
Report No.7

**Humanitarian Aid Coordination
During War and Peace in
Mozambique: 1985-1995**

Sam Barnes

Humanitarian aid coordination is necessary for effective use of resources. However, behind the rhetoric of collaboration and rationalisation one finds UN agencies competing with governments for power and influence and national institutions being replaced by donors in significant policy debates.

This study traces humanitarian aid coordination in three distinct phases:

- 1985–1990: The intensification of the emergency in Mozambique and the challenge to Government in directing aid;
- 1990–1992: Peace talks and the protracted emergency with increased UN control of Aid Coordination;
- 1993–95: ONUMOZ and donor driven resource allocation.

In addition to documenting the forms and mechanisms of aid coordination, the paper reveals how the UN often worked against itself. The changing policies on the role of the UN in humanitarian crises are followed the Mozambican context.

Ms. Sam Barnes worked with the United Nations in Mozambique from 1987 to 1994 initially with the UNDP Emergency Unit. After the signing of the General Peace Agreement in 1992, Ms. Barnes was in charge of the Assessment and Planning Unit within the UNOHAC, the humanitarian component of ONUMOZ, the UN peacekeeping operation. She remained with UNOHAC until December 1994. Since then she has undertaken research on the impact of humanitarian assistance in Mozambique and worked as a consultant for the United Nations in Tajikistan, Liberia, Angola and Somalia. The research for this work was supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the writing by Sida (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency) in Mozambique.

Ms. Barnes' other publications include "NGOs in peace-keeping operations: their role in Mozambique" in *Development in Practice*, Volume 8, Number 3, August 1998; "The Humanitarian Factor in Mozambique Peace Negotiations; 1990–92" in *War and Peace in Mozambique* by Stephan Chan and Moises Venancio with Chris Alden and Sam Barnes (London: MacMillan, 1998); "Peacekeeping in Mozambique" in *Peacekeeping in Africa* by Oliver Furley and Roy May (Eds) (Ashgate Publishing Company, 1998).

Published by

Nordiska Afrikainstitutet
(The Nordic Africa Institute)
P O Box 1703
S-751 47 Uppsala, Sweden

In cooperation with

Swedish International Development
Cooperation Agency

ISSN 1400-3120
ISBN 91-7106-433-8

STUDIES ON EMERGENCIES AND DISASTER RELIEF

is a series published jointly by Sida and the Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

1. K. B. Wilson, *Internally Displaced, Refugees and Returnees from and in Mozambique*. 61 pp. Uppsala 1994.
2. Jonathan Baker, *Refugee and Labour Movements in Sub-Saharan Africa. A review*. Roger Zetter, *Shelter Provision and Settlement Policies for Refugees. A state of the art review*. 106 pp. Uppsala 1995.
3. Sidney Waldron and Naima A. Hasci, *Somali Refugees in the Horn of Africa. State of the art literature review*. 87 pp. Uppsala 1995.
4. Eftihia Voutira and Shaun A. Whishaw Brown, *Conflict Resolution. A Review of Some Non-Governmental Practices. 'A Cautionary Tale'*. 50 pp. Uppsala 1995.
5. Toby Lanzer, *The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs in Angola: A Model for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance?* 40 pp. Uppsala 1996.
6. Hugo Slim, *Doing the Right Thing. Relief Agencies, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Responsibility in Political Emergencies and War*. 17 pp. Uppsala 1997.
7. Sam Barnes, *Humanitarian Aid Coordination During War and Peace in Mozambique: 1985–1995*. 27 pp. Uppsala 1998.

Indexing terms Aid institutions Emergency relief Humanitarian aid Ethics
--

ISSN 1400-3120

ISBN 91-7106-433-8

Printed in Sweden

by Reprocentralen HSC, Uppsala 1998

Contents

Foreword.....	5
Introduction.....	7
Background	8
Phase I: The Government leads 1985–1990	9
The United Nations increases its role: 1987–1990	10
An expanded role for the UN	12
The UN at odds with itself	14
UN coordination in the field	15
Phase II: Peace talks and protracted emergency needs—1990–1992	16
Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) steps into Mozambique	16
Phase III: UNOHAC—Humanitarian Coordination within the Peace-Keeping Operation 1992–1994	21
Establishing UNOHAC.....	22
Mine clearance and reintegration of demobilised soldiers.....	24
ONUMOZ exits	26
Conclusions	27
Selected references.....	27

List of Abbreviations

ARO	Africa Groups of Sweden (NGO)
CARE	An international NGO with 10 national members in North America, Europe, Japan and Australia
CENE	National Executive Commission on the Emergency
CHAP	Consolidated Humanitarian Assistance Programme
CORE	Commission on Reintegration
CPE	Provincial Emergency Commission (Mozambique Government)
CUSO-SUCO	Canadian University Services Overseas (NGO)
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
DPA	Department of Political Affairs (UN)
DPCCN	Department for the Prevention of Natural Disasters (Mozambique Government)
DPKO	Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (UN)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation (UN)
GPA	General Peace Agreement
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOM	International Organisation of Migration
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
OEOA	Office for Emergencies in Africa (UN)
ONUMOZ	UN Peace-Keeping Operation in Mozambique
PKO	Peace-Keeping Operation
SCF-UK	Save the Children Fund (UK NGO)
SPQRCDT	Department of Special Political Questions, Regional Cooperation, Decolonisation and Trusteeship (UN)
SRSG	Special representative of the Secretary-General
UNADP	UN Accelerated Demining Programme (Mozambique)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNILOG	United Nations Logistics Operation of World Food Programme (Mozambique)
UNOHAC	United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (Humanitarian component of ONUMOZ)
UNSCERO	United Nations Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations (Mozambique)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

Foreword

Studies of Emergencies and Disaster Relief is a series of research reports on topics of relevance to those who are working with humanitarian assistance. Sida, in close cooperation with the Nordic Africa Institute, sponsors the publishing of these reports as a contribution to the dialogue between humanitarian actors, in the field and at headquarters around the world

Coordination and cooperation have been key words in humanitarian assistance during the last few of years. Extensive work has been done within the UN system to strengthen the coordination mechanisms. The division of responsibility between the operative and policy-making parts of the organisation has been one aspect of this. Other aspects which have been part of this process include coordination on the ground, coordination between field offices and headquarters, coordination between multilateral and bilateral donors, coordination between the UN and the NGOs. In 1997 a new office within the UN, the Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Assistance was created. It replaced the Department of Humanitarian Assistance, set up in 1992.

The present report, written by Ms Sam Barnes, addresses the humanitarian aid coordination problems in Mozambique 1986–95. It is the second report on coordination aspects in this series, the first was written by Toby Lanzer who worked for DHA in Angola. Coordination remains an important subject on the international humanitarian agenda. By looking at case studies, lessons for the future can hopefully be drawn. Everyone involved in this field should read it.

Carin Norberg

Director Department for Cooperation with
NGOs and Humanitarian Assistance

Introduction

Coordination as applied by the United Nations, NGOs, donors and national authorities is one of the most overused and misunderstood concepts in the development dictionary. Its meaning varies depending on which of the stakeholders is employing it at a given moment. In the context of Emergency and Humanitarian Programmes, the sub-textual meaning of coordination approximates control regarding which areas need coordination—definition of needs, planning of interventions, rationalisation of financing or implementation; who should coordinate and assume the ultimate authority and responsibility over the process.

To some degree the debate about coordination is not so much about effective delivery of assistance but rather about power. The various stakeholders jockey to place their agency at the forefront of the process—positioning to enhance their own legitimacy and subsequent fundraising capacities. The inter-agency jostling that typifies complex emergencies has negative ramifications for cooperative and objective discussion on how to develop coordinated mechanisms for effective delivery of assistance.

External actors often exclude national actors from both the policy debates as well as the actual coordination mechanisms and expect that weakened national institutions will disregard their own mechanisms and ‘naturally’ accept donor institutions as leading coordination bodies.

This paper documents the socio-political process of humanitarian aid coordination leading up to and during the implementation of the peace agreement in Mozambique. The period under discussion 1985–95, represents a decade in Mozambique’s historical evolution which is characterised, for reasons of natural disasters, protracted war and regional politics, by the decline of the role of the Mozambican state with a corresponding increase or dominance of the international donor community in the areas of policy-setting and aid co-ordination.

Theoretically, in countries confronting complex emergencies, ‘coordination’ should be a tool which brings together governments and donors to constructively and decisively deal with the effects of emergencies. At the same time, theoretically, the UN system with its banner of ‘neutrality’ should be better placed, relative to

bilateral aid donors, to coordinate international efforts so that the leadership of government in policy making is not undermined. However, when peace-keeping operations come into the picture and government is one of the two parties to the peace agreement, new models must emerge which, optimally, secure the peace and consolidate government for its future responsibilities.

In practice, as the Mozambique case will show, inter-agency rivalry, divergent donor views on the roles and responsibilities of the State, subjective personality clashes, bureaucratic delays and careerism of individuals, at the expense of a coordinated international effort, closely approximates the reality on the ground.

For purposes of clarity, the paper assesses humanitarian aid coordination in three different phases:

- 1985–1990: The Emergency intensifies: Government capacity challenged the proliferation of NGOs;
- 1990–1992: Peace talks and protracted emergency needs; UN humanitarian coordination mechanisms debated;
- 1993–1994/5: ONUMOZ and humanitarian assistance coordination.

It should be noted that the humanitarian assistance programme in Mozambique and the causes that necessitated its changing foci—drought, floods, war, a shifting government macro-economic policy, peace negotiations and a shifting geopolitical context—stretched not only Government leadership and capacity, but also those of the UN/donor community to devise a coordination mechanism in tune with the pace of changes as they unfolded. As a result, the context exacerbated the differences between the Government, UN and donor approaches to coordination; at times, at the expense of coordinated programme delivery.

Background

Mozambique became independent from Portugal in 1975. The Frelimo Party, which led and won the liberation war formed a government on socialist principles. For only a few years, did Mozambique experience peace and stability. It was ravaged by internal war, floods and drought and subjected to external sabotage and destabilisation by South Africa's apartheid regime.

The internal war was to prove the most devastating. Fostered and financed by external parties and driven by cold war rivalries and geopolitical concerns, Mozambique's already weak economy, productive and social infrastructure was decimated. Five million people were displaced, including 1.7 million refugees in neighbouring countries, by the time of the signing of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) in October 1992.

Between 1992–1994, close to 100,000 soldiers needed to be assembled, disarmed and demobilised. Refugees returned and resettled, demobilised soldiers reintegrated into civilian society and the difficult and long process of land mine clearance began. Multiparty elections, threatened in the last hours by political fears of one of the parties to the GPA, were held in October 1994, and an elected Frelimo government took office in December 1994. All ONUMOZ peace keepers, military, political and humanitarian were withdrawn by the end of 1994, leaving only the mine clearance teams to continue their work.

Phase I: The Government leads 1985–1990

Generally, national governments link coordination very closely to issues of political control and sovereignty. The state appointed coordination entity defines the humanitarian emergency, is the interface with the United Nations and the donors and oversees the implementation of the programmes. The governmental emergency coordination body therefore establishes the “legitimacy” and the “public face” of the emergency.

In Mozambique, the structure of the humanitarian/emergency coordination mechanisms initiated in the 1980's exemplified the above model: i.e. government-led coordination. The Mozambique Government appointed a Secretary of State of International Cooperation for aid coordination at the policy level, while the Department for the Prevention and Combat of Natural Disasters (DPCCN) was tasked with the actual delivery of relief supplies. At the start of this period (1985), there were few NGOs which negotiated agreements with Government to operate within the country in a given sector and geographic area, encouraging a multi-sectoral approach on a district basis. In 1986, the Ministry of Cooperation assumed the functions of the Secretary of State of International Cooperation thus elevating aid coordination within the governmental power structure.

During this period, the US and WFP were the biggest donors of food aid. All relief food aid was channelled through the governmental agency, DPCCN, while food aid for the market sector went through the Ministry of Internal Trade and Commerce. In order to receive a substantive increase in relief food aid from the US in 1983, the Mozambique Government was pressured to accept the American NGO contractor, CARE, as part of the package. USAID wanted the relief food to be distributed by CARE and other NGOs, but Mozambique managed to maintain the government policy that food aid was distributed by the governmental body, DPCCN. CARE came in as the provider of technical assistance to the Logistics Support Unit (LSU) of DPCCN (receiving more than \$20 million in OFDA funds from 1984 to 1992) so as

to strengthen the capacity of Mozambican institutions to manage the food distribution.¹

The first USAID Director, summed up the real intentions of this assistance in an interview with a Swedish Evaluation team:

It has never been the USA's political and aid-related intention to go in and strengthen Mozambican public administration by helping to establish a national organisation to counteract emergencies. Quite the opposite; the faster such an attempt is eroded, the easier it will be for private interests and non-governmental organisations to assume responsibility for the distribution of emergency aid and to reach targeted groups.²

For a number of reasons, government-led coordination was not openly challenged until the late eighties for a number of factors. Most importantly, the UN agencies, bilateral donors and NGOs involved in support for relief operations took their cues from the government. Bilateral cooperation was led by the Nordic countries whose development philosophy supported government institutions as the primary implementers of assistance programmes.

The regional context, in which Mozambique was one of the “frontline states” in the struggle against apartheid South Africa greatly enhanced its political legitimacy. Typical of this view was the Swedish support for Mozambican government humanitarian programmes, which were seen as an integral part of their Southern Africa policy framework supporting the “legitimate self-defence” of a regime attacked by apartheid.³ The US had not yet emerged as a dominant influence with the Government nor with the other major donors in Maputo. By contrast, it's Southern Africa policy of “constructive engagement” was driven by the cold-war-geopolitical

¹ Mozambique was on USAID's “blacklist” until 1985 and could not receive development assistance. In August of 1987, the first USAID mission came to Mozambique, and in 1988, USAID started up its development assistance programmes with \$15 million. Before that assistance had been food aid through PL 480.

² *Mozambique: The Troubled Transition* by Hans Abrahamsson and Anders Nilsson, Zed Press (London, 1995) pp. 141–142.

³ Interviews in Stockholm by author, June 1995 with Per Örnéus and Anders Pedersen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

framework which was hostile to the region and its perceived alliance to the “communist bloc”.

Until 1987, the emergency in Mozambique was defined as being caused in large part by natural disasters i.e. drought, floods, cyclones. The emergency situation was as yet publicly presented as tied primarily to a political conflict. At the time of independence, Mozambique proclaimed itself as building “socialism” and therefore those international organisations sympathetic to the socialist development alternative and anti-apartheid policies were most active in the post-independence phase. The relief programmes of European NGOs such as Oxfam-UK, SCF-UK, as well as those which had a solidarity and anti-apartheid orientation (ARO-Sweden, Eduardo Mondlane Foundation-Holland, CUSO-SUCO-Canada, Oxfam-America) were working directly with DPCCN or Government line ministries. There was a strong commitment to government responsibility in defining and managing programmes. The NGOs operating during this phase had *cooperantes* working within governmental programmes, rather than running parallel programmes implemented by the NGO with expatriate development workers, which became the dominant model after the mid-eighties.

By the mid-eighties, the emergency took on additional dimensions as the impact of the destabilisation war overwhelmed events. The Mozambique Government recognised that it required more and more relief aid, as the numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs), affected rural populations and Mozambicans seeking security as refugees in neighbouring countries increased. These massive population movements pushed the country to a protracted “complex emergency”, primarily provoked by the civil war between the Government and Renamo, a rebel group which had its origins in and support from white Rhodesian forces and subsequently from apartheid South Africa. South Africa’s policies of regional destabilisation were typical of low-intensity conflicts of the eighties. Renamo’s rural terrorism devastated Mozambique’s economy bringing agricultural production to a standstill, and forcing the internal and external migration of close to one quarter of the total population. The regional context and the nature of the war, consolidated the support of the United Nations and the dominant bilateral agencies for the Government of Mozambique.

The Swedish Government had had a significant aid programme in Mozambique since the

time of Mozambique’s independence in 1975. Though not an important food aid provider, SIDA allocated funds to the government relief agency, especially for logistics and non-food relief. A Swedish mission to Mozambique in August 1987, led by Maurice Strong, accurately describes the mood of the donor community.

There is generally a high degree of trust in the Mozambican government, and the government is developing its own capacity to monitor, particularly as to the needs and effects of the emergency measures on the recipient populations. ... There was unanimous agreement amongst the government and donor representatives I met with, that the principal cause of the emergency conditions ...is the internal conflict by bands of “bandits” supported by South Africa....The emergency situation can be expected to continue as long as the current state of conflict and insecurity persists....⁴

The Nordic countries, especially Sweden and Norway, manifested their commitment to government led aid-coordination in these first years of the Mozambique emergency. As a consequence, the Government relief agency, DPCCN, grew into a large governmental entity handling several hundred million dollars of food and non-food aid with staff down to the district level. Government led coordination mechanisms emerged with the strong support of the international community. However, as the scale and complexity of the emergency grew, the Government mechanisms were unable to manage the operations effectively. Too little attention was paid by both Government and donors to developing and supporting the management skills necessary to direct and control such a scale of operations. Not surprisingly, corruption and diversion of relief supplies became more and more common.

The United Nations Increases Its Role: 1987–1990

The United Nations is mandated to support the governments of its member states. Therefore, it tends to promote the prominence of national institutions and governments in defining policies and priorities and taking the lead in the co-ordination of external assistance. This was particularly true in the 1980’s before humanitarian crises, due to internal wars, pushed the UN to expand its role and modalities of inter-

⁴ Report on Mission to Mozambique by Maurice F. Strong, 19 August 1987.

vention. In a conflict situation, however, the UN may vary its position when its impartiality is questioned in defining humanitarian needs and guaranteeing access to needy populations are at issue. Even in such cases, however, the UN negotiates in the first instance with the Government to expand the UN role in the coordination and limit that of the Government, so that assistance gets to all civilians in need, regardless of territorial control, with political impartiality.

UN emergency and humanitarian coordination mechanisms, in their various manifestations were attempted in Mozambique. Intermittent drought and the intensification of war in the mid-eighties, necessitated the setting up of the United Nations Office for Emergency Operations in Africa (OEOA) in 1984. This was in recognition of the fact that existing UN institutions were ineffective in dealing with the magnitude of emergencies in Africa. Mozambique, as one of the priority countries was included in its "Status Reports of the Emergency Situation in Africa".

OEOA Missions visited Mozambique to assess the deteriorating situation and back-up support was given to the UNDP Resident Representative who assumed the role of representing OEOA until it closed down in 1986. In the case of Mozambique, the OEOA coordination role was "soft" focusing mainly on information dissemination on emergency needs and mobilisation of financial support. The coordination, planning and implementation of actual operations rested with Government, but with UNDP support to mobilise donors and NGOs. OEOA was commended by donors as an efficient ad-hoc operation whose success was attributed to the combined authority of the Secretary-General with the leadership of Bradford Morse and Maurice Strong, both of whom had international standing and could gain support from key donors and UN agencies.⁵

With the closure of OEOA, emergency issues were placed under the United Nations Department of Special Political Questions, Regional Cooperation, Decolonisation and Trusteeship (SPQRCDT), since emergencies in Africa were becoming increasingly more complex, and influenced as much by political issues as natural

⁵ Responding to Emergencies: The Role of the UN in Emergencies and Ad-Hoc Operations" by Krister Eduards, Gunnar Rosen and Robert Rossborough, pp. 61–113 in *The United Nations Issues and Options: Five Studies on the Role of the UN in the Economic and Social Development Fields*, commissioned by the Nordic UN Project (Stockholm, 1991).

disasters. Thus it was the Special Emergency Programme, within SPQRCDT, which supported Mozambique as UN involvement in an Emergency Appeal process was sought by Government. UNDP at the field level continued to be the focal point for coordination of UN agencies, donors and linkages with the Government.

Intensified military activities in 1985/1986 increased the number of affected and displaced from 1.8 million to 3.2 million persons in a six month period.⁶ Though these figures were not verifiable, local authorities and relief agencies noted the massive increase in affected populations to at least 2.5 million persons, due to the expanded military operations by both Renamo and the Government which had dire economic and social consequences for the civilian populations.⁷ It was at this point that ICRC sought approval from the Mozambican Government to operate within its territory in the areas controlled by Renamo. All other relief efforts, UN and bilateral, continued to provide assistance only to areas that Government defined as accessible, i.e. under their control.

Emergency relief coordination activities of the Government and the United Nations did not even broach the question of relief for areas under Renamo control. ICRC, consistent with its mandate to provide assistance to those in need on all sides of a conflict, operated on its own and in liaison with Government and Renamo, but with no contact with official coordination bodies. The origins and nature of the war conditioned the international response. All assistance, under the UN Appeal went through Government channels and to government-held areas. The UN and donor rhetoric was firmly on the side of the Mozambique Government as the victim of apartheid aggression, the legitimate protector of its people, and the recipient of emergency relief aid. Renamo never achieved international legitimacy until the final period of the peace negotia-

⁶ Report to the United Nations Secretary-General on Emergency Operations in Mozambique, February 1997–October 1988, prepared by Arturo Hein, United Nations Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations in Mozambique, Maputo, October 1988.

⁷ After the offensive by Renamo in the Zambezi Valley, the Mozambique Government requested that Zimbabwean and Tanzanian troops enter into offensive operations aimed at pushing back Renamo from areas in Sofala, Zambezia, Manica and Tete that they had occupied. Both the Renamo offensive and the Government counter-offensive provoked massive displacement of population and reduced significantly secure areas for agricultural production.

tions in 1992. ICRC continued to be the only humanitarian organisation to provide assistance to civilians within Renamo held areas.⁸

The Government of Mozambique received significant international support for its relief efforts, but realised that it did not have sufficient resources to stave off a human disaster. The President of Mozambique requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations in late 1986 to launch an international emergency appeal for Mozambique. This initiative was also a mechanism to use the UN forum to gain additional political backing in its struggle against Renamo.

An Expanded Role for the UN

In February 1987, the Secretary-General launched an appeal to alert the international community donors of the looming crisis. Consequently, a donors' conference was held in Geneva in March at which \$330 million was pledged for emergency relief including massive food aid of 625,000 tons. Mozambique had entered emergency appeal politics. The country would prove to be one of the most effective at securing high levels of international support for over a decade.

As was the practice in UN Emergency Appeal machinery, the Secretary-General appointed a UN Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations (UNSCERO) who was at the same time the UNDP Resident Representative. To assist the UN Special Coordinator, an Emergency Unit was established within UNDP, with the mandate to support the Government in coordination, needs assessments, donor liaison and information dissemination of the Emergency programme. It was financed and staffed exclusively by UNDP, which eventually came to limit its effectiveness and credibility with other UN agencies with more extensive operational experience i.e. UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR.

There was increasingly a call for UNDP to show leadership within the UN system. A Swedish Mission to Mozambique on emergency coordination in August 1987, concluded that the UN did not have a leadership role in emergency coordination which was attributed to the lack of country level UN emergency experience and

limited support and resources from headquarters in respect to the UNSCERO functions. The mission also observed that there was a strong reluctance on the part of Government as well as bilateral donors and NGOs to be coordinated by the UN. The mission recommended that it would not be appropriate at that time (1987) to upgrade the status of the UN Emergency Coordinator to be similar to what had existed in Ethiopia or Sudan.⁹

The Mozambique Government was not completely supportive of the initiative to establish an Emergency Unit within UNDP seeing it as an attempt to usurp Government sovereignty over relief operations within Mozambican territory. Its preference was for UN funds be used to strengthen Government coordination mechanisms which were being developed to respond to the Emergency Appeal response. Subsequently, Government realised that this set-up could be used to advantage.

So as to become more effective in the supervision of this large scale relief programme, the Government created a National Executive Commission for the Emergency (CENE). The Commission was headed by the Prime Minister but its programmes were carried out by the Ministry of Cooperation. CENE was tasked with policy, coordination and day-to-day assessment and monitoring of relief operations. CENE was the Government counterpart for the UNSCERO and was provided with institutional and material support through a UNDP technical assistance project financed through a UNDP Trust Fund supported by Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands. Approximately \$3.5 million was dispersed from 1988 to 1994 to strengthen national (CENE) and provincial (Provincial Emergency Commissions—CPEs) emergency management and coordination entities. It also funded a small unit within CENE to support the commission and act as UNSCERO's day-to-day counterpart.

In May 1987, CENE appointed a National Coordinator with the rank of Deputy-Minister with access to the Council of Ministers through the Prime Minister's Office. This high level access to Cabinet enhanced the Coordinator's effectiveness in the implementation of the emergency programmes, providing an interface with the various governmental line ministries (i.e. health, water, education, defence) that were

⁸ See "The Humanitarian Factor in the Mozambique Peace Negotiations: 1990–1992" by Sam Barnes in *War and Peace in Mozambique* by Stephen Chan and Moises Venancio (editors), MacMillan Ltd, London, 1998.

⁹ Report on Mission to the United Nations by Maurice Strong, 19 August 1997 (Internal Document).

involved in relief operations and the donor community.

The CENE Coordinator held a weekly meeting with the UN Special Coordinator and chaired weekly meetings (Emergency Operations Committee-EOC) which counted on the participation of Government implementing entities (DPCCN, Ministry of Health, Rural Water Programme, etc.) and representatives of the international community (UNSCERO, UN agencies, donors, NGOs). UNSCERO, with CENE, prepared the meetings and acted as the secretariat. The EOC was an important co-ordination tool in this phase in which problems were identified, responses discussed and information passed from Government to implementers and donors. In addition, the EOC minutes, prepared by UNSCERO, provided an important information dissemination function by which embassies, NGOs, journalists and Government departments were kept informed on the evolving emergency situation in Mozambique.

The first CENE Coordinator, Prakash Ratilal, Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, was an economist who had previously served as the Governor of the Bank of Mozambique. The ties to internal trade were critical in ensuring that emergency programming had a foundation in a more global perspective of food security and the impact of food aid on market structures, especially the link between freely distributed relief food and commercially sold market food aid. Ratilal understood how the UN served to further the Government's political interests and managerial capacity.

In the first place, the UN acted as a foundation for the creation of a greater executive capacity within Government. Secondly, it helped to make world opinion aware of the nature and scale of the emergency in Mozambique and to mobilise international support for the Programme. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the UN established itself as a constant and neutral liaison between the Government and the donor community.¹⁰

Ratilal was very adept at using the UN as a mediator with those donors that had difficulty in accepting a clear Government position. Through UNSCERO, messages were passed from donors to Government and vice-versa and often diffused the "push-pull" relationship between the international community and Government. Though the UN could assist and facilitate coordination, there were strong signals that the

Government should be in the lead. The UN, vulnerable to such pressure in its dealing with a member state, rocked back and forth with the government vicissitudes, at times placing itself outside the "donor" camp.

The Mozambique Government with UN support launched Emergency Appeals (1987–1992) totalling over \$1.5 billion to assist the more than three million Mozambicans displaced or affected by the civil conflict. UNSCERO backed up these efforts, working with the Government and UN agencies to define the Emergency Programme.

Mozambique Emergency Appeals: 1987–1992

Appeal Year	Total Requirements	Total Pledges
1987/88	(no dollar value)	\$ 337,442,000
1988/89	\$ 380,406,000	\$ 363,565,820
1989/90	\$ 361,790,640	\$ 323,790,640
1990/91	\$ 135,789,026*	\$ 122,262,877
1991/92	\$ 262,522,468	\$ 168,494,735
1992/93	\$ 447,179,020	\$ 315,410,078
TOTAL	\$1,587,687,154	\$1,508,703,273

* 1990/91 Emergency Appeal did not include market food aid

Source: UNSCERO Closing Reports

The UN can often unwittingly allow itself to be used by Governments wishing to gain credibility for the Emergency Appeals or be used for internal political purposes. Mozambican local officials had learned that inflated numbers of "needy populations" could bring more food aid to their localities, resulting in an increased possibility of "diverting" a portion for public or private benefit. As a result, the beneficiary figures sent to CENE by provincial authorities were highly inflated, at the same time as corruption was surfacing as a serious issue in the relief operations carried out by DPCCN, the government agency. These figures were immediately questioned by many donors and UN agencies.

UNSCERO in January 1989, with the backing of Government and donors; organised a series of verification missions to the affected provinces to determine the actual number of Mozambicans that required relief assistance. At the time there was a generally held belief that those requesting the assistance and the implementing institutions stood to benefit from increases in vulnerable population and therefore "inflated" the needs—"cooked" the numbers. The verification missions served the interests of CENE as well as the UN's "external forces"—UN agencies, NGOs and bilateral donors in the missions could be used as the scapegoat by CENE to pressure provincial

¹⁰ Mozambique: Using Aid to End Emergency by Prakash Ratilal, UNDP, New York, 1990.

Governors to come up with an accurate and realistic picture of priority needs, thus taking the political heat off the central government in relation to its provincial colleagues. Through the participation of government, in the missions, the final recommendations were accepted as “neutral and reliable” by the divergent interests.

During the same period, the Government was coming under increasing pressure from some of the major donors—principally the US—over the “diversion” of food aid and other emergency relief. Despite the presence of CARE within the DPCCN, corruption allegations were widespread.¹¹ Pressure was put on UNSCERO to push the Government to investigate the allegations. Consequently, the Council of Ministers appointed a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the thefts of relief commodities. The Commission’s Report did not satisfy the donor community, and subsequently during the preparation of the 1990/91 Emergency Appeal, the UN demanded that the Government recognise corruption as a problem in the Appeal document, and that the Prime Minister discuss it directly with the donors at the Appeal Conference in New York.

Government leadership in relief coordination was being challenged by the donor community. The inability of DPCCN, the government relief agency, to satisfy the donors’ requirements for monitoring distribution to the beneficiary level coupled with the unwillingness of Government to take actions against those responsible for diversion of food aid led to an erosion of confidence and pressure for implementation to be taken out of the hands of government.

The UN at Odds with Itself

Despite UNSCERO’s good working relationship with the Government, there were tensions and power struggles within the UN regarding the prominent coordination role of UNSCERO. The Office backing up UNSCERO was a UNDP creation which was directed and staffed exclusively by UNDP. Its Chief Officer was named by UNDP, without consultation or input from other UN agencies despite their more extensive experience relative to UNDP in emergency operations in Mozambique. UNDP staff named to

¹¹ CARE had been contracted to provide technical assistance to the Logistics Support Unit of DPCCN. USAID evaluations criticised CARE for failing to direct adequate resources towards training and capacity building.

head the Emergency Unit, had no previous experience in emergency coordination and were assigned to their posts in response to personnel considerations at headquarters.¹² As such, they had limited credibility and effectiveness with UN agencies, donors, and Government. As the emergency programme expanded and with it the financial stakes, the role of UNSCERO and UNDP in coordination was increasingly challenged by the other UN agencies.

Concurrent to the discussions of UNDP’s effectiveness at the field level, by 1990 within the UN General Assembly member states were also questioning the overall efficacy of the UN in emergency and humanitarian operations. The traditional approach (UNSCERO model) which allocated leadership to the UNDP Resident Representative acting also as UN Resident Coordinator was not effective since UNDP lacked operational experience, appropriately qualified staff and the internal bureaucratic mechanisms to fulfil this role. Equally ineffective, was UNDRRO, established in 1971 to direct and coordinate relief activities of the UN system as a whole at the headquarters level.

With the proliferation of complex emergencies caused by civil conflicts and ethnic warfare (Iraq, Somalia, Sudan), there was a perceived need to rework the institutional mechanisms of the UN to respond to the new post-cold-war reality. As humanitarian operations became essential components of peace-keeping initiatives, a mechanism to provide leadership and effectively coordinate these activities was deemed necessary. Concrete proposals were put forward at a G7 Summit in London in July 1991. Concurrently, the Nordic countries had also commissioned studies to look into UN effectiveness, including emergency and relief operations. The need for a new institution in the humanitarian realm that could bring together disparate UN efforts under one common banner was widely accepted.

After much debate and discussion, in December 1991 the General Assembly passed resolution 46/182 “Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations”. The Department of Human-

¹² The need to reform UNDP personnel policy, if UNDP is to have a role in humanitarian coordination at the field level, is discussed in detail within a UNDP commissioned study, *UNDP in Conflicts and Disasters: An Overview Report of the Continuum Project* (UNDP Project INT/93/709) by Matthias Steifel, Geneva, August 1994 (revised version) pp. 45–63.

itarian Affairs (DHA) was thus established to consolidate the UN Secretariat offices involved in humanitarian emergency assistance activities, including UNDRO. In April 1992, the Secretary-General appointed Jan Eliasson, a Swedish diplomat, as Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs. DHA was to have bearing on decisions regarding the structuring of humanitarian coordination within Mozambique and the humanitarian component of the Mozambican peace-keeping mission.

UN Coordination in the Field

As the emergency situation in Mozambique began to constrain development planning, to its credit, UNDP named a WFP senior staff member with experience in emergency operations in Ethiopia and southern Africa, to be the UNDP Resident Representative. He also assumed the position of UNSCERO in his capacity as Resident Coordinator. Under his tenureship, work was accelerated with Government, UN agencies, donors and NGOs to mobilise support for the immediate relief needs and the planning for the resettlement and reintegration of 5 million internally and externally displaced Mozambicans, which would be necessary once a peace agreement was reached.

Previous UNDP Resident Representatives in Mozambique had been conditioned primarily by their experiences with standard UNDP Country Programmes, so even in a war situation and a disintegrating economy, UNDP country programmes continued to provide technical assistance to central ministries which, given the war had no viable development strategy and had become cut off from their provincial areas of operations and tied to increasingly entrenched central bureaucracies. The UNDP Resident Representative was fortunate to have a competent UNDP Deputy to take charge of maintaining this rather stagnant country programme, thereby releasing the Resident Representative to focus attention on his UNSCERO role of coordination of emergency relief, and planning for national reconstruction after an eventual peace agreement.

Unfortunately, the UNSCERO's previous professional experience in emergency operations did not compensate for his current institutional ties to UNDP. In Mozambique, the role of UNDP in emergency coordination at the field level was being challenged by the two largest operational agencies—WFP and UNICEF. In support of the 1989/90 UN Emergency Appeal, WFP had a

\$20.6 million dollar programme, UNICEF \$4.9 million, compared to UNDP's \$1.7 million. By 1992, in response to the Mozambique Emergency Drought Appeal, WFP contributed \$105 million while UNICEF's emergency programme increased to \$6.7 million. In 1992, no new UNDP contributions were recorded to support the drought emergency.¹³ WFP believed it should be the "lead agency" since it provided the largest amount of assistance from the UN family. UNICEF supplied most of the non-food aid, so the two jointly questioned the legitimacy of UNDP and UNSCERO maintaining a hold on UN emergency coordination. Although UNSCERO had a more operational approach due to the UNDP Resident Representative's long WFP experience, this was disregarded in the battle for agency positioning for the lead coordination role. Intra-agency rivalry thus informed all coordination discussions.

This was compounded by UNDP's centralised procedures and modalities, characterised by headquarters control, negotiations with central governments and long term country plans. These approaches were not appropriate for the Mozambique context in which the war had significantly weakened the government; politically, militarily and economically. The UN Resident Coordinator and UNSCERO roles placed added constraints, since they represented the UN to a member state government. Therefore, UNSCERO was hesitant to have direct contacts with the internal protagonist, Renamo, regarding the need for humanitarian assistance in Renamo-controlled areas, unless it was first cleared by Government. This opened the way for the initial UN overtures regarding humanitarian assistance into conflict zones being made by WFP and UNICEF.

The consequences of such UN rivalry created a vacuum in which NGOs and bilateral agencies could move to define their own programmes separate from and in parallel to both Government priorities and coordinated UN proposals. The post-war planning process suffered as personalities took the lead in defining priorities. Concomitant to this, increasing NGO implementation of emergency programmes reduced the role of government and set the stage for the donor-driven policies that were to characterise the peace-keeping phase.

¹³ See UNSCERO Closing Reports for each Appeal for comparative information on donations by UN agencies, bilateral agencies and NGOs.

Phase II: Peace Talks and protracted emergency needs—1990–1992

By 1989, it was increasingly apparent that the war had become widespread with its victims increasingly the civil society in rural communities. A negotiated end to the war thus appeared to be an option for Mozambique. Following protracted efforts by international actors to mediate between Government and Renamo to end the war, the two parties had their first direct contacts in Rome in July 1990. There followed a lengthy peace negotiation process which culminated in, among other things, a new Constitution which set the country firmly in the direction of a democratic, multiparty system.

In the event of a peace agreement, discussions about an appropriate and effective strategy for the post-war period which was to be characterised by massive population movements and resettlement began in 1990. However, the expectations that UNSCERO/UNDP and the UN system could respond quickly and with a “unified” plan were dashed, as UN interagency battles came to dominate policy discussions. Certain bilateral donors moved to support the Government in preparing for post-war reconstruction and demobilisation of soldiers. As early as 1990 the Swiss supported the Ministry of Finance to set up a unit to start planning for the demobilisation of soldiers and their reintegration into civilian life. Initiatives in provincial post-war planning were carried out and the peace negotiations were going on as the National Planning Commission began its process of preparing a National Reconstruction Plan with inputs from all the provinces. All of these were important in building a national constituency for peace and to prepare for the post-war period.

Notwithstanding UN inter-agency rivalries, UNDP’s visibility in leadership in relation to Government and donors was linked to its role in the coordination of humanitarian activities. There was a close working relationship between UNSCERO and government coordination entities which jointly defined needs and priorities. The definition of needs was very contentious, involving negotiation between Government agencies (CENE and line ministries) and UN agencies. Generally, UN agencies wanted to use the appeal process to expand their own pro-

grammes. This Mozambique appeal model did not follow the “unwritten rules” of other UN Appeals, which have as their objective fund-raising for UN agencies rather than the country in need.

In the case of Mozambique, inter-agency assessment missions were usually sent out from headquarters to work with Government and UNSCERO to prepare each appeal. However, consensus on what was a priority resulted from discussions in Maputo between the UN and Government, and not in New York, Geneva or Rome. UN agencies having become accustomed to Emergency Appeals as a fund-raising *carte blanche* did not look kindly at being told by Government or UNSCERO that their proposals should be adjusted in accordance with agreed upon Mozambican priorities.

The Special Coordinator played a constructive role in bringing together donors around the need for coordinated action in response to the 1992 Southern Africa drought. This included discussions on opening-up humanitarian corridors into Renamo-controlled areas. WFP and UNICEF had more experience with relief operations in conflict situations, as they were involved in Operation Lifeline in the Sudan. The idea of “peace corridors” began to be discussed in Maputo with donors and government while the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) brought the issue up directly with Renamo in Rome. As the drought situation worsened, UNSCERO/ICRC coordination was formalised and ICRC participated in regular donor meetings on the drought emergency chaired by UNSCERO and held at the World Bank.

Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) steps into Mozambique

Shortly after the passing of the General Assembly Resolution 46/182 creating DHA, UNDP sent a mission to Mozambique (February 1992) to review the UN emergency and relief coordination structures, as well as UN assistance to Government coordination and management of its emergency programme with the view to pro-

pose changes that would accommodate GA 46/182. This was headed by Michael Priestly, a senior advisor to the UNDP Administrator on Humanitarian Programmes, with extensive experience in emergency situations (Sudan, Ethiopia).

The creation of DHA was in part a response to the inadequacies of UNDP to undertake effectively its coordination role in complex emergencies. A UNDP commissioned study *UNDP in Conflict and Disasters* (1994) recognised that “UNDP is often regarded as having neither the institutional capacity, the necessary experience, nor the human and financial resources or the political clout to play a leadership role in emergency and post-emergency situations.” The Report stated that the principle causes of the UNDP’s “counter-performance” in emergency related situations were (1) a UNDP policy vacuum in relation to its role in complex emergencies (2) a vague UNDP mandate in humanitarian areas (3) insufficiently qualified staff and (4) UNDP’s close connection to governments and (5) bureaucratic rigidity.¹⁴ Some parts of UNDP realised that the agency had to come up with a new approach if it was to continue to play a leading role in humanitarian coordination in Mozambique. This framework would have to take into account DHA and the probable presence of a peace-keeping mission as a result of the peace talks.

The Priestly mission proposed that UNSCERO be transformed into a representative UN unit, with staff seconded from UN agencies involved in the humanitarian effort, in particular UNDP, WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO and FAO. The recommendation recognised that if the notion of UN coordination was to have any credibility amongst the agencies themselves and bilateral donors, and all UN agencies must be partners in the coordination effort. It was further recommended that the new UN Unit have a new name to reflect the change that “overall coordination is provided through a special representative of the UN Secretary-General, reporting to the newly appointed Under-Secretary-General of Humanitarian Affairs”.¹⁵

The Mission foresaw the need for an expanded relief effort into Renamo areas, during the negotiation and peace-keeping phases, and large scale population movements of internally

displaced and returning refugees in the post-conflict period. It seemed clear to the mission that the arrangements in place would not adequately meet the demands of the post-conflict situation. Thus, the Mission recommended the establishment of a UN presence in the provinces, but based upon the already existing UN agency field structures in the four provinces where they existed. In other words, a UN agency (in this case UNICEF, WFP or UNHCR) would represent the system in that province and coordinate the planning and implementation of humanitarian activities. If necessary, the new UN Unit would later establish provincial offices as needed, based upon the new concept of a UN coordination unit which had participation of all the major actors.

Unfortunately, UNDP did not listen to its own advisors. The bureaucratic wheels were already moving in the UNDP personnel department to replace the Emergency Unit Head, without consultation with other UN agencies. There was an opportunity, in May 1992, for an overture by UNDP to DHA and the other UN agencies to have a joint selection process in which candidates from the larger agencies operating in the emergency programme in Mozambique could be considered for the position—so as to begin to create this new UN coordination unit. Without listening to the field or its own mission’s recommendations, UNDP headquarters appointed one of its own who had no experience in emergency situations, thereby reinforcing the other UN agencies’ opposition to UNDP’s leadership in humanitarian coordination.

As the UNSCERO structure stayed the same, the context around it was continuing to change. In March 1992, Protocol III, part IV, signed by Government and Renamo indicated a role for the United Nations in the drawing up and implementation of a plan for the return and social reintegration of Mozambican refugees and displaced persons. The newly formed Department of Humanitarian Affairs launched its first Consolidated Appeal for the Drought Emergency in Southern Africa (DESA) in June 1992.

The DESA Appeal began to show an emerging DHA strategy—to use the UN to promote and fundraise first for UN agencies, ignoring nationally defined priorities. In Mozambique, the practice had been to define priority needs within the country which any entity—governmental line ministries, UN, bilateral or NGO—could implement. This came in contradiction to

¹⁴ Mattias Steifel, pp.10–12.

¹⁵ From draft report of the UNDP Reformulation Mission, 6 April 1992, p.15.

the evolving structure of “consolidated” appeals. Mozambique had written its own Drought Emergency Appeal with UNSCERO and UN agency support. UNSCERO had to make strong arguments with DHA for the continuation of the country-driven rather than agency-driven approach for the Mozambique portion of DESA.

Concurrently, WFP, in Mozambique, was planning to set up its own logistics unit, (UNILOG), rejecting an initiative to have a UN logistics unit that could serve the entire system under UNSCERO but with the co-participation of WFP and UNICEF. WFP decided to place its own field monitors in each province to coordinate food deliveries and distribution. These initiatives not only fragmented UN coordination and collaboration, but also undermined the Government’s predominant role in food deliveries and provincial level food aid coordination.

There were continuing discussions on the need for humanitarian corridors into Renamo areas and secure access to reach all Mozambicans in need. This culminated in the *Declaration on the Guiding Principles for Humanitarian Assistance* in Rome in July 1992, before the peace agreement. This placed humanitarian assistance coordination firmly within a peace-keeping context in which neutrality and impartiality had to become part of the *modus operandi*. UNSCERO presided over the Humanitarian Assistance Committee which was set up by the declaration to supervise and coordinate the humanitarian operations.

The possibility of maintaining peace in Mozambique was seen to be closely linked to the effectiveness of the humanitarian programme. In some previous peace-keeping missions, humanitarian coordination had been outside the mission and held by UNDP or a lead agency (WFP or UNHCR) creating difficulties in ensuring that humanitarian and political priorities were mutually re-enforcing and consolidating to the process. There was a growing recognition that the various aspects of peace-keeping should be integrated. Given that DHA had been set up, there was a strong lobby for one UN flag.

Before the General Peace Agreement was signed, planning and consultations had gone on regarding the possible role and structure of the humanitarian component of a UN Peace-keeping Mission in Mozambique. What UNSCERO provided was an institutional framework within the UNDP Mozambique Field Office which could be built upon for the humanitarian component of the peace-keeping operation. Under-Secretary-

General James Jonah and Under-Secretary-General Abdulrahim Farah in a briefing note to the SG on 8 August 1992 transmitted the view that the UN involvement in Mozambique was complex, that it should be integrated and that the humanitarian coordination component should be within the structure of the peace-keeping operation.¹⁶ This view surfaced in the non-paper sent to President Chissano on 19 August 1992 outlining possible modalities of UN involvement in the verification of a GPA. The non-paper refers to the fact that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) would also be responsible for coordinating any activities of the United Nations development and humanitarian agencies which were connected with the implementation of the GPA.

Chissano responded by requesting United Nations technical teams on the elections and the cease-fire. In Government’s view, humanitarian assistance coordination to guarantee delivery of relief to all Mozambicans had already been dealt with through the July agreement which established a Humanitarian Assistance Committee chaired by the United Nations, so no additional team was required to look into this area.

However, despite the pressing needs due to the drought, the implementation of the *Declaration* was slow and the hoped for access to increased numbers of needy Mozambicans by the ICRC and the UN was not materialising. In a letter from the SG to the President of the Security Council on the UN involvement in implementation of the peace agreement a few days before the signing of the peace agreement (29 September 1996), the SG reported that he would be sending the Deputy of the USG for Humanitarian Affairs to Mozambique “to devise a more effective United Nations response to the emergency situation and to expedite the opening of land corridors.”¹⁷

A General Peace Agreement (GPA) was signed by the Government of Mozambique and Renamo on 4 October 1992 in Rome. An expansive role for the UN was foreseen as the GPA stipulated a broad role for the UN in the overall supervision of the implementation of the GPA. The UN was to verify the cease-fire; supervise and monitor the withdrawal of foreign troops,

¹⁶ Interview by author with Taye Zerihoun, United Nations Department of Political Affairs, New York, April 17, 1995.

¹⁷ *The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992–1995*. New York: Department of Public Information, 1995, p.104.

the separation of the two armies, their entry into assembly areas, their disarmament and demobilisation; observe the electoral process and provide technical assistance and material support to the Mozambican Government to organise and carry out multi-party elections for president and members of parliament; and to assist the Government and Renamo in drawing up and implementing a plan for relief, resettlement and reintegration of Mozambican refugees, internally displaced persons and demobilised soldiers.

The humanitarian mission, headed by Charles La Muniere, Director and Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, arrived in Mozambique two days after the signing of the GPA (6 October). La Muniere was well known in Mozambique, as he had been the Director of the Office of Emergencies in Africa of SPQRCDT in the late eighties. He had headed several previous inter-agency missions to Mozambique starting in 1987 to prepare the emergency appeals. Before joining DHA, La Muniere was the Director of Emergency Programmes within UNICEF.

UN agencies and the major donors backed the notion that the existing coordination mechanisms (UNSCERO) with a UNDP monopoly were obsolete, for political and operational reasons. Given the peace agreement and the anticipated massive flow of refugees, internally displaced families and eventually demobilised soldiers to their areas of origin, active participation of the operational agencies was critical. In addition, the Humanitarian Assistance Programme was seen as having a clear political dimension that had a direct impact on the peace process, requiring an impartial UN unit which derived its mandate from the Peace Agreement rather than governmental agreements (with only one party to the peace agreement).

President Chissano emphasised to the mission that food had to be delivered rapidly and efficiently to the drought victims, as well as to the soldiers of the two armies—Frelimo-FAM and Renamo that were awaiting demobilisation. Incidents had occurred in which workers of relief organisations, local administrators, aircraft and vehicles had been forcibly held by troops from both sides demanding food and salaries. If this continued it could destabilise the peace process. He saw the importance of UN impartiality in providing assistance to both sides.

The mission proposed the immediate creation of the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC) to replace

UNSCERO. It was proposed that the new structure be made up of staff seconded from UN agencies (DHA, WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, FAO, WHO, UNDP) and the NGO community and include staff member from the Government and Renamo. UNOHAC would be headed by the then Special Coordinator of Emergency Relief Operations until the arrival of the SRSG, who would review the situation after his arrival.

Further, to complicate matters at a very delicate time politically, UNDP replaced its Resident Representative and therefore the head of UNSCERO a week before the signing of the GPA. Peter Simkin had represented DHA and led the UN delegation to the discussions in Rome in July 1992 that culminated with the Declaration on Humanitarian Assistance. He was the visible representative of the UN system in the discussions with Renamo regarding the provision of relief to areas under their control and was presiding over the Humanitarian Assistance Committee. He would have been the logical link, as the experienced UNSCERO and Resident Coordinator, with the SRSG. He had also been working closely with the Swiss on the planning and preparations for demobilisation. Shortly before his transfer, the Prime Minister of Mozambique transmitted the Government's wish that he stay on for a transition period. This was forwarded to UNDP New York, but to no avail. A new Resident Representative arrived who, to his credit, had previous experience in Mozambique, but could not bring that vital link with the major actors and negotiation process that had been going on during the previous year.

This action by UNDP was viewed by several ambassadors as an example of UNDP's inability to assume political leadership due to its own bureaucratic intransigence and lack of understanding of UNDP's role within peace-keeping contexts. However, it also reflected the weakness of the UN system which must approve changes in UN Resident Coordinators. The UN and especially DHA, should have recognised that to change the UNSCERO and the UN Resident Coordinator would not be advisable if the Security Council was considering a peace-keeping operation in the country. DHA was still in its start-up phase and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee had not yet taken on the issues of procedures for approval of "humanitarian coordinators".

The missions recommendations for increasing the effectiveness of UN humanitarian coordination left open the linkage of UNOHAC

to the peace-keeping structure and the question of who should head UNOHAC; concluding that only after the nomination of the Special Representative would the particulars of the linkages of UNOHAC to the peace-keeping mission be reviewed and defined.

Phase III: UNOHAC—Humanitarian Coordination within the Peace-Keeping Operation 1992–1994

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Aldo Ajello, arrived on 15 October 1992 in Mozambique to set up the Peace-keeping Operation, ONUMOZ. By early December the structure and framework for the operation was presented to the UN Security Council for approval. The humanitarian component was placed within the ONUMOZ structure under the leadership of the SRSG. The ONUMOZ framework built upon the interrelated mandates of the military, political, electoral and humanitarian components.

Without sufficient humanitarian aid, and especially food supplies, the security situation in the country may deteriorate and the demobilisation process might stall. Without adequate military protection, the humanitarian aid would not reach its destination. Without sufficient progress in the political area, the confidence required for the disarmament and rehabilitation would not exist. The electoral process, in turn, requires prompt demobilisation and formation of the new armed forces, without which conditions would not exist for successful elections.¹⁸

The recommendations of the DHA mission regarding the separation of UNOHAC from UNDP were endorsed at the country level by the key UN agencies and the donors. While there was agreement on the need to diminish UNDP's leadership in humanitarian coordination, the operational agencies and UNDP quickly came to view ONUMOZ and UNOHAC as a challenge to their power and influence in Maputo. The SRSG was the highest UN Official in the country, and all UN agency representatives had to accept his political leadership during the peace-keeping period.

ONUMOZ was the first major peace-keeping operation in which DHA was included alongside the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO). By the time the SRSG was appointed, the view in New York was to have a strong humanitarian component within ONUMOZ and

strip UNDP of its humanitarian coordination role in Mozambique. The SRSG agreed with the placement of UNOHAC within ONUMOZ and stated that he would have "refused to have it outside the structure".¹⁹ Bert Bernander was selected as the UNOHAC Director with the agreement of the SRSG, DHA and UNDP headquarters. Bernander, a former UNDP Resident Representative, had served as UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq and Cambodia and bore a higher rank within the UN system than the country agency heads. He reported to the SRSG and to DHA in New York. Some UN agencies, including the then UNDP Representative in Maputo, later protested his nomination preferring that the UNDP Resident Representative be given the post, as had been the case with UNSCERO. These views reflected the emerging anti-DHA constituency within the UN operational agencies,²⁰ which eventually resulted in the elimination of DHA in 1997 and the creation of a "softer" Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA).

The ONUMOZ period was characterised by strong criticisms of the UN humanitarian coordination machinery and its effectiveness. Given the high profile and cost of ONUMOZ,²¹ UN agencies in Maputo and some bilateral aid agencies (notably USAID) criticised the model of placing the UN humanitarian coordination office

¹⁹ Interview by author with SRSG, Aldo Ajello, United Nations, 3 April 1995.

²⁰ Jonathan Moore in his prescriptive essay for UNRISD entitled *The United Nations and Complex Emergencies: Rehabilitation in Third World Transitions* (1996) reveals the height to which UN interagency rivalries go. "One of the most prestigious UN operational agencies actually dispatched emissaries to its field office in Mozambique to pass the word that excessive cooperation with the overall guidance laid down by the SRSG and his staff (UNOHAC) would not be appreciated back at agency headquarters." (p.29)

²¹ The direct costs of the ONUMOZ operation were \$565 million (DPKO, 1996) while humanitarian support accounted for \$532 million in obligated funds during the ONUMOZ period, \$60 million for election support and \$16 million for the Renamo and Political Parties UN Trust Funds.

¹⁸ *The United Nations and Mozambique*, Document 26, Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ, p.152.

within the peace-keeping operation.²² The areas of dispute were the parameters of humanitarian coordination; extent of operations that UNOHAC should undertake as a temporary coordination entity, programme links with government, the role of donors, the mine clearance programme and planning for the reintegration of demobilised soldiers. Unfortunately, in practice, much of the debate was driven by agencies' and individuals' self-interest and concern for turf preservation in relation to the encroaching PKO-ONUMOZ. The substantive issues were more often than not overlooked.

Establishing UNOHAC

UNOHAC's establishment followed five years of UN coordination through UNSCERO/UNDP which proved to be a great advantage for ONUMOZ. The UNSCERO office was merged into UNOHAC and much of the staff transferred. UNOHAC's major task was to coordinate with Government and Renamo the emergency and humanitarian programmes of the UN agencies, bilateral donors and NGOs. This included information gathering, assessments and dissemination; maintenance of a database on financial support, population movements, sectoral activities and implementation; special support for mine clearance and reintegration of demobilised soldiers and the management of special trust funds established to finance humanitarian projects in the context of the GPA. All of these functions had been within the mandate of UNSCERO with the exception of mine clearance and support for demobilised soldiers.

Since UNOHAC had staff and a carryover budget from UNSCERO/UNDP, it was immediately functional. *De facto*, the humanitarian component of the PKO was the first on the ground since basic agreement on the framework

for humanitarian operations had been reached through the July 1992 Agreement on the *Guiding Principles for Humanitarian Assistance*. The Government released UNDP advisors to its Provincial Emergency Commissions (CPEs) to represent the UN at the provincial level and liaise with UNOHAC, linking with Renamo and Government while UNOHAC recruited its own Provincial level staff. This facilitated the expansion of relief operations into Renamo-controlled territory.

The UN agencies on the ground (WFP, UNICEF, WHO, UNHCR, UNDP, FAO) with large emergency programmes, NGOs and the Mozambican Government had worked together during the war period. Unlike other PKOs, significant organisational and logistical networks for humanitarian assistance delivery had been established long before this PKO and operations only needed to be extended into Renamo-controlled areas. Renamo had little experience with the international community and was unfamiliar with and distrustful of the rhetoric and practice of coordination. Relief operations were often delayed in the first months after the GPA due to Renamo's reluctance and inexperience in working with international humanitarian organisations. Significant time had to be spent with Renamo at national and local levels to gain their confidence and familiarise them with the norms and codes of conduct of international humanitarian organisations.²³

While the initial proposals to create UNOHAC included recommendations to integrate Government, Renamo and NGOs within the structure, the final formula included "international" professional staff, with the two parties participating in committees convened by UNOHAC. Twenty-four professional staff were divided between a central office and the ten provinces. Eleven were seconded from UN agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, UNHCR, WFP), a multilateral organisation (IOM) and a bilateral donor (USAID), while the remainder were funded by the ONUMOZ budget. It had been hoped that secondment from UN agencies would lead to greater collaboration and coordination. However, at both headquarters and field level there were divergent views between the agencies and UNOHAC on whether the sec-

²² It is interesting to note that Dennis Jett, US Ambassador to Mozambique at the time was strongly critical of UNOHAC's placement within the PKO. After leaving Mozambique and reflecting upon that conclusion in a broader context he stated in correspondence with the author "Regarding the humanitarian aspect of the PKO, I think everything should be under the control and responsibility of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Some tend to see humanitarian action as something that is good under any circumstances and that has to be divorced from political influences. I think the military and political impacts of humanitarian assistance are inescapable and need to be factored in to see whether they are a positive or negative element".

²³ ICRC in interviews with the author (Geneva, June 1995, June 1996) stated that from the time ICRC began working with Renamo in 1986, Renamo had difficulties in understanding the roles, mandates and limitations of humanitarian organisations.

oned staff were responsible to the UNOHAC Director or their agency representative, and this became another arena of the DHA/agency tug-of-war. Two major agencies lagged in their commitment to join the ONUMOZ (UNOHAC) machinery—WFP and UNHCR. UNHCR placed a liaison officer within UNOHAC in mid-1993, while WFP only placed a staff person there in 1994—18 months after the signing of the GPA. Each had large offices in Maputo with extensive field representation and viewed UNOHAC as an unnecessary interference with their work.²⁴

In terms of organisation, UNOHAC had two functional units—Assessment and Planning and Information Management, two special programme sections—Mine Clearance and Reintegration Programmes for Demobilised Soldiers, a Trust Fund manager and the field staff. The Assessment and Planning unit included eight professional staff, most seconded from UN agencies (WHO, UNHCR, WFP, UNDP, IOM) who oversaw the needs assessment and prepared the Consolidated Humanitarian Assistance Programme (CHAP) in their sectoral areas, collaborating with the two parties to the peace agreement and the relevant agencies and NGOs.

UNOHAC in conceptualising a transitional humanitarian assistance programme attempted to link relief to development. This initiative was criticised by USAID which stated that the biggest problem was the “unwillingness and seeming inability of UNOHAC to understand and accept the essentially short-term nature, politically-oriented requirements of the peace process, and their continual focus on long-term development issues.”²⁵ The SRSG, Aldo Ajello, at the time echoed this criticism by stating that UNOHAC was driven by development people and not peace keepers. On the other hand, Jonathan Moore, former US Ambassador to the UN and former Director of the Institute of Politics at the Kennedy School of Harvard University argues strongly that “a valuable coordinating tool is a medium-term rehabilitation strategy fashioned in close consultation with all actors under the guidance of the appropriate UN co-ordinator and working closely with the local

government.”²⁶ In referring to Mozambique, Moore’s view of UNOHAC was that it “with some success struggled to deal with immediate needs while attempting to lay a base for longer-term development”.

The Humanitarian Assistance Programme was presented at a Donor Conference in Maputo in June 1993, as required by the Rome Conference in December 1992. It totalled \$560 million and reflected an integrated approach to restoring basic services in the areas of agricultural production, health care, water supply, education and road rehabilitation through both sectoral and area-based approaches. This was supplemented by support for demobilisation, Mine Clearance and Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers. Further updates were prepared by UNOHAC in November 1993 and April 1994, for a total package of \$775 million of which \$633 was committed by the international community.

UN Consolidated Appeals both add and detract from the coordination process. It is important to develop a programme framework in which international aid can be channelled, but aid providers (UN, bilateral agencies and NGOs) tend to use the process (and the document) to justify their own funding needs. When a coordination entity pushes to put some rationale and coherence into the programme, excluding costly efforts of technical assistance, or promoting local government involvement in order to ensure sustainability and continuity, the coordination entity is often accused of moving into “implementation” issues that are the domain of the operational agencies or donors.

The fielding of the military and political components of ONUMOZ was delayed until mid-1993,²⁷ resulting in the humanitarian component being the advance guard of the peace process. The civilian populations had to gain confidence and the first visible sign of peace for many was the provisioning of basic necessities. This was carried out with neutrality and transparency under UN coordination. Weekly plans

²⁴ WFP actually went the extreme of prohibiting its staff from being international election observers, when the SRSG requested all UN agencies and embassies to contribute personnel so as to reduce costs and provide observers familiar with the country and language.

²⁵ Cable from US Ambassador Dennis Jett to US Department of State, 15 July 1994.

²⁶ *The UN and Complex Emergencies, Rehabilitation in Third World Transitions* by Jonathan Moore, UNRISD: Geneva, 1996.

²⁷ The delay in the deployment of ONUMOZ forces was due to financial constraints of the PKO, final commitments of national contingents were confirmed only in January and February 1993, the Mozambique Government only signed the Status of Forces agreement in May 1993. In short, everyone wanted to buy time to prepare and position themselves politically. Militarily, ONUMOZ only became visible in May 1993.

for relief distribution into Renamo-controlled areas were discussed and approved at a Technical Committee chaired by UNOHAC which included both Government and Renamo representatives as well as ICRC, WFP and NGO implementers. Initially, the decisions were made nationally but as the Provincial UNOHAC Offices opened, the real discussion and decision-making was at the provincial level and plans were sent to Maputo, more for information than authorisation.

The field presence was a critical part of UNOHAC's coordination mechanism and perhaps UNOHAC's most effective and operational coordination contribution. Provincial Humanitarian Assistance Committees functioned as important bridging mechanisms in which, under a UN banner, Government and Renamo worked together with humanitarian organisations to assess needs, establish priorities and deliver assistance to the most needy areas. Valuable information was gathered on needs in previously inaccessible areas, and was passed on through UNOHAC to the international community. In the first six months after the signing of the GPA, UNOHAC recorded that 16,000 tons of food, 2,000 tons of seeds and 130,000 units of relief supplies were distributed to civilians in Renamo-controlled areas. This increased to 116,000 tons delivered to ex-Renamo areas in 75 districts in all ten provinces by the end of the ONUMOZ mandate in December 1994. While only ICRC was working in Renamo areas at the time of the signing of the peace agreement, by 1994 more than 35 NGOs and UN agencies were working in what had been called Renamo-controlled areas.

So as to be visibly linked to the ONUMOZ machinery, the humanitarian coordination office moved out of UNDP and into the ONUMOZ headquarters. Though part of the PKO machinery, UNOHAC had to struggle to gain access to logistical resources for humanitarian purposes, as the PKO mentality gave priority to military and political operations. Humanitarian interventions in a peace-keeping context are not easy to define. On the one hand there is a desire to have them respond to short-term humanitarian and political needs, while at the same time taking into account longer term development priorities. The SRSG of ONUMOZ criticised UNOHAC for placing too much emphasis within its Consolidated Humanitarian Assistance Programme on medium and long-term rehabilitation needs, rather than focusing on

what needed to be achieved within the time frame of the GPA and creating bridging with other longer term programmes of the UN agencies.²⁸

Mine Clearance and Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers

Mine Clearance and Programmes for the Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers were the only part of the UNOHAC coordination mandate that did not overlap in some way with other UN agencies. Both were clearly tied to the implementation of the GPA, and were emerging as areas of UN and DHA intervention. The international donor community looked to UNOHAC to develop programmes. UNOHAC devoted limited human resources to these programme areas, which operated separately from the multi-sectoral programmes and reported directly to the UNOHAC Director. The UNOHAC Director tied the coordination of these areas closely to the formal Commissions set up by the GPA. Approval for Mine Clearance Programmes was sought by the Demining Sub-committee of the Cease-Fire Commission (CCF) chaired by the ONUMOZ Military Commander, while Reintegration Programmes for the Demobilised Soldiers were under the Commission on Reintegration (CORE) chaired by the UNOHAC Director. These commissions were set up to mediate and build consensus between the two parties (Government and Renamo), not to serve as donor coordination bodies or to discuss the details of implementation.

Mine Clearance was targeted as a priority activity in the Rome Donor Conference. A list of priority roads for Mine Clearance had been developed in mid-1992 by ICRC and UNSCERO as a discussion point for humanitarian access. This list, despite the fact that it was limited to the central provinces and should have been reviewed after the GPA was signed was presented and approved by the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) on December 31 1992 as *the* priority list of 28 roads for Mine Clearance. Donors were very keen to support Mine Clearance and contributed \$7.5 million to

²⁸ Aldo Romano Ajello, "The Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Mozambique in the Context of ONUMOZ" in *After Rwanda: The Coordination of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance* eds. Jime Whitman and David Pocock, London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1996, p. 202.

the DHA Trust fund in addition to the \$18.5 million provided through the ONUMOZ budget.

Despite this approval by the CSC, the mine clearance contract for these roads was only awarded some 18 months later in mid 1994. UNOHAC persisted in wanting approval of a comprehensive national plan by the Cease-Fire Commission. Since Renamo withdrew from all commission work in March 1993, there was a political paralysis for close to six months. The SRSG gave political priority to resolving issues surrounding the elections and demobilisation, so Mine Clearance never got on the agenda until November 1993. When donors pushed UNOHAC to move and award contracts in this period, the UNOHAC Director refused saying that approval by the two parties of a global plan was necessary. At the same time, UNDP had been given the go-ahead to prepare tenders for the mine clearance of the roads but its internal procedures and bureaucratic wrangling between UN and UNDP created long delays provoking donors to threaten to withdraw funds. The Secretary-General's Office finally intervened and UNDP was told to award the road contract. The remainder of the funds was taken back from UNDP and handed over to DHA so that UNOHAC in Maputo could begin to implement the rest of the programme.

With the expiry of Bernander's contract as head of UNOHAC, a Deputy DHA Director, Felix Downes-Thomas, was dispatched to Maputo to take over UNOHAC with orders to move forward on the Mine Clearance Programme. The UN Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP) started up in June 1994 to train Mozambican de-miners and expand both road and area mine clearance.²⁹ This programme and others by Norwegian People's Aid, Halo Trust and Handicap International are continuing in Mozambique well after ONUMOZ terminated its work. Coordination in the post-ONUMOZ period has been linked to a National Mine Clearance Commission set up by the Government in 1995. It has been slow in establishing itself, but is

²⁹ See *Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation on Mozambique* by Allistair Hallam, Kate Halvorsen, Janne Lexow, Armindo Miranda, Pamela Rebelo and Astri Suhrke (project leader), Chr. Michelsen Institute in association with Nordic Consulting Group (Oslo: The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997) Chapter 7: Demining, and *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action 1992-1994* by Richard Synge (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997) Chapter 5: Landmines in the Peace Process.

the centre for all documentation and information on land mines and demining programmes in Mozambique.

In retrospect, to move ahead in mine clearance once the approval had been given in the SCS by the two signatories to the GPA, the UN should have set up a consultative process on implementation, under UNOHAC. To complement this, donor coordination tied to the Provincial UNOHAC Offices could have enhanced the planning process and updated prioritisation of areas for mine clearance. This would have allowed the programmes to advance more rapidly.

UN planning and coordination of the programmes for the reintegration of demobilised soldiers suffered from equally strong criticisms by donors as the mine clearance programmes. Though it was clear from the outset that the demobilised soldiers were an important group, which if not responded to could destabilise the entire political process, there was a divergency between the parties to the GPA (Government and Renamo) and the donors as to whether they should be treated as a special group with targeted programmes. At the December 1992 Rome donors' conference, a position was taken that "while recognising the specific needs of each target group, the Conference concluded that international cooperation should address the needs of all vulnerable groups in priority areas, without discrimination. There should be integration of programmes for the demobilised (after they have left the assembly points), returning refugees, displaced persons and locally affected populations". The conference even went so far as to recommend that the GPA be altered and that "consideration could be given to expanding the scope of action of the Reintegration Commission (CORE) to include, in addition to the demobilised, displaced persons and returnees".³⁰

While the parties to the peace agreement and the UN (UNOHAC) recognised the importance of having special programmes for the demobilised soldiers, the Maputo donor community resisted until the soldiers, themselves, became a disruptive and destabilising force—looting relief warehouses, blocking roads and taking humanitarian personnel hostage in mid-1993. The donors then looked to UNOHAC for pro-

³⁰ "Donors' Conference for Mozambique (Rome, 15-16 December 1992)", Document 28 in *The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992-1995*, p.160.

grammes, and became critical when they were not to their liking. UNOHAC had focused on job training and credit schemes, tied to governmental and UN institutions. Economic reintegration was seen as the key from UNOHAC's point of view while others, notably USAID saw short term pacification and neutralisation as most important.

UNOHAC worked well in its coordination with the two parties through a tripartite mechanism within CORE. It was weaker in its donor coordination, and could have benefited from informal donor working groups to develop joint programmes and consensus. However, it should be noted that there were clear differences between UNOHAC and some donors over the role of government institutions in implementation. UNOHAC firmly backed the necessity of strengthening government and local institutions as important for longer term development while the expediency argument was used by others to channel funds through multilateral organisations and NGOs.

In November 1993, the Dutch Government suggested that a cash payment scheme should be considered in which the demobilised soldiers would be paid a salary over an eighteen month period to supplement their six month government subsidy, thereby "buying" peace until after the elections and providing support for the resettling demobilised soldiers to (re) integrate into their communities. This was strongly endorsed by the SRSG and the donor community, and what became known as the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS) became the foundation of support for the ex-soldiers. This programme received over \$35 million from Switzerland, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Finland, Norway, Spain and Portugal.³¹ Overall a \$95 million package of cash payments, transport, material benefits, training and small scale project grants was targeted to the 93,000 demobilised soldiers.

Despite the initial policy that demobilised soldiers should not be treated as a special group, it was politically evident by mid-1993 that the ex-soldiers, themselves, had to be convinced that they were recognised and receiving material benefits or they could derail the entire process. These programmes for demobilised soldiers continued through 1996, implemented by

UNDP, ILO and IOM. A final "bonus" RSS payment was made to all ex-soldiers in early 1997, signalling the end of the special programmes for the demobilised soldiers. Coordination after the ONUMOZ mandate passed on to government institutions—the Ministry of Labour and a National Commission of Social Reinsertion. This shift from CORE to Government, never functioned effectively and each individual project coordinated with its own donors' community and partner institutions resulting in no integrated approach.

ONUMOZ Exits

As most PKOs operate with a military framework and mentality, the humanitarian component was subject to the same pressures to *withdraw* by the end of 1994. Initially, UNOHAC was told by DPKO to shut down one week after the elections. Pressure was exerted by DHA that this was impossible, and that some transitional period was necessary—especially at the provincial level. The close-down of UNOHAC was eventually set for the end of December 1994 with the Provincial offices closing on 30 November.

UNDP was to pick up the coordination role that UNOHAC had assumed during the ONUMOZ period. UNDP set up a Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Unit to carry on this role, but it functioned as a UNDP programme unit focusing on administrative backstopping for UNDP projects (Mine Clearance, ILO Vocational Training for Demobilised Soldiers, and the DHA Trust Fund Projects passed on to UNDP). No active coordination was attempted by the unit. The World Bank through its annual Consultative Group process consolidated its leadership within the donor community and with the Government in the post-war transition thereby becoming the *de facto* coordinator of international aid.

³¹ See *Reintegration Programmes for Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique*, an evaluation prepared by Sam Barnes for UNDP/RSS, Maputo, Mozambique, March 1997.

Conclusions

Mozambique is often cited as a success story in the war-to-peace transition. Given that on the average \$1 billion per year came into Mozambique for emergency and development assistance in the period 1990–1995, it is important to examine the role of the international donor community (United Nations agencies, bilateral donors) and governmental authorities in the definition of aid priorities and the implementation of programmes. Though on the one hand, it was evident that there was a definite movement from government-led coordination (early eighties) of aid to donor-driven programmes (early nineties), the Mozambique Government managed to retain enough sovereignty and state

authority to influence the shape and content of the aid packages.

Mozambique was never a “failed state”. National line ministries and provincial governments continued to function throughout the period of war-provoked emergency. The GPA recognised the Government, its constitution and its laws during the UN peace-keeping transitional period. This placed Mozambique in a position that was significantly different from other “transitional” countries (Cambodia, Angola, Liberia, etc.) to which it is often compared. Aid Coordination moved firmly from Emergency or Humanitarian Appeals to development programming by 1995.

Selected References

Abrahamsson, Hans and Nilsson, Anders (1995) *Mozambique—The Troubled Transition*, Zed Books, London.

AWEPA (1995) *Report of AWEPA’s observation of the Mozambique electoral process: 1992–1994*, African-European Institute, Amsterdam.

Donini, Antonio (1996) *The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda*, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Occasional Paper #22, Providence, R.I.

Jett, Dennis C. “Lessons Unlearned—Or Why Mozambique’s Successful Peacekeeping Operation Might Not Be Replicated Elsewhere”, *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (Posted 5 December 1995), *www*.

Mazula, Brazao, editor (1996) *Mozambique: Elections, Democracy and Development*, Maputo.

Moore, Jonathan (1996) *The UN and Complex Emergencies: Rehabilitation in Third World Transitions*, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva.

United Nations (1995) *The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992–1995*. Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York.

United Nations (1996) *Elections in the Peace Process in Mozambique: Record of an Experience*, UNDP/DDSMS, New York.

UNHCR (July 1996) *Rebuilding a War Torn Society: A Review of the UNHCR Reintegration Programme for Mozambican Returnees*, Maputo, Mozambique.

Synge, Richard (1997) *Mozambique: UN Peace-keeping in Action: 1992–94*, United States Institute for Peace, Washington, D.C.

Vines, Alex (1996) *Renamo: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?* James Currey Ltd, London.

