the imposition of the Swedish trade ban against Zimbabwe.\(^3\) His visit was followed in March 1966 by that of ZANU’s Secretary for International Affairs, Simpson Mtambanengwe, who was based in Dar es Salaam and had been invited to Sweden by the Stockholm South Africa Committee.\(^4\)

Assisted by the committee’s chairman, Bengt Ahlsén of the Social Democratic Youth League (SSU), the Foreign Secretary of ZANU held a series of discussions with Swedish politicians and officials during his stay in Stockholm.\(^5\) In addition to addressing a public meeting in the parliament building, Mtambanengwe talked about the situation in Zimbabwe with Ingvar Carlsson, then chairman of SSU, C.H. Hermansson, the leader of the Communist Party, and Ola Ullsten of the Liberal Party. He also met SIDA’s Thord Palmlund, secretary to the Consultative Committee on Education Support to African Refugee Youth, and Anders Thunborg, secretary to the national board of the Social Democratic Party.\(^6\) Above all, Mtambanengwe was received on 17 March 1966

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\(^1\) Nordenmark op. cit., p. 43. The debate on the sanctions’ legislation against Zimbabwe coincided with the debate regarding the participation of the Swedish company ASEA in an international bid for the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric power station in Mozambique.

\(^2\) 1966 was the year when the Oxford Conference on Namibia was held; the International Court of Justice first upheld South Africa’s mandate over the country and the UN General Assembly later terminated it; an important fund-raising campaign for SWANU and SWAPO was carried out in Sweden; SWAPO launched the armed struggle; and the South West Africa Students’ Congress was held in Uppsala.


\(^5\) The ZANU youth branch in the mid-1960s was actively participating in the Social Democratic International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY).

\(^6\) Stockholm South Africa Committee: ‘Medlemsmeddelande’, 11 April 1966. During the visit, Mtambanengwe also met Hans Göran Franck, president of the Swedish section of Amnesty
by Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson, to whom he underlined that the oil embargo and the selective, voluntary sanctions against Zimbabwe as recommended by the UN Security Council in November 1965 were not having the intended effects and that Ian Smith’s minority regime had consolidated its control over the country.¹

Mtambanengwe’s visit took place a little more than one month before the first military encounter between ZANU and the Zimbabwean security forces at what was to be known as the Battle of Sinoia on 28 April 1966.² Expressing strong doubts regarding the efficiency of the limited sanctions’ policy and the sincerity of the British government, he suggested in an interview that ZANU was about to launch the armed struggle:

The intention behind the sanctions [...] has not been to overthrow the Smith regime and subsequently introduce majority rule and independence to the people [...] On the contrary, Prime Minister Wilson has very persistently maintained that the Africans in Zimbabwe will not be ready for [that] for many years to come. [However,] in Zimbabwe we are better prepared to govern our country than has been the case in many other countries that have been granted independence. If Bechuanaland and Swaziland, which now will be self-governing, are capable to manage on their own, there is nothing that says that we should not do the same. It is not for Wilson to decide when we in Zimbabwe will take power in our own country. It is a question that the people [...] will decide. To say that a people is not ready to rule itself is nothing but naked colonialism. [...] We have never believed in these sanctions. As the situation is today, there remains only one possibility, [namely] to intensify the resistance struggle inside the country. We must overthrow the Smith regime ourselves. Wilson will not do it for us.³

On the very day of the ‘Battle of Sinoia’, Herbert Chitepo, the Lusaka-based National Chairman of ZANU and the chief architect behind the movement’s military campaign, was also paying his first visit to Sweden. Invited to attend

International (which the year before had ‘adopted’ Robert Mugabe), Sven Hamrell of the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies and representatives of the National Council of Swedish Youth.

² On 28 April 1966, seven freedom fighters from ZANU’s military wing died in an encounter with Ian Smith’s security forces near Sinoia (now Chinhoyi), north-west of Harare. ZANU would thereafter mark 28 April as ‘Chimurenga Day’, the official start of the liberation war. ZANU’s military activities were, however, sporadic and quite ineffectual until December 1972, when a phase of protracted armed struggle was started in the north-eastern parts of the country. As was seen above, the armed wing of ZAPU, later known as the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), initiated joint military operations with ANC of South Africa in the north-western parts in August 1967. However, ZAPU’s former head of military intelligence, Dumiso Dabengwa, has stressed that “contrary to claims that ZANU started the armed struggle in 1966 in Chinhoyi, the fact is that ZAPU’s armed struggle started in 1965 when [...] small units were sent into the country” (Dumiso Dabengwa: ‘ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe War of National Liberation’ in Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger (eds.): Society in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War, Volume I, University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare, 1995, p. 27).
³ ‘Västmakternas dubbelspel räddar Smiths rebellregering’ (‘The duplicity of the Western powers saves the Smith rebel regime’), interview with Simpson Mtambanengwe attached to Stockholm South Africa Committee: ‘Medlemsmeddelande’ (‘Information to the members’), No. 3/66, Stockholm, 11 April 1966 (AJC).
the congress of the Socialist International in Stockholm in May, Chitepo participated on 28 April 1966 at a preparatory seminar in Uppsala, where he joined his Zimbabwean colleagues from ZAPU in condemning any British initiative to enter into negotiations with Ian Smith.¹

Combined with Sekeramayi’s political work in Lund² and following the visit by Hamadziripi, ZANU had through Mtambanengwe’s efforts at the beginning of 1966 managed to convey its political views to an important audience in Sweden. Before embarking on the armed struggle, Sithole’s organization had established direct contacts with the influential South Africa Committees in Lund, Uppsala and Stockholm, as well as with the ruling Social Democratic Party and the Swedish government. In addition to talks with several members of the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance,³ Mtambanengwe had met the leader of the Swedish Communist Party, C.H. Hermansson, and the future Liberal Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ola Ullsten. ZANU’s National Chairman Herbert Chitepo had, finally, paid a brief visit to Sweden. These early contacts were later of importance for the decision to grant direct, official Swedish humanitarian support to ZANU.

Also ZAPU paid important visits to Sweden in 1966. Through the Socialist International (SI) and the Swedish Social Democratic Party,⁴ Nelson Samkange, ZAPU’s representative to Great Britain, and Nicholas Chitsiga, his colleague in Europe, were invited as ‘fraternal guests’ to the tenth SI congress in Stockholm in early May 1966. In that connection, they addressed the Labour Day celebrations in Norrtälje and Avesta, respectively.⁵ Their attendance at the Stockholm

¹ Chitepo returned to Sweden on several occasions. There is, however, no archival documentation that he held official discussions on his first visit at SIDA or at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In addition, unlike his ZAPU colleagues he did not address the 1966 Labour Day celebrations. Did the outbreak of the military struggle unexpectedly prompt his return to Lusaka? In any event, during the Uppsala seminar he established contacts with the ruling Social Democratic Party.

² The editorial board of the Syd- och Sydvästafrika bulletin decided at the beginning of 1966 to also cover developments in other countries in Southern Africa than South Africa and Namibia. A brief presentation of Zimbabwe was published in No. 1–2/1966. South Africa was, however, still the main focus of attention and the decision to widen the scope of the bulletin was motivated as follows: “The board of the [Lund South Africa] Committee has upon mature consideration decided to henceforth in the bulletin also cover the other countries in Southern Africa as it has appeared that their problems are closely connected to the situation in South Africa” (Lund South Africa Committee: ‘Klubbmeddelande’ (‘Information to the members’), No. 2/66, Lund, 22 April 1966 (AIC). Increasing attention would thereafter be given to developments in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. A special issue on Zimbabwe (No. 7–8/1966) was published in November 1966. It should in this connection be noted that the South Africa Committees in spite of the dominance of the struggle in the Portuguese colonies and in Zimbabwe towards the end of the 1960s did not change name and that separate, competing solidarity movements with these struggles—as was the case in other countries—did not appear in Sweden.

³ Sven Hamrell, Thord Palmlund and Anders Thunborg.


⁵ Socialdemokratiska Partistyrelsen (The National Board of the Social Democratic Party): ‘Berättelse för år 1966’ (‘Report for the year 1966’), p. 7 (LMA). The rallies in Norrtälje were addressed by Nelson Samkange, who in a spectacular way had escaped from the Gonakudzingwa camp before
congress of the Socialist International would, however, lead to a clash with the British Labour Party and was subsequently described by the official ZAPU organ *Zimbabwe Review* as "a deliberate insult to the people of Africa".¹

The SI congress was preceded by a seminar on 'Development in Democratic Socialist Thought and Action in New Countries', held in Uppsala at the end of April 1966. The purpose was to formulate proposals to the SI congress by bringing together "leaders of democratic socialist thought in all the continents, members and non-members of the Socialist International alike".² While there was no limitation to the participation of the Zimbabwean representatives in Uppsala, they were, however, not allowed to address the actual congress in Stockholm. Behind this move was Harold Wilson’s Labour Party, which feared—as later acknowledged by the British SI secretary Albert Carthy—that the "African non-member representatives [would] demand that the Socialist International should put pressure on the British Labour government to take military

action against the country at present described as Rhodesia”. Instead, the SI congress passed a resolution which “urge[d] full support for the efforts of the British Labour government”. Not surprisingly, the reaction to what the Zimbabweans understood as a “banning” by the Labour Party was strong. ZAPU subsequently concluded that “it is clear that in the future many African leaders will find it difficult to accept invitations from the Socialist International”.3

Other African ‘fraternal guests’ were equally upset by the attitude of the British Labour Party. In a letter to Sten Andersson, the secretary of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, the FRELIMO President Eduardo Mondlane wrote in June 1966 that

I really see no reason why the British delegation should have been afraid [in] Stockholm. Even assuming that [the] British fear [concerning Rhodesia] was the real reason for the squelching of the African voice [...], I still believe [that] it would have been better to have allowed the issue to come to the fore, rather than what happened. Europeans do not even begin to understand the African people if they will always be afraid of hearing them. [...] It seems to me [...] that the Socialist International as a movement has lost an opportunity to talk to the peoples of the Third World, especially those of Africa. Unless it is really not concerned with becoming a truly international movement, it has got to re-study its approach to the world before it can interest the people of Africa.4

In the same letter—and in a similarly worded communication with Pierre Schori, who in 1965 was attached to the national board of the Social Democratic Party—Mondlane, however, expressed satisfaction over “the attitude of [the Swedish party] concerning the many problems which the Socialist International did or did not discuss”,5 stating that

all in all, I gathered the impression that the socialists of Western Europe as a whole are too over-concentrated on the problems of their own continent to be interested in the problems of the rest of the world. The only exception to this general impression was the attitude of the leaders of your own party. [...] [W]e had a strong impression that the Swedish socialists are not only not afraid of hearing the Africans speak, but are actually actively interested in stimulating a constant intercourse of ideas between the two continents. Probably this is due to the fact that it is a long time since Sweden was a colonial power. Therefore, the people are ready to identify their problems with those of the African peoples without arousing recent emotions of overlordship and superiority. If you could allow me to make a suggestion in this connection, I would say the following: That the present good relations existing between the Swedish Social Democratic Party and many African socialist parties, especially in East and Southern Africa, must be encouraged.6

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1 Letter from Albert Carthy to Eduardo Mondlane, London, 10 August 1966 (MHA).
2 Cited in Bushin op. cit., p. 59.
4 Letter from Eduardo Mondlane to Sten Andersson, [Dar es Salaam], 2 June 1966 (MHA).
5 Letter from Eduardo Mondlane to Pierre Schori, [Dar es Salaam], 2 June 1966 (MHA).
6 Letter from Eduardo Mondlane to Sten Andersson, [Dar es Salaam], 2 June 1966 (MHA).
The dominant member of the Socialist International in the 1960s was the British Labour Party,1 to which the ‘old guard’ of the Swedish Social Democratic Party had traditionally looked for international guidance. At the beginning of the 1960s, important voices within the Swedish labour movement had, however, started to criticize the role of its sister parties in the major NATO countries, principally the British Labour Party and the French Socialist Party.2 The chairperson of the Social Democratic Women’s League, Inga Thorsson, had in 1962 characterized them as “support troops for a conservative order”, demanding a more independent international course for the Swedish party.

Conflicting interests between traditional SI members and friendly non-member organizations from the Third World, such as the one experienced at the 1966 congress in Stockholm, would during the second half of the decade—as suggested by Mondlane—bring the Swedish Social Democratic Party closer to the latter. For example, acknowledging that Mondlane’s contacts with the Socialist International had been “more or less useless”,3 Schori sought FRELIMO’s direct political advice, not only regarding developments in Mozambique, but also on the situation in Portugal.4 In fact, top-level consultations with FRELIMO had already been initiated before the 1966 SI congress.5 Such contacts would eventually lead to a situation where the ruling Swedish Social Democratic Party decided to extend political and humanitarian support to national liberation movements engaged in armed struggle against other Western governments, such as in Indochina and in the Portuguese African colonies. Of particular importance in this context was that the party at its extraordinary congress in October 1967 set up a special International Solidarity Fund “to—in a better way and to a major extent—be able to assist sister organizations and liberation movements in poor and oppressed countries”.6 Via the fund, the Social Demo-

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2 There was, at the same time, close cooperation with the Social Democratic Parties of Denmark and Norway, both members of NATO.
3 Letter from Pierre Schori to Eduardo Mondlane, Stockholm [no date, but before September 1966] (MHA).
4 In turn, the independent international course of the Swedish Social Democratic Party in the late 1960s would from the mid-1970s strongly influence the politics of the Socialist International, where the dominance—not least regarding Southern Africa—passed from the British to the Austrians (cf. the role of Bruno Kreisky), Germans (Willy Brandt) and Swedes (Olof Palme).
5 At the end of 1965, Schori and Mondlane had exchanged views on the exiled opposition organizations against Salazar’s Portugal (letter from Pierre Schori to Eduardo Mondlane, Stockholm, 22 November 1965 and letter from Eduardo Mondlane to Pierre Schori, Dar es Salaam, 11 January 1966) (MHA).
6 Social Democratic Party: ‘Solidaritet: En information om socialdemokraternas internationella solidaritetsfond’ (‘Solidarity: Information about the social democrats international solidarity fund’) [no date] (LMA). The first payments from the International Solidarity Fund were made in 1968, as follows: 85,000 SEK to the National Liberation Front of Vietnam (for surgical equipment); 52,000 SEK to PAK of Greece; 25,000 SEK to PRD of the Dominican Republic; 15,000 SEK to “the liberation movement in Rhodesia” (without further specification); and 10,000 to the Socialist Party of Portugal (i.e. Acção Socialista Portuguesa) (ibid). The Social Democratic Youth League had in 1963 already set up its own solidarity fund. Financial support had through the fund been extended to both ZANU
cratic Party—contrary to the Trade Union Confederation—was in an autonomous position to extend direct support to various organizations.1

Closer political contacts were at the same time established with the liberation movements in Zimbabwe. In spite of the negative experience from ZAPU’s visit to Sweden in May, the organization sent a high-powered delegation from its headquarters in Lusaka to Stockholm in September 1966. It was led by ZAPU’s National Secretary, George Nyandoro, and included the National Treasurer, Jason (‘J.Z.’) Moyo, as well as Nicholas Chitsiga, who was based in Brussels and had already visited Sweden in November 1965 and in April-May 1966. During their visit, the ZAPU leaders2 held several meetings at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. They also met Olof Palme, at the time Minister of Transport and Communications.3

Concurring with ZANU’s International Secretary Mtambanengwe, Nyandoro and Moyo expressed serious doubts regarding Britain’s resolve to bring an end to Ian Smith’s rebellion, as well as with respect to the effects of the selective, voluntary sanctions recommended by the UN Security Council. As South Africa and Portugal would continue to trade with Smith, they argued that even comprehensive economic sanctions against Zimbabwe in the shorter term would be ineffective. Instead, they advocated international military action as the only way to avoid “an African Vietnam”.4 In their view, the negative attitude by the British to military action only served to encourage the minority regime. The ZAPU leaders therefore hoped that Sweden at the United Nations would support their demand for a military intervention, although they were aware that such a proposal could be vetoed in the Security Council. Never-

1 While SDP embarked on an independent course in its international relations, LO continued to operate through ICFTU, where US and British interests were particularly dominant. It created obvious contradictions between the Social Democratic political and labour fronts. For example, in Angola ICFTU supported its FNLA-aligned affiliate LGTA (Liga Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola; General Workers’ League of Angola), while neither the Social Democratic Party nor the Swedish government ever extended assistance to FNLA. Conversely, via SIDA and ANC the Swedish government extended support to the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), while LO and TCO refused to do the same. In an interview in June 1996, Pierre Schori stated that “the policy that LO developed [...] was to work through the ICFTU in Brussels. Of course, there you had all kinds of views represented. Those of the former colonial powers and also the policy of the United States, which was very aggressive at the time. In that context, it was difficult for the Swedish [LO] to get its views through. However, they had chosen to work through the international confederation as a point of principle. We talked a lot about this, but it was not until later that the policy was modified” (interview with Pierre Schori, Stockholm, 28 June 1996).

2 ZAPU’s political leadership in exile was composed of James Chikerema, George Nyandoro, J.Z. Moyo, Edward Ndlovu, George Silundika and Jane Ngwenya.


theless, Swedish support for military action would have a "powerful moral influence".\footnote{Ibid.}

As the search for non-violent solutions was a basic principle in Sweden’s foreign policy, the officials at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs replied that it was most unlikely that the government would support a call for military action, particularly in a situation where a decision on mandatory sanctions had yet to be taken by the Security Council. This would also be the case when the General Assembly the following month discussed the question of Zimbabwe. While supporting the demand for comprehensive sanctions, Sweden abstained from voting on the final resolution due to the fact that it advocated the use of military force. Facing criticism from within his own ranks, the Foreign Minister clarified Sweden’s position as follows in a parliamentary reply to the Social Democratic member Evert Svensson:

It is [...] self-evident in our view that no arrangements affecting the future of Southern Rhodesia should be permitted to make white minority rule permanent. [...] We share in the condemnation of the governments of South Africa and Portugal for their support of the illegal Smith regime. [And] we call on the Security Council to focus its attention on the situation in Southern Rhodesia so that it will be able to consider compulsory sanctions according to [...] the UN Charter. [...] However, the resolution also advocated the use of military [force]. According to one of the clauses, the United Kingdom was urged to use every available means—‘including in particular the use of force’—to bring the Smith regime to an end. [...] According to the UN Charter, the Security Council alone can make such a decision. [...] If violence had not been advocated in the resolution, we would have had no hesitation voting for it, for we support its contents as a whole. In particular for a country with Sweden’s traditions, it is naturally not possible to support solutions by violence, however strongly we may sympathize with the oppressed population. The measures taken must be concordant with the principles of the UN Charter.\footnote{‘Reply by the Foreign Minister to an interpellation in the First Chamber of the Riksdag’, 9 December 1966, in The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs: Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy: 1966; Stockholm, 1967, pp. 97–98.}

In the era of Vietnam, it was, however, precisely the question of violence that occupied the centre stage. It was the armed struggle launched by ZANU and ZAPU in 1966–67 in reaction to the vacillations by the Western powers that towards the end of the decade attracted the attention of an increasingly radical Swedish anti-imperialist movement. The government’s attitude at the United Nations would against this background be severely censured by broad sections of the Swedish youth,\footnote{Such criticism was also expressed by political organizations outside the wider socialist camp. In October 1968, for example, the Liberal Party Youth League addressed an open letter to Foreign Minister Nilsson in which it stated that “Harold Wilson already at an early stage should have intervened militarily against the [Smith regime].” The Liberal youth demanded moral and material support to the liberation movements by the Swedish government, as well as support for military action by Britain (letter to Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson from the Liberal Party Youth League, signed in Stockholm on 7 October 1968 by Olle Wästberg and Leif Victorin) (MFA).} which, at least nominally, had the Zimbabwean people
in mind when it for the first time in a major way confronted the authorities with
direct actions to stop a Davis Cup match in tennis against Zimbabwe at Båstad
at the beginning of May 1968.

Increasing Militancy

Due to the crushing of the South African opposition, the apartheid question—
which had given birth to the first organized Swedish solidarity expressions
with Southern Africa—would, as far as the region was concerned, from 1966 be
overshadowed by the issues of Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Following the
first demonstrations against the American intervention in Vietnam in mid-1965
and influenced by the European New Left, a broader Swedish anti-imperialist
movement would mainly be formed by university students and develop in
Lund, Uppsala and Stockholm. Both ZANU and ZAPU were at the beginning of
this process given prominent attention as armed, revolutionary forces against
the prevailing world order.

The anniversary of Ian Smith’s UDI was widely observed by the South
Africa Committees in Lund and Uppsala. In Uppsala, where during the spring
and early autumn of 1966 the committee had organized a series of activities to
raise money and collect books for Zimbabwean refugees in Zambia, street
demonstrations and collections in favour of ZANU and ZAPU were arranged in
cooperation with the African Students’ Association on 11 November 1966.
Shortly thereafter Tarisai Ziyambi, ZANU’s representative to the United King-
dom and Europe, visited the committee, which together with the Social Demo-
cratic Laboremus and the Liberal Student Union staged a Zimbabwe evening
where Ziyambi addressed the audience on the subject ‘Towards Real Indepen-
dence and a Free Zimbabwe’. 4

1 And—outside the region—the struggle in Guinea-Bissau.

2 The organized expression of the solidarity movement with Vietnam was the United FNL Groups
(De Förenade FNL-grupperna—DFFG), formed in April 1966. Summarizing DFFG’s influence, Sören
Wibe has written: “The leading position—politically and numerically—within the Swedish [extra-
parliamentary] left of DFFG could at the end of the 1960s not be questioned. DFFG’s moral and
prestige […] was so dominant that a stand against it on any question immediately was accepted as
counter-revolutionary” (Sören Wibe: ‘Från Pacifism till Marxism-Leninism’ in Jan Engberg et al.:
Rabén & Sjögren, Stockholm, 1978, p. 40). However, markedly influenced by Maoist thought, DFFG
appeared and was highly visible during the Vietnam war, but was lost from the scene thereafter. It
was strongly opposed to the traditional parties of the Swedish left and saw the solidarity movement
with Southern Africa as a popular expression which diverted attention from ‘the storm centre of the
global contradiction’, i.e. Vietnam and Indochina. In Sweden, the Vietnam movement as repre-
sented by DFFG—and the political organizations growing out of it, such as the Swedish Communist
Party (Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti; SKP) and the Communist Party Marxist-Leninists (Revolu-
tionaries) (Kommunistiska Partiet Marxist-Leninisterna Revolutionärerna); KPML (r)—played a very
marginal part in the development of the broad Swedish solidarity opinion with Southern Africa.

3 For example, in connection with the spring concert of the popular Uppsala choir Orphei Drängar
(‘Sons of Orpheus’).

4 Uppsala South Africa Committee: ‘Verksamhetsberättelse för tiden 4 februari 1966–23 februari
Ziyambi had gone to Uppsala from Lund, where the local South Africa Committee around 11 November 1966 similarly arranged a number of opinion meetings on Zimbabwe, staging street demonstrations “against the British Rhodesia policies and for the struggle against the oppression [waged] by the African liberation movement”. 1 A special issue of Syd- och Sydvästafrika dedicated to Zimbabwe was published for the occasion and on the evening of 11 November the committee co-sponsored a teach-in on Zimbabwe where the main speakers were Ziyambe from ZANU, Lawrence Vambe from ZAPU and Alexander Chikwanda from UNIP of Zambia. 2

Inspired by ZANU’s Sydney Sekeramayi, who at the time studied medicine at the University of Lund and in 1966 was appointed General Secretary of the Zimbabwe Students’ Union in Europe, the Lund committee would from then on more than any other solidarity group keep the issue of Zimbabwe alive in Sweden. With active assistance from the committee, the ZANU-dominated Zimbabwe Students’ Union in Europe held its congress in Lund at the beginning of March 1967. 3 Later in the month, it arranged an important discussion between Sekeramayi and Judith Todd, 4 who had just had her book Rhodesia published in Swedish. 5 In addition to a number of internal study circles on Zimbabwe, 6 in May 1967 the committee arranged an Africa week together with the Lund African Students’ Union, during which the anniversary of the armed

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The Uppsala South Africa Committee was very active in 1966–67. Meeting once a week at the local RIngharen restaurant for lunch discussions and holding a number of study circles to discuss developments in South and Southern Africa, it managed to regularly invite a number of prominent guests for more formal lectures. In 1966–67, John Collins of IDAF addressed the committee on ‘The Struggle for the Political Prisoners in South Africa’; Dennis Brutus of ANC spoke about ‘Robben Island and the World’; Alex la Guma, also representing ANC, discussed ‘The Resistance Movement inside South Africa’; and Godfrey Gaoseb of SWANU talked about ‘South West Africa’. The question of Zimbabwe was also given attention. In addition to the visit by Ziyambe, in February 1967 Peter Wallensteen, for example, held a study circle on the subject of ‘Great Britain and Rhodesia’ (ibid). Wallensteen, later an internationally renowned academic on questions relating to peace and conflict, was at the time closely following the sanctions debate regarding Zimbabwe, also publishing more general articles on the country. See, for example, Peter Wallensteen: ‘Rhodesias Väg till Självständighet’ (‘Rhodesia’s Road to Independence’) in Tiden, No. 2, 1966. In his article in the social democratic theoretical review, Wallensteen wrote that “it is difficult to determine which of the [opposition] parties enjoys the greatest support among the Africans, but it appears that Nkomo and ZAPU would be well placed. […] Concerning ZANU, it has been stated that it is primarily supported by intellectuals, i.e. a very small group” (ibid., p. 112).

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1 Information sheet by the Lund South Africa Committee [no date] (AGA).
2 Ibid.
3 Lund South Africa Committee: ‘Medlemsmeddelande’ (‘Information to the members’), No. 1/67, Lund [no date] (AGA).
5 Judith Todd: Rhodesia, Diakonistyrelsens Bokförlag, Stockholm, 1967. Close to ZAPU, Judith Todd was the daughter of Garfield Todd, former missionary and former Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia (1953–58).
6 As its counterpart in Uppsala, the Lund South Africa Committee was very active in 1966–67, holding a series of internal study circles. Zimbabwe was covered in circles on ‘The Political and Economic History of Rhodesia’ and ‘The Contemporary Situation in Rhodesia’. They were largely based on material published by the British journal New Left Review.
struggle by ZANU was commemorated.\(^1\) To update the committee members, Sydney Sekeramayi wrote a short piece entitled 'One Year since the Battle of Sinoia'.\(^2\)

Influenced by the worldwide Vietnam and New Left movements, the university-based Lund and Uppsala South Africa Committees would from 1966 increasingly concentrate their activities on internal studies of economic imperialism in general and the role of Swedish capital interests in the Third World in particular. In the solidarity work for Southern Africa, it soon led the committees —although with an important Social Democratic membership—on a confrontation course vis-à-vis the government. For example, when Prime Minister Tage Erlander at the beginning of 1967 paid his annual visit to his alma mater, the University of Lund, the local South Africa committee distributed a leaflet in which it stated that

\begin{quote}
in the struggle between the oppressed and the oppressors, no one can be indifferent. It is necessary to take a stand. The stand of the Swedish government is clear. It has betrayed its old [ideals], solidarizing instead with the interests of Swedish big finance, i.e. the same interests that continuously demand new tributes in the form of the lives of struggling Angolans or Vietnamese. In South Africa, Latin America or Portugal—wherever there are profits to be made—Swedish big finance stands ready, faithfully as a shadow assisted by the [...] government. The Swedish government is prostituted to the point that it safeguards the interests of Swedish industry in the Third World in spite of the fact that [they] constitute the prime obstacle to progress and economic development.

[...] Prime Minister Tage Erlander has come to Lund to receive an accolade by the students in a traditionally sociable atmosphere. Let us instead receive him with openly expressed contempt due to [his] government’s betrayal of the Swedish labour movement and of the oppressed peoples.\(^3\)
\end{quote}

In the history of the Swedish solidarity movement with Southern Africa, this was an entirely new discourse, announcing a more confrontational attitude towards the government and, in general, the established authorities. The Uppsala South Africa Committee underwent a similar process. In the beginning of 1967, the committee formally decided to support the National Liberation Front of Vietnam, a decision which according to many member organizations and individuals was outside its area of competence and led to breakaways and a general weakening of the committee.\(^4\) The organization would from then on increasingly shift its focus of attention to the situation in Indochina, eventually questioning the very relevance of a particular solidarity movement for South

\(^1\) Lund South Africa Committee: ‘Medlemsmeddelande’ (‘Information to the members’), No. 5/67, Lund [no date] (AGA).
\(^2\) Sydney Sekeramayi: ‘Ett År sedan Slaget vid Sinoia’, attached to ibid.
\(^3\) Leaflet by the Lund South Africa Committee and the Lund Clarté Section, attached to Lund South Africa Committee: ‘Medlemsmeddelande’ (‘Information to the members’), No. 4/1967, Lund [no date] (AGA).
and Southern Africa. The hardening climate between the solidarity movement and the authorities would at the same time lead to breakdowns in the communications with the authorities. When, for example, the Uppsala committee in May 1967 as a matter of routine requested permission to arrange a public fund-raising campaign in favour of the Southern African liberation movements, the request was rejected by the local police, which motivated its decision as follows:

Considering that [...] the money directly or indirectly may be used for the procurement of arms, which cannot be seen as a charitable purpose, and that similar money collections for [...] political aims [...] have led to certain disturbances of the [public] order, the [Uppsala] police authority has found no reason to approve [the] request.2

Arguing that the police on earlier occasions had approved public fund-raising activities in favour of ZANU and ZAPU; that it was “outside the area of competence of the police to take a moral stand in favour of pacifism and non-violence”; and that it was impossible to determine if the money collected would be used to buy arms or not, the South Africa Committee successfully lodged a protest against the decision.3 In the meantime, the street collection had been carried out as originally planned.4 Nevertheless, to the committee activists the incident indicated an increasingly hostile attitude by the authorities and added

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1 In a discussion paper to the boards of the Lund and Uppsala South Africa Committees—entitled 'Declaration of death of the South Africa Committee'—Ulla Byegård, the former chairperson of the Uppsala committee, later wrote: "The South Africa movement started on humanitarian grounds, [but] we have never had a clear long-term strategy for the South Africa Committees. [...] A correct long-term objective is in my view incompatible with the existence of independent committees. [...] We have declared our solidarity with the struggle of the peoples of Africa to seize power [and] we have embraced the principle that this is only possible through a revolution which in the end will use revolutionary violence and is directed against the principal enemy, i.e. US imperialism and its lackeys. [...] The main contradiction in the world today goes between US imperialism and its lackeys on the one side and the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America on the other. The storm centre of this contradiction is in East Asia [...] and it is the war in Vietnam that presents [us with the possibilities] of developing the anti-imperialist movement and consciousness. [Solidarity with Southern Africa] diverts attention from the anti-imperialist movement and splits the anti-imperialist movement. [Against this background], the best thing to do is to initiate a debate within the South Africa Committee regarding its continued existence" (Ulla Byegård: 'Dödförklaring av Sydafrika-kommittén'/'Declaration of death of the South Africa Committee', Uppsala [no date] (UPA).

2 Letter ('Avslagsbeslut'/'Rejection of request') from the Uppsala Police District to the Uppsala South Africa Committee, Uppsala, 19 May 1967 (UPA).

3 Letter from Ulla Byegård, Chairperson of the Uppsala South Africa Committee, to the Uppsala County Administrative Board (länsstyrelse), Nyköping, 6 June 1967 (UPA).

4 The collection was carried out before the reversal of the original decision by the police. Two members of the Uppsala South Africa Committee were arrested during the fund-raising exercise and sentenced to pay a fine (Uppsala South Africa Committee: ‘Verksamhetsberättelse för tiden 23 februari 1967–29 februari 1968’/’Report for the period 23 February 1967–29 February 1968’, Uppsala, 17 February 1968) (UPA). The money collected was eventually divided between ANC, PAC, SWAPO, ZAPU, ZANU, COREMO, MPLA, FNLA/GRAE, UNITA and PAIGC (Uppsala South Africa Committee: ‘Protokoll från sammanträde’/’Minutes from meeting’, Uppsala, 18 February 1968) (UPA). Strongly influenced by the maoist view of the united front, the Uppsala South Africa Committee had thus in mid-1967 already decided to support practically all the known movements in Southern Africa.
to the build-up of a climate of confrontation at the time of the Båstad events on 3 May 1968.1

The 1968 Båstad Demonstrations

The demonstrations against the Davis Cup match in tennis between Sweden and Zimbabwe2 at the coastal resort of Båstad would for the first time in decades involve a major confrontation between demonstrators and police. As a prelude to the Stockholm university students’ demonstrations later in the month,3 they may be described as the first major manifestation in Sweden of the 1968 worldwide student revolt. As such, they were as much—if not more—directed against the established Swedish political order as in favour of the struggle in Zimbabwe. Criticizing the protest marches simultaneously carried out against the match by the youth leagues of the Social Democratic, Centre and Liberal parties, the organizers of the action group which eventually stopped it described the events as “sifting the wheat from the chaff” and “a watershed between paltry quarter-radicalism of the leaders of the youth leagues and true commitment to the peoples of the world”.4

The background was that in January 1968 Sweden was drawn against Zimbabwe in the international Davis Cup tennis tournament. Ignoring international protests, at the beginning of March the Smith regime proceeded to execute three Zimbabwean freedom fighters. Various Swedish voices were immediately raised against the tennis match, which was to be played in Sweden. Students in Stockholm and Uppsala protested and in parliament the Liberal leader Sven Wedén, for example, stated that “participation with Rhodesia in sports events would surely be against the views of a very broad Swedish opinion”.5 The executions were also strongly condemned by the Social Democratic Foreign

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1 This was not an unfounded perception. According to official statistics, between 1 July 1966 and 31 December 1967 a total of 191 arrests were made by the Swedish police in connection with demonstrations against the war in Vietnam (Möller op. cit., pp. 98–99). In addition, at the end of March 1968 there were quite spectacular confrontations—involving the use of police helicopters—between Vietnam activists and the authorities in connection with a meeting in Stockholm of finance ministers and central bank governors from the world’s ten richest industrial nations, the so-called 10-group. This ‘battle at Foresta’ took place just over a month before the ‘battle at Båstad’.

2 There had been protests and minor demonstrations in connection with Davis Cup matches against South Africa in 1960, 1962 and 1964. See, for example, Per Wästberg: ‘Sport och rasförtryck’ ('Sports and racial oppression') in Dagens Nyheter, 12 July 1962.

3 University students occupied the building of the students’ union in Stockholm between 25 and 28 May 1968. The event—in Swedish known as kårhusockupationen—has come to represent a Swedish ‘May 68’ expression. The Båstad events earlier in the month were, however, more typical of the 1968 Zeitgeist, expressing rebellion against the Swedish government, establishment and capital, as well as concern for the colonized peoples. In turn, the events at Båstad prepared the terrain for the action by the Stockholm students. Together, the two events would include Sweden in the worldwide 1968 rebellion, although just as a faint breeze compared with the storms in Paris, Berlin or Prague, and—further afield—San Francisco and Tokyo.


5 Cited in Båstadaktivisterna op. cit., p. 64.
Minister Torsten Nilsson, but no steps to stop the match were taken by the government. The Swedish Tennis Federation—closely associated with the Wallenberg financial group—was allowed to continue preparing for the encounter.

At the beginning of April, the federation announced that the match was to be played in Båstad. Later in the month, an ad hoc action group—“an occasional anti-fascist, anti-imperialist united front of individuals seeing it as their duty to stop the match”—was formed in Lund. At about the same time, the Zimbabwean nationalists protested to the Swedish government. In a strongly worded letter to the Swedish embassy in Lusaka, ZAPU’s National Secretary Nyandoro wrote on 25 April that his organization was “horrified to learn that [...] Sweden [would] be competing against Southern Rhodesia in the Davis Cup”, pointing out that ZAPU found it incomprehensible and contradictory for Sweden to acknowledge the existence of a state of Rhodesia when Sweden is committed in its own right and through the United Nations to non-recognition [...]. We find it inconceivable for Sweden, which as far as we know is still committed to non-recognition of Rhodesia, that participants [...] from Rhodesia will be allowed to enter [the country] holding Rhodesian passports or whatever disguised travel documentation. To allow [...] entry to these fascist supporters of the British settler regime [...] is a tacit recognition of Rhodesia and a tacit repudiation of Sweden’s declared position on Rhodesia. We therefore request your government to take immediate appropriate steps to cancel [the match] in the interest of the people of Zimbabwe, [which is] struggling for self-determination and independence. [...] The people of Zimbabwe await your immediate action on this matter.

The UN Security Council had not yet voted in favour of comprehensive sanctions against Zimbabwe. In his reply to Nyandoro, ambassador Olof Kaijser rejected “the contention that the staging of a sports event in Sweden, organized by a private organization, would imply an official recognition of the state to which the participant athletes [see] themselves belonging”. Together with protests by the ZANU students in Lund, Nyandoro’s appeal would, however,
greatly encourage the Lund-based action group.\textsuperscript{1} Mainly composed of university students, the group attracted between 500 and 1,000 sympathizers from all over Sweden to Båstad,\textsuperscript{2} where the proposed form of action was a sit-in demonstration on the tennis court to prevent the match. Between the massive police force and the demonstrators, the situation got out of hand, leading to tumultuous clashes, although not to severe physical injuries. The tennis match itself was abandoned, but later staged at a closed venue on the French Riviera.

The ‘battle at Båstad’, as \textit{Dagens Nyheter} presented the events,\textsuperscript{3} was widely condemned by the Swedish media and the political establishment. During the following days, agitated journalists and politicians alike blamed almost without

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\textit{for National Security recalled: “Yes, I was in Båstad at that time. The Africa group in Lund was very active. Båstad is near Lund, so we went there, but I was very careful about one thing. I did not want to do anything that would lead me into a situation of conflict, especially with the police. I felt that if the activities that we were promoting in support of the struggle [in Zimbabwe] turned into a confrontation with the Swedish police, it would not create a good impression. So when we were organizing the demonstrations against the tennis match all of us [in ZANU] were saying: ‘Whatever happens, we should avoid confrontation with the Swedish police’. Sweden is basically a peaceful country and any kind of violent action would not be positively interpreted. We were very careful about that. [...] Sweden was extremely peaceful. Any violent action, or even statement, was not taken very well, so we were to operate within those guidelines” (interview with Sydney Sekeramayi, Harare, 27 July 1995).}
\end{flushright}

\textsuperscript{1} ZAPU’s statement was made public and Nyandoro was widely quoted at the time of the events. See Båstadsaktivisterna op. cit., p. 2 and, for example, \textit{Liberal Ungdom}, No. 5/1968, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., pp. 9, 10 and 97. A majority of the activists were from Lund and Uppsala.

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Dagens Nyheter}, 4 May 1968.
exception the activists for not separating sports and politics and for introducing violence, “hooliganism” and “terrorism”¹ into the political debate, grossly misrepresenting what had actually happened. As a number of political youth organizations expressed support for the demonstrators, it was, however, soon realized that the reaction against the tennis match represented “an ardent commitment by the youth, which the [political] parties have failed to canalize”.² In a letter to Education Minister Olof Palme,³ the Social Democratic organization Laboremus in Uppsala gave, for example, “its full support to the Båstad activists”, demanding that the minister

in all fora [...] seeks to broaden the opinion against the illegal [Smith] regime. [...] The aim of the action at Båstad was to stop the match and thereby the publicity the Rhodesian illegal regime would have enjoyed. The Swedish government was paralyzed in spite of declaring its support for an international blockade against Rhodesia. This we cannot excuse, nor ignore.⁴

The Social Democratic government was “deeply worried about these tendencies and tried to find means to counter them”.⁵ Less than a week after the demonstrations it decided to invite as many youth organizations as possible to an open exchange of views.⁶ Announcing the meeting, Prime Minister Erlander told the press on 8 May 1968 that “if the government had been asked by the tennis federation whether the match should be played or not, the reply would have been negative”.⁷ At the same time, the ZANU representative Sydney Sekeramayi—who had been at Båstad, although he did not participate in the clashes with the police⁸—characterized the events as “a storm in a teacup”, adding that “as a [Zimbabwean] one would have appreciated a consequent and firm action by the Swedish government. It should have stopped the match. We

¹ Sydsvenska Dagbladet, 4 May 1968.
² Dagens Nyheter, 15 May 1968.
³ On 21 February 1968, Olof Palme had together with Nguyen Tho Chan, ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to Moscow, led a torchlight demonstration in Stockholm with 5,000–6,000 people against the war in Vietnam. It provoked an uproar among the non-socialist opposition parties in Sweden and led the United States to recall its Stockholm ambassador. The pictures of Palme and Chan were published throughout the world and Palme—who in October 1969 succeeded Erlander as Prime Minister—became an internationally known politician.
⁴ Letter from Laboremus to Education Minister Olof Palme, Uppsala, 18 May 1968 (MFA).
⁵ Möller op. cit., p. 146.
⁶ The meeting with the youth organizations was proposed by Yngve Möller. He later wrote that the idea was that “the youth no longer would be able to say that those who governed the society did not want to listen” (ibid).
⁸ The day after the demonstrations, Sekeramayi and a student colleague from ZANU, Chagan Laloo, participated in an important teach-in on ‘Zimbabwe, Sports and Politics’, organized by the local branch of the Liberal Party Youth League at the diocesan centre in Båstad. The aim was to re-focus the attention on the issue behind the demonstrations. It was, however, disrupted by right wing elements (Båstadsaktivisterna op. cit., pp. 91–92).
would then have avoided the fuss’. A similar opinion was expressed by the future Liberal Minister of Trade, Hadar Cars. In an article in *Dagens Nyheter*, he had on 5 May already written that “the leaders [of our] society have through their inability to intervene put themselves and those of us who wanted the match to be stopped in a difficult and unpleasant situation”.

The meeting with the youth organizations took place in Stockholm on 14 May 1968. Led by Prime Minister Erlander, five cabinet ministers discussed for five hours with youth leaders from not less than fifty-nine organizations, representing the entire political spectrum. The deliberations focused on the right to demonstrate, the rules of the game in a democratic society and the war in Vietnam. The question of Zimbabwe was hardly touched upon. The representatives of the United FNL Groups (DFFG), the Clarté Association and the Left Party Youth League strongly criticized the government, while the South Africa Committees of Lund and Uppsala did not feature at all in the debate. In fact, neither Nyandoro’s strong letter to the Swedish government, nor the events at Båstad had a negative impact on the Swedish solidarity opinion with Zimbabwe. On the contrary, in 1968 both the Social Democratic and the Liberal youth intensified their support to the nationalist movement. Shortly before the meeting with the government, SSU granted an amount of 5,000 SEK to ZAPU and at about the same time FPU launched a new Rhodesia Campaign, also focusing on Nkomo’s organization. Announcing the campaign, the official *Liberal Debatt* explained:

“We cannot make ourselves comfortable with great words and revolutionary principles. We cannot—as the marxists of the Södra Afrika bulletin—rest content with strategic advice and taps on the shoulders of the oppressed. [...] On the contrary, Swedish liberalism must practically support the liberation of Zimbabwe. [...] While waiting for official contributions [by the government], FPU has decided to start its own fund-raising campaign. Its central point is direct assistance to ZAPU. It should be supported by all liberals. Every success for ZAPU is a defeat for white racial fascism in Southern Africa.”

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1 ‘Rhodesia måste isoleras’ (‘Rhodesia must be isolated’) in *Kvällsposten*, 9 May 1968.
3 Sven Aspling (Social Affairs), Herman Kling (Justice), Svante Lundkvist (Communications), Camilla Odhoff (without portfolio) and Olof Palme (Education).
5 Ibid.
6 Editorial: ‘Liberalt Stöd åt Zimbabwe’ (‘Liberal Support for the Liberation of Zimbabwe’) in *Liberal Debatt* No. 2/1968, p. 2. In spite of its 1968 call for exclusive support to ZAPU, *Liberal Debatt* would over the following years also open its pages to ZANU. In 1970, for example, Sydney Sekeramayi published an overview of the history of the liberation struggle. It was highly critical of ZAPU and its military alliance with ANC of South Africa. Nkomo and his followers were presented as a “reactionary, conservative group [...] which did not believe in the armed struggle and never prepared for it. It was merely forced to a number of revolutionary gestures after ZANU had embarked upon the armed [path] in April 1966, [...] entering into an empty propaganda-oriented alliance with ANC. In fact, if ANC itself had been serious about fighting the Vorster regime in South Africa, it would have allied itself with SWAPO, which fights
Beyond the public gaze, the Swedish government increased at the same time the humanitarian support to Zimbabwe. On 17 May 1968, two weeks after the Båstad events and shortly after the meeting with the youth organizations, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs granted an amount of 50,000 USD to the newly established Zimbabwe Christian Care via the World Council of Churches in favour of "people in Zimbabwe who have been victims of racial discrimination". The contribution represented almost half of Christian Care’s budget for 1968, significantly adding to its aid programme. Thus, in 1968 the Christian Council was in a position to assist the families of 475 political prisoners in Zimbabwe, inter alia by paying the school fees for 1,236 primary school children and 173 secondary school students. In addition, in September 1968 SIDA granted an amount of 7,000 GBP to a Prison Education Project organized directly by the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF) with the political prisoners themselves. The grant represented about two thirds of the total budget, benefiting 368 restrictees and detainees held by the Smith government at seven prison camps and jails throughout Zimbabwe. Among the recipients were leading nationalists such as Daniel Madzimbamutu and Willie Musarurwa of ZAPU and Edson Sithole of ZANU. Despite adverse conditions, they all managed to successfully pass academic examinations through correspondence courses with British universities. In a letter to IDAF smuggled out from the Gonakudzingwa camp in south-eastern Zimbabwe, Joshua Nkomo wrote:

"It is with delight that I write to inform you that a fair section of our students who are receiving financial assistance [...] from the Defence and Aid Fund have done quite well in their examination[s], considering the condition[s] under which they work. [...] May I, on behalf of all of us here at Gonakudzingwa, say how [...] appreciative we are for this most valuable assistance."


1 Letter/Decision to the National Audit Bureau from Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson, Stockholm, 17 May 1968 (MFA).
3 At the end of the 1960s, the Swedish government annually contributed a total of around 350,000 SEK for the prison education schemes in Zimbabwe run by Christian Care and IDAF (CCHA: ‘Svenska insatser till följd av kolonial- och apartheidförhållanden i Afrika samt övriga program avseende afrikansk flyktinghjälp’ /’Swedish contributions in response to conditions of colonialism and apartheid in Africa and other programmes concerning African refugee assistance’, Stockholm, 22 May 1970) (SDA).
4 Nkomo cited in letter from Phyllis Altman, IDAF, to Kerstin Oldfelt, SIDA, London, 29 November 1968 (MFA).
5 Cited in ibid.
Official Support to ZANU ...

The predicament of the detained leaders and their dependants was uppermost in the minds of the exiled representations when both ZANU and ZAPU in 1969 turned to the Swedish government with requests for financial assistance. They were at the same time supported by the Liberal and Centre parties. Direct, official Swedish humanitarian assistance to the Zimbabwean “resistance movements” had in a letter to the government at the beginning of November 1968 been demanded by the Liberal Party Youth League.1 In January 1969, the Centre leader Gunnar Hedlund and the Liberal leader Sven Wedén also submitted a joint parliamentary motion in favour of the movements in Southern Africa that “strive for social and economic justice. Particularly relevant in this context are the movements that operate in Rhodesia, [...] Mozambique, Angola, Portuguese Guinea, Namibia and South Africa”.2 As in the cases of ANC and SWAPO, it was the opposition Centre and Liberal parties that first advocated official support to ZANU and ZAPU in the Swedish parliament.

ZANU was the first Zimbabwean liberation movement to formally request Swedish government assistance. After initial contacts at the level of the Swedish embassy in Lusaka, in early February 1969 the ZANU Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Simpson Mtambanengwe, again visited the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm. This time he submitted a detailed, “purely humanitarian”3 request for approximately 75,000 SEK in favour of a Zimbabwe Welfare Trust (ZWT), set up by the movement in Lusaka in 1967. Formally an independent, private organization, ZWT was closely tied to ZANU. The deed of trust and the internal rules and regulations had been drafted by the respected Zambian solicitor Shamwana, who also acted as the ZWT chairman. ZANU’s National Chairman, Herbert Chitepo, himself a barrister-at-law and former Director of

1 Letter from FPU to the Swedish government, signed by Olle Wästberg and Lennart Rydberg, Stockholm, 7 November 1968 (MFA). In its resolution on comprehensive mandatory sanctions against Zimbabwe, the UN Security Council had on 29 May 1968 urged “all member states [...] to render moral and material assistance to the people of Southern Rhodesia in their struggle to achieve their freedom and independence” (UN Security Council Resolution 253 (1968) in Yearbook of the United Nations: 1968, Office of Public Information, United Nations, New York, p. 153).
2 Swedish Parliament 1969: Motion No. 511 in the Second Chamber, Riksdagens Protokoll 1969, p. 16. In January the following year, i.e. after the parliament in May 1969 had pronounced itself in favour of humanitarian support to liberation movements in Southern Africa, Per Ahlmark and Ola Ullsten of the Liberal Party introduced a motion in which they saw it as “self-evident that the Swedish support to the resistance movements in Southern Africa shall be substantially increased”, adding that they in particular had ZANU and ZAPU of Zimbabwe, FNLA and MPLA of Angola and ANC of South Africa in mind (Swedish Parliament 1970: Motion No. 624 in the Second Chamber, Riksdagens Protokoll 1970, p. 7). The demand was repeated in a Liberal motion by Per Ahlmark and David Wirmark in 1971 (Swedish Parliament 1971: Motion No. 683, Riksdagens Protokoll 1971, p. 3), and both in 1972 and 1973 the new leaders of the Centre and Liberal parties, Thorbjörn Fälldin (CP) and Gunnar Helen (FP), submitted joint party motions in which increased official support to ZANU and ZAPU was requested (Swedish Parliament 1972: Motion No. 934, Riksdagens Protokoll 1972, p. 16 and Swedish Parliament 1973: Motion No. 1101, Riksdagens Protokoll 1973, p. 10).
Public Prosecutions in Tanzania, was, however, also a trustee and “subsequent trustees shall be elected at annual meetings of the Zimbabwe African National Union. [...] Their duty shall be the administration of the fund”. The overriding objective of ZANU’s welfare organization was to extend “gratuitous relief by means of pecuniary or other assistance [to] necessitous persons who are, or have been, citizens or residents of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and [to] their dependants, arising out of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Rhodesia”.

Surprisingly, however, the official at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, ambassador Dag Malm, replied to Mtambanengwe that “the kind of assistance [sought], i.e. financial contributions for the maintenance of the families of the freedom fighters, so far had not been given by the Swedish government.” Malm’s reaction notwithstanding, a more substantial and positive comment to ZANU’s request was subsequently given by the Swedish ambassador to Zambia, Olof Kaijser. In May 1969, he wrote to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that “despite the risk that a contribution may be seen as taking a position in favour of one of the two competing [Zimbabwean] liberation movements, [...] I can recommend Swedish public support to the activities of the fund”. The Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance shared this view. At its meeting on 5 June 1969, the committee proposed “a general contribution to the Zimbabwe Welfare Trust”, which later in the month was specified to an amount of 50,000 SEK. The grant was disbursed by SIDA at the beginning of the Swedish financial year 1969/70. In accordance with the original request, it was used to cover school fees and maintenance costs for dependants of ZANU members who had been killed in Zimbabwe.

1 Zimbabwe Welfare Fund: ‘Trust Deed’ [no date], attached to ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Dag Malm: ‘Biståndsansökan från ZANU’ (‘Request for assistance by ZANU’), Stockholm, 6 February 1969 (MFA). As seen above, the Swedish government had since December 1965—i.e. over a period of more than three years—extended humanitarian assistance to political prisoners and their families in Zimbabwe. Even at higher levels in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs there remained, however, in the late 1960s often a negative and uninformed attitude towards the Southern African liberation movements. Foreign Ministry officials could—as in this case—out of ignorance or political conviction convey ‘official’ messages which not only were opposed to the political objectives of the Social Democratic government, but also contradicted earlier decisions and established policies of the ministry itself. The unfortunate situation would eventually be rectified through the creation of a Department for International Development Cooperation within the ministry in 1970.
7 CCHA: ‘Svenska insatser till följd av kolonial- och apartheidförhållanden i Afrika samt övriga program avseende afrikansk flyktinghjälp’ (‘Swedish contributions in response to conditions of colonialism and apartheid in Africa and other programmes concerning African refugee assistance’), Stockholm, 22 May 1970 (SDA).
Via the Zimbabwe Welfare Trust, ZANU—which from the mid-1960s through active diplomacy and the establishment of broad and multiform contacts had managed to build an important support base in Sweden—thus became, together with PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau, the first African liberation movement to receive official Swedish humanitarian support.1 From being widely seen as a small splinter group and standing outside the alliance of ANC, FRELIMO, MPLA, SWAPO and ZAPU formed in Khartoum in January 1969,2 ZANU, consequently, occupies a special place in the history of Sweden’s involvement with the nationalist movements in Southern Africa.

In September and October 1969, Richard Hove,3 at the time ZANU’s representative to the United Kingdom and Western and Eastern Europe, discussed a second request for support to ZWT with the Swedish embassy in London, stating that “our party realizes and appreciates that there are many countries which, while [being] sympathetic to the African cause, cannot on conviction support us militarily. We ask such nations to help us with the welfare aspect of our struggle”.4 As Swedish support to ZWT had just been granted, nothing further was done about the request. Hove also raised the question of direct contacts with the Swedish government.5 Together with Henry Hamadziripi, the Lusaka-based Treasurer and member of ZANU’s Supreme Council, he visited Sweden in February 1970. They were received at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by ambassador Dag Malm, who in his notes from the meeting recorded that the two nationalist leaders wanted to discuss “the question of further assistance to [ZANU] and ‘Swedish diplomatic recognition’ of the movement”.6 In his rather cryptic reply to the latter question, Malm stated that “Sweden could not be politically bound to assistance to the liberation movements”, explaining that this position was due to Sweden’s declared policy of neutrality and commit-

1 Swedish support to FRELIMO’s Mozambique Institute will be discussed below. The meeting of the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance held on 5 June 1969 also recommended a first grant to PAIGC of not less than 1 million SEK, which subsequently was confirmed as the Swedish official contribution for the financial year 1969/70.

2 Jointly organized by the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Committee and the World Peace Council, an International Conference of Solidarity with Southern Africa and the Portuguese Colonies was held in Khartoum, Sudan, in mid-January 1969. The conference made an “appeal to all democracy-loving peoples to recognize as the sole official and legitimate authority [...] the following fighting movements: MPLA (Angola), PAIGC (Guinea-Bissau), FRELIMO (Mozambique), ANC (South Africa), SWAPO (Namibia) and ZAPU (Zimbabwe)” (cited in Colin Legum and John Drysdale: Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1969–1970, Africa Research Limited, Exeter, 1970, p. C 155). The organizations in the Khartoum alliance were often described as the ‘authentic’ liberation movements.

3 Born in Mberengwa, Hove was one of many Zimbabwean politicians who had attended CSM schools. He was appointed Minister of the Public Service in Zimbabwe’s first independent government in 1980.


5 Letter (‘Representant för ZANU önskar besöka Sverige’/ ‘ZANU representative wishes to visit Sweden’) from ambassador Leif Belfrage to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, London, 22 October 1969 (MFA).

ments towards the United Nations.\textsuperscript{1} The ZANU representatives also enquired whether Sweden would be in a position to assist the movement with the procurement of a radio transmitter, to which Malm responded in the negative.\textsuperscript{2}

The first Swedish grant to ZANU covered the period from 1 July 1969 until 30 June 1970. Towards the end of the period, ZANU approached the Swedish embassy in Lusaka for continued and expanded assistance. In May 1970, the National Chairman, Herbert Chitepo, thus submitted one request on behalf of ZWT and another in the name of ZANU. The request concerning the Zimbabwe Welfare Trust envisaged, as before, humanitarian assistance to dependants of political prisoners in Zimbabwe, but also support to ZANU refugees in Botswana.\textsuperscript{3} The direct ZANU request was of a more political nature. Basing the submission on “the expressed commitment of [the Swedish] government to the cause of liberation, human dignity and freedom”, ZANU requested financial assistance of around 90,000 SEK for a programme of “political education [to] revitalize the youth movement inside Rhodesia through ‘cover organizations’, [...] involving 20,000 or more young people within a year”.\textsuperscript{4}

Both requests were supported by ambassador Kaijser, who conveyed his impression to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm that ZANU—“considering the tendencies towards splits which have appeared within [...] ZAPU—at present probably [is] the most efficient of the two [Zimbabwean] liberation movements”.\textsuperscript{5} As ZWT was late in presenting audited accounts for the contribution granted for 1969/70, it was, however, not until November 1970 that the requests were discussed by the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance. It recommended increased support to the Zimbabwe Welfare Trust, amounting to 70,000 SEK for the financial year 1970/71, while ZANU’s request for political work was rejected.\textsuperscript{6} The recommendation was subsequently followed by the government.

Albeit initially with modest amounts, Swedish official humanitarian support was via SIDA extended to ZANU from 1969. Once the first decisions had been taken, there developed a close and open relationship between the two. As recognized by Swedes and Zimbabweans alike, ZANU’s National Chairman Herbert Chitepo—who first visited Sweden in April 1966—contributed more than anyone to this situation.\textsuperscript{7} Under Chitepo’s leadership, ZANU would dur—

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\textsuperscript{1} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid. Two years later—in 1972—SIDA delivered a mobile radio station to PAIGC.
\textsuperscript{3} Letter from Herbert Chitepo to the Swedish ambassador, Lusaka, 21 May 1970 (MFA).
\textsuperscript{4} Letter from Herbert Chitepo to the Swedish ambassador, Lusaka, 20 May 1970 (MFA).
\textsuperscript{5} Letter (‘Ansökan om bistånd från ZANU’/ ‘Request for assistance from ZANU’) from Olof Kaijser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Lusaka, 22 May 1970 (MFA).
\textsuperscript{7} For example, in a remarkable display of trust Chitepo told Anders Möllander—at the time a junior official with SIDA—in Stockholm in October 1972 that ZANU was going to launch the armed struggle from bases in the Tete province in Mozambique towards the end of the year. Anticipating
ing the first half of the 1970s see the Swedish direct assistance to the movement grow substantially, while it was not until the beginning of 1973 that a continuous aid relationship was established with ZAPU. The fact that close relations by then had been maintained with ZANU for more than three years was not without consequence. It influenced official Sweden’s views of the situation in Zimbabwe and consolidated ZANU as a leading nationalist organization.¹

The humanitarian support to ZANU was suspended in March 1975, but later resumed. At the time of Zimbabwe’s independence in April 1980, the direct regular assistance disbursed by the Swedish government to ZANU over the years amounted in total to 45.5 million SEK.²

... and to ZAPU

Four months after Mtambanengwe’s visit to Stockholm, ZAPU also approached the Swedish government with a request for assistance. In July 1969, Edward

harsh counter-measures against the civilian population by the Smith regime and increasing flows of refugees into Zambia, Chitepo wanted to inform the Swedish government about possibly foreseeable humanitarian needs. Möllander later commented: “I found what Chitepo told me almost unbelievable. I could not understand that he came to us to tell us about a guerrilla struggle which would [only] begin in a couple of months. He must have had the security risks in mind and calculated them against [ZANU’s] need to be able to care for the refugees” (Möllander op. cit., p. 35). When asked about this open attitude towards a Western government, Sydney Sekeramayi—who facilitated Chitepo’s visit to Sweden—said in 1995: “[Chitepo] was very clear that [...] we could not discuss military support, but we could be honest. [...] When he talked about launching the armed struggle in Rhodesia, it was really part of a policy that there were certain people whom you could tell the truth, because it would not help if you hid [it] from them. They would later find out and think that you were not quite honest in the presentation of your case. So we agreed: ’Tell them that the struggle is on the way and that we expect non-military support from our Scandinavian supporters!’” (Interview with Sydney Sekeramayi, Harare, 27 July 1995). See also interview with Per Wästberg, Stockholm, 28 February 1996 and interview with Pierre Schori, Stockholm, 28 June 1996. Chitepo’s open diplomacy had the desired results. With a great number of refugees pouring into Zambia, in mid-1973 ZANU requested Swedish support for the purchase of a farm where they could be productively settled. SIDA agreed to the request in October 1973 (CCHA: ’Stöd till Zimbabwe African National Union, ZANU’/’Support to ZANU’, Stockholm, 8 November 1973) (SDA).

¹ The Swedish ambassador to Zambia, Olof Kaijser, reported in December 1970 to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm that the two detained Zimbabwean leaders Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole “should have agreed to renounce their leadership positions to make it possible to create a unitary liberation movement with Mr. Robert Mugabe as the official leader” (Letter (Relationerna mellan ZAPU och ZANU) ’/’The relations between ZAPU and ZANU’) from Olof Kaijser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Lusaka, 15 December 1970) (MFA). This was far from being the case. Nevertheless, the mentioning of Mugabe as a possible national leader shows that as early as in 1970 he was not an unknown entity to the Foreign Ministry officials.

² Based on disbursement figures according to SIDA’s annual accounts, established by Ulla Beckman for this study. In addition, following Rhodesian attacks on refugee camps in Mozambique and Zambia both ZANU and ZAPU received considerable amounts of Swedish emergency assistance in the late 1970s.
Ndlovu, Deputy National Secretary of ZAPU, visited the Swedish embassy in London with submissions in favour of a feeding scheme and of extended medical services to ZAPU members in Zimbabwe. However, as acknowledged by Ndlovu, the proposed assistance could involve ZAPU’s guerrilla forces in Zimbabwe and there was some hesitancy about the request.

Nevertheless, presenting ZAPU as “the sole representative of the African people of Zimbabwe”, Ndlovu soon thereafter submitted a more comprehen-

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1 Like ZANU’s Richard Hove, Ndlovu had received his education through CSM schools. Visiting Sweden in September 1972, he stated the view that the education work of the Swedish missionaries was important to the Africans (CCHA: Memorandum (‘Samtal med Edward Ndlovu’/’Discussion with Edward Ndlovu’) by Anders Mållander, Stockholm, 27 September 1972) (SDA). Ndlovu’s earlier links to the Church of Sweden Mission would in 1977 be particularly important in connection with CSM’s involvement on the side of ZAPU following the departure of school children and teachers from the Manama mission to Zambia.

2 Edward Ndlovu: ‘Proposals for a feeding scheme in Rhodesia’ [no date] and ‘ZAPU proposals for medical services’ [no date], attached to letter (‘Bistånd till ZAPU’/’Assistance to ZAPU’) from Jan Kronholm, Swedish embassy in London, to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, London, 1 July 1969 (MFA).

3 Letter from Edward Ndlovu, ZAPU Deputy National Secretary, to the Swedish Foreign Minister, Torsten Nilsson, London, 8 September 1969 (MFA)
sive request in a letter to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Torsten Nilsson. Underlining Nilsson’s “well known position of support to the liberation movement” and the fact that ZAPU “in [its] efforts of prosecuting the struggle effectively [is] experiencing enormous financial difficulties”, Ndlovu appealed for Swedish assistance to the tune of “at least 120,000 USD1 to cover some of our humanitarian and political needs”, stating “that a reply [should be] directed to me or to the National Secretary in Lusaka at PO Box 1657”.2

Only marginally focused on humanitarian needs, it was quite a heavy-handed approach. However, ZAPU stood by the request. In October 1969, the National Secretary, George Nyandoro, informed the Swedish embassy in Lusaka that the movement had decided to send George Silundika, Secretary for Information and Publicity,3 to Stockholm, requesting “your office to afford Mr. Silundika the opportunity to meet the Foreign Minister and all those connected with our problem [...] for the purpose of discussing [...] our application for assistance”.4 In transit between Moscow and London, Silundika came to Stockholm for a short visit at the end of October.5 In the meantime, the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance had on 14 October 1969 decided to “in principle recommend [Swedish assistance to ZAPU] in the form of food products and medical aid” in accordance with the original request.6 The committee concluded at the same time that Nyandoro’s open-ended political submission to Foreign Minister Nilsson “for the moment should not lead to any action”7 Silundika was informed about the recommendations during his stay in Stockholm.8 Conscious of Ndlovu’s acknowledgement that the requested food and medical assistance could involve ZAPU’s armed structures, the Ministry

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1 At the time roughly corresponding to 620,000 SEK.
2 Ibid. The general, unbudgeted request included costs for a) ZAPU’s dependants; b) administration (including “general organization of the Headquarters [and] printing and distributing of ZAPU’s bulletins”); c) political requirements (including transport means, “recruitment and training of personnel”, “reconnaissance operations”, “infiltration of men into areas of operation” and “general mobilization and organization of our people inside Zimbabwe in order to commit them to give massive support to our operations”); and d) food and clothing (including “money to meet operational expenses in assigned areas”).
3 Representing ZAPU, George Silundika was at independence in 1980 appointed Minister of Posts and Telecommunications. He died in 1982.
4 Letter from George Nyandoro to the Swedish ambassador, Lusaka, 2 October 1969 (MFA).
5 Silundika did not meet Foreign Minister Nilsson, but was received by Pierre Schori at the Social Democratic Party headquarters (letter ‘Besök i Sverige av ZAPU-representant’/’Visit to Sweden by ZAPU representative’) from Ethel Ringborg to the Swedish embassy in Lusaka, Stockholm, 10 November 1969 (MFA).
6 The recommended amount was 50,000 SEK (CCHA: ‘Framställning från ZAPU’/’Request from ZAPU’, Stockholm, 10 October 1969 (SDA)).
8 Letter (‘Bistånd till ZAPU’/’Assistance to ZAPU’) from Sixten Heppling and Kerstin Oldfelt to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 10 April 1970 (SDA).
for Foreign Affairs asked the Swedish embassy in Lusaka to get approval from the Zambian authorities before a final decision could be reached.\footnote{Letter (‘Bistånd till ZAPU’/’Assistance to ZAPU’) from Wilhelm Wachtmeister to the Swedish ambassador to Zambia, Stockholm, 23 December 1969 (MFA). No corresponding approval was deemed necessary in the case of ZWT, which was a private trust registered in Zambia.}

Ambassador Kaijser responded in mid-January 1970 that the Zambian authorities seemed positive to humanitarian assistance in favour of ZAPU.\footnote{Letter (‘Bistånd till ZAPU’/’Assistance to ZAPU’) from Olof Kaijser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Lusaka, 12 January 1970 (MFA).} Soon thereafter, however, a simmering crisis within the ZAPU leadership turned into open conflict when J. Z. Moyo, George Silundika and Edward Ndlovu publicly turned against ZAPU’s Acting President James Chikerema and George Nyandoro.\footnote{The crisis became public at the end of February 1970, when J. Z. Moyo issued a paper entitled ‘Observations on our struggle’. It accused Chikerema of irresponsibility and dictatorial leadership. Chikerema responded by dissolving the ZAPU executive and army command, vesting all powers in himself. In turn, this led Moyo, Ndlovu and Silundika to issue a document ‘On the coup crisis precipitated by J. Chikerema’ in March 1970. The split soon escalated into confrontations. At the end of April 1970, Chikerema’s supporters attacked the house where Moyo, Ndlovu, Silundika and some of their supporters were staying. A number of people were injured. Zambia intervened to try to unite the factions, but the rift was beyond repair, eventually leading to a split in 1971. In the longer term, the ZAPU crisis in 1970–71 was, above all, of critical consequence for the national liberation war. ZAPU’s former head of military intelligence, Dumiso Dabengwa, later wrote that ‘it was during this crisis that ZAPU lost its important and strategic contact with FRELIMO [of Mozambique]’ (Dabengwa in Bhebe and Ranger op. cit., p. 31). Largely through ZAPU commanders who joined ZANU—such as Rex Nhongo and Robson Manyika—the contact was instead taken over by ZANU. ZANU’s alliance with FRELIMO would be of decisive importance for the liberation war in Zimbabwe.} Against this background, Kaijser recommended that Swedish assistance should be held back, adding that it

\begin{quote}
would be [...] unfortunate and improper if deliveries [of Swedish assistance in the form of food and medicines] were to be made to representatives of a faction within the organization which possibly does not represent its leadership and thus does not have [the necessary] channels for the distribution of [the assistance] to the needy in Rhodesia.\footnote{Letter (‘Bistånd till ZAPU’/’Assistance to ZAPU’) from Olof Kaijser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Lusaka, 5 May 1970 (MFA).}
\end{quote}

The government decided to follow Kaijser’s advice. As the ZAPU crisis continued throughout 1970 and for the major part of 1971, the deferment, however, tended to become permanent. The attitude of the OAU and the Zambian government was in this context particularly important. In February 1971, the OAU Liberation Committee warned ZAPU that it would cut off its assistance unless the leadership dispute was urgently resolved.\footnote{Times of Zambia, 23 February 1971.} Instead, it escalated. In March 1971, a group within ZAPU’s armed forces arrested the main military and political leaders of the movement—except Chikerema and Nyandoro—and took them to a remote camp in Zambia. The Zambian government intervened, put down the mutiny and tried to resolve the dispute. Once again, however, the attempt failed, soon leading to harsh judgements on the Zimbabwean freedom
fighters by the Zambian press. After a series of critical articles, on 1 November 1971 the official *Zambia Daily Mail* thus published a particularly condemning editorial, stating that

> what is annoying about the Rhodesian situation [...] is that the Rhodesian people [...] are not responding to the challenge that history has put before them. [...] Instead of spending all their time putting the enemy on the move, they allow him to organise and consolidate his stay for [a] longer [time] than he should. This, we believe, is criminal negligence on the part of any nationalists from Rhodesia. [...] The people of Rhodesia feel [that] the only people who [...] should call themselves leaders are [...] those who speak the language of positive action. [...] In other words, they want leaders who are capable of answering the violence of the white settlers with their own brand of violence.

> [...] We feel that the time has come for African governments to make it clear to the freedom fighters from Zimbabwe that if they do not fight the oppressor at home, they will be sent back [...], even if this means sending them to colonial prisons. It should be made clear to them that if a freedom fighter is not prepared to fight, he is of more use in a colonial prison than outside.1

The drawn out leadership struggle within ZAPU had, however, just before that ended with the expulsion of Chikerema and Nyandoro.2 Together with a few dissident ZANU leaders—among them the former Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Nathan Shamuyarira—they subsequently joined the newly founded Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), while J. Z. Moyo as Vice-President was to lead ZAPU during Joshua Nkomo’s detention.3

Prime Minister Olof Palme paid a state visit to Zambia in September 1971. Naturally, the issue of Zimbabwe featured prominently in his discussions with President Kaunda. The two leaders visited Victoria Falls on the Zambezi river, which Palme described as a borderline of “human decency”.4 The visit, however, took place at a time when the ZAPU crisis was still unresolved and did not further the old relations between Palme’s Social Democratic Party and Nkomo’s movement.5 The victorious leadership around J. Z. Moyo was aware of this situation and that ZAPU during the crisis had lost opportunities of

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2 There was a strong ethnic undercurrent in the ZAPU leadership crisis. Chikerema and Nyandoro were Shona, while the rest of the leaders—like Joshua Nkomo—were Ndebele. Interestingly, in discussions with a visiting SIDA delegation in Dar es Salaam in November 1971, the ZANU Chairman Herbert Chitepo exclusively explained the ZAPU crisis in terms of a Shona-Ndebele division and FROLIZI as the creation of disgruntled Shona nationalists (Olle Milton: ‘Möte med representanter för ZANU’/’Meeting with representatives of ZANU’, Dar es Salaam, 23 November 1971) (MFA).
3 Like ZANU’s Herbert Chitepo, Moyo was an outspoken advocate of the armed struggle and of unity, playing a key role for the creation of the Patriotic Front between ZANU and ZAPU in October 1976. Like Chitepo, he met an untimely and violent death in Lusaka, killed by a parcel bomb in January 1977.
5 ZAPU’s South African ally, ANC, also had its internal problems at the time of Palme’s visit. During his stay in Lusaka, Palme, however, met Oliver Tambo.
receiving official Swedish assistance. As soon as the conflict was resolved, Edward Ndlovu addressed a letter to the Swedish ambassador in Lusaka, expressing the wish to re-establish the relations:

You have been following, be it remotely, the internal crisis in ZAPU, which for almost two years threw the credibility of our organization into doubt internationally. We are pleased to inform you that the generators of the crisis have since quit and also [been] expelled from the party, [i.e.] James Chikerema and George Nyandoro. Find enclosed copies of the letters of their expulsion, plus the accompanying reasons. We request [you] to forward these to your government with copies to SIDA [and] look forward to resuming normal relations with your mission, that is, without the cloud of a crisis hanging over our organization.1

Although ZAPU soon established regular contacts with Sweden, it was not until the beginning of 1973 that a more continuous aid relationship was entered into. On 15 January 1973, the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance recommended SIDA to grant 50,000 SEK in favour of “ZAPU members and their dependants in Zambia”2 during the Swedish financial year 1973/74 and on 2 February 1973—at the same time as the first official Swedish allocation to ANC of South Africa was formalized—SIDA’s Acting Director General, Anders Forsse, signed a decision to that effect.3 Only with the creation of the Patriotic Front between ZANU and ZAPU in October 1976 did ZAPU, however, receive substantial assistance from the Swedish government, which from that moment was to allocate equal amounts to the two liberation movements.4 By independence in April 1980, the direct regular assistance disbursed

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1 Letter from Edward Ndlovu, ZAPU National Deputy Secretary, to the Swedish ambassador to Zambia, Lusaka, 9 October 1971 (MFA). Warning against both ZANU and FROLIZI, in the same letter Ndlovu pointed out that “ZAPU stands for genuine unity [...] We have an obligation, however, to protect both our organization and the international supporters of the Zimbabwe struggle from political swindlers who frame fake unity just to attract aid”.
3 SIDA: Decision (’Stöd till African National Congress (ANC), Sydafrika, samt Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), Rhodesia’/’Support to ANC and ZAPU’), Stockholm, 2 February 1973. (SDA)
4 Supporting both ZANU and ZAPU, the Swedish government had behind the scenes been pushing hard for the formation of the Patriotic Front. In an interview in 1996, SIDA’s former Director General Ernst Michanek said that “I was myself active, talking to Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe on several occasions, [telling] each of them that ‘unless you find a way of working together, we cannot support either of you’. That was more or less the beginning of the Patriotic Front between ZAPU and ZANU. I think that we almost demanded that the front should be created. [...] [T]he situation was very, very delicate, so we had to take a position. Outside the military field, Sweden was by far the largest and most important financial supporter of both ZAPU and ZANU. [In addition,] Stockholm was a very important meeting point between the Zimbabwean liberation movements and international actors. I think that we played a prominent role in this connection and whatever decisions we took had been considered very thoroughly. In the case of Zimbabwe, we came to the conclusion that we had to steer in a way that we otherwise did not like to do. It was sometimes rather unpleasant, but necessary” (interview with Ernst Michanek, Stockholm, 19 March 1996). Similarly, Pierre Schori has stated: “[I]n Zimbabwe, we refused to give unilateral recognition to one movement. We thought that both ZANU and ZAPU were authentic movements and that there was no reason for us to follow the demand of one or the other. When one of them asked for unilateral support we said that ‘we do not give you unilateral recognition,
by the Swedish government to ZAPU totalled 42.9 million SEK,\(^1\) or slightly less than the 45.5 million granted to ZANU.

Immediately after its foundation in October 1971, FROLIZI also approached the Swedish government for assistance. On 31 January 1972, the titular leader of the organization, Skilkom Siwela,\(^2\) wrote to SIDA’s representative in Lusaka, explaining “in strict confidence” that FROLIZI was “the only external[ly] based organization working hand in hand with the African National Council led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa”, requesting “whatever financial assistance [that] you can [give] to the ANC”. Referring to Muzorewa’s forthcoming visit to Britain and to the armed struggle, Siwela further stated that “the methods of how money can best be sent into Zimbabwe without arousing a lot of suspicion will best be given by the bishop himself. Lastly, may I remind you that we out here also need funds for our other activities, which are, in the main, the decisive factor”.\(^3\) FROLIZI’s approaches to the Swedish government would continue throughout 1972, not least via its Secretary for Foreign Relations, George Nyandoro, who as a former ZAPU leader had established good political contacts in Sweden.\(^4\)

In August 1972, SIDA had, however, on behalf of the Swedish government already formally informed FROLIZI that it was “not in a position to grant any assistance to the people of Zimbabwe through your organization”.\(^5\) The decision was never altered.\(^6\) Nor would official Swedish assistance be granted to Bishop Muzorewa’s African National Council or, later, the United African National Council (UANC). Until Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, the only nationalist organizations to receive official support from Sweden were ZANU and ZAPU.

Finally, although the Båstad demonstrations of May 1968 at least nominally were organized in support of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, they did not lead to a sustained campaign by the Swedish solidarity movement. On the contrary. Concentrating their efforts on the situation in the Portuguese colonies—and in spite of the close and decisive alliance between FRELIMO and ZANU...
—the reorganized Africa Groups would from 1970 until the middle of the 1970s downplay the Zimbabwe question. Their book *Africa: Imperialism and Liberation Struggle*, published in January 1972,\(^1\) did not, for example, discuss Zimbabwe or the different Zimbabwean nationalist organizations at all. In fact, it was only at the second national congress of AGIS in June 1976 that it was decided to launch a more general Zimbabwe campaign, without, however, taking sides for any particular movement.\(^2\) Reluctant to support either ZANU or ZAPU \(^3\) and despite the formation of the Patriotic Front in October 1976, the board of the national solidarity organization subsequently decided to collect money and clothes in favour of “the guerrilla struggle in Zimbabwe”\(^4\)—not “any exile organization”—and that the material assistance should be channelled to the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA)\(^5\) in Mozambique, “where we have FRELIMO’s word that [it] will reach those who are fighting”.\(^6\)

As ZIPA was dissolved shortly thereafter, the Africa Groups decided the following year to support the Patriotic Front and divide any material assistance equally between ZANU and ZAPU. The decision was reached at the third national congress in May 1977.\(^7\) As in the cases of South Africa and Namibia, the non-governmental solidarity movement would thereby—after years of

\(^1\) Afrikagrupperna op. cit.


\(^3\) Illustrating a persistent negative attitude towards both ZANU and ZAPU, a member of the Stockholm Africa Group—supporting a campaign in favour of ZIPA—wrote in October 1976, for example, that “it is a common view that Nkomo is a stooge, and it is perhaps correct. But I feel just as suspicious towards Mugabe [...], who just now receives backing from certain quarters in the UN and from Whitehall as the ‘credible militant’” (letter from ‘Bertil’, SAG, 12 October 1976) (AGA).

\(^4\) Letter from Dick Urban Vestbro to Fellesrådet for det sørlige Afrika (The Norwegian Council for Southern Africa), 3 October 1976 [no place], (AGA).

\(^5\) Due to strong pressures by the Frontline States—particularly by Tanzania’s Nyerere and Mozambique’s Machel—ZIPA was formed in November 1975. The unified army included cadres from both ZANLA and ZIPRA. It was led by an eighteen-member military committee, composed of nine representatives from each of the two existing guerrilla forces. ZIPA’s first commander was Rex Nhongo, at the time the most senior ZANLA leader at liberty, and the second position was filled by Alfred ‘Nikita’ Mangena of ZIPRA. With the release of the ‘old guard’ ZANU High Command from Zambian prisons in October 1976 and the formation of the Patriotic Front the same month, ZIPA was dissolved. Several of its reluctant leaders were subsequently detained and imprisoned in Mozambique.

\(^6\) Letter from Vestbro, 3 October 1976. In November 1976, ZIPA submitted a request for refugee assistance to the Swedish government. Due to the formation of the Patriotic Front and to the subsequent dissolution of ZIPA it was left without further action (letter (‘Ansökan om stöd till Zimbabwe-flyktingar i Moçambique samt ansökan om humanitär stöd till ZIPA’/’Request for assistance to Zimbabwean refugees in Mozambique and request for humanitarian assistance to ZIPA’) from Knut Granstedt to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Maputo, 20 December 1976) (SDA).

\(^7\) AGIS: ‘Beslutsprotokoll från Afrikagruppernas kongress 1977’ (‘Minuted decisions from the congress of the Africa Groups 1977’) [no date], (AGA) As a sign of continuous doubts vis-à-vis ZANU and ZAPU, the congress decided that “if the Patriotic Front is dissolved, the support shall not automatically continue [to be extended] to ZANU and ZAPU. In such a case, the board shall in consultation with local [Africa] groups [...] determine how the future support shall be designed”. This position by the AGIS’ majority was taken only two and a half years before ZANU and ZAPU received well over 90% of the popular vote in the Zimbabwean independence elections.
hesitation and doubts—recognize the same liberation movements in Zimbabwe as those already assisted by the Swedish government.\(^1\) In relation to ANC, SWAPO, ZANU and ZAPU, the Africa Groups thus eventually added their voices to an existing official political and humanitarian effort. With regard to MPLA of Angola and FRELIMO of Mozambique,\(^2\) they would, however, to a large extent pro-actively define the issues and carry out significant campaigns in their favour.

\(^1\) Church-inspired organizations such as the Emmaus committees—in particular Emmaus-Björkå and Bread and Fishes—had, however, embarked upon important solidarity campaigns in favour of the Zimbabwean liberation movements.

\(^2\) As well as PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.
Angolan Insurrections and Swedish Reactions

Portugal, Africa and Sweden

Portugal was the first of the European powers to colonize Africa and the last to leave.\textsuperscript{1} Clinging to dreams of imperial destiny and guided by a mystique of \textit{luso-tropicalismo}\textsuperscript{2}—the idea that the Portuguese had a special faculty and vocation to live in the tropics and to assimilate peoples of all races into a single nation—Portugal would under the dictatorship of António Salazar firmly oppose the decolonization process.\textsuperscript{3} Having constitutionally incorporated its colonies as ‘overseas provinces’ in 1951\textsuperscript{4}—a device to perpetuate colonial rule—Salazar not only opposed decolonization, but viewed the very concept as unintelligible and, at any rate, not applicable to Portugal. In August 1963—almost three years after the adoption of the Decolonization Declaration by the UN General Assembly, more than two years after the outbreak of the war in Angola and months after the first military clashes with PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau—he stated that

demands are constantly made for decolonization, [which] is said to be the greatest need of the century and the highest work which mankind in our days could undertake. As no care has been taken to define the term, we do not yet have an idea of the precise content of such a complex phenomenon. [...] However, [...] it [seems] that the essence of decolonization is to be found in [...] the transfer of power from the white man, wherever he holds it, to the negro, who claims it and is said to have the right to it only because of his numerical superiority. [...] Even though this is not a matter which concerns us, it is difficult to admit this thesis, which considers the independence of peoples as containing in itself all the virtualities, so that no account need be taken either of the size of the territories or of the number and

\textsuperscript{1} Formally, the British colonial empire in Africa ended with Zimbabwe's independence in 1980.
\textsuperscript{2} The theory of 'luso-tropicalism' was developed by the Brazilian anthropologist Gilberto Freyre. Among its many critics was the MPLA leader, poet and sociologist Mário de Andrade, who—under the pseudonym Buanga Fele—analyzed the theory in an article ('Qu’est-ce que le 'luso-tropicalisme'? / 'What is 'luso-tropicalism'?') in the Paris monthly \textit{Présence Africaine} in 1955 (No. 4, October–November 1955).
\textsuperscript{3} Economically backward and dependent upon the colonies, it has been said that Portugal was in no position to decolonize, since—unlike Britain or France—it could never hope to neo-colonize (see Norrie MacQueen: \textit{The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire}, Longman, London and New York, 1997, p. 52).
\textsuperscript{4} In addition to the Asian territories of Macao (China), Goa (India) and East Timor (Indonesia), the Portuguese colonial empire was at the time composed of the African dependencies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea (Bissau), Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe.
value of the populations or of the resources at the disposal of the rulers to achieve the common good.¹

At the same time, Salazar described multiracialism as “a Portuguese creation, [derived], on the one hand, from our character and, on the other, from the moral principles of which we [are] the bearers”.² However, the myth of Portugal’s imperial destiny, unity and multiracialism was in the early 1960s irrevocably crushed in blood³ and its anachronistic colonizing schemes in Southern Africa⁴—largely based on forced labour—widely denounced. Fascist Portugal was firmly placed with apartheid South Africa and settler Rhodesia as one of the three constituent pillars of a white-ruled regional citadel.

With the strategically important Azores islands to offer, Portugal was welcomed as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at its foundation in 1949 and in 1955 admitted to the United Nations. At that time, there was still disagreement among the UN members regarding the status of the Portuguese ‘overseas provinces’. In fact, it was not until December 1960 that the General Assembly ruled that the territories were to be considered ‘non-self-governing’ according to the UN Charter.⁵ In December 1960, the assembly also adopted the historic Decolonization Declaration according to which “all peoples have the right to self-determination” and “by virtue of that right freely [shall] determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”. The two resolutions would constitute the basic international legal framework for the demands for self-determination in the Portuguese-ruled territories.

This study is concerned with Sweden’s relations with the nationalist struggle in Southern Africa. At least three dimensions outside the primary focus should in this context be borne in mind, namely that Portugal itself until 1974 was a dictatorship towards which in particular the ruling Swedish Social Democratic Party dedicated considerable efforts for change; that the liberation struggles in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique—albeit nationalist and with particular means and objectives—to a large extent appeared as coordi-

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² Ibid., p. 285.
³ Large-scale massacres had been carried out by the Portuguese in São Tomé in 1953, in Guinea-Bissau (Pijiguiti) in August 1959 and in both Mozambique (Mueda) and Angola (Catete, Icolo-e-Bengo) in June 1960. As in the case of the Sharpeville shootings in South Africa, the events were decisive for the nationalists’ resolve to launch the armed struggle.
⁴ Portugal continued to settle poor and middle-class citizens in Angola and Mozambique right up to the 1974 Lisbon coup. Between 1950 and 1974, the number of white settlers in Angola more than quadrupled, increasing from 78,000 to 335,000. In Mozambique, the corresponding numbers were 50,000 to almost 200,000 (James Ciment: Angola and Mozambique: Postcolonial Wars in Southern Africa, Facts on File, New York, 1997, p. 34). In Guinea-Bissau, the number of European residents was, however, marginal. There were never more than about 2,000 Portuguese civilians in the country. The anti-colonial struggle in Guinea-Bissau was, thus, not further complicated by a settler dimension.
Angolan Insurrections and Swedish Reactions

nated; and that PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde at the end of the 1960s played a prominent role for both the official and the organized solidarity movement’s involvement on the side of the nationalist organizations. While the struggle for democracy in metropolitan Portugal will only be referred to in passing, the early links between the African movements will be obvious throughout.

When the Swedish government in 1969 decided to support PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau, it was the first time that an industrialized Western country extended direct official assistance to a national liberation movement engaged in armed struggle against another Western country. Furthermore, Sweden and Portugal were allied partners of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The process leading up to the decision will be outlined below. In the meantime, it could be noted that few Western European countries were as different as Portugal and Sweden in the post-war period and that the economic links between the two were initially weak.

Although both had stayed outside the Second World War, the gulf separating the fascist dictatorship of Catholic Portugal from the social democracy of Protestant Sweden was huge. On the international arena, Portugal viewed itself as an important bearer of imperial destiny and had joined NATO, while Sweden made a virtue of its non-colonial past and had chosen a policy of non-alignment. Nationally, the Lisbon regime followed an ultra-protectionist path, administering a backward and stagnating agro-based economy, while the Social Democratic government of Sweden registered rapid economic growth and increasing export proceeds as a result of a policy of skills-intensive industrial processing. In the social sphere, the elitist policies of Portugal had led to rates of illiteracy and public disease that placed it more in the Third World, whereas the egalitarian policies of the ‘Swedish model’ placed Sweden in the highest rank regarding education and health.

The commercial relations between Sweden and Portugal were quite marginal until the middle of the 1960s. In 1950, the value of Swedish exports to Portugal amounted to 28.3 million SEK, representing 0.5% of total exports. The

1 In the case of Angola, it is less relevant to speak of a single national struggle. Even before the collapse of the Portuguese regime in 1974, the conflicts between the three main movements often reached an intensity suggesting civil war rather than a joint national liberation effort.

2 The important role played by PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde will be commented upon in the second volume. The decolonization process of São Tomé and Príncipe—led by MLSTP (Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe; Liberation Movement of São Tomé and Príncipe)—will, however, not be discussed. It could, nevertheless, be noted that there were early contacts between Sweden and the nationalist opposition on the small islands. For example, in 1961 Joachim Israel and the Maundy Thursday Committee against Racial Persecution in South Africa ‘adopted’ the Santomean student Miguel Graça and arranged a scholarship for him at the Lillsved folk high school (‘Protokoll fört vid sammanträde med Skärtorsdagskommittén’/’Minutes from meeting of the Maundy Thursday Committee’, 22 January 1962) (JIC). The future President of São Tomé and Príncipe, Manuel Pinto da Costa, attended the Afro-Scandinavian Youth Congress in Oslo in August 1962.

3 Through SIDA, the Swedish government granted official development assistance to Portugal after the collapse of the dictatorship in 1974.
corresponding figures for Sweden’s imports from Portugal were the same year 25.1 million SEK, or 0.4%. Ten years later, the value of Swedish exports had increased to 60.9 million SEK, but Portugal’s share of total exports remained the same, while the relative share of the imports from Portugal had decreased to 0.3%.\(^1\) Sweden’s foreign trade with Portugal was thus far less important than that with Portugal’s former colony Brazil. Direct Swedish investments in Portugal were also for a long time of marginal importance. Only a few Swedish companies—such as SKF and Electrolux—had established subsidiaries there in the 1920s, while some textile concerns later made direct investments. All in all, there were only five Swedish-owned production companies in Portugal in 1960 and their combined assets were low.\(^2\)

**EFTA**

Following Portugal’s membership of EFTA and the subsequent relaxation of its protectionist policies, the relationship with Sweden rapidly changed during the 1960s. When the two countries in January 1960—only a year before the start of the liberation war in Angola—signed the Stockholm Convention together with Austria, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland and Great Britain, they did not only for the first time become joint members of a common trade organization, but their overall economic interaction would soon develop and expand. Paradoxically, at the same time as the Swedish opinion grew more critical towards Portugal’s wars in Africa and the government increased official humanitarian assistance to the victims of these wars, there was—in particular—a marked increase of Swedish investments in the Portuguese economy, translating into a rapid growth of imports into Sweden from Swedish-owned companies in Portugal.

The total number of Swedish-owned companies in Portugal had by 1970 increased more than tenfold compared to 1960, or from five to over fifty. Prominent among them were textile companies, such as Algots and Melka, and the pulp and paper concern Billerud.\(^3\) Above all, the Swedish metallurgical and shipbuilding concerns of Kockums and Eriksbergs Mekaniska Verkstad had together acquired control of one fifth of the strategic Lisnave naval construction and repair yard—one of the biggest in the world—which became operational in

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\(^2\) Mats Björnsson: ‘Svenska företags intressen i Portugal’ (‘Swedish companies’ interests in Portugal’), University of Stockholm, 1972, p. 7.

\(^3\) Together with the giant Companhia União Fabril (CUF), one of largest monopolies in Portugal and heavily involved in the Portuguese territories in Africa—not least in the forced production of cotton in Mozambique and of peanuts in Guinea-Bissau—Billerud formed in 1964 the joint venture company Celbi for the production of paper pulp outside Figueira da Foz in northern Portugal. Billerud owned 70% of Celbi’s share capital. At the beginning of the 1970s, Celbi stood for one third of Portugal’s pulp production.
1967. Around twenty of the Swedish-owned companies established in Portugal in 1970 had started production there. Their combined investments were estimated at 310 million SEK\(^1\) and the total number of employees at around 4,600.\(^2\) In turn, the establishment of Swedish production companies was immediately reflected in the trade exchange. While Portugal’s share of Swedish exports in 1970 had only increased to 0.6%, on the import side there was a marked difference compared to 1960. In relative terms, Sweden’s imports from Portugal almost trebled between 1960 and 1970, growing from 0.3 to 0.8%. In absolute figures, the increase was more pronounced, accelerating from 51.8 million to 291.5 million SEK.\(^3\) Textiles and clothes from Swedish-owned companies in Portugal were largely responsible for this development.

In the main,\(^4\) the significant Swedish economic penetration was limited to metropolitan Portugal and did not involve the Portuguese dependencies in Africa. Nevertheless, the contradiction between support to the nationalist cause in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique and the rapidly evolving economic relationship between Sweden and Portugal from the beginning of the 1960s soon featured prominently in the debate. Portugal’s membership in EFTA was particularly targeted, above all by members of the Liberal Party. As early as July 1961, a group of influential young Liberals published an open letter to the Swedish government, demanding the expulsion of Portugal from EFTA:

> We, a group of young Liberals, protest against the passivity of the Swedish government towards the dictatorship in Portugal and its colonial oppression. It is now evident to all that the ‘disturbances’ reported from Angola in reality constitute a war between a national freedom movement and a white minority. By accepting Portugal’s membership in EFTA, Sweden gives [both] a moral and an indirect economic support to the oppression, [thereby] obstructing the freedom struggle. […] A clear repudiation and isolation of the repugnant Salazar regime would decisively assist the freedom movement in Angola and demonstrate that the ideals of Portugal are not those of the Western world.\(^5\)

A week later, the Social Democratic Student Union added its voice to the Liberal concern, although it limited its demand to a general protest against Portugal’s

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1. The combined Swedish investments in Portugal in 1965 were estimated at 15 million SEK.
4. Via Portugal (and South Africa), a number of Swedish companies had established sales outlets in Angola and Mozambique.
5. ‘Portugal ur EFTA!’ (‘Portugal out of EFTA!’) in Dagens Nyheter, 1 July 1961. The letter was inter alia signed by Per Ahlmark, chairman of the Liberal Party Youth League (FPU), Ernst Klein, first deputy chairman of FPU, Gabriel Romanus, secretary of FPU, Björn Beckman, chairman of the Liberal Student Union, and by the journalist Eva Moberg, who later formed the Swedish Amnesty group which ‘adopted’ the Zimbabwean leader Robert Mugabe. Per Ahlmark—who in 1967 became a Liberal MP—would throughout the 1960s campaign against Portugal’s membership in EFTA (see, for example, ‘I Lissabon där blundar de…’/‘In Lisbon they close their eyes…’ in Expressen, 27 October 1966 and ‘Sluta hyckla!’/‘Stop the hypocrisy!’ in Expressen, 9 May 1968).
policies in Angola. However, while the Social Democratic government maintained that EFTA was not an appropriate forum to act against Portugal, eventually the Portuguese regime itself reacted to the mounting Swedish criticism.

For example, following popular demonstrations against Portugal at EFTA’s ministerial meeting in Stockholm in March 1967, the Portuguese Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira threatened Sweden with a boycott.

The issues of EFTA and Sweden’s economic relations with Portugal would towards the end of the 1960s not only engage the Swedish solidarity movement, but—naturally—the liberation movements themselves. This was, above

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4 See below and interview with Jorge Rebelo (FRELIMO), Maputo, 1 May 1996. Frequently, however, the leaders of the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies also argued that Sweden (and the other Nordic countries) should not break their commercial relations with Portugal, but exercise pressure on Portugal within EFTA. According to Sverker Åström, Sweden’s representative to the United Nations, the PAIGC leader Amílcar Cabral said at a meeting in February 1970 that he “greatly understood that Portugal’s membership of EFTA imposed certain limitations on us, [but] was keen to emphasize that he in no way wanted to recommend a break of Sweden’s commercial relations with Portugal, which he knew that radical youth circles in Sweden demanded” (Letter (‘Samtal med Amílcar Cabral om läget i Portugisiska Guinea’ / ‘Conversation with Amílcar Cabral on the situation in Portuguese Guinea’) to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, New York, 26 February 1970) (SDA).
all, the case with FRELIMO of Mozambique when in mid-1968 it was announced that the Swedish company ASEA had joined an international bid to construct a hydroelectric power station at Cabora Bassa on the Zambezi river. Coinciding with the Swedish government’s decision to extend direct official support to the liberation movements, the question of ASEA and Cabora Bassa would more than any other single issue make the solidarity movement aware of the role played by Swedish transnational economic interests and—in the era of Vietnam—lead it towards increasingly radical positions. In fact, the Cabora Bassa question led to a crisis of confidence within the Social Democratic Party regarding the Swedish labour movement’s policies vis-à-vis Southern Africa.

According to the Swedish political scientist Ove Nordenmark, “the refusal by the [Social Democratic] government to intervene against ASEA [...] almost led to a complete break with Aftonbladet, SSU, LPC, a number of action groups and a radical fraction of the Liberal Party. However, the LO leadership and the board of the Metal Workers’ Federation expressed unreserved support for the cautious stand by the government”.1 Thus, due to her active involvement against the Cabora Bassa project in the province of Västmanland—the site of ASEA’s headquarters and the potentially affected factories—the future Social Democratic Minister for Development Cooperation and Foreign Affairs, Lena Hjelm-Wallén, was opposed by the trade union movement and almost lost her nomination to the Swedish parliament in 1968. She later described the incident as “an interesting start” to her long official involvement with Southern Africa.2

Threatened by the Swedish sanctions law against Rhodesia—which entered into force in June 1969 and explicitly defined a commodity or product to include electric power3—ASEA eventually withdrew from the Cabora Bassa project in September the same year. By that time, Swedish solidarity with the nationalist struggles in the Portuguese territories had grown from a number of scattered intellectual voices in the early 1960s to a more unison and solid expression upon which both the reorganized Africa Groups and the official Swedish assistance was built. In the beginning, this opinion was formed around the developments in Angola.

Early Relations with Angola

Until the outbreak of the liberation war at the beginning of 1961, Angola—perhaps more than any other country in Southern Africa—was largely unknown outside the Portuguese world.4 This was certainly the case in Swe-

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1 Nordenmark op. cit., p. 49.
3 ‘Act concerning certain sanctions against Rhodesia’, attached to letter from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Swedish UN delegation in New York, Stockholm, 1 July 1969 (MFA).
4 Visiting the country in 1953, John Gunther wrote: “Angola is probably the least known big country in Africa. [...] I don’t think that more than half a dozen British or American journalists have
den. A few indirect contacts had been established in the 19th century with the extreme northern parts of the country via Swedish missionary societies in Congo\(^1\) and—above all—with the south-western region through Axel Eriksson’s Namibian long-distance trading operations. A few individual Swedes had also visited Angola with the international Methodist Church or as explorers\(^2\) and adventurers.\(^3\) Apart from later shipping contacts—in particular via Transatlantic’s regular service between Sweden and South Africa—there were, however, no direct historical links with Portuguese West Africa. In 1960, Sweden’s official interests in Angola were still represented by two British citizens, respectively serving as consul in Luanda and vice-consul in Lobito.\(^4\)

Angola only appeared as a specific entry in the Swedish foreign trade statistics in 1971. Data for the country were until then registered together with those for São Tomé and Príncipe, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau under the heading ’Portuguese West Africa’. Even assuming that the bulk of the Swedish trade exchange with Portuguese West Africa only took place with Angola, the figures are extremely low. In 1950, the value of Swedish exports to the whole area amounted to 1.8 million SEK, representing 0.03% of total Swedish foreign sales. The import value was at the same time 2.3 million SEK, corresponding to 0.04% of Sweden’s imports.

Ten years later—just before the start of the liberation war—the trade balance had changed in Sweden’s favour, but the exchange was still marginal. In 1960, visited it in twenty years. It is the only country [except Egypt] where a traveller needs an exit as well as an entrance visa” (John Gunther: *Inside Africa*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1955, p. 596). The status of a closed area was a consequence of the fact that over the centuries Angola was used as a penal colony. In fact, Angola’s white population was through the early decades of the 20th century still dominated by Portuguese convicts, or *degredados*. Portuguese convicts entering Angola far outnumbered free immigrant peasants well into the 1930s, making a mockery of Portugal’s stated ‘civilizing mission’. The system was only abolished in 1954. As stated by Gerald Bender: “It is a supreme irony and tragedy that the instruments employed by Portugal to carry out its civilizing mission [have] been drawn […] from the dregs of Europe’s most underdeveloped nation and […] themselves were considered beyond the pale of civilization” (Gerald Bender: *Angola under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality*, Heinemann, London, 1978, pp. 93–94).

\(^1\) Beginning in 1881, the Mission Covenant Church of Sweden sent missionaries to the lower Congo basin. The work expanded throughout the two Congos, and there were in 1959 not less than 199 Swedish Covenant Church missionaries in the area. Together with representatives of the Swedish Baptist Mission, the Pentecostal Mission and the Örebro Mission, there were at the end of the 1950s around 400 Swedish missionaries in the two Congos, by far the largest Swedish missionary concentration in Africa (Wohlin (ed.) op. cit., Appendix). As noted, several of the leaders of the Democratic Party of Angola (PDA)—i.e. UPA’s partner in FNLA—had attended Swedish missionary schools in Congo.

\(^2\) Above all Peter August Möller, mentioned in the chapter on Namibia. The Swedish-born American Amandus Johnson could also be mentioned. He travelled in Angola in 1922–24 and his account *I Marimbans Land* (`In the Country of the Marimba’; Hugo Gebers Förlag, Stockholm) was published in Swedish in 1929.

\(^3\) A number of Swedish adventurers attracted to Southern Africa ended up in Angola, but very few wrote about their experiences. One amusing exception is Andy Andersson: *En Hötorgsgrabb i Afrika: Tjugofem Års Pionjärliv och Jaktäventyr i Rhodesia, Portugisiska Ost- och Västafrika samt Kongo* (*A Haymarket-lad in Africa: Twenty-five Years of Pioneer-life and Hunting Adventures in Rhodesia, Portuguese East and West Africa and Congo*), Wahlström & Widstrand, Stockholm, 1924.

\(^4\) *Svarta Afrika är morgondagens marknad* (*Black Africa is tomorrow’s market*) in *Stockholms-Tidningen*, 24 November 1960.
Swedish imports from Portuguese West Africa reached 3.8 million SEK—a share of the total of 0.03%—while the value of Sweden’s exports had increased to 10.7 million SEK, corresponding to 0.08% of the total. The main products imported by Sweden from Portuguese West Africa were vegetable oils, while paper, pulp and machinery were major export items. Sweden was never an important market for Angolan coffee. In 1950, for example, Sweden imported coffee from Portuguese West Africa for a total value of only 104,000 SEK, representing 4% of the already low total imports from the area. When the international solidarity movement in response to an appeal by MPLA carried out a boycott campaign against Angolan coffee in the 1970s, it thus never became a major issue in Sweden.

Nevertheless, a number of Swedish companies had in the mid-1950s made serious attempts to penetrate both the Angolan and the Mozambican markets. Prominent among them was the mining concern Bolidens Gruv AB. At the beginning of the decade, it signed a five-year concession agreement with the Portuguese government for mineral prospecting in both territories, establishing the local company Sociedade Boliden de Moçambique in Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) in April 1954. The concessions granted to Boliden were enormous, covering a total area of around 50,000 square kilometre, or more than a tenth of the surface of Sweden. In Angola, the 30,000 square kilometre concession was situated outside Moçamedes (now Namibe) in the south-western part of the country. The somewhat smaller Mozambican concession was in the Manica district between the port of Beira and the border with Rhodesia. The explorations were, however, not successful and discontinued in 1957.

The General Export Association of Sweden also became actively involved in promoting closer commercial links with Angola and Mozambique. After organizing what it termed ‘study and goodwill trips’ to French West and Equatorial Africa in 1952 and to Belgian Congo in 1953, the association hosted a similar visit to the two Portuguese territories in May–June 1955. The delegation was led by the Swedish envoy to Lisbon, Jan Stenström, who was impressed with what he saw during the visit. In an interview he stated that what particularly

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1 (For 1950:) Kommerskollegium: Handel: Berättelse för år 1950, Volym I, Sveriges Officiella Statistik, Norstedt & Söner, Stockholm, 1952. (For 1960:) Statistiska Centralbyrån: Handel: Berättelse för år 1960, Volym II, Stockholm, 1963. The trade exchange between Sweden and Portuguese West Africa did not increase after Portugal’s membership in EFTA. On the contrary. Thus, in 1970 Sweden sold goods to the area to a total value of 2.5 million SEK, representing a share of less than 0.01% of total Swedish exports. The corresponding import figures were 27.2 million SEK at a stable 0.08% (Statistiska Centralbyrån: Utrikeshandel 1970, Volym II, Stockholm, 1972).

2 Interview with Hillevi Nilsson, Stockholm, 4 February 1997. The boycott campaign against Angolan coffee was particularly strong in Holland and Canada.

3 Svensk Utrikeshandel, No. 18, 30 September 1955, pp. 11–12.

4 Södra Afrika Informationsbulletin, No. 5, 1969, p. 47.

5 The Swedish companies represented in the delegation were AGA, Bolidens Gruv AB, Firma Elof Hanson, AB Linjebyggnad and STAB/Sociedade Nacional de Fósforos, the latter based in Portugal.
attracted our attention was [...] the intense working effort and [...] the high living standards of the white population. [...] The Portuguese maintain remarkably good relations with the black population and the exemplary order is upheld with soft means. There is a lot that indicates that the blacks under generally quiet forms will grow into the position as fully mature citizens of the Portuguese union.¹

However, the goodwill trip did not lead to a breakthrough into the Angolan market. Moreover, Stenström’s view of the country’s harmonious race relations was fundamentally at odds with the stark realities. Also in 1955, the British historian Basil Davidson published the book *The African Awakening*, mainly relating his impressions from travels in Congo and Angola. Observing the emerging opposition to the Portuguese, “dimly and under shadow”, and quoting from discussions held in Angola, Davidson’s prediction was that there was “a growing nationalist movement among [the] Africans, who are trying to get outside intervention even if it brings down the whole house on their heads”.² As later developments would show, this view was more representative of the desperate situation of the crudely oppressed African majority.

The 1961 Insurrections and Initial Swedish Reactions

The liberation wars in Southern Africa started in Angola. More than anywhere else in the region, the nationalist cause would, however, from the beginning be marked by deep divisions. Holden Roberto’s UPA (FNLA)³ and Agostinho

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¹ Cited in *Svensk Utrikeshandel*, No. 18, 30 September 1955, pp. 10–11.
³ UPA (União das Populações de Angola; Union of the Peoples of Angola) was preceded by UPNA (União das Populações do Norte de Angola; Union of the Peoples of Northern Angola), formed in Léopoldville (now Kinshasa), Belgian Congo, in 1957. UPNA did not recognize Portuguese sovereignty over the historical kingdom of Kongo, also covering the northern parts of Angola, and was formed as a Bakongo organization to further the area’s independence. Holden Roberto (at the time often appearing as José Gilmore), who, although born in São Salvador in northern Angola, had been living in Congo all his life, soon became UPNA’s leading figure. In December 1958, he attended the All-African Peoples’ Conference in Accra, Ghana. He was told that the idea of restoring the Kongo kingdom was a “tribal anachronism” (Marcum (1969) op. cit., p. 67). Adjusting to the criticism, UPNA dropped the reference to the northern parts of the country, henceforth appearing as UPA. However, in all substance UPA remained a Bakongo ethno-nationalist movement. In March 1962, UPA and the smaller PDA (Partido Democrático de Angola; Democratic Party of Angola) together formed FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola; National Front for the Liberation of Angola). A week later, FNLA announced the formation of a Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile, or GRAE (Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio), of which Roberto was the undisputed leader. A brother-in-law and protégé of the future Zairean President Mobutu, he kept his base in Congo-Léopoldville. GRAE was recognized by OAU in 1963 and de-recognized in 1971.
Neto’s MPLA—together with Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA—the main Angolan actors in the country’s drawn out liberation drama—both appeared on the nationalist scene during the second half of the 1950s. While the Congo-based UPA, which had emerged from internal politics of the Bakongo ethnic group straddling the border between Angola and Congo, had managed to establish itself among the African liberation movements, much less was known at the end of the 1950s about MPLA. Unlike UPA, it did not, for example, attend the important All-African Peoples’ Conference in Ghana in December 1958, which subsequently led to the initial contacts between the African liberation movements and the ruling Swedish Social Democratic Party.³

It was, however, the older and decidedly more cosmopolitan MPLA, drawing its main support from urbanized Africans—intellectuals, workers and slum-dwellers—that attracted the attention of the Portuguese regime. Salazar’s feared secret police, known as PIDE,⁴ was from 1957 established in Angola to counter the nationalist movement’s increasing militancy. It soon set in motion a network of local informers and officials to systematically root out individuals suspected of nationalist activities, a process which in March and July 1959 culminated in massive arrests in Luanda. Among those arrested was the MPLA President Ilídio Tomé Alves Machado, who together with forty-nine others in a secret trial the following year was sentenced to a long jail term for political subversion. A second wave of arrests took place in June 1960, when fifty-two

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¹ MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola; Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) had its origins in a number of nationalist organizations emerging in Angola in the early 1950s, among them the small Communist Party of Angola and PLUA (Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola; Party for the United Struggle of the Africans of Angola). Officially, MPLA was founded in Luanda in December 1956 when a nationalist manifesto was issued, calling for the overthrow of Portuguese rule and the establishment of an independent Angolan state governed by a democratic coalition of all the forces struggling against colonialism. The supporters were severely hit by the Portuguese authorities in 1959–60, losing its Luanda-based leadership. In July 1961, MPLA established its exile headquarters in Conakry, Guinea, formally appearing as an institutionalized movement. The headquarters were moved to Léopoldville in 1961. After Agostinho Neto’s escape from prison in Portugal in July 1962, MPLA held its first national conference there in December. It was on this occasion that Neto was elected President. MPLA, however, had a precarious existence in Congo-Léopoldville. It was denied access to the areas bordering with Angola, as well as training facilities. At the end of 1963, the movement was ordered to close its offices in the country. It transferred the headquarters to Brazzaville, the capital of—former French—Congo.

MPLA was recognized by OAU in 1964 and given preferential treatment from 1966 to 1972.

² UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola; National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) only appeared on the scene ten years after MPLA and UPA. The driving force behind UNITA was Jonas Savimbi. Of Ovimbundo origin, he had been one of the few non-Bakongos in the UPA-FNLA-GRAE leadership. Occupying the position as GRAE Minister of Foreign Affairs, Savimbi eventually denounced Roberto for tribalism and dependence on the United States, resigning in July 1964. In March 1966, UNITA was formed at a conference in eastern Angola. Unlike FNLA-GRAE and MPLA, UNITA was not recognized by OAU before the fall of the Lisbon regime in 1974.

³ At the time, MPLA was not yet constituted as a “formal, political organization, with a published constitution and programme” (MPLA: MPLA—40 Anos por Angola /’40 Years for Angola’, MPLA, Luanda, 1996). On the origins of MPLA, see also Carlos Pacheco: MPLA: Um Nascimento Polémico (‘MPLA: A Polemic Birth’), Vega, Lisboa, 1997.

⁴ Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (International and State Defence Police).
people, including Father Joaquim Pinto de Andrade\textsuperscript{1} and Dr. Agostinho Neto\textsuperscript{2}, were seized. The arrest of Neto—at the time President of the MPLA Steering Committee within Angola—led to massive protests in his home area east of Luanda and to the massacre at Catete, where over thirty demonstrators were killed and more than two hundred injured by Portuguese soldiers.\textsuperscript{3}

The arrests and executions in Angola were not reported in Portugal,\textsuperscript{4} but strongly denounced by committed international writers such as Basil Davidson\textsuperscript{5} and, above all, by the exiled leadership of MPLA around the Secretary General Viriato da Cruz,\textsuperscript{6} the Acting President Mário Pinto de Andrade\textsuperscript{7} and Lúcio Lara.\textsuperscript{8} It was these developments that broke the long silence in Sweden

\textsuperscript{1} The older brother of Mário de Andrade, Father Joaquim de Andrade had been the Chancellor of the Luanda Archdiocese and was at the time of his arrest a member of the Executive Council of the African Society of Culture (Société Africaine de Culture), with headquarters in Paris. He was subsequently kept prisoner in a monastery outside Oporto in Portugal. In December 1962, Joaquim de Andrade was in absentia appointed ‘honorary president’ of MPLA. He broke with the movement in 1974, forming the so-called ‘Active Revolt’ opposition in Brazzaville.

\textsuperscript{2} The son of a Methodist catechist, Neto went to Portugal in 1947 to study medicine in Coimbra and, later, at the University of Lisbon. Together with Amílcar Cabral, Mário de Andrade and Marcelino dos Santos, Neto founded the Centre for African Studies (Centro dos Estudos Africanos) in Lisbon in 1951. It soon became an important forum for many of the future nationalist leaders in the Portuguese colonies. He also took an active part in Portuguese opposition politics. This involvement—and the publication of nationalist poetry—led to repeated jail sentences and rustication between 1951 and 1957. He was, however, able to complete his medical degree in 1958 and returned to Angola the following year. In June 1960, Neto was arrested at his medical practice in Luanda, flogged before his family and transferred to imprisonment on Cape Verde.


\textsuperscript{4} The Catete massacre never appeared in the Portuguese press (Marcum (1969) op. cit., p. 39). The author remembers how in 1977 he was shown by a survivor a line on a housewall in Catete, about 120 centimetres from the ground. The wall was peppered with bullet-holes. All males taller than the line on the wall had been executed by the Portuguese.

\textsuperscript{5} Davidson was instrumental in the establishment of the Council for Freedom in Portugal and the Colonies in the UK. After Neto’s arrest and transfer to imprisonment on the Cape Verdean island of Santo Antão, together with the British Anti-Slavery Society, the Methodist Church and the American Committee on Africa, the Council mounted an intensive campaign on Neto’s behalf, possibly deterring Portugal from executing the future President of Angola. Instead, in October 1960 Neto was transferred to the Aljube prison in Lisbon, from where he managed to escape in July 1962.

\textsuperscript{6} As many others in the MPLA leadership, da Cruz was both a nationalist leader and a distinguished poet. After founding PLUA in 1953, he became Secretary General of MPLA in 1956. He managed to escape the repression at the end of the 1950s and fled to France, where he teamed up with Mário de Andrade. In Paris, da Cruz and de Andrade cooperated closely with the cultural review Présence Africaine. Together with Lúcio Lara they formed the active nucleus of the MPLA leadership in exile. However, criticized for extreme left-wing views, da Cruz was pushed from the centre of power of MPLA at its national conference in December 1962 and—after trying to form an alliance with Holden Roberto—expelled from the movement the following year. He later settled in China, where he worked for the Afro-Asian Writers’ Bureau in Beijing until his death in 1973.

\textsuperscript{7} Mário de Andrade, another of the prominent writer-intellectuals of MPLA, pursued university studies in Lisbon and Paris, where he worked with Présence Africaine. Together with Amílcar Cabral from Guinea-Bissau and Marcelino dos Santos from Mozambique he formed the Anti-Colonial Movement (MAC) in 1957. Acting as MPLA President from 1960 to 1962, de Andrade later grew increasingly critical of Agostinho Neto’s ‘presidentialism’ and organized the Revolta Activa opposition in 1974. After Angola’s independence, he went into exile in Guinea-Bissau, where he served as Commissioner of Culture.

\textsuperscript{8} Lúcio Lara was by profession a mathematics and physics teacher. Elected to the MPLA executive at the first MPLA national conference in December 1962, Lara held the important post of Secretary for Organization and Cadres. As such, he was responsible for both classical and political cadre edu-
Angolan Insurrections and Swedish Reactions

around Angola. Having already written about Mozambique in November 1959, 1 Per Wästberg published in August 1960 an article entitled 'The terror in Angola' in the major Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter, in which—without explicitly mentioning MPLA—he introduced the "Angolan independence front" and its leaders da Cruz, de Andrade and Lara. 2 In January 1961, that is, just before the beginning of the armed struggle, Wästberg also gave a more detailed presentation of recent events in Angola—including the arrest of Agostinho Neto—describing MPLA as "the most important nationalist movement." 3

Nevertheless, it was only with the hijacking of the Portuguese cruise-liner Santa Maria by the quixotic Portuguese Captain Henrique Galvão, the attacks by MPLA followers on the prisons in Luanda and the UPA-inspired uprising in northern Angola in the period between January and March 1961 that the situation in the country was firmly placed in the Swedish debate. Together with the situation in South Africa—and, naturally, in addition to the war in Congo—the Angolan question would over the following year dominate the reports from Southern Africa. In July 1961, it led to the first major Swedish fund-raising campaign for the region. The campaign would in turn not only put MPLA into direct contact with Sweden, but also facilitate future relations with PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau and FRELIMO of Mozambique.

In an attempt to free their jailed leaders and fellow nationalists, around two hundred MPLA followers armed with knives and clubs on 4 February 1961 mounted an attack on the central prison in Luanda, marking the beginning of both the Angolan liberation war and the Thirty Years' War in Southern Africa. 4 The first attack on the São Paulo prison failed, reportedly resulting in the death

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1 Per Wästberg: 'Tystnadens diktatur' ('The dictatorship of silence') in Dagens Nyheter, 14 November 1959. The article prompted a protest by the Portuguese government to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Ryberg (1973) op. cit., p. 53).
2 Per Wästberg: 'Terrorn i Angola' ('The terror in Angola') in Dagens Nyheter, 17 August 1960.
3 Per Wästberg: 'Angola och Moçambique' ('Angola and Mozambique') in Dagens Nyheter, 26 January 1961. It is interesting to note that Wästberg, who was actively involved in the Swedish anti-apartheid movement, in this article mentioned that Portugal had concluded a military assistance pact with South Africa. "If—in the event of a revolt [in Angola]—South Africa comes to Portugal’s assistance", Wästberg wrote, "the free African states have in turn threatened to intervene. The whole [African] continent would in that case be involved in [the] war".
4 MPLA was the first of the Southern African liberation movements to embark upon armed struggle. It appears that the decision was reached immediately after the UN General Assembly had formally resolved that Angola and the other Portuguese territories were 'non-self-governing' according to the UN Charter. This historic decision was announced by Viriato da Cruz and Mário de Andrade at a press conference in London at the beginning of December 1960, in connection with a Conference of Nationalist Leaders from the Portuguese Colonies. However, at the press conference—which was held at the House of Commons—the MPLA leaders did not talk in terms of armed struggle, but of 'direct action'. According to Lúcio Lara, the expression was explicitly chosen on the advice of Fenner Brockway and Basil Davidson of the British Council for Freedom in Portugal and the Colonies in order not to antagonize potentially sympathetic Western listeners (interview with Lúcio Lara, Luanda, 16 April 1996).
of seven Portuguese policemen and about forty assailants. Nevertheless, the
insurrection continued and after a number of clashes a second attack was
launched on 10 February against another Luanda prison, also with fatal
results.¹ According to John Marcum,

the Portuguese vengeance was awesome. The police helped civilian vigilantes
organize nightly slaughters in the [Luanda slums]. The whites hauled Africans
from their flimsy one-room huts, shot them and left their bodies in the streets. A
Methodist missionary [...] testified that he personally knew of the deaths of almost
three hundred. The full dimensions of the massacre will [however] never be
known.²

Already badly hit by previous arrests, the emerging nationalist movement was
savagely decimated and only a small number of MPLA militants managed to
get out of Luanda to reorganize the struggle from the Dembos forests northeast
of the capital.

The insurrection in Luanda coincided with the Santa Maria affair. Expecting
that Captain Galvão was cooperating with the nationalists and that he was
directing the hijacked ship to Luanda, a great number of international jour-
nalists had gathered in the Angolan capital for the first time, and were present
when the prison assaults took place. It was thus impossible for the Portuguese
authorities to conceal the events,³ which were placed on the agenda of the UN
Security Council on 10 March 1961. The Swedish press was present in Luanda
through Sven Aurén, the Paris correspondent of the conservative daily news-
paper Svenska Dagbladet. Unlike most international commentators, Aurén was
far from sympathetic to what he termed a “revolt by the uncivilized against the
civilized” and “terrorism of the Algerian model”.⁴ Albeit partly critical to the
Portuguese colonial system, he would, above all, exclude the perspective of
Angola’s independence from Portugal as leading to “chaos” and to openings
for international Communism. In the second of his two long articles on Angola,
he wrote that

there is no reason for the assumption that the Communist bloc does not have its
eyes directed towards this perspective, ready to use it in case it should become a
reality. It is the duty of Portugal to stand firm in Angola, both for the sake of the
black population and for the Western world.⁵

² Ibid., p. 129. In January 1961 the so-called Maria’s War had already broken out in the area of
Malanje, some 400 kilometres east of Luanda, when followers of a dissident Christian sect rose
against the system of forced cotton-growing and, in general, Portuguese authority.
³ The Portuguese subsequently clamped down on foreign correspondents and imposed an almost
complete blackout on free reporting from Angola.
⁴ Sven Aurén: ‘Kontakt med Angola’ (‘Contact with Angola’) in Svenska Dagbladet, 19 February
1961.
This view was soon echoed by the Swedish conservative press and by the Moderate Party. In fact, the theoretical review, Svensk Tidskrift, had before the events in Luanda—but after the adoption of the Decolonization Declaration by the UN General Assembly—presented UPA’s Holden Roberto as a Communist and as a warning drawn attention to the fact that the Communist Party of Portugal at its 1957 congress had “adopted a resolution demanding the right of the African territories to immediate independence”. In the following issue, it wrote that

[Angola] is characterized by prosperity and satisfaction. Unlike the situation in so many other countries in Africa, the relations between [blacks] and whites are excellent. [...] There is no segregation [and] the inhabitants are, all in all, satisfied with their situation and at present totally uninterested in politics. The country is dominated by order, security and by the absence of racial hatred. The Angolans themselves do not wish any radical changes.

The opinions expressed by Svensk Tidskrift became more extreme after the Luanda attacks and the uprising in northern Angola. In mid-1961, the editor, professor Erik Anners—who in 1963 became a member of parliament for the Moderate Party—described it as “astounding” that the major part of the Swedish press was “ready to believe the anti-colonial propaganda stage-managed by the Soviet bloc” when presenting the recent developments in Angola as “a popular rebellion inspired by a freedom pathos against a blood-sullied colonial tyranny”. According to the editorial, the events in Congo had shown the consequences when “a colonial power backs away from the political, military and economic burdens and flees from its responsibility towards the innocent and defenceless masses”. In order to let “the other side” present its views, Anners chose to publish an article by the Irish officer Ronald Waring, at the time serving as an instructor at the Portuguese Military Staff College.

Waring’s article, written in May 1961 and entitled ‘Angola and World Peace’, probably represents the crudest example of the generally pro-Portuguese and pro-colonial comments published by the Swedish conservative press at the time. The author emphasized that “most African peoples since the beginning of time have lived a wild and primitive life. One tribe attacked the other; brother killed brother; fathers ate their own children at cannibalistic orgies; and witch-doctors requested heaps of bloody corpses to appease the

3 ’Dagens Frågor’ (‘The Questions of Today’) in Svensk Tidskrift, No. 5, 1961, pp. 268–269. It was the same editorial that maintained that “if the Europeans had not come to Africa [...] many peoples there would have probably still been eating each other and sold their children as slaves while their kings continued to amuse themselves by building pyramids of human skulls” (Ibid., p. 270).
deities of the jungle”.¹ According to the article, Portugal had understood that such people were unfit for self-rule, but a combination of Communists, terrorists and witch-doctors had descended upon Angola:

Well-trained agitators trickled in over the country, selected Africans who had received special education in Prague, Warsaw or Moscow. The witch-doctors cooperated with the terrorists [and] howling hordes of natives [staged] orgies of cannibalism.² It is to these people that the UN wants to grant ‘independence’, ‘self-determination’ and ‘democracy’. It is hardly believable that so-called responsible politicians can be caught by such obvious dementia. [In fact], can history show a more drastic example of complete madness?³

Such extreme and prejudiced statements were, however, exceptional and Svensk Tidskrift was not only severely taken to task by the social democratic, liberal and centre press, but also by some conservative newspapers, such as Norrbottens-Kuriren. Certainly, the rural insurrection set in motion by UPA in northern Angola in March lacked long-term political objectives and soon degenerated into indiscriminate ethnic savagery against all non-Bakongos, whites as well as mulattoes and blacks, but the publication of “a jumble of the crudest and most mendacious propaganda”⁴ by the Moderate theoretical journal was, however, too extreme even for Norrbottens-Kuriren. This said, beginning with the Angolan war of liberation in 1961, the conservative press and the Moderate Party would generally take positions against a broadening Swedish opinion in support of national independence and majority-rule in Southern Africa.

Following the outbreak of the insurrections in early 1961, Angola entered the Swedish Southern Africa debate. Under the banners of ‘Freedom to All Peoples’ and ‘Against Racial Oppression’, the issue of Angola’s independence from fascist Portugal would, together with the struggles in Algeria, Mozambique and South Africa, already play a prominent part at the Labour Day marches in Stockholm on 1 May 1961.⁵ On 1 July 1961, a group of young Liberals further requested the Swedish government to act for the expulsion of Por-

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¹ In a subsequent article in Svensk Tidskrift—written in defence of Waring’s contribution—Professor Anners stated that these were “well-known historical facts” (Erik Anners: ‘Angolakrisen inför Svensk Opinion’/*The Angola Crisis before the Swedish Opinion*” in Svensk Tidskrift, No. 1, 1962, p. 54).

² Waring wrote that he personally knew of a case where “a band of terrorists” had brought along a container with “a supply of salted arms, legs, hands and feet of European children as spare provisions”. However, while not ignoring the cruelties of the March insurrection, the American scholar James Duffy commented that “if savagery and atrocities provide the index of tribalism, Portuguese soldiers and colonists are no less atavistic than their African opponents” (James Duffy: Portugal in Africa, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1962, p. 216).


⁴ Cited in Anners in Svensk Tidskrift, No. 1, 1962, p. 56.

⁵ Stockholms Arbetarekommun 1961: ‘Verksamhetsberättelse’ (*Annual report of the Social Democratic Party district in Stockholm*), pp. 6–7 (LMA). Arne Geijer and Alva Myrdal were the main speakers on this occasion.
tugal from EFTA, “which would decisively assist the freedom movement in Angola” and the following week the Social Democratic Student Union demanded an official Swedish protest against Portugal’s policies in Angola.¹

While the recently formed South Africa Committee concentrated its opinion making efforts on apartheid South Africa,² it was the active involvement by some of Sweden’s leading journalists and commentators on international affairs which contributed to the fact that Angola played an important role in Sweden in 1961–62. In the social democratic camp, Victor Vinde, the chief editor of Stockholms-Tidningen, advocated a combination of protests against Portugal and assistance to the nationalists, arguing that “the dictator Salazar must be made impossible in all international fora [...] including EFTA. Under his dictatorship Portugal does not belong to the Western world”.³ Vinde’s opinion was echoed by other socialist newspapers. For example, Göran Therborn—later internationally known as one of Sweden’s most prominent social scientists—published a well informed background analysis of the developments in Angola in the syndicalist weekly Arbetaren.⁴

It was, however, above all Sven Öste at the liberal morning paper Dagens Nyheter and Anders Ehnmark at its evening counterpart Expressen who placed Angola in the Swedish debate. Both of them visited the lower Congo region in mid-1961. They established direct links with UPA and MPLA and published accounts that at the time not only informed the Swedish public, but were quoted in the international literature on the events surrounding the Angolan struggle.⁵ Ehnmark’s earlier contacts with the exiled leadership around MPLA and his promotion of Expressen’s fund-raising campaign for Angolan refugees in Lower Congo were particularly significant. In addition, Anders Ehnmark, Sven Hamrell, Per Wästberg and Sven Öste published in 1961–62 not less than four books that covered Angola. Three of them introduced the leaders of the Angolan liberation movements in their own words to the Swedish public. This effort largely explains why MPLA—and later, by extension, FRELIMO of

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¹ The students’ political organizations in Uppsala—joined in an International Action Committee—at the beginning of June 1961 in a letter to the Portuguese government had condemned its policies in Angola (Svenska Dagbladet, 15 June 1961).
² Although SSAK’s constitution stated that “racial oppression [...] in other parts of Southern Africa [than South Africa] will also be the subject of attention by the Committee”, it did not initiate any activities concerning Angola.
³ Victor Vinde: ‘SOS Angola’ in Stockholms-Tidningen, 6 July 1961. In the same article, Vinde protested against the fact that the Swedish diplomatic representative to Lisbon, Alexis Aminoff—who had previously served in South Africa and during his stay there had apologized to Prime Minister Verwoerd for the Swedish press criticism of apartheid—was allowed to “time and again state his sympathies in favour of the dictator Salazar”.
⁴ Göran Therborn: ‘Frihet även för Angola’ (‘Freedom also for Angola’) in Arbetaren, 7 September 1961.
⁵ See, for example, Marcum (1969) op. cit., p. 211.
⁶ Hamrell and Wästberg later became members of the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance. Ehnmark and Öste were never members of this important body.
Mozambique and PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau—at the beginning of the 1960s already received attention in distant Sweden.

Angolan Voices in *Expressen* and Öst and Ehnmark in Congo

On 15 March 1961—just over a month after the dramatic events in Luanda—Holden Roberto’s UPA took advantage of the confusion and went into action, launching an attack deep into the coffee-growing areas in the northern parts of the country. This was a much more serious challenge to the Portuguese than the Luanda prison assaults, thrusting Angola into a protracted state of rebellion. The UPA-inspired attacks provoked a widespread uprising and within days hundreds of Portuguese-owned plantations and farms, trading settlements and government posts were overwhelmed. At that stage, UPA’s instructions that the actions were only to be directed against the colonial government and Portuguese settlers’ property¹ gave way, however, to an uncontrolled popular explosion. The insurrectionists soon turned against all non-Bakongos, whether white or black, men or women.

It has been estimated that between 300 and 500 Portuguese and around 1,500 Africans were killed during the *jacquerie*.² Yet, this figure paled compared to the carnage wrought by Portugal’s reprisals. From May 1961, the Portuguese military increased its troops in Angola from 3,000 to around 25,000³ and “began striking back with indiscriminate wrath. They even bombed and strafed areas that had not been affected by the nationalist uprising”.⁴ By October, an estimated number of between 20,000 and 50,000⁵ Africans had died and another 150,000 had according to the United Nations been driven over the border with Congo.⁶

As the rebellion in northern Angola coincided with the civil war in neighbouring Congo—to which it largely appeared as, and to a certain degree also was, interlinked—the developments were closely followed by the United Nations⁷ and occupied prime space in the news all over the world. With a

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¹ Marcum (1969) op. cit., p. 143.
² MacQueen op. cit., p. 24.
⁴ Marcum (1969) op. cit., p. 144.
⁵ Cann op. cit. p. 28 and Macqueen op. cit., p. 24.
⁷ On 20 April 1961, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution through which it called upon Portugal to urgently “consider the introduction of measures and reforms in Angola for the purpose of the implementation of [the UN Decolonization Declaration], with due respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms [...] in accordance with the [UN] Charter” (United Nations: *Yearbook of the United Nations: 1960*, Office of Public Information, New York, 1960, p. 140). It is noteworthy that both the United States and the Soviet Union voted in favour of the resolution, as did Sweden. Portugal did not participate in the vote, which was only opposed by Spain and South Africa.
Swedish UN Secretary General and a substantial Swedish participation in the UN military operations in Congo, there was, similarly, a broad interest in Sweden for the situation in Angola. It was against this background that Öste and Ehnmark visited Lower Congo in mid-1961. Their separate visits took place at a time when Ehnmark’s newspaper Expressen had already initiated a series of in-depth articles on the theme ‘Africa from within’, with the objectives “to broaden the Swedish debate and give a clearer presentation of African opinions”.\(^1\) Angola featured prominently in the series. Edited by Ehnmark—who in the 1950s had entered into contact with Mário de Andrade and Marcelino dos Santos in Paris—it included original articles specifically written for Expressen, for the first time directly introducing the opinions of Angolan—and Mozambican—nationalists to a Swedish readership.

The series opened on 28 March 1961 with an article entitled ‘Racial oppression and terror behind the myths of Salazar’,\(^2\) written by the Goanese nationalist João Cabral, who earlier had visited Ehnmark in Sweden.\(^3\) Cabral belonged to the Goanese Political Convention,\(^4\) but was close to MPLA. He represented the Angolan organization in London from the end of 1960 and, more importantly, in April 1961 became Assistant Secretary General of the Conference of Nationalist Organizations in the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP), an umbrella organization within which MPLA of Angola, PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau and—later—FRELIMO of Mozambique were particularly prominent.\(^5\)


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\(^1\) The decision to embark on the series was taken by Bo Strömstedt and Anders Ehnmark. Strömstedt had at the beginning of 1961 taken up the position as cultural editor of Expressen and Ehnmark was responsible for foreign affairs at the cultural section. Together, they started “a new line” (letter from Anders Ehnmark to the author, [Taxinge, January 1997]).


\(^3\) Letter from Anders Ehnmark to the author, [Taxinge, January 1997].

\(^4\) Convenção Política de Goa. The Portuguese enclave of Goa was annexed by India in December 1961.

\(^5\) A Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguêsas (CONCP) was the successor of MAC and FRAIN, representing nationalist organizations in the Portuguese colonies. MAC (Movimento Anti-Colonialista; Anti-Colonial Movement) was formed in 1957 by inter alia Mário de Andrade, Amílcar Cabral and Marcelino dos Santos. At the second All-African Peoples’ Conference in Tunis, Tunisia, MAC was in January 1960 transformed into the African Revolutionary Front for National Independence (Frente Revolucionária Africana para a Independência Nacional; FRAIN), emphasizing the struggle in the Portuguese colonies in Africa. The prime movers behind the initiative were MPLA and PAIGC. FRAIN was seen as a common front against Portugal. Holden Roberto’s UPA was invited to join, which, however, the organization declined. At a meeting in Casablanca, Morocco, in April 1961, FRAIN was, finally, reorganized as CONCP, again broadening the coordination to all the Portuguese colonies, in Africa as well as in Asia. Once again UPA was invited, but refused to participate. CONCP set up a consultative council with Mário de Andrade of MPLA as President and a secretariat, based in Rabat, Morocco, with Marcelino dos Santos as Secretary General. João Cabral of Goa and Alfredo Bangura of Guinea-Bissau served as Assistant Secretary Generals. Mário de Andrade’s opening address to the CONCP founding conference was partly reproduced in Swedish in the anthology Africans on Africa published by Ehnmark and Hamrell in May 1962. One of the first Swedish parliamentary motions for official support to the
Cabral’s first article introduced the main issues and actors of the struggle in the Portuguese colonies in Africa. It was followed in May 1961 by a full-page article on the situation in Angola, where Cabral presented the newly formed CONCP. According to the author, one important objective of the alliance was “to raise funds and distribute them between the nationalist organizations in order to make the struggle efficient and to economically support the refugees from the colonies”.

1 A month later, CONCP made an appeal for funds to Expressen, which led to the Angola campaign between July and September 1961.

Mário de Andrade, at the time Acting President of MPLA and President of CONCP, also contributed an original full-page article to Expressen’s ‘Africa from within’ series. With the title ‘Popular front against the terror’, it was published in late June 1961. It is of historical interest both for its unitary and its conciliatory stand. The two main political messages conveyed by the MPLA leader to the Swedish readers were that “we are trying to create an internal Angolan front in which all resistance groups, parties and organizations join forces” and that “we propose a round-table conference where representatives of all political parties in Angola and of the Portuguese regime will be able to negotiate a peaceful solution to the problem”.

4 In veiled, but obvious, reference to UPA’s Bakongo separatism and backing from the United States, de Andrade, also warned against “those interests that rather support the independence of certain provinces than [that] of a united Angola”, expressing the fear that they could provoke “another Katanga”. As the Swedish military UN contingent was mainly being prepared to crush Tshombe’s secession—which was supported by the Portuguese—the message was largely understood.

In response to an appeal by CONCP, Expressen— the evening paper with the largest circulation in Sweden at that time— launched in July 1961 a fund-raising campaign on behalf of the Angolan refugees in Lower Congo, called the

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2 Expressen, 4 August 1961.


4 Ibid. MPLA had in June 1960 already called for a round-table conference with the Portuguese.

5 It was at the time alleged—and later confirmed—that Holden Roberto received funds from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). CIA was deeply involved in the Congo crisis, notably in connection with the assassination of the popularly elected Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in January 1961. Lumumba was detained by the Congolese army chief Joseph Mobutu, handed over to Tshombe in Katanga and summarily killed. On both accounts, see, for example, John Stockwell: In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1978. Stockwell had been CIA’s chief of station in Stanleyville (now Lubumbashi) and was responsible for the agency’s Angolan task force from early 1975. Regarding Roberto, Stockwell wrote: “Most of CIA’s field intelligence about the interior of Angola had come from Holden Roberto. [...] Operating from Kinshasa [...], he had established ties with the CIA. [...] To guarantee the breach between [MPLA and UPA-FNLA], Roberto’s forces repeatedly captured MPLA activists in northern Angola and transported them to [their] base at Kinkuzu, Zaire, and killed them” (pp. 52 and 116).

'Angolan Insurrections and Swedish Reactions

Angolan Insurrections and Swedish Reactions

It was the first sustained public campaign directly embarked upon by a Swedish newspaper in favor of a humanitarian cause in a Southern African country, preceding the 1966 Namibia campaign by the social democratic Aftonbladet and Arbetet by five years. The effort was largely assisted by Expressen's Africa series, but also by the fact that its morning counterpart, the national daily Dagens Nyheter, highlighted the events in Angola. Sven Öste, its foreign commentator, was the first Swedish journalist to visit the lower Congo region, where he came into contact with both MPLA and UPA.

Öste's visit took place in May 1961. He published his first major article the following month, characterizing the struggle in Angola as "dominated by almost inconceivable hatred and blind fear, emotions that can only be explained against one background, [namely] Portugal's record as a colonial power". Profoundly affected by his experience, the seasoned journalist described in detail the horrors of a war "where a Sharpeville takes place every day, a Lidice every week". Öste later wrote that his contacts with the Angolan refugees "squeezed [me] and left [me] with a hollow void". On behalf of Expressen, Ehnmark visited the same area with a Swedish photographer two months later. If possible, their accounts were even more vivid, documenting the arrival in Congo of the wounded and starving victims of the Portuguese military counter-offensive in northern Angola.

Before going to Congo, both Öste and Ehnmark had established contacts with MPLA. Both of them also personally experienced one of the first major indications of a tragic and, as it would turn out, irreconcilable gulf between UPA and MPLA, namely what later became known as the 'Ferreira affair'. Tomás Ferreira was a young military MPLA commander, who from his exile in Léopoldville was responsible for backup to surviving pockets of nationalist forces struggling in the Nambuangongo area north-east of Luanda. When Öste in May 1961 attempted to enter Angola from Congo, it was Ferreira who was

1 In Swedish, Angola-Hjälpen.
2 The Fund for the Victims of Racial Oppression in South Africa had already been launched in September 1959. Lacking the sustained backing of Expressen's Angola campaign, it could not match the results of the latter. It has been estimated that the anti-apartheid fund between September 1959 and October 1964 raised in total an amount of 140,000 SEK, or only just over half of the sum raised by Expressen for the Angolan refugees during the three months July–September 1961.
3 With a daily edition of around 350,000 copies, Dagens Nyheter reached at the time more Swedes than the social democratic Stockholms-Tidningen and the conservative Svenska Dagbladet together.
5 Ibid.
6 Öste op. cit., p. 221.
7 Bertil Stilling.
8 For example, Anders Ehnmark: 'Det smygande kriget i gräset' ('The creeping war in the grass') in Expressen, 29 July 1961.
responsible for the logistics. They were, however, blocked by the Congolese authorities and detained at Matadi, where Ferreira was assaulted by the local police and arrested.¹ Eventually, Öste managed to get Ferreira out of prison and back to Léopoldville.² Ehnmark, who had been introduced to MPLA through his old contacts with the CONCP leadership and was also trying to enter Angola, met Ferreira in July. His plan to accompany the MPLA commander across the border was, however, never implemented.

Some months later, Öste and Ehnmark were informed that Ferreira had been killed. It soon transpired that it was not by the Portuguese, nor by the Congolese, but by UPA. After crossing the border into Angola in early October 1961, Ferreira and his squad of twenty men had been intercepted by UPA and executed. Initially, Holden Roberto vehemently denied UPA’s involvement, but two years later he confirmed that he personally had issued the orders to annihilate MPLA columns trying to infiltrate Angola.³ Ferreira and his men

¹ Öste in Expressen, 16 June 1961. In the article, Öste calls Ferreira ‘Fernando’.
² Öste op. cit., p. 221.
³ Marcum (1969) op. cit., p. 214 and Davidson (1972) op. cit., p. 212.
were by no means the last MPLA cadres to die in this way. In his standard work on the Angolan revolution, John Marcum concludes that “whenever an opportunity arose to physically eliminate MPLA [leaders], a chronically insecure and increasingly callous Holden Roberto seized it”. Occurring only months after the MPLA and UPA insurrections against the Portuguese, the Ferreira affair was “one of the most discussed, most deplored and most difficult to explain in the long chain of human tragedies [plaguing] the Angolan revolution”. In the meantime, Holden Roberto himself did not appear overly concerned. Talking to Öste at the time of the assassination of Ferreira, the UPA leader stated that

MPLA is a bunch of intellectuals, assimilados and mulattos, who want to form a government in cooperation with Portuguese plantation owners. They want to protect their own unique position. They are the future bourgeoisie. [...] You have mentioned Tomás Ferreira, whom you know. But, who is he? A screamer; a man who has no troops; a bluffer who has never seen battle.

The 1961 Angola Campaign and Galvão’s Visit

The human tragedy in the northern parts of Angola and the refugee situation in Lower Congo was widely known in Sweden when CONCP in late June 1961 approached Expressen for assistance. As many of the refugees pouring into Congo were suffering from open wounds or pneumonia, the organization particularly asked for antibiotics. Expressen responded positively and immediately started a campaign to procure penicillin for the refugee population. The campaign was conducted in cooperation with the Mission Covenant Church of Sweden which had a large number of missionaries working in Lower Congo and was familiar with the local conditions. In addition to cash contributions from the general public, Swedish pharmaceutical companies were also asked to contribute towards the campaign, a challenge which, for example, was met by AB Kemiintressen.

Although conducted during the Swedish summer holiday period from July to September, the Angola campaign received an extraordinary response. Several of Sweden’s best-known theatre groups and artists joined the initiative,

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1 Marcum (1978) op. cit., p. 198.
2 Marcum (1969) op. cit., p. 211.
3 Under the legislation in force from 1926 to 1961, Africans could be classified as ‘assimilated’ Portuguese and granted citizenship. In order to be recognized as an assimilado, a person had to be over 18 years of age, speak and write Portuguese, show proof of supporting him/herself, adopt Portuguese cultural values and, generally, ‘be of a good character’. Very few Africans could achieve this status. The distinction was formally abandoned in 1961, when Portugal—at least in theory—extended civil rights to all the inhabitants in the ‘overseas provinces’.
4 Cited in Öste op. cit., p. 222–223.
5 Expressen, 26 December 1961.
donating the proceeds from their appearances to the Angolan cause. At the end of the campaign, the total value of the cash and material contributions received amounted to 251,000 SEK. Out of a total of 19 tonnes of medical drugs registered by the International Red Cross for the Angolan refugees in Congo, not less than 4.5 tonnes—about 25%—were in the form of penicillin from Sweden.

In the history of Sweden’s involvement with Southern Africa, Expressen’s Angola campaign of 1961 stands out as a significant, first broad expression of solidarity. That is also how it was viewed by the African nationalists. In mid-August, that is, shortly after the start of the campaign, CONCP’s Secretary General Marcelino dos Santos addressed a letter to Expressen in which he wrote that “you can rest assured that we with the greatest attention are following what you [...] are doing for our people. Your generous solidarity with our cause constitutes a strong support in our struggle for freedom and independence.”

Although the campaign was strictly humanitarian, dos Santos’ letter and Ehnmark’s accounts from Congo clearly informed the Swedish public that it was carried out in support of the Angolan resistance struggle. In Congo, the penicillin was distributed to MPLA’s medical services. As later stated by Ehnmark, “the liberation movement that Expressen supported was MPLA”, which, “although weak in northern Angola, was strong in the border area when it came to reception of the refugees. [They had] inter alia many medical doctors [and] it was the MPLA doctors that took care of the penicillin. [...] I was all the time in contact with MPLA.”

MPLA kept CONCP informed about the assistance, and during a meeting of the organization in Rabat, Morocco, in October 1961—at the conclusion of the Swedish campaign—Marcelino dos Santos, introducing himself as the Secretary

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1 This was, for example, the case with the Castle Plays (Slottsspelet) in Uppsala (Expressen, 17 and 21 July 1961), the China Variety Theatre (China-varietén) in Stockholm (Expressen, 22 and 28 July 1961) and with the popular singer Siw Malmkvist in Karlstad (Expressen, 28 July 1961).
2 Expressen, 26 December 1961. The Namibia campaign carried out by Aftonbladet and Arbetet from mid-1966 until the beginning of 1967 raised a total of 101,000 SEK.
3 Ibid. At the time, the International Red Cross had a Swedish representative in Léopoldville, Captain Gösta Streijffert.
4 Letter from Marcelino dos Santos to Expressen, Rabat, 12 August 1961, reproduced by the newspaper on 16 August 1961.
5 In response to the refugee crisis in Lower Congo, both UPA and MPLA formed relief medical services. MPLA’s medical service—Corpo Voluntário Angolano de Assistência aos Refugiados (Angolan Voluntary Refugee Assistance Corps; CVAAR)—was staffed by eight doctors and interns, headed by Dr. Américo Boavida. Set up in August 1961 and quickly eclipsing UPA’s services, “CVAAR met strong, sometimes violent resistance when it tried to establish branch dispensaries in areas of UPA influence [...] UPA partisans viewed CVAAR as a vehicle for MPLA political penetration” (Marcum (1969) op. cit., pp. 206–207).
7 Letter from Anders Ehnmark to the author, [Taxinge, January 1997].
General of the “organization of Portugal’s future ex-colonies”,1 addressed Expressen’s Paris correspondent Svante Lövgren, thanking the newspaper and stating that

the solidarity that we have found among you high up in the North inspires us with confidence. Once our struggle is over, the world will accept us as it has already accepted our liberated [black brothers]. At that point in time, we will not be lacking friends. But it is now, during the struggle, that your support and sympathy are so much valued. 2

That a major liberal newspaper in 1961 had already mounted a popular campaign together with CONCP and MPLA would not be without political consequence. Influenced by David Wirmark and Olle Wästberg, the Liberal Party later also advocated support to FNLA and established direct links with Holden Roberto’s organization. In fact, at the beginning of the 1970s the question whether to support FNLA or not became the only major controversial issue regarding official Swedish assistance to the Southern African liberation movements between the ruling Social Democratic Party and the non-socialist opposition. Due to the early contacts with MPLA and CONCP, the pro-FNLA stand of the Liberal Party was, however, never fully backed by the wider Liberal movement, including the main newspapers. It was, in addition, contradicted by the close relationship developed from the mid-1960s between several influential Liberal politicians and opinion makers and the leadership of MPLA’s Mozambican CONCP ally, Eduardo Mondlane’s FRELIMO.

Expressen’s campaign did not only bring MPLA into contact with an emerging Swedish solidarity opinion, but also its CONCP allies. Obviously, this was the case with the future FRELIMO leader Marcelino dos Santos, but less known is the fact that the Secretary General of PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau, Amílcar Cabral, as a result of the campaign also approached Expressen with a request for assistance. Preparing the launch of the armed struggle,3 Cabral sent a telegram to Anders Ehnmark from Conakry, Guinea, requesting assistance in the form of medical drugs,4 adding that “we are also liberating ourselves”. 5 In the early 1960s, there were, however, not yet any conditions in Sweden for a campaign in support of the little known nationalist struggle in the small Portuguese colony on the West African coast. Ehnmark—who more than anyone else was responsible for Expressen’s Angola effort—later stated that “I knew who Amílcar was, but nothing more happened. It was, after all, a bit early.”6 Towards the end of the decade, the situation had, however, changed. Supported by Basil Davidson

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1 Expressen, 12 October 1961.
2 Cited in Ibid.
3 PAIGC launched the armed struggle in Guinea-Bissau in January 1963.
5 Letter from Anders Ehnmark to the author, [Taxinge, January 1997].
6 Ibid.
and having established close relations with the Social Democratic Party, PAIGC
would feature as both the first and the major recipient of official Swedish
humanitarian support among the African liberation movements. Recognizing
Cabral’s outstanding diplomatic skills, Lúcio Lara later acknowledged that this
development made the MPLA leadership “a little jealous”.1

Immediately after the Angola campaign, Ehnmark was involved in another
event which focused attention on the Portuguese colony, namely the visit to the
Nordic countries by the anti-Salazar Portuguese Captain Henrique Galvão. In
late January 1961, Galvão had seized the Portuguese luxury liner Santa Maria in
the Caribbean and it was the rumour that he was sailing to Luanda to precipi-
tate a coup that attracted foreign journalists to the Angolan capital at the
time of the February insurrection.2 As Galvão had been closely involved with the
African colony, there were reasons to give credence to the rumour. Having
served as governor of the Angolan Huíla province, senior inspector of the
overseas territories and deputy for Angola in the Portuguese national assembly,
he had, above all, in 1947 led a government mission to report on the conditions
in Portugal’s African colonies. His findings3 turned him from one of the strong-
est supporters of the Salazar regime to one of its most active and ardent oppo-
nents, rendering him a series of jail sentences in the 1950s.4

A rebel, democrat and well known writer,5 the maverick Portuguese oppo-
sition politician was above all a nationalist who professed faith in a Lusitanian
community, including the African territories, but argued that the nationalist
movements were unprepared for independence.6 Nevertheless, after the Santa
Maria affair, Galvão was widely known as one of the leading Portuguese oppo-

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1 Interview with Lúcio Lara, Luanda, 16 April 1996.
2 Leading a group of 24 men, Captain Galvão captured the Santa María and its more than 600
passengers in the Caribbean. As later described by Galvão, the so-called Operation Dulcinea did,
eventually, envisage the capture of Luanda, but only at a later stage of the operation (see Henrique
Chased by American, British and Dutch warships, Galvão agreed after eleven days to take the liner
to Recife, Brazil, where the hijackers were given political asylum. Establishing his base in Tangier,
Morocco, Galvão was in November 1961—less than two weeks after his visit to the Nordic
countries—involvement in the hijacking of a Portuguese airplane, dropping anti-Salazar leaflets over
Lisbon during the Portuguese election campaign. In February 1962, he was in absentia sentenced to
22 years’ imprisonment.
3 Galvão’s report to the Portuguese national assembly was suppressed. Only a decade and a half
later did it begin to appear in publications outside Portugal. In the highly critical report, he inter alia
described how forced labour was practised on an extensive scale throughout Portuguese Africa,
particularly in Angola.
4 Early in 1960, Galvão escaped from prison and found asylum in the Argentine embassy in Lisbon.
5 In February 1961, Aftonbladet published a sympathetic profile of Galvão under the title ‘The last
6 See Henrique Galvão: ‘Colonialism, Nationalism and Independence’ in Ronald Chilcote: Emerging
Nationalism in Portuguese Africa: Documents, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford,
1972, pp. 34–39. Concerning Angola, Galvão stated in this document from July 1963 that
“Agostinho Neto, Mário de Andrade and Viriato da Cruz, in spite of their lack of capability, are
certainly more worthy of respect than Holden Roberto and his clan of barbarians” (p. 36).
sition politicians against Salazar’s fascist regime and an outspoken critic of its colonial policies. It was in that capacity that he was invited in October 1961—“with Expressen as a go-between”1—on a lecturing tour of Sweden, Finland and Norway by six Nordic student unions, representing more than 40,000 members.2

Even before his arrival, Galvão’s visit was highly publicized due to the fact that he was refused a visa by the Swedish immigration authorities, who argued that he was “a pirate” and questioned “whether there was anything in Portugal that [could] motivate his acts”.3 This provoked vigorous reactions. In a strongly worded editorial, Expressen described the Swedish immigration authorities as a “censoring body [...] guided by political values alien to the Swedish opinion”4 and the Nordic student organizations demanded that Galvão’s visa application should immediately be granted.5 Eventually it was, and during the last week of October 1961 he could address huge audiances in the three countries on the subject ‘With the Santa Maria against Salazar’. In Uppsala, for example, no less than one thousand people gathered on 30 October in the university’s main hall to listen to the ageing rebel, who declared that he “was not a pirate, but honoured by the title”. The statement was met by “one of the most hearty applausees ever heard in the hall”.6

Not everybody was pleased with Galvão’s visit. The Moderate review Svensk Tidskrift strongly denounced it 7 and in the local Upsala Nya Tidning a student representative stated that “the Galvão-friendly hysteria is not on a par with sound foreign policy clarity”.8 The ensuing debate forced Lars Lönnroth, chairman of the organizing Verdandi association in Uppsala, to acknowledge that it was “questionable” whether Galvão was “the man to carry out the liberation of Portugal”. Expressing widely held beliefs, he, however, added that “only a democratic [Portuguese] regime which [...] is willing to forcefully increase the living standards [of the population] and prepare for the independence of the colonies can avert the presently [growing] temptation to join Communism”.9 In a nutshell, this summarized widely held arguments behind the Swedish involvement in favour of democracy in Portugal and national independence in the African colonies.

1 Expressen, 21 October 1961.
2 The six organizations were the university students’ unions of Gothenburg, Lund and Stockholm in Sweden, the Verdandi association in Uppsala, Sweden, the student union of the Swedish-speaking University of Åbo (Turku) in Finland and the Norwegian National Union of Students.
3 Expressen, 21 October 1961.
4 Expressen, 22 October 1961.
8 Upsala Nya Tidning, 7 November 1961.
9 Ibid.
Reflecting Galvão’s relative importance in and for the Swedish debate, his book *Santa Maria: My Crusade for Portugal*—originally published in 1961—was translated into Swedish and distributed by the liberal Bonniers’ publishing house the following year.¹ Much more important for the emerging solidarity opinion with Angola was, however, that original contributions by the MPLA leaders Mário de Andrade and Agostinho Neto were published in Swedish by Wästberg,² Ehnmark and Hamrell ³ in 1961–62; that Ehnmark and Wästberg wrote a study on Angola and Mozambique in 1962⁴; and that Öste the same year brought out a book of African profiles in which he gave a revealing portrait of the FNLA leader Holden Roberto.⁵ These texts were to a large extent read and discussed by popular study circles all over Sweden.⁶

Barring the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, no other Southern African issue in the early 1960s had been as widely introduced to the Swedish public as that of Angola, a territory which before 1960 was almost unknown and would soon revert to a marginal position in the debate. Re-introduced by the organized solidarity movement from the mid-1960s—primarily by the Lund South Africa Committee—it was again MPLA that mainly attracted attention. Initially connected to Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA, the ruling Social Democratic Party would, however, only establish relations with MPLA via FRELIMO and PAIGC at the end of the decade. The Liberal Party was at about the same time distancing itself from MPLA, instead advocating support to FNLA. In the meantime, Swedish contacts with the Angolan nationalist opposition were until the mid-1960s maintained by the youth and student organizations, paving the way for official humanitarian assistance to refugee students from 1964/65.

**Youth and Student Contacts**

Establishing headquarters in Brussels from 1959, the World Assembly of Youth (WAY) soon paid attention to the crisis in Congo, an issue that was intensely

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¹ Henrique Galvão: *Santa Maria: Mitt Korståg för Portugal*, Bonniers, Stockholm.
² Wästberg (1961) op. cit. In this early anthology, Wästberg published poems by Mário de Andrade (‘Sabalus Visa’/’Sabalu’s Song’) and by Agostinho Neto (‘Eld och Rytm’/’Fire and Rhythm’).
³ Ehnmark and Hamrell (1962) op. cit. built upon the *Expressen* series ‘Africa from within’ and published extracts from Mário de Andrade’s opening address to the founding conference of CONCP in April 1961 (‘Angola’s Kamp’/’Angola’s Struggle’).
⁴ The study by Ehnmark and Wästberg (1962) op. cit. was in 1963 published in English under the title *Angola and Mozambique: The Case against Portugal* by Pall Mall Press, London, and Roy Publishers, New York.
⁵ Öste’s important book (1962) op. cit. included a presentation of Holden Roberto. Although the author describes Roberto as “a politically more mature, a more educated and a more balanced Lumumba” (p. 215), the interview with the FNLA leader contradicts this image, revealing rather Roberto’s militaristic and reckless outlook: “What do you really do that means anything to us? What does your country do? Does Sweden give us weapons? Do you stand up demanding that the Swedish government should give us weapons?” (p. 203).
⁶ Interview with Sven Hamrell, Uppsala, 10 April 1996.
discussed at the assembly’s council meeting in Accra, Ghana, in 1960. WAY’s involvement in Congo led to early contacts with both the MPLA and the UPA youth branches, that is, JMPLA and JUPA, and in May 1962 the organization sent a mission to the former Belgian colony to assess the situation and present proposals for assistance to the Angolan refugee youth. A representative from the National Council of Swedish Youth (SUL) participated in the mission,\(^1\) which at the political level recommended the establishment of a united front between MPLA, UPA and PDA, a proposal which coincided with the views held by MPLA, but was opposed by UPA.

WAY continued to maintain relations with both JMPLA and JUPA. In May 1963, for example, leaders of the two Angolan political youth organizations\(^2\) visited Sweden on a WAY-sponsored trip to draw attention to the Angolan independence struggle and to the needs of the Angolan youth.\(^3\) It was, however, with JUPA that both WAY and SUL eventually established the closest links. In a later interview, Holden Roberto explained that his movement’s first contacts with Sweden and the other Nordic countries were made via WAY and its Swedish secretary general, the Liberal David Wirmark, whose early role he underlined and whom he described as a “personal friend”.\(^4\)

Important contacts were also established in the first half of the 1960s at the level of the university student movements. After the outbreak of the insurrections in Angola and the ensuing repression against the Centre for African Studies and the *Casas dos Estudantes do Império*\(^5\) in Lisbon and Coimbra at the beginning of 1961, a great number of Angolan—as well as Guinean and Mozambican\(^6\)—students clandestinely left Portugal. They settled in Europe, the United States and in independent Africa, where they were assisted by WAY, WFDY, WUS and other international youth and student bodies,\(^7\) subsequently forming their own organizations. Reflecting the deep gulf between, on the one hand, MPLA and CONCP and, on the other, UPA-FNLA, the Angolan students were, however, divided from the start. On MPLA’s initiative, some thirty students from Portugal’s African colonies—of whom more than twenty were from Angola—set up the inter-territorial General Union of Students from Black Africa under Portuguese Colonial Domination (UGEAN), in Rabat, Morocco, in September 1961. UGEAN represented the same political coalition which had

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\(^2\) Jordão Aguiar of JMPLA and André Katíbia of JUPA.


\(^4\) Interview with Holden Roberto, Luanda, 17 April 1996.

\(^5\) In English, ‘Houses for the Students from the Empire’, to which students from the Portuguese colonies were attached and which became important centres of anti-colonialism and intellectual radicalism during the 1950s.

\(^6\) For example, the future President of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano.

\(^7\) Interview with Alberto Ribeiro, Harare, 5 May 1996.
been founded six months earlier, also in Morocco, by MPLA, PAIGC and Mozambican nationalists. It later joined the Prague-based International Union of Students.

Countering MPLA’s initiative, in March 1962—the same month as FNLA was formed—a group of twenty UPA-aligned Angolan students met in Lucerne, Switzerland, under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi\(^1\) to set up a rival National Union of Angolan Students (UNEA). Several of the founding members would later occupy leading positions in UNITA. This was the case with Jorge Valentim, UNITA’s future Secretary for Information,\(^2\) who was elected to the important position of vice-president for international affairs.\(^3\) While studying at Temple University in Philadelphia, USA, Valentim was appointed President of UNEA at the organization’s second general assembly in Switzerland in May 1963.\(^4\) Another future UNITA leader was Jorge Sangumba, who—also a student in the United States—joined UNEA somewhat later and in September 1965 followed in Valentim’s footsteps by becoming responsible for the external affairs of the student organization.\(^5\) He was appointed Secretary for Foreign Affairs of UNITA in August 1969.\(^6\)

UNEA immediately took steps to request membership of the International Student Conference/Coordinating Secretariat (ISC/COSEC), with headquarters in Leiden, Holland. Both Valentim and Sangumba played prominent roles in the Western-oriented student international, as well as in the International University Exchange Fund (IUEF), set up by ISC/COSEC in 1961. At its annual meeting in Christchurch, New Zealand, Valentim was in July 1964 elected assistant secretary for African affairs of COSEC,\(^7\) while Sangumba was attached to IUEF.\(^8\) Several influential Swedish student politicians, aid administrators and opinion makers active in ISC/COSEC and IUEF—such as Thord Palmlund\(^9\) and, above all, Lars-Gunnar Eriksson\(^10\)—would at an early stage be in contact with the future UNITA leaders. These relations help to explain why the

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\(^1\) Savimbi had in 1958 started to study in Portugal, but left for Switzerland, where in December 1961 he enrolled as an undergraduate student in the Department of Law and International Politics at Lausanne University. Often presented as Doctor Savimbi, he eventually completed a licence—roughly equivalent to a master’s degree—in political science.

\(^2\) Valentim served as UNITA’s chief negotiator before and after the 1994 Lusaka peace accords with the Angolan government. In April 1997 he was appointed Minister of Hotels and Tourism in the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation.

\(^3\) Marcum (1969) op. cit., p. 306, note 64.

\(^4\) Marcum (1978) op. cit., pp. 351–352, note 16.

\(^5\) Ibid., p. 163.

\(^6\) Sangumba later operated from London. Recalled to UNITA’s headquarters in Angola in the late 1970s, he was reportedly executed after a disagreement with Savimbi at the beginning of the 1980s.

\(^7\) Marcum (1978) op. cit., p. 162.


\(^9\) Palmlund—later occupying the important position of secretary to the Swedish Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance—was in the early 1960s active in ISC.

\(^10\) In 1966, Eriksson became the director of IUEF.
Swedish Social Democratic Party soon after the founding of UNITA in March 1966 established links with the new organization.

In the meantime, it was the MPLA-inspired UGEAN that caught the attention of the Swedish and Nordic student movements. While the recently formed UNEA was not invited to the Afro-Scandinavian Youth Congress in Oslo in August 1962, UGEAN participated with a large delegation at the historic meeting.1 Among the Angolan participants were the future MPLA Minister of Defence, ‘Iko’ Carreira, and Henrique de Carvalho Santos (‘Onambwe’). Together with such prominent UGEAN representatives as the future Presidents Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique and Manuel Pinto da Costa of São Tomé and Príncipe, they played an important role at the congress, not least to publicize the Angolan nationalist cause. A long interview with Carreira was published in the Norwegian newspaper *Dagbladet* 2 and de Carvalho Santos was nominated by the African delegates to address a concluding public meeting with representatives from ANC of South Africa and ZAPU of Zimbabwe. Carreira also introduced the resolution adopted concerning the Portuguese colonies.3 It denounced “the backward attitude of the Portuguese government and its preparations to exterminate the people[s] it dominates”, appealing for “concrete and effective assistance to the nationalists”.4

In the case of Sweden, official support to Angola was in the beginning channelled via the UN Special Educational and Training Programme for the Portuguese Territories, set up in 1962. Following the decision by the Swedish parliament in May 1964 to allocate a ‘refugee million’ in favour of education of African refugee youth, this multilateral effort was in the mid-1960s complemented by a bilateral programme. This largely benefited Angolan secondary school students in Congo (Zaire), but via IUEF and WUS also students at university level in Europe.5 From the financial year 1964/65, an increasing number of individual scholarships were extended by the Swedish embassy in Kinshasa, and in 1965/66 SIDA and UNHCR agreed to jointly support a combined agriculture and community development project in favour of Angolan students at Kimpese, close to the border with Angola.6

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1 In June–July 1962, UGEAN also attended the tenth conference of ISC/COSEC in Québec, Canada.
2 In the interview, Carreira stated that “we want equality for all races in Angola, [...] unity between all African peoples [and] a republican, democratic government, [which] in stages will develop the economy and transform the country into a modern, strong and viable independent state”. He also said that “the Western powers—following the example of the Commonwealth and South Africa—should expel Portugal from NATO” (*Dagbladet*, 18 August 1962).
3 *Dagbladet*, 20 August 1962.
4 ASYC Report, op. cit., p. 147.
5 In 1965, Sweden complemented the official bilateral educational assistance programmes in Southern Africa with allocations in favour of legal assistance to political prisoners and maintenance of their families, mainly via IDAF, WCC and the Church of Sweden Aid. The legal aid programme covered South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe, but not Angola or Mozambique.
The scholarship programme grew rapidly over the years. In 1966/67, it already covered more than 120 secondary students—of whom a majority attended the Protestant Sona Bata refugee school in Lower Congo—and three students attended the Lovanium university in Kinshasa.1 As the number of secondary students qualifying for higher studies progressively increased, emphasis was shifted to the university level. In 1971/72, a total of 19 Angolans studied at Lovanium with Swedish assistance.2 At the end of the 1960s, SIDA annually allocated between 150,000 and 200,000 SEK to the programme, which eventually was administered with assistance from the United Nations Development Programme and the World Council of Churches. It was phased out after Angola’s independence in 1975.

Swedish assistance to Angolan students in Congo was motivated by the high number of refugees in the country, estimated at more than 500,000 in the mid-1960s. It was humanitarian concerns—not politically partisan considerations—that determined the programme. The support was, however, noticed by both the Kinshasa-based FNLA and by MPLA, with headquarters in neighbouring Congo-Brazzaville, and the two rival liberation movements soon approached the Swedish government for direct support in the field of education. In the case of Roberto’s FNLA, it eventually led to the submission of a formal request by his representative to Sweden, Mateus João Neto. In April 1971, Neto solicited funding for the construction of the movement’s planned Franquetti school complex, budgeted at 2.1 million USD, and for “revolutionary culture [and] primary school education” in favour of 100,000 Angolans in Zaire, with an annual estimated cost of not less than 7 million USD.3 Together with similar requests by FNLA, it was considered “weakly anchored in reality”4 and “left without further action”5 by the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance in June 1971.

Following a visit to Sweden by Agostinho Neto the previous year, the Swedish government had at that time already decided to extend direct, official humanitarian support to MPLA.6 When UNESCO in June 1971 approached Sweden for additional support to the construction of a more realistically conceived MPLA school outside Dolisie in Congo-Brazzaville, planned for 270

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1 Letter (‘Ambassadens stipendieprogram läsåret 1966/67’/‘The embassy’s scholarship programme during the academic year 1966/67’) from Dag Malm to SIDA, Kinshasa, 28 February 1967 (SDA).
4 Ibid.
6 It was decided in March 1971 to allocate an amount of 500,000 SEK to MPLA for the financial year 1971/72.
students, the terrain was thus prepared for a positive reply. The Dolisie project had earlier in the year been submitted by MPLA to the Danish WUS committee. In November 1971 it was discussed with Lúcio Lara, head of MPLA’s Brazzaville office and responsible for education matters, at government level in both Copenhagen and Stockholm. After further deliberations between WUS, SIDA, the Danish aid agency DANIDA and UNESCO, the Swedish government decided in June 1973 to grant an amount of 3.3 million SEK for the school. WUS Denmark was responsible for overall coordination of the project, while the Swedish contribution was channelled via UNESCO.

Albeit indirectly, Swedish official assistance to Angolan refugee students was thus extended from Zaire to MPLA’s base area at Dolisie in Congo-Brazzaville. The school project was greatly appreciated by MPLA and had the additional political effect of bringing Sweden and MPLA closer at a particularly crucial time. Following the signing of a formal unity agreement between MPLA and FNLA in Kinshasa in December 1972, the Soviet Union had by mid-1973 phased out its assistance to Agostinho Neto’s organization. In addition, at a

1 CCHA: ‘Ansökan från MPLA om stöd för skolbyggnadsprojekt i Dolisie, Folkrepubliken Kongo (Brazzaville)’ ('Request by MPLA for a school construction project at Dolisie, People’s Republic of Congo (Brazzaville)'), Stockholm, 23 May 1972 (SDA).
3 MPLA’s principal political school, the Centre for Revolutionary Education (Centro de Instrução Revolucionária) (CIR), was also situated at Dolisie. The schools for political and classical education were separate. The project supported by WUS, UNESCO and SIDA concerned vocational training and belonged to the latter category.
4 See interview with Lúcio Lara, Luanda, 16 April 1996.
5 Initiated by the OAU—which in 1971 had withdrawn recognition from GRAE, but not from FNLA—the December 1972 agreement between MPLA and FNLA was negotiated under the auspices of Presidents Kaunda (Zambia), Mobutu (Zaire), Ngouabi (Congo-Brazzaville) and Nyerere (Tanzania). According to the agreement, the two Angolan movements should immediately end all hostile acts towards each other and form a Supreme Council for the Liberation of Angola (Conselho Supremo da Libertação de Angola) (CSLA), coordinating a unified military command (chaired by MPLA) and a political council (headed by FNLA). Membership on all three bodies was to be based on parity, but FNLA, i.e. Holden Roberto, would preside over the CSLA. One of the main reasons why MPLA signed the agreement was that it would make it possible to use Zaire as a rear base. However, it soon transpired that the Mobutu government was not willing to open its territory to MPLA. MPLA guerrillas were not permitted to transit and MPLA members were still subject to arrest within Zaire. The agreement thus became hollow and eventually broke down.
6 Contrary to Cuba and Yugoslavia—and in spite of a visit by Agostinho Neto to Moscow at the beginning of 1973—the Soviet Union withdrew its support to MPLA. It was only resumed in early 1975. Vladimir Shubin, who at the time served as secretary for African affairs of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, explained in 1995: “[FNLA] signed this unfortunate agreement with MPLA […], which nobody remembers any more and which became one of the problems between the Soviet Union and MPLA […]. Neto was to be second to Roberto. It was a mistake and became a problem for us […]. I was present when Neto came [to the Soviet Union] after the agreement and [when he] tried to explain the needs for it. [But] our people were not convinced and the assistance was suspended. Not stopped in the full sense, because there were still MPLA students in the Soviet Union and the military supplies continued. […] [However], the agreement immediately lowered the prestige of MPLA” (conversation with Vladimir Shubin, Cape Town, 12 September 1995). The decision to resume the assistance was taken after MPLA’s Inter-Regional Conference in the Angolan district of Moxico in September 1974. According to Shubin, it was in a decisive way based on information given by Lars-Gunnar Eriksson of IUEF: “I used to know Lars-Gunnar Eriksson. I
time when both Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia embarked upon active diplomatic support to FNLA, an internal MPLA faction opposed to Neto’s leadership and led by Daniel Chipenda in Zambia—later known as the ‘Eastern Revolt’ (Revolta do Leste)—was uncovered in April 1973. The direct humanitarian assistance initiated in 1971 and the additional support to the Dolisie school were in this light seen as an important de facto official Swedish recognition of MPLA by the leadership around Agostinho Neto.\footnote{Interview with Lúcio Lara, Luanda, 16 April 1996.}

Responsible for logistics, Chipenda, however, remained as SIDA’s MPLA counterpart in Zambia. This would lead to strains between Sweden and MPLA at the level of the Swedish embassy in Lusaka.

\textsuperscript{1} Interview with Lúcio Lara, Luanda, 16 April 1996.
Towards Official Support to MPLA

MPLA and the Lund South Africa Committee

The Angolan nationalist cause had during the first half of the 1960s primarily been presented to the Swedish public by journalists and writers, as well as by representatives of Swedish NGOs linked to international youth and student organizations. In contrast with South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, no high-ranking Angolan nationalist leader had visited Sweden and no Angolan student authorized to speak on behalf of the liberation movement was resident there. In brief, there was no direct information activity or diplomacy carried out in Sweden by either FNLA or MPLA.

The situation changed during the latter part of the decade. At the same time as the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa was given decreasing attention, the struggle in Angola would—together with the issues of Namibia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique—again come to the fore. With FNLA largely absent, the cause of MPLA from 1966 was principally taken up by the South Africa Committee in Lund. The following year, Jonas Savimbi, the President of the newly founded UNITA movement, was invited to Sweden by the Social Democratic Party. Although last on the political scene, Savimbi became the first of the Angolan leaders to directly express his views to the Swedish ruling party. Finally, in 1968 the Left Party introduced a parliamentary motion in favour of official Swedish assistance to the CONCP alliance, including MPLA.

It was the active Lund South Africa Committee and its *Syd- och Sydvästafrika* information bulletin that re-introduced MPLA in Sweden. After exclusive coverage of South Africa and Namibia from the beginning of 1964, two years later the bulletin opened its pages to the struggle in other parts of Southern Africa. In January 1966, the committee was visited by Pedro Gomes Higino, “active within the leadership of one of the main branches of the Angolan liberation movement, MPLA”. An interview with Higino was published in the following issue of the bulletin. Later that year, *Syd- och Sydvästafrika* also published a special issue on ‘Portugal in Africa’, an update on MPLA’s struggle.

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1 The President of FRELIMO, Eduardo Mondlane, regularly visited Sweden from 1964.
2 Agostinho Neto of MPLA paid his first visit to Sweden in July 1970, while Holden Roberto of FNLA went there for the first time in November 1971.
3 *Syd- och Sydvästafrika*, No. 1–2, 1966, p. 4.
4 *Syd- och Sydvästafrika*, No. 4, 1966.
5 “Ny Fas i Frihetskampen i Angola” (‘A New Phase in the Freedom Struggle in Angola’) in *Syd- och Sydvästafrika*, No. 7–8, 1966, p. 20.
and a profile of the MPLA President Agostinho Neto. No corresponding attention was given to FNLA or UNITA. In the case of Angola, the Lund South Africa Committee would from the beginning put itself behind MPLA, influencing future opinions of the organized Swedish solidarity movement.

UNITA, IUEF and the Social Democratic Party

Little known is that the Social Democratic Party at about the same time established important contacts with Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA. This was mainly a consequence of earlier links with Angolan pro-Savimbi students within ISC/COSEC and IUEF. One of Savimbi’s main constituencies consisted of a core of politically active students within UNEA, the student body formed under his auspices in 1962. The group was led by the UNEA President Jorge Valentim, who in July 1964 had been elected assistant secretary for African affairs of COSEC.

While studying in Switzerland, Savimbi had from 1962 served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Holden Roberto’s Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE). However, from the beginning of 1963 an increasing—to a large extent ethnically defined—rift appeared between Roberto’s northern Bakongo constituency and Savimbi’s Ovimbundu followers from central and southern Angola. Several influential FNLA-GRAE politicians and student leaders from the Angolan enclave of Cabinda also supported Savimbi in the mounting conflict. This reached its culmination at the OAU Heads of State and Government summit meeting in Cairo in July 1964, where Savimbi during a press conference resigned in a spectacular way from GRAE, charging that Roberto’s government-in-exile “far from intensifying military action and regrouping the popular masses—the only way to hasten the liberation of Angola—limits itself

2 The struggle in the Portuguese African colonies was at the same time brought to the fore by prominent intellectuals. In 1967, the German–Swedish writer Peter Weiss published his drama Sången om Skråpuken (‘The Song about the Hideous Mask’), a particularly powerful indictment of Portuguese colonialism and Western complicity. It was premiered in Stockholm in January 1967 and partly reproduced by the Södra Afrika Informationsbulletin in its first issue (No. 1, 1967, pp. 17–18). The Lund South Africa Committee had assisted Weiss with facts for the play (Lund South Africa Committee: ‘Medlemsmeddelande’/‘Information to the members’, No. 1/67, Lund [no date]) (AGA).
3 Many Ovimbundu contract labourers working on Portuguese farms—derogatorily called ‘bailundos’, i.e. people coming from the area of Bailundu in the central highlands—were killed during the UPA insurrections in northern Angola from March 1961. This was not forgotten by Savimbi’s Ovimbundu followers. As a curiosity it could be noted that Savimbi after the 1992 elections set up headquarters in Bailundu.
4 Such as the GRAE Minister of Armaments, Alexandre Taty—who later joined the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC)—Miguel N’Zau Puna and ‘Tony’ Da Costa Fernandes. Both N’Zau Puna and Fernandes formed part of the initial core group behind the founding of UNITA. Working closely with Savimbi for twenty-five years, they left UNITA at the beginning of 1992, accusing Savimbi of the killings in 1991 of Tito Chingunji and Wilson dos Santos, UNITA’s former representatives in the United States and Portugal.
to empty speeches”.¹ Shortly thereafter, Savimbi issued a devastating indictment of Holden Roberto, in particular denouncing “American imperialism” and “flagrant [Bakongo] tribalism” within his movement.²

Equally critical of what he viewed as Mbundu dominance and Communist influence within MPLA,³ Savimbi set about organizing a third Angolan movement, seeking and receiving assistance in Algeria, Egypt and China. Crucial for the initiative was UNEA’s support. Savimbi’s protégé Jorge Valentim—who in 1963 as FNLA-GRAE representative in Katanga had grown disillusioned with Roberto’s leadership—spearheaded the move to break the student body away from Holden Roberto. This was largely achieved through ISC/COSEC. In the words of Marcum, “Valentim decided to use COSEC travel funds and his position as UNEA President in a campaign to detach UNEA from GRAE […], publishing a series of anti-GRAE student bulletins and pamphlets”.⁴ The campaign was successful and after a special assembly in Utrecht, Holland, in September 1965 UNEA ceased to be part of GRAE.

With additional support from a nucleus of experienced FNLA-GRAE military and political leaders,⁵ in January 1966 Savimbi was in a position to form a Preparatory Committee for Direct Action⁶ in the Zambian capital Lusaka. This was the forerunner of UNITA, formally founded by some seventy Savimbi followers at a conference near Muangai in the eastern Angolan district⁷ of Moxico in March 1966. The conference adopted a constitution which laid down that “real independence for Angola only will be achieved through […] armed struggle […] against the Portuguese colonial power inside the country”.⁸ Six months later—in September 1966—UNITA held its first congress in Lusaka, where Savimbi was elected President of the Central Committee.

Savimbi and UNITA were largely unknown in Sweden. However, in December 1966 Anders Ehnmark—who in 1961 had initiated the ‘Angola Help’ campaign for MPLA—visited the small UNITA office off Livingstone Road in Lusaka, where he in Savimbi’s absence⁹ met and interviewed the movement’s recently elected three Vice-Presidents, Smart Chata, Kaniumbu Muliata and Solomon Njolomba. The presentation of UNITA and the interview with its leaders—one of the very first by the international press—was published by

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⁴ Marcum (1978) op. cit., p. 162.
⁵ Such as José Kalundungu, FNLA’s military Chief of Staff, and Dr. José Liahuca, head of SARA.
⁶ In Portuguese, Comité Preparatório da Acção Directa.
⁷ As Angola officially was a ‘province’ of Portugal, the term ‘district’ formed part of the colonial parlance. The liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies normally used the term ‘province’, but—particularly in earlier documents—also often ‘district’.
⁸ Cited in Marcum (1978) op. cit., p. 166.
⁹ Savimbi had in October 1966 crossed the border into Angola, returning to Zambia at the end of March 1967.
Expressen on 22 December 1966, shortly after UNITA’s first military actions against the Portuguese in eastern Angola. Savimbi’s lieutenants—all three former FNLA members—explained that they had broken with Roberto since he had “become too dependent on the Americans and in addition did not achieve anything inside Angola”. In UNITA, they said, “we want to follow an African course, independent of the East and the West”, expressing no understanding or mercy towards the Portuguese settlers in Angola:

[They] are people of the Stone Age. They ship our soil to Portugal, which is only a heap of stones. [...] But it is good that they are so lazy, leaving our minerals in the ground. There is not one good Portuguese in Angola. They are all evil. We will fight them, and then we will see what to do with them.¹

To launch its politico-military campaign in eastern Angola, UNITA had in spite of President Kaunda’s initial support to MPLA been allowed to open offices in the Zambian capital.² Influential behind the decision was Rupiah Banda, who—after his studies at the University of Lund—in 1965 had been appointed Zambia’s ambassador to Egypt, where he established a personal friendship with Savimbi.³ However, shortly after Ehnmark’s meeting with the UNITA leaders in Lusaka, the new organization staged an attack on the border town of Teixeira de Sousa (now Luau), cutting off the Benguela railway line and holding up Zambian copper exports through Angola. The Benguela line was of critical importance to landlocked Zambia and Kaunda warned Savimbi not to continue the attacks. Nevertheless, in March 1967 UNITA again dynamited the railway, which as a result was closed for several weeks. This provoked strong reactions in Zambia. When Savimbi—after visiting China and Sweden in May–June—returned to Zambia in early July 1967, he was immediately arrested and expelled to Egypt. UNITA was at the same time barred from operating from Zambia.

Savimbi and the UNITA leadership eventually slipped back into Angola through Zambia in July 1968, remaining in the country until the Lisbon coup of April 1974. The time from the Muangai conference until the return to Angola—in particular the period from March 1967—was dedicated to intensive political and military⁴ preparations, including frequent travels and international diplomacy. The International University Exchange Fund (IUEF), its director Lars-

¹ Anders Ehnmark: ‘Vi dödar portugiserna med deras egna vapen’ (‘We kill the Portuguese with their own weapons’) in Expressen, 22 December 1966.
² MPLA opened its politico-military campaign in eastern Angola (‘Eastern Front’) in May 1966.
³ Banda served as Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1975 and 1978, playing a crucial role in switching Zambia’s sympathies from MPLA to UNITA.
⁴ UNITA’s first guerrilla commanders were trained at the Nanking military academy in China from the beginning of 1965. N’Zau Puna studied there in 1967–68, before entering Angola with Savimbi in July 1968.
Gunnar Eriksson and the Swedish Social Democratic Party would in this context play important, although little known, roles.

Interviewed in Luanda in 1996, both Jorge Valentim and UNITA’s former Secretary General Miguel N’Zau Puna—who together with ‘Tony’ Fernandes and Jorge Sangumba, formed part of the inner circle which prepared Savimbi’s return to Angola—underlined the assistance received from Eriksson, as well as the support from Pierre Schori, then attached to the National Board of the Swedish Social Democratic Party. Eriksson was described as “a great friend of ours”, who—together with Schori, “who had direct contacts with President Savimbi”—through “support [and diplomatic] openings” brought UNITA closer to Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries. According to Valentim, Sweden and Scandinavia constituted at the time a “reference and [a] model”, while N’Zau Puna recalled how “our first contacts really were with Sweden”.

Valentim had as a student leader attended a conference on Southern Africa in Uppsala, Sweden, in 1964, at about the same time becoming involved with the Scandinavian countries via the Norwegian IUEF director Øystein Opdahl. The links developed further under Opdahl’s successor, Lars-Gunnar Eriksson, a former chairman of the Stockholm South Africa Committee and international secretary of the Swedish National Union of Students. Eriksson became director of IUEF in 1966 and remained in that position until the beginning of 1980. Sweden was IUEF’s main financial contributor and Eriksson would over the years be in close contact with the Social Democratic Party, inter alia through Pierre Schori. Via Eriksson, Schori and the Swedish ruling party soon became involved with Savimbi and the group that behind closed doors in Egypt was preparing UNITA’s entry into Angola. After visiting the movement’s Zamalek office in Cairo, Eriksson organized N’Zau Puna’s travel arrangements from

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1 None of the major works on Angola or the principal biographies on Savimbi mention the involvement by IUEF during this crucial period. See, for example, Marcum (1978) op. cit., Fred Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa, Mainstream Publishing Company, Edinburgh, 1986 or Yves Loiseau and Pierre-Guillaume de Roux: Portrait d’un Révolutionnaire en Général: Jonas Savimbi, La Table Ronde, Paris, 1987.

2 N’Zau Puna was in August 1969 appointed Secretary General of UNITA and Political Commissar of its armed wing, the Armed Liberation Forces of Angola (Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola) (FALA). Under Savimbi, he occupied the number two position in UNITA for more than two decades until his resignation at the beginning of 1992. N’Zau Puna entered the Angolan parliament after the democratic elections in September 1992, forming the Movement for Democratic Reflection (Tendência de Reflexão Democrática) together with other former UNITA members.

3 Bridgland op. cit., pp. 68–79.

4 Interview with Miguel N’Zau Puna, Luanda, 17 April 1996.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Interview with Jorge Valentim, Luanda, 18 April 1996.

8 Interview with Miguel N’Zau Puna, Luanda, 17 April 1996.

9 Interview with Jorge Valentim, Luanda, 18 April 1996. Setting up the interview, the author was surprised indeed to find that Valentim greeted him in not-so-broken Swedish.

10 Eriksson had also served as a substitute member of the government appointed Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance.
Tunisia—where he at the time was studying agronomy—to the Egyptian capital. More importantly, it was Eriksson who through IUEF arranged and paid for Savimbi’s and N’Zau Puna’s return to Angola. After laying false trails, the journey took the two UNITA leaders to Dar es Salaam, where they were met by Namibian friends from SWAPO. With SWAPO assistance they managed to re-enter Angola in July 1968.

These developments took place behind the scenes. However, in one of his first articles on Portugal and the wars in Africa, Schori wrote in the social democratic journal *Tiden* in mid-1967 that the Swedish ruling party had “good contacts with […] UNITA of Angola”, without mentioning either MPLA or FNLA. In fact, Savimbi had through Eriksson by that time together with Jorge Sangumba already visited Sweden. After a trip to China—where he met Mao Tse-tung in Yunan in May—the UNITA leader had been invited by the Social Democratic Party for discussions in Stockholm at the end of May 1967, shortly before his arrest in Zambia. Per Wästberg later recalled the visit:

> I think that in the beginning several of us were giving [UNITA] a chance, which was never the case with FNLA. [...] Jonas Savimbi came to Sweden and I remember how Pierre Schori and I—only the two of us—sat with him in the basement of the restaurant *Aurora* in Stockholm, very isolated. There was nobody else. I think that we talked for five hours. Savimbi was, of course, [in Sweden] in order to get support. I was not totally impressed and to Schori’s credit I must say that he was even less impressed. But we both recognized that Savimbi […] was a forceful, persuasive talker and a personality. Not unsympathetic. Very civilized, one thought at the time.

During his short stay, Savimbi met the press, explaining that UNITA’s objective was to form a united liberation front in Angola. He had left FNLA-GRAE due to Roberto’s dependence on the United States, but was just as opposed to MPLA’s reliance on the Soviet Union. UNITA, Savimbi stated contrary to the remarks made to Ehnmark in Lusaka by his three Vice-Presidents, was willing to cooperate with the opposition in Portugal and “with all the whites who wish[ed]”

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1 Interview with Miguel N’Zau Puna, Luanda, 17 April 1996.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 SWAPO and UNITA were at the time closely aligned, in particular at the level of the representations in Cairo, where the SWAPO office was headed by Andreas Shipanga. In June 1967, Shipanga introduced Savimbi “as a good friend” to *Dagens Nyheter*’s Anders Johansson in Cairo (letter from Anders Johansson to the author, [Eskilstuna], 26 April 1998).
6 Interview with Miguel N’Zau Puna, Luanda, 17 April 1996.
7 One issue raised by Savimbi in Stockholm was the possible funding of a vocational training programme for Angolan refugees in Zambia, recently drawn up with IUEF (letter from Lars-Gunnar Eriksson and Jørgen Steen Olesen, IUEF, to SIDA, Leiden, 29 June 1967) (SDA).
8 Interview with Per Wästberg, Stockholm, 28 February 1996.
to stay and [were] loyal to an independent Angola”. Meanwhile, UNITA had embarked upon a protracted struggle and had already “hundreds of guerrilla

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1 ‘Lång gerillakamp förestår i Angola’ ('A protracted guerrilla war awaits in Angola') in Svenska Dagbladet, 1 June 1967.
groups in action”.  

To show the movement’s initial success, Savimbi displayed Portuguese banners and uniforms captured from the enemy.

The UNITA leader also talked to Ulla Byegård, chairperson of the Uppsala South Africa Committee, mentioning that UNITA was considering placing a representative to Sweden. Soon thereafter, Stella Makunga was unofficially appointed to the position, combining studies in Stockholm with political work. Indicative of the close relations between the Social Democratic Party and UNITA, she was in 1967 given a scholarship by the Tage Erlander Foundation for International Cooperation. Outside the Maoist organizations—which on the margin of the Swedish solidarity movement with Southern Africa for a long time maintained that UNITA was “leading the struggle” in Angola—UNITA’s

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1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
4 Letter from Miguel N’Zau Puna to Lena Sundh, Sweden’s ambassador to Angola, Luanda, 30 April 1998.
5 Makunga would over the following years mainly distribute UNITA’s information bulletin Kwanza-Angola in Sweden.
7 See, for example, Gnistan (‘The Spark’), Organ of the Communist League Marxist-Leninists (Kommunistiska Förbundet Marxist-Leninisterna) (KFML), No. 3, 1970.
representation would, however, not play any substantial role in Sweden. Nevertheless, in the immediate wake of Savimbi’s visit some of the established solidarity committees did stage fund-raising activities in favour of UNITA too. This was, for example, the case with the Uppsala South Africa Committee, which included UNITA among ten Southern African liberation movements for which it collected smaller amounts in 1967. Similarly, towards the end of the year the Stockholm South Africa Committee—chaired by Bengt Ahlsén from the Social Democratic Youth League—donated 5,000 SEK to ZANU of Zimbabwe and 1,000 SEK to UNITA.

The UNITA Parenthesis Closed

The relations between IUEF, the Social Democratic Party and UNITA came to an end shortly after Savimbi’s return to Angola in mid-1968. Closely involved with the project to create a third Angolan force, once it was established inside the country it was soon abandoned by the Swedes. There were a number of reasons for this. Perhaps the most important—underlined by N’Zau Puna—was that UNITA’s communication channels with the outside world were cut off. Another was that the Zambian government turned its back on UNITA and that the movement was not recognized by the OAU. In addition, the Swedish solidarity movement would from 1969 actively mobilize popular support in favour of MPLA, raising serious doubts about UNITA as a genuine liberation movement. In what arguably constitutes one of the first denouncements of UNITA’s relations with Portugal, Dick Urban Vestbro had already in mid-1969 written in the Swedish socialist weekly Tidsignal that there was “evidence that [UNITA] collaborates with the Portuguese”, quoting from pamphlets distributed by the Lisbon regime in Angola. Finally, from 1969 the newly appointed

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1 The situation would change in the mid-1980s, when UNITA’s local office established close relations with representatives of the Moderate Party.
2 Uppsala South Africa Committee: ‘Protokoll från sammanträde’ (‘Minutes from meeting’), Uppsala, 18 February 1968 (UPA). As earlier noted, the movements were ANC, PAC, SWAPO, ZAPU, ZANU, COREMO, MPLA, FNLA/GRAE, UNITA and PAIGC.
4 Interview with Miguel N’Zau Puna, Luanda, 17 April 1996.
5 Other considerations notwithstanding, the fact that Zambia had broken with UNITA made official Swedish humanitarian assistance impossible. SIDA’s former Director General Michanek stated in 1996: “The position of Zambia was important in this connection. Whatever we might have thought about UNITA at that time, we simply could not support an organization that was impossible from the point of view of some of our cooperating partners” (interview with Ernst Michanek, Stockholm, 19 March 1996).
6 Dick Urban Vestbro: ‘Sydafrikas akilleshål’ (‘South Africa’s Achilles’ heel’) in Tidsignal, No. 28, 1969, p. 7. In July 1974, the Paris-based magazine Afrique Asie published translations of documents showing that Savimbi “at least since 1972” had been an agent of the Portuguese. Other documents—some dating back to 1971—were in November-December 1979 published by the Portuguese weekly Expresso. The documents were in 1988 reproduced in English and commented by William Minter in his Operation Timber: Pages from the Savimbi Dossier, Africa World Press, Trenton.
Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme—possibly influenced by African leaders such as Cabral of Guinea-Bissau and Mondlane of Mozambique, who together with Agostinho Neto formed part of the CONCP alliance, but also by Nyerere of Tanzania and Tambo of South Africa—expressed support for MPLA.

Nevertheless, for quite some time after Savimbi’s return to Angola, UNITA continued to be presented as an alternative to FNLA and MPLA. In an article by the Mozambican journalist and poet Virgílio de Lemos, Tiden argued in the autumn of 1968 that “it appears that [UNITA] would be able to create a solid internal organization [in Angola]”, although the author hastened to add that “it lacks the ability to express itself politically”.1 Sangumba, UNITA’s London-based Secretary for Foreign Affairs—attached to IUEF—visited Stockholm in May 1969, denouncing MPLA’s “dependency on support from the Soviet Union and its elitist ideology”.2 The visit took place at a time when the Swedish parliament had just endorsed direct official Swedish humanitarian support to the Southern African liberation movements. The decision—and the subsequent assistance to PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau—was noted with satisfaction and expectation by the UNITA leadership in Angola. To “re-establish relations with our Swedish friends”,3 Samuel Chitunda, UNITA’s newly elected Secretary for Coordination, thus addressed a letter to Prime Minister Palme “on behalf of the Central Committee of UNITA” in November 1969, stating that

we are aware of all [the] efforts [...] made by [the Swedish] government under the wise leadership of Your Excellency. [...] It should not be to exaggerate sending [you] our very warm congratulations on the revolutionary measure your government has taken on [the] political situation in [the] Portuguese African colonies. People in Angola under [the] UNITA leadership will hope that your hands will be extended to help us to wipe out the fascist regime from our country. All UNITA is doing is to force the fascist Portuguese rule to grant independence to the Angolan people, so that we [may] set up [...] a progressist government which will stand firmly against the imperialist, capitalist and neo-colonialist forces all over the world.4

By that time, however, the Swedish debate centred around the question whether to grant official assistance to FNLA or MPLA or to both of them. UNITA did not feature as a serious alternative and was generally presented as inactive and of marginal importance by proponents of FNLA as well as by defenders of MPLA. In July 1970, for example, Olle Wästberg from the Liberal Party Youth League—then leading the pro-FNLA campaign in Sweden—wrote in Expressen that “UNITA during the last two years only seems to have had an

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2 Margareta Romdahl: ‘Svårt skaffa läkemedel för gerillan i Angola’ (‘Difficult to procure medicines for the guerrillas in Angola’) in Dagens Nyheter, 21 May 1969.
3 Interview with Miguel N’Zau Puna, Luanda, 17 April 1996.
extremely limited activity”. At about the same time, the liberal provincial newspaper Nerikes Allehanda—arguing that “MPLA has the people’s vote”—simply stated in a full-page article on the Angolan situation that “UNITA may be briefly discussed. It’s importance is minor”. Even so, the social democratic journal Tiden continued to propagate the case of UNITA.

As late as at the end of 1970—after the MPLA leader Agostinho Neto had visited Sweden as a guest of the Social Democratic Party—Tiden published another article by Virgílio de Lemos. In the light of the ruling party’s backing of MPLA, it stands out as particularly contradictory. The Social Democratic members were thus told that MPLA had “openly declared its Communist dependency” and that it “lacked a real popular base”, while UNITA according to the article “does not want to be dependent on any quarter” and was presented as “possibly the only liberation movement in Angola that is trying to create a new type of nationalist party, able to decrease the gap between the rural population and the petty bourgeoisie”. The article was severely criticized a couple of months later in Tiden by Dick Urban Vestbro of the Lund South Africa Committee, rhetorically asking if the social democratic journal’s publications by “this Trotskyist phrasemonger” were “a sign of political ignorance”, concluding that “the Social Democratic Party’s support to PAIGC, FRELIMO and MPLA does in any case appear in a strange light”. By that time, the young Social Democratic MP Birgitta Dahl had already submitted a parliamentary motion in favour of MPLA and the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance had recommended official support to the movement. No markedly pro-UNITA articles were from then on published by the Social Democratic Party press.

From UNITA’s perspective, the relations with Sweden were according to the former Secretary General N’Zau Puna “good from 1966 until 1968”. Arriving in Dar es Salaam on their clandestine journey back to Angola in mid-1968, Savimbi and N’Zau Puna were, however, briefed by their “SWAPO friends [and] started [through them] to understand that there was a Swedish initiative to support MPLA”. As no official Swedish pronouncement by that time had been made in favour of MPLA, it is likely that their interpretation was influenced by the strong opinion in Sweden for MPLA’s allies in CONCP, that is, PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau and FRELIMO of Mozambique. Nevertheless, assisted by Sweden through IUEF and close to SWAPO, the UNITA leadership seems to

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1 Olle Wästberg: ‘Visst var jag i Angola’ (‘Of course I was in Angola’) in Expressen, 14 July 1970.
2 Thomas Laghe: ‘Luanda-uppproret en väckarklocka för angolersna’ (‘The Luanda revolt an alarm clock for the Angolans’) in Nerikes Allehanda, 3 June 1970.
5 Interview with Miguel N’Zau Puna, Luanda, 17 April 1996.
6 Ibid.
7 In the interview with N’Zau Puna, the former Secretary General talked about UNITA’s and SWAPO’s regional common culture and past; how SWAPO assisted UNITA with procurement of
have taken the information rather lightly, counting on diplomatic representation and support by the Namibians while establishing a base inside Angola. According to N’Zau Puna, this is also what initially happened after the entry into Angola and the subsequent breaking off of direct relations with the Swedish ruling party. In 1996, he stated that "we benefited from SWAPO’s good relations with Sweden", citing Andreas Shipanga, Emil Appolus and Peter Katjavivi as important SWAPO defenders of UNITA’s cause in both Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries. As a result of Cold War polarization—in particular after the January 1969 Soviet-sponsored solidarity conference with Southern Africa in Khartoum, which grouped SWAPO together with MPLA among the ‘authentic’ liberation movements—the essentially tactical SWAPO-UNITA alliance would, however, be downplayed by the Namibians in their international diplomacy. Not recognized by OAU and at the time mainly relying on Chinese support, UNITA was soon isolated inside Angola.

At the official level, no other Nordic country developed such close relations with MPLA as Sweden, both before and after Angola’s independence in November 1975. The relationship will be further discussed below. It could, in the meantime, be noted that the unique Swedish position vis-à-vis MPLA in the Western world in the eyes of both UNITA and FNLA was largely due to Olof Palme. In an interview in 1996, UNITA’s Valentim—stating that he knew Palme personally—argued that it was a consequence of Palme’s policy to counterbalance the influence of the United States. FNLA’s Roberto—himself close to the Americans—explained at the same time that the reason why the Swedish Social Democratic government in his view did not support FNLA was more ideological, the politics of Palme being “more to the left”. He added that Palme by exerting great personal influence also shut the doors for FNLA in the other Nordic countries.

With the closing of the parenthesis of favoured relations between UNITA and the Social Democratic Party, IUEF also shifted its support to MPLA in the early 1970s. The move occurred when the Soviet Union withdrew its non-military support to MPLA after the Kinshasa unity agreement between FNLA
and MPLA in December 1972. While continuing to keep FNLA at bay, IUEF
would as one of very few international organizations support MPLA at a time
when the movement was increasingly isolated. Interestingly, IUEF played a role
when Moscow resumed assistance to Agostinho Neto in late 1974, after the
April Lisbon coup and only a year before Angola’s independence. In 1995,
Vladimir Shubin—as Secretary for African Affairs of the Soviet Afro-Asian
Solidarity Committee advising the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union—underlined the part played by IUEF. According to Shubin,
the IUEF position was very good. They absolutely supported Neto, which was very
important [and] helped our people in Moscow to better understand the situation,
so credit must go to IUEF and to Lars-Gunnar Eriksson.1

The relations between UNITA and Sweden rapidly deteriorated after Angola’s
independence. Accusing the Swedish non-socialist government of ferrying
Cuban troops for military operations against UNITA, in October 1977 Jonas
Savimbi threatened to intervene by force against a Swedish-supported interna-
tional Red Cross/UNHCR humanitarian operation in favour of Zairean re-
fugees in eastern Angola.2 Ten years later—when a group of parliamentarians
from the Moderate Party actively backed an extreme right Swedish support
committee for UNITA3—Savimbi went from words to action, taking three Swe-
dish aid workers in Angola as hostages. One of them was killed. During the
negotiations to release the remaining two, Savimbi’s wrath was in particular
targeted at the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Pierre Schori,4 who
twenty years earlier had been involved with the UNITA project and had
welcomed the UNITA leader to Stockholm.

FNLA and the Liberal Party

Although recognized by OAU and initially gaining quite widespread inter-
national support, Holden Roberto’s FNLA never established itself as a serious
Angolan liberation movement in Sweden. Through the World Assembly of
Youth and its Swedish secretary general, the Liberal David Wirmark, the FNLA
youth did at the beginning of the 1960s enter into relations with member
organizations of the National Council of Swedish Youth, but the movement was
largely absent from the Swedish debate. Only rarely did the press mention
FNLA or its Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE). More

1 Conversation with Vladimir Shubin, Cape Town, 12 September 1995.
2 ‘UNITA attack: Sverige deltar i Angola-kriget’ (‘UNITA attack: Sweden participates in the
Angolan war’) in Göteborgs-Posten, 13 October 1977 and Anders Johansson: ‘Sabotagevakt på
hjälpplanet’ (‘Guard against sabotage on the aid plane’) in Dagens Nyheter, 14 October 1977.
3 The extreme right solidarity committee with UNITA was called the Swedish Angola Help (Svenska
Angola-Hjälpen), the same name that in 1961 was given to Expressen’s campaign in favour of MPLA.
4 See, for example, Bosse Schön: ‘Schori gjorde UNITA till Sveriges fiende’ (‘Schori turned UNITA
into Sweden’s enemy’) in Aftonbladet, 9 September 1987.
importantly, Holden Roberto and his organization were not embraced by the organized solidarity movement with Southern Africa¹ and no political party defended their cause. However, the situation radically changed from 1968 when the Liberal Party—according to Carl Tham, at that time a political adviser to the party leader Sven Wedén, largely as a "reflection of a more anti-Communist position within the party"²—started to campaign for FNLA.³

In contrast to both MPLA and UNITA—and, indeed, to the other major Southern African liberation movements—FNLA-GRAE had in its international diplomacy during the 1960s paid little attention to Sweden or the Nordic area in general. When Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson in December 1968 declared that the Swedish government was prepared to grant official humanitarian aid to the liberation movements, this was, nevertheless, positively noted by FNLA, which shortly thereafter decided to place a representative to the Scandinavian countries in Stockholm. As stated by FNLA,

the willingness expressed by the Swedish government to support African liberation movements in the accomplishment of their humanitarian projects has been a matter of interest. [...] The highest institutions of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola [have therefore] mandated its executive, the [Revolutionary] Government [of Angola in Exile], to plan for an adequate political strategy towards [the] Scandinavian people[s] and governments.⁴

The FNLA-GRAE representative to Scandinavia, Mateus João Neto,⁵ was introduced by Holden Roberto in late May 1969,⁶ but had, in fact, already arrived in

¹ The Uppsala South Africa Committee had in 1967 included FNLA-GRAE among ten Southern African liberation movements to which it donated smaller amounts of money. This was, however, a one-off affair.
² Interview with Carl Tham, Stockholm, 14 January 1997. "I guess that Olle [Wästberg] was the one who demanded assistance to FNLA and that the party supported him" (ibid.).
³ At its 1968 congress, the Liberal Party decided to draw up guidelines for support to "resistance movements".
⁴ RGAE (GRAE) Mission-Scandinavia No. 4/69: 'Press conference by the Secretary of the Ministry of Information, Henri Mutombo', Stockholm, 22 April 1969 (MFA). FNLA's comparatively tardy interest in Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries occurred at a time when the US government was withdrawing its assistance to the organization. According to Marcum, "Washington funnelled covert assistance to Holden Roberto as a fallback option in case of a Portuguese defeat. From 1962 until 1969, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) [...] provided Roberto with what was probably a modest supply of money and arms. [...] With the advent of the Nixon administration [...], the CIA 'deactivated' Roberto, though it left him on a 10,000 USD annual retainer for 'intelligence collection'. Roberto's well-known anticommunism notwithstanding, the Nixon administration placed all its bets on Portugal" (Marcum (1978) op. cit., p. 237).
⁵ Neto had before his arrival in Sweden studied at the College of Agriculture in Vienna, Austria. He was in 1972 appointed GRAE Minister of Information, Planning and Economics. Following the Alvor agreement between Portugal, FNLA, MPLA and UNITA, Neto became in January 1975 Minister of Agriculture in the Angolan transitional government, but left FNLA a couple of months later.
⁶ Letter of introduction by Holden Roberto, Kinshasa, 29 May 1969 (MFA). Several Swedish diplomatic representatives of the 'old school' were far from enthusiastic about the decision to grant official support to the Angolan liberation struggle. In addition, many of them gave proof of remarkable ignorance. The Swedish ambassador to Portugal, Gunnar Dryselius, wrote in November 1969 to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm that "MPLA is a Moscow-led Communist resistance movement whose leader Alejandro Neto has placed his relative Mateus João Neto in Stockholm" (Cable from Gunnar Dryselius to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, 24 November
Sweden in mid-1968 for studies at the Stockholm School of Economics.¹ He was quite active at the beginning of 1969, stating the case of FNLA to the Swedish press.² According to Roberto, Neto did not, however, “get any support whatsoever”³ and it was against that background decided to carry out a diplomatic offensive towards Sweden and Scandinavia. Henri Mutombo, Secretary of GRAE’s Ministry of Information, was sent to Sweden in April 1969, “forced to break his participation in [FNLA’s ongoing] special conference [...] to analyse and reply [to] the questions pending [...] about Scandinavia”.⁴ During his brief stay in Stockholm, Mutombo was officially received at the Ministries of Education and Foreign Affairs, as well as by Pierre Schori at the National Board of the ruling Social Democratic Party.⁵ He also held a press conference at the AFB building, claiming that FNLA “successfully [had] reconquered almost one fifth of [the Angolan territory]”.⁶

Shortly thereafter, the young Swedish journalist cum politician Olle Wästberg—at the time vice chairman of the Liberal Party Youth League⁷—and his wife Inger Claesson accompanied FNLA on a mission into the liberated areas in northern Angola. Wästberg’s accounts were published in four full-page articles in Expressen in November 1969⁸ and included in a book on Angola the following year.⁹ His impressions of FNLA ¹⁰ would for the first time seriously place Roberto’s movement in the Swedish Angola debate. They also introduced

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¹ Interview with Mateus João Neto by Tord Wallström (’En miljon angoleser i landsflykt i Kongo’/’One million Angolans in exile in Congo’) in Arbetaren, 17 January 1969.
² Ibid.
³ Interview with Holden Roberto, Luanda, 17 April 1996.
⁷ A younger brother of Per Wästberg, Olle Wästberg would on questions relating to Southern Africa defend quite different positions. While Per Wästberg placed himself on the side of the Southern African nationalists, his brother viewed the regional struggle from an East–West perspective and where Per Wästberg viewed developments from the South, Olle Wästberg saw them from the North. Holding various prominent positions in the Liberal Party, Olle Wästberg entered the Swedish parliament in 1976. He was Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Finance from 1991 to 1993 and chief editor of Expressen 1994–95.
⁸ See Olle Wästberg: ‘Portugiserna tvingade oss till svält och slavarbete’ (The Portuguese forced us into starvation and slavery) in Expressen, 1 November 1969 and following. Wästberg also published his accounts in English in Swedish Features in 1969.
⁹ Olle Wästberg: Angola, Bokförlaget PAN/Norstedts, Stockholm, 1970. At the time, Swedish organizations often set up study circles to further their knowledge of a particular subject. Wästberg’s Angola book contained a detailed ‘study plan’. Among the questions proposed for discussion were whether the Angolan nationalist movements should be treated equally and if and how Sweden should support them?
radically different views between, on the one hand, the solidarity movement and the ruling Social Democratic Party and, on the other, influential Liberal spokespersons on Southern Africa, such as David Wirmark and Wästberg himself. Forcefully arguing that Sweden “must not take a stand in favour of [...] one of the two popularly supported [Angolan] movements”, Wästberg would over the following years in debates with among others Dick Urban Vestbro of the Lund South Africa Committee and the British historian Basil Davidson maintain that official Swedish support should be given to both FNLA and MPLA. The exchange continued until Angola’s independence under Agostinho Neto’s MPLA in November 1975.

During his stay in Congo, Wästberg visited FNLA’s main military base at Kinkuzu, as well as the Nzilo camp in Katanga province, opened north of Kolwezzi in 1967. In addition, before embarking on his peripatetic adventure in northern Angola, Wästberg was taken on a tour of FNLA’s hospital at Franquetti outside the capital. He also met Holden Roberto at the FNLA-GRAE headquarters in central Kinshasa. His impressions from the infamous Kinkuzu base—where a number of leading MPLA members, including women, had been imprisoned and executed and which had been described as an “African Buchenwald”—were uncritically positive. Silent on the subject of FNLA’s abuses against captured MPLA members, Wästberg enquired about the situation of three Portuguese prisoners held at the base, being assured that “they are treated in a humane way”. His presentation of Holden Roberto—widely known for being both reckless and ostentatious—was equally sympathetic. Meeting the FNLA leader—“raised by the British mission [and] living extremely plainly; he does not smoke and is a teetotaller”—in “a small, unpretentious office room”, Wästberg said that he “gave an almost timid impression.”

1 The Liberal Party—and, more importantly, the wider Swedish liberal movement—was divided with regard to FNLA. See, for example, interview with Carl Tham, Stockholm, 14 January 1997 and interview with Anders Johansson, Eskilstuna, 19 November 1996.
2 Here, as an example, cited in Västerbottens-Kuriren, 17 July 1970. See also Olle Wästberg (1970) op. cit., p. 123.
5 See the exchange between Per Wästberg and David Wirmark in Dagens Nyheter, 21 February, 5 March and 11 March 1975.
6 In March 1967, for example, FNLA apprehended a group of twenty MPLA members returning to Zaire from northern Angola. Among them were five women, including Déolinda Rodrigues de Almeida, a leading member of the MPLA executive committee. She was taken to Kinkuzu, held prisoner and later executed. Marcum mentions that there were nearly a hundred MPLA prisoners at Kinkuzu at the beginning of 1968 (Marcum (1978) op. cit., p. 198).
7 See Marcum (1978) op. cit., p. 151.
8 Olle Wästberg (1970) op. cit., p. 87.
9 Ibid., p. 81. Present at the meeting was José Manuel Peterson, head of FNLA’s security services. In Wästberg’s brief words, Peterson was “Roberto’s closest man [...], baptized and raised by Swedish missionaries” (Ibid.). As Roberto’s personal aide, Peterson was, however, far from imbued by Christian ethics. He was directly responsible for FNLA’s record of human rights abuses. Marcum
On the whole, the young Swedish Liberal’s presentation supported the view that Roberto’s movement was the true nationalist Angolan organization, both through its military policy and its civic concerns. According to Wästberg, FNLA’s political “opinions are still undogmatic and [they do] not adhere to any established ideology. Central to the political programme is the unity of Angola. In his speeches, Holden Roberto has often emphasized that the mere struggle unites Angola. A people which conquers freedom through armed struggle will later not surrender to selfishness and tribalism”.¹ In addition, he found that “FNLA differs from all other liberation movements [...] in one way: [It] has established itself as a ‘government’ for the approximately 500,000 Angolan refugees in Congo, [which] gives FNLA a special—very practical—orientation”.²

Wästberg’s actual journey with FNLA into Angola was important. Few international observers had at the time accompanied any of the liberation movements into the country and his accounts were widely quoted.³ A Swiss journalist, Pierre-Pascal Rossi, had in July-September 1968 spent forty-six days with FNLA in northern Angola.⁴ Wästberg’s visit—undertaken in July-August 1969, that is, exactly one year later—largely confirmed Rossi’s reports. Claiming that he had walked almost 1,500 kilometres in thirty-nine days⁵—a remarkable achievement—Wästberg described the northern parts of Angola as “close to depopulated”⁶ following the 1961 insurrection, the Portuguese military campaign and the exodus across the border into Congo-Kinshasa. Together with his wife, he accompanied a group of more than a hundred FNLA guerrillas and, like Rossi, observed scores of liberation fighters on the way to a FNLA-controlled zone south of Bembe, some 250 kilometres north of the capital Luanda. Here, Wästberg visited FNLA’s military and administrative centre inside Angola. His reports supported Roberto’s claims that FNLA controlled larger areas. Thus, “right in the middle of the Portuguese colony” Wästberg experienced the liberated areas “as a self-governing country”, where FNLA had “established its own administration, with its own defence, hospitals, schools and its own church”.⁷

¹ Ibid., p. 107.
² Ibid., p. 121.
³ For example by Basil Davidson in his In the Eye of the Storm (p. 218).
⁵ Olle Wästberg in Expressen, 1 November 1969.
⁶ Ibid.
As FNLA and MPLA maintained that they controlled essentially the same areas in northern Angola, Wästberg’s accounts were called into question by influential MPLA advocates, a dimension which added asperity to the Swedish Angola debate. This increased when the visiting MPLA President Agostinho Neto during a press conference in July 1970 expressed the opinion that Wästberg had never been to Angola at all, but been only taken around the Lower Congo forests by FNLA. Neto’s statement was in turn strongly rejected by Holden Roberto, who described it as “pure propaganda” in a meeting with the Swedish ambassador to Kinshasa. The Swedish debate concerning FNLA and MPLA would thus reproduce the divergent opinions of the two movements

1 Davidson (1972) op. cit., p. 218.
2 Olle Wästberg: ‘Visst var jag i Angola’ (‘Of course I was in Angola’) in Expressen, 14 July 1970. According to Wästberg, “two guerrilla organizations [could] be active in the same region in Angola without entering into contact and both of them [could] be convinced that they [were] alone in the area” (Wästberg (1970) op. cit., p. 120).
3 Letter from Olof Bjurström to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Kinshasa [no date, but possibly July–August 1970], (MFA). Ten years later, Anders Ehnmark published a novel inspired by the debate around Wästberg’s visit. The satire is about a Swedish foreign correspondent who is sent by his newspaper to Angola to write about the liberation struggle. He never gets there, remaining with the Angolan ‘UNA movement’ in Congo, where the time is in turmoil. For the good of the cause, he decides to ignore this fact and proceeds to write about the liberation struggle as if he actually was experiencing it inside Angola, adjusting his observations to his wishes, the reality to the dream (Anders Ehnmark: Ögonvittnet (‘The Eyewitness’), Norstedts, 1980).
4 Olle Wästberg probably had better firsthand information about FNLA than any other Swede. Together with the Swedish journalist Gertrud Brundin—according to Holden Roberto particularly close to FNLA—he returned, for example, in April 1973 to the Kinkuzu base and to the Franquetti hospital. He also held privileged discussions with Roberto on the breakdown of the December 1972 unity agreement with MPLA (interview with Holden Roberto, Luanda, 17 April 1996 and letter ‘Samtal med Holden Roberto; uppgörelsen med MPLA’/Conversation with Holden Roberto; the agreement with MPLA) from Henrik Ramel to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Kinshasa, 18 April 1973 (MFA).
and to a large extent confuse the core issues of humanitarian needs and official assistance. A decision was eventually reached to assist only MPLA. This was not an easy resolution. SIDA’s former Director General Ernst Michanek explained in 1996:

We assessed the situation in Angola very carefully and had all kinds of connections to find out whom we should support. We had sympathies with the final objective of both MPLA and FNLA, but as they were fighting each other we had to discuss whether to support both movements or only one of them. Together, at the table, we came to the conclusion that the arguments in favour of MPLA were much stronger than the arguments for the FNLA. There were counter-arguments against FNLA. We had to take a hard political decision.1

That FNLA in 1970 had gained an important constituency in Sweden was apparent when Per Ahlmark and Ola Ullsten from the Liberal Party in January submitted a parliamentary motion in favour of official Swedish assistance to both FNLA and MPLA.2 At about the same time, the Liberal Party Youth League donated 5,000 SEK to each of the two organizations.3 Nevertheless, despite his friendship with influential Swedish opinion makers, such as David Wirmark and Olle Wästberg, the President of FNLA had yet to find a reason to visit Sweden. It was only at the end of November 1971 that Holden Roberto eventually came to Stockholm, being the last—and perhaps the least interested—of the historical Southern African leaders to present his case to the Swedish government and people.4

Roberto’s visit was not organized by the Liberal Party or any other leading political organization, but by the Stockholm University Students’ Union.5 It took place, furthermore, almost two years after the Swedish government had decided to grant humanitarian assistance to MPLA, shortly after a meeting between Olof Palme and Agostinho Neto in Lusaka6 and at the same time as the MPLA veteran Lúcio Lara was visiting Sweden.7 It is against this background not surprising that the visit was far from a success. The Africa Groups—the recently reorganized Swedish solidarity movement with Southern Africa—“condemned the invitation of Holden Roberto”, arguing that it could “only mislead the Swedish public and weaken the support for the real liberation struggle [waged] in Angola [by] MPLA, which [...] has liberated a third of [...]”

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1 Interview with Ernst Michanek, Stockholm, 19 March 1996.
4 The first of the exiled Southern African leaders to visit Sweden was ANC’s Oliver Tambo in April 1961. Before Roberto, Agostinho Neto of MPLA was the last. He went there in July 1970.
5 Letter of information by Johan Hjertqvist and Charlotte Sellberg, Stockholms Universitets Studentkår (The Stockholm University Students’ Union), Stockholm, 18 November 1971 (MFA).
6 Palme and Neto met in Lusaka during the Prime Minister’s visit to Zambia in September 1971.
7 Coming from Denmark, Lara visited Sweden to discuss the proposed Dolisie school project with SIDA.
the territory”.1 Boycotting Roberto’s appearance at the Stockholm university, the Africa Groups distributed a highly critical information sheet entitled ‘Facts about Holden Roberto’s ‘Liberation Movement’”;2 called on its supporters to contribute to a fund-raising campaign in favour of MPLA and invited the public to attend an alternative meeting with Lúcio Lara on ‘Colonialism and Neocolonialism in Africa’.3

During the visit, Roberto was received at both SIDA and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.4 Presenting his case for Swedish assistance, he had, however, to leave empty-handed. No official commitment in favour of FNLA was made.5 Twenty-five years later, the still embittered FNLA President recalled how he encountered “great difficulties” in trying to contact the Swedish government and how he—when he eventually succeeded—was met by “aggressiveness”, “real opposition” and “total rejection” at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, where the officials were “deeply committed to MPLA”.6 The experience notwithstanding, Roberto returned to Sweden in November 1972. This time he was invited by the Liberal Party, leading a big delegation to its congress in Gothenburg. According to the FNLA leader, it was “an important occasion for us and we increased our contacts”.7 The members of the influential Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance remained, however, as little impressed as before. In an interview in February 1996, Per Wästberg—the brother of Olle Wästberg—said that

everybody who had met Holden Roberto and other representatives of FNLA—often dressed in smart suits—could not trust them a bit. Even if Roberto tried to seduce the Liberals and also managed to some extent. I have met him a few times. I immediately thought that this was a person that you should not have any deep relations with, regardless of ideology. He was a tribal man, I would say.8

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2 According to the information sheet, FNLA was mainly active in exile. It was not a national liberation movement, but a Bakongo-based tribalistic organization, supported by US economic interests with links to the CIA. Roberto’s movement was further described as racist, fomenting non-political mystical and religious beliefs (Ibid.).
3 Ibid.
4 At the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Roberto met Lennart Klackenberg, head of the Department for International Development Cooperation. On his return to Kinshasa, Roberto wrote to Klackenberg, thanking him for the “fraternal discussions which permitted us to realize your unconditional support to our just cause”, adding that “we will spare no efforts, so that the confidence and interest you have vested upon us be justified” (letter from Holden Roberto to Lennart Klackenberg, Kinshasa, 6 January 1972) (MFA).
5 Cable from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Swedish embassy in Kinshasa, 10 March 1972 (MFA).
6 Interview with Holden Roberto, Luanda, 17 April 1996.
7 Ibid.
8 Interview with Per Wästberg, Stockholm, 28 February 1996.
Switzerland at the United Nations and the Solidarity Movement

For a long time Switzerland played a passive role regarding Portugal and the Portuguese-held territories in Africa. Although supporting the principle of self-determination, from 1964 the government regularly abstained from voting on the relevant UN General Assembly resolutions as they “included paragraphs calling for the application of sanctions against Portugal”, 1 a question which in the Swiss principled view only the Security Council was mandated to resolve. Nevertheless, as closer contacts were established with the nationalist movements in Angola and Mozambique, the Swiss government would from the mid-1960s more forcefully denounce Portugal and its African wars. The issues in Southern Africa were at the same time increasingly seen as interwoven. Addressing the “two dark menacing clouds [that] dominate the political horizon, the war in Vietnam and the situation in Southern Africa”, 2 Foreign Minister Nilsson criticized, for example, the ‘unholy alliance’ between Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa 3 during the UN General Assembly debate in October 1966. “We are”, he said,

confronted with a set of interrelated problems [...] in [the] entire [Southern African] area. If the illegal Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia had not been able to count on [...] understanding and sympathy from the white minority in South Africa, it probably would not have dared to openly break with the British government. If Portugal had not had friends in Pretoria, the possibilities might have been greater to convince the Lisbon government that its colonial policy belongs to a bygone era. [And] if the South African government had not been so blind in [its] racial policy, the problem of South West Africa would not have reached such a tragic and critical stage. 4

The criticism was sharpened the following year. Pointing out that Portugal’s military budget had grown by 220% between 1961 and 1967, the Swiss delegate, Brita Skottsberg-Åhman, severely censured Portugal at the United

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3 The close historical ties between Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa centred on Mozambique, which for South Africa served as a reservoir of unskilled labour and a convenient gateway through the port of Lourenço Marques. The Beira harbour and rail facilities were similarly vital to landlocked Rhodesia’s overseas trade. Against the threat of international sanctions, the economic, political and military cooperation between the three countries increased sharply in the mid-1960s. In 1964, Portugal and South Africa concluded a number of agreements, inter alia covering a hydroelectric project on the Cunene river between Angola and Namibia and the use by South Africa of the pipeline from the Mozambican port of Beira to the Rhodesian refinery at Umtali. After UDI and the subsequent oil embargo against the Smith regime, the UN Security Council called on Portugal not to allow the use of the Beira facilities for oil deliveries to Rhodesia. However, Portugal refused, arguing that the resolution denied the principle of free access to the sea by landlocked countries.
Nations for trying “to transform the Africans [...] into Portuguese [...] through the force of arms”. “Why”, she asked,

should the inhabitants of [...] Angola and Mozambique become Portuguese? No other colonial power has made it a requirement that the peoples in their territories should be able to read and write in the language of their foreign rulers before being allowed to vote in their own country, as the laws in the Portuguese colonies prescribe. Neither has any other colonial power demanded that the Africans should give up their own way of life and [...] culture to be turned into images of their colonial masters.¹

Nevertheless, it was not until 1968 that Sweden voted in favour of the regular UN General Assembly resolution on Portugal and the Portuguese colonies. The change was due to an initiative by the Afro-Asian countries, who after consultations with the Nordic governments sponsored a text “free from [...] controversial elements such as the sanctions paragraph”.² The resolution—adopted on 29 November 1968—had far-reaching consequences for Sweden’s policies towards Southern Africa. Appealing to all member states “to grant the peoples of the territories under Portuguese domination the moral and material assistance necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights”,³ it paved the way for Foreign Minister Nilsson’s statement on 9 December 1968 that the Swedish government was prepared to extend humanitarian support to the liberation movements. In addition, by “[deploring] the activities of the financial interests operating in the territories under Portuguese domination”—said to “obstruct the struggle [...] for self-determination, freedom and independence and [to] strengthen the military efforts of Portugal”⁴—the resolution supported those who opposed a Swedish economic involvement there. This was particularly relevant in connection with the ongoing debate concerning the Swedish company ASEA and its bid for the construction of the Cabora Bassa power plant in Mozambique. The first extra-parliamentary actions against ASEA and the Cabora Bassa project had taken place in Gothenburg only a week before the adoption of the UN resolution.⁵

The issue of Cabora Bassa played a major role for the reactivation and radicalization of the Swedish solidarity movement, not only with Mozambique, but also with Guinea-Bissau and Angola. It will be discussed below. In the

¹ Ministry for Foreign Affairs (1970) op. cit., p. 78.
³ United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2395 (XXIII) of 29 November 1968, cited in Yearbook of the United Nations: 1968, Office of Public Information, New York, p. 803. In addition, the resolution “deplor[ed] the aid which the government of Portugal continues to receive from its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”. It should be noted that the NATO members Denmark and Norway also voted for the resolution. It was adopted by 85 votes (including Sweden and the other Nordic countries) against 3 (Brazil, Portugal and South Africa), with 15 abstentions (inter alia France, Italy, Malawi, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States).
⁴ Ibid., p. 804.
⁵ Göteborgs-Tidningen, 23 November 1968 and below.
meantime, it should be noted that the reorganization of the few surviving South Africa Committees—which started in Lund and Uppsala in 1970—and soon led to the formation of similar "anti-imperialist working groups," called Africa Groups, in Arvika and Stockholm—was largely influenced by MPLA’s struggle. Several initiatives contributed to this development.

As noted above, the *Syd- och Sydvästafrika* bulletin—from 1967 *Södra Afrika Informationsbulletin*—dedicated in the mid-1960s various articles to Angola and MPLA, and at the end of 1967 the Greater Stockholm branch of the Left Party Youth League set up a Working Group for the Liberation Movements in Africa, supporting MPLA. In 1969, the socialist weekly *Tidsignal*—close to the Left Party—also published several articles on Angola and MPLA, such as a long interview with Beto Traça, the movement’s representative to Algeria, who visited Stockholm in mid-1969. In addition, the independent socialist monthly *Komentar*, launched in 1968, formed about the same time a study group on Africa which focused on the struggles in the Portuguese territories. In 1969, for example, *Komentar* published an article on the strategic alliance between Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa by the young journalist Jan Guillou, later one of Sweden’s most popular writers. An Angola-MPLA Group was formed in Stockholm the same year. Besides fund-raising activities for Agostinho Neto’s movement, it issued information and publications on and by MPLA.

Critically examining the positions of FNLA, MPLA and UNITA, the Stockholm-based Angola-MPLA Group published at the beginning of 1970 a document on ‘The so-called Problem of the Unification of the Nationalists in Angola’. At a time when the Liberal Party forcefully advocated the case of

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1 Meeting in Uppsala, the South Africa Committees of Lund and Uppsala decided in June 1970 to widen their horizon to the whole of Africa and to change their names to the Africa Groups of Lund and Uppsala, respectively. Joint responsibility for the *Södra Afrika Informationsbulletin* was established at the same time (*Södra Afrika Informationsbulletin*, No. 9, 1970, p. 2).

2 ‘Protokoll från konferens mellan Afrikagrupperna i Sverige’ (Minutes from conference between the Africa Groups in Sweden), Stockholm, 2–3 January 1971 (AGA).


5 Acknowledged as a prominent writer of politically oriented novels, it is little known that Guillou made his literary debut with a story about Southern Africa. As early as 1971 he published *Om Kriget Kommer* (‘If the War Comes’) (PAN/Norstedts, Stockholm), a novel in which the Swedish air force through SIDA’s presence in Botswana covertly transfers forces to Southern Africa to deploy them in a blitz war against apartheid South Africa.

6 Angola-MPLA Gruppen.


FNLA and the ruling Social Democratic Party still showed some hesitancy towards MPLA, it initiated an important debate on the character and objectives of the three Angolan movements. The discussion was later in the year continued by the four Africa Groups then existing through an analysis published in the Södra Afrika bulletin under the title ‘Who Leads the Struggle in Angola?’.

Establishing that “three of the Angolan organizations have shown the strength—or have had propaganda intensive enough—to become known far outside Africa, [namely] MPLA, FNLA and UNITA”, the Africa Groups noted that their “respective points of view through contacts with different Swedish groups have been introduced to the Swedish public”. Against this background, the Africa Groups felt “a duty to take a stand: We [...] have earlier not committed ourselves to supporting any particular organization in Angola [...], [but] it has eventually become indefensible to try to adopt some sort of ‘neutral’ position”.

Analyzing the three Angolan movements from the points of view of their respective ideology and programme, their capacity to mobilize the people and their political practice in the liberated areas, the article concluded that “all signs indicate that [...] MPLA is the Angolan movement which patiently is mobilizing the masses and already has laid the basis for the people’s protracted war for the liberation of Angola”. Against this background, the four Africa Groups resolved that “MPLA is the only movement in Angola that [...] deserves our support”, adding that they felt “a duty to reject the propaganda which the representatives of FNLA and UNITA, as well as their Swedish supporters, disseminate in different newspapers in Sweden”.

By November 1970—that is, after Agostinho Neto had been invited to Sweden by the Social Democratic Party—the solidarity movement had decided to defend the cause of MPLA. It was an important decision. The situation in Angola was far more complicated than in Guinea-Bissau or Mozambique, where PAIGC and FRELIMO, respectively, were the undisputed liberation movements and the involvement by external forces less pronounced. The active advocacy by the Africa Groups in MPLA’s favour during the first half of the 1970s contributed to the fact that Swedish official assistance never was extended to FNLA or UNITA, but only to MPLA. In an internal discussion

1 Arvika, Lund, Stockholm and Uppsala.
3 Ibid., p. 19.
4 Ibid., p. 32. Written after the assassination of the FRELIMO President Eduardo Mondlane, the article stated that it was easier to arrive at a standpoint in the case of Angola than in the case of Mozambique, where, however, the solidarity movement “in spite of certain factors to which we have been doubtful” already had concluded that “no other movement than FRELIMO deserves to be supported” (Ibid., p. 19). Holden Roberto was dismissed as “a tribal leader in exile” and UNITA as “a good friend of the CIA” (Ibid., pp. 21 and 29).
5 Ibid., p. 29.
6 In mid-1975, i.e. after the coup in Lisbon and at a time when both FNLA and UNITA resurfaced on the scene, the Africa Groups again distributed a presentation of the three Angolan movements, För ett Fritt Angola: En Analys av MPLA, FNLA och UNITA (‘For a Free Angola: An Analysis of MPLA, FNLA and UNITA’), Afrikagruppernas Skriftserie, No. 4, Stockholm, August 1975.
paper on the history of the Africa Groups, Sören Lindh, one of the leading members, argued in 1982 that “the most important contribution during the initial stages [from 1970 until 1974] was probably the political analysis of the situation in Angola and the support for MPLA.”

Official Support to MPLA

While the first parliamentary motions in favour of Swedish assistance to ANC of South Africa, SWAPO of Namibia and ZANU and ZAPU of Zimbabwe were submitted by the non-socialist Liberal and Centre parties, it was the Left Party Communists that introduced a similar recommendation in the case of the nationalist organizations in the Portuguese territories. Although the Social Democratic Party was soon identified with official Sweden’s support to the Southern African liberation movements, it is, thus, worthy of note that the ruling party did not take the parliamentary initiative vis-à-vis any of the movements discussed in this study.

In January 1967—more than two years before the endorsement of the very principle—the future party leader Lars Werner and other members of what was still called the Communist Party of Sweden submitted a motion in favour of FRELIMO of Mozambique. It was not supported by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs. Together with C.H. Hermansson, the chairman of the renamed Left Party Communists (LPC), Werner again introduced a motion in January 1968, this time in support of “the liberation movement in the Portuguese colonies via CONCP”, that is, the alliance of FRELIMO, MPLA and PAIGC. This initiative was also rejected by the parliamentary majority.

In January 1969, Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson had already made his groundbreaking statement in favour of government support to the liberation movements, with the result that not only the Left Party Communists, but also the Liberal and the ruling Social Democratic parties, submitted parliamentary

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2 Werner led the Left Party Communists/Left Party from 1975 until 1993.

3 Swedish Parliament 1967: Motion No. 466 in the First Chamber (Werner) and Motion No. 590 in the Second Chamber (Hector and others), Riksdagens Protokoll, 1967, pp. 1 and 1–2.


5 Swedish Parliament 1968: Motion No. 507 in the First Chamber (Werner) and Motion No. 633 in the Second Chamber (Hermansson and others), Riksdagers Protokoll, 1968, pp. 12 and 1–3.

6 The motion discussed the situation in Guinea-Bissau and did not mention Angola or MPLA. Asked in 1996 why the party advocated support to the CONCP alliance and not directly to the member movements, C.H. Hermansson stated that “we probably thought that it was more neutral to support the CONCP coordinating body and not get involved with the individual movements” (interview with C.H. Hermansson, Stockholm, 22 November 1996).
motions to this effect. In the case of the Liberal Party, it was in favour of official humanitarian assistance to the exiled population from Guinea-Bissau under the care of PAIGC, while the Social Democratic motion—among others signed by the future Minister of International Development Cooperation and Foreign Affairs, Lena Hjelm-Wallén—advocated a financially modest support of 100,000 SEK to PAIGC’s civilian activities in the liberated areas of the country. The motions submitted by the Left Party were wider in scope and more substantial. For the first time explicitly mentioning MPLA in a Swedish parliamentary motion, Hermansson and Werner proposed an allocation of ten million SEK to PAIGC and an equal amount to “FRELIMO and other liberation movements, to be distributed through CONCP”. During the financial year 1969/70, it was, however, only PAIGC of the CONCP members that would receive official assistance, amounting to one million SEK.

The Left Party Communists repeated the submissions the following year. In 1970, Per Ahlmark and Ola Ullsten of the Liberal Party also demanded a generally “increased support to [African] resistance movements”, in the case of Angola mentioning both FNLA and MPLA. Finally, in January 1971—after Agostinho Neto’s visit to Sweden the year before—Angola and MPLA were both covered in parliamentary motions by the Left Party Communists and the Social Democratic Party. The motion introduced by C.H. Hermansson proposed an equal amount of ten million SEK to FRELIMO, MPLA and PAIGC, while Birgitta Dahl, Mats Hellström, Lena Hjelm-Wallén and other Social Democrats on behalf of the ruling party for the first time presented a particular motion explicitly requesting assistance to MPLA.

The decision to eventually extend support only to MPLA was to a large extent influenced by the way in which the three Angolan movements presented

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3 The paragraph about Angola was very brief and the presentation of MPLA far from convincing. Hermansson and Werner merely stated that “an armed liberation struggle is also being waged in Angola” and that “the best known of the liberation movements is MPLA”.
4 Swedish Parliament 1969: Motion No. 404 in the First Chamber (Werner) and Motion No. 465 in the Second Chamber (Hermansson and others), Riksdagens Protokoll, 1969, pp. 10 and 4–6.
5 Swedish Parliament 1970: Motion No. 452 in the First Chamber (Werner) and Motion No. 500 in the Second Chamber (Hermansson and others), Riksdagens Protokoll, 1970, pp. 1 and 4.
6 Swedish Parliament 1970: Motion No. 624 in the Second Chamber, Riksdagens Protokoll, 1970, pp. 6–9. No parliamentary motion was in the early 1970s submitted by any party in favour of UNITA. However, ten years after Angola’s independence the Moderate member Birger Hagård requested in January 1985 “humanitarian assistance to [...] the areas controlled by the liberation movement UNITA” (Swedish Parliament 1984/85: Motion No. 844, Riksdagens Protokoll, 1985, pp. 1–7).
8 Swedish Parliament 1971: Motion No. 667, Riksdagens Protokoll, 1971, pp. 15–17. The Social Democratic motion did not propose a specific amount, but official assistance in the form of goods, educational and medical equipment, as well as vehicles to MPLA. This was thus in line with the requests submitted by Chipenda and Neto in 1970.
themselves and their humanitarian requirements. While FNLA submitted requests that were found both “sketchy [and] weakly anchored in reality” by the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance,¹ UNITA never submitted any formal request at all.² In contrast, MPLA drew up detailed lists of its needs, which, furthermore, were presented and explained to the Swedish government directly by the movement’s leadership. The first request envisaged support to MPLA’s educational and medical programmes, mainly in the eastern parts of Angola.³ It was introduced by Daniel Chipenda, at the time a member of MPLA’s Steering Committee and responsible for logistics. He visited Stockholm in May 1970 together with the future MPLA representative to Sweden, António Alberto Neto.⁴ Chipenda was received at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,³ becoming the first MPLA leader to hold direct talks with Swedish government officials.⁶

The request was further discussed with the MPLA President Agostinho Neto in Stockholm two months later. Neto had been invited to Sweden by the Social Democratic Party⁷ immediately after the important International Conference of Support to the Peoples of the Portuguese Colonies, held in Rome in late June 1970.⁸ Pierre Schori attended the conference on behalf of the Swedish ruling

² Other Angolan organizations contacted the Swedish government with requests for support. This was, for example, the case with the largely unknown Parti Social-Démocrate de l’Angola, based in Kinshasa, which in December 1968 approached SIDA (letter to SIDA from the PSDA President Maurice Luvualu, Kinshasa, 12 December 1968) (SDA). In late 1971, the Bakongo-based organization UPRONA (União Progressista Nacional de Angola) also applied for official Swedish assistance (CCHA: ‘Protokoll’ /’Minutes’, Stockholm, 27 December 1971) (SDA).
³ Letter from Danel Chipenda to Ethel Ringborg, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 29 May 1970 (MFA).
⁴ Based in Sweden, A.A. Neto served as MPLA’s representative to Scandinavia from September 1970 until May 1973, when he was separated from the movement. The circular letter of notification to that effect by MPLA’s Department of External Relations could illustrate the importance attached by MPLA to the Nordic countries. It stated that “António Alberto Neto is no more [a] militant of our movement [and] therefore no more [the] MPLA representative in [the] Scandinavian countries, namely Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Netherlands, England and others” (Circular letter by Pascal Luvualu, Responsible of the MPLA Department of External Relations, Dar es Salaam, 20 May 1973) (SDA) Neto, who like practically all the representatives of the various Southern African liberation movements to Sweden was also a student, proceeded to pass his doctoral examination in political science at the University of Grenoble, France, in 1974. He resurfaced on the Angolan political scene as the leader of the Democratic Party of Angola (Partido Democrático Angolano) (PDA) before the presidential and parliamentary elections in September 1992.
⁶ Chipenda also met the Africa group of Kommentar, where Hillevi Nilsson was active. This marked the beginning of her involvement with MPLA (interview with Hillevi Nilsson, Stockholm, 4 February 1997).
⁸ Some 400 delegates from around 60 countries attended the Rome conference, organized by an Italian committee in cooperation with CONCP. It was in connection with this conference that Agostinho Neto of MPLA, Amílcar Cabral of PAIGC and Marcelino dos Santos of FRELIMO to the dismay of the Portuguese government were received by the Pope.
Besides political discussions with the Social Democratic Party and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Neto and his delegation had a longer meeting at SIDA, where the original submission for educational and medical assistance was supplemented by a request in the field of transport. Due to the Mobutu government’s opposition, MPLA had to transport its supplies from the port of Dar es Salaam via the 2,000 kilometre long road to Lusaka and from there another 1,000 kilometres under extremely difficult conditions through western Zambia to the front in eastern Angola. Against this background, the MPLA President wished to include both heavy-duty trucks and inflatable rubber boats in the proposed assistance from the Swedish government. The military transports, Neto assured SIDA, were organized and controlled by the Tanzanian and Zambian authorities. There was thus “no risk that transport means possibly donated by Sweden would be used for military purposes”.

MPLA’s request was discussed by the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance (CCHA) together with submissions from FNLA in November 1970. Although SIDA had recommended an allocation of 300,000 SEK to MPLA for educational and medical support, the committee, however, decided to “postpone [the question and] await a study into the possibilities of channelling [the] assistance through the Red Cross”. FNLA’s submissions were at the same time “not found sufficiently substantiated [for] a positive stand”. Considering possible Swedish humanitarian support to the two major competing Angolan liberation movements—both with important supportive constituencies in Sweden—CCHA entered into a “general discussion about the [...] organizations [regarding] how representative and effective they were”. According to a letter from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Swedish ambassador in Kinshasa, the discussion centred on the question whether Sweden

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1 See interview with Pierre Schori, Stockholm, 28 June 1996. In addition to Schori, who was in charge of international questions at the National Board of the Social Democratic Party, the conference was inter alia attended by Karin Jonsson from the Social Democratic Youth League and by Anu-Mai Köll and Per-Olof Österholm from Kommentar. The latter published a report from the conference, as well as interviews with Agostinho Neto and Marcelino dos Santos (Kommentar No. 7, 1970, pp. 32–34 and No. 8, 1970, pp. 22–27, respectively).

2 The Social Democratic Party was in 1970 particularly active towards the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies. The PAIGC leader Amílcar Cabral was invited to Sweden in June, the MPLA President Agostinho Neto in July and Anselmo Anaiva and Joaquim Chissano of FRELIMO in November 1970.

3 Neto was accompanied by António Alberto Neto and Rui de Sá, the latter MPLA representative to Egypt.


6 Letter (’Bistånd till befrielserörelser’/’Assistance to liberation movements’) from Marc Giron, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to the Swedish ambassador in Kinshasa, Olof Bjurström, Stockholm, 12 November 1970 (MFA).

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.
should support one, but not the other. [...] The outcome of the discussion was that MPLA was considered sufficiently well established to be eligible as a recipient of Swedish support. [...] Several of the committee members were very doubtful whether it was appropriate to grant official Swedish support to FNLA. Does the movement have a position which deserves support? Are the Angolans not assisted in a better way through the concentration of the support to only one liberation organization, naturally in combination with continued scholarships to Angolan refugees in Congo?1

The letter also pointed out that the committee members “were in agreement that when a decision [eventually] had to be taken, it would result in an opinion storm.” It was against this background important to “find the most substantiated arguments possible”.2

Nevertheless, only four months later the committee recommended an allocation of 500,000 SEK for educational and medical supplies—vehicles were later included—directly to MPLA via SIDA during the financial year 1971/72.3 The recommendation was endorsed by the government. In the absence of minutes from CCHA’s proceedings,4 it cannot be conclusively established what caused

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1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
4 Over the years, the minutes from the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance only recorded decisions reached, not the discussions held.
the change of mind between November 1970 and March 1971.\footnote{The proposed study into the alternative of channelling assistance to MPLA via the Red Cross was never implemented.} It would, however, appear that the position by the highly popular and influential Secretary General of PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau, Amílcar Cabral, played a significant role.

Amílcar Cabral, Sweden and MPLA

PAIGC was the first African liberation movement to receive direct official Swedish assistance. This was largely due to the skilful efforts by Cabral himself, later described by Pierre Schori as “a master of diplomacy […], a formidable person and a great international figure”.\footnote{Interview with Pierre Schori, Stockholm, 28 June 1996. Olof Palme and Amílcar Cabral became particularly close. After the assassination of Cabral in January 1973, the Prime Minister stated in the Swedish parliament: “I had a number of talks with Cabral over the years. He was an extremely impressive person. What was most remarkable about him was that he—in the midst of the struggle for national liberation—was giving constant thought to the work of peaceful reconstruction which would have to come after liberation and which had already begun in the liberated areas. […] He was interested in Sweden, not because of our technological solutions—for his country is still very poor—but because he wanted to study the ideas which have guided us when we have been building up our peaceful social structure” (‘Extract from the opening speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. Palme, in the general political debate in the Riksdag’, 31 January 1973, in Ministry for Foreign Affairs: Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy: 1973, Stockholm, 1976, pp. 19–20).} The liberation struggle in Guinea-Bissau attracted considerable interest in Sweden from the end of the 1960s. A number of Swedes were received by Cabral at PAIGC’s headquarters in Conakry and some of them also visited the liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau. PAIGC was not only a founder member of the CONCP alliance with MPLA, but Cabral had as a student in Portugal in the early 1950s been closely involved with the future MPLA leaders Mário de Andrade and Agostinho Neto. As an agricultural consultant in Angola, he had, in addition, participated in the process leading to the formation of MPLA in 1956.\footnote{Patrick Chabal: *Amílcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People’s War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, pp. 29–53.} It was thus logical that Cabral and the PAIGC leadership conveyed a positive image of MPLA to their visitors.\footnote{This would, of course, also be the case during Cabral’s various visits to Sweden from the end of 1968. Eduardo Mondlane, the President of FRELIMO, similarly advocated support to his Angolan comrades-in-arms in MPLA.}

One of the first Swedes to visit Guinea-Bissau was the writer Göran Palm, who together with Bertil Malmström from the Uppsala South Africa Committee spent three weeks in October-November 1969 with PAIGC in the liberated areas.\footnote{Rolf Gustavsson of the Lund South Africa Committee—later a well-known Africanist and reporter with Swedish television—visited the liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau at the end of 1968. Accounts by Gustavsson and Palm were published in *Södra Afrika Informationsbulletin*, No. 7, 1970, pp. 9–13 and 37–41.} The Swedish government had at that time already decided to grant
assistance to PAIGC. To increase its knowledge about the little known Portuguese colony, SIDA asked Palm to write a report from his visit, particularly with regard to PAIGC’s humanitarian needs. According to Palm’s report, Amílcar Cabral

particularly emphasized [...] that most important is that Sweden [...] widens the valuable assistance already extended to FRELIMO of Mozambique and PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau and also includes MPLA of Angola: ‘Angola is after all the most important front in our common struggle. The greatest natural resources and the most attractive investment objects for big international capital are found in Angola. If the liberation struggle in Angola is brought to a halt, the Portuguese will [continue to] cling to Africa, even if both FRELIMO and PAIGC are victorious’. [...] But why should Swedish assistance to Angola be granted [...] to MPLA? Are there [...] not other liberation movements equally worthy of support? Not only Cabral, but several other PAIGC leaders replied to this question [and] no disagreement whatsoever could be noted among the respondents: ‘Where would the assistance otherwise go? To us—as to FRELIMO—it has from the outset been clear that MPLA is the only liberation movement in Angola that really can claim to represent the Angolan people. [...] We do not believe that a progressive nation [such as Sweden] needs to hesitate any longer. It is also urgent. The struggle in Angola is tremendously important and MPLA needs all the support it can get. Besides, does it not carry weight that both we [in PAIGC] and FRELIMO—that already are assisted by Sweden—cooperate with MPLA?’.

Palm’s report was nevertheless contradicted by Olle Wästberg’s direct—and widely disseminated—accounts from his travels with FNLA in northern Angola in July-August 1969. There thus appeared two clearly identifiable camps, defending either FNLA or MPLA. The stalemate was illustrated in November 1970 by the non-decision by the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance. As noted, it was, however, in March 1971 finally broken in favour of MPLA. The decision was taken after a visit to Guinea-Bissau by the Social Democratic MP Birgitta Dahl. With an active past in the Social Democratic Laboremus association in Uppsala, attached to the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies and at the time an official with SIDA who had met Agostinho Neto in Stockholm

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1 Palm wrote in his report that “the first [...] supplies from Sweden had not yet arrived when we left Guinea-Bissau, but the very decision provoked great enthusiasm within PAIGC and probably contributed to [the fact] that we were received as princes everywhere. [...] Like FNL in Vietnam, PAIGC wants to avoid one-sided dependency on the East European states. Assistance from a West European country seems [...], for example, more welcome than a substantial increase in the Russian support. When such assistance comes from the [...] rather unknown, but nevertheless tremendously admired country of Sweden, the joy knows no limits. PAIGC hopes [...] that the contacts with Sweden will also open the doors to other West European states” (Göran Palm: ‘Rapport från Guinea-Bissau’/’Report from Guinea-Bissau’ [no place or date]) (SDA).

2 Ibid.

3 Dahl was actively involved in international questions. In the early 1970s, she served, for example, as auditor of the Uppsala Africa Group’s fund-raising campaign in favour of PAIGC and was in 1972 appointed chairperson of the Swedish Committee for Vietnam (Svenska Kommittén för Vietnam). After serving as Minister of Energy (1982–90) and of the Environment (1986–91), in 1994 Dahl became Speaker of the Swedish parliament.
in July 1970, Dahl held in addition to her parliamentary seat a more central position than Palm to convey PAIGC’s opinions.

Together with the journalist and photographer Knut Andreassen,1 Dahl visited the PAIGC-held areas of Guinea-Bissau in November-December 1970.2 Granted leave of absence from SIDA, she was—as earlier Göran Palm—asked to write a report from her visit.3 It was submitted in January 1971 4 and confirmed


2 According to Dahl, it was ANC of South Africa that initially brought her into contact with PAIGC. Together with her future Social Democratic cabinet colleague Anna-Greta Leijon, she had already met ANC’s Oliver Tambo in Uppsala at the time of the 1962 Afro-Scandinavian Youth Congress in Oslo (conversation with Birgitta Dahl, Uppsala, 14 April 1998).


Palm’s relating of Cabral’s and PAIGC’s views on Angola. According to Dahl, the PAIGC Secretary General emphasized that if

Swedish assistance would be granted to the liberation struggle in Angola, it should go to MPLA. I know both Holden Roberto and Agostinho Neto well. Roberto has never lived a real African life among the people. [...] He is now sitting in a hotel in Congo, negotiating with all and sundry. He has received more support and more money than any African [liberation leader] and yet achieved so little. Neto [...] has lived for Africa and the liberation movement all his life. He lives among the people and knows its conditions. MPLA has had difficulties and made mistakes. [The movement] has obtained little external support and has been opposed by Congo-[Kinshasa]. Still, it has gone considerably further [than FNLA]. They are serious and have [both] the correct objectives and the right working methods. If anyone should be supported, it is MPLA.¹

The final considerations by the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance in favour of exclusive support to MPLA can, as stated, not be conclusively established. Nevertheless, Dahl’s report did play an important part. Referring to the report, Anders Möllander—who at the time served as assistant secretary to the committee—later wrote “that we got clear indications from the PAIGC and FRELIMO leaders that it was MPLA that should receive Swedish assistance”.² Viewing the relations in a broader historical perspective, Pierre Schori said in 1996 that “in a way you could say that Amílcar Cabral initiated our contacts with the MPLA, but we had developed those contacts even earlier”.³ On the other hand, representing the non-governmental solidarity movement, Hillevi Nilsson—who during more than two decades was closer to MPLA than any other Swede—saw in 1997 the Swedish government’s stand as influenced rather by the Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere.⁴ It remains, however, that the final decision was taken shortly after Dahl’s meeting with Cabral. The first particular parliamentary motion in favour of official Swedish support to MPLA was also introduced by Dahl in January 1971, shortly after her visit to Guinea-Bissau.

Only initiated during the financial year 1971/72, the direct official Swedish humanitarian assistance to MPLA was never important in quantitative terms. Until Angola’s independence in November 1975, it amounted in total only to 7.8 million SEK.⁵ Even if the indirect support of 3.3 million via UNESCO to the school at Dolisie is added, the total was less than half of the 23 million dis-

¹ Cited in Möllander op. cit., pp. 28–29.
² Möllander op. cit., p. 28.
⁴ Interview with Hillevi Nilsson, Stockholm, 4 February 1997: “Agostinho Neto had really good contacts with Nyerere and Nyerere had good contacts with Olof Palme and the Swedish Social Democratic Party on the whole.”
⁵ Based on disbursement figures according to SIDA’s annual accounts, established by Ulla Beckman for this study.
bursed to FRELIMO—not counting the support to the Mozambique Institute—and just about one fifth of the 53.5 million to PAIGC.\textsuperscript{1} Of all the African liberation movements supported by the Swedish government, MPLA was by far the least favoured.\textsuperscript{2} It is not surprising that Lúcio Lara in 1996 stated that the assistance to PAIGC made the MPLA leadership “a little jealous”, adding that “we compared the figures […] and saw the difference”.\textsuperscript{3} The disparity was, however, to a very large extent a consequence of the internal conflicts that beset MPLA from 1973, heavily affecting the movement’s administrative capacity.

Nevertheless, the support represented a \textit{de facto} recognition of MPLA as Angola’s legitimate liberation movement, or as a ‘government-in-waiting’\textsuperscript{4}. This, in turn, had far-reaching political consequences. Despite dissimilar conditions, the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme and the MPLA President Agostinho Neto would over the years establish a close political relationship. For example, after Neto’s visit to Sweden in mid-1970 they met in Lusaka during the Prime Minister’s official visit to Zambia in September 1971.\textsuperscript{5} The only other liberation leader that Palme consulted during his visit was ANC’s Oliver Tambo. Pierre Schori, who worked closely with Palme on the issues of Southern Africa, later described “the bonds between the MPLA leadership and [the] Swedish Social Democracy” as “unique in the [W]estern world”, adding that “Neto often turned to us for advice on various issues, both international and domestic. To us he seemed anything but an implacable Marxist revolutionary”\textsuperscript{6}.

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{1} Ditto.
\item\textsuperscript{2} It should be noted that the proportions were different at the non-governmental level. According to a study by SIDA—summarized by the Stockholm Africa Group—MPLA received in 1971 Swedish NGO support to a value of just below 1 million SEK, compared to 1.7 million to FRELIMO and only 400,000 to PAIGC. It is significant that MPLA was completely dominant among the Angolan organizations. While nine different Swedish NGOs contributed to the 975,000 SEK raised in favour of MPLA, only one organization in 1971 supported FNLA, granting it the very marginal amount of 2,500 SEK. The SIDA study thus underlined MPLA’s marginal-ization in the Swedish opinion in the early 1970s (Stockholm Africa Group: ‘Support to the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies from Swedish non-governmental organizations, 1971’, Stockholm [no date, but probably February 1973], (AGA)).
\item\textsuperscript{3} Interview with Lúcio Lara, Luanda, 16 April 1996.
\item\textsuperscript{4} Interview with Pierre Schori, Stockholm, 28 June 1996.
\item\textsuperscript{5} During the meeting— which on the Swedish side also was attended by Pierre Schori and Per Wästberg—Palme said that the support to the liberation movements would be substantially increased. “MPLA [could] count on a positive attitude by the Swedish government [and] the assistance to MPLA [would] at least be doubled”. Neto acknowledged with appreciation that SIDA following his request in 1970 had agreed to include transport in the recently initiated support to MPLA. He noted, however, that SIDA wanted to supply German or French trucks and “could not understand why [it] would not rather deliver Swedish vehicles” (Pierre Schori: ‘Promemoria’ / ‘Memorandum’ (‘Samtal med Agustino Neto, generalsekreterare för MPLA, Angola, I State House, Lusaka, 24 september 1971’ / ‘Conversation with Agustino Neto, General Secretary of MPLA, Angola, State House, Lusaka, 24 September 1971’), Stockholm, 1 October 1971) (MFA).
\item\textsuperscript{6} Pierre Schori (1994) op. cit., p. 12. Cf. interview with Alberto Ribeiro-Kabulu, Harare, 5 May 1996, where he recalls how Palme during a discussion with Neto in 1977 told the Angolan President that “I can not believe that you—with your background, your attitudes and the way in which you have led the liberation struggle—are a Marxist”. According to Ribeiro, Palme’s comments had a deep impact on Neto, who shortly thereafter “started to work on an independent settlement […] of the conflicts [in] Angola and Namibia […] without the participation of outside forces.” Neto’s initiative was, however, cut short by his illness and death in September 1979.
\end{itemize}
The understanding and mutual respect between Palme and Neto was in 1996 confirmed by several of those nearest to the late Angolan President, such as Ruth Neto, his sister and in her own right a prominent nationalist leader.\(^1\) Paulo Jorge, the former Angolan Foreign Minister, referred at the same time to a meeting in the Mozambican capital Maputo where Samora Machel and Joaquim Chissano of FRELIMO, himself and other Southern African nationalists addressed Palme as an “honorary freedom fighter”.\(^2\) The Angolan diplomat Alberto Ribeiro-Kabulu, finally said that Neto was “somehow seduced by Olof Palme [and] the principles of social solidarity [... of the Social Democratic Party in Sweden”\(^3\).

Palme’s contacts with Neto helped him to see beyond appearances and go to the core of the Angolan problem. In February 1976—that is, at the height of the Angolan post-independence crisis, when the American CIA had covertly backed an FNLA incursion from Zaire; the South African army had openly invaded Angola from Namibia in support of UNITA; and the MPLA government had turned to Cuba for military assistance—Palme published an important article in the Swedish liberal newspaper *Dagens Nyheter*. In the article, he wrote that

> I am reading in the newspaper[s] that MPLA almost consistently is described as ‘Marxist’, pro-Soviet or—in the Moderate press—even as Communist. This is a propagandistic simplification. Marxism has historically been of little significance to African socialism [and] MPLA does not markedly differ from other liberation movements [...] At any rate, Communists have until this year constituted a very small minority in MPLA. [... However,] there is, of course, a reason for these labels. It is more legitimate to fight ‘Communists’ and ‘terrorists’ [in order] to support their opponents.

> [...] MPLA visited most countries in the Western world trying to get weapons for the struggle against the Portuguese. The answer was no. They then turned to the Soviet Union and the answer was yes. Lately, MPLA has received massive military support from the Soviet Union and Cuba. [...] Cuba has [also] sent considerable troop detachments to Angola. We are critical of this, just as we are critical of all other foreign intervention.

> [...] The Swedish position has been completely clear. We are against all foreign interference in the internal affairs of Angola. It must stop. Angola should be given the possibility to [achieve] national independence, a non-aligned position and the opportunity to form its internal development by itself. I am convinced that this is in accordance with MPLA’s own objectives.

> [...] It is important to remember that the war waged in Angola is not between ‘the Free World’ and ‘Communism’ [and] that it must not in a prejudiced way be

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1 Interview with Ruth Neto, Luanda, 16 April 1996. Ruth Neto served for many years as the head of the MPLA-aligned Women’s Organization of Angola (*Organização das Mulheres de Angola*) (OMA), which after independence established close relations with the non-partisan Left Association of Swedish Women (*Svenska Kvinnors Vänsterförbund*) (SKV).

2 Interview with Paulo Jorge, Luanda, 15 April 1996. Jorge was in the early 1970s MPLA’s Director of Information. He served as Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of Angola from 1976 until 1984.

viewed on the basis of the clichés of the Cold War or from the perspective of the conflicts between the super powers. It is fundamentally a continuation of the long liberation struggle that was embarked upon one and a half decades ago and which in its final phase has had a tragic course due to internal divisions and foreign intervention.1

Swedish and Portuguese Reactions

The contacts between the Swedish government and the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies were at the end of the 1960s still generally looked upon with scepticism, or outright disapproval, by Sweden’s diplomatic representatives to Portugal and some of the key countries in Africa. After a meeting with leading Portuguese military representatives, the Swedish ambassador to Lisbon, Gunnar Dryselius, wrote, for example, to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm in March 1969 that “the claims concerning ‘liberated areas’ [...] are to a great extent not founded on facts. The Portuguese are in total control, not only in Mozambique and in Angola, but also in Portuguese Guinea”.2 Obviously impressed by the information received from the Portuguese,3 Dryselius concluded that “it must be considered as totally divorced from reality to argue that there exists any possibility at all for the externally led freedom movements—either militarily or politically—to score any decisive or even essential victory over the Portuguese”.4 Similarly, the Swedish ambassador to Kinshasa, Olof Bjurström—who, however, maintained good relations with the FNLA leader Holden Roberto and was in favour of Swedish non-partisan humanitarian aid to the Angolan refugees in Congo—did not express any major confidence in the Angolan liberation movements or, for that matter, in the Africans in general. As late as in October 1970, he wrote to the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm that

the eventual liberation of Angola will hardly be achieved by the Angolans themselves. The guerrilla can of course constitute evidence of the people’s yearning for independence, but I doubt that it by itself may ever become the decisive factor. This is not about Algerians or other war experienced and hardy peoples, but about considerably more primitive and weaker Africans.5

Pro-Portuguese and prejudiced opinions by Swedish official representatives continued long after the parliamentary majority had overwhelmingly pro-
announced itself in favour of direct assistance to the liberation movements. Dryselius’ successor as Sweden’s ambassador to Portugal, Karl Fredrik Almqvist, appeared in this respect as particularly critical towards his government’s positions.\footnote[1]{And to the United Nations. In April 1972, the UN Special Committee on Decolonization (‘Committee of 24’) organized an exploratory mission to the liberated areas in Guinea-Bissau. The Swedish UN diplomat Folke Löfgren participated in the mission. While the UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim congratulated the mission members on their successful visit, Almqvist was extremely critical of what he called “infringement of another country’s (i.e. Portugal’s) sovereignty”, maintaining that the mission had “violated international law” and that the Swedish participation could undermine Sweden’s “international goodwill” (letter from the Swedish ambassador to Lisbon, Karl Fredrik Almqvist, to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, 14 April 1972 (MFA). See also interview with Salim Ahmed Salim, Copenhagen, 16 November 1995.} In January 1971, this prompted the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to send him a brief, but stern, instruction, reminding him that “we do not have any reason to divulge any detailed information about [our assistance to the liberation movements] to the Portuguese”.\footnote[2]{Letter (‘Stöd till angolanska befrielserörelser’ / ‘Support to Angolan liberation movements’) from Lennart Klackenberg, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to K.F. Almqvist, Swedish ambassador to Lisbon, Stockholm, 8 January 1971 (MFA).} Representatives of the Swedish business community were, perhaps less surprisingly, far from supportive of Sweden’s criticism of the EFTA partner and the relations with the nationalist movements. In 1967, Jacob Wallenberg of the powerful Wallenberg group expressed during a visit to Portugal his “great appreciation and respect for [the fact that] a small country like Portugal untiringly continues to defend its territory”\footnote[3]{Jacob Wallenberg cited in Kvällsposten, 26 November 1967.} In his book *Documents from Within*, Pierre Schori has vividly described how Swedish businessmen in Portugal “evidently saw their interests threatened, criticizing the government in Stockholm. [...] They received fire backup from the conservatives in Sweden, who accused the Social Democratic government of breaking international law by supporting rebels, revolutionaries and terrorists and endangering Swedish export interests”.\footnote[4]{Schori (1992) op. cit., p. 227.}

The tense relations between Portugal and Sweden following the announcement on granting direct support to the liberation movements also led to tragi-comical incidents. When the port authorities in Lisbon, Luanda, Lobito, Lourenço Marques, Beira and other cities during two weeks at the end of October and beginning of November 1969 declared a blockade against Swedish vessels, the Swedish Shipowners’ Association approached the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm, arguing that its members were suffering undue economic losses due to a political decision. The criticism was, however, deflated when at the same time a Swedish ship was seized in the Angolan port of Moçamedes for flying the flag of Holden Roberto’s (former) UPA movement. This was seen as a deliberate provocation by the Portuguese authorities, who fined the captain. Behind the incident was, however, the innocent fact that the small Swedish
Tor Sellström

1 shipping company\textsuperscript{1} for reasons of courtesy had had ‘an Angolan’ flag made from a specialized publication, which in turn displayed UPA’s ensign.\textsuperscript{2}

It was Swedish journalists who at the beginning of the 1960s first raised the issue of Portugal and the nationalist struggle in Angola and the other Portuguese-held territories. It was also against the Swedish media that the Salazar regime reacted when in the middle of the decade it actively started to hit back at the mounting criticism from Sweden. Returning from a UN seminar on apartheid South Africa, held in Brasilia, Brazil, Per Wästberg was in late September 1966 barred from entering Portugal. Wästberg had attended the Brasilia seminar as an official Swedish delegate. He was, in addition, an appointed member of the official Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance, which since 1964 had recommended Swedish government support to Angolan and Mozambican refugee students. It was, however, in his capacity as a journalist with the liberal newspaper \textit{Dagens Nyheter} that he was declared \textit{persona non grata}. The Portuguese secret police kept a file of blacklisted journalists and Wästberg was not allowed into the country.\textsuperscript{3}

It was, finally, the Portuguese government which threatened to boycott Sweden, not the other way around. Maintaining that only the UN Security Council was mandated to decide on economic sanctions, the Swedish government had at the United Nations from 1964 regularly abstained from voting on the General Assembly resolutions that combined condemnation of Portugal’s colonial policies with demands for international isolation of the Lisbon regime. However, in October 1966 Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson sharpened Sweden’s criticism of Portugal’s colonial wars, characterizing the intransigence of the alliance between Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa as a “dark menacing cloud”. An official reaction was delivered by the Portuguese Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira at a press conference in Lisbon in mid-March 1967, where he threatened to sever all commercial relations with Sweden, stating that “if Sweden dislikes buying Portuguese products because it helps our overseas territories, it is enough to start procuring [their] products from other countries”.\textsuperscript{4} In turn, Nilsson commented that “Nogueira’s attack shows that he is aware of what the Swedish government thinks about Portugal’s policies in Africa”\textsuperscript{5} The liberal \textit{Expressen} went further, stating in an editorial that

\textsuperscript{1} The Fernström Shipping Company.
\textsuperscript{2} Cable from Gunnar Dryselius, Swedish ambassador to Lisbon, to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, 13 November 1969. A similar incident had taken place in Lourenço Marques, Mozambique, in 1967, when a Swedish ship entered the harbour flying the FRELIMO flag. A much more serious episode occurred in the port of Beira in October 1973, when the Portuguese authorities seized two Scania lorries shipped by SIDA to FRELIMO in Tanzania with the Norwegian ship \textit{Drammensfjord} (See interview with Stig Lövgren, Sollentuna, 21 February 1996).
\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Dagens Nyheter}, 3 October 1966. Wästberg had not written about metropolitan Portugal. In November 1959 he had, however, already denounced Portugal’s colonialism in Mozambique in \textit{Dagens Nyheter}. This led to a Portuguese protest to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Wästberg wrote his first article on Angola in August 1960.
\textsuperscript{5} Cited in \textit{Aftonbladet}, 17 March 1967.
the strange situation has now arisen whereby the Portuguese government is threat-
ening Sweden with a trade boycott as punishment [for the fact that] we dislike Por-
tugal’s policy of violence in Angola and Mozambique and [its] methodical sabotage
of the UN blockade against Rhodesia. One ardently hopes that the Portuguese will
implement the threat. If so, the Swedish government has drastically to reconsider
its EFTA policies towards Portugal.¹

The EFTA debate would mainly take place against the background of Sweden’s
relations with Mozambique. Portugal’s strong demonstrations against the
Swedish decision to assist the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies
were also primarily staged in 1969 in reaction to the links with FRELIMO.

¹ Expressen, 17 March 1967.
The Mondlanes and FRELIMO of Mozambique

Early Contacts with Portuguese East Africa

From a geographical point of view, the Portuguese colony of Mozambique—known as Portuguese East Africa—was even more distant from Sweden than Angola. Bordering the British-held territories of Tanganyika, Nyasaland and the two Rhodesias and largely integrated with the economy of South Africa, Mozambique did, however, for a long period play a relatively more important role for Sweden than Angola.

Although there were no direct Swedish links with Mozambique, the capital Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) was from the second half of the 19th century a strategic port of call on the trade routes between Scandinavia and the Far East and Australia. The early shipping contacts became in the early 20th century more regular—particularly after the establishment of Transatlantic’s services between Sweden and Southern Africa—with increasing bilateral trade as a result. The goodwill mission to Angola and Mozambique by the General Export Association of Sweden found in 1955 that “it is of particular interest that the Swedish flag is not an unknown phenomenon in the ports of either Angola or Mozambique, thanks to the links maintained since a long time back by the Transatlantic Shipping Company”. The links also explain why not less than three Swedish consulates had been opened in Mozambique by 1960.

In the beginning, Sweden’s commercial relations with Mozambique developed unevenly. In 1911, for instance, Swedish exports to Portuguese East Africa amounted to not less than 1.4 million SEK—representing 0.2% of Sweden’s total exports.

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1 In 1903, for example, a total of 634 ships called at Lourenço Marques, out of which not less than 90 (14%) were Norwegian, while 9 were Swedish and 4 Danish. At the time, Lourenço Marques had a European population of around 4,500. With an average of two Scandinavian ships a week and in relation to such a small population—almost entirely composed of men—it is perhaps not too surprising that the Mozambican capital also attracted Scandinavian prostitutes. Studying the Mozambican censuses in the Historical Archives in Maputo, the author encountered at least two Scandinavians among the women domiciled in the city’s red light district at the end of the 19th century, namely one ‘Kitty’ Lindström and one ‘Bianca’ Berg (Sellström in Odén and Othman (eds.) op. cit., p. 44, note 61).


3 ‘Svarta Afrika är morgondagens marknad’ (‘Black Africa is tomorrow’s market’) in Stockholms-Tidningen, 24 November 1960.
exports—while the imports from the colony were negligible.\(^1\) The figures do not, however, represent the normal trade exchange, but exceptional sales from Sweden to Mozambique. For example, while the Portuguese authorities contracted a French firm to supply the equipment for lighthouses and beacons along the Angolan coast, in the case of Mozambique the corresponding order went to the Swedish company AGA.\(^2\)

Similarly, Electrolux had after the Second World War important, but irregular orders of paraffin-based refrigerators to Mozambique, at times representing up to a third of total Swedish sales to the colony.\(^3\)

Albeit very small, Sweden’s regular trade exchange with Mozambique was until the 1960s marginally bigger than that with the more significant economy of Angola. In 1950, the value of Swedish deliveries to Mozambique amounted to 2.3 million SEK, corresponding to 0.04% of total Swedish exports. The import value was at the same time as high as 9.7 million SEK—compared to only 2.3 million from Portuguese West Africa—representing 0.15% of Sweden’s imports.\(^4\) The main products exported from Sweden were—as in the case of Angola—paper, pulp and machinery, while copra and vegetable oils, similarly, constituted the almost exclusive import items. As noted above, at the beginning of the 1950s the Swedish mining company Bolidens Gruv AB was granted a major concession for mineral prospecting in the Mozambican district of Manica, establishing the local company Sociedade Boliden de Moçambique in April 1954. The unsuccessful explorations were, however, abandoned in 1957 and did not result in closer economic relations between the two countries. Nor did the Swedish Export Association’s goodwill mission of 1955. Although growing in absolute terms, the bilateral exchange indicated in 1960 that Mozambique was becoming more marginalized as a Swedish trading partner, occupying a position similar to that of Angola.\(^5\) In that year—that is, shortly before the launch of FRELIMO’s liberation struggle—Swedish imports from Mozambique remained at a stable level of 10 million, while the export value had increased to 8.3 million SEK. In Sweden’s total trade, both imports from and exports to Mozambique represented, however, only shares of 0.06%.\(^6\)

Sweden and Portugal became joint members of EFTA in January 1960. Due to the fascist Salazar regime and its colonial wars in Africa, it was from the outset a controversial partnership. Sweden’s commercial relations with Angola

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3. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. In the mid-1950s, Sweden’s share of both Angola’s and Mozambique’s exports and imports represented around 1% (Svensk Utrikeshandel, No. 18, 30 September 1955, p. 16).
and—in particular—Mozambique featured prominently in the following EFTA debate. The opposition Liberal Party and the popular solidarity movement argued that EFTA would strengthen the direct links between Swedish trade interests and the two Portuguese-held territories. This was, however, not to be the case. While Swedish investments in and trade with metropolitan Portugal increased considerably between 1960 and 1970, the commercial interaction with Angola and Mozambique became even more marginal than before. Between 1960 and 1970, Portuguese West Africa’s share of total Swedish exports remained at 0.08%, while imports dramatically fell from 0.03 to an insignificant 0.01%. The Swedish trade balance with Mozambique became for the first time positive, but the overall descending curve was conspicuous. With a total value of 18.3 million SEK in 1970, Swedish exports to the colony only represented a share of 0.05%, down from the 0.06% registered in 1960. Commodities imported from Mozambique for a value of 6.8 million SEK represented at the same time an almost negligible 0.01% of Sweden’s total imports, compared to the 0.06% registered in 1960, the year when EFTA was founded.

Mozambique was for a long time unknown in Sweden. Almost no information about the situation there reached the outside world. After a visit to Mozambique during his stay in Rhodesia, Per Wästberg, however, introduced the Portuguese colony to the Swedish public in November 1959 through a highly critical article with the title ‘The dictatorship of silence’ in Dagens Nyheter. It described a country where censorship, a well trained state police and espionage keep criticism under lock and key. [...] Those who know most speak the least. [...] A triumphant curtain of silence which few foreigners manage to penetrate surrounds Mozambique. The whites keep silent about what they know. The authorities are unwilling to give actual information. [...] And the blacks do not have a voice. They are deliberately prevented from getting education [and] they are being cut off from news from the awakening Africa that surrounds them. At the least false step they risk corporal punishment and deportation. Nobody knows their thoughts and there is no one to give them expression.

Wästberg’s article was published before the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa in March 1960 and the insurrections in Angola in February-March 1961, that is, the two major events in Southern Africa that alerted the international

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2 Ibid.
3 Swedish missionaries had, however, been active within the Methodist church in Mozambique since the beginning of the 20th century. They were among the first to denounce the cruelties perpetrated by the Portuguese troops (for example, ‘Missionärsbrev från Mozambique: De vita mördar oss’/‘Missionary letter from Mozambique: The whites are murdering us’ in Expressen, 7 September 1965).
opinion on both apartheid and Portuguese colonialism. As earlier noted, the Swedish South Africa Committee was founded at the beginning of March 1961 and on 1 May 1961 the Social Democratic Labour Day marches condemned “the racial oppression” in Southern Africa. The demonstrations in Stockholm—addressed by Arne Geijer, the Chairman of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation—attracted not less than 60,000 people. Interestingly, it was not only South Africa and Angola that featured in the international section of the demonstrations, but also Mozambique. The Mozambican struggle was thus for the first time publicly observed by the Swedish labour movement as early as 1961. It would from the mid-1960s become a regular feature, with the FRELIMO President Eduardo Mondlane making his first appearance at the First of May demonstrations in Gävle in 1966.

To give expression to the thoughts of the black majority—or, as explicitly stated, “to broaden the Swedish debate and give a clearer presentation of African opinions”—the liberal evening paper Expressen launched in March 1961 its in-depth series ‘Africa from within’. It was edited by Anders Ehnmark, who in Paris in the late 1950’s had come into contact with the Mozambican nationalist and poet Marcelino dos Santos. The future Vice-President of the Mozambique Liberation Front was at the time a member of UDENAMO, one of the Mozambican nationalist organizations that in June 1962 formed FRELIMO. More importantly, dos Santos was closely associated with the FRAIN anti-colonial alliance—constituted around MPLA of Angola and PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau—which in April 1961 was reorganized as CONCP. Based in Rabat, Morocco, Marcelino dos Santos became the first Secretary General of the Conference of Nationalist Organizations in the Portuguese Colonies.

1 The June 1960 Mueda massacre in northern Mozambique was at the time not given attention by the international press. As at Sharpeville, the police opened fire on a peaceful demonstration, reportedly killing over 500 Africans (Thomas H. Henriksen: Mozambique: A History, Rex Collings, London, 1978, pp. 167–168).

2 Stockholms Arbetarekommun 1961: ‘Verksamhetsberättelse’ (‘Annual Report of the Social Democratic Party district in Stockholm’), p. 6. It could be noted that the 1961 Labour Day demonstrations in Stockholm included a section of Swedish UN soldiers returning from Congo; that the fund-raising campaign ’LO-Help Across the Borders’ featured prominently; and that Arne Geijer in his speech “gave his view on how the help to the underdeveloped countries should be organized” (Ibid.) (LMA).


5 Born in Maputo, dos Santos studied at the School of Commerce in Lisbon, where he in 1951 together with Agostinho Neto from Angola and Amílcar Cabral from Guinea founded the Centre for African Studies. While doing post-graduate studies in Paris, he cooperated with the cultural review Présence Africaine. In 1957, he was a co-founder with MPLA’s Mário de Andrade and Cabral of the Anti-Colonial Movement (Movimento Anti-Colonialista). After becoming Secretary General of CONCP, he was closely involved in unity talks between his own organization, UDENAMO, and other Mozambican nationalist organizations, leading to the formation of FRELIMO in June 1962. He was subsequently appointed Secretary for External Affairs and—in 1970—Vice-President of FRELIMO. In June 1975, Marcelino dos Santos became Minister for Development and Economic Planning in the first government of independent Mozambique.
It was in response to an appeal by CONCP that Expressen in July 1961 launched a fund-raising campaign in favour of the Angolan refugees in Congo. It was also through Expressen—the largest evening paper in Sweden at that time—that the Swedish public for the first time was given a direct opportunity to get to know a leading Mozambican nationalist voice. In an exclusive full-page article published on 28 June 1961, Marcelino dos Santos—introduced as "formerly known as a poet, but now wholly occupied with the preparations for the coming insurrection in Mozambique"—wrote that

the myth that the Portuguese colonies should be ‘overseas provinces’ has been crushed by [...] the events in Angola. The days of the Portuguese colonial system are numbered. The contradictions it has created will through historical necessity result in national liberation for Portuguese Africa. [...] It is in this situation natural that Mozambique [also] demands its right to freedom and autonomous rule. For the Mozambican people, it constitutes the first condition for social emancipation. [...] Without any political rights and organizations, the people of Mozambique have started their freedom struggle. Organizations for the struggle have been formed underground. The struggle will be difficult, particularly as the government of Portugal does not seem willing to understand anything about the spirit of our times. In addition, the secret agreements entered into between Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia have created a colonial coalition [which blocks] the developments.

 [...] The National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO) pulls out all the stops to awaken and unite the entire people [and] to immediately and with all means available liquidate Portugal’s colonialism. The liberation struggle continues, in spite of the oppression and the massacres. [...] But what we intensely wish is that the Portuguese government—as much for the sake of Portugal as for the sake of Mozambique—decides to respect our legitimate demands for freedom and independence.1

Dos Santos was the first Mozambican nationalist to present his views to the Swedish people. He would, however, not be the only one to raise the cause of Mozambique in the early 1960s. On the contrary. Partly as a result of the attention given in Sweden to the nationalist struggle in Angola, the conditions in the little known East African Portuguese sister colony were at the time also covered. Per Wästberg’s anthology Africa Narrates2—first published in August 1961—included a militant ‘Appeal’ by the Mozambican female poet and nationalist Noémia de Sousa.3 A couple of months later—in March 1962—Ehnmark and Wästberg published their widely read study Angola-Moçambique,4 in which

1 Marcelino dos Santos: ‘Striden blir svår’ (‘The struggle will be difficult’) in Expressen, 28 June 1961.
2 Wästberg (1961) op. cit.
3 The poetess Noémia de Sousa, also writing under the name Vera Micaia, is considered the first woman writer in modern Mozambican literature. Between 1951 and 1964, she worked for several journals and reviews in Mozambique, advancing the theme of African culture. Political persecution by the Portuguese secret police eventually compelled her to seek refuge in France.
4 Ehnmark & Wästberg (1962) op. cit. As noted above, the book was translated into English and partly into Russian in 1963.
the former wrote the part on Angola and the latter was responsible for Mozambique. In addition, in May 1962 Ehnmark and Sven Hamrell brought out the important political anthology *Africans on Africa*.¹ This was based on the articles published earlier in *Expressen’s* ‘Africa from within’ series, but included a new, exclusive contribution on Mozambique by Marcelino dos Santos.² Finally, from 1962 the Swedish press increasingly started to pay attention to the situation in Mozambique, describing the country as possibly turning into another Angola.³

Initial Contacts with FRELIMO

From being practically unknown, the situation in Mozambique had by 1962 been introduced to the Swedish public through a number of articles and books by Ehnmark, Hamrell and Wästberg in which Mozambican voices were also given direct expression. As in the case of Angola, there were, however, no prominent Mozambicans in Sweden who could act as resident diplomats for the nationalist movement. Nevertheless, important contacts were established between the political youth movements in the Nordic countries and the CONCP-aligned General Union of Students from Black Africa under Portuguese Colonial Domination (UGEAN). As already stated, UGEAN participated with a large delegation at the Afro-Scandinavian Youth Congress in Oslo, Norway, in August 1962, where the future Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano linked up for two weeks with influential Swedish representatives. One of them was Anna-Greta Leijon, who became closely involved with Southern Africa and ten years later entered the Social Democratic government. During his stay in Scandinavia, Chissano also met the future Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson.⁴

The Afro-Scandinavian Youth Congress took place at a crucial moment in the history of the Mozambican liberation movement. The founding conference of FRELIMO had been held in Dar es Salaam less than two months before, but in contrast to MPLA of Angola and ANC of South Africa, the Mozambican movement had not yet opted for an armed struggle. Chissano later recalled the discussions in Oslo about whether to use violent means or not: “It was very interesting, because […] we were still trying to see if we could fight peacefully […], although we could already see that the armed struggle was an alterna-

¹ Ehnmark & Hamrell (1962) op. cit.
⁴ Interview with Joaquim Chissano, Maputo, 2 May 1996. Following the violent deaths of Olof Palme in February and Samora Machel in October 1986, Carlsson and Chissano would two and a half decades later lead their respective parties and governments.
He was, however, not given the opportunity to pursue the discussion. Immediately after the Oslo meeting, Chissano—who then studied in Poitiers, France—was recalled to Africa, where he settled in Dar es Salaam. Appointed to FRELIMO’s Central Committee, serving as the movement’s representative to Tanzania and later coordinating the armed struggle against the Portuguese, Chissano’s appearance in Oslo was his “last job to [...] promote the liberation struggle in Europe”. He only returned to the Nordic countries in November 1970, after the assassination of the FRELIMO President Eduardo Mondlane.

It was instead Mondlane himself who with his American-born wife Janet Rae Mondlane became directly responsible for FRELIMO’s successful diplomacy towards Sweden and the other Nordic countries. Between September 1964 and October 1967, the FRELIMO President visited Sweden on not less than five different occasions, meeting a wide range of organizations and laying the foundation for the quite extraordinary support FRELIMO enjoyed in Sweden. Albeit indirectly, via the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam—headed by Janet Mondlane—FRELIMO became in 1965 the first Southern African liberation movement to receive Swedish humanitarian support. In addition, a particular FRELIMO support group was set up in Uppsala in 1966 and the first Swedish parliamentary motion for official assistance to a Southern African liberation movement was submitted in favour of FRELIMO in 1967. Finally, a high-ranking official FRELIMO representative was after direct consultations with the ruling Social Democratic Party stationed in Sweden towards the end of 1967.

Through active and non-partisan diplomacy, Eduardo and Janet Mondlane managed to mobilize support for FRELIMO across the socialist and non-socialist political blocs and over the often quite deep divide between the established political parties and the reorganized, post-Vietnam solidarity movement. Oliver Tambo of ANC of South Africa would play a similar role from the beginning of the 1970s, but during the second half of the 1960s it was undoubtedly the Mondlanes who not only actively contributed to the development of the Swedish solidarity opinion with Southern Africa, but also very skilfully—without compromising their own principles—avoided the dangers of dividing it along political or ideological lines. Of decisive importance was that the organization Mondlane represented was the undisputed national liberation movement of Mozambique. Although opposing groups existed and emerged, FRELIMO’s leading role was never challenged internally or called into question externally. In addition, FRELIMO always maintained a strictly non-aligned course, notably vis-à-vis the Sino-Soviet conflict.

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1 Ibid.
2 Ibid. In addition, the future Mozambican President worked as a tutor in mathematics at the Mozambique Institute (Mozambique Institute: ‘Report’, Dar es Salaam, 1 September 1965) (AJC).
3 With—as always—the exception of the Moderate Party.
4 Nevertheless, FRELIMO was counted among the so-called ‘authentic’ movements of the Khartoum alliance supported by the Soviet Union.
While the nationalist struggle in Angola exploded onto the international arena at the beginning of 1961, the Mozambican opposition to Portugal’s colonial rule was more scattered and rudimentary. The Portuguese tried to insulate Mozambique from the changes happening elsewhere in Africa, but a large part of the population—around half a million at any given time—was working as migrant labourers in the neighbouring countries and exposed to political ideas suppressed inside the country. The expatriate Mozambicans were in a better position to respond to the first decolonization wave in Africa towards the late 1950s, forming a number of mainly regional or ethnically based movements. Most important were UDENAMO and MANU. The National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO) had been formed by people from southern Mozambique living in Rhodesia in 1960, while the Mozambique African National Union (MANU) emerged from an ethnic Makonde self-help organization in Tanganyika in 1961, representing interests in northern Mozambique. A third organization, the African National Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI), was at about the same time set up by expatriates from central Mozambique in Nyasaland.

Encouraged by CONCP and guided by Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, the three movements came together for a unity conference in Dar es Salaam in June 1962, where the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)—the first truly national Mozambican liberation movement—was created. Three months later—in September 1962—the movement was properly launched by an inaugural congress, which inter alia declared that the objectives of the front were “to promote unity among Mozambicans; develop literacy, women’s education and cadre training […] and seek broad international support for the forthcoming struggle to liberate Mozambique”. In anticipation of the struggle, FRELIMO soon sent young volunteers to newly independent Algeria for military training. Finally, the inaugural congress appointed Eduardo Mondlane, the most distinguished black Mozambican and at
the time an assistant professor of anthropology at Syracuse University in New York, as FRELIMO's first President. Widely known and respected for his nationalist positions, Mondlane was a compromise candidate insofar as he had not been closely associated with any of the previous movements. Marcelino dos Santos of UDENAMO was elected Secretary for External Affairs.

FRELIMO’s early beginnings were fraught with difficulties. Immediately after the inaugural congress, Mondlane returned to the United States for a last year of teaching and the movement did not really begin to command support until after his final return to Dar es Salaam in 1963. During the following year, Mondlane actively started to build an international support base for FRELIMO, which had been recognized as the only representative Mozambican liberation movement by OAU in 1963. Together with Janet Rae Mondlane he also set up the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam to give primary instruction and teach nursing skills to young Mozambican refugees and prepare them for further education. At the same time, the preparations for the armed struggle continued. It was eventually launched on 25 September 1964.

The Mondlanes First Visit to Sweden

from the Portuguese colonies, such as Agostinho Neto and Mário de Andrade from Angola, Amílcar Cabral from Guinea and Marcelino dos Santos from his own country. Constantly harassed by the secret police, he left Portugal for the United States in late 1951, gaining a Ph.D. in sociology at Northwestern University, Illinois. In 1957, Mondlane joined the Department of Trusteeship of the United Nations in New York, for the following four years working as a research officer on the situation in Tanganyika, South West Africa and the Cameroons. He visited Mozambique as a UN official in 1961, but resigned from the world organization later in the year, joining the Syracuse University in New York as an assistant professor in anthropology. At the same time, he openly joined the Mozambican nationalist movement and was invited to attend the founding conference of FRELIMO in June 1962.

1 A number of smaller groups left FRELIMO in 1962–63. In June 1965, they coalesced into the Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique (Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique; COREMO), which set up headquarters in Lusaka with the Zambian government’s permission. Referring to the Swedish assistance to FRELIMO’s Mozambique Institute and claiming that the organization had over four thousand Mozambicans under its care in Zambia, in June 1966 COREMO unsuccessfully addressed a request for financial support to SIDA (letter from Mazunzo M. Bobo, COREMO National Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to Ernst Michanek, Director General of SIDA, Lusaka, 15 June 1966) (SDA) At about the same time, the organization was noted by the South Africa Committees in Lund and Uppsala. Next to FRELIMO, the information bulletin Syd- och Sydvästafrika thus presented COREMO as “a second fighting organization [...], operating in the southern part [of Mozambique]” (No. 10, 1966, p. 5), while the Uppsala committee in mid-1967 at one stage included it among ten Southern African liberation movements for which it raised funds (Upssala South Africa Committee: ‘Verksamhetsberättelse för tiden 23 februari 1967–29 februari 1968’/ ‘Report for the period 23 February 1967–29 February 1968’, Upssala, 17 February 1968) (UPA).

2 Returning to the United States after the FRELIMO congress in September 1962, Mondlane left the running of the movement to his ‘personal representative’, a black American by the name of Leo Clinton Aldridge (alias Leo Milas). Born in Texas, USA, Aldridge masqueraded as a Mozambican of Zulu parentage. Confronted as an impostor, he proceeded to expel several newly elected FRELIMO officials, thereby largely contributing to its initial problems and dissentions. Quite remarkably, Aldridge—promoted to the position of Secretary for Defence and Security—remained in FRELIMO until August 1964, when he was finally exposed and expelled. In revenge, he accused Eduardo Mondlane of being an agent of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

3 In Portuguese, Instituto Moçambicano.
Eduardo and Janet Mondlane visited Sweden for the first time in mid-September 1964. As earlier noted, the Swedish National Union of Students had after the formation of the Nationalist government in South Africa in 1948 and its decision to withdraw state scholarships to black students at the University of Witwatersrand supported the efforts by the National Union of South African Students in favour of the students. The future Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme participated in the campaign and Eduardo Mondlane—expelled from university for being “a foreign native”—was one of the beneficiaries. The loose connection to Sweden was, however, not known by the FRELIMO President at the time of his first visit. Behind the initiative to go to Sweden was instead his wife Janet, prompted by developments at the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam.

During their visits to Mozambique in 1961 and to Tanzania in 1962, the Mondlanes had become acutely aware of the low standards of education offered to the black population inside the country and of the plight of the Mozambican youth in exile. After the formation of FRELIMO, Mrs. Mondlane, however, wrote that

> the spirit and determination of [the young refugees] is high. They know what they are after. They believe in their future and they are only asking for help to send them along their way. It is going to be a long, long way from that airless, mosquito-ridden, lightless, cement-block house [in exile] where they have little to eat, to the leadership of a large African country [...]. But that is where [they] are headed. It is on them that the leadership of Mozambique will depend. It will come from them and [...] those that follow them. [S]omething should be done [...] to see that they get to [...] school as quickly as possible. The time is very short. [It] will be important for building a nation [...] for which so much is needed.¹

Returning to Dar es Salaam in 1963, the Mondlanes attached high priority to the question of refugee education, setting up the Mozambique Institute. Albeit a FRELIMO institution, it was formally organized as a registered Tanzanian trust, with the Minister of Education of the host country as honorary chairman, the Principal of the Dar es Salaam University College as secretary and the Tanzanian Director of Development and Planning as treasurer.² With strong links to the academic world in the United States, the Mondlanes managed to raise funds from the US Ford Foundation, initially to construct a hostel for fifty

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The Mondlaines’ first visit to Sweden: Eduardo and Janet Mondlane met by Sven Hamrell of the Verdandi association at the Uppsala railway station, 12 September 1964. (Photo: The Uppland County Museum)

young Mozambicans who would attend local Tanzanian schools and be given tutoring by senior Mozambicans. Ground was broken on the hostel site at Kurasini outside the Tanzanian capital and in early September 1964 the first Mozambican students moved into the building.

The Mozambique Institute was from the outset a thorn in the flesh to the Portuguese. The Lisbon government brought pressure to bear on the United States to withdraw American assistance to the institute and, in turn, the US government prevailed upon the Ford Foundation to do so.¹ The support from the foundation was suddenly discontinued. According to Joaquim Chissano—also active as a tutor at the institute—"the point made by the Ford Foundation was that we [in FRELIMO] were embarking on armed struggle for liberation, which they could not understand".² Shortly after its conception, the whole educational effort was thus "collapsing".³ In this situation, Janet Mondlane managed via Z.K. Matthews at the World Council of Churches in Geneva to secure bridging funds for the institute,⁴ but no longer term commitments to FRELIMO’s educational plans. “In my mind”, Janet Mondlane later explained,

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¹ Interview with Janet Mondlane, Maputo, 30 April 1996 and interview with Sérgio Vieira, Maputo, 29 April 1996.
² Interview with Joaquim Chissano, Maputo, 2 May 1996.
³ ibid.
⁴ Interview with Janet Mondlane, Maputo, 30 April 1996. Professor Zachariah Keodirelang (Z.K.) Matthews, former Principal of the University College of Fort Hare and member of the National
I searched around, thinking how the world was at the time. I thought about Sweden, in great part because my grandparents were Swedish1 and I always felt a kind of alliance with the Swedish people. Thinking about that, I decided that I must go to Sweden. I invited myself [and] went [...] looking for funds. My husband joined me later.2

The visit to Sweden by Janet and Eduardo Mondlane in September 1964 was of far-reaching importance. Eduardo Mondlane was the first incumbent leader of any Southern African liberation movement to directly present his views to the broader Swedish public. It is noteworthy that the FRELIMO President and his wife—who later established privileged contacts in Sweden—had to invite themselves for their first visit. This reflected, however, the fact that the Swedish Southern Africa opinion at the time was mainly preoccupied with South Africa and Namibia, leaving little attention to the struggle in the Portuguese colonies. Over the years, the Mondlanes actively contributed to a change in this regard. Even in his first interview in Sweden, Eduardo Mondlane said that he wished “that Sweden would take the same position vis-à-vis the Portuguese as [it does] towards South Africa”3 and in her talks Janet Mondlane discussed the situation in both Mozambique and Angola.4

According to the FRELIMO President, the purpose of his first visit was
to try to create the basis for a more active [Swedish] opinion against Portugal, with the objective that Sweden adopts economic sanctions against the colonial power; supports us morally at the United Nations and in other international organizations; and gives [us] material assistance, in particular for [...] education.5

Although the Mondlanes did establish contact with the ruling Social Democratic Party,6 it was not the central political issues that dominated their first visit, but the question of education. This was given high priority by FRELIMO and was also the direct reason for the trip to Sweden. On his arrival, Eduardo Mondlane said that “it is actually easier for us to obtain weapons than educational assistance”6 and during their stay the Mondlanes publicly addressed both the general issue of education in Africa and the more specific problem of refugee education. While in Uppsala, for example, Janet Mondlane gave two lectures at the university, one on ‘African Refugee Problems’, arranged by the

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1 Née Johnson, Janet Rae Mondlane’s grandparents had emigrated from northern Sweden. Their Swedish family name was Johansson.
2 Interview with Janet Mondlane, Maputo, 30 April 1996.
3 ‘Moçambiqueledare vädjar för aktion mot Portugal’ (‘Mozambique leader appeals for action against Portugal’) in Dagens Nyheter, 12 September 1964.
5 Dagens Nyheter, 12 September 1964.
6 Interview with Janet Mondlane, Maputo, 30 April 1996.
7 Dagens Nyheter, 12 September 1964.
Verdandi student association and together with her husband another on ‘Problems of African Education’ under the auspices of the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.

It was the active and influential Verdandi student association in Uppsala that served as the Mondlanes’ host. Sven Hamrell, who two years earlier with Anders Ehnmark had co-edited the political anthology *Africans on Africa*—published by Verdandi—and who was well informed about CONCP, FRELIMO and the struggle in Mozambique, was a leading member of the association. He was also attached to the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies and a member of the Swedish South Africa Committee. Centrally positioned, Hamrell was instrumental in bringing the Mondlanes into contact with the Swedish aid agency NIB and the Consultative Committee on Education Support to African Refugee Youth, appointed by the government only the previous month. This was, indeed, a key contact, not only for FRELIMO, but also for Sweden’s future support to Southern Africa.

The Swedish parliament had in May 1964 approved the Social Democratic government’s submission to allocate one million SEK for scholarships and educational assistance to African refugee youth from “South Africa, […] South West Africa and […] certain other not yet self-governing areas”. In order to advise the government on the utilization of the ‘refugee million’ a consultative committee was appointed on 13 August 1964. At its first meeting on 21 August, it resolved that the secretary, Thord Palmlund, should as soon as possible travel to Southern Africa to identify education institutions that could accommodate refugee students and administer Swedish grants.

Palmlund’s exploratory mission to Africa took place in November 1964, leading to decisions on the distribution of the ‘refugee million’ at the beginning of 1965. At the time of Eduardo and Janet Mondlane’s visit in mid-September 1964, the budgetary allocation was thus still uncommitted. As the Mozambique Institute—corresponding to the spirit of the Swedish intentions and organized as a private trust in a country with which Sweden maintained close relations—

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3 The Verdandi student association in Uppsala was founded in 1882 by Karl Staff and Hjalmar Branting as a forum for political and cultural debate on issues where the liberal and the labour movements shared interests and values, described as “radical humanism”. Staff and Branting later became the leading politicians in Sweden, responsible for the introduction of parliamentarism and universal franchise. The Liberal Karl Staff served as Prime Minister in 1905–06 and in 1911–14, while the Social Democrat Hjalmar Branting held the same post in 1920, 1921–23 and 1924–25.
4 *Dagens Nyheter*, 12 September 1964.
5 The study *Angola–Mozambique* by Ehnmark and Wästberg was also published in the series ‘Verdandi Debatt’ (‘Verdandi Debate’), launched in 1961.
7 NIB was, as earlier noted, reorganized as SIDA from 1 July 1965.
8 That is, the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance (CCHA).
was facing a financial crisis, it was quite natural that the appeals for support by
the FRELIMO President and the director of the institute would fall on fertile
ground.\(^1\) Despite the fact that without previous contacts Janet Mondlane had
decided to go to Sweden, the visit took place for quite fortuitous reasons at a
crucial moment, paving the way for Sweden’s official involvement with
FRELIMO and other liberation movements in Southern Africa.

Thord Palmlund visited the Mozambique Institute in mid-November 1964\(^2\)
and on 15 May 1965 the first Swedish grant—amounting to 150,000 SEK and
donated for the general purposes of the institute, as well as for the purchase
of a hostel for female students—was officially presented to the Tanzanian Minis-
ter of Education by the Swedish chargé d’affaires in Dar es Salaam, Knut Gran-
stedt.\(^3\) Albeit formally indirect, it was the first official Swedish humanitarian
grant to any liberation movement in Southern Africa. The decision never
caused a political controversy in Sweden. On the contrary, it was wholly sup-
ported by the opposition Liberal Party. In fact, while still the secretary general
of WAY, the Liberal David Wirmark had established close contacts with
Eduardo Mondlane and had also been received at the Mozambique Institute.\(^4\)
In addition, the future Swedish Prime Minister Ola Ullsten, at the time chair-
man of the Liberal Party Youth League, had in October 1964—that is, before
Palmlund—already paid a visit to the FRELIMO school, vividly describing the
conditions of the Mozambican refugees in a longer article in *Dagens Nyheter* two
months later. Referring to the uncommitted ‘refugee million’, Ullsten conclud-
ed that “it is difficult to find a better planned project than this. [...] We can
afford to help. To teach African children algebra and English can only be a
slight threat to our neutrality”.\(^5\)

The early involvement by leading Liberal opinion makers in favour of
FRELIMO added to the party’s commitment to official Swedish support to the
Southern African liberation movements. In the case of Mozambique, the Liberal
Party—in the Cold War divide clearly defending Western positions and a
principled champion of free trade—would not only turn a blind eye to
FRELIMO’s socialist visions and to the military support received from the
Soviet Union, but forcefully advocate Portugal’s expulsion from EFTA. The
Liberal Party thus appeared to criticize the Social Democratic Party and gov-
ernment from the left. In the case of Angola, however, the Liberal Party ex-
pressed support for FNLA—the main rival of FRELIMO’s CONCP ally MPLA

\(^1\) Anders Möllander mentions that the Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere wrote to the Swedish
government about the plight of the Mozambican refugees in the country, asking for support to the
Mozambique Institute via the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in Uppsala (Möllander op. cit., p. 21).
\(^2\) Letter from Eduardo Mondlane to David Wirmark, Dar es Salaam, 19 November 1964 (MHA).
\(^3\) Mozambique Institute: ‘Report’, Dar es Salaam, 1 September 1965 (AJC).
\(^4\) Letter from Eduardo Mondlane to David Wirmark, Dar es Salaam, 19 November 1964 (MHA).
\(^5\) Ola Ullsten: ‘Strid flyktingström från Moçambique’ (‘Strong refugee stream from Mozambique’) in
—placing itself to the right of the Social Democrats. The inconsistency eventually worked against Swedish official support to FNLA.

The unplanned, but highly successful, first visit by Eduardo and Janet Mondlane to Sweden took place immediately before the launch of FRELIMO’s armed struggle against the Portuguese. Nevertheless, the FRELIMO President did not hide that the movement was about to use violence. On the contrary, showing a remarkable trust in his newly found Swedish interlocutors Mondlane revealed to Per Wästberg of the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance that “something surprising [soon] would happen, on a table-napkin [writing] a date he favoured highly, [namely] 25 September 1964”.1 On that day—only two weeks later—FRELIMO initiated the armed struggle by attacking a Portuguese post in the northern Mozambican district of Cabo Delgado. As in the cases of MPLA or ANC—and later SWAPO, ZANU and ZAPU—the question of armed response to the oppression and political exclusion of the majority of the population would not stand in the way of official Swedish humanitarian assistance.

Official Support to the Mozambique Institute

Beginning as a simple hostel for Mozambican refugee students in Dar es Salaam, the Mozambique Institute would over the years considerably expand its activities. In addition to the main secondary school in Dar es Salaam, the institute started administrative and teacher training courses at Bagamoyo, some 70 kilometres north of the Tanzanian capital; opened a primary school for refugee children at Tunduru in southern Tanzania; and supported a growing number of ‘bush schools’ in the liberated areas inside Mozambique. Increasing emphasis was also given to agricultural production and self-help schemes, in particular at the Tunduru refugee camp. Finally, the Dr. Américo Boavida Hospital2 was inaugurated at Mtwara in June 1970. Located just north of the Mozambican border, it soon also became a medical centre for the population in the liberated areas, which, in addition, in 1970 already was serviced by over thirty medical posts and a number of first-aid stations.3

During the second half of the 1960s, the Mozambique Institute changed character from a secondary school project to that of “a technical and fund-raising institution working in the fields of health, education, welfare and economic development”,4 both among the refugee population in Tanzania and inside Mozambique. Although formally not a FRELIMO structure, it was led by

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1 Wästberg (1986) op. cit., p. 113.
2 Américo Boavida was a prominent black Angolan doctor, killed in a Portuguese helicopter attack on MPLA in eastern Angola in 1968.
3 Janet Rae Mondlane: ‘Background information for project proposal submitted to DANIDA’ [no place or date, but probably Dar es Salaam, January 1971], p. 3 (MHA).
President Mondlane’s wife and for all practical purposes part of the liberation movement. Under Janet Mondlane’s active and able directorship, the institute managed from the end of the 1960s to raise considerable financial and material resources for its activities, thereby broadening FRELIMO’s international support base. As would be the case a decade and a half later with ANC’s Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College (SOMAFCO)—also situated in Tanzania—what began as an education project developed into an important diplomatic and economic undertaking for the liberation movement.

In the mid-1960s, the Mozambique Institute was a unique project. No other Southern African liberation movement had embarked upon anything similar. Although strictly humanitarian, it was, however, from the beginning actively opposed by the Portuguese, who managed to persuade the US government to block continued support from the Ford Foundation. Dependent upon the Soviet Union, China and other Eastern countries for military supplies, it threatened to place FRELIMO exclusively in the Eastern camp, which the non-aligned liberation movement firmly wanted to avoid. As later stated by the FRELIMO leader Sérgio Vieira, “we made a tremendous effort to depolarize [...] the liberation struggle, [because] decolonization was not [a] Cold War [issue].” In its political work inside Mozambique, it was for the same reason important for FRELIMO to be able to show that the West was not a monolithic entity and break the perception of a ‘bad–good, West–East’ dichotomy. From FRELIMO’s point of view, the significance of the grant to the Mozambique Institute thus surpassed the strict humanitarian purpose for which it was given. Not only did it come at a crucial time for the institute, but it was the first official financial contribution by any Western government—moreover allied to Portugal within EFTA—to the nationalist movement.

The first Swedish grant to the institute was given to its education programme. Amounting to 150,000 SEK, it was covered under the so-called ‘refugee million’ for the financial year 1964/65. Modest in financial terms, it did, however, represent 15% of the first ever specific Swedish budgetary allocation for humanitarian assistance to Southern Africa, constituting the biggest single item of the allocation. The assistance was extended as a cash contribution

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1 In 1971, for example, the Mozambique Institute received contributions in cash and kind from non-governmental organizations in Canada, England, Finland, Holland, Sweden, USA and West Germany. It was in the same year assisted by the Lutheran World Federation and the World Council of Churches, as well as by the governments of Denmark, Holland, Norway and Sweden (The Mozambique Institute: Mozambique and the Mozambique Institute 1972, Dar es Salaam, [no date], p. 56).

2 In April 1966, SWAPO’s General Secretary Jacob Kuhangua circulated a proposal at the United Nations to establish a Namibia Institute in Tanzania. It was, however, only in 1976 that the UN Institute for Namibia opened in Lusaka, Zambia.

3 See, for example, interview with Joaquim Chissano, Maputo, 2 May 1996 and interview with Sérgio Vieira, Maputo, 29 April 1996.

4 Interview with Sérgio Vieira, Maputo, 29 April 1996.

5 Interview with Jorge Rebelo, Maputo, 1 May 1996.
to be administered by the Mozambique Institute. It was increased to 200,000 in 1965/66 and to 300,000 SEK in 1966/67, granted as "support to the activity in general, [without] further specification". By the time the institute was forced to close in March 1968, a total of 1.7 million SEK had been disbursed. This amount similarly corresponded to approximately 15% of the total Swedish humanitarian support to Southern Africa during the five years 1964/65–1968/69. Via the Mozambique Institute, FRELIMO was thus a major recipient of official Swedish support long before the secondary school students, the university organizations and the organized solidarity movement initiated their important campaigns for the movement and almost a decade before Swedish government assistance was extended to ANC of South Africa. Although the Swedish involvement with the nationalist cause in Southern Africa began in reaction to apartheid South Africa and the issue of Mozambique was the last to appear on the Swedish scene, it was thus the latter that materially opened the way for Sweden’s commitment to the regional struggle for self-determination, majority rule and democracy.

Despite close and regular relations with Eduardo and Janet Mondlane, the support to the Mozambique Institute would, nevertheless, due to conflicts within the Mozambican liberation movement be suspended in 1968. It was to resume only in 1971, but then as part of a direct cooperation programme with FRELIMO. Some of the more influential Swedish NGOs had in the meantime embarked upon important campaigns in favour of both the Mozambique Institute and FRELIMO, in the process linking up with other Nordic actors and broadening the support for Mozambique.

What provoked the suspension of the Swedish assistance was an open conflict at the institute’s secondary school in Dar es Salaam at the beginning of 1968. This was in many respects a prelude to the internal FRELIMO struggle that culminated in the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane in February 1969 and which was not ultimately solved until Samora Machel assumed the presidency in May 1970. The immediate cause of the crisis was the refusal by a group of students to participate in the liberation effort. At an early stage, FRELIMO had laid down that "it is only through practical experience in nation-building and self-help that the students [at the institute] may begin to understand the difficulties gained upon winning independence". Before being allow-
ed to pursue further studies abroad, the students were required to “take up responsibilities in the semi-liberated zones of Mozambique”. Bonding to the liberation struggle could be prescribed for a period of up to two years. Lured by greener pastures in the United States or Europe and agitated by the young Mozambican Catholic priest and teacher Mateus Gwenjere—a severe critic of Eduardo Mondlane, branding him a “traitor [who] moves too slowly and speaks too softly”—the students went on strike in January 1968. Accusing Janet Mondlane of CIA connections and turning against both the white Mozambican and expatriate teachers, the strike continued, eventually leading to a walkout by more than a hundred students and to the closure of the school in March 1968. Two months later—on 10 May 1968—FRELIMO’s main office in Dar es Salaam was raided and a member of the Central Committee stabbed to death.

The conflict around the Mozambique Institute was given prominent coverage in the Swedish media. Not only did it unfold immediately after Anders Johansson as the first international journalist ever had visited the liberated areas in northern Mozambique and at the start of the Cabora Bassa debate, but it also involved a young Swedish teacher, as well as harsh comments in the official press of the host country. Largely echoing the criticism by Gwenjere and the dissident Mozambican students, the official Tanzanian newspaper *The Nationalist* argued the day after the attack on the FRELIMO office in an editorial that “negligence on the part of some leaders of the liberation movements in observing the rights of the individual members [...] leads to squabbles and fights”. More importantly, at a mass rally to mark Africa Liberation Day in Dar es Salaam, two weeks later the Tanzanian First Vice-President Karume criticized “freedom fighters [for making] friends with people [they] fully well knew were [their] enemies”, asking them “to avoid luxuries”. With racist overtones, Karume advised the liberation movements: “If you find an enemy, kill him. An African does not have to take a white war prisoner. What [would] you give him? He does not eat [maize porridge] or cassava”. Finally, at the end of May *The Nationalist* stated in an editorial largely interpreted as directed against Eduardo and Janet Mondlane that

some freedom fighters have given in to pleasure seeking instead of going to the frontline or even doing anything really serious about the struggle [...] for freedom and national independence. Others live luxuriously in air conditioned bungalows in independent African countries at a time when their own people are suffering

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2. Cited in Henriksen op. cit., p. 178.
from untold colonial cruelties. There are even some among them who go to the extent of owning expensive semi-golden rocking chairs in their houses simply to enjoy a type of bohemian pleasure, which is so bitterly unrealistic for a freedom fighter.

[...] Even more curious and dangerous is the kind of fraternisation some freedom fighters exercise towards the agents of the very enemies of their struggle. It is not rare in Dar es Salaam, for example, to see a freedom fighter locked in heavy drinking bouts with strange faces of white men. True, some of these people pose as ‘liberals’, ‘democrats’, ‘socialists’ or even ‘anti-colonialists’. But such are the very tricks about which freedom fighters should be extremely watchful. [...] A true African freedom fighter should look for more than that. [He] should be extra careful about such guises which the agents of the enemy may employ through drinks, diplomatic parties or cheap bribes.¹

At the same time, the anti-white sentiments stirred up by Father Gwenjere—and to varying degrees supported by members of Nyerere’s government—led to the immediate expulsion from Tanzania of three white Mozambican FRELIMO members and of Birgitta Karlström, a young Swedish volunteer at the Mozambique Institute. Among the Mozambicans given forty-eight hours to leave the country on 27 May 1968 was Dr. Helder Martins, responsible for FRELIMO’s medical services in Tanzania and later the first Minister for Health in independent Mozambique. Another was the future member of FRELIMO’s Political Bureau, Minister of Security, Economic Affairs and Cooperation, Jacinto Veloso, who as a lieutenant in a spectacular fashion had defected from the Portuguese Air Force by flying his plane across the border to Tanzania in 1963.³

It was the expulsion of Karlström that attracted the attention of the major Swedish newspapers, noting that the motives behind the unusual action were unclear.⁴ The FRELIMO President and the Swedish embassy in Dar es Salaam tried in vain to get them clarified and the decision nullified in discussions with the Tanzanian government.⁵ While the immigration authorities referred to an instruction from the Foreign Ministry, the Second Vice-President Rashidi Kawawa explained that Karlström did not have a proper work permit.⁶ Ac-

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¹ The Nationalist, 28 May 1968.
2 Interviewed in 1996, Janet Mondlane said that “a lot of strange things were said about me by some FRELIMO members [...] who were allied with some members of the Tanzanian government. That made my life very difficult” (interview with Janet Mondlane, Maputo, 30 April 1996).
3 The third Mozambican-born so-called Portuguese to be expelled was Fernando Ganhão, who earlier had deserted from a Portuguese battalion in Mozambique and at the time served as representative of the council of teachers at the Mozambique Institute.
4 For example, in Svenska Dagbladet, 2 and 5 June 1968 and in Dagens Nyheter (‘Utvisad ur Tanzania utan att veta orsaken’/’Expelled from Tanzania without knowing the reason’), 5 June 1968.
5 ‘Promemoria’ (Memorandum’) from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (based on communications with the Swedish embassy in Dar es Salaam) to Ernst Michanek, SIDA, Stockholm, 10 June 1968 (SDA).
6 Ibid.
according to Mondlane, the true reason behind the expulsion was that she was close to one of the expelled Mozambicans.  

Although the decision to expel Karlström and the three white Mozambican teachers initially was seen as an official Tanzanian stand in favour of the dissident students, subsequent developments showed that the Mozambique Institute continued to enjoy the support of the host government. A commission of enquiry rejected the claims by Gwenjere and the dissident students as “unjustified” and President Nyerere made it clear that he wished to see a continuation of the activities. Nevertheless, to exercise closer control over the institute—originally set up as a private trust—the government requested closer links to the Tanzanian Ministry of Education. The question was solved in mid-1968. At the same time as the FRELIMO Central Committee formally declared that the institute formed part of the liberation movement, the secondary school was officially registered as an institution within the jurisdiction of the government of Tanzania.

A lack of teachers resulting from the 1968 expulsions, the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane and the subsequent crisis within FRELIMO would, however, considerably delay both the re-opening of the secondary school and the resumption of the official Swedish assistance. In addition, the fact that FRELIMO’s official representative to Sweden, Lourenço Mutaca—personally appointed by Eduardo Mondlane and with a strong Swedish base—suddenly left the movement in early 1970 gave rise to questions about the situation in the organization. Finally—after two and a half years—the Mozambique Institute’s secondary school re-opened in Bagamoyo in late October 1970. The re-opening

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1 Ibid. Jacinto Veloso and Birgitta Karlström were close friends. Veloso had also established a friendship with the Swedish journalist Anders Johansson in connection with his visit to Tanzania and the liberated areas in northern Mozambique in early 1968. Settling in Algiers after the expulsion from Tanzania, Veloso remained over the following years in close contact with Karlström and Johansson, through them trying to get a scholarship to study in Sweden. An experienced military aviator, he initially expressed the wish to study for a commercial pilot’s licence (letter from Jacinto Veloso to Anders Johansson, Algiers, 31 January 1969) (AJC). Closely involved with FRELIMO’s political work, he, however, later changed his mind, opting for training as a documentary film producer. After a private visit to Sweden in mid-1969—where “the fields reminded me of [... the African savannas”—Veloso wrote to Johansson, informing him that both SIDA and IUEF had turned down his applications for a scholarship, but that “the Norwegians” were ready to support him (letter from Jacinto Veloso to Anders Johansson, Algiers, 3 October 1969). (AJC) On his behalf, Johansson then wrote to the director of the film school at Dramatiska Institutet in Stockholm, but Veloso was never admitted and his film plans were eventually—and reluctantly—abandoned. In April 1970, Mozambique’s future chief negotiator with the South Africans regarding the 1984 Nkomati Accord and with the Americans around the issue of Angola and Namibia wrote to Johansson: “It’s a big shock for me! I’m in a permanent depression!... [It] will finish [by] kill[ing] me! It’s [an] impoten[t] sensation in front of the ‘political machine’?” (letter from Jacinto Veloso to Anders Johansson, Algiers, 12 April 1970) (AJC).

2 'Promemoria’ from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 10 June 1968.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid. The crisis at the Mozambique Institute focused on the secondary school in Dar es Salaam, only marginally and indirectly affecting its other activities.

5 Letter from Eduardo Mondlane to Lourenço Mutaca, Dar es Salaam, 21 June 1968 (MHA).
had been well prepared by Janet Mondlane and her staff. The Swedish government’s assistance—including the secondment of two science teachers—resumed soon thereafter, but now as part of a more comprehensive, direct humanitarian support programme to the liberation movement. By that time, broadly based fund-raising campaigns by Swedish secondary school and university students had turned both the Mozambique Institute and FRELIMO into popular and well known names in Sweden.

**Support via the Methodist Church in Mozambique**

Before turning to the Swedish youth and students’ campaigns, it should be noted that one of the Swedish free churches—the United Methodist Church in Sweden—from the second half of the 1960s channelled official Swedish support to a secondary school programme in favour of black students inside Mozambique.

Official Swedish humanitarian assistance to Southern Africa started in the mid-1960s as education support to young Africans in exile. With the exception of education programmes in favour of political prisoners, only rarely did the government in the beginning channel funds to disadvantaged groups within the respective countries. In the case of Mozambique, the early support to the Mozambique Institute in Tanzania was, however, from 1967 supplemented by a programme in favour of Protestant-run secondary schools in Lourenço Marques and Inhambane through the mission board of the United Methodist Church in Sweden.

The Church of Sweden Mission and a number of Swedish free churches had from the second half of the 19th century established a significant presence (South Africa and Zimbabwe) and close contacts (Namibia) in Southern Africa. Mainly due to the control exercised in community of interests by the Portuguese colonial authorities and the Catholic church, no direct Swedish mission-
ary activity was, however, established in Angola or Mozambique. Nevertheless, in both countries Swedish Methodists supported and participated in the international, American-led Methodist mission. Established in Mozambique at the end of the 19th century and using African vernaculars for instruction, the Methodist mission soon extended its range. It was, however, increasingly opposed by the Portuguese regime. The use of African languages was banned in 1921 and in 1941 the Estatuto Missionário was passed to further limit the influence of the Protestant schools. Catholicism became from then on in effect the official religion of the colony and “African education [...] organized in three stages, each of which was designed to eliminate most students and to serve as a barrier to higher education”. As a result, in 1950 the illiteracy rate in Mozambique was almost total, or 98%.

Despite adverse conditions, the Methodist schools survived and in the mid-1960s the church decided to start a national scholarship programme to its secondary institutions in the Mozambican capital and—later—Inhambane. The United Methodist Church in Sweden applied for funds from SIDA for the programme. A first contribution—amounting to the modest amount of 30,000 SEK—was granted in 1967. The Swedish government’s financial support to the Methodist effort would from then on be a permanent feature. From 30,000, the regular annual allocation increased to 100,000 SEK in 1972. During the eight years from the financial year 1967/68 until 1974/75, a total amount of 570,000 SEK was disbursed from SIDA via the Swedish Methodists, representing about half of the budget of the secondary school programme, which, in addition, was mainly supported by the Board of Methodist Missions in New York and by the World Council of Churches in Geneva.

Under the Methodist-sponsored programme, between 150 and 200 black Mozambican students were in the early 1970s annually given scholarships to attend secondary schools. The programme also made it possible for the Anglican church that supported the white minority regime, while many nationalist leaders—among them Robert Mugabe—were raised in an opposition Catholic missionary environment.

1 The Missionary Act between the Portuguese government and the Catholic church.
3 Ibid., Table 3.10, p. 52. The illiteracy rates in Angola and Guinea-Bissau were at the same time 97 and 99%, respectively.
5 CCHA: ‘Stipendiering av afrikanska sekundärskoleelever i Mozambique genom Metodist kyrkans Yttre Mission’ (Scholarships to African secondary school students in Mozambique via the Mission Board of the Methodist Church in Sweden’), Stockholm, 29 March 1968 (SDA).
6 Based on disbursement figures according to SIDA’s annual accounts, established by Ulla Beckman for this study.
7 CCHA: ‘Dagordning/Stipendiering i Mozambique genom Metodistkyrkans Yttre Mission’ (‘Agenda/Scholarships in Mozambique via the Mission Board of the Methodist Church in Sweden’), Stockholm, 7 April 1972 (SDA). The official Swedish support to the Methodist programme in Mozambique was discussed with FRELIMO. The liberation movement supported the programme, but was against a request submitted to SIDA by the Methodist Church in 1971 regarding the
dist church to subsidize students who were ready to go abroad to pursue higher studies not offered to blacks in Mozambique. Some of them were sent to universities in Portugal and the United States. Among them was Graça Simbine, the future wife of the FRELIMO President Samora Machel and independent Mozambique’s first Minister of Education and Culture.¹

FRELIMO and Vietnam

It was the popular information and fund-raising campaigns by the Swedish secondary school and university students which at the end of the 1960s definitely brought the issues of education and the struggle for national independence in Mozambique closer to the Swedish people, in an important way contributing to FRELIMO’s central role in the solidarity movement with Southern Africa. In turn, the campaigns were largely inspired by Eduardo and Janet Mondlane’s early and well established contacts with the Swedish youth and student movements.

The first visit to Sweden by the Mondlanes in September 1964 had, as noted, been hosted by the Verdandi student association and during their stay both the FRELIMO President and his wife, the director of the Mozambique Institute, had addressed the university students in Uppsala. Eduardo Mondlane returned to Sweden exactly one year later—in September 1965—invited by the National Council of Swedish Youth (SUL), which was coordinating the consumer boycott against apartheid South Africa initiated in March 1963. Although the second visit was given a much higher political profile than the first—including talks with Olof Palme, the ruling Social Democratic Party and the Swedish Trade Union Confederation²—it was, nevertheless, dominated by meetings with the youth and student organizations.³ In addition to discussions with SUL and the youth leagues of the Social Democratic, Centre and Liberal parties, Mondlane thus addressed the students at the Stockholm University on ‘The Liberation Movement in South East Africa’ and the university students in Uppsala concerning ‘The Strategy of Liberation in Southern Africa’.⁴

construction of a student hostel in Lourenço Marques. CCHA followed FRELIMO’s advice and the request was turned down (Ibid.) In spite of the opposition expressed by FRELIMO, the international Methodist movement, however, raised funds for the hostel—Covo Lar—which was opened in 1973 (Alf Helgesson: Church, State and People in Mozambique: An Historical Study with Special Emphasis on Methodist Developments in the Inhambane Region, Doctoral dissertation, Studia Missionalia Upsaliensia LIV, Uppsala, 1994, p. 360).

¹ Helgesson op. cit., p. 361. Together with fellow university students in Lisbon, Graça Simbine left Portugal to join FRELIMO in Tanzania in late 1972. She subsequently took up a position with the Mozambique Institute.
² SUL: ‘Program för Dr. Eduardo Mondlane’ (‘Programme for Dr. Eduardo Mondlane’), Stockholm, 12 September 1965 (MHA). See also Stockholms-Tidningen, 14 September 1965.
³ During his visit to Sweden, Eduardo Mondlane also addressed the Conference of European National Youth Councils (CENYC), the European branch of the World Assembly of Youth (WAY).
⁴ SUL: ‘Program för Dr. Eduardo Mondlane’.
Eduardo Mondlane’s speech at the University of Uppsala on 16 September 1965 would, in particular, have an impact on the emerging solidarity opinion with Mozambique. In “a very clear and candid language”,¹ he criticized both SUL and the Swedish South Africa Committees for their almost exclusive attention to South and South West Africa, arguing that

it is an illusion to believe that the problem of South Africa is independent of the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, or of Southern Rhodesia, and that it can be solved without their freedom. It is therefore to be desired that the [Swedish] South Africa movement also will include these territories in its activities.²

In addition, Mondlane made an ardent appeal for more active and committed solidarity by the students:

Raise funds! Give us weapons! You produce excellent weapons in Sweden, but only to make money. Now you have a better outlet. [...] All of you are [also] needed in our education programme. Go down to our education centre for refugees in [Tanzania]! After four years of university studies you can afford to dedicate one year to us. Ninety-five per cent of the population in Mozambique is illiterate [and] we need all the resources [available].³

Largely as a result of Mondlane’s criticism, the Lund South Africa Committee decided in early 1966 “after mature consideration” that the information bulletin Syd- och Sydvästafrika from then on should also cover “the other countries in Southern Africa”, arguing that “it has appeared that their problems are closely connected to the situation in South Africa”.⁴ Various articles on Portugal’s wars in Africa, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique were subsequently published. In 1966, the bulletin presented a ‘General Overview’ of the situation in Mozambique—with an introduction of FRELIMO ⁵—and an ‘Anatomy of the War’ in the country.⁶ This marked the beginning of an increasingly intense coverage of the liberation struggle in the Portuguese colonies, while the situ-

¹ Dagens Nyheter, 17 September 1965.
² Cited in Dagens Nyheter, 17 September 1965. Mondlane repeatedly made this point with all his contacts in Sweden. In a letter to David Wirmark, he wrote, for example, in November 1964—i.e. after his first visit—that “the interest that the Scandinavian people have shown so far in the struggle of the peoples of Southern Africa is almost exclusively concentrated on South Africa. We do not begrudge our brothers of South Africa this preference, because their freedom is our freedom. But now that some of you know some of the needs of the peoples in the general Southern African area, we hope that you will be able to expand your aid to include us” (letter from Eduardo Mondlane to David Wirmark, Dar es Salaam, 19 November 1964) (MHA) More than any other Southern African leader in the mid-1960s, Mondlane consistently argued for a broadening of the Swedish solidarity movement from South to Southern Africa.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Lund South Africa Committee: ‘Klubbmeddelande’ (‘Information to the members’), No. 2/66, Lund, 22 April 1966 (AJC).
⁶ Syd- och Sydvästafrika, No. 4, 1966.
ation in South Africa and Namibia towards the end of the 1960s was relegated to the background.¹

The FRELIMO President’s appeals for funds and an active commitment to the nationalist cause in Mozambique had an impact on the Swedish youth. Mondlane returned to Sweden in April 1966 to attend the tenth congress of the Socialist International. During his stay, he attended a conference in Uppsala on ‘Development in Democratic Socialist Thought and Action in New Countries’ and addressed—for the first time—the Swedish labour movement at the First of May celebrations in Gävle.² Always spreading his message via the press, Mondlane had by then convinced a group of young people in Uppsala to start a fund-raising and information campaign in favour of FRELIMO, subsequently formalized as the Swedish FRELIMO Group.³ Organized outside the political organizations and the existing South Africa Committees, it was the first private solidarity initiative in Sweden towards a particular Southern African liberation movement.

After reading an interview with Mondlane in the Swedish press, the promoter behind the initiative, Per Jansson, wrote a letter to the FRELIMO headquarters in Dar es Salaam in May 1966, informing the movement of the intention to start a solidarity campaign and asking for information to sustain it. As the first initiative of its kind, the letter merits being quoted. Indicative of the increasing internationalist concerns among growing segments of the Swedish youth, the role played by the National Liberation Front of Vietnam and the mix of innocence, righteousness and optimism which was to characterize the 1968 youth and student movement, Jansson wrote to FRELIMO in somewhat strained English:

I didn’t know about your organization at all before, but at present your leader, Mr. Eduardo Mondlane, is visiting [Sweden] and the other day I read an article about FRELIMO in which [he] was interviewed. [...] Mr. Mondlane compared FRELIMO to [...] FNL [of South Vietnam] and I think that is suitable. Some students here in Sweden have started an organization in support of FNL, which up to now has

¹ In 1972, Södra Afrika Informationsbulletin—the successor to Syd- och Sydvästafrika—presented itself as follows: “(The bulletin) is jointly published and edited by the Africa Groups. It mainly disseminates current information on the struggle in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique; on developments in Portugal; on Swedish interests in Portugal and Africa; and on the role of US imperialism in Africa” (Södra Afrika Informationsbulletin, No. 15–16, May 1972, p. 2). From an almost exclusive coverage of South Africa and Namibia in the mid-1960s, the organ of the Swedish solidarity movement with Southern Africa would in the early 1970s be almost entirely concerned with the struggles in the Portuguese colonies.


³ In Swedish, Svenska FRELIMO-gruppen. The Uppsala-based group should not be confused with the FRELIMO Group (FRELIMO-gruppen) which two years later was formed by Sören Lindh among his colleagues at the Swedish Agency for Administrative Development (Statskontoret). It was the latter group—formally set up in November 1968—which survived the turbulent years at the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, eventually joining the Stockholm Africa Group and forcefully promoting the cause of Mozambique within the organized solidarity movement in Sweden (See Kerstin Norrby and Sören Lindh: ‘FRELIMO-gruppen: Verksamhetsrapport per den 10 mars 1969’ / ‘The FRELIMO Group: Activity report by 10 March 1969’ [no place or date] [AJC].
delivered 70,000 USD to the liberation movement. I support FNLF, though I am a little worried at its dependency on China. Comparing Vietnam to Mozambique, I don’t think FRELIMO will be dependent on any great power. Other African countries have proved that independence without a new dependency is possible. When independence has been realized, the task is to solve the problems and difficulties in the ‘new’ country. I consider that socialism is the way to go about it, because a socialistic reform programme carries through a necessary redistribution of all capital. In this way all prosperity is divided among the people. It would be very foolish to conserve the old society and through that also the disproportions.

[...] To show you how much the Swedish people hate the Portuguese colonial policy, I and my friends thought it would be a very good idea to start a collection in support of FRELIMO. We also considered that we ought to demonstrate for your struggle of liberation and open a kind of FRELIMO branch office here in Uppsala, from which we will inform on the African’s struggle against Portuguese terrorism in Mozambique and other parts of Africa. In this way, we could support you in two ways: first you would receive collected money (and perhaps equipment too) from us, and, on the other hand, we would be able to inform on the crimes of the Portuguese government.

[...] We are definitively determined to support in all ways! To make this support possible, we want you to send all kinds of information, such as pamphlets, booklets, pictures, photos and papers. That will make it possible for us to print the first appeal for the collection. After that you can continue your delivery of information so as to realize our plan to start a paper or magazine giving information for the Swedes on FRELIMO.

FRELIMO responded favourably and the Uppsala-based Swedish FRELIMO Group was formally set up towards the end of 1966, launching an appeal for support to its fund-raising campaign in a letter to a wide range of newspapers and journals. It stated that “the Mozambique question does not appear as a controversial or politically divisive question [in Sweden]. The conditions for a united, strong opinion thus exist. We hope that you will assist us in creating such an opinion by calling your readers to collectively support the campaign”. The campaign—which was not restricted to a particular purpose, but referred to a general, unconditional support to FRELIMO—had, however, only limited success. During the first six months of 1967, it received about two hundred smaller contributions from political organizations—among them notably the board of the ruling Social Democratic Party—trade unions and

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1 This sentence was underlined by the recipient at the FRELIMO Office of the Vice-President.
2 Letter (‘Information on FRELIMO and its struggle for liberation; a Swedish organization in support of FRELIMO; and some aspects on freedom, socialism and progress’) from Per G. Jansson to FRELIMO, Uppsal, 7 May 1966 (MHA).
3 Lasse Hellström was appointed chairman and Pär (Per) Jansson secretary.
5 Ibid.
individuals, raising some 4,000 SEK for FRELIMO. Over the following years, the group collected a little more than 11,000 SEK for the liberation movement. It was even less successful regarding information about the struggle in Mozambique. The group managed to translate and freely distribute one issue of FRELIMO’s official organ Mozambique Revolution and issued a couple of brief newsletters, but it could not sustain a regular activity. Despite the fact that the issue of Cabora Bassa had mobilized a broad and strong opinion in Sweden at the end of the 1960s, the FRELIMO Group in Uppsala was eventually dissolved at the beginning of 1970. Instead, its members joined the solidarity movement with Vietnam.

The end—like the beginning—of the first local Swedish FRELIMO support group outside the existing solidarity movement and the established political organizations also reflected the outlook of large segments of the Swedish youth at the time. Announcing its dissolution, the initiator behind the campaign declared in April 1970 that

the storm centre in the struggle against US imperialism today is in South East Asia. That is where the imperialists have concentrated their main forces, and that is also where the liberation struggle is best organized and most successful. A victory for the people of Vietnam is a victory for all the peoples of the world. It must therefore be correct to participate in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism by working within the anti-imperialist front of the [Swedish] FNLF-groups and by supporting their fund-raising campaign. [...] To give higher priority to FRELIMO would be tantamount to committing a strategic error. The [anti-imperialist] forces would be split up and the struggle shifted onto a sidetrack. [...]. When we acquired this rudimentary knowledge [...], we more or less stopped working within [the Swedish FRELIMO-group]. We are now about to also formally dissolve the group and close the fund-raising campaign.

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1 Among the individuals who contributed to the campaign were Pierre Schori (SDP), David Wirmark (LP) and Per Wästberg.
3 Svenska FRELIMO-gruppen: Circular letter from Pär Jansson, Uppsala, 18 April 1970 (AJC)
4 Svenska FRELIMO-gruppen: Circular letter (‘Lämna aktivt stöd till frihetsrörelserna i de portugisiska kolonierna!’/ ’Give active support to the freedom movements in the Portuguese colonies!’), Uppsala, 1967 [no date] (AJC).
5 The Uppsala group would in its information work quite innocently defend untenable positions. Discussing COREMO—and despite its name and original intentions—it stated in 1967 that “divisions are always regrettable, but one should [not] because of that simply criticize organizations that break away from already established institutions. Strictly speaking, the objective of the Swedish FRELIMO Group is to support only FRELIMO, but we want, nevertheless, to leave all options open and not take a stand against, for example, COREMO, even though FRELIMO itself does so” (Ibid.).
6 Svenska FRELIMO-gruppen: Circular letter from Pär Jansson, Uppsala, 18 April 1970 (AJC). Leading representatives of the Uppsala South Africa Committee had some years before argued that solidarity with Southern Africa divided the anti-imperialist movement and diverted attention from the “storm centre” in South East Asia. This explains why the pro-Chinese organizations that were so influential in the solidarity movement with Vietnam remained on the margin of the solidarity movements with Southern Africa and Latin America.
Under the catchword of a ‘united anti-imperialist front for Vietnam’, many Swedish solidarity activists would at the close of the 1960s abandon their earlier commitment towards Southern Africa. The debate would, however, also prepare the terrain for the reorganization and reactivation of the increasingly depleted South Africa Committees, eventually leading from 1970 to the formation of more militant Africa Groups. Serving as a bridge between the first and the second generation solidarity opinion with Southern Africa, the Lund South Africa Committee and the editorial board around the Södra Afrika information bulletin rejected the Maoist-inspired ‘focus theory’ and the notion of a singular ‘storm centre’ in the world, maintaining instead “a comprehensive view, where the racial oppression in Southern Africa and the war in Vietnam constitute two sides of the same phenomenon, [namely] the excesses by the rich world against the poor, coloured peoples”.¹ This view inspired new solidarity expressions towards Southern Africa and Mozambique. When the Uppsala group dissolved itself and joined the Vietnam movement, another FRELIMO group had, for example, already been formed in Stockholm in November 1968. This group—also called the FRELIMO Group—later joined the reorganized Stockholm Africa Group, effectively contributing to sustained solidarity work for FRELIMO and Mozambique in Sweden.²

Nevertheless, the fact that individuals and—as in the case of the Uppsala group—entire solidarity structures gave up their work for Southern Africa had negative consequences for the liberation movements, not least materially. While millions of Swedish Kronor were collected for the struggle in Vietnam, there were in the early 1970s no corresponding results from the Africa Groups.³ Competing material support to the movements in Southern Africa—whether official or by non-governmental organizations—was seen as divisive by the dominant Vietnam movement. After years of public, audited fund-raising for FRELIMO, the Uppsala FRELIMO Group—announcing its dissolution—reluctantly conceded that “we find that we for formal reasons are obliged to forward the funds presently credited to FRELIMO’s fund-raising account to this organi-

¹ Aftonbladet, 29 January 1967.
² See interview with Sören Lindh, Stockholm, 4 February 1997.
³ The Africa Groups gave at the time explicit primacy to political support and information activities over material support. In an information sheet—written in English—the Stockholm Africa Group stated as late as at the beginning of 1973: “We regard the political support to the liberation movements as [...] primary. The material support must always be a part of this political support. Our foremost task is to inform about the reasons for the oppression and enlarge the political support to the liberation movements, not to collect money. [...] The easiest way to collect large amounts of money is to strictly appeal to the emotions of people. But this creates no understanding of the reasons why money is needed. [...] The most important [aspect] is not the coin, but the political acknowledgement of a people’s right to an armed fight for their defence and liberation” (Stockholm Africa Group: ‘Support to the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies from Swedish non-governmental organizations, 1971’, Stockholm [no date, but probably February 1973] (AGA). Nevertheless, the Africa Groups did carry out fund-raising campaigns for the liberation movements. In the case of Mozambique, the FRELIMO-Sweden campaign raised around 100,000 SEK between November 1968 and January 1973. The corresponding figures for MPLA (from 1971) and PAIGC (from 1969) were 40,000 and 70,000 SEK, respectively (Ibid.).
zation. We have, [however], decided that [the administrative means] of the group shall be disbursed to the fund for Vietnam”.1 By that time—in 1970—FRELIMO had, however, been firmly established in the broader Swedish solidarity opinion, receiving material support from diverse sources, ranging from the local Emmaus group in Björkå to the ruling Social Democratic Party. Above all, the Mozambique Institute had in 1968–69 been identified as a privileged recipient of substantial resources by the secondary school and university students.

A Tenner and a Day’s Work for the Mozambique Institute

In October 1967, the FRELIMO President made another visit to Sweden, yet again addressing the youth and student organizations. Described by the social democratic evening paper Aftonbladet as “presently perhaps Africa’s most successful warrior leader in the struggle against colonial oppression”2, Mondlane was by then not only a well known liberation figure in Sweden, but an African nationalist whose opinions through his own academic credentials and his attention to the issues of youth and education carried particular weight among the students. After a meeting with Mondlane in Stockholm, all the major political youth and student organizations except the Moderates adopted, for example, a strongly worded resolution, which requested the Swedish government to condemn Portugal’s oppressive policies in Africa, grant support to the liberation movements and work for the expulsion of Portugal from EFTA and NATO.3

Six months later—in April 1968—the student organizations at the University of Stockholm decided to grant not less than 100,000 SEK to FRELIMO’s education projects in the liberated areas of Mozambique via the newly established Students Development Fund (SDF).4 The following month it was announced that some five hundred teachers and staff members at the University of Gothenburg during the previous year had set aside 1% of their salaries in favour of another ‘development action’.5 The amount raised—90,000 SEK—was to be used in equal shares for the procurement of a fishing vessel to Tanzania

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2 Aftonbladet, 9 October 1967.
3 Dagens Nyheter, 10 October 1967.
4 Dagens Nyheter and Svenska Dagbladet, 11 April 1968. The Students Development Fund (with no designation in Swedish) was the branch for international assistance of the Swedish university student unions. Åke Magnusson, later the author of several books on South Africa and actively and controversially involved in the sanctions’ debate against apartheid, was the first president of SDF.
5 In Swedish, U-hjälpsaktionen i Göteborg, FRELIMO’s representative Loureno Mutaca and Anders Johansson of Dagens Nyheter were largely instrumental in bringing about this decision. Johansson had just visited the liberated areas in northern Mozambique. Assisted by Mutaca, he submitted a memorandum on FRELIMO’s education activities to U-hjälpsaktionen i Göteborg shortly before the decision was reached (Anders Johansson: ‘Promemoria angående utbildningshjälp för Moçam-bique’/‘Memorandum on educational assistance to Mozambique’, Handen, 4 May 1968) (AJC).
and disbursed to the Mozambique Institute for its education projects inside Mozambique.\footnote{Dagens Nyheter, 10 May 1968.} In the wake of the May 1968 student revolt, the Båstad demonstrations and the Cabora Bassa debate, the Swedish university students’ solidarity with FRELIMO grew further in 1968–69. It largely centred on the question of how to use the ten Swedish Kronor—‘the tenner’—all students were paying as part of their membership fee to the student unions for worthy humanitarian causes. After intense debates—particularly in Gothenburg, where proposed financial support to the South African Committee for Higher Education was opposed and defeated in favour of ‘a tenner to FRELIMO’\footnote{The SACHED project—which from the mid-1960s was one of the first education projects supported by the Swedish government in South Africa—was strongly opposed by the socialist student organizations at the University of Gothenburg. SDS (Studerande för ett Demokratiskt Samhälle/Students for a Democratic Society) described SACHED as “aiming at turning the blacks into tolerant and obliging [citizens] towards the white South African regime” (SDS: ‘Vart tar GIS-tian vägen?’/’Where does [our tenner] go?’, Leaflet, Gothenburg [no date, but 1968] (AJC).}—SDF decided in February 1969 to allocate 80,000 SEK to the Mozambique Institute’s education efforts in Tanzania and the liberated areas.\footnote{Student Development Fund: ‘Press release’, Gothenburg, 13 February 1968 (AJC). At the same time, it was decided to set aside 30,000 SEK for education of Angolan refugees in Congo and 7,500 SEK for laboratory equipment to the Swaneng Hill School in Botswana.} Two months later, the student union at the University of Umeå in northern Sweden decided to donate an additional amount of 15,000 SEK raised outside SDF as an untied contribution directly to FRELIMO.\footnote{Dagens Nyheter, 20 April 1969.}

By that time, the secondary school students had already made their important entry onto the scene. Beginning in 1961, the Swedish Union of Secondary School Students (SECO)\footnote{In Swedish, Sveriges Elevers Centralorganisation. Reorganized in 1982, it changed its name to Elevorganisationen i Sverige (The Swedish School Student Union).} had in cooperation with the National Council of Swedish Youth developed the concept of an annual Operation Day’s Work\footnote{In Swedish, Operation Dagsverke.} to “translate [the secondary students’] interest in international questions into practical action”.\footnote{SECO: ‘SECO’s insamling 1969; FRELIMO-Moçambique Institute’ (‘SECO’s fund-raising campaign 1969; FRELIMO—Mozambique Institute’) [no place or date, but 1969] (AJC). The first national Operation Day’s Work was organized in favour of the Dag Hammarskjöld Memorial Fund after the death of the Swedish UN Secretary General in September 1961. As earlier noted, the campaign—En Dag för Dag (‘A Day for Dag’)—managed to raise not less than 400,000 SEK.} The concept was simple, but effective. Once a year all secondary school students were given a day off to carry out various jobs for interested private or public companies or institutions against a remuneration below normal rates. The proceeds of the work—organized with the objective “to create understanding and commitment among students according to the principle ‘youth helps youth’”\footnote{Ibid.}—were subsequently channelled to one or more international projects. Operation Day’s Work soon became an important institution, regularly taking place in September or October. It was from the outset...
administered by the secondary school students themselves, who at the begin-
ning of each year at the annual 'students' parliament\footnote{In Swedish, Elevriksdag.} discussed different possible beneficiaries. After reaching a decision, the period until the actual Operation Day’s Work was dedicated to information among the students and the general public about the subject of the campaign. Involving all secondary schools, SECO’s Operation Dagsverke effectively contributed to a rapidly growing international awareness among the Swedish youth, not least vis-à-vis the problems of Southern Africa.\footnote{Operation Day’s Work campaigns were carried out in favour of Mozambique in 1969 and 1972, respectively raising 2 million and 450,000 SEK; Zimbabwe in 1979 (information only); and Southern Africa (including ANC) in 1981 and 1985. The amount raised in 1981 was 1.6 million SEK and the 1985 result was not less than 8.5 million SEK (Elevorganisationen i Sverige: Reply to a questionnaire from the Nordic Africa Institute, dated 29 July 1996). Operation Dagsverke has continued as a regular feature in Sweden. In 1998, it was organized in favour of Angola.} Many future activists and members of the organized solidarity movement were introduced to the wider issues of the region’s liberation struggles through the campaigns.

In mid-February 1969, the secondary school students’ parliament unanimously decided to dedicate the upcoming Operation Day’s Work to the health and education projects carried out by the Mozambique Institute.\footnote{Svenska Dagbladet, 18 February 1969.} Influential behind the decision—reached only days after the assassination of Eduardo
Mondlane\textsuperscript{1}—was Janet Mondlane. She had returned to Sweden in December 1968. During the visit she met representatives of SECO—and of the Finnish secondary school students\textsuperscript{2}—discussing the idea of a campaign for Mozambique, and, “marvel of marvels, they adopted the Mozambique Institute”\textsuperscript{3}. At the following SECO assembly, the proposal initially competed with two literacy projects in Tanzania and Tunisia, but unanimity was reached in favour of the Mozambican project. It was at the same time decided that the support should be administered by the experienced Swedish organization Save the Children.\textsuperscript{4} Soon thereafter, the Swedish Union of Secondary School Students issued a comprehensive campaign brief to all the secondary schools in the country, stating that

\begin{quote}
this year the subject of our campaign is the Mozambique Institute. It is an organization which mainly is concerned with health and education in an area—the region in northern Mozambique that has been liberated from the colonial power of Portugal—which is in dire need of financial support. Through our action we do not only want to contribute funds. We also wish to [...] spread knowledge about [...] people who under very difficult conditions are fighting for the right to their country, an existence worthy of humans and the possibility to decide their own future. Growing interest in the problems of the developing countries by an increasing number of people [in Sweden] is in the longer perspective of the utmost importance. Let us therefore practically manifest our solidarity through Operation Day’s Work, which [...] is organized in cooperation with Save the Children [and constitutes] an action by the youth in support of the youth.\textsuperscript{5}
\end{quote}

Eduardo Mondlane’s book \textit{The Struggle for Mozambique} was largely used as study material during the following campaign. It was published in Swedish shortly after his death at the beginning of 1969, the same year as it appeared in English.\textsuperscript{6}

The actual Operation Day’s Work was held in early October 1969, preceded by internal information campaigns\textsuperscript{7} and public coverage via press, radio and television. From a purely material point of view the result was impressive. At a time when the official Swedish support to the Mozambique Institute was still suspended, the Swedish secondary school students managed in one major

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1] The FRELIMO President was killed by a parcel bomb in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on 3 February 1969.
\item[2] The secondary school students in Finland joined their counterparts in Sweden, organizing an important \textit{taksivirkki} in October 1969 and raising 450,000 FIM. The proceeds were mainly used for the procurement and installation of FRELIMO’s first printing press (Soiri and Peltola op. cit., pp. 32–42).
\item[4] In Swedish, \textit{Rädda Barnen}.
\item[7] Janet Mondlane participated actively in the campaigns, \textit{inter alia} addressing meetings in different schools in Sweden (interview with Janet Mondlane, Maputo, 30 April 1996).
\end{footnotes}
effort to raise not less than 2 million SEK for FRELIMO, or more than the 1.7 million disbursed by the government between 1965 and 1968. Even more important in the longer perspective was the political impact of SECO’s campaign. The unanimous ‘parliamentary’ decision by the secondary students in favour of FRELIMO was taken before the Swedish parliament had endorsed the principle of direct support to the Southern African liberation movements. The students were never deterred by the argument that FRELIMO was waging an armed struggle or by the sudden death of Eduardo Mondlane. As in the case of the university-based SDF, it is, on the contrary, probable that these factors weighed in favour of the decision. Above all, the 1969 SECO campaign played a major role for the future relations between Sweden and FRELIMO. That is also how it was seen by the Mozambican liberation movement. In a subsequent report to SECO, Janet Mondlane wrote that

it is not possible to express the extent of our feeling of admiration for the Swedish students who tirelessly worked to aid the young students who come from Mozambique. The effect of the efforts of our Swedish friends will be felt beyond their own generation, for it is this generation of students who will continue laying the foundation of a new country.

Almost thirty years later, she remembered SECO as “an extraordinarily powerful youth organization” and the 1969 Operation Day’s Work as a decisive breakthrough:

That is how a kind of mass consciousness about what was happening in Mozambique really began [in Sweden]. [...] It was not just the money that was important, but the sensitization of the whole population. These young people went home and

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1 Elevorganisationen i Sverige: Reply to a questionnaire from the Nordic Africa Institute, dated 29 July 1996.
2 As was seen above, in 1968–69 the Swedish universities raised around a quarter of a million SEK for FRELIMO, while the SECO contribution was 2 million. There are no comparable data on NGO support for 1970. A study by SIDA found, however, that fourteen Swedish non-governmental organizations together in the year 1971 raised more than 1.7 million SEK for FRELIMO (Stockholm Africa Group: ‘Support to the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies from Swedish non-governmental organizations, 1971’, Stockholm [no date, but probably February 1973] (AGA). Between 1968 and 1971, the Swedish NGO support to FRELIMO thus amounted to at least 4 million SEK. This should be compared to the 0.5 million SEK disbursed by the Swedish government through SIDA during the financial year 1971/72. A number of conclusions may be drawn from these figures, which were largely similar in the cases of other Southern African liberation movements. One is, obviously, that the movements enjoyed widespread support at the level of the Swedish civil society around 1970 and another that the joint material support by the Swedish NGOs at the time was considerably larger than the official support. In this context, it should be emphasized that it has not been possible within the present study to reliably establish the total value of the Swedish support extended by the NGO community and individuals to the Southern African liberation movements. It could, however, safely be concluded that the monetary transfers from Sweden to the Southern African liberation movements exceed by a wide margin the official figures given in the text.
talked about what they were doing. It was a big event. [...] After that, things began to snowball.¹

Largely inspired by Eduardo and Janet Mondlane, the student movements actively contributed to both the material and political support to the Mozambican liberation struggle in Sweden. From the mid-1960s, the FRELIMO President also established unusually close relations with the ruling Social Democratic Party and a number of leading Liberal politicians and opinion makers.

¹ Interview with Janet Mondlane, Maputo, 30 April 1996.
Armed Struggle and FRELIMO in Sweden

The FRELIMO President had on Janet Mondlane’s initiative visited Sweden for the first time in September 1964. The Verdandi student association in Uppsala acted as host during their stay, which took place immediately before the launch of the armed struggle. As the transition from peaceful to violent means of struggle presented FRELIMO with new challenges—not least on the international arena—the Central Committee decided at the beginning of 1965 that Mondlane should make another tour of Western Europe, including the Scandinavian countries.\(^1\) The visit to Scandinavia was, according to Mondlane, “meant to stimulate interest in our struggle against Portuguese colonialism. We wish to interest the Scandinavian people in not only getting their governments to pressure Portugal to change her policies […], but also [in] contributing directly in a material form to the struggle”.\(^2\)

Asking for help with “plans and contacts”, Mondlane wrote to Verdandi’s Sven Hamrell, proposing a visit to Sweden from the end of April 1965.\(^3\) By that time, the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance had already decided to recommend Swedish official support to the Mozambique Institute. Partly for that reason,\(^4\) Hamrell advised against the proposal, replying that “I do not think that any more money can be forthcoming from Swedish sources for the time being”.\(^5\) Indirectly referring to the armed struggle and to Mondlane’s stated objective to raise material support in Sweden, Hamrell added that

> I have a hunch that it is better to try to get some more money for the refugees before launching a new publicity campaign [in Sweden]. […] I fear that certain conservative members of our parliament might object to our support for what they regard as a dangerous revolutionary movement. Well, you know how they can twist things and disturb what I hope can be handled as a strictly bureaucratic matter.\(^6\)

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\(^1\) Letter from Eduardo Mondlane to Sven Hamrell, Dar es Salaam, 5 March 1965 (MHA).
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^4\) In his reply, Hamrell added: “The timing of your visit would not be suitable for your purposes since the academic year more or less ends on May 1. After that date”, he explained to the FRELIMO President, “everybody in the university towns is dead drunk for about two weeks” (letter from Sven Hamrell to Eduardo Mondlane, Uppsala, 22 March 1965) (MHA).
\(^5\) Ibid.
\(^6\) Ibid.
Hamrell instead recommended a visit to Denmark and Norway, “where I don’t think that you have made any headway so far”.¹ In the meantime, however, Mondlane was invited to Sweden by the National Council of Swedish Youth (SUL). Appreciating Hamrell’s “frank advice against visiting Sweden at this time”, Mondlane informed him about his travel plans, adding that “I will still take into consideration your caution about not creating sensations [in Sweden] which might affect our humanitarian refugee support”.²

Mondlane’s second visit eventually took place in mid-September 1965. Invited by SUL, he dedicated much attention to the Swedish youth and student movements, but it was during this visit that he also established direct contacts with the Swedish government, the Social Democratic Party and the Trade Union Confederation.³ In particular, it was in September 1965 that Mondlane for the first time met Olof Palme,⁴ his indirect benefactor a decade and a half earlier. This marked the beginning of a relationship within which they—in the words of Janet Mondlane—“respected each other a lot [and] made strategies together”.⁵ During his visit, the FRELIMO President would not, however, pay heed to Hamrell’s advice or his own words of discretion regarding the armed struggle. On the contrary, throughout his stay Mondlane not only appealed for Swedish humanitarian support, but also for weapons and assistance to the armed struggle.⁶ In marked contrast to his low-key visit the previous year, Mondlane similarly requested the Swedish government to “see to it that Portugal is forced to leave EFTA”.⁷

The questions of military assistance to the Mozambican struggle and of Portugal’s expulsion from EFTA—later combined with forceful opposition to the Cabora Bassa project—would regularly be raised by Mondlane during his visits to Sweden. After his death in February 1969, the same position was taken by Joaquim Chissano, Marcelino dos Santos and other visiting FRELIMO leaders. More than any other Southern African liberation movement supported by Sweden—including their MPLA and PAIGC allies—FRELIMO consistently maintained a critical stance towards the official Swedish separation of civilian

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¹ Ibid.
² Letter from Eduardo Mondlane to Sven Hamrell, Dar es Salaam, 2 April 1965 (MHA).
³ SUL: ‘Program för Dr. Eduardo Mondlane’ (‘Programme for Dr. Eduardo Mondlane’), Stockholm, 12 September 1965 (MHA).
⁴ Stockholms-Tidningen, 14 September 1965.
⁵ Interview with Janet Mondlane, Maputo, 30 April 1996. After the death of the FRELIMO President, Palme, in particular, underlined to Janet Mondlane how he and Eduardo Mondlane had worked closely together during the meeting of the Socialist International in Stockholm in May 1966 (Ibid.).
⁶ ’Frihetsrörelsen i Moçambique vill helst ha vapen av Sverige’ (‘The freedom movement in Mozambique would prefer to get weapons from Sweden’) in Svenska Dagbladet, 14 September 1965 and ’Moçambiquedele: Ge svenska vapen till vår rörelse’ (‘Mozambican leader: Give Swedish weapons to our movement’) in Dagens Nyheter, 17 September 1965.
⁷ Cited in Stockholms-Tidningen, 14 September 1965.
and military support and vis-à-vis Sweden’s economic relations with Portugal.¹ This would from the mid-1960s place FRELIMO in the centre of the Swedish political debate, where forces to the left of the Social Democratic government—including the organized solidarity movement—demanded untied and unconditional assistance and the opposition Liberal Party insisted on Portugal’s expulsion from EFTA.² Nevertheless, FRELIMO’s stand did not prevent the establishment of close relations with the ruling Social Democrats.

Mondlane, the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Opposition

An indication of the nature of the future relationship was given shortly after Mondlane’s second visit to Sweden. On behalf of the National Board of the Social Democratic Party, Pierre Schori wrote to the FRELIMO President in November 1965, asking for guidance regarding the Portuguese political opposition. The ruling party had in its international relations until then mainly followed the policies of the dominant member parties of the Socialist International. Seeking the views of a non-member African liberation movement on the political situation in a European country—furthermore linked to Sweden and the colonial master of the territory claimed by the movement—was, indeed, indicative of a new, independent course. In his letter to Mondlane, Schori wrote that the

*Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional*³ [has] written to us, saying that they are willing to supply us with information about the anti-fascist struggle in Portugal and her colonies. They also want to have more intimate relations with us. Before any action is taken, I wanted, [however], to contact you to find out your views on [this organization]. [...] Please let us know your opinion on the different organizations involved in the fight against Salazar.⁴

Two months later—after a longer absence from Dar es Salaam—Mondlane replied to Schori at the Social Democratic Party headquarters, stating that

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¹ See interview with Joaquim Chissano, Maputo, 2 May 1996 and interview with Marcelino dos Santos, Maputo, 3 May 1996.
² The solidarity movement and many leading young Social Democrats also demanded Portugal’s expulsion from EFTA. This was, for example, the case with Annie Marie Sundbom of SUL—later leader of the Social Democratic Women’s League (1970–80)—who organized Mondlane’s visit to Sweden in 1965. In subsequent letters to Mondlane, she was particularly critical of the contemporary discussions on the “unification of Europe” and of Portugal’s membership in EFTA (letters from Annie Marie Sundbom to Eduardo Mondlane, Stockholm, 15 October 1965 and 3 January 1966) (MHA).
³ The Portuguese Patriotic Front of National Liberation was set up in late 1962 under the leadership of General Humberto Delgado. With headquarters in Algiers, FPLN accommodated a wide spectrum of anti-Salazar forces, including the Communist Party of Portugal (PCP). It was divided in mid-1964, when Delgado left to set up his own opposition organization. FPLN would from then on be dominated by PCP. Close relations between FPLN and CONCP were established in 1965.
⁴ Letter from Pierre Schori to Eduardo Mondlane, Stockholm, 22 November 1965 (MHA).
FRELIMO is now working in close cooperation with this front [and] I am personally satisfied that the Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional is a genuine united front of the various political tendencies in Portugal which are determined to rid themselves of fascism. Furthermore, I am satisfied that the front as a whole is in complete agreement with the aspirations of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies in Africa. [...] I should [therefore] like to support any arrangement that you might wish to undertake to give them any aid that they might need to strengthen their programme against Portuguese fascism.¹

Mondlane was invited by the Socialist International (SI) to attend its congress in Stockholm in early May 1966. In that connection, he also addressed the Swedish labour movement in Gävle on 1 May 1966. As earlier noted, the SI congress developed into both a particularly acrimonious meeting between the larger European members—above all the British Labour Party—and the invited Southern African liberation movements, as well as to a breakthrough in the relations between the Swedish Social Democratic Party and FRELIMO.² Disappointed with the dominant European parties—which he described as “too over-concentrated on the problems of their own continent to be interested in the problems of the rest of the world”—Mondlane wrote to the SDF secretary Sten Andersson, conveying that “even though the attitude of the congress as a whole toward the role of the African observers left a great deal to be desired, the part played by the Swedish Social Democratic Party [...] was very good. In saying this, I express not only my own personal impressions and feelings, but also those of most, if not all, of the Africans present”.³

Based on this experience, the FRELIMO President concluded that

the present good relations existing between the Swedish Social Democratic Party and many African socialist parties, especially in East and Southern Africa, must be

¹ Letter from Eduardo Mondlane to Pierre Schori, [Dar es Salaam], 11 January 1966 (MHA). Six months later, Schori established direct contacts with FPLN (letter from Pierre Schori to Eduardo Mondlane, Stockholm [no date, but before September 1966] (MHA) Eventually, however, the Swedish Social Democratic Party extended support to Mário Soares’ Acção Socialista Portugueza (Portuguese Socialist Action), the forerunner of the Socialist Party of Portugal. Schori visited Portugal on a fact-finding mission for the Socialist International in early 1967. Interviewed thirty years later, he recalled: “I carried out under-cover work and made a kind of radiography of the political opposition. The first ever, I think. That was also when I met Mário Soares for the first time, in his lawyer’s office. He had defended many of the liberation movements in court. [...] My report was [...] entitled ‘Portugal: Colossus on Clay Feet’. [...] I described the different political forces in the country and my recommendation was to support the small Socialist Party, which at the time was called Acção Socialista. It had only about fifteen to twenty active members around Mário Soares, but they had a vision for the future and contacts with democratic people all over the country. My recommendation was to invite them to congresses of the member parties of the Socialist International. Mário Soares then started to be invited, and when the dictatorship fell in 1974 he was the only politician with solid international connections” (interview with Pierre Schori, Stockholm, 28 June 1996). See also Pierre Schori: ‘Portugal’ in Tiden, No. 8, 1967, pp. 483–495. In this article for the official Social Democratic journal, Schori concluded that “the real settlement [of the Portuguese question] will [...] take place in Africa” (p. 495).

² Cf. interview with Marcelino dos Santos, Maputo, 3 May 1996.

³ Letter from Eduardo Mondlane to Sten Andersson, [Dar es Salaam], 2 June 1966 (MHA).
encouraged. In so far as they affect Mozambique, FRELIMO is deeply interested in cultivating a special relationship with your party. [...] I should therefore like to propose that a high officer of FRELIMO be invited, either officially or unofficially, to Sweden to set up an information centre to provide the Swedish people and other Scandinavians with fresh information from Mozambique and to learn as much as he can from the Social Democratic Party of Sweden about the organization, administration, information and other activities of the party [...], so that he may help to apply these things in the structure of FRELIMO. He should also be given an opportunity to study one, two or more concrete subjects at the University of Stockholm, such as political economy, planning and public administration.2

That Mondlane was keen to place a representative in Sweden was further underlined by the fact that he the very same day raised the idea in a more personal letter to Pierre Schori3 and that he the following day also wrote to the secretary of the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance, Thord Palmlund, requesting a scholarship for a FRELIMO envoy.4 Mondlane emphasized the role of the Swedish ruling party in the official letter to Palmlund, writing that “during my last visit to Sweden I was so impressed by [...] the Social Democratic Party of Sweden that I decided to establish a more permanent system of communications [with] Sweden”.5 It was, finally, in the letter to Palmlund that he proposed a candidate to be placed there, namely Lourenço Mutaca, FRELIMO’s Secretary for Financial and Economic Affairs and thus a high-ranking member of the organization.6

Several of the Southern African liberation movements had since the beginning of the 1960s de facto been represented in Sweden by resident student members.7 Some of the students had been granted scholarships as a result of direct interventions by the leaders of their respective movements. Mondlane’s proposal in mid-1966 constituted, however, the first politically motivated initiative

1 Jacinto Veloso, the future Mozambican minister and member of FRELIMO’s Political Bureau, worked closely with Eduardo Mondlane in Dar es Salaam in the mid-1960s. In an interview in April 1996 he said that Mondlane looked upon Sweden and the other Nordic countries as “real allies and maybe even ideal partners [in the struggle for national liberation]. They did not have any particular interests [in the issue] or were, at least, equidistant from the East–West conflict” (interview with Jacinto Veloso, Maputo, 29 April 1996). Similarly, Joaquim Chissano has stated that we were “ideologically [...] close to Sweden, [which] constituted a balance to the tendencies of copying what one could see in countries [such as] the Soviet Union or China” (interview with Joaquim Chissano, Maputo, 2 May 1996).

2 Letter from Eduardo Mondlane to Sten Andersson, [Dar es Salaam], 2 June 1966 (MHA).

3 Letter from Eduardo Mondlane to Pierre Schori, [Dar es Salaam], 2 June 1966 (MHA). Mondlane was greatly impressed by Schori, stating that “I know that everything that I enjoyed while in Sweden was arranged by you”. Having established a close personal relationship, the FRELIMO President added: “I hope that after the [SI congress] you found time to get away from it all [to] rest, because even though I think [that] you are a tough fellow, you can not work the way you do without collapsing” (Ibid.).

4 Letter from Eduardo Mondlane to Thord Palmlund, [Dar es Salaam], 3 June 1966 (MHA).

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 In the case of SWANU of Namibia, important members of the political leadership were studying in Sweden.
to have a representative of a liberation movement formally accredited to the
ing the idea of having an
official FRELIMO representative in Sweden was at the time—three years before
the endorsement of the principle of Swedish official support to the liberation
movements—from the point of view of protocol still controversial. It was only
towards the end of 1967 that Mutaca could eventually take up his position.¹ At
that time, the ruling Social Democratic Party had through the Tage Erlander
Foundation for International Cooperation—the forerunner of the International
Solidarity Fund set up in October 1967—already invited representatives of
FRELIMO to acquaint themselves with the work of Swedish trade unions and
political organizations.² In addition, the FRELIMO President had by then
raised the idea with his contacts in the Liberal Party.³

Nevertheless, Mondlane’s initiative opened new ground. His proposal that
the FRELIMO representative should combine political work with academic
studies would later guide the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assis-
tance. In mid-1969, the committee established the principle that scholarships for
African students in Sweden “as far as possible should be restricted to persons
with a particular connection to [the] liberation movements” and that their
study results should partly be judged on the basis of “the information activities
[that] they perform [in Sweden]”.⁴

The affinity to the ruling party notwithstanding, the FRELIMO President
would in his dealings with Sweden never compromise his commitment to the
armed struggle, hide his criticism of the Swedish government’s economic rela-
tions with Portugal or limit his contacts to the Social Democrats. For example,
already returning to Stockholm in September 1966 Mondlane emphatically
stated to the Swedish press that “we want to extend our war”.⁵ At the same
time, he did an interview with David Wirmark of the non-socialist opposition
Liberal Party in which he said that

you are too neutral in Sweden at present. [...] If Sweden’s words of solidarity with
us shall be taken seriously, it is logical that we expect that Sweden exercise pres-

¹ Letter from Anders Johansson to the author, [Eskilstuna], 26 April 1998.
² One of the first FRELIMO members to be invited by the Social Democratic Party was Lopes
Tembe. See ‘Vi kommer att befria Moçambique!’ (‘We will liberate Mozambique!’) in Borås Tidning,
26 March 1968.
³ Letter from Eduardo Mondlane to David Wirmark, Dar es Salaam, 16 September 1966 (MHA).
⁴ The representatives of the Southern African liberation movements that were financed via SIDA,
 i.e. with official Swedish funds, covered as a rule Sweden and the other Nordic countries. Sometimes they
also covered other European countries. In the case of SWAPO of Namibia, for
example, West Germany and Austria fell within the area of responsibility of the Stockholm-based
representative.
⁵ ‘Vi vill öka ut vårt krig’ (‘We want to extend our war’) in Aftonbladet, 12 September 1966. See also
Dagens Nyheter, 14 September 1966.
sure on Portugal within EFTA, but also directly. The pressure should aim at the expulsion [of Portugal] from EFTA and at an economic boycott of the country.¹

During the following visit in October 1967, Mondlane sharpened his criticism. In an interview with the Liberal MP Per Ahlmark, he thus not only requested the expulsion of Portugal from EFTA, but informed the Swedish readers that the feelings towards Sweden within FRELIMO at the time were quite bitter. When I went here, some of my friends in the movement queried why I was visiting a country which in its trade policies is an ally of Portugal.² My reply was that I [...] should try to influence the debate and assist those who demand action against Portugal.³

Those who demanded action were found in the Swedish solidarity committees with Southern Africa, among the youth and the students, in large sections of the social democratic movement and in the Liberal Party. When the Cabora Bassa issue forcefully broke into the national political debate from mid-1968, both the FRELIMO President and his recently arrived representative, Lourenço Mutaca, consequently joined the critics of the Social Democratic government’s defence of trade relations with Portugal and of the LO leadership’s arguments in favour of ASEA’s proposed involvement in Mozambique.

Liberals against the Government

Sweden’s trade partnership with Portugal in EFTA was strongly criticized from the beginning, in particular by younger members of the opposition Liberal Party, which otherwise was a principled defender of free trade. As already noted, as early as in July 1961 a group of young Liberals had in an open letter to the Swedish government argued that “by accepting Portugal’s membership, Sweden gives [both] a moral and an indirect economic support to the [colonial] oppression, [thereby] obstructing the freedom struggle”. The group was led by Per Ahlmark, the chairman of the Liberal Party Youth League, who as a parliamentarian later in the 1960s would appear as the most active Swedish politician against Portugal’s EFTA membership.

The critics argued that by supporting the Portuguese economy, Sweden and the other EFTA members strengthened Lisbon’s resources to carry out the wars


² At the same time, the official FRELIMO journal Mozambique Revolution published an article on EFTA stating that “the contradiction between the Scandinavian image and [the] actual government policy is daily becoming more blatant” (Mozambique Revolution, No. 31, October–November 1967, p. 8).

³ Cited in Expressen, 9 October 1967.
in Africa. Positive economic developments in metropolitan Portugal were in the
1960s also accompanied by increasing budgetary allocations to the military. In
1965—four years into the colonial wars—the defence expenditure amounted to
not less than 48% of the national budget, considerably higher than that of any
other European nation.1 At the same time, there was a marked growth of both
direct Swedish investments in Portugal and in the trade exchange between the
two countries. In addition, in the mid-1960s Portugal became an increasingly
attractive destination for Swedish tourists. Between 1965 and 1966, for example,
the number of visitors from Sweden grew by more than a third,2 which made
Pierre Schori comment in the social democratic journal Tiden that “12,500
Swedish tourists contributed last year to the financing of the war”.3

Sweden had since the outbreak of the war in Angola banned exports of
armaments and war equipment to Portugal.4 At the beginning of 1967, the
South Africa Committee in Lund, however, revealed that the Swedish car
manufacturer Volvo was placing advertisements for its all-terrain vehicle Lap-
lander—described as “totally adapted to the toughest military and civilian
activities”5—in the Portuguese army journal Jornal do Exército, and requested
an explanation from the government.6 The issue was also raised by Anders
Johansson in Dagens Nyheter.7 On behalf of the Ministry of Trade, the Inspector
of War Equipment8 subsequently explained that the Volvo vehicle was intend-
ed for “transport of personnel” and therefore not regarded as war equipment.
He also confirmed that the Laplander had been sold to Portugal.9

Nevertheless, with the notable exception of Eduardo Mondlane, few voices
were raised in the mid-1960s against EFTA and the Swedish-Portuguese trade
partnership from within the liberation movements themselves. For example, as
late as in January 1967 Janet Mondlane wrote to Sven Hamrell that “FRELIMO
has not made any official statement on Portugal and [...] EFTA. [Marcelino] dos
Santos, the Foreign Secretary, says that although he would like to help you
right away, there is nothing he can say at this moment”.10 In addition, both
MPLA and FNLA of Angola were surprisingly silent on the issue, at least in
their direct contacts with Sweden, while Amílcar Cabral of Guinea-Bissau was

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1 Cann op. cit., p. 9.
3 Ibid.
6 ‘Volvo, Regeringen och Exportrestriktionerna’ (‘Volvo, the Government and the Export
8 In Swedish, krigsmaterielinspektör.
9 B. Bjuggren: ‘Beträffande Volvo i Portugal’ (‘Regarding Volvo in Portugal’) in Dagens Nyheter,
20 May 1967.
10 Letter from Janet Rae Mondlane to Sven Hamrell, Dar es Salaam, 26 January 1967 (MHA).
often reported as taking a less critical attitude than Mondlane. Visiting Sweden in December 1968—that is, at the height of the Cabora Bassa debate—the PAIGC Secretary General in an interview with Pierre Schori expressed the opinion that Portugal should not be excluded from EFTA as “it would only mean that [it] could act even more freely”.¹

Although Schori in 1967 had reported from a fact-finding mission to Portugal in the social democratic journal Tiden that the Portuguese opposition in general was critical of EFTA,² there were, likewise, few critical voices raised within the social democratic movement. It was instead the Left Party and—above all—a radical group within the Liberal Party that demanded Swedish action against Portugal via EFTA. Quoting Eduardo Mondlane, the Communist (Left) Party submitted a parliamentary motion in January 1967 through which it demanded “effective pressures and measures against Portugal within the United Nations, EFTA and other international organizations”.³ However, the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs rejected the proposal, pronouncing the opinion that

> it must be pointed out that EFTA [...] is an organization that is entirely concerned with economic—notably commercial—tasks and that it does not contain any formal conditions whereby a member state can exert pressure of a political kind against another member state. Nor do provisions exist in the EFTA Convention that presuppose that a member state can be excluded.⁴

The same day—30 March 1967—as this opinion was given by the Foreign Affairs Committee, an unusually intense debate took place in the First Chamber of the Swedish parliament between the recently elected Liberal member Per Ahlmark and the Swedish Minister of Trade, Gunnar Lange, on the question of EFTA, Portugal and Sweden. Forcefully arguing that “Sweden and other EFTA countries [by] supporting Portugal’s economic development contribute to the prolongation of the wars in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea” and underlining that the EFTA Convention stated that “the organization should aim for [...] a rational utilization of resources [and] gradual increase in the standard of living [...] in each member country”, Ahlmark—who also quoted Eduardo Mondlane—similarly demanded Swedish pressures on Portugal within EFTA. They should “make Portugal willing to agree to the introduction of inde-

¹ Cited in ‘Portugals argumentnöd bevisar: Kolonialkrigen går dåligt!’ (‘Portugal’s lack of arguments prove that the colonial wars are not going well!’) in Arbetet, 13 December 1968.


³ Swedish Parliament 1967: Motion No. 466 in the First Chamber (Werner) and Motion No. 590 in the Second Chamber (Hector and others), Riksdagens Protokoll, 1967, pp. 1 and 1–2. In the same motion, the Communist Party requested official Swedish “financial and material support to the liberation movement in Mozambique”, i.e. FRELIMO. It was the first Swedish parliamentary motion ever in favour of official support to a liberation movement in Southern Africa.

pendence and majority government” in the African colonies. “Passivity in EFTA cannot be excused by possible activity [...] in the United Nations. It must be the task of our country”, Ahlmark said,

in all situations [...] to raise [...] the possibility of bringing to an end the tragedy in the African colonies of Portugal. Today we contribute to prolonging it. [...] I feel that Sweden [...] must obstruct the economic development of Portugal as much as possible. In all international organizations where we can raise the matter, we should raise the matter. Our ultimate aim must be to bring about efficient UN sanctions, but the fact that the UN has not yet decided to decrease trade with Portugal is no reason for us to increase [it].

Trade Minister Lange was of a different opinion. Characterizing Ahlmark’s intervention as a “demagogic assault”, he—like the Foreign Affairs Committee—rejected any political action within the framework of EFTA:

Neither the political pre-conditions, nor the formal possibility, exist whereby pressure of the kind [Ahlmark] has in mind might be exerted through [...] organizations concerned with trade and concomitant tasks such as EFTA [...]. It is within the framework of the UN that political action must be taken. The member states are by the [UN] Charter under an obligation to comply with decisions made by the Security Council. As long as no mandatory decision on sanctions has been made by the Security Council, members of organizations such as EFTA [...] are bound by the agreement that regulates the aims and activities of [the] organizations. [In addition], Sweden has never in modern times felt that it should have recourse to unilateral commercial measures as a form of pressure against governments [who] in various respects pursue a policy with which we disagree.

While Lange did not address EFTA’s objectives regarding rational utilization of resources and increased standard of living in the member countries, he did, however, give his view on the growing economic cooperation between Sweden and Portugal, seeing increased exchange and development—not isolation—as the key to democracy in Portugal and self-determination in its colonies:

Increased trade, which is partly an outcome of [the] EFTA cooperation, has, of course, contributed to Portugal’s economic development. However, it is not so easy to [determine] how far economic advancement has affected Portugal’s policy in Africa [...]. [T]here are grounds for thinking that economic progress [...] fosters a process of democratic liberation. There is every reason to reflect on the [following] question: Which Portugal is most sensitive to social and political change, an underdeveloped community with considerable illiteracy still remaining or a community where industrialism makes a rapid advance and forces through investment in education and training? There is no doubt that [the] public opinion in this country

1 ‘Portugal, Sweden and EFTA’, an unpublished translation by Gunnel Arrbäck of the Swedish parliamentary record of the debate between Per Ahlmark and Gunnar Lange in the First Chamber, 30 March 1967 [no date or place]. The debate was partly reproduced in FRELIMO’s official journal Mozambique Revolution (No. 31, October–November 1967, p. 5).

almost unanimously hopes that the inhabitants of the Portuguese possessions will get a chance to decide their own fate [and that it] also hopes that a democratic system of government will emerge in Portugal itself. What is, in fact, at stake is how we in this country best can contribute to such a trend.¹

Lange’s confidence in industrial development as a democratic lever in Portugal and its African colonies would only a year later be severely criticized and opposed by growing sections of the Swedish public opinion, press and political organizations, including his own Social Democratic Party.

Cabora Bassa in Southern Africa and Sweden

The campaign against ASEA’s participation in the proposed hydroelectric project at Cabora Bassa² on the Zambezi river would towards the end of the 1960s more than any other single Southern African issue mobilize and radicalize the Swedish opinion, effectively contributing both to the development of the reorganized solidarity movement and to the decision to extend official humanitarian support to the liberation movements in the region.³

Originally conceived in the 1950s, the giant Cabora Bassa scheme in the remote Mozambican district of Tete comprised, in the first place, the building of a dam on the Zambezi, the construction of a power station and the erection of transmission lines to the Witwatersrand mining and industrial area in South Africa.⁴ Backed by South African interests—primarily the private Anglo-American Corporation, but also by the Pretoria government through the Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM)—it was one of the biggest construction projects ever envisaged. When completed, the dam would not only be the largest in Africa, but the fifth largest in the world.

Cabora Bassa represented, however, much more than a hydroelectric scheme in a remote, underdeveloped area of northern Mozambique. The scheme would according to the plans not only facilitate the extraction of rich mineral deposits, but also the irrigation of large tracts of land, eventually making it possible to

¹ Ibid.
² Or Cahora Bassa.
³ At the same time, the liberation struggle in Guinea-Bissau and the diplomacy of PAIGC undoubtedly had major impacts on both the solidarity movement and on the Swedish government and parliament.
settle up to a million Portuguese in the area. In addition, by damming the Zambezi and creating a huge artificial inland lake to the Rhodesian border, the Portuguese government hoped to open new transport routes into Africa. This perspective was welcomed by Ian Smith’s internationally isolated UDI government, which, furthermore, was thrilled by the prospect of a ‘Southern African Ruhr’ close by. At an early stage, the chairman of the National Export Council of Rhodesia—a country subjected to mandatory sanctions by the UN Security Council—stated that “this is probably one of the greatest opportunities ever to come the way of Rhodesian manufacturers. [...] It promises to be a field with long term prospects and one which should now be cultivated and nurtured with a view to reaping the handsome harvest which will inevitably follow”.¹

In brief, planned by Portugal, largely financed by South Africa and supported by Rhodesia, the Cabora Bassa scheme was a strategic undertaking in defence of the white minority regimes in Southern Africa. As such, it was immediately singled out as a target by FRELIMO, which from the launch of the armed struggle in September 1964 had wrested control from the Portuguese over large areas of the northern Mozambican districts of Cabo Delgado and Niassa and at the time of the actual preparation of the Cabora Bassa project was taking the struggle to the Tete district. The first symbolic clash between colonialism and liberation in Southern Africa around Cabora Bassa occurred in March 1968, when three international consortia handed in their tenders for the project in Lisbon at the same time as FRELIMO announced the opening of a new military front in Tete. Reporting on the advance of the liberation struggle at a press conference in Dar es Salaam, Eduardo Mondlane underlined that

the importance of [...] this front of [the] armed struggle is not limited to our country. It is also important in the general context of the struggle in Southern Africa. Suffice it for us to recall that Tete shares borders with Zimbabwe, where our [...] brothers at this very moment also pursue their liberation [...] struggle [against] the racist minority regime [of which] Portugal is [the] chief ally. Our struggle in Tete is therefore a concrete manifestation of our solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe and a direct contribution to their victory. The same applies to South Africa [...], [whose] interest in [the Cabora Bassa] project is so great that [it has already] sent troops to defend the site of the dam.²

Apart from FRELIMO’s own reports, there was in early 1968 little information at hand about the progress of the liberation struggle in Mozambique. No independent journalist had visited the liberated areas and the “lack of confidence in FRELIMO’s communiqués was by then so great that it is doubtful whether many would have believed anything [about the situation] if a reputable news-

man had not been present”. Of great importance for the debate in Sweden was that the journalist in question was Anders Johansson of the liberal Dagens Nyheter, the biggest morning paper in the Nordic countries. Johansson had from the early 1960s played a prominent role in the Swedish solidarity movement with South and Southern Africa. He had not only been instrumental in the formation of the popularly based South Africa Committees and in the launching of their regular bulletin on Southern Africa, but had also established a wide network in the region, including access to privileged information from the South African and Rhodesian governments. Johansson’s visit to the liberated areas of Mozambique, his contacts in Southern Africa and the fact that he was trusted both as a committed solidarity activist and a respected Africa correspondent contributed to his influential role in the Cabora Bassa debate.

Anders Johansson was not only the first international journalist to visit the liberated areas in Mozambique, but he did so on the occasion of Eduardo Mondlane’s first ever entry into the country as President of FRELIMO. Johans-

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2 A film crew from Yugoslavia had preceded Johansson (interview with Anders Johansson, Eskilstuna, 19 November 1996).
son had met Mondlane in Stockholm in September 1965. Representing *Dagens Nyheter*—a newspaper with which the Mondlanes had established close personal relations—and covering the official visit to Tanzania of Prime Minister Erlander in January 1968, he received the necessary clearance by the Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere to go to Mozambique. Together with Mondlane, Johansson crossed the Rovuma river into the Mozambican Cabo Delgado district in February 1968. Spending a week with FRELIMO’s guerrilla forces and meeting Samora Machel—a tough, but highly respected Commander-in-Chief with a typical guerrilla beard, [leading] an army of 8,000 soldiers—he was in a position to report to the world that

I only noticed the presence of Portugal in weapons captured by the liberation front, two reconnaissance planes and some destroyed villages which [had been] shot to ruins by Portuguese artillery. [...] I [got] proof enough to say that FRELIMO has started a successful war of liberation against the Portuguese colonial power. Already, the guerrillas hold larger areas than those covered by many independent Afro-Asian states. FRELIMO is effective in spite of a rather slack organisation (grades and uniforms are non-existent) and has more trained men than many armed forces in Africa. It is supported by the civilians and fights on ‘home ground’ in a terrain highly suitable for guerrilla warfare.

Johansson’s reports from the liberated areas in Mozambique were published by *Dagens Nyheter* in mid-April 1968. They had a worldwide impact and “turned

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1 Ibid.
2 Eduardo Mondlane regularly corresponded with Olof Lagercrantz, the chief editor of *Dagens Nyheter* (1960–75). During her visits to Sweden in the late 1960s, Janet Mondlane also used to stay with the Lagercrantz family. In a personal letter after the visit to Mozambique by Anders Johansson, Mondlane wrote to Lagercrantz in November 1968: “Another reason for writing to you now is to thank you for sending comrade Anders Johansson to Mozambique with us to see the liberated areas of our country. Anders is such a dynamic and humane journalist that he left an indelible impression on all of us in Mozambique. We were all pleased to read his very good reports in your newspaper and in other [...] papers, relating what he had seen in Mozambique. I hope that in the near future Anders will again visit Mozambique and do more of the same. I have just received a very interesting letter from him telling me of the various projects which are now under way in Sweden for supporting the liberation struggle [...] We feel that not only did we get a journalist to visit Mozambique, but [that we] also gained a true friend in him” (letter from Eduardo Mondlane to Olof Lagercrantz, Dar es Salaam, 6 November 1968) (MHA). Together with Pierre Schori and Bengt Säve-Söderbergh of the Social Democratic Party and Sören Lindh of the Africa Groups, Anders Johansson was awarded the honorary Bagamoyo medal in 1993 by the Mozambican parliament.
3 Interview with Anders Johansson, Eskilstuna, 19 November 1996. In 1966 Åke Ringberg of *Dagens Nyheter* had been invited by Eduardo Mondlane to visit the liberated areas in Mozambique. Considering the project “too risky”, he, however, declined the invitation (letter from Åke Ringberg to Eduardo Mondlane, Stockholm, 28 September 1966) (MHA).
4 Johansson later told the author about Mondlane’s excitement and how the FRELIMO President had insisted on being the first person to cross the border line (conversation with Anders Johansson, Eskilstuna, 5 March 1996).
6 Ibid.
7 ‘DN-man hos gerillan i Moçambique’ (‘Dagens Nyheter—man with the guerrilla in Mozambique’); ‘Antal soldater ej avgörande’ (‘The number of soldiers is not decisive’); ‘Gerillan har folkets stöd’
the Portuguese propaganda upside down’. Coinciding with the official FRELIMO representative Lourenço Mutaca’s initial diplomatic activities in Sweden, the articles also facilitated his entry into the new environment. It was, finally, through Johansson’s articles that the Swedish public for the first time learned about Cabora Bassa and possible interests from Sweden in the project. At the time, it was, however, not yet publicly known which particular interests they represented.

ASEA and Initial Reactions

ASEA’s participation became publicly known in Sweden at the beginning of May 1968, two months after the submission of the tenders. Three international consortia were competing for the project. The Västerås-based Swedish company formed part of the so-called ZAMCO group, which under the overall leadership of the South African Anglo-American Corporation comprised a total of fifteen companies from France, Italy, Portugal, South Africa, Sweden and West Germany. Representing a country which was highly critical of both South Africa and Portugal, there was initially some resistance against the incorporation of ASEA. However, “Marcus Wallenberg was on good terms with [the Portuguese Foreign Minister] Franco Nogueira and discounted the political opposition in his [...] country. [Thus,] the Overseas Ministry [in Lisbon] eventually accepted that ASEA was a necessary evil”. More important was that the project involved the transmission of electricity over a distance of about 2,000 kilometres from Cabora Bassa to South Africa and that ASEA was world-leading in the cheaper and more efficient technology of converting and transmitting high-voltage direct current. ASEA thus played a crucial role. If the ZAMCO bid was successful, the company would during the first project phase be responsible for the terminal stations at Cabora Bassa and outside Johannesburg in South Africa. The costs involved during the first phase—scheduled for

('The guerrilla enjoys the support of the people'); and ‘Vi måste befria Afrika’ ('We must liberate Africa') in Dagens Nyheter, 17, 18, 19 and 22 April 1968.

1 Interview with Anders Johansson, Eskilstuna, 19 November 1996. Johansson documented his visit through a wealth of photos. One of them, showing Eduardo Mondlane and Samora Machel in a relaxed conversation on an anthill, would later tour the world and be reproduced as a postage stamp in independent Mozambique.

2 The Cabora Bassa scheme had briefly been presented by Södra Afrika Informationsbulletin in its No. 3, 1967.


4 In his press conference in Dar es Salaam on 25 March 1968, Mondlane had, however, mentioned ASEA among the international companies involved in the project.

5 Dagens Nyheter, 9 May 1968.

6 In Portuguese, Consórcio Hidroelétrico do Zambeze.

7 Marcus Wallenberg was at the time chairman of ASEA’s Board of Directors.

8 Middlemas op. cit., p. 53.
completion in April 1975—were estimated at around 1.2 billion SEK, out of which approximately 10% involved deliveries from ASEA.¹ An order of that magnitude and duration would be among the biggest in the company’s history.

As soon as ASEA’s participation in the ZAMCO bid was publicly known, there was a wave of reactions. In one of his first public statements in Sweden,² FRELIMO’s recently arrived representative Lourenço Mutaca denounced any possible Swedish participation in the project, telling the LO-owned social democratic evening paper *Aftonbladet* in no uncertain terms that “Swedes who actively engage in the Cabora Bassa project must take into account the possibility of getting a bullet through the heart. FRELIMO does not make any special allowances for Swedes. All whites who organize [...] works [at the site] are fair game”.³ These were, indeed, strong words by the FRELIMO President’s personal appointee. However, the previous day—10 May 1968—the Stockholm branch of the Social Democratic Youth League had already requested the Swedish government to stop ASEA’s participation. This marked the beginning of a widening rift between large sections of the social democratic movement and the Swedish government around the Cabora Bassa project.⁴

Two factors may more than others explain the immediate repudiation of the Cabora Bassa project and ASEA’s involvement by the Swedish youth. In the first place, the issue appeared at a particularly turbulent moment. The Båstad demonstrations against the Davis Cup tennis match between Sweden and Rhodesia had taken place only a week before the announcement of ASEA’s participation. The tennis match and the Cabora Bassa project were together seen as a tacit recognition of the Southern African white minority regimes by the Swedish government, which at the same time was being criticized for passivity towards the war in Vietnam. In addition, the Wallenberg financial group was involved in both issues, indirectly through its support to the Swedish Tennis Federation concerning the Davis Cup match and directly via its

¹ *Dagens Nyheter*, 9 May 1968.
³ ‘Kommer ASEA hit så skjuter vi svenskar!’ (‘If ASEA comes here we will shoot the Swedes!’) in *Aftonbladet*, 11 May 1968. From the very beginning, Mutaca actively campaigned against ASEA. On 27 May, for example, he addressed a long letter to ASEA’s employees, which was copied to Prime Minister Erlander, Trade Minister Lange, the Metal Workers’ Federation, LO, all the Swedish political parties and to the press (Open letter—‘Till anställda vid ASEA’/’To employees of ASEA’—from Lourenço Mutaca, Stockholm, 27 May 1968) (AJC). It would, however, appear that at the time he acted without proper authorization from the FRELIMO leadership. In a letter to FRELIMO’s Department for Foreign Relations, Mutaca informed them on 1 June 1968 that he had “embarked upon a campaign against ASEA in spite of not having received any information from Dar es Salaam regarding FRELIMO’s position” (letter from Lourenço Mutaca to FRELIMO’s Department for Foreign Relations, Stockholm, 1 June 1968) (MHA). Eduardo Mondlane replied to the letter three weeks later. Talking about the crisis at the Mozambique Institute and of the approaching FRELIMO congress, Mondlane did not mention the Cabora Bassa project, ASEA or Mutaca’s activism against the project (letter from Eduardo Mondlane to Lourenço Mutaca, Dar es Salaam, 21 June 1968) (MHA). Mondlane would, however, later also threaten to shoot any Swedes participating in the Cabora Bassa project.
⁴ *Aftonbladet*, 11 May 1968.
ownership of ASEA in the case of Cabora Bassa. Despite the Wallenberg motto ‘to be, but not to be seen’, the financial group was identified by the youth, who also noted that it was mainly companies within the Wallenberg sphere that were established in South Africa. During the boycott debate in the early 1960s, that presence had already been made highly visible through various pronouncements in support of the apartheid regime. Åke Vrethem, the director of the ASEA group, had—as noted—in a television debate in October 1963, for example, characterized South Africa as “the most distinguished outpost and supporting pillar of civilization in Africa”, a statement which over the following years was often quoted by the Swedish solidarity movement.\(^1\)

On the far left of the political spectrum and largely influenced by the Vietnam debate, increasingly active sections of the Swedish youth saw the Cabora Bassa project as a confirmation of an alliance between the Social Democratic government and Swedish export capital. Commenting upon the fact that the local trade union at the ASEA factory in the small town of Ludvika—directly affected by a possible ZAMCO order—pronounced itself in favour of the company’s participation, the Uppsala South Africa Committee, for example, argued in mid-1969 that

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\text{the Social Democratic Party is a bourgeois reformist party supported by [...] good relations with big capital. It conducts a policy of class collaboration which leads to a social formation characteristic of the highly developed capitalist society, namely structural fascism. In such a society, the capitalists can force groups of workers to abandon proletarian internationalism and—as in the case of Ludvika—assume a narrowly nationalistic position.}^2
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Such views soon marginalized the few surviving South Africa Committees from the central debate concerning ASEA’s role and Sweden’s relations to the Mozambican liberation movement. Largely influenced by the war in Vietnam, the committees were, in addition, at the time uneasy about FRELIMO’s revolutionary credentials. Years later, Dick Urban Vestbro, a leading member of the Swedish solidarity movement with Southern Africa, self-critically noted that

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\text{we in the South Africa Committees [...] were quick to belittle FRELIMO in comparison with FNL of Vietnam. [...] We thought that our work against imperialism and capitalism was as important as that of FRELIMO, if not more. I was not restricted by any major modesty when I [in Tidsignal] criticized FRELIMO for not being socialist, whatever that meant in the context of Mozambique. My contacts with FRELIMO could thereby have been closed for good. [However], the FRELIMO leader Marcelino dos Santos understood that I actually meant well, but was badly informed. [...] Somewhat later, we who saw ourselves as true revolutionaries [and] had criticized FRELIMO for being officially represented by an American middle}
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\(^1\) For example by the support group FRELIMO-Sweden in FRELIMO, No. 1 [no place or date, but Stockholm, 1968].

\(^2\) Södra Afrika Informationsbulletin, No. 5, 1969, pp. 5–6.
class woman’ [and] ‘a housewife from Chicago’ [...] were given lessons about FRELIMO’s revolutionary policies by no one less than Janet Mondlane herself.¹

Meanwhile, the fact remains that the Social Democratic government and trade union leadership from mid-1968 until the conclusion of the debate in September 1969 steadfastly defended ASEA, in the process alienating important constituent groups of the wider labour movement and contributing to the formation of a broader and radicalized second generation Swedish solidarity movement with Southern Africa.

Setting the Cabora Bassa Debate

“Worried about the writings in the papers and over SSU’s demands that the government should stop ASEA’s participation”,² the Swedish company informed the trade union at the Ludvika factory in mid-May 1968 that deliveries to the project would represent secure employment for some 300 workers over a period of three years. Thus informed, the local union stated that “we cannot show solidarity with the [blacks] in Mozambique at the cost of losing our jobs”,³ a position which was supported by the Swedish Metal Workers’ Federation⁴ and by the LO chairman Arne Geijer. ⁵ At the same time, Trade Minister Gunnar Lange gave his assent to ASEA’s possible involvement in the Cabora Bassa project. Pressed by Per Ahlmark in parliament, Lange stated that the government took a negative view of Swedish investments in Mozambique, adding, however, that ASEA’s role in the proposed project was not that of an investor, but of a seller.⁶ Even before the contract had been awarded to the ZAMCO consortium, a dividing line was thus drawn within the Social Democratic movement, with SSU and the LO-owned newspaper Aftonbladet opposing ASEA’s participation and the Metal Workers’ Federation, LO and the government defending it.

A radical wing of the Liberal Party was just as much against ASEA’s participation. It was led by Per Ahlmark, the young MP who as early as in 1961 demanded Portugal’s expulsion from EFTA and in 1967 had a particularly harsh exchange with Trade Minister Lange on the subject. After the announcement of ASEA’s participation in the ZAMCO tender, Ahlmark again went on the offensive, requesting—as noted—a clarification by the Social Democratic

² The director of ASEA Ludvika, Olle Dirke, cited in Dagens Nyheter, 15 May 1968.
³ Aftonbladet, 14 May 1968.
⁴ Dagens Nyheter, 18 May 1968.
⁵ Aftonbladet, 18 May 1968.
⁶ Dagens Nyheter, 17 May 1968.
government regarding its stand on Swedish investments in Mozambique. The Trade Minister’s reply that possible deliveries from ASEA did not constitute an investment, but a commercial transaction which the company should decide upon without outside interference,¹ was sharply censured by Ahlmark.²

During his visits to Sweden, Eduardo Mondlane had established close relations with both the Social Democratic Party and the opposition Liberal Party. 1968, the year of the Båstad demonstrations, the student revolt and the Cabora Bassa debate, was also an election year in Sweden.³ Not only the general issue of ASEA’s participation in the Cabora Bassa project, but also the views by the FRELIMO President would feature in the electoral campaigns by the ruling party and the major opposition party. In support of one of the two contenders, statements by Mondlane were thus sought both publicly and behind the scenes, frequently quoted and often misrepresented. Before the announcement of the ZAMCO bid, Pierre Schori of the Social Democratic Party published, for example, in early May 1968 an article in Aftonbladet on ’Ahlmark’s guerrilla war’ in which he referred to an interview with Mondlane conducted by Ahlmark in October 1967. In the interview—published in Expressen under the title ’Sweden helps Portugal to shoot Africans’⁴—the FRELIMO President had severely criticized Sweden’s relations with Portugal, describing them as “outrageous”.⁵ Defending the Social Democratic government, Schori replied by quoting a private letter from Mondlane in which—according to Schori—he stated that

> little did I imagine that the interviewer was not a journalist, but a leading member of an opposition party whose main interest it was to gather [arguments] against the Social Democratic Party. I do not think that Ahlmark’s interest in our cause is as altruistic as it would appear, since he as a Liberal must support a programme which is less radical than that of the [Social Democrats]. During a luncheon given by the Liberal Party, [...] it was clear to me [...] that the [Liberals] in government not only would support continued EFTA trade with Portugal, but [that they] are also more inclined to join NATO.⁶

In turn, Schori’s article prompted the Liberal Party secretary David Wirmark to write to Mondlane, informing him of the public disclosure of his private letter, as well as asking him for a reaction. “I find it disagreeable”, Wirmark wrote,

¹ Dagens Nyheter, 17 May 1968. See also Gunnar Lange: Brännpunkter i Handelspolitiken (‘Focal Points in Trade Policy’), Socialdemokraterna, Partistyrelsens Informationstjänst, No. 2, Stockholm, 1969, p. 12, where Lange described ASEA’s participation as “a normal export transaction”.
³ Parliamentary elections were held in September 1968. They resulted in the biggest post-war success of the Social Democratic Party, which received over 50% of the vote to the Second Chamber. With just over 14%, the Liberal Party, on the other hand, recorded the worst result since 1944.
⁴ ‘Sverige hjälper Portugal att skjuta ner afrikaner’ (’Sweden helps Portugal to shoot Africans’) in Expressen, 9 October 1967.
⁵ Ibid.
that private correspondence is disclosed in this way. [...] I will also admit that these
statements have caused some surprise in our party, as they do not correspond to
facts known by us and, in fact, give a misleading picture of what Swedish
liberalism stands for in these matters. I would therefore appreciate [...] very much
if you [have] any comments to offer on [the] article [by Schori] (translation
enclosed) and want to assure you that the struggle for a free and independent
Mozambique also in the future will receive a wholehearted support among the
Swedish Liberals.¹

In the same letter, Wirmark told Mondlane about Ahlmark’s parliamentary
debate with Gunnar Lange regarding ASEA and Cabora Bassa, indicating that
he would forward a translation of the exchange “so that you can see what the
government had to say about this matter”.² He also reminded Mondlane about
an earlier request by Ahlmark to visit the liberated areas of Mozambique in
order to “give a fully fledged report in the liberal paper Expressen on the actual
situation and on the struggle”, underlining that “I think [that] this would be
extremely useful. I hope that you will do everything to assist him”.³

Ahlmark, the future Liberal Party leader and Deputy Prime Minister
(1976–78), never visited FRELIMO’s liberated areas in Mozambique.⁴ There is,
in addition, no evidence that Eduardo Mondlane ever reacted to Wirmark’s re-
quest for comments on Schori’s article. Nevertheless, statements by the FRELIMO
President were used during the mounting Cabora Bassa debate in mid-1968 by
Social Democrats and Liberals alike in support of their respective positions vis-
à-vis the liberation struggle in Mozambique, thereby granting Mondlane’s
movement a wide and positive audience. What was debated was not FRELIMO
and what it represented, but whether it was the ruling Social Democrats or the
opposition Liberals that best defended the Mozambican nationalist cause. This
effectively contributed to a broadening of FRELIMO’s support in Sweden.⁵

¹ Letter from David Wirmark to Eduardo Mondlane, Stockholm, 20 May 1968 (MHA).
² Ibid.
³ Ibid. Later in 1968, Ahlmark and Wirmark formed part of a working group set up by the Liberal
Party to define the principles that should guide the party’s policy, relations and support to national
liberation movements. As noted above, it presented its report—entitled Support to Resistance
Movements—in May 1969.
⁴ According to Schori, Ahlmark had requested a visit to Mozambique before the Swedish
parliamentary elections in September 1968, indicating that the Liberal MP mainly had electoral
motives in mind (Aftonbladet, 9 May 1968).
⁵ The eagerness to champion the cause of FRELIMO was not devoid of inconsistencies. For
example, in mid-1968 the liberal theoretical journal Liberal Debatt published a highly sympathetic
presentation of FRELIMO and the armed liberation struggle in Mozambique. The article was
largely based on an interview with Mondlane in which he strongly denounced Sweden’s con-
dictory policy towards Mozambique, on the one hand supporting FRELIMO through SIDA and the
Social Democratic Party and on the other allowing ASEA to participate in the “shameful” Cabora
Bassa project. Although also containing critical comments vis-à-vis the Liberal Party, the article was
in the main directed against the ruling Social Democrats (Lars O. H. Nyberg: ‘FRELIMO och Cabora
Bassa’ in Liberal Debatt, No. 6, 1968, pp. 26–32). An unabridged version of the interview with
Mondlane appeared shortly thereafter in the first issue of FRELIMO, an information bulletin pub-
lished by the support group FRELIMO–Sweden. According to this version, Mondlane replied as
follows to the question how FRELIMO looked upon the Swedish political parties and the issue of
Cabora Bassa, Rhodesia and Direct Actions

On 10 July 1968, the Portuguese government announced that it had provisionally awarded the Cabora Bassa contract to ZAMCO. The initial skirmishes regarding ASEA’s possible participation in the project thereby gave way to a more substantial confrontation. Although the main battle lines had already been drawn, the focus and tactics of the forces opposed to ASEA and Cabora Bassa would largely shift during the following debate. Influential opinion makers—primarily Anders Johansson of Dagens Nyheter—thus introduced a Rhodesian dimension, emphasizing that ASEA’s participation could contravene the UN Security Council’s mandatory sanctions against Ian Smith’s UDI regime. Increasingly militant sections of the youth decided at the same time to embark upon direct actions against the Swedish company.

Since his visit to the liberated areas in Mozambique in February 1968, Anders Johansson had been actively campaigning against the Cabora Bassa project. In a strongly worded article in Dagens Nyheter in mid-May, he wrote, for example, that

if the workers at ASEA in the face of the threats by the company direction, LO’s silence and Lange’s playing with words maintain their position to contribute to the strengthening and prolongation of the colonial power of the Salazar regime in Mozambique, they—as well as the board of the Metal Workers’ Federation—must consequently abstain from speaking about solidarity with the oppressed of the world on the First of May and other occasions.

In the same article, Johansson—who had access to various Southern African information sources—reported for the first time that not only South Africa, but also Ian Smith’s Rhodesia was interested in electricity from Cabora Bassa. Substantiating the assertion, he would on several occasions over the following

Cabora Bassa: “Perhaps the Social Democratic Party will eventually change position and stop [ASEA’s participation], or you might get a new government in September, a more corrupt [and] pro-Portuguese [one]. I spoke to a leader of the Liberal Party two months ago and he said [that] ‘we think that it is better to invest in your country so that you will be better off when you get your freedom’. It is outrageous!” (interview with Eduardo Mondlane, Dar es Salaam, July 1968 in FRELIMO, No. 1 [no place or date, but Stockholm, 1968]).


2 Indicative of the marginalization of the anti-apartheid issue at the time, very few Swedish voices—including from within the solidarity movement—were raised against the fact that the electricity produced at Cabora Bassa was to be exported mainly to South Africa and that ASEA would participate in the construction of a terminal station outside Johannesburg. In a statement endorsed by the National Board of the Social Democratic Party, Trade Minister Lange, for example, simply noted in February 1969 that South Africa “is not subjected to any sanctions”, legitimizing Swedish involvement in the strategic energy cooperation between Lisbon and Pretoria (Gunnar Lange op. cit., p. 13).

months publish quotations from and references to a wide range of South African and Rhodesian reports and articles.¹

The possible Rhodesian connection had an instant impact on the debate. In response to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia, the UN Security Council had in November 1965 recommended a trade ban against the rebel colony, which—for the first time ever—was followed by a decision on compulsory sanctions in December 1966. Complying with the recommendations by the Security Council, the Swedish government had in late November 1965 declared a total ban on all trade with Rhodesia. At the time, however, there was no specific Swedish legislation on international economic sanctions. In February 1966, a government committee was appointed to draft such a legal instrument. The committee presented its proposal in March 1968, shortly before the public announcement of ASEA’s participation in the ZAMCO tender. According to the proposal, all exports to and imports from Rhodesia were to be banned, as well as all activities to "promote or liable to promote"² commercial relations between Sweden and Rhodesia, including monetary transfers.

The submission of the draft Rhodesia Law coincided with the Cabora Bassa debate, contributing to "extensive and at times very agitated discussions within and outside parliament".³ What was discussed was not the issue of sanctions against Ian Smith’s Rhodesia—where the Swedish position was firm—but the role that ASEA’s participation in the Mozambican project in this context could imply. As soon as the ZAMCO bid was presented, it was evident that Rhodesian companies were to feature in the construction of the dam, not least as suppliers of building materials. As a consortium, ZAMCO and ASEA would thus contravene the UN sanctions against Rhodesia, as well as the proposed Rhodesia Law. Nevertheless, both the Swedish company and the government chose to ignore the wider issue. Instead, the problem was isolated to a question of deliveries of components for the transmission of electricity locally and to

¹ For example in *Dagens Nyheter*, 11 September 1968. Johansson also petitioned the United Nations on the question of Cabora Bassa and Rhodesia. A letter by him, dated 12 November 1968, was circulated by the UN Decolonization Committee to the members of the General Assembly in May 1969. In the letter, Johansson wrote: "I wish [...] to draw your committee's attention to the Cabora Bassa project [...]. If anybody of your committee, delegates or officials, is interested in information about this project, I am prepared to send some material from various sources. This project is built by the Portuguese colonialists in cooperation with the regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia and foreign business interests—even Swedish—in order to strengthen the white minority bloc in Southern Africa and to contain the revolution of the African majority. I am convinced that electricity will be delivered from Cabora Bassa to Rhodesia, which means—as far as I understand—that several French, West German, South African and Swedish companies are ignoring the UN decisions on Rhodesia, evidently without their respective governments doing anything to stop them. Certainly, a special report by your committee on the Cabora Bassa project would be very useful" (UN General Assembly: 'Petition from Mr. Anders Johanson, Foreign Correspondent of *Dagens Nyheter*, Stockholm, concerning Mozambique', A/AC. 109/PET. 1081, New York, 15 May 1969) (AJC).

² Cited in Nordenmark op. cit., p. 43.

³ Ibid.
South Africa, thereby turning a blind eye to any possible Swedish connection with Rhodesia.¹

Increasingly radicalized sections of the Swedish youth held, however, a different view. At the beginning of October, the Liberal Party Youth League, for example, addressed Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson with a demand to extend Swedish economic sanctions to “the whole of Southern Africa”.² And two weeks later, the Social Democratic students in the university town of Lund stated that they were going to stop ASEA’s involvement in the Cabora Bassa project “with all [possible] means”. Emphasizing that the statement “should be seen as a threat”, the students directed their main criticism to their own government, which, they declared,

acts completely against the public opinion and [against] the wishes of the party congress. As it is, ASEA is both technically and formally in a position to implement the Cabora Bassa project, which not only will supply Mozambique, but also Rhodesia and South Africa with electric power. We wish that the government through legislation makes it impossible for a Swedish major company to ignore UN resolutions on sanctions against Rhodesia. If the government continues with its evasive actions and passivity [...], we do not foresee any other way than to embark on direct actions against ASEA.³

Although the threats of direct intervention and sabotage against ASEA were never carried out, extra-parliamentary actions were in late November 1968 initiated by the Gothenburg-based student organization Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). In connection with a meeting arranged by Amnesty International—addressed by the British historian Basil Davidson, who had attended FRELIMO’s congress in Niassa in July 1968—members of SDS decided to organize a sit-in demonstration in an ASEA outlet in central Gothenburg. As in the case of the Båstad demonstrations, it provoked a massive police intervention and the arrests of not less than forty-two demonstrators.⁴ Four days later, an office of the Wallenberg-owned Enskilda Banken was also occupied.⁵ In mid-December, coordinated demonstrations against ASEA were, finally, carried out all over Sweden, including Gothenburg, Lund, Malmö, Stockholm, Västerås, Umeå and Uppsala.⁶

¹ Dagens Nyheter, 10 December 1968 and Svenska Dagbladet, 11 December 1968. Following pressures from SSU, the Social Democratic Party congress resolved in June 1968 that the government should verify whether the Cabora Bassa power station could supply electricity to Rhodesia. Despite repeated demands—inter alia by the social democratic paper Aftonbladet—such a study was, however, never carried out (see, for example, Aftonbladet, 13 September 1968).
² Letter from FPU, signed by Olle Wästberg and Leif Wictorin, to Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson, Stockholm, 7 October 1968 (MFA).
³ Aftonbladet, 23 October 1968.
⁴ Göteborgs-Tidningen, 23 November 1968.
⁵ Södra Afrika Informationsbulletin, No. 5, 1969, p. 36.
⁶ Svenska Dagbladet, 15 December 1968. An estimated number of between 300 and 400 demonstrators in Västerås—the site of ASEA’s headquarters—were met by 130 policemen (Ibid.). It was the biggest police mobilization ever in Västerås (Vestmanlands Länstidning, 16 December 1968).
The demonstrations were not only directed against ASEA. With equal vigour they targeted the Social Democratic government, accused of double-dealing with regard to the national liberation struggle in Mozambique. A number of policy statements and actions by the government gave rise to such views. Thus, while the Erlander government did not yield in its defence of ASEA’s participation in the ZAMCO consortium, Sweden voted on 29 November 1968 in favour of the UN General Assembly resolution which not only deplored “the arbitrary eviction of the African population and the settlement of foreign immigrants” in the Portuguese-held territories, but also “the activities of [...] financial interests operating [there]”.¹ Such activities, the UN resolution declared, “obstruct the struggle [...] for self-determination, freedom and independence and [...] strengthen the military efforts of Portugal”.²

The very same arguments were raised by the Swedish opposition to ASEA’s involvement, but the government would not pay heed to the domestic voices, nor take the consequences of its internationally declared position. The obvious contradiction was not lost on the anti-Cabora Bassa movement. Representing the ruling Social Democratic Party, Pierre Schori and Bernt Carlsson—the latter at the time working with Trade Minister Gunnar Lange—were thus severely

² Ibid.
criticized by U-aktionen and others during a public debate in Stockholm at the end of February 1969.\textsuperscript{1}

On the other hand, it was at the height of the Swedish Cabora Bassa debate towards the end of 1968 that the Social Democrats took the first concrete steps towards official assistance to PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau and the liberation movements in Southern Africa. The recommendations contained in the UN General Assembly resolution of November were in this regard followed. The resolution made an appeal to all UN members “to grant the peoples of the territories under Portuguese domination the moral and material assistance necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights”.\textsuperscript{2} The call was ten days later—shortly after the PAIGC leader Amilcar Cabral had visited Sweden as a guest of the Swedish Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson. In what was to become an historic statement, Nilsson declared on 9 December 1968 that the Swedish government was “in touch with a number of the leaders of the African liberation movements” and “prepared to help [with] humanitarian aid [...] that puts the members of these movements in a better position to continue their struggle for the liberty of their people”.\textsuperscript{3} In the case of Mozambique, it was at the same time announced that the Social Democratic Party had donated an amount of 10,000 SEK to FRELIMO and that the Social Democratic Youth League had granted another 5,000.\textsuperscript{4}

The apparent contradiction between official humanitarian assistance to the Southern African liberation movements and continued Swedish economic interests in the region would from the mid-1970s feature prominently in the post-Vietnam solidarity debate. In the light of Sweden’s vote at the United Nations and the announcement of support to the liberation movements, the position taken by the Social Democratic government was, not surprisingly, in the meantime seen as contradictory by FRELIMO. After the UN General Assembly deliberations, Miguel Murupa from FRELIMO’s Secretariat for External Affairs\textsuperscript{5} paid a visit to Stockholm in December 1968 to both convey appre-

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{1} Dagens Nyheter, 1 March 1969.
\textsuperscript{4} Dagens Nyheter, 11 December 1968.
\textsuperscript{5} Murupa and Mutaca played active and influential roles in the Cabora Bassa debate and for the development and radicalization of the Swedish solidarity movement with Mozambique. It is against this background ironic that both of them would soon leave FRELIMO. Murupa, who had graduated in economics from Howard University in Washington, was—like Mutaca—one of Eduardo Mondlane’s protégés. After the assassination of the FRELIMO President, he abandoned the liberation movement, only to join the Department of Psychological Warfare of the Portuguese Army in Mozambique (Gibson op. cit., p. 285). Mutaca stayed with FRELIMO until February 1970, when he together with the representative to Egypt, Judas Honwana, sided with Uria Simango in the post-Mondlane leadership struggle. FRELIMO’s first representative to Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries would thereby also be the last. Just before the Lisbon coup in April 1974, Mutaca, however, wrote to Samora Machel and was welcomed back to the movement. Working for an international drought relief organization, he was later killed in Ethiopia.
\end{flushleft}
cipation of the Swedish stand against Portugal and concern regarding ASEA and Cabora Bassa.¹

Together with FRELIMO’s resident representative Lourenço Mutaca, Murupa was received by Trade Minister Gunnar Lange.² Lange was not impressed by Murupa’s arguments against Cabora Bassa. Reiterating that the government was not going to reconsider its position, he declared that Sweden had to honour its international agreements, that the Rhodesian connection had not been substantiated and that the project, in any case, was to benefit the people of Mozambique in the longer run.³ In brief, the positions were irreconcilable. When Murupa volunteered the necessary information regarding Cabora Bassa and Rhodesia, Lange—contrary to the decision taken at the Social Democratic Party congress in June 1968—replied that the government’s position was firm and that it would not stop ASEA from participating in the project.⁴ This, in turn, not only provoked strong reactions from the Social Democratic Youth League,⁵ but also, for example, critical comments by ZANU’s Claude Chokwenda, who in the syndicated social democratic regional newspapers wrote that “the project is of great significance to Zimbabwe” and that “we Africans would deplore [a decision] by the Swedish government in favour of ASEA’s participation”.⁶

Chokwenda’s intervention was exceptional. Resident students of the Southern African liberation movements had, as a rule, limited their public statements to the situation in their own countries. Even more unusual was that visiting officials of the liberation movements publicly turned against the Swedish government. This was, however, to be the case with FRELIMO’s foreign policy spokesman. Not finding any encouragement in his meeting with Trade Minister Lange, Murupa joined and addressed the demonstrations against ASEA and the Social Democratic government in Västerås a couple of days later.⁷ Finally, in his last interview with the Swedish press, the FRELIMO President Eduardo Mondlane repeated at the end of January 1969—a week before his assassination—Mutaca’s harsh words from May 1968, stating that “we will do all that we can to shoot the Swedish technicians from ASEA who participate in [...] the construction of Cabora Bassa”.⁸

¹ Dagens Nyheter, 10 December 1968.
² During his short stay, Murupa also met Olof Palme, then Minister of Education (Svenska Dagbladet, 11 December 1968).
³ Dagens Nyheter, 10 December 1968.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Dagens Nyheter, 11 December 1968.
⁶ folkbladet Östgöten, 7 January 1969.
⁷ Svenska Dagbladet, 15 December 1968.
Social Democratic Divisions and ASEA’s Withdrawal

The Cabora Bassa issue entered the Swedish national political debate in earnest at the beginning of 1969. Eduardo Mondlane, the person who more than anybody had propagated the Mozambican nationalist cause in Sweden, would, however, not live to see the conclusion of the discussion. He was assassinated by a parcel bomb in Dar es Salaam on 3 February.\(^1\) The assassination provoked strong reactions in Sweden. Olof Lagercrantz, the chief editor of *Dagens Nyheter* and a close friend of the Mondlames, published a long obituary, calling for increased Swedish support to FRELIMO via the Mozambique Institute.\(^2\) Per Ahlmark of the Liberal Party similarly wrote that “there is no better way to honour Mondlane’s memory than to follow his advice and do everything that we can to isolate Portugal economically”\(^3\). Shortly after the assassination, the Swedish university students also decided to grant 80,000 SEK to the Mozambique Institute via the Students Development Fund, while the secondary school students resolved to carry out the 1969 Operation Day’s Work for the same purpose.

Despite strong criticism from SSU and *Aftonbladet*, the leadership of the Social Democratic Party, however, did not change position. At a meeting in late February 1969, the national board of the ruling party reiterated that “the policies [of South Africa and Portugal] should be opposed by other means than through a trade war by an individual country.”\(^4\) On the same occasion, Trade Minister Lange once again underlined that “the deliveries from ASEA [...] have nothing to do with a possible transmission of power to Rhodesia”.\(^5\) This insinuance soon provoked open divisions within the social democratic movement. At its annual conference in March, the youth league expressed total support for FRELIMO and urged the government to denounce Cabora Bassa as a sanctions-busting enterprise at the United Nations.\(^6\)

At about the same time, a Social Democratic meeting in Stockholm addressed by Prime Minister Erlander unanimously adopted a resolution opposing the position taken by the party board, demanding action to stop ASEA’s participation and accusing the government of “double standards”.\(^7\) The seriousness of the criticism was underlined by the fact that the resolution was introduced by a Social Democratic MP, Oskar Lindqvist. The issue of Cabora Bassa had

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\(^{1}\) Although the assassins were never caught, circumstantial evidence indicated that the Portuguese secret police PIDE was behind the murder. A former PIDE officer, Rosa Casaco, confirmed in February 1998 PIDE’s direct involvement (*Expresso*, 21 February 1998).


\(^{3}\) Per Ahlmark: ‘Kampen kan ta många år’ (‘The struggle may take many years’) in *Dagens Nyheter*, 10 February 1969.

\(^{4}\) Statement by the National Board of the Social Democratic Party in Lange op. cit., p. 24.

\(^{5}\) Lange op. cit., p. 13.

\(^{6}\) *Södra Afrika Informationsbulletin*, No. 5, 1969, p. 38.

\(^{7}\) *Svenska Dagbladet*, 13 March 1969.
thereby entered the inner core of the ruling party, where it was hotly debated during the following weeks and months. At the end of March, for example, the assembly of the Social Democratic Stockholm district—chaired by Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson—dedicated four hours to the situation in Mozambique and the Cabora Bassa project. At the end of the debate, the government position received 178 votes, while the opposition was supported by 145 delegates. As stated by Nordenmark in his study on the Swedish sanctions’ laws against Rhodesia and South Africa, “the polarization regarding the Cabora Bassa question [was] at the time next to complete.”

The draft Rhodesia Law was submitted to parliament on 21 March 1969. It was eventually this legislation—passed on 28 May 1969—which settled the drawn out question of ASEA’s participation in the Cabora Bassa project, not a direct intervention by the government. The parliamentary debate on the Rhodesia Law largely coincided with the discussions on official Swedish humanitarian support to the Southern African liberation movements. In addition to members of the Left Party—in particular C.H. Hermansson—several younger Social Democratic and Liberal MP’s, such as Jan Bergqvist, Per Ahlmark and Ola Ullsten, advocated increased control over Swedish private investments abroad and closer contacts with the liberation movements. SDP’s Birgitta Dahl declared that the ruling party must integrate its foreign, trade and aid policies in order to promote international solidarity. In her opinion, private Swedish companies should not be allowed to “carry out foreign policy”, Sweden’s aid policy should “be directed towards the progressive countries” and support should be given to the “social liberation movements”. This was a direction that the Social Democratic Party under a new leadership was soon to follow. At the party congress in September-October 1969, Tage Erlander was succeeded by Olof Palme. Representing a generation that was deeply involved with Southern Africa and with a personal devotion to the nationalist cause, Palme set in motion a “movement within the movement”, which outside the board and the congresses of the party led to “a 100% turnabout of the Social Democratic Party and of the [wider Swedish] labour movement.”

Both the question of official Swedish humanitarian support to PAIGC and the Southern African liberation movements and the divisive issue of Cabora Bassa had, however, formally been settled when Palme assumed the leadership of the party and the government. The Swedish parliament had in early May 1969 endorsed the principle of support to the liberation movements and later in the month the Rhodesia Law was passed, entering into force on 11 June 1969. In its first paragraph, the law stipulated that “by commodity and product is meant

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1 In Swedish, Stockholms arbetarekommuns representantskap.
2 Dagens Nyheter, 23 March 1969.
3 Nordenmark op. cit., p. 49.
4 Aftonbladet, 27 March 1969.
5 Andersson in Huldt and Misgeld (eds.) op. cit., p. 97.
a material object having the nature of movable property, [...] taken to mean also electric power”. Against this background—and reneging on its earlier assurances—ASEA surprisingly and spectacularly withdrew from ZAMCO and the Cabora Bassa project on 3 September 1969, the very same day as the South African led consortium was awarded the firm contract by the Portuguese government. It was a major triumph for the Swedish solidarity opinion with FRELIMO, indicating what a sustained campaign was able to achieve. The Economist of Britain commented that “the shouts of Swedish student demonstrators have produced a loud echo in the Zambezi Valley”, dealing “a serious blow” to the Cabora Bassa project. The FRELIMO leadership—which through Samora Machel as late as at the beginning of September 1969 had denounced Sweden’s “duplicity” towards Mozambique—also stressed the role of the popular mobilization in Sweden for ASEA’s decision. Shortly after the announcement, the official FRELIMO journal Mozambique Revolution commented that there can be no doubt that [...] the real reason was the wholesale opposition to the project by the progressive forces in Sweden, shown by the attacks in the press, massive popular demonstrations and even, to a certain extent, criticism in the Swedish parliament. [ASEA] could not withstand the surge of attacks from all sides [...]. This event is of the utmost significance, for it demonstrates the influence and effectiveness of organized public opinion. [...] [T]his is extremely important, for Portugal—the poorest and most underdeveloped country in Europe—can wage war against our country only due to the support she receives from her capitalist allies. Thus, actions [such] as those that have taken place in Sweden [...] can be as effective a contribution to our liberation struggle as material assistance.

When Olof Palme later in the month assumed the leadership of the Social Democratic Party, a major—in fact, probably the most important—contradictory factor in Sweden’s Southern Africa policy had thus been removed from the political agenda. Although not the result of a government intervention, the campaign against Cabora Bassa—settled at the same time as official support to the nationalist movements was initiated—largely cleared the way for Sweden’s relations with the liberation forces. The question of Swedish economic relations with the white-ruled South would in the 1970s and 1980s feature prominently in the debate. It is most likely that the involvement by a major Swedish company of the Wallenberg sphere in a South African-led strategic enterprise in

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1 Translation into English of the Swedish Rhodesia Law in letter from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Swedish UN delegation in New York, Stockholm, 1 July 1969 (MFA).

2 In his study of Cabora Bassa, Middlemas wrote that “according to [the] ZAMCO directors, [...] ASEA had already been ordered out, with South African approval, because of its inability to sort out [the domestic] political problems. The French and Germans were simply not prepared to concede the Swedish government’s demand for a promise not to deal in any capacity with Rhodesia” (Middlemas op. cit., p. 82).


Mozambique and endorsed by the government would have radically influenced this debate.

The significance of Cabora Bassa for the radicalization of the Swedish solidarity movement with Southern Africa and for the establishment of relations of trust between the government and the regional liberation movements cannot be overstated. 1 ASEA’s decision was a relief for both the Swedish political forces concerned and for the liberation movements themselves, primarily, of course, for FRELIMO. Invited by the Social Democratic Party to its September-October 1969 congress, Marcelino dos Santos—member of the FRELIMO troika which had been appointed after the assassination of Mondlane 2—declared in Stockholm that “we are very happy that ASEA withdrew from the Cabora Bassa project. In all honesty, ASEA’s participation in the ZAMCO consortium would have created a number of problems for both Sweden and [...] FRELIMO” 3

Support to FRELIMO and Reactions

Due to the closure of the Mozambique Institute at the beginning of 1968, the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane one year later and FRELIMO’s subsequent leadership struggle, the Swedish government’s direct support was suspended until 1971, when it was resumed in the form of a direct cooperation programme. Until Mozambique’s independence in June 1975, an amount of 23 million SEK—not counting the earlier grants to the Mozambique Institute—was disbursed through SIDA to FRELIMO under this programme. 4 Adding the 1.7 million SEK paid to the Mozambique Institute from 1965, the official Swedish support to the Mozambican liberation movement thus did not reach 25 million SEK, or less than half of the 53.5 million disbursed to PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau from 1969. 5 As in the case of MPLA of Angola, even such a modest contribution was, however, exceptional in the Western world.

1 The struggle in South Africa was at the time given little attention in Sweden. In September 1969, the Swedish Cooperative Union and Wholesale Society (KF) called off the consumer boycott carried out since 1963.
2 The other members of the troika were Uria Simango and Samora Machel. After the expulsion of Simango, Machel was installed as the new FRELIMO President in May 1970.
3 Dagens Nyheter, 3 October 1969. Interviewed in May 1996, the Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano said that “support when things are easy has no meaning. But the fact that Sweden took the decision to withdraw [from Cabora Bassa], losing some income for its economy, was a big contribution to the liberation struggle in Mozambique. We think that some of these issues have to be made public so that our people will know that we should value the support we got from different countries” (interview with Joaquim Chissano, Maputo, 2 May 1996).
4 Based on disbursement figures according to SIDA’s annual accounts, established by Ulla Beckman for this study.
5 Ibid. As earlier noted, FRELIMO also benefited from important non-governmental financial campaigns in Sweden.
This was also how the situation was viewed by Sweden’s EFTA partner Portugal and by the Portuguese settlers in Mozambique. Following the Swedish government’s decision to extend humanitarian assistance to PAIGC, ASEA’s withdrawal from the Cabora Bassa project and the ruling Social Democratic Party’s invitation of Marcelino dos Santos of FRELIMO and Amílcar Cabral of PAIGC to its congress in late September 1969, there was a storm of protests against Sweden in Portugal, Mozambique and in other parts of the lusophone world, also reaching South Africa. Despite the fact that official Swedish support to the Mozambique Institute at the time was suspended and that direct cooperation with FRELIMO had not yet been decided upon, the anti-Swedish reaction was particularly strong in Mozambique.

On 16 October 1969, the municipal authorities of Lisbon, Luanda and Lourenço Marques decided to boycott Swedish products and on the same day the Swedish consuls in the Angolan and Mozambican capitals resigned. A couple of days later, the Portuguese Governor-General in Lourenço Marques issued a communiqué to ‘the people of Mozambique’ in which he explained that the [local] stevedores have refused to [discharge or load] the Swedish ships Bullaren and Skälderviken [...] in reaction to the Swedish government’s attitude towards Portugal and its support to the terrorist organizations. [...] Demonstrators thereafter [marched] to the city hall, where two speakers attacked the Swedish position and urged the local authorities to break off the commercial relations with Sweden. The demonstrators dispersed after singing the national anthem and giving cheers for the President of the Republic. [...] The Mayor immediately conveyed the demonstrators’ patriotic demands to the Governor-General, who with the greatest appreciation noted the civic emotions with which the dockworkers of Lourenço Marques so vigorously have reacted.

The following week, Transatlantic’s Sunnaren was boycotted in the port of Beira. Explaining the action, the local newspaper Notícias de Beira quoted on its first page a dockworker stating that “he who pays the assassin is meaner and more disgusting than the killer himself, and Sweden pays the assassins of our soldiers and even those of our families”. At the same time, the ultra-nationalist Luso-Mozambican monthly Ressurgimento, published in Machava, presented Sweden as “a sinister ghost [who] tries to stir up the waves of disorder, blood and misery that terrorism is spreading amongst the peace-loving peoples of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique”. Similar feelings were expressed by Portuguese residents in Brazil, who at the beginning of November 1969 addressed cables and letters of protest to the Swedish embassy in Rio de Janeiro and

1 Notícias (Lourenço Marques), 21 October 1969.
2 Diário de Moçambique (Beira), 26 October 1969.
3 Notícias de Beira (Beira), 26 October 1969.
4 Ressurgimento (Machava), 31 October 1969.
5 Letter from Carl Gustaf von Platen to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro, 10 November 1969 (MFA).
published a particularly vitriolic attack on Sweden in the local community 
paper O Mundo Português.\textsuperscript{1} Circles in South Africa joined the campaign. Repre-
sentatives of South Africa’s wine producers declared that they “had noted the 
Portuguese action against Sweden and supported a corresponding boycott”.\textsuperscript{2} 
Closer to home, the association of Norwegian dried cod producers,\textsuperscript{3} finally, 
expressed concern over the Swedish position towards Portugal and its African 
colonies.\textsuperscript{4}

The reactions did not have any real impact on the Swedish government. 
Interviewed in 1996, Pierre Schori recalled that “there were protests by the 
Portuguese. They organized demonstrations outside the Swedish embassy in 
Lisbon and they […] threatened to boycott Swedish goods […], but it did not 
work”.\textsuperscript{5} More important were the expressions of support received from various 
protagonists opposed to fascist Portugal. During the Portuguese 1969 election 
campaign, the future President Mário Soares, for example, paid tribute to 
Sweden’s assistance to the liberation struggle in the Portuguese colonies.\textsuperscript{6} In 
addition to the Organization of African Unity, movements outside FRELIMO’s 
CONCP alliance also added their voices of support. In late October 1969, 
COREMO’s Secretary for External Affairs, Fanuel Mahluza, thanked the Swe-
dish government\textsuperscript{7} and the following week UNITA’s Secretary for Coordination, 
Samuel Chitunda, wrote to the recently appointed Prime Minister Olof Palme, 
extending “our very warm congratulations on the revolutionary measure your 
government has taken on the political situation in [the] Portuguese African 
colonies”.\textsuperscript{8}

\textsuperscript{1} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{2} Letter from Eric Virgin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 3 November 1969 (MFA).
\textsuperscript{3} In Norwegian, De Norske Klippfiskexportørers Landsforening.
\textsuperscript{4} Letter from Yngve Möller to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 19 April 1974 (MFA). Around 
1970, exports of dried cod accounted for approximately one third of Norwegian sales to Portugal.
\textsuperscript{5} Interview with Pierre Schori, Stockholm, 28 June 1996.
\textsuperscript{6} Aftonbladet, 22 October 1969.
\textsuperscript{7} Letter from Fanuel G. Mahluza, COREMO Secretary for External Affairs, to the Swedish Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs, Lusaka, 28 October 1969 (MFA).
\textsuperscript{8} Letter from Samuel Chitunda, UNITA Secretary for Coordination, to Prime Minister Olof Palme, 
Lusaka, 2 November 1969 (MFA).
A Concluding Note

Overview

Without a colonial past, Sweden remained politically distant from Africa until after the Second World War. The historical links to South Africa—established by emigrants, explorers, scientists, missionaries and businessmen—were, however, significant, and there emerged in the early 1960s a growing concern for the struggles for democracy and national independence in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique. Based upon a strong and active public opinion, Sweden became in 1969 the first Western country to extend direct official assistance to the Southern African liberation movements.

Swedish intellectuals and students started in the 1950s to raise their voices against the South African apartheid regime. A fund-raising campaign in support of the victims of apartheid was launched even before the Sharpeville shootings of March 1960. Supported by the student and youth movements—as well as by church representatives after the granting of the Nobel Peace Prize to Chief Luthuli—this campaign and other initiatives led at the beginning of the 1960s to the formation of a national anti-apartheid committee. Broadly based boycott campaigns against South Africa—inspired by ANC and supported by the powerful Swedish cooperative movement—soon thereafter gave birth to active local solidarity committees and to an involvement with the entire Southern African region. The emerging solidarity movement was assisted by a number of books and a wealth of articles on Southern Africa by Swedish writers and journalists, as well as by translations into Swedish of texts by prominent Southern African nationalists. Some of the leading national newspapers—such as the liberal Expressen and the social democratic Aftonbladet and Arbetet—joined the solidarity efforts, respectively organizing fund-raising campaigns for MPLA of Angola and SWANU and SWAPO of Namibia.

One of the first initiatives by the emerging anti-apartheid movement was to offer study opportunities in Sweden to black students from Southern Africa. A number of students were in addition sponsored by the Swedish university unions or given scholarships by the official aid agency. Many represented nationalist organizations in their home countries. Actively participating in the debate and in the build-up of the organized solidarity movement, they played prominent parts in the development of the Swedish opinion towards Southern Africa. Skillfully acting as diplomats, several of the Southern African students managed to attract support for their respective movements among opinion makers and politicians far outside their local university milieus. The relations
thus established proved valuable when the leaders of the Southern African liberation movements in the mid-1960s intensified their diplomatic contacts with Sweden.

In the beginning mainly raised by individuals and political organizations in the liberal political centre, the humanitarian concerns found an echo in the ruling Social Democratic government. As part of Sweden’s aid policy, the government decided in 1964 to extend educational assistance to African—mainly Southern African—refugee youth. Responding to appeals by the United Nations, legal aid to political prisoners and their family members in South Africa and Zimbabwe was granted the following year. To advise the government, a broadly based consultative committee was appointed, counting several of the leading opinion makers on South and Southern Africa among its members. One of the first recommendations by the committee—subsequently endorsed by the government—was to channel official Swedish support to FRELIMO’s Mozambique Institute in Tanzania. The contacts with FRELIMO were important for the 1969 decision to extend assistance directly to the Southern African liberation movements.¹

The constituent parts of the Swedish solidarity movement with Southern Africa were largely in place by the mid-1960s. A first generation of local anti-apartheid committees—extending their activities to Zimbabwe and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique—had been formed and the initial re-active humanitarian views had been replaced by a more pro-active and militant approach. In May 1965, the solidarity movement defined as one of its main objectives to “convince the Swedish government, parliament and public of support to the liberation movements in Southern Africa”. The demand for an officially declared boycott against South Africa was at the same time gaining increasing support. By June 1965, not less than 20 out of Sweden’s 24 regional councils refused South African products, and 139 out of the 384 members of the Swedish parliament supported the voluntary boycott declared by the youth in March 1963.

The only political party that did not form part of the wider Swedish solidarity opinion was the conservative Moderate Party. The political youth leagues and the younger parliamentarians of the Left, Social Democratic, Centre and Liberal parties defended the nationalist cause. To a new generation from the socialist parties and the liberal centre, solidarity with South and Southern Africa gained a particular significance. This largely explains why the issue of direct official support to the liberation movements never became divisive in Sweden. The four future Prime Ministers Olof Palme (SDP; 1969–76 and 1982–86), Thorbjörn Fälldin (CP; 1976–78 and 1979–82), Ola Ullsten (LP; 1978–79)² and Ingvar Carlsson (SDP; 1986–91 and 1994–96)—continuously heading the

¹ And, as noted, to PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau.
² Ullsten also served as Minister for International Development Cooperation 1976–78 and Minister for Foreign Affairs 1979–82.
government for more than twenty years of pro-active Swedish involvement in Southern Africa—all became concerned with Southern Africa in the 1950s or in the early 1960s. In 1988, the ANC leader Oliver Tambo thus characterized the links between Sweden and Southern Africa as "a natural system of relations [...] from people to people [...], which is not based on the policies of any party that might be in power in Sweden at any particular time, but on [...] a common outlook and impulse".

In addition—although frequently frowned upon by conservative members of the Swedish diplomatic corps—the exiled leaders of the Southern African liberation movements started to visit Sweden and were received at the highest level of government from the beginning of the 1960s. Often invited by the ruling Social Democratic Party, many addressed the traditional Labour Day demonstrations. In the case of ANC, Oliver Tambo visited Sweden for the first time in 1961. The following year, he appeared at the First of May rallies in Gothenburg and in August 1962 he held discussions with Prime Minister Tage Erlander in Stockholm. Direct, bilateral Swedish contacts with the South African government were at the same time brought to an end.¹

As a comparison, it could be noted that Tambo did not visit the Soviet Union until April 1963.² What is more, it was only in November 1986 that the first—and last—meeting between the ANC President and the Soviet Head of State, at the time Mikhail Gorbachev, took place.³ Maintaining close rela tions with the apartheid regime at government level, the major Western powers were similarly late to recognize the leader of the South African majority. Tambo’s first official visit to France was not arranged until 1984, and then through contacts with the Swedish Social Democratic Party.⁴ Only in September 1986 did he for the first time confer with a leading member of the British government, Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe. In January 1987, Tambo was, finally, received by the US Secretary of State George Shultz.⁵

In the case of South Africa, there was thus a difference of some twenty-five years between the first Swedish contacts with ANC at the highest level of government and corresponding contacts between ANC and the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain and the United States, all permanent members of the UN Security Council.

¹ Within EFTA, official relations were maintained between Sweden and Portugal. No bilateral contacts were ever entered into with Ian Smith’s Rhodesia. In the case of South Africa, it was only during the independence celebrations in Namibia in March 1990—attended by Nelson Mandela—that a direct encounter between a Swedish (Sten Andersson) and a South African (‘Pik’ Botha) minister took place (See interview with Roelof ‘Pik’ Botha, Cape Town, 12 September 1995).
² Shubin op. cit. in *African Affairs*, p. 6.
³ Ibid., p. 13 and interview with Thabo Mbeki, Cape Town, 8 September 1995.
⁴ Schori op. cit., p. 29.
⁵ Thomas op. cit., p. 205.
The often very personal relations between Swedish politicians and opinion makers and the Southern African leaders—as well as with Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania—facilitated a deeper understanding of the nationalist core of the liberation struggles. Talking about Olof Palme’s early contacts, Sydney Sekeramayi of ZANU—who studied and worked in Sweden for more than ten years and entered the government of Zimbabwe at independence in 1980—said, for example, in 1995 that “having spoken to people like [Eduardo] Mondlane [of FRELIMO], [Herbert] Chitepo [of ZANU] and others, [Palme] could understand what they were saying. I think that they were able to impress on him that ‘the issue at home is not an ideological issue between Communism and capitalism. It is one of [national] liberation. If we are able to liberate ourselves, we will be able to make up our minds about the best ideological position to take’”.

Of significance was that the first sustained Swedish contacts were made with those movements that eventually became victorious in their respective countries, that is, ANC of South Africa, MPLA of Angola, FRELIMO of Mozambique and ZANU and ZAPU of Zimbabwe. In the case of Namibia, SWANU—at the time aligned with ANC—initially played a prominent role, but SWAPO was from 1966 seen as the genuine nationalist representative. When official assistance was eventually granted by the Swedish government, it was ANC, SWAPO, MPLA, FRELIMO and ZANU and ZAPU—the latter subsequently forming the Patriotic Front—that de facto were recognized as ‘governments-in-waiting’. Direct official Swedish support was never channelled to competing organizations, such as PAC of South Africa, FNLA and UNITA of Angola or UANC of Zimbabwe.

It was through the armed struggle that the liberation movements were drawn closer to the Soviet Union and/or China. Against that background, it is relevant that the political relations established in Sweden in practically all cases preceded the military operations. Neither the transition to armed struggle nor the links with the Communist countries eroded the support the Southern African nationalist movements already enjoyed. As later stated by Pär Granstedt of the Centre Party: “It was evident from the Swedish debate that most people realized that the liberation movements were not part of the Eastern

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1 See, for example, interview with Pär Granstedt (CP), Stockholm, 3 June 1996; interview with Lena Hjelm-Wallén (SDP), Stockholm, 14 January 1997; interview with David Wirmark (LP), Stockholm, 20 February 1996; and interview with Ernst Michanek (SIDA), Stockholm, 19 March 1996.
3 Via the Conference of Nationalist Organizations in the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP) and the General Union of Students from Black Africa under Portuguese Colonial Domination (UGEAN).
4 With the exception of Angola, where MPLA launched the liberation war in February 1961.
5 Armed sabotage was launched in South Africa by Umkhonto we Sizwe in December 1961, but it was through the Wankie campaign with ZAPU of Zimbabwe in August 1967 that ANC embarked upon large-scale military operations. FRELIMO started the armed struggle in Mozambique in September 1964, ZANU in Zimbabwe in April 1966 and SWAPO in Namibia in August 1966.
6 See, for example, interview with Gunnar Helander (CSM/SSAK), Västerås, 12 February 1996 and interview with David Wirmark (LP), Stockholm, 20 February 1996.
bloc. The problem was that their main source of support happened to be the Communist countries. We [therefore] saw it very much as our task to see to it that they also had other supporters”.¹ This was a radically different view of ‘constructive engagement’ than the policy which the United States developed towards apartheid South Africa in the 1980s.²

Although the nationalist organizations enjoyed increasing support, they were in the mid-1960s primarily seen by the Swedish government as protest movements against racial oppression and denial of civil rights. What Thabo Mbeki of ANC—who from the mid-1970s established exceptionally close contacts with Sweden—later described as a ”particular [Swedish] approach” was yet to be made, namely ”that the concept of emancipation of a people cannot be reduced to a protest movement, but concerns the right to self-determination of small nations. That is something which is legitimate [and] necessary and must [therefore] be supported […] without seeking to define what the people should be”.³ The official humanitarian assistance of the 1960s constituted an expression of re-active solidarity against apartheid and oppression, but not yet a pro-active support to the regional struggles for liberation. Despite increasing popular demands and regular appeals by the liberation movements, the Social Democratic government—as well as the ‘old guard’ of the Centre and Liberal parties—would, notably, not consider an official Swedish boycott against South Africa or measures against Portugal in EFTA.

The issues of direct support to the liberation movements and unilateral sanctions against South Africa came to a head in 1965. Diverging opinions between Prime Minister Tage Erlander and the invited ANC leader Oliver Tambo at the First of May celebrations were then followed by strong criticism against the Social Democratic government by the solidarity movement and Liberal politicians, as well as by the Social Democratic Youth League and important social democratic press voices. An editorial in the ruling party’s theoretical journal Tiden concluded in June 1965 that “a social democratic policy of the more energetic kind that in particular is recommended by the younger forces of the party will be required if the initiative in these questions will not be taken over by Communists and Liberals”. The criticism prompted the executive committee of the ruling party to issue a statement, published in October 1965 as a booklet with the title South Africa and Us. Declaring that it was “out of the question […] to consciously foment armed racial struggles in a far away country however strongly we do sympathize with the victims of oppression” and re-

¹ Interview with Pär Granstedt, Stockholm, 3 June 1996.
² Coined by Chester Crocker, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, ‘constructive engagement’ was the policy by which the United States under President Reagan regulated its relations with South Africa, favouring the maintenance of ties with the apartheid regime in the hope of influencing developments towards democracy (See Chester Crocker: High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1992).
³ Interview with Thabo Mbeki, Cape Town, 8 September 1995.
stating that “every decision on economic sanctions must be taken by the UN Security Council”, it did not, however, satisfy the Swedish solidarity opinion.

Not yet a full member of the executive committee of the ruling party, Olof Palme had by then made his first major public contribution to what has been described as a “100% turnabout of the Social Democratic Party and the labour movement on a fundamental ideological question”,¹ that is, the policy regarding national liberation in the Third World. Acting as Foreign Minister during the summer holidays, he addressed the Christian Social Democrats’ congress in Gävle in July 1965, stating that “the fundamental moral [values] of democratic socialism [...] make it our obligation to stand on the side of the oppressed against the oppressors, on the side of the poor and the distressed against their exploiters and masters”.

Palme’s famous Gävle speech—which provoked an outcry from the non-socialist opposition and a major foreign policy debate—was inspired by the developments in Vietnam² and has been regarded as the point of departure for Sweden’s active foreign policy. It is, however, likely that Palme also had South and Southern Africa in mind. Addressing the Labour Day demonstrations in Kramfors together with Charles Kauraisa from SWANU, Palme had as early as on 1 May 1964 given a militant speech in which he—in contrast to the official position of the Social Democratic government—characterized apartheid and racism as a threat to international peace and warned against a division of the world between rich and white, poor and black. Preparing his Gävle speech, Palme must also have noted the ‘divided platform’ between Erlander and Tambo three months earlier, as well as the subsequent debate in the social democratic movement.

With Palme’s dramatic entry into the foreign policy arena, a new generation of Social Democrats would lead the ruling party towards more independent international positions. In March 1966, Palme chaired the International Conference on South West Africa in Oxford, England. With regard to Southern Africa, it was, however, the developments at the congress of the Socialist International (SI) in Stockholm two months later that decisively marked the beginning of the reorientation.

The SI congress revealed deep conflicting interests between the major European members and the invited non-members from the Third World, in particular between the British Labour Party and ZANU and ZAPU of Zimbabwe. The positions taken by the Swedish Social Democratic Party were, however, highly respected, motivating the FRELIMO President Eduardo Mondlane to suggest that the “good relations [...] between [the party] and many African socialist parties, especially in East and Southern Africa, must be encouraged”. Under the Social Democratic party secretary Sten Andersson and Pierre Schori—who in

¹ Andersson in Huldt and Misgeld (eds.) op. cit., p. 97.
² Only at the end of his speech did Palme actually mention Vietnam, stating “for it is about Vietnam that I have mostly been talking”, a sentence which he added at the very last minute (Elmbrant op. cit., p. 60).
1965 had been attached to the party’s national board—the proposal was translated into concrete action. The Social Democratic Party, which traditionally had looked to the British Labour Party and other major SI members for international guidance, embarked on a non-aligned course, establishing direct relations with the liberation movements outside the international. The following year—in October 1967—the party set up an international solidarity fund to “be able to assist sister organizations and liberation movements in poor and oppressed countries”.

The break with the cautious past was at the level of policy formulation reflected in a number of articles by the younger generation of Social Democrats. While the party leadership in response to increasing criticism in the autumn of 1965 defensively issued the booklet *South Africa and Us*, three years later Pierre Schori—now the international secretary of the Social Democratic Party—took the offensive with an article in the party journal entitled ‘The Liberation Movements and Us’. It illustrated the turnabout that had taken place and anticipated Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson’s historic statement of December 1968, announcing that the Swedish government was “in touch with a number of the leaders of the African liberation movements” and that it was “prepared to help [...], in the same way as we help the liberation front in South Vietnam”.

In the era of Vietnam, the foreign policy reorientation introduced by Palme in the Swedish labour movement had a parallel in the liberal movement. In November 1968, a working group was appointed to draw up the Liberal Party’s guidelines for support to national liberation movements. The policy report by the opposition party—entitled *Support to Resistance Movements*—expressed a remarkable concurrence with the Social Democratic positions, emphasizing that the ideological label of a liberation movement was of secondary importance and that it, at any rate, should not exclude official Swedish support. Nor should its methods of struggle.

The guidelines produced by the Liberal Party were published in May 1969, the same month as the Swedish parliament endorsed a policy of direct official humanitarian assistance to the Southern African liberation movements. As the Left Party in 1967 already had advocated such support and the Centre Party coordinated its positions with the Liberal Party, there was an overwhelming majority for the decision. Excluding the Moderate Party, it represented 85% of the Swedish electorate. Pushed by an active public opinion and carried forward by a new generation of political leaders, Sweden would as the first Western country launch a policy of pro-active support to the movements struggling for democracy and self-determination in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique.

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1 Olof Palme became chairman of the Social Democratic Party and Prime Minister in 1969. Gunnar Helén assumed the chairmanship of the Liberal Party the same year. Thorbjörn Fälldin—who in 1969 was appointed vice chairman of the Centre Party—took over the party leadership in 1971.
Towards an Explanation

That a broadly based popular anti-apartheid movement emerged in the early 1960s was far from peculiar to Sweden. Grand coalitions of socialists and liberals against apartheid South Africa in the Western world were formed in Britain, Holland and elsewhere, and locally active solidarity committees were, for example, organized in Denmark and Norway. More specific was that the anti-apartheid movement in Sweden in a unitary, non-divisive manner during the following years extended its concerns to the entire Southern African region, a characteristic which would be maintained throughout the 1970s and 1980s. What really gave the Swedish solidarity opinion a special significance was, however, its strength and perseverance in impacting upon the political parties and the government, preparing the ground for the decision to grant the liberation movements official assistance. Nevertheless, in spite of vigorous campaigns and broad popular support, the wider solidarity movement did not succeed in convincing the ruling Social Democratic Party to impose economic sanctions against South Africa or to take political action against Portugal within EFTA. Economic measures against South Africa would only be introduced towards the end of the 1970s.
At the close of the 1960s, there were a number of factors that motivated the Swedish government to extend humanitarian support to the Southern African liberation movements. Before turning to the question of how the support developed—which will be discussed in Volume II—the main determinants should here be summarized.

As stated in the Introduction, the discipline of international politics normally establishes that the parameters for a nation’s foreign policy are determined by three basic objectives, namely national security, ideological affinity and economic opportunity. Public legitimacy is often added as a fourth objective. In the case of Sweden, how did these objectives relate to Southern Africa? What made Sweden—a small, industrialized Western country in northern Europe—actively involved on the side of national liberation in far away Southern Africa? Why did Sweden—as so many other Western nations—not merely assume a role of the passive bystander? Which interests—if any—did Sweden and the regional liberation movements have in common?

The developments in Southern Africa during the 1960s did not in a narrow sense constitute a threat to Sweden’s national security. Sweden had after the Second World War defined its basic foreign and security policy as ‘non-participation in alliances in peacetime, aiming at neutrality in the event of war’. Standing outside a collective security organization—such as NATO—Sweden was at the same time less restricted in its foreign policy options and more constrained to resort to its own defence capability and seek global solutions to potential conflicts across the dividing line between the Western and Eastern blocs. From a security point of view, the latter consideration explains the importance attached by Sweden to the United Nations. Active membership of the world organization developed into one of the cornerstones of Swedish foreign policy.

The significance of the United Nations as a global ‘security umbrella’ and ‘conflict resolver’ increased during Dag Hammarskjöld’s period as Secretary General between 1953 and 1961. His tenure largely coincided with the decolonization process in Africa, which was followed with keen interest in Sweden. Sweden was one of the main contributors to the UN military peace-making operations in Congo from July 1960. More than 6,000 Swedes took part in the military operations and 10% of the UN soldiers who died in combat were Swedes. With increasing super power involvement, the complexities of the decolonization process and its potential to escalate into bigger conflagrations became evident not only to the Swedish government, but entered the homes of the ordinary citizens. The awareness increased dramatically when the Swedish UN Secretary General died in a mysterious plane crash in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) in September 1961. It was, in addition, underlined by the war in neighbouring Angola and by the military support rendered by Belgian, French,

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1 The following discussion is largely inspired by the Swedish political scientist Marie Demker and her analysis of Sweden and the Algerian war of liberation (Demker op. cit.).
Portuguese, Rhodesian and South African mercenaries and Western financial interests to the secession of Katanga, which the Swedish UN contingent primarily was deployed to suppress. The Congo war brought Sweden closer to the realities of Southern Africa, highlighting the threat to international peace represented by the uncompromising white minority regimes.

The developments in South Africa pointed in the same direction. As early as in January 1957, Olof Tandberg concluded an article in *Stockholms-Tidningen* by stating that it was "inevitable [...] that an insurrection will come. The question is only when". His words would to a large extent set the tone for the initial anti-apartheid debate in Sweden. Victor Vinde, the chief editor of the social democratic newspaper, described in May 1961 apartheid as "a threat to peace in Africa and thereby to peace in the world". At the time, this was a characterization that the Social Democratic government wanted to avoid since it implied that the Security Council could impose mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa. At the United Nations, Sweden instead condemned apartheid as "a crime against humanity". To the increasingly active Swedish solidarity opinion with Southern Africa, the regional developments were, however, seen as ominous, and in 1965–66—coinciding with the activation of Sweden’s foreign policy by the younger Social Democratic generation around Olof Palme—Sweden officially expressed the opinion that the situations in South Africa, South West Africa (Namibia), Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and the Portuguese colonies (Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique) individually constituted threats to international peace and security.¹ The regional issues were at the same time seen as interwoven. In his address to the UN General Assembly in October 1966, Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson described the situation in Southern Africa as a "dark menacing cloud", strongly denouncing the "unholy alliance" between Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa.

While security considerations were important at the global level, it was, however, with respect to ideological affinity that Sweden would decisively side with the national liberation movements in Southern Africa. It was around basic ideas concerning human rights and the world order that the old independent nation in the North and the still struggling peoples in the South would find a common ground.

In foreign policy, all states endeavour to promote and support their own fundamental norms and values. To Sweden—where the Social Democratic government after the Second World War with broad support outside the ruling party² was laying the foundations for an egalitarian welfare state based on solidarity—apartheid and colonialism were affronts. Sweden had managed to stay outside the war, but its horrors of racism and foreign occupation had taken

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² The Centre Party (then the Farmers’ League) formed part of the Swedish government between 1951 and 1957.
place within living memory.\textsuperscript{1} The white regimes in Southern Africa were seen
to violate not only fundamental human rights, but also the liberal freedoms and
equality among nations upon which the post-war world was to be built. Apart-
heid and colonial oppression were not regarded as internal affairs, but widely
seen as crimes against humanity. In 1995, the former South African Foreign
Minister Roelof ‘Pik’ Botha—who served at the South African embassy in Stock-
holm between 1956 and 1960—recalled how

Sweden [...] had this obsession not to have racism ever again, knowing what it had
caused the world. [...] [A] basic philosophy of justice and fairness prevailed. Racial
discrimination, allocation of rights and duties [...] on the basis of membership in a
group, class, race or religion was anathema. [...] Concerned media and others al-
ways saw this as a crusade, as something that they had to fight. Irrespective of
where it occurred, they were against it. They therefore sided with the organizations
that were on the ground [...] and professed that they were representing the majority
of the people who were seeking freedom. [...] It was a very strong and emotional,
yet intellectual, assault.\textsuperscript{2}

As an alliance-free state outside the opposing power blocs, the right to self-
determination was both part of the national ideological value system and of
fundamental importance to Sweden from a security point of view. The govern-
ment’s position in this regard would at an early stage bring it into opposition
with the European colonial powers and South Africa. In December 1959, Swe-
den became the first Western country to vote in favour of Algeria’s right to self-
determination in the UN General Assembly, and the following year it was
among the countries that supported the Decolonization Declaration, while
Britain, France, Portugal, South Africa and the United States abstained. In 1960,
the ruling party also adopted a manifesto in which national liberation and
international solidarity featured prominently: “The Social Democratic Party
greets the emancipation [of the suppressed peoples] with satisfaction and
sympathy. [...] In the relations between rich and poor countries, social demo-
cracy must uphold the ideas of equality and solidarity which have always
guided its struggle in the developed countries”.

In the Swedish view, decolonization and self-determination were not only a
universal right, but an important lever to break up the Cold War division
between the two power blocs and enlarge the non-aligned camp, which was
seen as a force for détente and peace. Based on the assumption that the emerg-
ing nations would embark upon an alliance-free course, there was an important
element of strategic self-interest in the promotion of national liberation (and in
the granting of development assistance to recently independent states). Gov-
ernment Bill No. 100: 1962—drafted by a working group led by Olof Palme and

\textsuperscript{1} Some have argued that a fair amount of bad conscience and feelings of guilt were caused by
Sweden’s position during the war. See, for example, interview with Carl Tham, Stockholm,

\textsuperscript{2} Interview with Roelof ‘Pik’ Botha, Cape Town, 12 September 1995.
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dubbed ‘the bible of Swedish development aid’—was quite explicit in this regard, stating that among the peoples in Asia and Africa who recently have won, or shortly will gain, full independence, there is a strong ambition to stay outside big power influences and conduct what they themselves often call a policy of neutrality. Although the policy of these countries and the Swedish line to a large extent differ on account of both origin and form, they do, however, have so much in common that a mutual interest and willingness to cooperate can develop. [...] To seek to maintain and consolidate an understanding of Sweden as a neutral and progressive country [...] must [therefore] be considered a not insignificant Swedish interest.

This—as expressed in the bill—“parallelity of interests” largely explains the motives behind Sweden’s involvement with the national liberation movements in Southern Africa. The peoples who would eventually gain national independence were together with Sweden expected to follow a non-aligned course outside the opposing power blocs. From the liberation movements’ perspective, common interests also existed. In the case of FRELIMO of Mozambique, it was, for example, important “to break the dichotomy bad–good, West–East”. President Joaquim Chissano later declared that “it was very much in our interest to have Swedish support. It proved our policy in terms of [international] relationships. [...] We wanted to be as independent as possible”. Similarly, ANC’s Thabo Mbeki, First Deputy President of South Africa, stated in 1995 that the position of Sweden created more space than the African or non-aligned position. It created space for ANC to be able to deal with the rest of the Western world. And not just the Western world, but even with regard to the Eastern world and the relationship of ANC with those countries.

In addition, active membership of the United Nations evolved in the post-war period into a constituent part of the national ideological foreign policy framework. Sweden became a “believing” UN member. As such, during the 1960s it would at the same time vigorously uphold the principles laid down in the UN Charter regarding economic sanctions—opposing the solidarity movement’s demands for unilateral action—and follow the world organization’s recommendations concerning assistance to the oppressed in Southern Africa. It was thus with reference to the United Nations that the Swedish parliament in May 1969 endorsed a policy of direct support to the liberation movements. A strong believer in the search for peaceful solutions, Sweden would strictly limit the support to non-armed, civilian needs.

After a visit to Tanzania, Ola Ullsten—at the time chairman of the Liberal Party Youth League—recommended in December 1964 official Swedish assis-

1 Interview with Jorge Rebelo, Maputo, 1 May 1996.
2 Interview with Joaquim Chissano, Maputo, 2 May 1996.
3 Interview with Thabo Mbeki, Cape Town, 8 September 1995.
4 Möllander op. cit., p. 7.
tance to FRELIMO’s Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam. “We can afford to help”, the future Prime Minister said. “To teach African children algebra and English can only be a slight threat to our neutrality.” During the 1950s and the 1960s, the Swedish economy registered an average annual growth rate of 3.5%, developing into one of the strongest in the world. With regard to the third foreign policy objective—economic opportunity—Sweden was in a better position than most countries to assist the liberation movements. As stated by Ullsten, humanitarian assistance would, in addition, not affect Sweden’s global security position in any notable way. He could, similarly, have said that support to the Southern African nationalist organizations on the whole only constituted a marginal risk for the Swedish economy, and in most cases practically none at all.

The Swedish post-war economic boom laid the foundations for the social democratic vision of a ‘people’s home’. With a markedly trade-dependent economy and rapid internationalization, the building of the egalitarian welfare state was at the same time increasingly vulnerable to external factors. Promotion of trade liberalization and participation in international organizations—such as GATT and EFTA—became important against this background. Backed by Swedish export interests, the Social Democratic government actively pursued a liberal trade policy.

Swedish trade in the 1950s and 1960s was concentrated to Europe, while Southern Africa played a marginal role. Furthermore, at the close of the latter decade—when official support to the liberation movements was decided upon—the combined relative weight of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe in Sweden’s commercial exchange had steadily decreased. While sales to the five countries represented 1.9% of total exports in 1950, the share had in 1960 fallen to 1.3% and in 1970 to 1.1%. Corresponding figures for Sweden’s imports from the five were 1.5, 1.1 and 0.6%, respectively. Combining the statistics, the five countries only stood for 1.7% of Sweden’s foreign trade in 1950. Their share had ten years later fallen to 1.2% and in 1970 to 0.7%, a decline of more than half over twenty years. During the prolonged post-war period of sustained Swedish economic growth, the five countries thus became progressively less important to Sweden. This was particularly true for the two Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique and for Namibia and Zimbabwe, who together represented a share of 0.5% of Swedish foreign trade in 1950. Twenty years later, this had fallen to an insignificant 0.1%. It follows that a politically motivated decision to assist the nationalist organizations in the improbable event of economic retaliation would only very marginally affect Sweden’s material position.

In the case of South Africa, the situation was, however, more complicated. Sweden’s pre-war relations with the country were primarily economic. A number of Swedish companies had been established there, and in 1948—when the Nationalist Party came to power—South Africa occupied third position among Sweden’s non-European trading partners, behind the United States and
Argentina. Trade between Sweden and South Africa would thereafter continuously decrease in relative terms, but at the end of the 1960s South Africa still played a certain role, particularly as an export market. Its share of Sweden’s global trade was in 1950 1.2%, but fell to 0.7% in 1960 and further to 0.6% in 1970. However, while imports from South Africa in those years only represented 0.7, 0.3 and 0.2%, respectively, sales to the country stood for 1.8, 1.0 and 0.9% of total Swedish exports in 1950, 1960 and 1970. In addition, it was only in South Africa that Swedish manufacturing companies had made direct investments. In this respect too there was a relative downward trend in the 1960s, but growing in absolute figures the Swedish investments were far from insignificant. With total assets of 72 million SEK in 1960, South Africa ranked fifteenth among the countries in the world with Swedish investments. In 1970, the assets had increased to 242 million, but South Africa now only ranked nineteenth. However, Swedish ownership in South Africa represented at the same time 1.6% of total overseas assets. In relative terms, apartheid South Africa—the only Southern African country of any economic significance to Sweden—was thus more important as an investment than as an export market.

South Africa’s role in Sweden’s international economic relations would to a large extent determine that the Moderate Party—closely aligned with Swedish export interests—stood outside the anti-apartheid coalition between socialists and liberals. In defence of their South African assets, representatives of Swedish concerns within the powerful Wallenberg group—such as ASEA—actively turned against the solidarity movement, publicly characterizing South Africa as “the most distinguished outpost and supporting pillar of civilization in Africa”. Their weight also added arguments in favour of the position taken by the Swedish government regarding sanctions against South Africa. As noted, Sweden strictly followed the UN Charter, opposing demands for unilateral action and maintaining that only the Security Council was mandated to isolate a country from global economic interchange.\(^1\) The reluctance of the Social Democratic government to intervene against private Swedish interests in Southern Africa was, in addition, illustrated by the refusal to act against Portugal within EFTA and, above all, by the backing of ASEA in the case of the Cabora Bassa project in Mozambique. Of its own accord, ASEA eventually withdrew from the project in September 1969, four months after the Swedish parliament had both passed the sanctions law against Rhodesia and paved the way for direct support to the Southern African liberation movements. Olof Palme assumed the leadership of the Social Democratic Party and the Swedish government one month later. With regard to Southern Africa, his first period as Prime Minister—lasting until mid-1976—was thus with the important exception

\(^1\) As will be seen in Volume II, the Swedish position would due to the South African regime’s continued intransigence change during the 1970s. Thus, Olof Palme—then the leader of the opposition—stated in the Swedish parliament in March 1977 that “free human beings are more important than free movements of capital” (Schori op. cit., p. 27) and in June 1979 the Swedish parliament passed the first sanctions law against South Africa, banning new investments.
of South Africa devoid of economic complications. It would, instead, be associated with an increasingly progressive Swedish involvement on the side of the nationalist organizations.

With regard to the fourth foreign policy objective—public legitimacy, or acceptance by public opinion—this presentation has illustrated the assertion made by SIDA’s former Director General Ernst Michanek in 1996. It was “not the [Swedish] government that took the political initiative [concerning support to the liberation movements]. Even less so in the case of matters of a controversial nature. The whole build-up of the Swedish public opinion on Southern Africa came from below”. When the decision to assist the nationalist organizations was eventually reached, the first generation of organized solidarity with Southern Africa had, however, largely been overwhelmed by the Vietnam movement. The official position by the state was, ironically, taken when the non-governmental mobilization for Southern Africa was at a low. A more militant, post-Vietnam solidarity movement emerged in the early 1970s with the Africa Groups in Sweden (AGIS). It would towards the middle of the decade express support for the same liberation movements that already received government support. That official support preceded recognition by the popular solidarity movement and that both the Swedish state and civil society supported ANC, SWAPO, MPLA, FRELIMO, ZANU and ZAPU was peculiar to Sweden. With different emphases and although tensions often appeared between the two, the common concern strengthened Sweden’s involvement in favour of national liberation in Southern Africa. In addition, the Swedish government and AGIS would via SIDA eventually enter into close cooperation.

A more comprehensive presentation of the Swedish support to the Southern African liberation movements will be made in the following volume. In the interim, it should be noted that all the four basic foreign policy objectives mentioned above were conducive to Sweden’s active involvement in Southern Africa. In the search for peace in the Cold War global context (national security), developments in South and Southern Africa were increasingly seen as threatening. With regard to fundamental values and a basic understanding of international norms (ideological affinity), the white minority regimes were anathema, while the liberation movements were seen to represent democracy and common strategic interests. On the question of material pursuit of welfare for Sweden and its citizens (economic opportunity), there were conflicting views, but the economic relations with the region were—with the exception of South Africa—of marginal to insignificant importance. In its ambition to strive for a broad domestic foreign policy acceptance (public legitimacy), the Swedish government was, finally, from the early 1960s under pressure from an active opinion, firmly anchored in the socialist left and the liberal centre. A combination of factors thus explains why the quest for national liberation in distant Southern Africa developed into a Swedish concern.
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2. Periodicals and newspapers quoted

**Periodicals**

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-African Affairs-
-Afrikabulletinen-
-The Economist-
-Foreign Affairs-
-Frihet-
-International Studies Quarterly-
-Kommentar-
-Kulturkontakt-
-Liberal Debatt-
-Liberal Ungdom-
-Mozambique Revolution-
-New African-
-The New Left Review-

**Newspapers**

The main source consulted for newspaper articles is the Press Archive of the Uppsala University Library which holds cuttings from around 50 Swedish newspapers since 1945. The cuttings are organized according to subject and country. Swedish newspapers have also been studied at the Uppsala University Library (*Carolina Rediviva*) and selected Norwegian press reports at the Oslo University Library.

**a) Swedish newspapers**

-Aftonbladet-  
-Arbetet-  
-Borås Tidning-  
-Dagbladet-Nya Samhället-  
-Dagens Nyheter-  
-Dala-Demokraten-  
-Expressen-  
-Folkbladet Östgöten-  
-Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning-  
-Göteborgs-Posten-  
-Göteborgs-Tidningen-  
-Jönköpings-Posten-  
-Kvällsposten-  
-Ljusnan-  
-Morgonbladet-  
-Nerikes Allehanda-  
-Nordvästra Skånes Tidningar-  
-Ny Dag-  
-Nya Norrland-  
-Nyheterna-  
-Smalands Folkblad-  
-Stockholms-Tidningen-  
-Sydsvenska Dagbladet-  
-Svenska Dagbladet-  
-Upsala Nya Tidning-  
-Vestmanlands Läns Tidning-  
-Värmelands Folkblad-  
-Västerbottens-Kuriren-  
-Västernorrlands Allehanda-  
-Västgöta-Demokraten-  
-Orebro-Kuriren-  
-Östergötlands Dagblad-  
-Östersunds-Posten-
b) International newspapers

Aftenposten, Oslo
Arbeiderbladet, Oslo
The Cape Times, Cape Town
Dagbladet, Oslo
The Herald, Harare
The Nationalist, Dar es Salaam
Notícias, Lourenço Marques
Notícias de Beira, Beira
The Star, Johannesburg
The Sunday Times, Johannesburg
Times of Zambia, Lusaka
Zambia Daily Mail, Lusaka

3. Official records

The main series of public documents consulted are:

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B. Unpublished sources

1. Archives

The Nordic Africa Institute (NAI) holds a substantial number of documents on and by the Southern African liberation movements, including stencilled information bulletins published in Swedish from the 1960s. Other documents cited or consulted are, upon written request and subject to approval by the repository archive, available at the institute for bona fide students. For the benefit of the non-Swedish reader/student, the title of the Swedish documents are given an English translation in the footnotes. The main archives, organizations or private collections holding the documents are given an abbreviated reference within brackets, such as (MFA) for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Swedish documentary sources thus referenced are:

- (AGA) Africa Groups in Sweden (Afrikagrupperna i Sverige), Stockholm (The documentation has subsequently been transferred to the Labour Movement Archives and Library–LMA)
- (AJC) Anders Johansson (private collection)
- (BHC) Bertil Högberg (private collection)
- (CSA) Church of Sweden Mission Archives (Svenska Kyrkans Missions Arkiv), Uppsala
Tor Sellström

(ISA) Isolate South Africa Committee (Isolera Sydafrika-Kommittén). (The documentation has been donated to the Nordic Africa Institute-NAI)

(JIC) Joachim Israel (private collection)

(MFA) Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Utrikesdepartementet), Stockholm

(LMA) Labour Movement Archives and Library (Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv och Bibliotek), Stockholm

(NAI) Nordic Africa Institute (Nordiska Afrikainstitutet), Uppsala

(OPA) Olof Palme International Center, Stockholm

(SDA) Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Styrelsen för Internationellt Utvecklingsarbete), Stockholm

(UPA) Archives of the Popular Movements in Uppland County (Folkrörelsearkivet för Uppsala Län), Uppsala

In addition, the following two archives in Southern Africa are similarly referenced:

(MCA) Mayibuye Centre for History and Culture in South Africa, Cape Town, South Africa

(MHA) Historical Archive of Mozambique (Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique), Maputo, Mozambique

At the time of data collection, the documentation held at the active—or recently active—non-governmental organizations (AGA, ISA and OPA) had not been organized and/or classified for easy reference. The same applies, naturally, to the two private collections (AJC and JIC). With regard to the major Swedish archives consulted (CSA, MFA, LMA, SDA and UPA), the information below should, however, guide the interested student via the principal records to the individual document cited. This said, it should be noted that the documents held at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and at the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SDA) are restricted. Secondly, the files, series or archives indicated contain a considerable number of documents. Only the ten MFA files comprise around 400 dossiers with up to 200 pages each. The SDA series are considerably larger. The single archive on the LO/TCO Council of International Trade Union Cooperation at LMA consists, similarly, of several hundred volumes.

Due to the amount of documents involved and to the diverse classification systems used, it has not proved meaningful to further subdivide the documentation for direct reference in the footnotes. Bearing in mind the country discussed, the organization referred to and the date of the document cited, it should, nevertheless, not be too difficult to locate an individual source. Finally, regarding the more recent MFA and SDA sources—roughly covering the period 1990–1994—a large number of active documents have been consulted during meetings with Foreign Ministry and Sida officials, i.e. before filing. They are also referenced in the footnotes as (MFA) or (SDA), respectively. The volumes, files, series and archives studied at the main repositories are:

a) Church of Sweden Mission Archives (CSA)

Files: Correspondence on South Africa, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South West Africa (Namibia): 1955–1980

b) Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA)

Files: HP 1 / By and By¹ British territories in Africa: 1962–1980
    HP 1 / Ymo Mozambique: 1975–1986
    HP 21 / Ysy Questions regarding national minorities; South Africa: 1961–1979
    HP 53 / Ysy Protectorates, mandates and possessions; South Africa: 1974–1978
    U 30 / By Humanitarian aid: British territories in Africa: 1965–1974
c) Labour Movement Archives and Library (LMA)


Pierre Schori Private archive

d) Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SDA)

Series: 1.11 Refugee and humanitarian assistance: 1972–1994. (Before 1 July 1972, the series bore the designation 4.4)
Sub-divided according to organizations, this is the main SIDA series on Swedish and international NGOs channelling humanitarian assistance to Southern Africa. (Example: 1.11.1/AGIS)
1.12 Assistance to liberation movements: 1972–1994. (Before 1 July 1972, the series similarly bore the designation 4.4)
Followed by the name of a liberation movement, this is the main SIDA series on Swedish humanitarian assistance to Southern Africa (Example: 1.12.1/ANC)
1.13 Contributions to Swedish NGOs: 1972–1994 (Before 1 July 1972, the series was 4.6)
This series was in use during the period 1972–1978. Within the series, each liberation movement had an individual designation. (Example: 2.6.2.3: Assistance to FRELIMO)

e) Archives of the Popular Movements in Uppland County (UPA)

Archives: Laboremus:
- Documents 1960–1965
- South Africa Committee: Documents 1963–1968

The documents cited from the Historical Archive of Mozambique (MHA) were kindly identified by its director, Mrs. Inês Nogueira da Costa. The ANC box files consulted at the Mayibuye Centre in Cape Town (MCA) are as follows:

Box files: 1 South Africa United Front: 1961
3 ANC Women’s Section/Correspondence with Sweden: 1979–1981
15 Notes and correspondence on foreign funding in South Africa: 1985–1987
19 Bommersvik, Sweden: Workshop on post-apartheid research priorities: 1987
26 Report from workshop in Sweden on research priorities, August 1987
51 ANC National Executive Committee: Records 1986–1990
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59 ANC Department of Research: Minutes of Harare consultative meeting: July 1997
64 International relations–Scandinavia: 1986–1990
69 Correspondence with ANC offices–Scandinavia: 1987–1990
2. Interviews

Over eighty interviews were carried out for the study. They are listed below. The interviews are published by Nordiska Afrikainstitutet in Tor Sellström (ed.): Liberation in Southern Africa — Regional and Swedish Voices (1999).

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Paulo Jorge, Luanda, 15 April 1996
Lúcio Lara, Luanda, 16 April 1996
Ruth Neto, Luanda, 16 April 1996
Miguel N’Zau Puna, Luanda, 17 April 1996
Alberto Ribeiro-Kabulu, Harare, 5 May 1996
Holden Roberto, Luanda, 17 April 1996
Jorge Valentim, Luanda, 18 April 1996

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Joaquim Chissano, Maputo, 2 May 1996
Janet Mondlane, Maputo, 30 April 1996
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Marcelino dos Santos, Maputo, 29 April 1996
Jácinto Veloso, Maputo, 29 April 1996
Sérgio Vieira, Maputo, 29 April 1996

Namibia
Otelie Abrahams, Windhoek, 16 Mars, 1995
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Hadino Hishongwa, Windhoek, 15 March 1995
Peter Katjavivi, Windhoek, 20 March 1995
Charles Kauraisa, Windhoek, 20 March 1995
Dirk Mudge, Kalkfeld, 18 March 1995
Aaron Mushimba, Windhoek, 16 March 1995
Mishake Muyongo, Windhoek, 17 April 1995
Festus Naholo, Windhoek, 15 March 1995
Zedekia Ngavirue, Windhoek, 17 March 1995
Hifikepunye Pohamba, Windhoek, 15 March 1995
Andreas Shipanga, Windhoek, 20 March 1995
Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, Windhoek, 17 March 1995
Ben Ulenga, Windhoek, 16 March 1995

South Africa
Jaya Appalraju, Johannesburg, 14 September 1995
Alex Boraine, Cape Town, 12 September 1995
Rolof ’Pik’ Botha, Cape Town, 12 September 1995
Gara Ebrahim, Harare, 22 July 1995
Gerald Giose, Cape Town, 6 December 1995
John Gomomo, Stockholm, 6 September 1996
Rica Hodgson, Johannesburg, 19 September 1995
Lindiwe Mabuza, Bonn, 14 March 1996
Reddy Mampane, Johannesburg, 17 September 1995
Trevor Manuel, Cape Town, 8 September 1995
Thabo Mbeki, Cape Town, 8 September 1995
Billy Modise, Johannesburg, 15 September 1995
Kay Moonamsy, Johannesburg, 14 September 1995
James Motlatsi, Johannesburg, 25 April 1996
Sankie Mthembi-Mahanyele, Cape Town, 7 September 1995
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Beyers Naudé, Johannesburg, 15 September 1995
Barney Pityana, Uppsala, 23 January 1997
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Garth Strachan, Cape Town, 10 September 1995
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Birgitta Berggren, Stockholm, 27 March 1996
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Stig Blomquist, Bro, 29 January 1997
Pär Granstedt, Stockholm, 3 June 1996
Birger Hagström, Stockholm, 9 October 1996
Sven Hamrell, Uppsala, 10 April, 1996
Gunnar Helander, Västerås, 12 February 1996
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Sören Lindh, Stockholm, 4 February 1997
Stig Lövgren, Sollentuna, 21 February 1996
Åke Magnusson, Stockholm, 27 January 1997
Ernst Michanek, Stockholm, 19 March 1996
Hillevi Nilsson, Stockholm, 4 February 1997
Pierre Schori, Stockholm, 28 June 1996
Bengt Säve-Söderbergh, Stockholm, 14 January 1997
Carl Tham, Stockholm, 14 January 1997
David Wirmark, Stockholm, 20 February 1996
Per Wästberg, Stockholm, 28 February 1996

Zimbabwe
Canaan Banana, Harare, 3 June 1996
Dumiso Dabengwa, Harare, 27 July 1995
Kumbirai Kangai, Harare, 19 July 1995
Didymus Mutasa, Harare, 27 July 1995
Abel Muzorewa, Harare, 26 November 1996
John Nkomo, Harare, 21 July 1995
Sydney Sekeramayi, Harare, 27 July 1995
Ndabaningi Sithole, Harare, 25 July 1995
Josiah Tungamirai, Harare, 7 June 1996

Others
Kenneth Kaunda, Lusaka, 15 July 1995
Salim Ahmed Salim, Copenhagen, 16 November 1955
Vladimir Shubin, Cape Town, 12 September 1995
Appendices

Appendix I: Conversion table: SEK / USD 1950–1995

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<td>1955</td>
<td>5,18 SEK</td>
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*Source: Riksbanken Infocenter*
Appendix II:
Parliamentary elections in Sweden 1948–1994: Distribution of votes (%)

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>LPC</th>
<th>SDP</th>
<th>CP</th>
<th>LP</th>
<th>MP</th>
<th>O</th>
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<td>23.8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3.4</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>19.5</td>
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<td>47.8</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>16.5</td>
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<td>47.3</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<td>50.1</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
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<td>16.2</td>
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<td>25.1</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>10.6</td>
<td>20.3</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
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<td>12.4</td>
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<td>9.1</td>
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<td>8.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>18.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
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<td>45.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LPC—Left Party Communists, SDP—Social Democratic Party, LP—Liberal Party, CP—Centre Party, MP—Moderate Party, O—others, such as the Green Party and the Christian Democrats

Appendix III:
Governments in Sweden 1951–1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Coalition Partners</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Tage Erlander</td>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>CP</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Tage Erlander</td>
<td>SDP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Olof Palme</td>
<td>SDP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Thorbjörn Fälldin</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>LP, MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Ola Ullsten</td>
<td>LP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Thorbjörn Fälldin</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>LP, MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Thorbjörn Fälldin</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>LP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Olof Palme</td>
<td>SDP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Ingvar Carlsson</td>
<td>SDP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Carl Bildt</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>CP, LP, CD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SDP—Social Democratic Party, CP—Centre Party, LP—Liberal Party, MP—Moderate Party, CD—Christian Democrats
Appendix IV: Swedish exports to Southern Africa and Portugal 1950–1970
*(percentage share of total exports)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area/Country</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----- South Africa</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----- region less South Africa</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa and Portugal</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Includes Northern Rhodesia/Zambia and Nyasaland/Malawi.

Appendix V: Swedish imports from Southern Africa and Portugal
1950–1970

*(percentage share of total imports)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area/Country</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----- South Africa</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----- region less South Africa</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa and Portugal</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a) Includes Northern Rhodesia/Zambia and Nyasaland/Malawi. Traditionally, Sweden imported a lot of copper from Zambia.*

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