Refugee and Labour Movements in Sub-Saharan Africa
A review
by
Jonathan Baker

Shelter Provision and Settlement Policies for Refugees
A state of the art review
by
Roger Zetter

Nordiska Afrikainstitutet 1995
Indexing terms:

**Baker**
Refugees
Labour migration
Sub-Saharan Africa

**Zetter**
Refugees
Refugee camps
Housing
Housing construction
Emergency shelter

ISSN 1400-3120

Printed in Sweden by
Reprocentralen HSC 1994
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Preface

The study of refugees, although a vital topic, has generally been neglected by the academic community and the aid agencies. In order to redress this situation SIDA has commissioned a series of background reports that highlight this important theme. Report No 1, by Dr K.B. Wilson and titled Internally Displaced, Refugees and Returnees from and in Mozambique, was published in November 1992, with a second edition in December 1994.

This present study, published by SIDA and Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, comprises two separate reports. The first, by Dr Jonathan Baker, is an overview of refugee and labour movements in sub-Saharan Africa, while the second, by Dr Roger Zetter, discusses a central concern for refugees, that of shelter provision and settlement policy.

Baker provides recent data on refugees in sub-Saharan Africa, and two features emerge from his discussion. First, the region has the highest number of refugees of any continent and hosts 36 per cent of global refugees. Second, the plight of internally displaced populations as a result of conflict has not been accorded the attention that it deserves, often because of government sensitivities. Consequently, any degree of accuracy regarding the numbers of internal refugees is fraught with great difficulty.

Dr Baker highlights the burden imposed upon individual host countries by refugee inflows: Malawi being an excellent case in point which, until very recently, provided sanctuary to more than one million refugees from Mozambique. He also emphasises that refugees should not be perceived as only a ‘problem’ and discusses the positive contributions made by refugees to host countries.

In the second part of his study, Baker focuses on international labour migration in sub-Saharan Africa. Unlike much conventional wisdom which views labour migration as a negative phenomenon, he presents a more balanced argument and states that it can also be considered as a capital accumulation strategy which can bring about positive developments in rural areas of origin. However, he states that one should not understate the threat of expulsion facing migrant workers from host countries, nor the psychological problems involved, separated as they are from the security of family networks. In this regard, parallels may be drawn between the plight of refugees and migrant workers.

Dr Roger Zetter, in his overview study of refugee shelter provision and settlement policy, addresses some central concerns and challenges some of the underlying, but misleading, assumptions regarding this important topic. Although the provision of shelter is one of the basic needs of refugees, host governments and humanitarian agencies usually adopt short-term responses. The apparent dilemma facing policy makers and governments is the contradiction between the permanency of housing and the presumed temporariness of refugees. More generally, Zetter argues that “shelter and settlement policies are
a powerful indicator of both the humanitarian will of the international community to address a basic right of refugees—their status in a host country—and also the abilities of host countries and assistance agencies to implement realistic and acceptable refugee policies”.

He states that research on refugee shelter and settlement issues has been a neglected field and is poorly documented, lacks coherence and is widely diffused. Consequently, many important lessons and experiences from earlier situations are rarely transferred to new refugee contexts. Further, while there is a large body of literature on shelter and housing from the perspective of rapid urbanisation in the Third World, which can make contributions to comprehending the needs of refugees, this has largely been ignored.

Dr Zetter draws on examples from many parts of the developing world, as well as his own research on refugee housing in Cyprus, to illustrate his arguments. His study is underpinned by a number of central contentions including, inter alia, the following. First, that relief and development are complementary concepts. Second, that refugees often exhibit a high degree of resilience and thus should not necessarily be considered as a burden for host countries. Moreover, they often possess technologies and skills which can be used to build and upgrade their own shelters. Third, refugees must be given the right to work as this is a significant factor in facilitating the success of self-help processes within the housing sector.

These two studies by Jonathan Baker and Roger Zetter have been collected in one volume because, in my view, they complement each other well. In addition, they reveal and illustrate the great diversity of concepts, issues and contexts which constitute the study of refugees.

Lennart Wohlgemuth
Director of Nordiska Afrikainstitutet
Refugee and Labour Movements in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Review

Jonathan Baker
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet

Introduction

Population mobility in sub-Saharan Africa is a complex issue and there are no simple reasons as to why individuals migrate. This presentation will address two aspects: first, migration of labour across international boundaries for work within sub-Saharan Africa, and second, the involuntary or forced movement of people from one country to another as refugees. However, as this review attempts to illustrate, the distinctions between migrants workers and refugees are often unclear. Migrants workers often face expulsion and hardships similar to the plight of refugees, while refugees in countries of asylum can contribute to economic development in host countries as labour and as consumers.

Africa has always been a continent characterised by high population mobility. In pre-colonial Africa, movements of people were an integral part of the historical development of the continent throughout the present millennium. Many of these movements were not voluntary and involved the forcible removal of millions of peoples to locations outside the continent by Arab and European slave traders.

Furthermore, as Julius Nyerere has commented “If one looks at what are called African tribal migrations over recent centuries, many of the movements would today be defined as “refugee problems”. Minority groups, or dissident families, were fleeing from the dominant authorities and moved to what is now a different country. Very many African nations are made up of a lot of old waves of refugees” (Nyerere, quoted in Kibreab, 1991: 18-19).

One of the greatest external influences on sub-Saharan Africa was the impact of Islam from 640 until the 19th Century. Muslim traders crossed the Sahara into the Sahel and West Africa, bringing with them goods, innovations, new organisational forms and the Koran (Serpa, 1992: 235). Other ways in which Islamic impulses were introduced were by sea to East Africa. The upshot of these processes was to add a new and resilient dimension to traditional African forms of organisation and behaviour. Islamicised areas became the foci for inter-regional and long-distance trade which encouraged migrations for economic reasons. Among those who had the wherewithal, the pilgrimage to
Mecca was obligatory.

The European colonial period, starting in the last quarter of the 19th Century, introduced new processes and regulations which were to oblige Africans (especially males) to migrate to European-dominated mines, farms and plantations to earn money to pay for obligatory tributes such as poll and head taxes.

In contemporary Africa, migrations of people within their own countries and across national borders as refugees or to find work and opportunities have become very much part of the political economy and social structure of the region.

**Refugees in sub-Saharan Africa**

Over the last decade the number of refugees globally has increased. From 1980 to 1985, the number of refugees increased from an estimated 8.5 million to an estimated 10 million. At the end of 1992, there were an estimated 18.5 million refugees globally (Table 1). In 1992, Africa, with an estimated 6.7 million refugees, had 36 per cent of global refugees—the highest of any continent. This figure can be compared with one million refugees in 1975 and 5 million in 1981. Although the data are not always very reliable, and sometimes contradictory, they do provide some pointers to the magnitude of the problem.

Table 1. *Numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons globally, 1992*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th>Internally displaced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>6.7 million</td>
<td>9.2 – 14.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>0.4 million</td>
<td>0.7 – 2.9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>1.0 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>6.6 million</td>
<td>4.7 – 6.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>1.0 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>3.0 million</td>
<td>3.0 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>2.3 million</td>
<td>15.1 – 24.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>18.5 million</strong></td>
<td><strong>32.7 – 47.9 million</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Norwegian Refugee Council, 1993

The international agency which has responsibility for refugees at the global level is the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which was established in 1951 to provide assistance to refugees following World War II. According to the UNHCR, a refugee is “any person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience, remains unwilling to accept the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling to return to it” (Africa, South of the Sahara, 1993:74).

It is these people defined as refugees outside their country of origin or habitual residence that receive the protection and support of the UNHCR. However, such protection and support is not extended to internally displaced persons (internal refugees) who do not flee their countries of origin, but are often forcibly displaced within them. For these people, the UNHCR has no mandate,
although the international Red Cross and NGOs do provide essential relief supplies in many cases—if host governments are willing.

One problem facing NGOs and humanitarian agencies in their attempts to alleviate the suffering of internal refugees is that they have to be especially careful when dealing with the sensitivities of governments, who often reject what they perceive as interference in their internal affairs by outsiders. Added to this, even when permission is granted for external agencies to intervene, cumbersome bureaucracies and internal warring can do much to inhibit or prevent the smooth functioning of relief operations. Given these conditions, and the reluctance of some governments to admit that they have an internal refugee problem, it is no wonder that any degree of reliability regarding the numbers of internal refugees is impossible, as the figures for Africa in Table 1, testify.

The case of internal refugees in Rwanda presents an illuminating, although by no means, unique case. The recent political history of Rwanda, particularly since independence in 1962, has been shaped more than any other factor by ethnic division. The population is comprised essentially of two groups—the Hutu (about 85 per cent of the population) and the Tutsi (about 14 per cent). The Tutsi were privileged by the colonial powers, at the expense of the Hutu.

Since independence, periodic outbursts of anti-Tutsi feeling have resulted in often violent action by the Hutu which led, for example, to the massacre of 20,000 Tutsi in 1963. Consequently, many Tutsi have fled Rwanda and have taken refuge in neighbouring states, particularly Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania.

In October 1990, a group of 10,000 guerrilla soldiers (mainly refugees), of the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR) invaded north-east Rwanda from Uganda in an attempt, it was stated, to depose a corrupt and incompetent Hutu regime.

The result of the invasion, apart from the killing of many civilians in border regions, was the internal displacement of between 800,000—900,000 Rwandans (about 10 per cent of the population) from the north to the central and southern parts of the country (Upsala Nya Tidning, 8 September, 1993). Events in Rwanda in 1994 have, however, brought about dramatic changes and these are discussed later in this paper.

One ray of hope for addressing the plight of internal refugees is the present concern shown by the UNHCR. A recent innovative strategy adopted by the UNHCR in eastern and southern Ethiopia has been the so-called "cross mandate" approach whereby assistance is provided to all needy people in a community or area without distinction. Consequently, “mixed populations of refugees, returnees, displaced persons, demobilized soldiers, victims of conflict and drought, benefit equally, be it from distribution of food rations or rehabilitation/recovery projects” (UNHCR, 1993c: 9). The advantage of this strategy, apart from the obvious and very important relief and developmental aspects, is that it reduces or eliminates tensions and jealousies (observed elsewhere in African refugee situations) between local host and non-local populations, as everyone benefits equally from such interventions.

Table 2 provides a breakdown by country of origin of refugees and countries of asylum in sub-Saharan Africa.
### Table 2. Refugees in sub-Saharan Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Countries of Asylum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NORTH EAST AFRICA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>74,000</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>109,373</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>92,111</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25,695</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20,500</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17,745</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>406,147</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAST AFRICA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>410,500</td>
<td>Tanzania (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>400,153</td>
<td>Rwanda (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39,000</td>
<td>Zaire (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>245,612</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>85,806</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50,929</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50,012</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>21,085</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTRAL AFRICA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>25,782</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15,983</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15,624</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10,750</td>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHERN AFRICA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>197,954</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>101,779</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>Malawi (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>Zimbabwe (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>Tanzania (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>Swaziland (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>Zambia (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>South Africa (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>40,000-100,000</td>
<td>Widely distributed in Africa and elsewhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11,226</td>
<td>Returnees (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST AFRICA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41,749</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>431,500</td>
<td>Guinea (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>153,500</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>Benin (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>66,498</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13,076</td>
<td>Mali</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. Data for year ending 1992 unless otherwise indicated; refugee flows of less than 10,000 have been excluded. The data includes both UNHCR-supported refugees and other spontaneously settled and unassisted refugees.

2. In addition to the official refugee population of 20,000 Somalis, the Government of Djibouti has estimated there are 125,000 refugees and displaced persons from Somalia and Ethiopia living unassisted in the capital, Djibouti-ville.


While the data in Table 2 are not always consistent with data provided elsewhere in this review because of variations among different sources, they do provide an indication of the magnitude of the refugee problem, particularly for countries of asylum. Having said this, a note of caution is necessary concerning
the general reliability of refugee numbers. As Kibreab states “How many refugees are there in Africa? The true answer is that nobody knows. Precise statistics on African refugees are either not available or when available are most unreliable” (1991:8; see also the excellent discussion by the same author on the issue of data non-reliability, pp 8-15). An illustration of data unreliability is provided by the case of Mozambican refugees in Malawi. According to the UNHCR, Malawi was host to 1.1 million refugees from Mozambique in early 1993. However, the French NGO, Médecins sans Frontières, stated that the maximum number of Mozambican refugees in Malawi was 844,000—a discrepancy of 256,000 persons! (Mozambiquefile, 1993: 14).

It is further suggested that refugees “are predominantly women and children” (Schultheis, 1989:7). But this stereotyped picture may be misleading. In some cases it may be true that refugee populations have high dependency ratios (i.e. many children, women and old people), but in other cases normal population distributions (by age and sex) are found, while in other cases, males predominate (Kibreab, 1991: 15-18). However, according to the UNHCR “the vast majority of refugees who benefit from UNHCR’s international protection and assistance are destitute women and children, mainly of rural background” (UNHCR, 1993c: 4). What this might imply is that it is mainly male refugees who settle spontaneously in countries of refuge and are unassisted by the UNHCR.

What cannot be denied, however, is that the influx of refugees falls “inordinately heavily upon a few countries” (Rogge, 1981) or regions (the Horn being an excellent example) within sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 3 which provides an indication of the refugee burden for individual countries). Malawi provides a good example of an asylum country which hosts an enormous refugee population. In early 1993, the estimated refugee population (including those under the protection of the UNHCR and others spontaneously settled) in this country was 1.1 million Mozambicans (if the UNHCR figure is accepted)—about 12 per cent of Malawi’s population. By late 1993, this figure is reported to have fallen by about half as many refugees had returned to Mozambique (Mozambiquefile, 1993: 14). Of course, even with external financial support and relief supplies, host countries, which are themselves often poor, are also obliged to carry heavy responsibilities and costs which are not always immediately measurable. For recent and comprehensive discussions of the refugee situation in Mozambique, see Wilson, 1992 and the Journal of Social Development in Africa, 1993.

However, one should be careful not to characterise refugee influxes as only incurring costs for host societies. A more balanced and appropriate approach would be to view the presence of refugee populations as bringing both benefits and costs. It should also be emphasized that sweeping generalisations about the possible positive and negative effects of refugees are not valid, and these effects will vary considerably from country to country and from region to region. With this in mind the following comments may be useful.

Possible benefits include first, a much greater market (created by refugee demand) for goods produced by local populations including milk, butter and other consumer items. Second, some host countries which still have abundant, but under-utilised, agricultural land resources may benefit from refugee influxes, especially if refugees are allowed access to land to increase food production. Moreover, in agricultural areas which are characterised by labour scarcity, refugees can provide an
important source of casual labour. The success of this strategy also depends on
the extent to which refugee populations integrate with local rural populations.
Tanzania provides a good example of such a strategy and refugees from Burundi
and Rwanda have integrated well into the Tanzanian agricultural economy. The
same argument, however, would not apply in land-scarce or land-poor regions
such as eastern Ethiopia, Rwanda or Burundi.

The importance of these two considerations should not be understated. The
recent repatriation of large numbers of Mozambican refugees from Malawi,
caused the loss of many customers for Malawian businesses, as well as a dimin-
ished supply of casual labour in agriculture (Mozambiquefile, 1993: 14).

Third, the construction of infrastructure such as roads, water supplies and
health centres may bring benefits to local host country populations, as well as to
refugees. This can have particularly important implications for populations in
areas which are presently poorly served and/or are inaccessible. An excellent
example of this is Kenya where the UNHCR has actively supported local infra-
structures such as roads and airstrips, as well as medical supplies and equipment
for hospitals, in remote settlements in the north-eastern and eastern parts of the
country. Moreover, in cooperation with German assistance, UNHCR has estab-
lished energy-saving and environmental-preservation projects, on a long term
basis, in the Dadaad area in Kenya, as well as considerable improvements to
water supplies in towns and villages located in the vicinity of refugee camps
(UNHCR, 1993b:17).

On the negative side, environmental deterioration is considered to be the
greatest problem associated with large influxes of refugees, particularly if they
are concentrated in camps, rather than dispersed throughout a receiving
country. However, in the general absence of detailed empirical investigations
on the subject, generalisations are only possible. Environmental damage is
caused in two main ways: deforestation through fuelwood gathering and for
hut construction, and overgrazing of livestock in the vicinity of camps.

Deforestation is the easiest problem to identify as reductions in tree cover are
measurable and visible. Evidence collected regarding fuelwood gathering from
one of five camps (established in 1984) for Mozambican refugees in Zimbabwe
illustrates the nature of the problem. Due to the lack of alternative energy
sources, women refugees have the responsibility for gathering firewood daily,
and as deadwood is no longer available, living trees have become the fuel
source. Consequently, “the surrounding areas have been very visibly denuded”
and areas in proximity to the camp are “almost completely treeless” (Le
Breton,1992:9).

The upshot of this process of deforestation has been siltation of a local river
(important for refugee consumption), resulting in a severe reduction in water
volume. Moreover, severe deforestation may have major impacts on the micro-
climate leading to reduced rainfall, increased soil erosion, and siltation of water
courses which, in turn, can dramatically and irreversibly bring about a decline
in agricultural production. The social and economic costs of deforestation can
be substantial. Naturally, as competition for declining wood resources
Table 3. Total refugee populations in sub-Saharan Africa by country of Asylum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Asylum</th>
<th>Refugee Population</th>
<th>ASA % of Host Country Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>271,745</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>42,233</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>19,035</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>9,532</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>220,357</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>153,000</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>431,918</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>112,000</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>585,000</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>401,900</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>4,117</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>100,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>1,058,498</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>13,076</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>40,971</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>3,397</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>4,420</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>400,162</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>71,620</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>5,866</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>722,100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>55,580</td>
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<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>553,148</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>246,291</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>430,129</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>142,108</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>237,241</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,736,074</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Increasing refugee populations lead to tensions with local host populations. Moreover, as the time taken to gather wood increases, this places heavier burdens on women who have to forgo other chores and activities because of time constraints, or work even longer hours.

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1. Includes both UNHCR-supported refugees and other spontaneously settled and unassisted refugees.
2. Data for year ending 1992, except figures for Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire where additional refugee flows of 375,000, 261,000 and 39,000 respectively from Burundi have been included following the violent coup attempt in October 1993. Data for 1993 also applies to Benin, Ghana, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire.

* negligible

In response to this critical situation in and around all the camps in Zimbabwe, the UNHCR and a group of NGOs have established a Fuelwood Crisis Consortium to attempt to tackle the problem. A two-year programme will focus on three aspects: the introduction of fuel-efficient stoves (to reduce wood consumption by 60 per cent), reforestation schemes in and around the camps, and an environmental awareness campaign targeted at women and schools. The stoves will be assembled and maintained in camp workshops, and it is hoped that by the end of 1993 all camp households will have one. Reforestation is necessarily a longer-term project, and with the ongoing repatriation of refugees to Mozambique, the local host community will benefit.

The major lesson to be learnt from this example, however, is that although it is impossible to gauge the ultimate refugee population in a given area because of the suddenness of the influx (see below), longer-term planning should, whenever possible, be an inbuilt component especially when camps appear to have durability and have been in existence for a few years; as mentioned earlier the Zimbabwean camps have been in existence since 1984.

However, as data from Kenya show, some refugee populations can increase or decrease dramatically within a year, a month or even a week. For example, in early 1991 Kenya’s refugee population was estimated at 14,000. By December 1992 it had climbed to 427,278, fell to 414,327 in January 1993 and fell again to 384,910 in May 1993 (UNHCR, 1993b). This figure is likely to decline substantially by the end of 1993 as Somali and Ethiopian refugees return to their respective countries, where conditions are improving.

What creates refugees?

In order to find a durable solution to the refugee problem in Africa, it is essential to identify the underlying causes behind the displacement of millions of individuals. However, one thing is clear, “the causes of exodus vary from one country to another, but all have one common denominator—flagrant violation of fundamental human rights” (Kibreab, 1991:23).

It is difficult to identify one single factor in the African context which has created the refugee problem; it is often rather a complex combination of, *inter alia*, political, economic, historical, ethnic, religious and environmental considerations. But for the purposes of this present discussion it is appropriate to try to isolate some of the above factors.

Wars of national liberation have created many refugees. The Algerian liberation struggle against the French ended in 1962 after an extremely brutal war, which created many refugees in neighbouring countries. In the mid 1970s the Portuguese colonies of Guinea Bissau, Angola and Mozambique fought their independence struggles, although nearly twenty years later internal and external destabilisation, particularly in Angola, has not brought peace to this country (see below for a discussion). Zimbabwe (formerly Southern Rhodesia) achieved independence in 1980 after a long and protracted war with a white minority government, which resulted in the creation of 750,000 refugees—inside and outside the country. Namibia (formerly South African-controlled South-West Africa) achieved independence in March 1990, again after a long and bitter struggle with South African forces. In both the Zimbabwean and Namibian cases,
Refugees generated through these liberation conflicts were quickly and effectively repatriated and integrated into their respective societies.

More recently, Eritrea achieved independence following a 30-year liberation struggle with Ethiopia and a national referendum in April 1993 where nearly 99 per cent of voting Eritreans (both inside and outside the country) voted for independence. Eritrea’s present population is estimated at 3.5 million with an additional one million (nearly 30 per cent of the total population) living outside the country as refugees (Horn of Africa Bulletin, 1993). Of these, 500,000 fled to Sudan, although 70,000 have already been repatriated to Eritrea. The repatriation of the remaining 430,000 from Sudan presents a daunting task. The Eritrean economy has been physically shattered by years of armed conflict and economic activity is at a low level, with unemployment a particular problem. Consequently, the question that must be raised is how will so many refugees be absorbed into a severely under-functioning economy? Assets that many of these refugees do possess, however, particularly those in the Middle East, Europe and North America are skills and capital, which could be used in the reconstruction effort.

The only territory in the whole of the African continent which is still struggling for national liberation is Western Sahara (formerly Spanish Sahara). Morocco claims historical rights to the territory, prior to Spanish colonisation, while the Sahwari population claims the right to self determination. While a UN-sponsored referendum should have been conducted in 1992, Morocco has consistently obstructed the peace and independence process by delaying tactics. Meanwhile many Sahwaris are refugees in Algeria, housed in four main camps around Tindouf (Akakpo, 1993: 1668-1669). Hopefully, the problem of Western Sahara and its refugees can be resolved peacefully through a referendum, if the Moroccans can be persuaded to accept the fact that the vote would most probably not be in their favour.

Internal repression and external destabilisation by South Africa.

In Southern Africa, the greatest threat to regional stability and the state responsible for the creation directly and indirectly of millions of refugees was apartheid South Africa. Since the establishment of Apartheid in 1948 as the official policy of the White supremacist regime much of the non-White population within the country was subjected to cruel and inhumane treatment. The refinement of Apartheid is best characterised by the creation of “independent” homelands or bantustans—Transkei being the first to accept “independence” in 1976. The thinking behind the creation of these homelands was that by eventually assigning all Blacks a nationality of “their own country”, there would be no Black South African citizens. More importantly, from the perspective of the designers of this policy, Blacks could be sent to reside in their bantustans, which were to be labour reserves for the benefit of the White industrial and agricultural economy, and so avoid the costs of labour reproduction. The result of this policy was the creation of 3.5 million internally displaced persons between 1960 and 1982 (Schultheis, 1989:24).

The establishment of a democratic South Africa in April 1994, resulted in the elimination of the vestiges of apartheid, including the homelands. It has been estimated that between 40,000-100,000 South Africans are refugees outside the country; however, to this figure should be added thousands of political exiles throughout the world. As a result of the democratisation process these people
are now permitted to return to South Africa under the auspices of the UNHCR. Between April 1991 and June 1993, only 11,226 refugees had returned and there are indications that the process is losing momentum. Over the last year and a half only a few refugees have returned (Schutte, 1993: 5-6).

The countries which suffered most from apartheid South African aggression and destabilisation tactics in Southern Africa, namely Namibia, Mozambique and Angola, have entered or are entering a period of relative stability and peace. As mentioned above, Namibia became independent in 1990, and Namibian refugees were quickly repatriated and integrated into the society.

The situation in Mozambique is now stabilising after 16 years of war, compounded by a severe drought. In October 1992, a cease-fire was agreed between the FRELIMO government and the apartheid South African-sponsored RENAMO, and parliamentary and presidential elections are scheduled for the end of October, 1994.

Table 4 presents the original timetable for the repatriation of refugees to Mozambique. However, according to reports in October 1994, 1.2 million Mozambican refugees have already been repatriated and the remainder will have been repatriated by mid-1995 (The Star, October 6-12, 1994 : 5).

Table 4. Plan of Repatriation Movements to Mozambique

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>Starting date</th>
<th>Time frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>May 1993</td>
<td>Two to three years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>June/July 1993</td>
<td>Two years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Aug/Sept 1993</td>
<td>Six months/one year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>April/May 1994</td>
<td>Less than a year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>April/May 1994</td>
<td>Six months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>To be determined</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


One of the major problems facing the repatriation programme is the presence of more than two million mines in Mozambique. A United Nations de-mining operation is scheduled to take between seven to 10 years to complete. The UNHCR has started a mine-awareness campaign in the refugee camps, and heavily mined areas in Mozambique will be demarcated (UNHCR, 1993a:6).

A second problem facing returnees is the fact that a number have found that the land they abandoned during the civil war has been sold to private companies and individuals (Africa Analysis, 1993, 182). A similar situation in Burundi is reported by Watson (1993: 23-25) who documents cases of returning Hutu refugees who found that their lands had been occupied by Tutsi farmers and absentee landlords.

In Angola, the situation has worsened since September 1992 when multi-party elections were held. The result of the elections clearly showed that the ruling MPLA government had won the mandate to form the next government. The result was contested by UNITA which subsequently took up arms again in order to win militarily. The last year has seen some of the worst fighting to date in Angola and civilian populations have suffered enormously. In early September 1993, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to impose sanctions on UNITA unless a cease-fire was declared within 10 days. The leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, responded to this threat and declared a cease-fire on
the 20th of September, 1993, although this did not prevent fighting from continuing.

From November 1993, UN-sponsored negotiations have been taking place in Lusaka between the MPLA and UNITA to try to find a way out of the current impasse. Both sides have agreed to a cease-fire, but the timing and implementation for this have not been established. In mid-October 1994, it was, once again, reported that the parties had reached an agreement in principle on the resolution of the conflict, as a first step towards a peace settlement. Key issues concern the creation of a national army composed of elements, on a 50–50 basis, from both armies, the distribution of ministerial posts to UNITA, as well as the future status of Savimbi in a new Angolan government. If UNITA can be persuaded to accept a peaceful resolution to the conflict (it appears that Savimbi has no alternative without substantial external military backing), it is possible that peace may return to Angola, and allow for the return of refugees from neighbouring countries, as well as the return home of internally displaced people (see Legum, 1993b, *Africa Analysis*, 1993,187, and recent issues of *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, for discussions and reports of developments in Angola).

After years of war, destabilisation and immense destruction, there is, thus, reason to be optimistic regarding the situation in Southern Africa. However, when peace does return completely to the region, many tasks remain including the restoration of war-ravaged economies and the integration of millions of refugees into these dislocated countries.

*Ethnic and Religious persecution*  

Other reasons why people have fled in fear of their lives from their home countries are as a result of ethnic repression (in some cases amounting to genocide) and intolerance of religious diversity. Ethnic repression has taken many forms in Africa and it is beyond the scope of this presentation to detail these here. However, the cases of Rwanda (mentioned earlier) and Burundi provide examples, *par excellence*, of where one ethnic group has oppressed the other because of ethnicity. In Burundi the ethnic composition of the population mirrors the situation in neighbouring Rwanda—about 16 per cent are Tutsi and 83 per cent are Hutu. Unlike Rwanda, however, power in Burundi is in the hands of the minority Tutsi who savagely maintain this privilege. “Selective genocide” has been the term used to describe the situation in Burundi. The most savage attack against the Hutu majority occurred in 1972 when the Tutsi systematically eliminated Hutu, and “the killings are conservatively estimated to have caused between 80,000 and 100,000 deaths. Approximately 3.5 per cent of the country’s total population ... were physically wiped in a period of a few weeks” (Lemarchand and Martin, 1974: 5). Further, the same authors state that “a new society has in fact emerged, in which only Tutsi elements are qualified to gain access to power, influence and wealth; what is left of Hutu society is now systematically excluded from the army, the civil service, the university and secondary schools. Hutu status has become synonymous with an inferior category of beings; only Tutsi are fit to rule...” (1974:18).

Since this genocide occurred, two coup d'états have taken place, the last one in 1987, when Major Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi, assumed power in a bloodless coup. Although inter-ethnic violence and massacres occurred in 1988 and 1991,
Buyoya initiated a process of reform which enabled the Hutu majority to participate more actively in everyday life. “Many Hutu were brought into government and a few into the army, and the education system was made much more meritocratic” (Watson, 1993: 3). However, despite these improvements, Tutsi continued to dominate the university, the financial sector and the army which was still virtually exclusively Tutsi (Watson, 1993: 3).

More importantly, the Buyoya regime set in train a bold process of fundamental change. In March 1992, after 26 years of Tutsi-dominated politics under the Party of Unity and National Progress (UPRONA), Burundi became a multiparty state. Presidential and multiparty legislative elections were successfully and peacefully held in June 1993. Not surprisingly, the opposition Hutu party, the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) won an overwhelming victory, with Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, elected as president (Watson, 1993: 3). President Buyoya and most high-ranking elements in the Tutsi-dominated army accepted the results of the elections. Thus, for the first time in decades it appeared as if the mood of reconciliation would prevail. Ndadaye re-affirmed the rule of law and declared that FRODEBU was a party for all Burundians, not only Hutu. In an effort to strengthen national unity, President Ndadaye selected a number of Tutsi as cabinet ministers, including a Tutsi woman, Sylvie Kinigi, as prime minister.

However, “things began to go wrong when the president announced that changes would have to be made in the army’s structure to make it more representative” (Legum, 1993d: 3). Fearing the loss not only of political, but also military, power, a group of Tutsi officers staged an attempted coup d’état on the 21st October 1993, which resulted in the callous murder of President Ndadaye and a number of his cabinet ministers (see Amnesty International reports 130/93, 139/93, 142/93 and 145/93 which detail the events during the attempted coup). The attempted coup sparked off violent inter-ethnic conflict resulting in many thousands of deaths (the exact death toll is unknown) and the generation of large refugee flows to Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire (see note 2, Table 3).

Bearing in mind the long history of ethnic genocide in Burundi, the latest violence appears to confirm the notion that inter-ethnic conflict is an inherent characteristic of Burundian society. Yet such an analysis may be premature. Both ex-President Buyoya and the Tutsi chief of the army condemned the coup attempt, with the latter claiming his “unconditional loyalty to the democratically chosen government” (Legum 1993c: 2). This appears to be the first time that Tutsi leaders have renounced ethnic division and hatred in Burundi. It could well be that the tragedies that have characterised the recent history of Burundi have finally brought about the realisation that ethnic polarisation and supremacist ideologies (as in South Africa) are redundant and counterproductive.

However, the tragedy that befell Burundi can not be compared with the unprecedented violence, accompanied by appalling atrocities, which erupted in Rwanda and which plunged the country “into the most tragic part of its history yet” (Amnesty International, May 1994). The event which lead to the violence, and the eventual internal and external displacement of more than one million Rwandans, was the shooting down on the 6th April of the plane carrying Juvenal Habyarimana (the Hutu president of Rwanda) along with his Burundian Hutu counterpart, Cyprien Ntaryamira, following the signing of the...
Arusha Peace Accords which would have lead to the end of the three-year long civil war between the Rwandan government and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front.

The plane which was probably brought down by a rocket launched from Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, unleashed a savage and orchestrated response from Hutu extremists who encouraged the extermination of the Tutsi population, in what can only be described as a policy of genocide. Although the exact death toll may never be known, according to one source “at least 500,000 people” have been massacred in 1994 (Africa Confidential, 26.8.1994 : 2).

In 1994, the number of Rwandan refugees in neighbouring countries increased dramatically. For example, between April and October 1994, 515,000 Rwandans sought refuge in the Kagera Region of north-west Tanzania (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14.10.1994: 4). With the take-over of power by the erstwhile guerrilla force, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, in July 1994, the level of violence has subsided a good deal although tensions, fear and much hostility still remain.

Religious persecution has also been a factor in the creation of refugees. The activities of one Christian sect in particular, Jehovah’s Witnesses, have resulted in cruel treatment by many governments, particularly in Southern Africa. The sect refuses to participate in politics (“nation building”), and does not honour symbols of state power such as flags or anthems. Consequently, hideous persecution has resulted in sect members fleeing their countries to find safe refuge elsewhere. Three countries, Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique, are the worst offenders regarding the treatment of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Hodges, 1985: 4; this author provides details of the incredible cruelties that the sect has endured).

Elsewhere in Africa, the application of Islamic law in societies characterised by religious heterogeneity has created resentment, opposition and refugees. Sudan provides a good example of such a case, where the Islamic fundamentalist regime of General Bashir is applying the sharia to non Muslims, despite the regime’s insistence that such regulations would apply only to Muslims (Legum, 1993a). However, the current conflict situation in Sudan is much more complex than a north-south religious division would suggest, and the millions of southern Sudanese who are internally displaced in the south, in addition to refugees in Kenya and Ethiopia, are testimony to this. The current situation in Sudan reflects also a form of ruthless internal colonialism where the Arabicised north is attempting to impose its power and hegemony on a culturally, historically, economically and socially very different south (see Johnson, 1988, who provides a useful historical background to the present conflict).

Towards the second millennium: a note of optimism regarding refugees in Africa

If the current trends in Africa in favour of negotiation to resolve conflict are maintained, the refugee map of Africa (like the political map elsewhere) will look very different from what it is today. If the current negotiations between the MPLA and UNITA are successful, and if peace returns to Liberia following elections scheduled for February 1994, the main remaining areas of conflict and refugee generation will be limited to issues of ethnic conflict (Burundi and Rwanda) and religious conflict (Sudan).

More generally, the collapse of the USSR and the termination of the Cold
War has ended superpower rivalry in Africa. Less than five years ago the assumption that “refugee flows are closely related to the world’s dominant political and economic systems and the polarization of the world along East-West lines” (Schultheis, 1989:6), was indeed correct. This meant not only superpower rivalry in the African political and military arena but also implied the promotion (imposition) of one particular model of development over another (Schultheis, 1989:13). The experience of the Soviet development model as the experiences of countries like Ethiopia, Guinea or Mozambique demonstrate, was misguided or misappropriate for the African reality. However, whether the present dominant paradigm for Africa of promoting free market mechanisms, economic liberalisation, and structural adjustment, will fare any better, only time and experience will show.

Early in the 21st Century, it has been suggested that because of increasing poverty in Africa caused by declines in real incomes, collapse of the distributional abilities of African states, high debt burdens, accelerating population growth rates, continuing declines in food production and environmental devastation, Africa may experience mass spontaneous migrations of people (often termed “environmental refugees”) moving across borders in search of sustenance and survival. Further, this may produce political instability in Africa which, in turn, may lead to renewed conflict and war between states as they compete for dwindling resources. Should this worst-case scenario come true, then the prophecies of Malthus and, more recently, the Club of Rome will have been vindicated.

An alternative and optimistic scenario points to an Africa entering a new phase where political stability, true democratisation, mass participation and greater regional cooperation are emerging concepts, which will provide the foundations for a genuine African sustainable development. Not only should we believe in this scenario, it is in our common interests to actively promote it.

International labour migration in sub-Saharan Africa

Precise data regarding the numbers of migrants in sub-Saharan Africa do not exist. Some estimates have been made of the numbers of international migrants (i.e. those crossing borders to work in other African countries), but no estimates concerning the number of internal migrants are available. Some countries such as Ethiopia have recently published fairly reliable data on internal migration which provide good indications of the direction of population movements as well as the characteristics of these migrants (see Transitional Government of Ethiopia., 1991: 244-286).

One source (in 1989) estimated the number of international migrants, including refugees, in sub-Saharan Africa at 35 million people (Ricca, 1989: 4-5). According to the World Bank, this is not an implausible estimate and would mean that sub-Saharan Africa contains nearly 50 per cent of global international migrants—although the region contains only 10 per cent of world population (Russell, et al, 1990: 11).

The nature and pattern of international migration within sub-Saharan Africa differ according to the three major regions—East Africa, Southern Africa and West Africa.

In East Africa, the major movement of people has comprised refugees and it is this region which has the largest refugee population of any part of sub-
Refugee and Labour Movements in Sub-Saharan Africa

However, migrant movements across borders do take place, and since independence fairly well-established patterns of labour migration to plantations and farms have been established from Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire to Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. These migrations tend to be interrupted whenever there are tensions among the neighbouring states, resulting in border closures. However, African borders are very permeable (and this applies to most of sub-Saharan Africa) and much labour movement is not constrained by official policies and regulations.

Sudan represents a special case in north-east Africa as many people have migrated to the Middle East to find employment, particularly to Iraq. In mid-1990, there were 190,000 Sudanese working in Iraq and 12,000 in Kuwait (Van Hear, 1992: 9). The Gulf War meant that many of these migrants were obliged to return to Sudan; Van Hear provides estimates that vary from 35,000 to 200,000 (1992: 9). This evacuation had a number of negative consequences for households of returnees, as well as the Sudanese economy (see the discussion below on migrant remittances).

In Southern Africa, the migration system has been dominated by the economic attractions of work in the South African economy, particularly in the gold mines. Traditionally, labour migration has been organised on a contract basis and can therefore be categorised as temporary and oscillatory. Apart from workers recruited within South Africa itself, the main sending countries have been Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe, with Lesotho, Mozambique and Malawi providing the largest numbers of externally recruited workers. Some countries such as Tanzania and Zambia placed restrictions on their citizens working in South Africa, soon after independence.

The South African Chamber of Mines has always tried to devise policies which would assure a constant and more permanent supply of labour to the gold mines (see Crush, 1992: 46-71, for a discussion of this issue). Consequently, the Chamber of Mines has tried to recruit more South African labour by improving conditions of service, including career advancement and pay improvements. The South Africans have always been aware of the potential threat by neighbouring countries to impose bans on labour emigration. This threat materialised in the case of Malawi, traditionally the third largest sending country, which reduced its labour contribution to the gold mines from 21.1 per cent of total employment in 1970 to 3.3 per cent in 1985 (Russell, et al., 1990: 19).

The effect of South African attempts to recruit more local labour combined with reductions in labour from neighbouring countries has meant that the proportion of foreign workers in the gold mines has decreased from 78 per cent in 1974 to about 40 per cent in the mid-1980s (Russell, et al., 1990: 19). The most recent data for foreign contract workers in South African gold mines show what appears to be a continuation of this trend (Table 5).

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>176,117</td>
<td>172,677</td>
<td>159,248</td>
<td>153,371</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Schutte, 1993: 5.
A widespread phenomenon is the existence of many illegal economic immigrants in South Africa and, to a lesser extent, in Namibia and Botswana. Although the data are highly uncertain and variable, most observers believe that there are between one and two million in South Africa, while the Development Bank of Southern Africa suggests that numbers could be as high as an unbelievable eight million! (The Weekly Mail & Guardian, 23-29 September, 1994: 33). Mozambicans are thought to constitute between 60-80 per cent of all illegal immigrants and presumably many sought refuge in the Republic to avoid the war in their own country. Johannesburg has the greatest concentration of illegal migrants and in the inner city between 10 and 30 per cent of residents are estimated as such.

Apart from Mozambicans, illegal immigrants also comprise nationals from Zimbabwe and Nigeria and persons from Francophone countries, including Zaire. Common occupations of these groups in Johannesburg include hawking and petty trade, some are in the highly competitive taxi business, while some are successful large-scale business people. More generally, farming, hotels, domestic service, construction, cleaning, and security services are major users of illegal immigrant labour (The Weekly Mail & Guardian, 23-29 September, 1994: 33).

In the wake of this sizeable illegal workforce, there is a debate underway in South Africa as to whether stricter measures should be adopted to prevent further illegal immigration and to deport those already in the country. Proponents of harsher measures include black workers and traders who feel that their livelihoods would improve if deportations were increased and illegal entry made much more difficult. Opponents of stricter measures include the leadership in the ANC and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). One argument put forward by the latter is that by expelling, for example, large numbers of Mozambicans would exacerbate existing economic and political instability in Mozambique which might overspill into South Africa.

However, expulsions of illegal workers do take place and in 1994 more than 20,000 Zimbabweans were deported from South Africa and Botswana (The Namibian, 12.10.1994: 4). In an attempt to prevent the inflow of illegal workers to South Africa, there have been suggestions that the border fence with Zimbabwe should be re-electrified. In the case of Namibia, a cattle fence has been erected along the border with Angola to prevent, it is stated, the spread of foot-and-mouth disease in Namibia. However, informed observers report that the purpose of the fence is to keep out Angolans from crossing into Namibia for work (van der Linden and Amutenya, 1993).

West Africa features as the region with the highest concentration of migrants of any in sub-Saharan Africa, and there are well-established patterns of labour movement across national boundaries. Indeed, since the beginning of this century migration has been an important element in the regional economy. According to Adepoju (1988:60) “migrants have always considered West Africa as an economic unit within which trade in goods and services flowed freely; the free movement of people was therefore an integral feature of prevailing economic interdependence among the nation states”.

With few exceptions, the recent Liberian civil war being one and the ethnic conflicts created by political in-fighting in Togo being another, refugees have not been an issue in West Africa². At least two major factors characterise labour
movements in West Africa. First, the general flow of labour has been down-slope, i.e. from the poorer inland Sahelian countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, to the richer coastal states such as Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria. It should be emphasized, however, that there are quite significant flows of labour between West African coastal states, and more specifically from poorer to richer countries.

The Côte d’Ivoire is currently the foremost country for immigration in West Africa and is host to an estimated three million foreign workers, of whom 712,000 come from Mali, 225,000 from Guinea, 168,000 from Ghana, 52,000 from Nigeria and between 40,000 and 100,000 from Senegal. Data regarding the number of Burkinabé in Côte d’Ivoire is contradictory; according to Ivorian authorities there are 1.5 million in the country, while Burkina Faso authorities put the figure at 750,000! (Robin, 1992:13). Despite this discrepancy, Côte d’Ivoire is, by far, the preferred destination for Burkinabé. Ghana is both a labour receiving and sending country, but at the beginning of this century was the major recipient country in West Africa, a status which it maintained until 1960 when an estimated 827,000 migrant workers were living in the country (Robin, 1992:13). In the decade of the 1960s, the Ghanaian economy declined, consequently affecting the demand for foreign labour. The oil-generated boom in Nigeria also resulted in demand for foreign workers, and following the oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979, hundreds of thousands of Ghanaians migrated there for work as private business people and as professionals. In 1982, for example, there were 20,000 Ghanaian teachers in Nigeria (Robin, 1992:14).

Second, migration in West Africa “has become largely spontaneous and includes levels of both seasonal and undocumented migration reportedly higher than elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa” (Russell, et al., 1990:17). Because migration is spontaneous and therefore largely unregulated, migrants have adopted flexible mobility strategies and have been able to respond to changing economic opportunities arising in different countries. However, because many West African migrants move to neighbouring countries unofficially they are not uncommonly subjected to expulsion when economic conditions suddenly deteriorate. For example, in 1969, Ghana expelled between 500,000 and one million illegal immigrants, mostly from Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Togo and Liberia, while Nigeria expelled at least one million workers in 1983 (Robin, 1992:13). Margaret Peil (1971, 205-29) provides a good background to the expulsion of migrants in West Africa during the 1950s and the 1960s.

**International labour migration in sub-Saharan Africa: the Balance Sheet**

In the literature, migration has traditionally been viewed as a negative phenomenon which leads to the depletion of able-bodied males from rural areas which leads, it is argued, to the break up of traditional societies and to a decline in agricultural production. While this may, to some extent, be true, a more balanced view may be necessary. For example, migration can also been viewed as a capital accumulation strategy which benefits rural households.

According to a study from 1984 of five countries (Turkey, Tunisia, Mexico, Italy and West Bengal), out-migration of males did not cause a decline in agricultural production in any of the countries studied (Comte, 1992:17). Three reasons are suggested why this is the case. First, if the migrant is a seasonal labourer he will usually return to his village during periods of heavy labour
demand, i.e. during planting and cultivation. Second, the rural household may
decide to plant less labour-intensive crops, such as sorghum over groundnuts,
as in parts of West Africa. Third, if there is surplus labour available in the
village, then this may be hired to substitute migrant labour, or labour may be
hired in from other areas (see, for example, Loiske, 1994 who discusses this
process of hiring agricultural labour from other areas to a village in central
Tanzania).

But there are examples of where agricultural production does decline as a
result of male out-migration. In Lesotho, a major labour exporting country to
South Africa, wives of migrants tend to be conservative in making agricultural
management decisions, and rarely undertake agricultural innovation for fear of
being chastised by their husbands. Moreover, women are rarely provided with
resources to purchase improved seed and fertilizer. More worrying is the fact
that migrant workers lose interest in cultivating their land, because they earn
much more as wage earners in South Africa. Consequently, they have the
means to purchase food rather than produce it themselves (Comte, 1992:17).

Money earned by migrants is an important source of income and investment
for migrant households. It has been estimated that in some areas, migrant
remittances can constitute up to 50 per cent of a sending household’s income
(Comte, 1992:17). According to Russell et al, “at the household level,
remittances are a crucial source of income for many families”, and in the case of
Lesotho are the principal source of subsistence for more than 40 per cent of all
households (1990:35).

For many migrant households, remittances are often used to cover consump-
tion needs but, contrary to many characterizations of migrant behaviour,
“remittances are used for investment, and indeed are an important source of
Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and the Sahel indicate that remittances
are “positively associated with improvements in rural areas” (Russell, et al,
1990:35).

At the national level, remittances can make a vital contribution to a country’s
foreign exchange position and, in some countries, are very substantial com-
pared to exports of goods and services. For the period 1985-89 remittances from
Sudanese working abroad amounted to 50 per cent of the total value of the
export of goods and services (Wahba, 1991:42). In 1989, remittances by
Sudanese working overseas amounted to $ 417 million, compared with $ 543
million for merchandise exports (Van Hear, 1992: 16; Economist Intelligence
Unit, 1991). For Burkina Faso, workers’ remittances make a vital contribution to
the national economy and in 1990 were valued at US$ 114 million compared
with US$ 75 million (1989 data) for the value of exported goods (World Bank,

Thus, any interruptions in the flow of migrant remittances can have major
repercussions both at the household and national levels. In the case of Sudan, it
has been estimated that the value of remittances lost (including the costs of
repatriation) as a consequence of the Gulf War were $ 300 million (Van Hear,

The major negative consequence of international labour migration in Africa,
apart from the great psychological and emotional stresses caused by family
separations, is the spread of AIDS. While AIDS has traditionally been concen-
trated in urban areas and rural communities connected to towns and cities along major trucking routes, there is evidence that returning male migrants from the Côte d’Ivoire to Burkina Faso are bringing the disease to isolated rural communities. This pattern is, doubtless, being duplicated elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa in regions characterised by high levels of labour migration (Baker, 1992:21). In South Africa, the spread of AIDS is associated with labour migration (Schutte, 1993:8).

International labour migration within sub-Saharan Africa is unlikely to abate much in the foreseeable future. However, present evidence would suggest that some of the traditionally important host countries may adopt policies to constrain further in-migration. The Côte d’Ivoire, the foremost labour importing country in West Africa, is presently experiencing a recession which will most likely result in tighter policies towards migrants. This will, of course, have major consequences for migrant households and labour exporting countries, such as Burkina Faso and Mali. Moreover, the contraction of labour markets in host countries coincides with the impact of structural adjustment programmes in both labour exporting and importing countries, and in the face of declining household real incomes, stricter migration policies may certainly have very severe consequences for migrant households.

Notes

1 Compare this figure with the fewer than 300,000 refugees who are resident in the Nordic countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th>Asylum Seekers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>5 238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>200 000</td>
<td>83 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>35 000</td>
<td>13 884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>5 300</td>
<td>3 634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


2 It is worth noting that in the early 1960s, an estimated two million people fled Guinea and settled in neighbouring countries as a result of the authoritarian and ruthless regime of Sekou Touré.
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Shelter Provision and Settlement Policies for Refugees

A state of the art review

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Durable shelter, provided to satisfactory physical standards, using appropriate materials and related to prevailing cultural parameters, constitutes one of the basic needs for refugees. Complementing this ‘architectural scale’ of shelter provision are macro-level considerations such as location of settlements and economic impacts—because the influx of large numbers of refugees places great pressure on the housing resources, the land use patterns and settlement structures of the host country. Furthermore, great variations in climatic conditions, building standards and processes, and levels of urbanisation across the world all add to the complexity of policy formulation and implementation in this field. With upwards of 50 million forcibly displaced people (documented and undocumented refugees and internally displaced), each one of whom needs housing, the need for shelter and settlement strategies thus presents unique problems and major challenges to policy makers and agencies concerned with refugee assistance.

1.1 The Goals, Objectives and Scope of this Review

This state of the art review examines the nature of these problems and challenges. In seeking to reshape the existing paradigm its main goals and objectives are to:

- advance a conceptualisation of the role of shelter provision and settlement policies which is essentially developmental rather than relief orientated;
- reorientate current understanding of the scope and purpose of planning processes and tasks by emphasizing their fundamental significance in tackling the long term consequences of mass forced migration;
- provide a comprehensive and critical appraisal of current practice in order to draw out the lessons of best practice;
- offer an effective vehicle for the dissemination of current experience.

Its focus is both procedural and substantive. Procedurally it analyses the policy, planning, managerial and logistical factors which are crucial to policy makers and practitioners working in this sector. Substantively, it proposes, as a conceptual framework for analysing the sector, a series of complementary spatial scales within which shelter and settlement issues can systematically ordered.

To these ends, the study presents a review of the key principles and issues which emerge from research and field experience over the last decade or so. It provides a series of critical perspectives and reference points for: enhancing professional capability and policy responses in refugee relief programmes; examining existing and future training provision; and for the development of future research by documenting some of the recurring themes which bridge the concerns of researchers and practitioners.

These objectives are set within the wider context of current debates about the
nature of durable solutions and the form and purpose of refugee assistance; this is elaborated below (Chapter 1.3 and 1.4). Placed within this wider perspective, the intention is to enhance the value of the findings for policy formulation. The study contends that systematically conceived policies for refugee shelter and settlement provision would not only lead to the more effective deployment of resources and assistance: they would also complement economic and spatial development strategies of host countries and create an environment in which refugees would have greater control over their livelihoods and the resources at their disposal.

In its examination of the strengths and weaknesses of current and recent past responses, the review is explicitly multi-disciplinary. It evaluates policies and paradigms from a number of built environment disciplines; but it is also concerned with the work of researchers in the fields of anthropology, sociology and politics. To enrich the field of refugee provision, the study also draws on the extensive practice and research base in related fields. These include: mass housing provision for low income groups in the developing world; natural disaster response; self help and community mobilisation in the urban housing sector.

A key task of this review is to disseminate the wide corpus of experience in a comprehensive way. Governments and assistance agencies have considerable experience of shelter provision in different refugee situations—emergency and protracted, variations in social and cultural needs, climates, different technologies. This experience has not been effectively pooled and disseminated, compared, for example, with post disaster shelter provision.

1.2 The Current State of Shelter Research

There is now a considerable body of literature for this sector: the bibliography, although selective, gives some indication of this. However, in comparison with other critical sectors of refugee assistance—for example, nutrition, protection, resettlement—and despite the fact that refugee camps and settlements are the focal point of most refugee assistance, the literature is much less well documented, lacks coherence and is widely diffused. Equally, professional experience, evident in a number of site planning manuals and an extensive range of project evaluations, is not effectively disseminated and it is generally of insufficient quality, at present, to provide an effective body of replicable experience for policy makers and field staff. Lacking an institutional memory, the knowledge and experiences gained from previous responses are inadequately transferred to new refugee crises; the scope for imaginative new options remains unexplored. Indeed one has to search back to 1987 (Hardin 1987; UNHCR/DMC 1987) to find any (though unpublished) appraisal of the issues and back a further decade before that for an overview paper (Cuny 1977) or technical appraisal (Harris and Hulse 1977). Subsequent work by Cuny (1980) set down practical operational guidance for camp planning which was developed by the same author three years later (Cuny 1983). These early initiatives led to the bench-mark of the UNHCR’s own Handbook which drew together and presented the then existing camp planning praxis (UNHCR 1982).

This early impetus towards a comprehensive and holistic treatment of the subject was not sustained. In short, little systematic and rigorous research exists in the field. As a result there remain very significant lacunae in the conceptual-
sation of the policies, processes and impacts of the differing approaches to
refugee shelter and settlement. Instead, as the bibliography to this study
indicates, there is an extensive yet highly disparate literature in which agency eval-
uation reports are preponderant. These provide a potentially valuable data
source and a record, of sorts, of past and current praxis. Indeed, to this extent,
this paper is perhaps the first attempt to address, in a holistic way, the present
corpus of knowledge and operational experience. This is a necessary first step
in the process of conducting a more detailed examination and developing a
more critical understanding of current practice in order to provide more
responsive and viable solutions to the shelter needs of refugees.

The absence of a coherent body of conceptual and operational literature in
this field confirms the reluctance of the international aid regime, and the aca-
demic community, to take seriously the need to address the subject. Frequently,
shelter provision has too often been considered as part of the general logistics of
delivering the conventional package of material aid and relief, not as an impor-
tant element in its own right.

More recently, several unconnected but nonetheless significant factors have
contributed to the growing realisation within UNHCR, international agencies
and donors, that a large vacuum exists in refugee assistance policy. Previously
held assumptions, for example about appropriate shelter construction tech-
nologies or different settlement strategies, are under close scrutiny. Recent
refugee crises in former Yugoslavia and with the Kurdish refugees at the time
of the Gulf War have highlighted, \textit{inter alia}, the inadequacy of preparedness;
the lack of climatically appropriate and durable emergency shelter; and, more
revealingly, the lack of consideration which has been given to shelter standards
and refugees’ expectations except in a European context.

From a different perspective a growing body of literature over the last
decade, based on research in Africa and south east Asia, has challenged the
physical, social and economic viability of the traditional solutions of camps and
settlement schemes as valid responses to the shelter and settlement needs of
refugees. Another impetus for this review is the reassertion, by the UNHCR
and the international community, of repatriation as the preferred solution to the
world’s refugee crisis. This has crucial bearing on the nature of shelter and set-
tlement responses for refugees and returnees.

Finally, the existence of the extensive but disparate body of research and
practice literature for this sector suggests that a critical evaluation and overview
of the present `state of the art’ is now timely. Thus the First International Work-
shop on Improved Shelter Responses and Environment for Refugees, convened
by UNHCR in Geneva in June/July 1993 (UNHCR 1993), and the original impe-
tus for the preparation of this study, was an important landmark in developing
the field.

This overview draws on two comparative literatures which provide impor-
tant co-ordinates for our own concerns. First, in the fields of natural disaster
responses (e.g. Davis 1981; UNDRO 1982; Anderson and Woodrow 1989; Aysan
and Davis 1992) and to a lesser extent with ‘development refugees’ (Cernea
1990, 1992; Hansen and Oliver-Smith 1982; Scudder and Colson 1982; Scudder
1993), the knowledge base and operating principles in relation to shelter and
settlement have been much more systematically developed and with clearer
regard to the need to conceptualise some of the concerns. This contrasts with
the situation for refugee policy and practice. Contingent to our own concern, it provides important comparative experience. Similarly, refugee needs also bear similarities to shelter and settlement provision under conditions of rapid urbanisation in the developing world—spontaneous development processes, self-build modes, positive economic impacts, community participation (Turner 1967; Payne 1984; Gilbert and Gugler 1992). Current refugee praxis remains largely ignorant of this experience.

1.3 From Relief to Development

The challenge to develop appropriate shelter and settlement policies for refugees highlights the dilemma central to all refugee policy making—relief or development? temporary needs or permanent responses? Related to this are issues of participation or co-optation? host country or international interests? These considerations establish a crucial context for this review: a central contention is to argue the primacy of developmental rather than relief responses to refugee crises.

The scale and speed of refugee movements and the presumed temporary status of refugees contrasts with the relatively high costs and durable nature of shelter provision. Accordingly, host governments and the humanitarian assistance agencies have usually adopted short term, pragmatic responses. Often, however, these prove to be at the expense of the inevitable. Longer term and more durable housing provision become necessary, beyond the emergency and care and maintenance phases,—the Palestinians being the most telling example (e.g. Marx 1992). In the transition from relief to development very different needs arise as refugee shelter and settlements become more permanent and spontaneously settled refugees become more fully integrated with their hosts. By definition shelter—in any context—is both a durable commodity and developmental in its impact. But the impacts which mass refugee movements place on, for example, the settlement patterns, the environment, the regional development strategies and the building materials industry, are often conceived as negative by host countries. In these terms the need for systematic and planned responses to the impacts of mass influxes becomes essential: this constitutes another major theme of this study.

The relief-development continuum underpins a third fundamental concern which this study addresses, the extent to which refugees can and should participate in the formulation and implementation of their own shelter provisions. Participation of refugees is advocated as one of the most crucial elements in a viable shelter strategy (e.g. Clarke 1987a). Yet fully empowering refugees in shelter provision introduces complex issues about the fundamental rights which host governments might provide for refugees, for example: legal rights of land occupancy; the balance between encampment and freedom of movement and where to settle; the extent to which assistance should support durable housing and thus, eventually, questions of permanency.

These and other contradictions between the physical permanency of housing, shelter production processes and the presumed temporariness of refugees, penetrate to the heart of the dilemmas of refugee policy making and assistance. In the search for durable solutions, shelter and settlement policies are a powerful indicator of both the humanitarian will of the international community to address a basic right of refugees—their status in a host country—and also the
abilities of host countries and assistance agencies to implement realistic and acceptable refugee policies.

These considerations indicate that this sector offers a potentially rich field for research and policy development and new ways of thinking about the nature of refugee needs and assistance. Since analysis of refugee assistance has not, to date, examined shelter and settlement in an holistic way, this potential has remained unexploited. One objective of this state of the art study is to attempt a conceptualisation of this policy arena and to establish some parameters for further research and inquiry.

1.4 Reconcieving Refugees and Refugee Policy Making

The main objective of this review, then, is to offer a new conceptualisation of shelter provision and settlement policies. In this objective, a second contextual frame which defines the scope of this review. This is the fundamental reconceptualisation of refugee policy making and assistance which is evident in recent literature. This defines new directions in the formulation of shelter and settlement policies and for tackling familiar operational constraints in the sector. The reconceptualisation is predicated on a number of contentions which support the arguments presented in this study. The study contends that:

1. The relief and development models are complementary and should form a central part of refugee assistance programmes at national and international levels. Planning methodologies, policies and interventions at different spatial scales play an enabling role in the transition from relief to development in refugee assistance.
2. Refugee impacts and assistance should be evaluated in terms of the costs and benefits for all interest groups—refugees, hosts, governments, donors and agencies; spatial and economic planning processes provide one framework for mediating these interests and for formulating integrated policy making for hosts and refugees.
3. Locational considerations—especially at a regional scale—are critically significant for refugee survival and well-being and the impact on host communities; these considerations should be at the crux of planning and settlement policies formulated in refugee situations.
4. Refugees contribute development resources to a host country; but current policies for assistance inhibit this contribution from being achieved; proactive responses designed to capitalise on these resources—e.g. through self help construction, employment provision, market expansion—are a necessary part of a planned approach to refugee influxes.
5. Sector policies must be diversified to draw on a wider range of development, project and professional experience; in retooling the planning process the appropriateness of training and consultancy skills and technological replicability, in the context of refugees’ needs, are key factors to take into account.
6. Physical planning, as an integrative process of policy formulation, management coordination and implementation, provides essential and prerequisite instruments and methodologies for effective shelter and settlement provision.
7. In-country capacity—professional, material, logistical—linked to international project experience should be the starting point for drawing up shelter and settlement policies.

1.5 The Scope of the Field

As already noted, and as will become evident in the body of the paper, there are many dimensions to shelter and settlement provision. This study attempts to provide a systematic review of them. A brief summary of the settlement forms covered by this paper will help to set the scene. Two of the most familiar and widely documented categories are refugee camps and rural settlement schemes;
these are known collectively as organized or local settlements. Although implemented across much of the developing world, the viability of these highly institutionalised responses to mass influx, in terms of social, physical or economic needs, is increasingly questioned as section 3 of the study discusses. A third category is self settlement, often known as spontaneous settlement. Particularly in the case of rural refugees, this is frequently advocated as the preferred option; but it may impose negative impacts on the hosts (Chambers 1986). The lessons learned from this option provide another part of the study (Chapter 6). These three settlement forms are largely rural in location and apply, in the main, to the developing world.

There is known to be substantial refugee self settlement in urban areas in the developing world (Rogge 1986, 1990). Unlike their rural counterparts, however, it is still a case of ‘what the eye does not see’ (Chambers 1979) and has not been widely researched. Urban settlement by refugees predominates in the developed world—a scarcely surprising reflection of higher levels of urbanisation, land scarcity and the saliency of individual rights of land ownership and tenure. This study considers urban based responses in Chapter 4. Two components are considered: urban based housing construction, for example in former Yugoslavia, Lebanon and Cyprus; and rental housing and reusing the existing built fabric. These are less familiar options; but they are significant in more developed countries.

### 1.6 Contents and Organisation of the Paper

A review of the sector categorised according to particular settlement types was not thought to offer sufficient scope for a holistic exploration of the underlying issues and principles. Instead this review is organised in terms of an ascending spatial scale. This enables much wider perspectives to be developed and integrated into the overall thematic concerns of the review. It commences at the micro level of the dwelling, construction technology and building materials and ends with macro level consideration of regional factors and national economic perspectives.

- **Shelter and its setting**: self help and refugees’ capabilities; indigenous capacity (Chapter 2);
- **Camp and settlement planning**: the limitations of and the scope for improvements to current practice—progressive upgrading and planning for durability (Chapter 3);
- **Planned alternatives to encampment**: new planning tools for settling refugees (Chapter 4);
- **Planning by refugees**: learning from spontaneous settlement and regional parameters (Chapter 5);
- **From Relief to Development**: a macro-economic perspective; refugees as development resources and the role of shelter and settlement planning (Chapter 6).

A final chapter sets out the conclusions, summarises the lessons learned and identifies action proposed for the future.

In seeking a fundamental reorientation of the scope and purpose of planning processes in refugee situations, one sub-section of each chapter of the review outlines the principal recommendations for revising current praxis: these are sections 2.4, 3.3, 4.4, 5.4 and 6.3. These five sections constitute a set of policies and practices at different spatial scales of the planning process which, taken together, offer a comprehensive framework for planning for refugees.
1.7 Bibliographic and Data Sources

The study draws almost exclusively on secondary data. This was derived from a preliminary key word scan which listed approximately 260 entries in the UNHCR Centre for Documentation on Refugees and 1100 entries in the Documentation Centre of the Refugee Studies Programme, University of Oxford; UNHCR Refugee Abstracts (1983-present) and the Journal of Refugee Studies (1988-present) were also scanned. The main sources then drawn upon for the review include:

- Field mission and evaluation reports of UNHCR PTSS (28 studies from 1989), other UN organizations, NGOs, consultants.
- Technical manuals and guidelines prepared by UN and other organizations on shelter provision, settlement and camp planning.
- Shelter manufacturers’ and suppliers’ technical reports and marketing literature.
- Reports of workshops and training programmes for the sector.
- Academic papers in journals, books and monographs for the sector and related literatures in urbanisation and housing.
2. Shelter and its Setting

2.1 Introduction

The provision of shelter is one of the basic needs of refugees. But fundamental to any understanding of the role of assistance agencies in refugee shelter provision, must be a concern with far more than housing as a physical commodity and the application of basic standards codified in operational guides. Essential though plastic sheets, tents, and professional rules of thumb for density standards might be in emergency phases, what is remarkable is the way in which refugees very quickly commence the process of adapting, personalizing and upgrading their shelter. No different from other communities, refugee housing represents a cultural commodity (Oliver 1976); it supports a diversity of functional requirements (Payne 1984); it is an important economic multiplier (UNCHS 1987; Tipple 1991). In the most adverse circumstances, the way refugees construct and consolidate shelter provides important lessons for policy makers and field staff about refugees’ capacity to survive and the skills and experiences they bring to the housing process.

A second major consideration is to recognise that refugees, their needs and their experiences are not isolated from similar categories of other severely deprived groups. Significant in the present context are the processes of consolidation, extension and adaptation which are displayed in the shelter responses of the low income groups in the fast growing cities of the developing world. These physical processes of rapid urbanisation, together with the equally rapid social and economic transformations which they represent, are largely driven by ‘informal’ self-settlement mechanisms combined with self help construction technology. These spontaneous processes of their urban counterparts, mirror rather similar responses by which a majority of the world’s refugees—especially in the developing world—have settled in host countries. There are essential differences of course, not least in the political and managerial contexts, as between third world urban dwellers and refugees. Yet, even so, it is surprising that the consideration of refugee housing needs has not, to date, engaged a parallel and very extensive literature (e.g. Angel et al. 1982; Gilbert & Gugler 1992; Lloyd 1979; Payne 1984, 1989; Turner 1967; Ward 1982; World Bank 1992).

2.2 In-country Technology and Standards

Substantial case study experience advocates that the design and construction of shelter, even in emergencies, should be based on indigenous technologies and local materials, or the careful adaptation of imported or non-traditional methods and materials. Where this does not happen, shelter provision is frequently either too expensive (and thus meets too few needs) or is inflexible.
and incapable of replication because requisite skills are not available. This is not to say that international technology should never have a part to play; it too can offer qualities of efficiency and significant potential for adaptation to local circumstances. But too often international agencies and donors, in their concern for the rapid deployment of emergency assistance, import foreign technologies and professional capability because these are most readily to hand (UNCHS 1987a). This marginalises consideration of indigenous technology and capacity. Primacy should be given to the refugees’ own culture as the determinant of design decisions (Clark 1987 b & c).

Nagel’s study of refugees in Costa Rica (1987), makes these points effectively, showing how the construction of satisfactory concrete plinths was beyond the capacity of local artisans and timber framed buildings designed by European architects were unaffordable by many refugees. A similar preference for local technology is illustrated by Ressler (1979) in a study which shows how imported ‘A’ frame technology in Bangladesh was unsatisfactory. It could not be justified in terms of costs vis a vis local technologies and was culturally unacceptable without adaptation of the physical and social space around the dwelling.

There are two pioneering studies on the theme of appropriate technologies. The first, although in the context of disaster rather than refugee relief, presented the issues by formulating a holistic approach to the design and implementation of low cost shelter (Hartkopf and Goodspeed 1979). This paper is significant because it was an early illustration, subsequently borne out in other studies, of the need for a comprehensive perspective on the problems which can arise from the mismatch between imported and indigenous technologies. Thus, a more recent evaluation of shelter construction in Somali refugee camps in Kenya illustrates how, with insufficient technical advice and limited NGO capability, prefabricated shelter was being erected which was structurally dangerous (MSF 1993).

The second study deals with shelter needs for women (UNCHS 1987a). Its value lies in its comprehensive treatment of the subject and the unusual and welcome gender perspective. After considering minimum needs and performance requirements, this study confirms the fact that neither prefabricated systems nor specially designed emergency shelter have been effective for the reasons already set out. The report argues that the best shelter provision is that provided by the population under normal circumstances. The importance of roofing cannot be overstressed as the key for adequate shelter. Simple durable structures and labour intensive technology are advocated with designs that are capable of adaptation by the occupants. Where imported technologies are used in emergency conditions, the study makes the important point that these should allow for reuse later in the dwelling improvement stage. Clearly, more investigation is needed into ways of diversifying local capacity and technology.

In contrast, Howard (1989), shows how plastic sheeting, to take one example of a non-traditional material, can be effectively combined with local materials and adapted to different circumstances for emergency shelter and short term needs. Scherrer’s study (1990) of the upgrading of roofing structures by Afghan refugees usefully demonstrates how indigenous (and self help) technology was applied with low inputs of capital, energy and imported materials, whilst at the same time also boosted local employment.
More recently, there has been considerable experimentation, notably in Nordic countries, in developing and manufacturing prefabricated lightweight structures. These are often adaptations, for refugee needs, of commercially developed technologies originally designed for domestic residential, recreation or leisure markets. The components are ‘re’-designed to be easily reassembled and customised to refugee conditions, for example by using roofing thatch and adobe wall panelling. They offer adaptability and durability as compared with more conventional forms of emergency shelter. There are also many prefabricated, more permanent structures now on the market designed for longer term refugee housing under more extreme climatic conditions than found in most traditional refugee hosting countries. However the product and transport costs, apart from doubts about cultural responsiveness, preclude widespread use at the present time. This is especially the case for the more sophisticated specifications and complete units. Furthermore, local contracting expertise is needed for reassembly which may not be available; site preparation costs can be high. These points are well made in the context of an early mission in former Yugoslavia (UNHCR PTSS 92/53). A full cost-benefit analysis of the economic viability of some of these products in different local situations, including for example the potential savings on local building materials like timber for structural members, needs investigation.

In seeking to adapt technologies, another problem which can arise is conflict over the contrasting standards for building and layout which are adopted by different international agencies and also by host governments (UNHCR PTSS 92/). As reported in a physical planning mission to Bangladesh for the planning of camps for 250,000 Rohingya refugees, and in many other cases, these conflicts can hamper the implementation process unless compromise is achieved. The problems of conflicting standards are acute under the pressures of emergency situations. In the case of former Yugoslavia a consultant to UNHCR advised pragmatism in response to extremes of density—space occupancy of less than 3.5 sq. m/pc in some cases—far below accepted local or UNHCR standards (UNHCR PTSS 92/53). In the circumstances it was argued that higher space standards should not be a precondition of international assistance since they would only be achieved by loosing vitally needed accommodation.

Because of the humanitarian pressures to cope with refugee crises, imported technologies are most frequently adopted as the only apparent solution to mass shelter needs. A review of the literature confirms, despite evidence of repeated failure, the value in appraising the role of indigenous capacity.

2.3 Building Materials

Except for refugees resettled in third countries, most possess technologies which can be adapted to local conditions—self build experience and artisanal labour is frequently to be found amongst refugee communities. However, shortfalls in the provision of building materials are a major constraint to the provision and improvement of shelter. Access to building materials is the crucial element in the process of shelter consolidation; but these materials quickly become commodified and locally scarce. Even where materials like poles, mats, thatch and mud can be locally garnered, supply constraints and environmental degradation caused by excess demand in countries like Malawi (UNHCR PTSS 89/39; Government of Malawi 1988) and Rwanda (Castor Consultants 1993), for
example, can be exceptionally severe. Paradoxically, in more developed countries, like former Yugoslavia (UNHCR PTSS 92/53), where the production of building materials is more industrialised, supply constraints can be just as acute. The adherence to well established planning and building regulations accentuates the problem.

The situation is inevitably complicated by host country technologies and practices. Thus, in the case of Sierra Leone, many of the basic construction materials are imported to the country and thus are comparatively expensive, especially for the displaced population in the camps (UNHCR PTSS 93/38). The use of traditional methods was recommended in this example; but paradoxically this required the ‘reinvention’ of local building materials technology. A similar situation is cited in Uganda (UNHCR 1985) where local contractors were only familiar with estimating and supplying imported and more expensive materials. This mission proposed assistance for upgrading the local materials production and training contractors for local building methods for the Rwandese refugee settlement.

Conditions in developed countries hosting large numbers of refugees present other complications to be tackled. In many of the republics of former Yugoslavia, industrialised housing construction processes require high inputs of cement and steel which are now in extremely short supply. This hinders the reconstruction process and the provision of shelter for refugees (UNHCR PTSS 92/53). Conversely timber is rather more abundant but its use as a conventional building material has declined and with it technological familiarity (Klemecic Kozul 1994). These conditions set up contradictions which are difficult to resolve; whilst self-build options are preferable these are unfeasible, yet large scale industrialised housing production is less likely to be adaptable to longer term refugee requirements.

Whilst a general preference for local materials and technologies is advocated care needs to be exercised. Guidelines established by UNHCR for shelter provision in an agricultural refugee settlement scheme in Somalia appear to offer contradictory evidence in this regard (Tag-Eldeen n.d.) although no follow up data is available. The use of locally available wood and natural materials for a low cost and intensively participatory housing solution was advocated. Technologies were investigated but the cost was an estimated $800 per unit and a search area for building materials covered over 2700 ha! Barry’s evaluation of UNHCR’s assistance programme for returnees in Nicaragua (Barry 1990) emphasises the need for both the explicit testing of assumptions and also effective project planning even where local materials and technologies are used. In this example, local but inappropriate materials were supplied; assumptions were made about self help capability and no technical assistance was provided. Amongst other consequences, roof structures were too heavy and the estimated construction time was too short, in practice for the refugees’ capabilities. The main reason for erroneous assumptions about resource inputs and work scheduling are attributed to the lack of participation.

Solutions to these constraints are not easy to find, not least because of the high cost of transport of building materials, the strains which excess demand places on domestic market needs, and potential environmental degradation. Stockpiling of all but emergency needs is economically infeasible—in any case climatic, topographical and social conditions are so variable. In emergency situ-
ations these bottlenecks are usually overcome by importing materials, technologies and sometimes prefabricated units—extensively so in the case of former Yugoslavia where, for example, US$ 1m of repair kits and prefabricated shelter needs for 25,000 people were identified on one mission (ICVA/UNHCR Task Force 1992). Large volumes of imported commodities are unlikely to be either cost effective or easily adaptable to cultural norms.

2.4 Implementation Strategies: Revising Practice

The extensive technical evidence from project evaluation over the last decade helps to redefine workable and appropriate strategies for shelter construction. The revisions to policies and technologies necessary for refugee situations are corroborated by the experience drawn from rebuilding after disasters (Cuny 1983, 1992; Aysan and Davis 1992). This suggests that preparedness and self help are the keys and this necessitates changes to many current assumptions underpinning conventional practices in the refugee context.

2.4.1 Assessment and Preparedness

Much debate surrounds the need for stockpiling building materials and/or emergency shelter as a central element in a preparedness plan. Strong support for stockpiling, possibly on a regional basis, is advocated by suppliers and representatives of NGOs working in the field (UNHCR 1993). Whilst there is certainly a need to co-ordinate agency data bases of stockpiled commodities in order to avoid duplication and ensure speedy procurement, the case for specialist stockpiles is not clear cut. Apart from the substantial capital tied up, as the foregoing evidence suggests, local needs and capabilities are so diverse that stockpiles are almost bound to be mismatched with local technologies, shelter building practices and needs.

Disaster preparedness experience indicates that it is information and knowledge, rather than physical commodities, which need to be stockpiled. The same principle applies to refugee situations. In-country universities, building research institutes and governments themselves already play a major role in the documentation of housing technologies, methods and construction processes and the inputs which are needed in different climatic and topographical zones. This could go hand in hand with: the preparation of contingency building sketch designs; the preliminary evaluation of the impact of building standards and planning codes on emergency shelter needs; the adaptation of local technologies; and some assessment of how local building material production capacities might be adjusted to cater for rapidly changing demand. More sophisticated preparation might involve a review of the economics of the building materials industry at differing levels of anticipated demand and appropriate policy interventions to manage the demand.

Where a refugee influx has already occurred, in-country expertise and data should be exploited before international technologies are imported. The availability of this expertise should be evaluated as part of the conventional needs assessment surveys and operations planning; higher profile should be given, in these exercises, to this sector. There may, even so, be a case for external professional assistance to support and expedite the preparation of these kinds of data bases.
There is, of course, a limit to the advanced detailing and preparation which can take place—not least because few countries envisage themselves to be potential hosts to mass refugee influxes from their neighbours. The utility of early warning methodologies is still very limited. On the other hand, much of the information—especially on taxonomies of housing design and technologies for example—may well exist already as part of domestic policy agendas, although not necessarily in this form. Vernacular and modern housing construction comprise part of the education and training of built environment professionals; they are incorporated in building and planning regulations. At the national level, economic development plans usually evaluate the capacity of the building and construction sectors under different growth scenarios. Modest reconfiguration of these data is needed for refugee situations. For example, density requirements and service infrastructure standards are likely to need reconsideration; construction technologies may have to be adapted to cater for anticipated shortfalls in building materials or construction equipment.

No reference has been found to indicate that this kind of comprehensive, but obviously essential, technical appraisal of shelter construction needs has yet taken place as part of the policy planning response to mass refugee influxes. More usually it occurs, if at all, ex post facto, and is often limited to the locations immediately impacted by refugees.

2.4.2 Building Materials

Inadequate consideration is usually given to building materials supply. But there are two important and interrelated reasons why particular attention needs to be paid to refugee impacts and requirements. First, this sector is highly susceptible to acute demand-led scarcity and supply bottlenecks created by refugee influxes. Second, as a result of scarcity and inadequately planned provision, refugees impose long term adverse environmental impacts. This is because they are compelled to supply their own building materials from locally available sources.

Ad hoc responses, therefore, should be replaced by more systematic evaluations of needs and supplies for both short and longer term requirements. Again the experience from disaster mitigation is relevant. A well phased plan, with an initial action planning methodology, may be necessary. Amongst other considerations this might: review and implement expedited methods for building materials production and the supply of tools and equipment; survey and develop access to in-country contingency supplies of materials (including tools and equipment); develop expedited procurement and purchasing procedures from local suppliers; develop co-operative purchasing methods; review building codes and regulations. Two important conditions underpin an action plan of this kind. First in supplying materials, tools and so on, sources from outside refugee impacted areas should also be considered in order to minimise negative local environmental impacts and market instabilities. An action plan should also outline longer term strategies, for example, the elaboration of plans for enhancing in-country production capacity of both natural and manufactured materials and components.

Ideally these components of a ‘materials’ action plan would parallel the information base on housing technologies and construction processes. In any case they should, like the preparedness plan, form a central element in the
needs assessment survey conducted when mass influxes occur.

The important point about both these interventions (preparedness and building materials) is that they can and should build on already available in-country base line data, policies and expertise. Thus, for example, strategies for the building materials industry and construction capacity are likely to form part of the orthodox national planning programme. A contingency plan for refugees could be integrated with this. Where a preparedness plan does not exist then the national planning framework might provide the appropriate base line for incorporating the refugee impact. In any case, the speedy incorporation of a refugee-initiated action plan, within the overall planning policies of the host country, is an essential element in the developmental approach to refugee planning being advocated in this study.

Since competition for resources—alternatively termed the refugee burden—constitutes the main source of conflict between hosts and refugees, action to overcome excess demand for building materials would mitigate a major source of this competition. A structured approach to the supply of building materials advocated here, should help to mitigate against the extreme negative consequences of refugee influxes. Conversely, there are positive developmental opportunities, particularly where a long term perspective is taken. This is discussed below (Chapter 6).

In the context of building materials, the valuable UNCHS study (1987) in this context has been discussed above (Chapter 2.2). Another useful and reasonably comprehensive exposition of the practical strategies and options for promoting the use of local building materials and enhancing the manufacture of traditional materials is set out in a report on the repatriation of Afghan refugees (UNOCA 1991). The UNCHS/UNEP (1994) proposals build on the firm commitment to the principle of self help for the repatriating families. Similarly, the proposals advocate the use of local building skills and commodity markets as significant variables in the reconstruction of shelter and the rebuilding of communities.

2.4.3 Self-Help, Enablement and Refugee Participation

Despite structural and institutional limitations and contradictory interpretations about the role of self help housing processes, they are still widely advocated in the developing world as a crucial element in strategies for the provision of mass housing needs. For refugee communities as well, all the available evidence, whether from encamped or self-settlement model, confirms that the most effective approach to housing provision is to enhance the refugees’ own capacity, skills and self reliance (e.g. Harrell-Bond 1986; 1990; Weeda 1987; Clark 1987 a, b & c; Freres 1988; Kok 1989). This coping capacity is frequently underestimated (UNICEF 1986). However, not only is it likely to be an efficient and economical use of resources in providing affordable shelter: there are likely to be cultural and psychosocial benefits for the community as well. Fuller participation in physical reconstruction may facilitate the community rebuilding process and, by leading to more effective coping mechanisms, offer enhanced potential for self-sufficiency. The fact that the majority of the world’s refugees are self settled and thus autonomously deploy self help processes as the mechanism to achieve it, appears to confirm these contentions.

There are, of course, important differences between planning for participation in refugee situations and conventional development situations. Refugees
have more limited choices and limited access to material resources; community and leadership structures and cooperative networks which underpin participation and self help are often fractured; there is uncertainty over the duration of exile. The key professional skill required enablement—providing the link between the well developed capabilities which most refugee communities bring with them into exile, and the physical, social and psycho-social constraints of the new situation. And, as in all self help situations, the refugee community must not be looked as an homogeneous group.

Clearly, participation in aided self help processes is a crucial element in the provision and upgrading of refugee shelter. Nonetheless, a range of factors condition the form and the extent to which self help policies can be adopted in different refugee contexts—cultural traditions, levels of development and urbanisation, land availability, the extent to which community structures remain in place, for example. Clarke (1987a) also notes the significance of the legal status of refugees and their access to building resources.

From a potentially large agenda of policy variables, five, specific to the refugee situation, are identified here: building materials, long term needs, income generation, tenure, donor policies.

First, shortfalls in building materials supply and lack of familiarity with local construction technologies, must be overcome. These shortfalls are most acute in the emergency phase and can place severe impediments on self build activity. However, where large refugee movements and protracted residence takes place, continuing pressures on the environment and/or building materials markets may also be experienced in the longer term. Some of the appropriate interventions which might overcome these constraints have already been discussed above (sections 2.3: 2.4.2). Particular attention needs to be given to enhancing managerial and institutional capabilities, and in coordinating base line data and procurement procedures.

The second consideration is to ensure that temporary structures for emergency needs do not pre-empt more durable provision of housing. Most refugees quickly adapt temporary shelter—like their counterparts, the urban migrants in informal settlements of the developing world—and this reflects important processes of adjustment and adaptation. Plot sizes should be sufficient to allow consolidation to take place with satisfactory standards (Gupta 1990; Ressler 1979; Oliver-Smith 1992).

The principle of parity with host country standards should be followed and this is now widely accepted practice as the result of evaluations, for example from the Mozambican influxes in southern Africa (UNHCR PTSS 89/39). Nevertheless, problems with conflicting standards, (discussed in section 2.2), show the difficulties in achieving this objective.

More problematic are likely to be the third and fourth factors—affordability and perceived security of residence. Both are formidable barriers for refugees. If self help and subsequent upgrading of refugee shelter are to be affordable, this requires access to labour markets and the right to work. My own work on self-help housing in Cyprus (Zetter 1987: 1992) and Post’s study in the Sudan (1985) demonstrate that employment is a critical determinant of self help inputs and housing upgrading. It generates investment capital, and a demand side a multiplier effect for artisanal labour and materials supplies. Studies of self help processes in non-refugee communities reinforce these findings (Skinner 1983;
Angel et al. 1982; Gilbert and Gugler 1992)) emphasizing how they are incremental and small scale—determined by the level and regularity of income.

This evidence underlines a critical constraint for refugees in housing themselves—inadequate and irregular income. Employment is often denied them by national refugee legislation and settlements may often be located great distances from employment centres and markets. Very limited provisions are made for refugee craftsmen and artisans to re-establish their trades and exploit new markets. Likewise, the potential afforded by additional factors of production and the expansion of the market base generated by refugee influxes is rarely assessed in terms of positive developmental opportunities. Locational factors, as much in relatively developed countries (ICVA/UNHCR 1992) as in the developing world (Kibreab 1989), are amongst the most important factors determining refugees’ survival capacity and should be at the crux of planning policies for refugees (Chapter 5).

Extensive study of the housing development of urban migrants in the developing world, demonstrates that access to land with perceived security of tenure—not necessarily conventional legal title—is highly instrumental in the consolidation process (Angel et al. 1982; Zetter 1984). In the case of refugees, enhancing perceptions of tenurial security is politically highly contentious since it bears on durability of residence in the host country. Hansen’s study (1990) of self settled Angolan refugees in Zambia exemplifies how these perceptions underpin differential processes of integration amongst the study group. In Malawi (Zetter 1992a; Wilson 1990) it is clear that local circumstances—ethnic links between refugees and hosts and the relatively benign attitude of the government to the refugee settlement process—have been very influential supporting the large numbers of Mozambicans who have self settled and constructed their own shelter.

Effective land use planning policies and liberal attitudes to employment are essential tools to tackle these barriers to employment, land access and residential location. But these conditions demand a longer term perspective which integrates refugee assistance with the host country’s own development needs. A planned response at this level is imperative in the more urbanised setting in southern and eastern Europe where the pressures on land supply and urban services are more apparent. These requirements are discussed below (Chapters 4 and 5).

This complex technical and professional agenda links to the final, and perhaps the most fundamental factor, rethinking the role and attitudes of host countries and donors refugees influxes. Removing the institutionalised constraints imposed by assistance programmes extends beyond operational needs to the heart of the status of refugees. It requires new forms of intervention which combine the concerns of technology and product with an understanding of housing processes in their local setting. It also requires the systematic assessment and removal institutional barriers to self help and substantial review of the current assistance policies of international donors, NGOs and host countries. At present, funding policies do not, generally, support housing construction which is developmental and durable; the emphasis is on short term and temporary solutions (see Chapter 4). Government policies on access to employment and attitudes to protracted residence must be reconsidered; but these are politically sensitive issues for the host population.
Institutionalised refugee assistance frequently pre-empts refugee participation and the refugees' own capacities and capabilities to build and adapt shelter, as indeed in many aspects of livelihood. Where participation is advocated, it frequently assumes a mistaken social homogeneity amongst the refugee community. Clark (1987b), on the basis of his work in Zaire, makes a cogent argument for institutional support for, rather than control of, refugee participation. Contrary to much current practice and although highly 'dependent', the Shaba settlements display several aspects of what should be good practice. This was developed further in a series of far reaching proposals designed to overcome conventional barriers to participation (Clarke 1987a). These are: minimizing the current professional and bureaucratic obstacles in contracting practice, project planning and design procedures; identifying procedures and principles for participation in project planning, needs assessment and evaluation phases (rarely the case in orthodox practice where involvement is only at the implementation stage); incorporating refugee participation into the contract procedures of implementing partners; altering the staff and programme mix with a greater emphasis on developmental policies. This experience has also been the basis for proposals for participation based at different stages of the project cycle (Refugee Policy Group 1986).

These conclusions emphasise the point that self help can rarely be laissez faire. Enablement and aided self help, terms drawn from the vocabulary of third world planners and community development professionals, better describe the requirements. For, as some of the examples have shown, the developmental approach sometimes demands the (re)-introduction of skills and materials because of reliance on import substitution technologies. Paradoxically, this might only be feasible with the mediation of professional assistance from outside the refugee community.
3. Camp Planning—Improving Current Practice

3.1 Camps—the Image of Refugee Shelter and Settlement

Camps are the form of shelter and settlement most commonly associated with provision for refugees. Two themes dominate the academic and practice based literature on refugee camps. First there is the extensive body of technical and field reports concerned with camp planning—logistics, site planning, operational needs. Second, there is a now substantial and parallel body of research-based literature which exposes the largely negative impact and consequences of encampment on the lives of refugees (for example, Rogge 1981; Harrell-Bond 1986; Reynell 1988; Waldron 1988; Pacheco 1989; Hitchcox 1990; Chan 1991; Journal of Refugee Studies 3/4 1992; Goovaerts 1993; Kibreab 1994).

These literatures, as Christensen (1982) Chan (1990) and Kibreab (1994) explain, offer contrasting paradigms of the social needs and aspirations of refugees—helpless victims and dependent clients reliant on the relief and assistance regime or goal oriented agents of change adapting to adversity and the institutionalisation of their social world. Unfortunately for refugees, their hosts and policy makers, these two literatures have never sufficiently engaged. Instead, the debate about settlement options has become polarised precisely because camps are such powerful symbols of the orthodox managerialist relief model (and its inherent limitations). The preoccupation with the physical appearance and design of camps and shelter, not the social and institutional world these structures represent, emphasises this polarity. Our conceptual understanding of refugee camps is dominated by their role as vehicles for the provision of material assistance to refugees, not as one constituent in a complex relief model. It is to challenge this limited conceptualisation that much recent academic research has been directed.

There are, as this section of the study shows, many technical elements to be addressed in the design of better settlement policies. But, in the context of these policies, an immeasurably more important problem to resolve is the political will of host governments and relief agencies to confront the fundamental dilemma which refugee camps pose. Their enduring presence is a direct physical challenge to the fundamental assumptions on which the orthodox relief model is based—the presumed temporariness of refugees. Questions of durability of shelter provision, locational decisions related to longer term social and economic needs, the appropriate methodologies for progressive upgrading of social and physical infrastructure—in short the transition from relief to development—are paramount.
3.2 Camp Planning and the Limitations of Current Practice

Refugee camps reflect two interacting sets of interests inherent to refugee relief and assistance programmes. On the one hand there are the physical attributes—the need to ensure provision of shelter, the design of camps according to basic standards of health and hygiene and also locational factors. On the other hand the role of camps as managerial devices is crucial.

Indicative of the physical importance of camp planning to refugee relief agencies, a short bibliographic search currently reveals nearly a dozen generic/comprehensive manuals or handbooks and a video training pack concerned in full, or in part, with site planning for refugees or post disaster reconstruction (UNHCR 1979; Cuny 1980; USAID 1981; UNHCR 1982; UNDRO 1982; Oxfam 1985; UNICEF 1986; UNHCR/DMC 1987; UNDP/UNDRO 1990; Goethert and Hamdi 1988, 1989; MSF 1992). With the exception of the last two manuals, they all present rather similar methodologies for the site planning process, although with considerable variation in levels of detail, range of components and comprehensiveness. There is also a plethora of country based studies, guides and other handbooks dealing comprehensively or specifically with particular sectors/infrastructure: these set out minimum standards of provision and layout. They are too numerous to list here. There is a strong prescriptive style to most of them, a characteristic confirmed by field evidence. Moreover, they are largely based on the building traditions and the operational experience of tropical and non-industrialised, developing countries. They are of limited value in the context of eastern and southern Europe characterised by more sophisticated construction technologies, greater prefabrication, well developed contracting industries and where planning and building codes are more familiar.

The existence of these manuals underlines the fact that, whilst they all note the disclaimer that ‘the establishment of camps must be only a last resort’ (UNHCR 1982:57), the encamping of refugees is the managerial ‘solution’ adopted by most host countries and relief agencies for well rehearsed political, logistical and managerial reasons which need not be repeated here. And indeed, in some cases there may be no alternative—for example the provision of legal protection and the prevention of armed attacks on refugees. Invariably though, camps are the focal point of the relief programme in physical and material terms. Accommodating, in most cases, only a limited proportion of refugees (frequently estimated to be less than half the total), nonetheless, they absorb a disproportionately large part of refugee assistance.

When the pressures of rapid refugee influxes have to be confronted, implementation needs—the rapid delivery of shelter provision and pragmatic locational decisions—drive the planning cycle: this is the antithesis of a planned response. Camps are usually designed according to fairly crude engineering principles; planning processes are at best piecemeal and are frequently dictated by donors and NGOs who, as the implementing partners, provide capital inputs for the physical and social infrastructure according to their own mandates, timescales, and funding options. The product is imposed on a largely compliant, but occasionally resistant, refugee clientele.
3.2.1 Physical Conditions

The extensive range of evaluation missions now documents a well developed analysis of commonly experienced physical problems of and limitations to refugee camps. These are comprehensively set out in a mission report on the Mozambican Refugee Emergency (UNHCR PTSS 89/39). Most camps are far too large—generally 20,000-30,000 is a crude rule of thumb—to function effectively either as social communities or for the logistical and managerial requirements for which they are established. There is little scope for progressive upgrading or for the morphology of the camp layout to evolve beyond familiar regimented layouts. They rapidly fill up and densities are frequently so great that morbidity rates remain high and the capacity of services, basic if available at all, is rapidly overloaded. Especially problematic is the provision and maintenance of satisfactory standards for water supply, sanitation and waste disposal to ensure acceptable health conditions (Shears 1983; Swenson 1987; Shook 1990; UNHCR 1992a). In most cases this is not just a matter of overcoming technical constraints, although it is frequently presented in these terms. It is centrally a planning issue—determining the physical layout and appropriate standards and coordinating the timing, location and agencies responsible for the provision of key infrastructure.

The technical and institutional limitations of many current approaches are evident, for example, in the Togo refugee settlements in Benin (UNHCR PTSS 93/14) for the then refugee population variously estimated at between 94,000-200,000, for populations displaced Sri Lankan (UNHCR PTSS 92/16) and in the Bhutanese refugee camps in Nepal (UNCHR PTSS 92/46). In these cases a combination of adverse site characteristics, camp infrastructure created in the initial emergency phases but inadequately suited to longer term needs, equipment failure, lack of culturally adaptable technical solutions and weak institutional coordination and planning, variously contributed to the familiar problems of disease transmission and declining health conditions.

3.2.2 Environmental Degradation

Limitations to the environmental carrying capacity and the longer term consequence of environmental degradation are increasingly recognised as amongst the most severe outcomes of the highly concentrated demand for building materials, fuel wood and agricultural production which camps tend to produce (UNHCR 1990; Gurman 1991; IOM 1992; UNCHS/UNEP 1994). This is noted in many studies, notably in Malawi where, with the influx of over one million Mozambican refugees, extensive deforestation has taken place in the southern part of the country (UNHCR PTSS 89/39; Wilson et al. 1989; Government of Malawi et al. 1990; Tamandong-Helin 1990). Studies of settlement programmes for Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia (UNHCR PTSS 93/2) and Sudanese refugees in Uganda (UNHCR PTSS 93/52) also draw attention to the self sufficiency limitations arising from adverse environmental conditions in a number of camp locations as well as the heavy pressure on forest and other natural resources as a result of the high population densities in relation to the environmental carrying capacity. Especially problematic is the fact that because some of these impacts are long term they go unrecorded: this severely distorts the true economic costs of refugee impacts for a host country. An exception to this is an unusual study from Thailand which sets out a valuable methodology for
analysing refugee camp ecology (Benyasut 1990).

Many of these concerns about environmental depletion and risks inherent in the establishment of camps—concentration of refugees in environmentally fragile areas, contamination of water supplies, disproportionately high population and animal densities in relation to carrying capacity, lack of sensitive environmental management policies by and for refugees, emergency needs preempting adequate environmental assessments—and the negative impacts on refugee and hosts’ livelihood were brought together in an important UNHCR study (Gurman 1991). The fundamental contention of the report, paralleling this current review, is the need to establish ‘development related’ perspectives to refugee assistance programmes to enable these longer term impacts can be clearly revealed. Without these perspectives and the effective deployment of comprehensive planning methodologies to tackle these impacts, the conventional short term emergency orientation will persist and sustainable responses will continue to be neglected. So long as the operational remit for UNHCR, and thus its implementing partners, remains as an emergency relief agency, then shelter and settlement provision will always highlight the contradiction between the long and the short term interests. Material aid for anything that becomes developmental, and the shelter and settlement sector as we have argued is certainly that, raises complicated questions about funding and institutional terms of reference.

Of course, these and other outcomes may result from mass population movements of many kinds: they are not attributable only to refugee camps. Nevertheless it is the combination of factors characteristic in refugee camp situations—high population densities, large population concentrations and settlement on land which has often been neglected in the past precisely because of inherent fragility—which make the environmental concerns an issue of particular importance.

3.2.3 Long Term Conditions—Social and Economic Development

Another matter of great concern is that camps are politically conceived as a temporary option. But objective evidence confirms that they remain, sometimes for decades (Palestinian refugee camps in Gaza (Jabr 1989), Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan (Anderson and Dupree 1990)). They are the semi-permanent physical landmarks of a refugee presence and evolving social and economic entities (Marx 1992). Yet they fail to provide for the enduring conditions and requirements of their inhabitants.

‘The need to plan and implement options for long term settlement planning and self sufficiency from the start of an emergency’ (UNHCR PTSS 89/39:19) is clearly stated. But, the underlying political rationale of temporariness drives a set of planning principles which are poorly equipped either to support the longer term developmental objectives for refugees and their hosts or to accommodate the incremental social and physical evolution of the settlements. Accordingly, social integration with hosts may be impeded; new and alien settlement forms cause desocialisation within the refugee community creating dependency and inhibiting social cohesion; social deprivation is spatially consolidated. Inhospitable or uncongenial locations constrain opportunities for self sufficiency and livelihood for refugees as already observed (for example see UNHCR PTSS 93/2; 93/52) and as numerous other research reports document
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for a variety of locations world-wide (for example: Rogge 1980; Reynell 1988; Aguayo et al. 1989; Wilson 1992; Zetter 1992a; Kibreab 1993; Callamard 1994). Nonetheless, this evidence of the negative social and economic consequences of camps has to be balanced with the positive survival strategies which research shows refugees to adopt even in adverse circumstances. The most convincing evidence for this contention probably lies in the body of research on Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Notwithstanding wide variations, in some locations the refugees dominated, indeed in some cases their presence benefited, the local economy (Ashraf 1988; Centlives 1988; Christensen and Scott 1988; Boesen 1990; but see also Kutch (1987) for contradictory evidence on short term impacts in the case of Pakistan). Similarly the extent of social integration varied contingent both on the competition for scarce economic resources and ethnic affiliations. In these examples it is important to note that the positive outcomes are usually to be found in locations where there is a well developed local economy or, crucially, where refugee camps are located close to existing population centres. However, the overall prognosis of the research is that the long run costs of refugee camps to governments and donors, in terms of protracted dependency, may well be much higher than other solutions.

Thus, despite the authoritative stance of the manuals and the inputs of field experience, fundamental rethinking is required on the current approaches to camp planning which are both operationally weak and conceptually limited.

3.3 Revising the Praxis

These contradictory findings and challenges indicate some of the directions for reshaping present practice. Indeed, the seeds of a new praxis lie in some of the evaluation mission reports already cited. However what is lacking is a systematic attempt to elaborate an overview of this new praxis from the case-by-case field experiences. More development work is required: what follows as an attempt to outline the key elements and methodologies of the new praxis.

3.3.1 Innovations in Planning Methodology

The literature review highlights several innovate methodologies which offer potential for reshaping and improving the planning and design process of refugee camps in line with these goals. Independent field evaluation of their effectiveness is desirable. Summarising the main findings, the following factors could form the basis of a new praxis.

UNHCR has proposed a three phase model (UNHCR/DMC 1987). The first phase deals with the immediate influx and basic needs, but safeguards land and services for future up-grading; the second phase involves a limited planning process as the population builds up, sites are expanded, shelter provision becomes more mixed, upgrading takes place and economic activity increases. The third phase is designated as ‘ground up’ in which detailing of the ‘master plan’ and site development plans complete the programme.

To an extent this model is a pragmatic rationalisation of the circumstances which prevail in most camp planning situations. It is unclear how the three phases are intended to interlink in practice. This is a significant limitation to the model because the linear process on which it is implicitly based is largely discredited in conventional planning practice. In the field situation, ensuring
that early commitments do not pre-empt later developmental requirements is the crucial requirement; this methodology does not fully explore how this could be achieved in practice. However, this model reinforces two key objectives:

- progressive up-grading should be a central component of the planning and development process;
- camp planning is a comprehensive set of activities which should take into account of social, economic and infrastructure needs.

Drawing on a more radical methodologies which has now come to be termed Action Planning, (Koenigsberger 1964; Safier 1974; Baross 1991), Goethert and Hamdi (1988; 1989) promote the use of rapid appraisal and design methods. This approach emphasizes the principle that camps should have an inbuilt capacity to become fully fledged durable settlements in terms of layout, infrastructure, social facilities and so on. This principle determines a planning methodology which stresses the importance of: rapid information and data collection as the prerequisite to effective and speedy decision making; community participation as a central element of the design and development process; institutional coordination constituting the central planning task. This manual recognises that although the physical process ranks low in priority in the emergency phase compared with other priorities—food and medical provision, water supply etc.—it is of prime importance since it forecloses options available at the consolidation phase.

Synthesising their analysis focuses attention on a number of key methodological recommendations:

- durability (if not permanency) of physical structures should be an objective incorporated from the initial stages of the design and development process;
- mixed scanning to separate strategy from detail: such an approach would give field staff and refugees much greater autonomy, flexibility and discretion in development and design at the local level;
- an information base on planning procedures, technical characteristics of different layouts, house designs, materials components etc., is essential in the preparation and assessment of the performance of alternative options;
- refugee participation and self help capacity—better described as enablement—should be maximized: refugees know best—after all, most settle themselves—and so their practice should be closely observed (Clark 1987; Freres 1988);
- an integrated approach to planning for refugees and hosts should be pursued;
- the role and coordination of agencies in technical support must be clearly established.

A third approach provides the basis for the development of new methodologies is the MSF Operational Guide (various formats see MSF 1992). This breaks new ground. The merits lie, not so much in the technology—the scope is similar to the other manuals—but in the directness with which it challenges accepted practice. The objectives of this manual reinforce the need:

- to encourage a much firmer participatory and ‘humane’ approach to camp planning;
- to adopt non standard solutions to physical and project developments at the local, implementation level.

Here there is a real attempt to balance technical prescription and standard solutions with reasoned justifications for decisions and proposals which flow from local circumstances. Concrete suggestions are made for the involvement of refugees and for effective communication with them. The need for the non-standard solutions is firmly stressed—a point trenchantly made by Goovaerts
(1993) in his summary dismissal of pre-determined standards of costs, space requirements and layout.

3.3.2 Goals of the New Praxis and the Nature of the Planning Task

These findings and recommendations provide an agenda for a much more rigorous and comprehensive approach to camp planning. They indicate a fundamental revision of the goals of refugee camp planning and a wide ranging role to be played by planning, beyond the orthodox model of a technocratic tool kit mainly concerned with the application of predetermined standards and designing physical end-state master plans (Goovaerts 1993). The essence of the revised praxis lies in the proposition that camps should be planned and managed as durable structures; refugee enablement is a key objective. A number of goals derive from this challenging proposition.

- The planning process must aim to provide a comprehensive framework for developmental and environmental needs, including concepts of long term environmental sustainability; durability should be adopted as an objective at the outset of the planning cycle and used to guide a phased programme for the implementation of refugee camp construction.
- The appropriate planning methodologies and skills which are necessary involve not just physical design, but also expertise in social and demographic parameters and in a community based participatory approach to decision making and enablement which fully involve refugees.
- Planning should be conceived as a process of management as much as a set of physical and design activities. Innovative and effective measures for institutional co-ordination and project management systems. The essence of camp planning lies in tackling the complicated but key tasks of project and agency coordination—between different levels, agencies, actors and resource inputs. Many of the problems highlighted above can be attributed to the lack of effective coordination in policy formulation and implementation.
- Locational factors (considered in Chapter 5) should be a major determinant in policy formulation, since these have a crucial effect on the economic livelihood of the refugee population, their sense of integration and their impact on hosts.

In short, the planning of refugee camps involves both process and product. These goals or guiding principles, which are rarely if at all considered in a comprehensive way, are now examined in more detail.

Not surprisingly, these parameters are not new. Indeed, these requirements are already fully elaborated in different ways in at least three major UNHCR reports spanning the last decade and a half—Planning Rural Settlements for Refugees (UNHCR 1979); Lessons Learned Survey (dealing with Mozambican Refugees in the region) (UNHCR PTSS 89/39) and Refugees and the Environment (Gurman/UNHCR 1991). What is new is the synthesis of the proposals and recommendations into an integrated and coherent programme for the role which planning should play in developing settlements for refugees.

The adoption of a higher profile for planning processes would offer two fundamental improvements on current camp planning practices. First it would provide the mechanism for an integrated multi-sectoral approach to the provision of refugee assistance in camp situations, as opposed to the short term, project driven model at present in operation. This would embrace physical infrastructure, health care provision, social, community and economic needs, and environmental considerations. The effective deployment of physical planning and development principles would ensure the systematic provision of these basic attributes of refugee camps.
Second, planning is a tool for managing physical development—in this case the management and coordination of development investment, the agencies responsible for the investment, the timing and location of that investment. As evaluation mission after evaluation mission point out, the coordination, institution building and management of refugee settlement planning are fundamental but rarely filled roles (UNCHS 1994). The number of actors and agencies involved and the extremely diverse nature of their political interests, professional capabilities, and mandated fields of action, make coordination an essential activity in refugee settlement planning. Innovative organization structures, fully involving refugees, are needed to support effective coordination at all levels of the assistance programme. This also demands that, in addition to physical design/layout skills, due emphasis is given to the professional capability for managing the development of refugee settlements. The UNCHS project in rebuilding war damaged communities in Lebanon(1994) sets out a model approach to these requirements.

Planning, as a systemic management process, can enhance the coherence of decision making for the provision and development of refugee settlements. Effective planning should thus: ensure compatibility and complementarity of project inputs for physical and community infrastructure, for example; lead to more effective coordination of scarce resources; help to avoid duplication; and direct investment and resourcing to achieve longer term objectives. There are obvious practical benefits in terms of, for example: more orderly provision and development of scarce land resources; improved health conditions through coordinated infrastructure provision; more efficient use of scarce investment; greater capacity and flexibility for incorporating long term needs. By its nature the orientation of planning is developmental and long term; but in refugee situations it also provides important technical tools and a skills base to tackle short term, crisis needs. Of all the professional activities involved in refugee relief, it is perhaps the best equipped to bridge short term relief action with longer term policy making and implementation for developmental needs.

There are obvious practical constraints to implementing this model of planning; but there are also more problematic substantive and procedural limitations to its adoption. They lie at the heart of the ideology of the international refugee relief regime as presently constructed. First, it requires that the conventional approaches to needs assessment surveys are reformulated. At present the project and agency driven nature of needs assessments do not allow full weight to be given to the importance role which planning should play in the design and coordination of refugee camp development. Second, the year-by-year project budgeting which characterises most refugee assistance operations inevitably reinforces short term programming. This undermines the multi-year approach inherent in the planning cycle and the longer term developmental programming which is necessary for environmental policies and infrastructure investment. These constraints are reflected in the third and the central political dilemma of refugee assistance—who are actually the clients of the planning task in refugee situations? Are the objectives of the intervention emergency and short term or developmental and long term?
3.3.3 Key Policy Proposals for Best Practice

In practical terms these principles define an approach best described as planning for permanency but designing for flexibility and change. Translating these principles into practice emphasises a number of factors.

Infrastructure, Sites and Services. As Goovaerts (1993) points out, planning for permanency implies that initial investments in infrastructure (particularly water and sanitation) must be higher than normally obtain. On the other hand it is most likely that these costs would be recouped in lower recurrent costs in health care and system maintenance. In addition remedial investment in subsequent stages is also likely to be lower and thus upgrading easier to accomplish (see also UNHCR PTSS 89/39). What is suggested here is, in effect, the sites and services approach popular as a housing strategy for low income urban dwellers in the 1980s (discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.2.4).

Such an approach to infrastructure investment of course requires political commitment by governments and agencies to durability of camp development and self sustainability—the fundamental dilemma outlined at in the introduction to this study.

Replicating Spontaneous Housing Processes. Assessment of spontaneous settlements should more directly inform the design process of camps and the supporting role which should be played by professional and agency interventions. Indeed a key outcome in the UNHCR’s own Survey of Lessons Learnt [from the Mozambican Refugee Influxes in Southern Africa] states ‘At the beginning stages of an Emergency UNHCR should take a more active role in assessing some of the basic aspects of spontaneous settlement and site planning [shelter, access to water and sanitation, village patterns].’ (UNHCR PTSS 89/39:17).

Observation of self settled refugees can give clear indications of the cultural and spatial determinants by which refugees organise their own settlements patterns, the familiar construction technologies and the processes of upgrading and extension which characterise housing development. In Malawi, for example, these are in the form of dense clusters grouped around small open spaces, usually indistinguishable from and often integrated with host villages. In contrast, the planned camps are usually grid iron, despite all the evidence, including the UNHCR’s, which rejects this type of layout. This form is suitable for the rapid distribution of plots, but there is much evidence cited about the negative impacts from case studies in (e.g. Hardin 1987 and UNHCR/DMC 1987). Likewise in Cyprus, the formalised layout of the permanent refugee housing estates contrasts with the vernacular patterns of the small towns and villages from where the displaced came (Zetter 1987) and this has had inhibited processes of social cohesion within the developments. Oliver-Smith (1992) demonstrates how layout, in the case of post disaster rehousing, failed when it lacked the variety as well as the culturally constructed ritual spaces. Refugees needs are no different.

An analysis of spontaneous housing processes also underpins the drive to enhance community participation and self help practices in refugee camps—not just in housing construction but at all scales of camp planning and development. There is of course a balance to be struck between participation and the technical and resource constraints as Cuny points out (1987). But intervention
should be supportive of autonomous practices, rather than imposing bureaucratic solutions. These issues have been elaborated above (Chapter 2.4.3).

**Flexibility of Space Use.** Site layout should be based on the designation of land uses with a decentralised and clustered disposition of plots and shelter, with clearly designated and usable open space and with community uses incorporated into the layouts. Evidence of the social and physical suitability of this approach is noted in Managua for example (Hardin 1987). Public spaces should be flexibly designed for changing uses: reception centres can become schools and clinics, food distribution points can be converted to markets (UNHCR/DMC 1987). At the same time there should be flexible plot size standards to allow for expansion and upgrading of plots as uses and needs evolve—refugees have livestock, consumer goods and gardens: space must be designed to accommodate them (Oliver-Smith 1992:61).

These principles of camp and plot layout are briefly though effectively set out as a site development concept in a mission report dealing with Mozambican refugees in Swaziland (UNHCR PTSS 90/40). Soni (1994) also gives a coherent exposition of the principles of camp planning in the context of Burundian and Rwandan refugees in Tanzania.

**Site Selection.** At the local level site selection needs far more careful consideration. Few ideal sites ever exist. But in the case of refugee camp planning, political and pragmatic local factors often determine locations on the most marginal land. Most frequently used are criteria such as access to government owned land, preference for flat terrain which is easier and cheaper to develop. But these determinants for large numbers of refugee camps frequently prove to be problematic, for example in Turkey for displaced Kurdish refugees (UNHCR PTSS 91/05) and in Croatia and Bosnia (UNHCR PTSS 92/49N). They may lead to understandable resistance by refugees. Sites which are initially more complex to develop, but where the topography and the natural ecology could create variety in the layout, afford climatic protection and avoid erosion, are often ignored. The search for locally and regionally self sustainable sites is essential.

**Regional location.** Regional and locational determinants are a crucial consideration—there should be sufficient capacity within the local economic base to absorb the refugee settlement. These factors are examined with in section 5.

### 3.4 The Parallel Case—Informal Settlements in Cities of the Developing World

Extensive research, drawn from many cities in the developing world, describes processes of informal settlement consolidation and upgrading remarkably relevant to the situation of refugee camps (e.g. Turner 1967; Lloyd 1979; Angel et al. 1982; World Bank 1983; Davidson and Payne 1983; Skinner 1983, 1992; UNCHS 1987; UNCHS 1988; Payne 1982, 1984, 1989; World Bank 1992). Despite their structural and procedural limitations, these well tested processes of mass housing supply for the urban poor provide a technology for an enabling approach—an 'upgrading' or 'progressive development' model—which is replicable for refugee settlements. These experiences offer valuable insights into the processes
that might be facilitated to enhance the consolidation of spontaneously developed refugee settlements. Clearly there is not scope in this paper more than to sketch the main elements relevant to refugee situations.

Only one detailed study on urban informal housing processes for refugees/forcibly displaced has been located in the literature search—in Beirut (Souhail 1989). It mirrors surprisingly closely the literature on rapidly urbanising cities. Lacking organized emergency shelter, 50,000 people displaced from the division of the city squatted on vacant land or in empty properties. The advantages of supporting the displaced in situ and the economical use of existing infrastructure were noted. Government intervention to upgrade the infrastructure (water and sanitation) and provision of social services was assessed.

An initial step should be much closer collaboration and technical exchange between UNHCR and UNCHS (Habitat) Nairobi—the latter has highly developed information and documentation functions and the accumulated expertise of two decades. As a result of the Geneva Workshop in 1993 (UNHCR 1993), UNCHS/UNEP convened a further workshop reviewing the continuum from relief to development (UNHC/UNEP 1994). The intended focus of this initiative and the extent to which the essential relationship between the various IGOs will actually transpire, remains to be seen. It is not yet evident that the distinctively different needs and options in shelter provision as between refugee and disaster relief operations, have been fully appreciated (Goovaerts 1994).

There are of course very different expectations, operating conditions, implementing agencies and political frameworks as between refugee and ‘conventional’ settlement processes. And there are important contrasts between the urban setting of these experiences and the rural setting of many refugee camps and settlements. Nevertheless, evidence from the cities of the developing world confirms that many of the findings suggested so far in this and the preceding section of the study offer a body of valuable practice for refugee planning needs. The following elements form an outline of some of the main experiences that could be replicated in the upgrading and consolidation of refugee settlements:

- perceived (not necessarily formal) security of land occupancy is most fundamental to the success of upgrading programmes and is a vital trigger to self help consolidation processes; this would require major change in the responses of governments and agencies to the status of refugees (Chapter 2.4);
- where there is scope, opportunities should be taken to integrate some refugee settlements—possibly by infill processes—into larger urban areas and existing infrastructure provision; this might ensure better social integration and scale economies;
- upgrading of social, rather the physical infrastructure (i.e. community facilities schools, health centres etc.), is often the priority for the social groups in low income areas in the cities of the developing world; for refugee aspirations as well, therefore, this implies that technocratic assumptions about physical as opposed to social needs must be very carefully evaluated;
- upgrading works best where it designs and adapts to local technologies and materials and where it attends to issues of organizational efficiency and implementation bottlenecks; this may require support for and upgrading to local building production methods. Such approaches not only have a utilitarian function, in reducing costs and creating an easier to maintain environment; but also in terms they fulfil a social role by supporting the processes of community building and social adaptation; the replicability of these findings for refugee settlements has already been discussed above (Chapter 2.4);
- proposals must be affordable and sustainable in terms of life cycle costs. In refugee situations donors and agencies typically adopt emergency solutions to physical shelter needs and the
organization and implementation of camps and settlement programmes. All the evidence suggests that emergencies usually turn into protracted needs and short term savings create long term costs, hence the need for life cycle costing;

– performance indicators are preferable to prescribed building regulations and planning standards; this flexibility creates many more opportunities for low income groups to adapt and design their own, generally more affordable, solutions (Chapter 2.4);

– access to formal and informal funding sources and innovative funding methods are shown to be crucial in the consolidation of low income settlements; this suggests that options to diversify income sources and financial support for refugees to enhance their own shelter (and indeed other) initiatives could produce similar positive returns (Chapters 4.3 & 5.4);

– enhancing access to and provision of building materials and materials loans are often necessary to overcome shortfalls in settlement upgrading and consolidation. This experience confirms that the availability and provision of building materials must form part of preparedness and needs assessment surveys (Chapter 2.4). Acute shortfalls are characteristic of most situations of the mass influx of refugees;

– there is extensive technological expertise available on the provision of water and sanitation (the basic requirements for improving refugee settlements as well) both in upgrading and sites and services schemes; the sharing of this expertise with the range of professionals involved in refugee camp planning could produce significant improvements in planning methodology, technical solutions and cost savings;

– high levels and innovative methods of community participation and involvement of the beneficiaries at all stages of the design and development process are essential; this cannot be over-emphasised, but the uncertain status accorded refugees—both legally and as a (perceived) dependent social group—has severely limited the efficacy of most participatory decision making in refugee situations;

– there is a premium on institutional coordination, sustaining momentum of the programme and rapid implementation (Chapter 3.3.2).

These factors, and the technical experience which supports them, it is contended, would help to underpin the new praxis for refugee camp planning. They also indicate an agenda of factors that should become essential components of needs assessment surveys.
4. Retooling Planning Practice for Refugees—
Formal Sector Alternatives to Encampment

4.1 The Need for Alternatives

Although the ideas discussed in the previous section may lead to a more appropriate praxis for camp planning, it is perhaps a reflection of the resistance to planning for durable refugee settlement that there has been remarkably little innovation of spatial planning policies and options for the needs of refugees, beyond encampment. Yet there is now a conjuncture of factors which demand an urgent review of potential options and the investigation new approaches. Amongst the factors creating the impetus for a radical review are the following: the evident limitations of current shelter and settlement policies discussed in the previous sections; the enforced deployment of a variety of unorthodox responses to enormous displacement in the republics of former Yugoslavia; the evolving conditions of mass population movements in other parts of the eastern Europe—notably the former Soviet Union; and the need to address the growing pressures on and specialist needs of refugees for housing in resettlement countries in western Europe.

Whilst this section of the review is not exclusively confined to host countries in south-eastern and eastern Europe, the discussion and proposals are likely to be more relevant to these countries than those in the ‘south’ where rural to rural flows are more prevalent.

The countries and regions of Europe now experiencing mass influxes of refugees confront conditions which contrast substantially with the experience gained in refugee shelter provision and settlement planning in the ‘south’ during the last two decades or so. There are significant social, economic and institutional variations between these regions, of course. Nevertheless, a set of generic conditions also obtains which, taken together, governs the scope and options for shelter and settlement provision to a far higher degree than has been the case in the ‘south’. These include, depending on the case, some or all of the following factors:

- generally higher levels of urbanisation with the implications this has for housing standards, building technologies and production methods, land availability, locational options;
- urban-industrial economies (albeit small scale in some cases), and thus a higher proportion of the host and, potentially, the refugee population in the urban sector, with implications for survival strategies, employment options, locational decisions, construction technologies and contracting activity;
- the existence (if not the operation) of planning institutions, plans and codes of control over land use and development which are likely to govern standards and locations for refugee shelter provision as well as providing the instruments for the potential coordination and implementation of such strategies;
existing or emerging proprietorial interests in land and thus more complex legal and procedural conditions governing acquisition of land and access to land supply;
the availability of public and other institutional buildings or ‘collective centres’ (e.g. schools, army camps, summer camps, hotel buildings), which can be used for emergency and potentially for longer term needs;
significant climatic extremes which require more durable physical structures and more complex building technologies;
populations with the experience of and expectations governed by relatively high standards and sophisticated methods of housing provision prior to refugeehood.

These factors create major constraints and limit the flexibility that refugee relief and assistance agencies have traditionally had in determining refugee settlement plans in the developing world. But they also offer many positive opportunities. Innovative planning responses and new approaches to policy making can be adopted. Existing practices can be enhanced and refined to meet the radically different needs of refugees.

There is limited experience to build on as Rogge emphasizes (1985), certainly in terms of urban-based responses to refugee shelter and settlement needs (see also Conner 1989). The examples most closely related to present conditions in eastern and southern Europe are perhaps to be found in: Greece, after 1922, where quite large numbers of refugees were eventually absorbed in the urban sector (see for example Hirschon 1988; Kafkoula 1993; Marrus 1985); in Greece with the return of the Pontic Greeks (Journal of Refugee Studies 1991); and in Cyprus after 1974, characterised by a number of planning innovations in both urban and rural locations (Zetter 1987; 1991; 1992). In all three cases, deriving from what would now be called ethnic cleansing, the absorption of refugees and forcibly displaced people by hosts with ethnic affinities, is of particular relevance to the situation likely to characterise much of the rest of this decade in southern and eastern Europe.

4.2 Innovative Planning Tools for Durable Solutions

4.2.1 Reusing the Built Environment

One consequence of the changing political and social conditions which have accompanied the recent mass population movements in southern and eastern Europe, is the sudden availability of quite substantial numbers of empty buildings which can potentially be used to accommodate the incoming refugees. Some of the more obvious examples are redundant army camps and barracks, hotels empty as a result of the collapse of tourism industry, hostels and community centres which can be redeployed as transit centres and emergency accommodation. More suitable is the often large number of vacated houses where forcible population transfers (‘ethnic cleansing’) which has taken place. Sometimes the occupation of these vacant premises is ‘illegal’: at other times it is more organised. In either case the use of existing buildings and, more specifically, the primary infrastructure, offers faster and often cheaper means of responding to shelter needs. For example, UNHCR has established a cost ceiling of $500pc for remedial action to accommodate refugees in collective centres in former Yugoslavia. This is half the allocation for new shelter provision (UNHCR PTSS 92/53), itself surely an unrealistically low figure in the circumstances.
Certainly as part of the overall stock taking of emergency shelter needs as well as for the considering longer term housing options, a systematic review and assessment of the capacity of the existing stock and its potential to be renovated or adapted for longer term shelter supply is essential. There is evidence, in former Yugoslavia, that a systematic approach to managing the supply of vacant premises is now superseding the ad hoc and short term use of institutional buildings (UNHCR PTSS 92/53).

Whilst institutional buildings provide an important component of short term supply clearly it is purpose-built housing which affords the most suitable stock for long term requirements. One of the most highly developed examples of this response is in Cyprus. The invasion of Cyprus in 1974 by Turkey has resulted in the internal displacement of nearly 40% of the population—250,000 people—into two separate ethnic communities—Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. As the post-invasion crisis evolved into protracted separation (now two decades), both communities faced a housing emergency.

A large number of the more than 7000 housing units, vacated by Turkish Cypriots in the process of reverse forced migration, were gradually occupied by the Greek-Cypriots displaced from the north (Zetter 1987: 1992; Kliot and Mansfeld 1994). The Government institutionalised this process by establishing a sophisticated registration system of all the properties. Temporary occupancy licences were granted to regularise the situation and to ensure the inalienable rights of the Turkish Cypriot owners should they return. Considerable rehabilitation of the properties has subsequently taken place, funded by grants and loans from the government and by the householders themselves. This initiative accounts for about 15% of the total housing provision for the displaced Greek-Cypriots—of an aggregate programme of some 47,000 units (Chapter 6).

On the Turkish Cypriot side a similar process of occupation and rehabilitation took place. Given the vastly different numbers involved in the transfer of populations (200,000 Greek Cypriots as opposed to about 50,000 Turkish Cypriots), and thus the large surplus of vacant housing stock ‘available’ for the displaced Turkish Cypriots, there was far less pressure to adopt emergency solutions. The rehousing process was conducted more systematically with well developed administrative procedures (Morvaridi 1993: Kliot and Mansfeld 1994). Uprooted villagers were often resettled in their original groups. Housing (and land) was allocated on the basis of family size and a points system in order to compensate the loss of immovable property from the south.

The reuse policy was developed by both communities independently of each other. There was no political ‘collaboration’ mediated between them to achieve these similar outcomes. Ironically, it was on the presumption that properties were being temporarily vacated, that some of the households made spontaneous arrangements for the occupation of their houses.

From this well developed example of the reuse of existing stock to rehouse forcibly displaced populations, at least four principle benefits can be identified:

- on economic grounds alone it represents an effective utilisation of otherwise idle investment;
- in the early years of the crisis, the occupancy of these houses provided an important safety valve, especially on the Greek-Cypriot side, against enormous supply side shortfalls;
- a substantial number of the forcibly displaced have been rehoused in existing communities; by assisting the integration process this is a socially preferable alternative; and it allowed the displaced people to be more closely linked into employment and agricultural opportunities, than is usually the case for refugees;
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- on the Greek-Cypriot side, the occupation of Turkish-Cypriot housing in some of the less developed parts of the island, has been coordinated with investment in rural economic development which has resulted in accelerated commercial farming potential and, more recently, small scale tourism. This is an excellent example of a developmental approach to refugee needs.

The replication of these policies—particularly the reuse of vacated housing—is contingent on similar conditions to the Cyprus case: that is where countries are the recipients and donors of ‘forcibly exchanged’ populations or, in the parallel situation, where internal forced displacement takes place to consolidate ethnic identity. With necessary modifications to reflect prevailing practice with regard to land ownership laws and locally determined processes for allocation, these policies could achieve similarly positive benefits. Indeed there is media evidence that this is occurring widely now in the republics of former Yugoslavia. Potentially the ‘re-use’ policy could be extended to include not only property (housing and land) vacated by refugees involved in reverse movements, but as an appropriate intervention to exploit areas where rural depopulation may have taken place: one such proposal has been made for northern Slovenia (Elliot 1993). Again this would be an efficient utilisation of idle investment or under-utilised resources, especially if integrated into regional plans and linked into donor supported projects for refugees and hosts.

Conversely, it is the political and institutional implications of formalizing a reuse policy which constitute the major constraint to replication, in the sense that its implementation in Cyprus conveys a powerful impression of permanency. This is especially the case in the legal forms of occupancy adopted by the Turkish Cypriot administration, but also given the de facto outcomes of the process for the Greek Cypriots. Whether other refugee communities and their hosts and host governments would be prepared to accept the message of permanent population displacement and territorial exchange which these policies convey, is questionable. Indeed the diplomatic stance of the Turkish Cypriot side is that displacement is a permanent feature of the island. By contrast the diplomatic stance of the Greek Cypriots considers the displacement to be temporary, despite the powerful physical symbols of permanency. Whatever the contentions of the two sides about permanency or temporariness, there is a crucial principle which underpins the response of both communities: both have accepted the compatibility of the relief and development models of refugee assistance. Certainly in the Cyprus case the policies of the two sides, at least as implemented, are clearly developmental.

This bears on a related practical issues. The Cyprus experience also indicates the detailed consideration which needs to be given to the institutional, legal and financial components to implement such a policy. This includes, for example: the forms of title—permanent or temporary? tradeable or non-tradeable asset?; the administrative structures and rules to allocate housing—housing as compensation or social need?; social criteria—grouping of villages or allocation on needs basis?; finance—who pays, donors or host country? what are the implications for financing housing programmes for domestic needs? what happens to the investment on repatriation?

Policies, like these in Cyprus, for the reuse of housing imply not only permanency, but also an apparent sanctioning of population transfer by ethnic cleansing—in effect encouraging countries to expel minority populations. Accordingly, given the extreme political sensitivities of these circumstances, re-occu-
pation of vacant housing stock can be a valuable, but only an ex post facto and pragmatic, response to refugee expulsions and influxes. Even so, both the reuse of collective centres and the reoccupation of vacated housing should not be neglected as a part of the comprehensive assessment of planning policies for shelter provision.

4.2.2 Expanding the Rental Sector

The rental sector constitutes a source of housing provision for refugees in some countries and is thus needs to be examined as another component of refugee shelter policies. For reasons discussed below, its role is likely to be more limited than the reuse of vacant housing stock. Conventionally it is assumed that rental housing serves short term needs as a safety value against acute demand-led shortfalls which refugee influxes generate—for example in Cyprus (Zetter 1987) and Slovenia (Elliot 1993; Klemecic Kozul 1993). But there is circumstantial evidence to show that this sector serves long term refugee needs as well—not just in resettlement countries in Western Europe and North America but in conventional receiving countries. Thus, in assessing the impacts of refugees on the host economies, several studies examine the impact which refugee influxes have on the rental housing markets from the point of view of consumers, notably in the urban sector—for example in Sudan (Kuhlman et al., 1987) and Pakistan (Ashraf 1988; Conner 1989). Supply shortages are intensified and thus rental increases levels increase in the short term; but stability returns in the longer term as the market responds to new demand levels.

Policy initiatives to enhance the role of the rental sector are probably more relevant in more urbanised host countries or in countries which, although less urbanised, host quite large numbers of urban refugees, as was the case in the Sudan. Hence, stimulating the rental housing sector and enhancing refugee access to it, was proposed for refugees in the Sudan (Post 1985; Rogge 1990b), although no further information is available on whether this was successfully implemented. Goovaerts (1993) also advocates this as a way of widening shelter options in the republics of former-Yugoslavia.

It can be hypothesised that if a rental housing market for refugees and forcibly displaced populations were to be stimulated as part of a comprehensive shelter programme, this might encourage urban based developers and landowners to build small and medium scale projects, or to improve or convert existing properties and under-utilised stock. At the same time this increase in housing supply could make a real contribution to reducing the burden on households sharing grossly overcrowded accommodation: this is certainly the case in former Yugoslavia. For refugees there are the benefits of incorporation into existing communities and better access to job markets. These initiatives are contingent on the existence of private property interests and contracting capability; in eastern Europe these preconditions are only gradually becoming available and thus there is limited potential to deliver rental housing at present.

In practice, the political and institutional constraints attached to the reuse of housing stock for forcibly displaced populations discussed above, also apply to the expansion of the rental sector—short term or permanent response? emergency relief or developmental policy? To the extent that a rental housing policy is rather more developmental in its impact than a reuse programme, issues of finance and tenure are likely to be pre-eminent and the scope for implementa-
tion primarily determined by the policies of donors and assistance agencies. Would these agencies be willing to fund projects where the refugees are not the direct beneficiaries? What form would project assistance take—rent support, investment guarantees or developer subsidies?

Also to be considered are how the long term uncertainties of this rather ‘specialised’ demand would condition the behaviour of landlords. Rent and tenancy controls would need revision and the tenurial rights of refugees would need protecting. Further, how durable is the investment if repatriation were to take place? Issues of finance are considered in more detail below (section 4.3).

In addition, as the evidence from receiving countries in western Europe shows, competition between refugees and hosts for scarce resources like housing can lead to ethnic and community tension. Thus questions of equity and compatibility with entitlements available for the domestic housing market—especially in rental welfare housing provision—become much more significant than in the case of reusing vacant housing.

In western European countries and north America, on the other hand, where there are proportionately smaller numbers of asylum seekers and resettled refugees, some countries—especially the Nordics—have an impressive record in providing subsidised housing. In other countries, in Britain for example, where the provision of social housing for rental has always been a vital element in assisting refugees in the settlement process, new initiatives are evident to review the role of this sector (Housing Corporation UK 1994).

These experiences indicate important areas of policy development. First, the rental housing sector is a crucial resource for refugees in the initial stages of resettlement in advanced economies. It offers more flexibility to refugees than owner occupation does not in the short and medium term. Second, refugees are likely to be a vulnerable and exploited group in the competitive housing markets, as in other sectors, of their resettlement countries (Cohen and Joly 1989; Majke 1991; Joly et al., 1992; Marret 1993; Robinson 1993). This is increasingly the case where restrictionist policies are limiting access both to conventional public housing stock and to employment and thus the capacity to pay open market rents. As a result, the need for a coherent policy which addresses rental housing provision for refugees is evidently more pressing.

4.2.3 Planning Codes and Standards

Retooling current planning practice also involves examination and review of existing planning codes and standards especially for the private sector of the housing market. In Greece, for example, the Asia Minor refugees in Athens have displayed a prodigious ability to partition and subdivide houses over a 50 year period, largely to retain the cultural norms of the dowry house (Hirschon 1988). In Cyprus, the displaced have extended houses built for them by the government and established informal sector businesses, despite the prohibition of planning policies (Zetter 1987; 1991). The self build housing schemes also demonstrate a high propensity for property extension. Densification is leading to overdevelopment and the contravention of building and planning regulations with implications for environmental standards for light, air, noise etc., vis a vis neighbouring property. In Sudan, refugees increased their toe hold in urban housing by consolidating their shacks thereby ‘becoming fully urbanized’ (Rogge 1990b:21, 1990; Post 1985), although still living in squalid conditions. In
Slovenia extensive multiple occupation and extended family occupation of property has taking place to accommodate mainly Bosnian refugees. There is now anecdotal evidence of similar processes of conversion and adaptation taking place (Klemecic Kozul 1993).

It appears from these examples that refugees, like their migrant counterparts the urban squatters of the developing world, display remarkable capacity to adapt and extend dwellings and diversify the uses of them. These examples evidence the demand pressures from migrants and refugees, even under conditions of exceptional constraint. They demonstrate the important conclusion that building codes and planning standards—densities, acceptable diversification of uses and, above all, attitudes to physical extension and adaptation—must be carefully and thoroughly reviewed in the context of refugee demand.

Revision to the codes and standards poses a dilemma for policy makers—the classic dilemma experienced in all planning systems. To accommodate the pressure of rapidly increased demand by refugees, one response is to reduce standards or at least ignore the ‘illegal’ sub-market activities of subdivision, multiple occupation and extension. This would allow housing supply to increase and, by avoiding the imposed costs incurred by current standards, would help to limit the impact, on both refugees and hosts, which increased demand places on land costs, rental levels and so on. On the other hand, there is a long term price to pay in terms of degraded built and natural environments and their impact on the physical and social well-being of refugees and their hosts. This is an argument for holding standards or at least to evaluate carefully the long term consequences of not doing so.

Much will depend on the professional and administrative capacity to enforce a given set of standards. In practice, most host countries are likely to adopt pragmatic responses to this issue in the development of their shelter strategy. This is not to advocate the short term expedient: merely to acknowledge that under the extreme pressures of refugee influxes, standards may inevitably be driven down. Given the likelihood of long term occupancy, there are, as we have seen (Chapter 3.4), well developed methodologies to handle the upgrading of substandard environments if this eventually becomes necessary.

Several benefits are, nonetheless, to be anticipated from a careful revision of codes and standards:

- the possibility of substantially expanding the capacity of the existing stock or in reducing in overcrowding;
- an increase in capacity of stock at much lower cost than could be achieved by conventional public sector provision;
- the investment stimulus and likely multiplier effect in the local economy for small contracting enterprises, artisanal builders and the building materials industry;
- assisting the process of refugee integration.

4.2.4 Sites and Services

During the last decade, one of the most significant methods of providing affordable shelter to the low income urban dwellers in the cities in the developing world has been the sites and services approach; the World Bank was a keen advocate and a principal donor (Payne 1984; World Bank 1992). These schemes provide low cost serviced plots (to varying levels of provision, but with minimum guaranteed standards) to beneficiaries who then self-build shelter: the process, in effect, institutionalises the informal housing mechanisms familiar in
low income group informal settlements (Chapters 2.4, 3.3.3, 3.4). The projects can be upgraded in time, with increased or improved services when these can be afforded by the beneficiaries. Public intervention is not always required. In the command economies of eastern Europe the process was mostly related to illegal housing construction because of shortfalls in state provision. In Turkey the widespread growth of the gecekondu illustrate a well developed sub-market version (Payne 1982; 1989), as indeed is the case in much of Latin America (Gilbert et al. 1985).

With the preference for ‘enabling’—i.e. market-led—methods of housing provision, public sector-led approaches, like sites and services, are now less favoured (World Bank 1992). Nevertheless, they offer potentially valuable component of refugee housing provision in some situations.

Experience suggests that the crucial elements in the success of this policy are: land availability, plot and housing construction standards which are affordable by the beneficiaries, control over administrative costs, effective financing methods for the beneficiaries (Zetter 1985). Of course it requires the supply of land—usually though not always through public sector procedures—and this is undoubtedly problematic. These conditions apply equally to the refugee situation. Many of the implications of this approach—tenure security, standards and affordability, major changes in policy with regard to the long term status of refugees in host countries—and the way they might be resolved have been discussed in various parts of this review; funding issues are considered below.

A sites and services approach has been extensively used in Cyprus, where over 11,000 plots have been developed by individual households on government serviced land and 12,000 on privately owned plots (Zetter 1987; 1992). Low interest loans and grants were made available according to means tests, and the displaced families were required to build according to approved plans. These have been extensively ‘customised’ and it is evident that levels of investment are substantially higher than the official grant/loan. The sizes of the projects vary from over 1000 plots adjacent to urban areas to quite small developments of 20 or 30 units on rural locations.

The programme capitalises on the strong cultural traditions of self build in the island—a potential unlocked in novel circumstances—and introduced, ironically, when more institutionalised forms for housing the refugees proved totally inadequate to cope with the demand. The advantages of self help processes have already been discussed (Chapter 2.5): as a developmental response to protracted displacement it has much to commend in social and economic terms (see Chapter 6). Significantly, there is little variation in the commitment to repatriation amongst the displaced Greek Cypriots between this form of housing and other modes, even after 20 years of exile (Zetter 1993).

This approach to mass housing offers a model which could be replicated in other countries, with modifications made to accommodate local economic and social conditions and construction technologies. The need is hinted at in former Yugoslavia, as a means of optimising the use of scarce and valuable land on the urban periphery and in order to avoid the risk of creating permanent sub-standard housing areas (UNHCR PTSS 92/53). Although not yet reviewed in published documents, a sites and services approach is being used in Croatia, with capacity for 12,500 people to date (UNHCR 1993a). Access is available to refugees and the internally displaced. The infrastructure is permanent but
dwelling units are prefabricated. It is reported that gardens are being established and the dwelling units and plots are assuming individual identity—these were the initial indicators of permanency in Cyprus. The programme is principally funded by external donors and unfortunately contains a high level of imported capital and professional expertise.

4.3 Financing Housing Initiatives

The essence of all these initiatives is that they extend the options and improve the quality and quantity of residential provision for refugees. As Goovaerts (1993) points out, it is generally the lower income group hosts who incur the financial and physical burdens of sheltering refugees, and who experience the tensions which arise when resources become overstretched. If handled with political sensitivity, extending the shelter options for refugees should also help, therefore, to mitigate some of the pressures on domestic housing markets for the hosts. Moreover if refugees repatriate, the hosts will also be the beneficiaries of developmental investment.

These proposals however are contingent on fundamental changes to the funding policies of donors, assistance agencies and governments, especially in countries where there are well developed housing investment processes (either market or state provision) and production systems. The following factors comprise a minimum agenda that will need to be addressed.

Host governments may need to use fiscal tools to stimulate adjustments to the savings and lending policies of housing finance and banking institutions. Such adjustments might, for example, include preferential interest rates and other credit schemes for housing investment to assist small scale residential development processes. These interventions are vital in stimulating the self build initiative and can enhance building materials production and small-scale contractor activity. It is interesting to note that a recommendation for building materials credit for housing construction was made for Burundi returnees (Neumann 1994). There might also be a case for investment grants as well as loans.

The Cyprus experience is a case in point. The government sanctioned reductions in bank liquidity rates which directed investment into the housing sector after 1974, together with preferential tax policies for the capital rebuilding of the construction industry. These were significant elements in stimulating the sector’s recovery from near total destruction, and the mobilisation of the housing programme for the displaced (Chapter 6). These policy initiatives can apply as much to low income group households of the host population as to refugees. They are indicative of the wide-ranging nature of housing policy review which is essential to tackle the severe pressures on conventional housing market processes caused by mass population influxes.

Changes in landlord and tenant and rent control legislation, to protect refugees from exploitation, might also be necessary. New types of short term leasehold may need to be established.

Rather more problematic is the challenge which these initiatives pose to the current assistance policies and priorities of donors and NGOs. Assistance of the kind being proposed in this study—which is largely developmental as opposed to emergency, and is based on equity for hosts and refugees, as opposed to differentiation and selectivity—will require major reshaping of donor' assis-
tance policies. Encouraging the physical extension of houses, stimulating rental housing provision and rent support mechanisms, and providing substantial long term investment in durable housing are certainly unconventional options at present. But these should all be examined as ways of diversifying supply in the emergency and post emergency phases. They are likely to be much more responsive and more speedily mobilised than conventional institutionalised responses.

The economics of housing market conditions will vary in each country and will probably differ between localities within the same country. These variations will need to be investigated in each case. But the opportunity cost of aid invested in the domestic housing market is likely to be rather more attractive than for conventional shelter and settlement strategies for refugees. In addition there are significant social benefits and economic multipliers.

4.4 Planning as Promotion

In earlier Chapters (2.4 and 3.3), we have defined the main parameters of a planning model for refugee situations at the micro and camp level. The managerial and coordinating functions of planning processes were stressed together with a conceptualisation which emphasised planning intervention as an enabling activity responding to the skills and resources of the communities it served and supporting their needs. Planning objectives and policies which recognised the durability of camps as a settlement form were considered essential.

These are the widely recognised characteristics of comprehensive land use planning which are rarely deployed in the context of refugees. They define a model of planning which applies equally to the modes of intervention discussed in this chapter. The experience of refugee settlement planning described in this chapter enables us to elaborate further this model of planning and an appropriate praxis based on it.

Effective land use planning and development policies, set within a spatial framework, are essential tools to tackle the barriers to and impacts of refugees in the areas of employment, land access and innovative shelter development options which this chapter has identified. Physical/spatial plans provide one framework within which the developmental opportunities and constraints which refugees create for the host country can be evaluated and incorporated. At the same time this reinforces the need for a longer term perspective which integrates both refugee assistance and host country development objectives.

Making plans involves a number of processes: two are particularly salient to refugee situations. First, it requires the application of a coordinated assessment of the conflicting interests in the use and development of land. Second, it provides the methodologies to conduct systematic decision making in order to mediate these competing interests, to allocate scarce resources and to maximise development opportunities.

Conventionally, the choice of settlement locations and the other forms of intervention in shelter provision by host governments and agencies are pragmatic and ad hoc; this leads to sporadic and unsatisfactory settlement patterns—unsatisfactory for refugees and hosts—poorly coordinated investment programmes and projects, inefficient and inaccessible locations. However, an effectively planned and coordinated approach to the locational distribution
of refugee settlements (camps, new housing, sites and services schemes, reuse of the built environment) provides several potential advantages, for hosts and refugees.

First a well conceived spatial framework enables donors and agencies to make complex allocative decisions on projects and programmes within a broader context which embraces both refugees and hosts. Scale economies in infrastructure and public service investment could be achieved and refugee and host communities might be more efficiently served by considering their needs in a coordinated way. Second host governments would have a clearer framework for managing, programming and implementing assistance programmes—particularly the locational distribution of refugee settlements and their integration into the mainstream of spatial planning policies for the hosts. Third, the large scale environmental impacts which inevitably accompany mass refugee influxes could be more clearly anticipated and policies prepared to ameliorate them.

Taken together, the benefits of more rational decision making about refugee settlement would also ensure that the competing interests of refugees and hosts for environmental resources, physical and social infrastructure and employment could be evaluated and some attempts made to mediation them. In this way, the transition from emergency aid to developmental planning would be facilitated; but it requires a longer term perspective which integrates policy making for refugees with hosts.

A planned response is imperative in the more urbanised setting in southern and eastern and south-eastern Europe where there are substantial pressures on land supply and urban services. Refugee influxes should trigger a rapid review of plans for the urban areas—where these exist—so that provision for refugees and their needs are incorporated into the comprehensive plans for the impacted localities. Linking new residential areas (e.g. sites and services schemes for refugees) to land allocated for employment uses is one obvious proposal. The development of new, or the more efficient use of existing, infrastructure should be considered in the locational decisions which have to made. Thus in Cyprus again, ‘refugee’ housing estates were located on the urban periphery with precisely these intentions. They are now incorporated into the urban fabric, as the towns have expanded (Zetter 1987) and planning ‘gain’ has been achieved; for example, peripheral distributor roads have been created from the piecemeal construction of sections within each estate. The displaced Greek Cypriots have been integrated into the urban sector with positive economic outcomes at household and macro-economic levels. Again these are excellent examples of a developmental approach benefiting both the displaced and their hosts through coordinated land use planning.

Regrettably, few countries hosting refugees have adequate planning tools for existing needs and what capacity exists is strained by the additional pressures which refugees create. There are only occasional examples of ad hoc planning exercises—usually for selecting sites for camps, for example in Turkey (e.g. UNHCR PTSS 91/10) and in Bosnia and Croatia (UNHCR PTSS 92/49N). Very rarely do they link to more comprehensive planning processes, for example the preparation or revision of a spatial planning strategy (see e.g. UNHCR PTSS 91/02 on planning in Syria after the Gulf crisis).

Despite the limiting conditions in most developing countries, consideration
must be given to the systematic preparation of land use plans and co-ordinated decision making and investment implementation. It is crucial that existing in-country planning capacity—professional capability, institutional structures—is not bypassed. Too often the usual response is to conduct a multi-agency needs assessment survey to clarify capabilities, responsibilities and ad hoc commitments which ignores in-country planning systems and structures.

Despite the fact that the planning systems of developing countries are invariably have limited—conventionally their land use plans methodologies are bureaucratic and cumbersome—they provide the best opportunity for coordinating the land use and settlement impacts of refugees with their hosts. Moreover, many developing countries are familiar with innovative and action oriented planning methodologies such as ‘rapid appraisal’, ‘action planning’ and mixed scanning methods which separate strategy from detail. These are valuable tools to tackle emergency situations. They can: provide base line data on land use and environmental conditions; sieve potential development locations; identify existing infrastructure provision; generate a schematic outline of options, development proposals and plans of action; and assess the resource and institutional capacities for implementation. They can provide a much needed framework within which QIPs can be evaluated. These forms of plan making and implementation process could enhance the institutional capability of the host country to handle refugee planning. The most positive consequence would be to redirect the thinking of governments, donors and agencies away from project driven and short term interventions towards developmental strategies for refugees and hosts.
5. Planning by Refugees—Regional Parameters and the Lessons from Spontaneous Settlement

5.1 Introduction to the Regional Context

Camps and similar forms of institutionalised provision accommodate relatively small numbers of refugees—e.g. 50% in Zimbabwe (Zetter 1992a), 40% in Malawi (Government of Malawi 1990), 20% of Eritreans in Sudan (Kok 1989), 5% in Slovenia (Elliot 1993), and less than 50% in Croatia (Harrell-Bond 1993)—the majority of the world’s refugees either prefer or have no other choice but to self settle.

From the refugees’ perspective, location of settlement is the vital factor in their livelihood and survival strategies and the chances of integration within the local economy (for example, Government of Malawi 1988; Wilson et al. 1989; Ager 1990; Zetter 1992). Equally, locational factors are crucial for host countries. The unconstrained mass movements of refugees or policies of encampment tend to concentrate high densities of population in specific locations and this often produces dramatic impacts on the already fragile environments and economies of host countries. These factors make imperative the need to consider refugee settlement policy within a broader planning frame (UNHCR 1992). But few host countries, especially in the developing world, have well articulated regional planning policies or guidance. As a result, the attempts to consolidate and regroup settlements, usually after the emergency phases, take place in an ad hoc manner (Soni 1994).

Whilst these conditions are widely acknowledged, it is remarkable that all but one of the site planning manuals previously cited—the exception being Goethert and Hamdi (1988, 1989)—fail to mention regional locational factors in the planned settlement of refugees. This is perhaps not altogether surprising given that locational choices are severely constrained. The UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies (1982), for example, deals entirely with site specific requirements but not the regional or sub-regional context.

As the foregoing comments suggest, the regional dimension of refugee settlement planning cannot be left to chance. There is an extensive agenda for action. This emerges from a small but increasing volume of empirical research which examines the economic relationships between refugee settlements (whether spontaneous or planned) and their surrounding areas. These studies, drawn on in this section of the review, demonstrate just how significant location considerations are to the refugees and their hosts.
5.2 Self-settled Refugees and the Regional Context

5.2.1 The Impact of Refugees

One of the most comprehensive of several studies carried out in this context in the last decade, was conducted amongst the Eritrean refugees (some 75% of whom were self settled) in Kassala, Eastern Sudan (variously reported e.g. Wijbrandi 1986; Kuhlman et al. 1987; Kok 1989). The importance of this research to the present context is that, amongst other objectives, it attempts to analyse the impacts of refugees on their hosts specifically within a regional framework. The main findings of this study show that despite both severe environmental degradation (only partially the result of the influx of refugees) and also the constraints on refugee economic activity, the congeniality of the host area led to high levels of social integration and broadly similar levels of economic status as between hosts and refugees. Eritrean refugees consumed scarce resources (notably water) but at significantly lower levels than their hosts. There was crowding out in local labour markets but, conversely, refugee labour and demand had stimulated a large expansion of some agricultural sectors, notably horticulture. Some of these findings are contested by Bascom (1989) in a smaller study in a village setting on the Sudan-Eritrea border, changing market conditions for export crops led to the marginalisation and exploitation of many small scale refugee (and poorer host) farmers as they were dispossessed of land by commercial farmers. This led to rapid downward economic mobility, after the refugees had enjoyed many years of hospitality and satisfactory arrangements for using land.

Urban refugees in Kassala town, according to the main studies, had integrated into the local labour market of the burgeoning economy of the city—paradoxically partly the result of the assistance programme to service their needs (see also Post 1985). There appeared to be only a weak pattern of spatial clustering of refugees: instead the main factors determining spatial distribution were rent levels and the availability of property. These urban refugees displayed clear evidence of permanency in the settlement (University of Khartoum 1986). However, consistent with findings elsewhere (e.g. in Pakistan (Ashraf 1988)), the refugees were generally to be found in lower socio-economic status employment than their hosts.

Overall, the refugees and hosts were coping and well integrated until the onset of drought which brought about the collapse of the regional economy when both groups suffered equally. At the time of the study the regional capacity to absorb more migrants was assessed to have reached its limit. Although the spontaneously settled refugees had made positive contributions, it was concluded that their overall impact had negative consequences for the region. But as Kok observes, the same ‘applies to the refugees in organized settlements, but in this case their cost to the Sudanese and the international community, has so far been much greater’ (Kok 1989:439). Kok advocates, in retrospect, regional solutions to overcome the adverse regional consequences.

Empirical findings that refugees can stimulate a local economy are elaborated by a number of other field studies—in Pakistan (Ashraf 1988), Malawi (Wilson et al. 1989), Zambia (Hansen 1990), Southern Sudan (Harrell-Bond 1990), and Mexico and Honduras (Hansch 1992). In all these cases the researchers show that the characteristics of the regional setting are one of the most significant determinants of refugees’ survival strategies—whether
Self settlement is shown to be the more beneficial for the refugees in terms of social well-being, although not necessarily in economic terms: these, of course, were not the refugees receiving assistance.

Wilson et al. (1989) show how an essential input for the survival strategies of Mozambican refugee households in Malawi derived from access to wage and bartered employment on smallholder and commercial farms. In addition, piece work and petty trading in the hinterland surrounding the settlements, as well as extensive trading of food aid, all contributed to household incomes. Refugees and their Malawian hosts had developed many innovative niches for income generation.

Significant regional variations occurred and wage rates were found to vary by a factor of two between some districts. This is explained by variations in the ecological capacity of localities and the agro-ecological potential of settlement hinterlands—since refugees relied heavily on natural resources to meet their basic needs. These factors were not only crucial to their survival but also in relation to the environmental impacts they created (Wilson 1992). Agricultural expansion increased (as in Sudan (Kok 1989)) and this intensification was reinforced through refugee employment. In some areas refugees displaced locals in the labour market, or their economic activation was caused by the commoditisation of previously unmarketed goods. Ager’s study (1990), also in Malawi, makes the additional point that women seemed far more integrated into local economic activity in self settled locations than in camps, where men tended to dominate the economic opportunities.

In contrast to the more densely populated self settled areas, Wilson’s study shows that in more isolated areas, the economic well-being of refugees tended to be constrained. The refugees could not sell their food or labour so easily, because local markets were small and saturated, and essential consumer goods, having to bear the high costs of transport to more remote locations, were relatively expensive.

Ashraf’s examination of the impact of self settled Afghan refugees in Peshawar (1988) is especially significant in the context of this review because it gives detailed consideration to the issue of housing. It was found that shortage of property led, not surprisingly, to escalating rents and inequitable leasing conditions. Refugees adopted strategies to minimise costs, such as leasing property in groups and seeking accommodation in the villages away from the larger urban settlements. A building boom and, interestingly, a process of out-migration by local residents were identified, as they sought to capitalise on fast rising property values by leasing or selling to refugees. These impacts were noted at all settlement levels: even in villages, accommodation previously offered as a gesture of hospitality became commodified. More generally though, the refugees achieved relatively high levels of social and economic integration, despite the pressure on urban services. As in Malawi, refugees engaged in new services, mobilised hitherto unexploited sectors of the economy and appear to have prospered despite, or perhaps because of, the underdeveloped economic status of the region. However, the study’s findings also show that the lower economic echelons of the host community suffered from the increasing compe-
tion for resources—notably housing—and access to unskilled labour markets where they were displaced by the refugees.

5.2.2 The Implications for Policy and Practice

Different timescales, data sets and methodologies make it difficult to draw general conclusions from the particular instances of these case studies. They all give evidence of negative outcomes, of course: these are to be expected amongst the populations and regions of host countries existing, for the most part, at the margins of economic and environmental capacity. Often factors external to the refugee context—drought or the changing international market conditions in the case of Sudan—destabilise a fragile balance which has been achieved. Nevertheless, despite the obvious strains on the hosts and their environment, these research findings also demonstrate that the negative outcomes are almost always outweighed by the positive benefits which can and do arise—at least at an aggregate level—for both hosts and refugees within an increasingly integrated economic system. There are several important implications for the development of appropriate policy frameworks for handling the regional impact of refugees.

First, all the studies emphasise that spontaneous settlement is an effective and viable mode of coping with refugee influxes. This is a lesson which governments and agencies are reluctant to acknowledge, but it cannot be ignored. Spontaneous settlement must form part of the agenda of assistance programmes at the regional level. As Jones contends in her Somalia study, it should be deployed, alongside repatriation and resettlement, as a durable solution (Jones 1983). However, it is rare indeed to find official support for spontaneous settlement rather than encampment: an exception is the case of Liberian refugees and internally displaced people in Sierra Leone (UNHCR PTSS 93/38), is rare indeed. Another study of urban refugees in Kassala, recognised that as the refugees were likely to stay permanently, long term objectives should be the point of departure for policy makers (University of Khartoum 1986). Even if the contention for durable responses is not accepted, the empirical evidence demonstrates that spontaneous settled refugees exercise far greater flexibility, than their encamped counterparts, in selecting more environmentally sustainable locations in which to locate or in adopting more sustainable settlement practices. These advantages appear to accrue to spontaneously settled urban refugees as well. Research in Pakistan (Conner 1989) and in Sudan Post (1985) suggests that refugees were opportunistic in selecting residential locations within the urban areas.

A second conclusion can be drawn specifically from the Malawi research. Here the positive outcomes are underpinned by an assistance programme which is unusual in the extent to which the Government has both resisted the establishment of a parallel aid programme and has ensured, as far as possible, that the internationally funded assistance has been developmental for both refugees and hosts. Thus social and physical infrastructure—clinics, roads, social services—is clearly long term rather than emergency in nature and has largely been provided jointly for refugees and hosts (Government of Malawi 1990; Zetter 1992a, 1995). The benign response of Malawi to self settlement has been significant to the extent that this mode comprises over half the total refugee population. In addition the central role played by District Commis-
sioners in the government of Malawi provided a ready made ‘sub-regional’

government framework to coordinate the relief programme for both sponta-

neously settled and encamped refugees. It has to be said, however, that imple-
mentation has been ad hoc rather than a coherently conceived regional
planning framework. Even so, the experience of implementing the policies of
joint provision and developmental investment in many of these areas offers
important lessons relevant to the design of assistance programmes elsewhere.
Although it is usually neglected, a well conceived regional strategy for
investment in public goods and services which integrates refugee and host
needs is a necessity on grounds of equity and efficiency (Callamard 1994). It can
provide a framework for reducing some of the inevitable pressures on public
services—always a source of aggravation for the hosts—and for offsetting some
of the negative impacts of refugees on the local population through
‘compensatory’ and much needed long term investment in their communities.

This policy, it is contended, has helped to underpin the self settlement option
which, even if not desirable in all cases, has been effectively sustained in
Malawi. It indicates the direction for major reshaping of current practice
towards positive acceptance of self settlement. In the Malawi case the govern-
ment has been instrumental in developing this policy: but this policy option
must inform the programming of assistance by all the key actors and
agencies—it is not just the host government’s responsibility.

Third, Wilson makes the important observation that ‘the level of engagement
of refugees in the host economy is strongly affected by the size of that economy
and potential to absorb new labour and skills’ (Wilson 1992:229). A crucial
corollary is the extent to which the refugees and hosts can expand the capacity
and productivity of the regional economy, and effect a multiplier through their
demand for goods and services. Thus evidence from both Pakistan (Ashraf
1988) and Sudan (Kuhlman (1987) and Kok (1989)) for example, show how the
processes of complementarity and competition between refugees and hosts
tended to produce an aggregate expansion of the regional economy. Taken
together these factors precisely constitute another part of a regional policy
agenda. This is to assess variations in inter- and intra-regional absorptive capac-
ity and resource constraints and then to establish flexible investment and other
strategic policies to overcome the developmental barriers. Since these research
data clearly confirm the multiplier effect which self settled refugees have on a
regional economy (by definition without public investment since it is un-
planned), this indicates the important role which a regional level strategic
investment programme could play in diversifying the economy, in stimulating
development and offsetting the initial negative effects. Sectoral investment
might include a diverse range such as communications infrastructure, building
materials supply, regional trading and marketing centres and the selective
investment in industrial and agricultural sectors. Moreover, it is a proposition
worth exploring that, the levels of investment needed to achieve a modest stim-
ulation of the regional economy for self settled refugees and hosts are likely to
be far less, and the returns far greater, than for equivalent investment in con-
ventional camps and settlement schemes. Again, there is negligible evidence—
with some exceptions discussed in Chapter 6—that this proposition has
informed a regional level of policy making to tackle refugee impacts.

Fourth an important proviso needs to be made in reporting these findings.
The beneficial effects which they identify are measurable in aggregate terms. However, each study reveals negative distributional consequences for some social groups or employment sectors—often, although not always, for example, lower income groups, unskilled workers, landless households. These consequences are confirmed by research in Zambia (Mwanza et al., 1988) and another study conducted in Pakistan (Kutch 1987). These outcomes are particularly problematic for host populations, since in a real sense they are the passive ‘recipients’ of these negative impacts. There is some evidence that the time period during which these adverse outcomes is material. Thus the downward social and economic mobility experienced by vulnerable groups in the host society, associated with the disequilibrium effects in the early stages, might be reversed as the economy absorbs and then expands to cater for the refugee population. The conclusion to be drawn from this evidence is clear: it is recommended that another element in the agenda of regional planning must be to conduct a disaggregated assessment of the distributional impacts (as far as is possible given data and other limitations) and adopt policy initiatives which minimise the short term negative effects. These might include differential taxation policies to compensate losses or charge windfall gains (in order to iron out the distortions caused by excess demand), and the stimulation of investment in key sectors to expand the employment base.

Competition for resources made the more scarce by refugee influxes can lead to intense political and social conflict, even where hosts and refugees are ethnically affiliated. This emphasises the importance of programmes, at regional and other levels, which respond positively to these competing interests. Too often assistance seeks to mediate the factors which generate the most conflict. This may aggravate the situation—placing employment restrictions on refugees is a standard response—or by ignoring spontaneous settlement altogether. These conventional reactions to spontaneous settlement can be explained in terms of the central dilemma at the core of the international refugee relief and assistance regime (Chapter 1.3). The interests of none of actors or agencies are served by acknowledging the long term presence and thus the development needs of refugees and their host communities.

A final qualification is to recognise in all these examples that ethnic ties between hosts and refugees are a significant determinant of integration and economic well being. Thus, for example, Wilson (1989) in Malawi, Post (1985) in Sudan and Ashraf (1988) and Sorensen (1991) in Pakistan and Zimba (1994) show how ethnic affiliation, though neither a sufficient nor necessary condition in itself, is at least a very significant positive factor underpinning these outcomes. These findings apply to both spontaneous and encamped refugees. Conversely Post (1985) shows how the lack of ethnic affiliation was a barrier to integration in both settlement types.

5.3 Planned Responses and the Regional Economic Context

Despite the strains which self settled refugees place on a region’s economy, environment and society, this does not, as Kok argues, ‘constitute a good argument for the resettlement of refugees into organized settlements elsewhere in the country’ (1989: 438). However camps and settlement schemes are the favoured option; they too generate widespread impacts at a regional level which are rarely investigated or anticipated. Perhaps not surprisingly, studies
of encamped refugees and settlement schemes also bear out the findings already noted.

5.3.1 Encamped Refugees and the Regional Context

As with spontaneously settled refugees, there is ample research which emphasises the crucial need to explore how best to integrate encamped refugees into the regional and local economy. Hansch’s analysis of the situation of encamped refugees in Mexico and Honduras (1992), stresses how important to refugee livelihood is the camp setting vis à vis access to local markets. He demonstrates that the duration of residence is a key variable in developing entrepreneurial capabilities; length of stay provides the continuity necessary to provide familiarity with and integration into the local economy. Especially important in this case, and indeed in many others, are the intricate strategies for trading food aid.

Likewise, Christensen’s extensive work over the last decade (Christensen 1982; 1983; 1985; 1987), also shows how the trading of surplus food (surplus in an economic, not nutritional sense) is essential to survival and this is contingent on the capacity of local markets (in Somalia and Pakistan) to absorb surplus commodities. Despite encampment, she emphasizes how self help income generation—through trading and local employment opportunities—commenced amongst Afghan refugees well before official interventions. Employment was short term and irregular and, as in Wilson’s Malawi study, dependent on access to local labour markets mainly in agriculture, semi-skilled and informal sector occupations.

The crucial point Christiansen and others (e.g. Callamard in Malawi (1994)) make, is that it is not aid per se which is important, nor necessarily the location of the camps. Rather, two other factors are at play: first, the resourcefulness with which the refugee recipients invest assistance in other than survival needs. Second the scope given to develop other economic activities. Commodification of assistance allows refugees to enter into the regional and local economy and the opportunity to consolidate and enhance the economic survival of their households. As we have seen (Chapter 3), this resourcefulness may not always be evident: it may be inhibited by the dependency which camps induce and there is evidence that camps tend to accommodate the more vulnerable members of the refugee community who may be less likely to display an entrepreneurial capacity than their spontaneously settled counterparts (Wijbrandi 1986). Even so, the fact the expansion of refugee camp economies is so widely reported—at rates of return far in excess of those which could be expected from official income generating projects—confirms that much more attention needs to be given to understanding and assisting these processes through strategic planning policies. Paradoxically, it is the formally constituted income generating projects, designed to kick start the economy of refugee camps, which rarely achieve this objective.

Another key factor to emerge from a study in Nicaragua is that for encamped refugees, as for self settled refugees, is employment diversification (Bilbao 1988). Flexibly organised, this created stability and development within the community and was sustained by the implementation of social infrastructure according to a planned programme.

Conversely, Ashraf (1988), Callamard (1994) Christensen (1992), Rogge (1990b) and Wijbandi (1986) all note the irony that refugee camps also play a significant
role in enhancing the regional and local economy for the host community. Callamard’s detailed analysis of one Mozambican refugee camp in Malawi shows how, despite negative structural and policy factors such as shortfalls in the refugees’ food basket, diversion of food rations and a subsistence host economy, a flourishing trading system emerged which included both hosts and refugees. The commoditisation of exchange benefited women and villagers in the host community and also refugee men with the longest duration of stay. The domination of markets adjacent to Kampuchean refugee camps by the host Thai population, bears witness to the same outcomes (Rogge 1990a). Large amounts of assistance, in the case of Afghan refugees in Pakistan for example (Ahraf 1988), are pumped in through projects and cash with a consequent multiplier for local inhabitants.

This research also lends support to Chambers’ (1986) original contention, that it is not necessarily the poorest socio-economic sectors of the host population who always suffer the adverse economic effects of refugee settlements. It is conceivable, for example, that the sale of food rations by refugees may help to reduce commodity prices for low income groups locally. Simultaneously this might undermine commodity markets for the richer landowners and traders. More research is needed to confirm this contention and to observe the local conditions which give rise to different distributional outcomes.

In general, we can conclude, from the empirical research and operational views, that under conditions of encampment, location will certainly enhance or constrain the dynamics of the refugee and local economy; it is necessary but not sufficient by itself to be considered as the critical factor. As with spontaneously settled refugees, salient factors are ethnic ties, the capacity of the local and regional economy, the structural features of the assistance programme, in particular, factors such as the extent of the limitations on refugees gaining access to employment. These conditioning variables are well established in the case of Eritrean refugees in Sudan (Kibreab 1991) and long settled Burundian refugees in Tanzania (Daley 1991) and for example. Nevertheless, it is political agendas and the assumed temporariness of refugees which determine, almost invariably, that refugees are settled in the most marginal areas. These are localities where the carrying capacity of the land is most fragile, building materials are scarcest, access to productive resources and alternative sources of employment most limited and the environment most vulnerable to degradation.

Again, further research is needed to assess more fully the impact of refugee camps on the regional/local economy and the strategic policy implications. However, at a general level it can be concluded that a regional planning response would include many of the same policy considerations which apply to self settled refugees. What this and other research (e.g. Chambers 1986; Kibreab 1989) underlines, is the need for a development-orientated strategy related to a detailed understanding of local conditions. Important in this context is an examination of the host and refugee communities from an economic perspective, rather than the more conventional social and physical perspectives — this is never the case. In this way locational choices, investment decisions, the stimulus to the economy which assistance programmes generate, the negative and positive impacts of new markets, commodities, labour force and so on, can be analysed comprehensively and appropriate planning strategies adopted to mediate the conflicts and maximise the economic potential.
5.3.2 Planned Settlement Schemes and the Regional Context

It is unfortunate that the planning methodology most coherently developed to provide a long term settlement strategy for refugees—planned settlement schemes—have largely failed to produce positive outcomes for either refugees or their hosts. Planned settlement schemes, usually based on the objective of creating self sufficiency by increasing agricultural production, have been widely deployed, most notably in Africa, as a response to protracted refugee situations. The contentions are: that they offer a more durable solution than camps; and that refugees removed from localities which are unable to cope with the burden, can be resettled in areas of a country with under-utilised capacity. Settlement schemes have sometimes been conceived as component of regional development strategies. A key assumption is that refugees can achieve self-sufficiency in the settlement schemes (Bachet 1981).

As long ago as 1981 Rogge raised doubts about the long term effectiveness of settlement schemes (Rogge 1981). These doubts are now confirmed with the benefit of Kibreab’s full retrospective analysis (1989) of 106 UNHCR assisted rural settlements developed in Africa in the period 1962-82. He found that only nine had attained any form of self sufficiency (i.e. independently of external assistance over an extended period). They account for an investment of over US$ 274m by the UNHCR alone, yet accommodate only 25% of the estimated refugee population in Africa.

Kibreab’s evidence is widely corroborated in other studies (Refugee Policy Group 1986; Armstrong 1988; Black and Mwabe 1992). These show how ecological capacities are limited, agricultural methods are poorly adapted to local conditions (leading to rapid depletion in soil fertility) and infrastructure is insufficient to integrate them into the regional or national economy. There is dependency on external assistance. The schemes are often located on marginal land and yields rapidly decline as cultivation intensifies or as population increase is not matched by increasing land provision or productivity increases. Economic activity is insufficiently diverse to provide the potential for self sufficiency. Above all, most of the settlements are too isolated and integration in to the local economy is often officially prevented.

Even so, an early review of the rural settlement experience provides a valuable insight into and discussion of the planning tasks both for self settled and for settlement scheme refugees (Diegues 1981). For the time it was a very forward thinking document. It has currency today. Diegues argues for simple but subtle responses to self settled refugees—food provision at carefully selected sites, surveys on agricultural implements, enabling access to land, strengthening the social and physical infrastructure, monitoring the living conditions of refugees and hosts. These recommendations should form part of current practice, not just at the regional planning framework but more locally as well. For settlement schemes, again Diegues offers practical but well grounded guidelines relevant, beyond the now defunct settlement schemes, to the present concern with regional planning: the importance of a consolidation phase in the refugee economy, integration of refugee settlements into regional development frameworks, equal opportunities for refugees and hosts.
5.4 An Agenda for Regional Planning

How do these studies inform the development of more coherent regional economic responses to refugee impacts? Given the experience with planned settlement schemes, the prognosis for regional planning in the context of refugee influxes may not seem very optimistic. Nevertheless, some indication of the options which are available has already been given in the preceding discussion. This concluding section links these findings together.

A prescribed approach to regional planning for refugee impacted areas would be dangerous: particular conditions will determine the tasks. Clearly, too, there are case-specific factors which cannot be replicated in all refugee situations. In addition, ethnic affinity and closeness to areas of origin are also relevant but independent variables. Fundamental are the structural issues which lie outside the regional policy frame of planning for refugees—the attitude of governments to settlement and employment, the role of hosts in providing land and shelter for the refugees and the short time scales within which donors and NGOs expect results. These factors can only be tackled through major political shifts in the refugee assistance regime.

These reservations aside, this body of research has been considered in detail because it is instructive about the complex of regional and locational considerations which should be, but rarely are, taken into account when refugee policies are being formulated. It is reassuring to note that some regional level considerations are finding their way into practice albeit in an ad hoc fashion. Examples here are the case of needs assessment missions for Gulf War refugees in Turkey (UNHCR PTSS 91/05; 91/10) and in the lessons learned from the Mozambican refugee emergency (UNHCR PTSS 89/39) where attention is drawn to the need to establish coordinating mechanisms at the regional (and national) level especially in protracted refugee crises. The fact remains, however, that the positive outcomes reported in most of the research have largely been accidental: the negative outcomes are the result of a failure to evaluate and plan for refugee impacts. In neither case was a systematic or integrated approach to regional planning adopted.

What are the lessons for a new praxis of regional planning? First, conceptually, regional planning may adopt many forms—a process of resource audit and evaluating the capacity for sustainability and development; an approach to investment allocation for stimulating economic development; a method to ensure the efficient functioning of the regional economy; a tool to ensure that development of economic activity is compatible with settlement and infrastructure patterns and natural resources. In varying degrees, all these forms of regional planning are desirable; this is implicit in the research literature.

Thus, second we have reached a number of conclusions about the shape and content of regional strategies. More specifically (Chapter 5.2.2, 5.3.1), a regionally based approach to policy formulation and implementation should: assess the resource constraints and plan for the absorptive capacity of the regional economy; seek to diversify economic activities and consider sectoral investment necessary to achieve this; determine the most appropriate locational ‘fit’ for the refugee population; respond to the distributional economic impacts.

Third, enhancing participation in the local economy is likely to be the single most beneficial objective of a regional strategy for improving the well being of both hosts and refugees (Chapter 5.2.2). This, in turn, is most likely to be most
achieved by improving the general economic conditions of the impacted area. It is essential to recognise that although refugee influxes must trigger regionally-based responses, these should not be driven by the impacts and needs of refugees alone. Rather what are needed are systematically conceived strategies for developing and conserving the resource base of the area in which the interests of host and refugees are considered in tandem (Smith 1989).

Fourth, such an approach to formulating coherent regional policy should build on the existing capacity and institutional structures and wherever possible existing schematic plans should be enhanced. And, as already argued, the case for an planning framework which integrates the needs of both refugee and hosts rests on grounds of both equity and efficiency (Callmard 1994).

Within the context of these conceptual parameters and the lessons learned from practice, the following considerations constitute amongst the most significant operational components of a regional policy framework:

**Data and Resource Audit**

- establishing base line data at a regional level on the main resources (economic and environmental), existing capacity/shortfalls and productive potential and the likely impact of given levels of refugees. This, in some respects, comprises the regional level of a preparedness plan (Chapter 2.4.1);
- assessing local labour market capacity to absorb refugee labour in the urban and rural sectors;
- assessing the feasibility of expanding urban economic activity;
- assessing the carrying capacity of the land; this includes the short and long term agricultural potential, for example soil fertility, as well the natural resource base—for example for firewood, building materials etc.;

**Policy**

- formulating policies to address resource shortfalls; interventions to avoid negative disequilibrium effects are particularly essential;
- prioritising investment options and selecting relevant policy interventions which governments and agencies might adopt to enhance the capacity and underpin longer term regional development;
- maximising opportunities to diversify the economic base for rural refugees and hosts away from agriculture as the sole activity:
- enhancing participation in the local economy is essential; government and agency assistance policies which eliminate restrictions on refugees gaining access to labour markets are particularly desirable;
- generating policies and projects which improve the general economic conditions of the impacted area rather than supplying goods and projects for which there is no, or alternatively a highly competitive, market;
- stimulating demand side interventions which increase the flow of goods and services;
- improving the quality of regional infrastructure to facilitate inter- and intra-regional transfer and thus improved integration into the national economy;
- improving access to local food and commodity markets for refugees;
- integrating the planning and provision of social and physical infrastructure for the needs of both hosts and refugees;
- preparing contingency plans to provide additional material support at moments of extreme pressure; (Kok’s study (1989) gives the example of how this support was provided through a reception centre which rendered assistance at points of severest drought when the carrying capacity of land and economy was at its most fragile).

These proposals for developing an integrated approach to regional planning for refugee impacts constitute a challenging agenda. They demand fundamental reformulation of the role of donors, NGOs and intergovernmental organisations—especially the relationship between UNHCR, UNDP but also UNEP, UNCHS
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and DSA. They require that detailed consideration be given, during needs assessment missions and the preparation of operational plans, to the regional level institutional capacity of host governments. Structures and mechanisms to strengthen coordination and integration at the regional level will need to be explored and establishing a management cadre at this level must become an early stage in operational planning.

Developing appropriate regional level polices in response to refugee influxes constitutes perhaps the most important area for future research and policy development.
6. From Relief to Development: Refugees as Development Resources
A Macro-Economic Perspective

6.1 National Perspectives and Developmental Frameworks

It is perhaps symptomatic of the nature of the international refugee assistance regime that invariably its focus is on the areas immediately impacted by refugee influxes and its methodological capability is mainly attuned to a crisis/emergency time scale. Thus, only limited consideration is given to the policy and programme requirements for shelter provision and settlement planning at larger spatial scales and within a framework of longer term developmental objectives. A dichotomy exists between emergency humanitarian relief and developmental assistance. The contention in the last chapter, is that concepts of relief and development are inseparable in the context of refugee situations. It is precisely because shelter provision and settlement planning constitute both humanitarian needs and developmental resources, that they provide the means to bridge the dichotomy at the core of conventional responses to refugee influxes (Bulcha et al. 1983).

We have already noted the very restricted view of operational planning at the regional level (Chapter 5): this is paralleled by limited empirical research which, nonetheless, provides a penetrating assessment of regional impacts and the type of policy frameworks necessary to address them. The national level picture is even more limited with an almost complete dearth of empirical research into macro-economic factors, despite the acknowledged impacts at this level. Only three research studies have been identified explicitly concerned with this level—Zetter on Cyprus (1993), Kutch on Pakistan (1987) and Freres on Horn of Africa (1988). Equally, operational experience of policy formulation which encompasses spatial and economic planning, is similarly sparse—Malawi is an exception here. This absence of research and operational evaluation is surprising given international concern for this issue over the last two decades (UN 1984; 1984a; ICVA/UNHCR 1985; UNDP 1990). It is precisely those countries, where the struggle for development is most acute, which host the vast majority of the world’s refugees. The continuing impoverishment of the mass of their populations and the added burden of structural readjustment ensure that their economic development programmes are highly vulnerable to the distorting effects of the mass influx of refugees.

Ambitions for an integrated and development-led approach were set out as long ago as 1961 in the 17th Session of the UN General Assembly (Kibreab 1991:91) and an integrated planning response for refugees after the Congo crisis in the early 1960s was attempted. The ICARA II conference on refugees in
Africa in 1984 was a landmark in this context (UN 1984a). This addressed, comprehensively and on a continent-wide scale, the fundamental question of integrating refugee assistance into the overall development needs of host countries. It systematically considered the modalities of strengthening the economic and social infrastructure of host countries in order to enhance their capacity to deal with the pressures of large refugee influxes which were burdening a number of African countries at that time. Important policy initiatives such as Ex Com’s 1984 ‘Principles for Action in Developing Countries’ (UN 1984a) and ICVA/UNHCR Development Approaches (1985) established a coherent framework which might have led to the integrated long term developmental responses of the kind we shall examine below in Cyprus (Chapter 6.3). Assistance policies did not change in practice.

Precisely the same point was made in an ILO mission report on refugees in Somalia (ILO 1987). This recommended that refugee income generating projects should be conceived within a national framework rather than the confines of the camps so that refugee assistance should complement rather than conflict with a country’s overall development programme.

A further IGO initiative to tackle the issue occurred five years later with the 1989/90 UN General Assembly resolutions on refugees and displaced persons. The cynical view is that this was simply a means to solve inter-organizational conflicts over the roles of UNHCR and UNDP and the lack of UN co-ordination in refugee assistance. Nevertheless, the resulting definition of ‘territorial’ responsibility between the two IGOs (UNDP 1990), highlighted the need for assistance programmes to consider the continuum from relief to development. It gave recognition to the fact that longer term aid programmes are essential if refugees are not to impede the developmental aspirations of host countries.

In responding to his rhetorical question ‘Refugees: Development or Relief?’, Cuenod has made a significant contribution to the exploration of these themes in a widely quoted paper (Cuenod 1989). He challenges the prevailing orthodoxy of refugee assistance by elaborated the conceptual and operational case for a developmental approach. He provides an incisive diagnosis of the constraints to developmental and long term policy making for refugees, based on analysis of the interests of the main actors and agencies in the international relief regime. His agenda for action proposes a refocusing of assistance from the humanitarian to the economic scale and thus a radically new role for ‘northern’ donors and agencies. In his view the necessity of an economic perspective on refugee impacts inevitably leads to a long term, i.e. a developmental, framework for refugee assistance. These recommendations are endorsed by Smith’s reconceptualisation of the refugee development thesis (Smith 1989). This emphasises the importance of policies which are contextualised within a framework of sustainable development, an essential requirement for refugee impacted countries in the developing world which are already facing deteriorating economic prospects.

Yet a decade after ICARA II, the ILO report and the more recent UNDP/UNHCR coordination agreement, there is little tangible progress. These initiatives to reshape the methodology or content of refugee assistance programmes to incorporate broader spatial scales and the longer time horizons remain paper exercises. Refugees remain in lengthy exile without durable responses to their needs: self sufficiency is barely perceptible. A new attempt is
Shelter Provision and Settlement Policies for Refugees

the UNHCS/UNEP 1994 workshop on settlement strategies for the continuum of relief and development. Despite its title, and attempts to reconceptualise an understanding of processes and policy needs, there remain the underlying and continuing symptoms of a problem defined primarily in terms of failed inter-agency co-ordination.

The systematic and co-ordinated audit of the impacts of the Mozambican refugees on public expenditure by the Government of Malawi is a unique instance, in practice, of an attempt to formalise national level policy requirements (Government of Malawi 1990; Zetter 1995). Given the interests served by the international refugee regime, the prevailing neglect of a macro level perspective is not altogether unexpected. But, as this review argues, the neglect is detrimental to the needs of refugees and their hosts. The case for macro level consideration rests first on the contention that refugees can effect positive outcomes at the level of the national economy. This requires a policy framework which supports rather than constrain these opportunities. Second, since negative impacts are never appraised they are therefore never effectively tackled; this is because the assistance regime has developed neither a methodology nor even a sense of concern to investigate them.

Three empirical studies assessing macro-economic effects have been identified. Kutch (1987), in a study which mirrors Ashraf’s research (1988) (discussed above Chapter 5.2), analyses the impact of the presence of Afghan refugees in Pakistan in terms of growth and productivity effects. Whilst the economy was found to have grown as a result of the refugees, this was achieved at the cost of adverse distributional consequences for the host population, at least in the short term. Overall this study estimates that the net economic outcomes have been negative in the short term. Conversely, the research findings also identify positive long term developmental impacts—for example in improvements to Pakistan’s infrastructure—achieved by the large volume of international relief: this is presumably an unintended by-product. At an aggregate level the productivity of the economy is not thought to have increased: rather redistribution has taken place.

Whereas Kutch’s study is mainly concerned with substantive conditions, my own work (Zetter 1992) and that of Frere (1988) discuss the issue of refugees and development from both substantive and operational perspectives. My own work, deals specifically with the role of the shelter sector at a macro-economic level. Frere’s research in the Horn of Africa has a broader remit. These two studies and are considered below (Chapter 6.3).

6.2 Disasters as Development: Refugee Shelter as a Development Resource

Refugees, as we have seen in the previous Chapter, create contradictory economic impacts. The negative consequences of refugees for a host country’s economy are usually premised on some or all of the following assumptions: diversion of mainstream development investment; destabilise local labour and commodity markets; create supply blockages; accentuate the scarcity of basic resources; become assistance-dependent; give rise to uncompensated public expenditure (see e.g. Kutch 1987; Mwanza et al., 1988; UNHCR 1990).

This orthodoxy, however, ignores the significant evidence from two related policy environments. This demonstrates that, on the one hand, the disequilibrium of natural disasters, and, on the other, the specific contribution of the
housing and construction sector to national economic growth, can be the catalysts for development opportunities. Contrary to the negative expectations, therefore, when translated to the refugee situation, this evidence indicates that there may be potentially positive outcomes, at the national level, from the impact of mass refugee influxes. Clearly, refugee policy making in the shelter and settlement sector must engage this alternative view.

The literature on how communities rebuild after natural disasters or enforced displacement is particularly instructive for rethinking responses to refugee influxes at the national planning level. Here, as Cuny (1983,1992) amongst others (Cuenod 1989; Gorman 1987; ICVA/UNHCR 1985; Zetter 1992) notes, there has been a remarkable turnaround in thinking. High levels of external intervention represented by the ‘relief model’ and assumptions about the negative impacts of disaster, have been replaced by the ‘disaster as development’ model. Evidence cited especially from a number of Latin American countries (Anderson and Woodrow 1989), but also from many other natural disasters (Aysan and Davis 1992) indicates two conclusions in even the most extreme situations. First, the disequilibrium of disaster may often help to break through economic, social and institutional barriers and create opportunities to kick start the economy through the physical process of reconstruction. Of course, by comparison with refugee situations, there are fewer constraints to disaster reconstruction: for example, land availability, legal and political considerations about the status of and protection for refugees, national government involvement which adds different dimensions to the process and context of assistance. Second, a bottom up approach is likely to be more effective.

By maximising participation and community-based resources, disaster victims are best left to do what they know best—to rebuild their own houses and communities with the minimum of external interference. Similarly in the case of refugees, the validity of self help process has already been discussed (Chapter 2.4). Higher levels of assistance may be necessary for the rather different circumstances of refugees because of dislocation and discontinuities in community structures and high short run costs. It is essential that this is kept to a minimum.

The role of housing in economic development constitutes the second policy environment relevant to this re-evaluation of the impact of refugees. In many developing countries, housing construction is acknowledged to be one of the leading sectors of economic growth. Whether in the formal or the informal economy, housing is a significant multiplier in employment and the building materials industry; it absorbs labour with low opportunity cost; it stimulates an increase in inter-household income transfers and adds significantly to the capital formation of the national economy. (UNCHS 1984; UNCHS 1987, 209-211; World Bank 1992:62-64). These positive impacts are generally highest in the case of low income households and in developing economies. Typically housing investment may account for up to 20% of GNP (Malpezzi et al., 1990) and is the ‘single largest form of fixed capital investment’ (Tipple 1991:1), representing up to 50% in some situations.

These findings are significant in the context of refugees since, by and large, refugees are mainly comprised of low income categories, shelter is a basic need and it is developing economies which host a majority of the world’s refugees. Arguably therefore, the conditions under which these achievements occur—large scale migration and rapid urbanisation through unplanned squatter settlements,
often representing up to 60%/70% of urban housing provision in many third world cities—bear comparison with the impact of refugee influxes. Yet the macro-economic developmental potential which the mass shelter needs of refugees might similarly offer host countries has not, to date, been widely recognised.

6.3 Refugees, Housing and Economic Development

The conjuncture of these two policy environments creates new perspectives on planning for refugees at the national level. Unique to date is the experience of Cyprus in this context. Its significance lies in the striking parallels with the present and probably protracted conditions of displacement in former Yugoslavia and eastern Europe and also, to a lesser extent, to the processes of reconstruction in Mozambique and South Africa with the mass of returnees. The implications of the Cyprus experience are worth considering in some detail.

My research (Zetter 1987; 1991; 1992) shows how, after the Turkish invasion of 1974, and deploying a disaster as development model, the Government’s large scale rehousing of the forcibly displaced served not only to absorb the population in the unoccupied southern half of the island (some 200,000 Greek Cypriots, nearly 40% of the ethnic Greek population), but also to rebuild the shattered economy.

This programme was mobilised through a series of Emergency Economic Action Plans between 1975-1986 (Republic of Cyprus 1975; 1977; 1979; 1982), incorporating all other sectors of the economy. The economy was devastated; but the 40% of the population who were displaced represented significant demand for housing and other goods and services. The refugees were impoverished; but a rehoused labour force supporting an entrepreneurial economy, offered considerable scope for economic reconstruction and diversification. The opportunity costs of commercial farming in previously under-developed rural areas were dramatically reduced, encouraging new settlement and production.

The housing programme of about 48,000 units to date, which was largely accomplished within a decade and a half of the invasion, comprised three main components—contractor built estates (13,600 units); the more popular self build housing on government sites and serviced land (11,600 units) and private land (12,000 units) and the rehabilitation of property vacated by Turkish Cypriots involved in the reverse migration to the north (7,200 units) (see Chapter 4.2.1). The housing programme accounted for 40% of public sector development expenditure up to 1981. Remarkably little of this derived from international assistance—about 20% overall—most of it was raised through a variety of innovative methods of taxation and public savings. Fiscal policies encouraged both private sector housing investment (see Chapter 4.3), and the restructuring of the construction and building materials industry to ensure that it had the capability to deliver the rebuilding programme. Between 1976 and 1981 GDP expanded by 9% pa average, unemployment fell from 30% in 1974 to less than 2% by 1978. During in this period it was the construction industry which showed the propensity for the fastest growth in the economy and dominated capital formation—largely the result of government investment in the refugee housing programme. Significantly, before 1974, public sector housing provision scarcely existed. The capacity to deliver this programme was mobilised ab initio.

Beyond the humanitarian concerns, a number of factors account for this remarkable achievement. These offer lessons for possible replication of this experience elsewhere.
First, a unique characteristic is the mobilisation of the crisis response through national level economic policies, conceptualising the disaster in terms of a developmental opportunity and durable solutions, rather than a short term emergency assistance and relief operation. Moreover the developmental approach was initiated almost immediately. It follows, probably coincidentally but precisely, Cuenod’s proposition (1989), that humanitarian assistance should be set within the wider developmental framework. Whilst emergency action plans and an emergency budget were established to implement the humanitarian response during the first decade of the crisis, the reconstruction policies and projects were always framed within the context of the ordinary development budget and the overall national development objectives. Assistance and development projects for refugees, wherever possible, complemented national economic development strategies of Cyprus and the investment programmes which underpinned them. This maxim should be the crucial guiding principle for the international organisations, NGOs and donors who dominate the refugee assistance regime. But as we have seen, repeated attempts by the international community (Chapter 6.1), have not operationalised this principle except in Cyprus where the government assumed total control of the post crisis reconstruction.

A second lesson is that the political will existed to adopt a strongly interventionist role by the government for public sector economic management and integrated spatial planning. This included factors such as investment capital, logistics, interagency/interministerial management and coordination, social welfare needs and of course housing. This imperative, it is worth noting, was achieved through the line ministries not by setting up parallel institutional structures. Accordingly, the disaster as development response model was institutionalised in a series of Emergency Economic Development Plans to guide the reconstruction of the economy. This systematic approach—in short a classic planned response—ensured that the policies and programmes of the public and private agencies were fully integrated and coordinated. This also meant that the familiar economic destabilising effects of rapid reconstruction—for example inflation in building material and labour costs—could be managed by fiscal interventions as part of a holistic strategy. Similarly, as noted above, the institutional lending policies and liquidity levels of the corporate financial sector, could be managed by the government in order to channel investment into preferred sectors like housing (Chapter 4.3).

Third, the economy has been rebuilt and the housing programme delivered largely in the urban sector, a strategy which has effectively combined economic and spatial objectives. Despite the rural origins of a majority of the refugees they have, in effect, been incorporated by the reconstruction process within an urbanised economy. Inevitably, from a social perspective, the consequences for family structure, social classes and community grouping present problematic outcomes in contrast to the remarkable achievements of the economic reconstruction (Zetter 1991; 1994).

These lessons pinpoint the elements critical to the success of the Cyprus reconstruction and which have potential relevance to other situations. Clearly there were other preconditions specific to the Cyprus situation: the ethnic affinity of hosts and displaced; the fact that the population was technically displaced in their own country rather than de jure refugees (although de facto
they are in effect refugees); administrative and professional capability; and the ‘imposition’ by the state of a long term developmental programme despite the politically controversial implications this had for potential repatriation. Until recently, therefore, it was possible to argue that Cyprus was a unique case. However, it is no longer unprecedented. The mass displacement and ethnic consolidation in former Yugoslavia and other republics of the former Soviet Union bear remarkable similarities to the specificities of the Cyprus case. Two decades’ experience in the successful application of a developmental response offers a rich and replicable technology for reconstruction after refugee influxes. The key point is that the ‘refugees’ were not marginalised from the mainstream of the economy of the hosts, where their potential contribution to rebuilding the shattered economy would have been lost. The planned response was designed to achieve both their spatial and economic integration.

Frere’s research in the Horn of Africa appears to corroborate the lessons arising from my own research in Cyprus (Frere 1988). His findings are that the successful linking of aid and development is conditioned by: political will; administrative capacity; resource availability and infrastructure capacity; early mobilisation of developmental activities. These are remarkably similar to the Cyprus conditions. Important in Frere’s study is participation, community involvement and community building (both hosts and refugees). This contrasts with the Cyprus situation where refugee participation was marginal in what was, in effect, a programme driven by political and technocratic interests.

No standardised template exists for intervention at a national level. Indeed introducing a development dimension into emergency relief programmes is highly dependent on the specific conditions of the refugee population and the structure of the national and local economy. As a joint intergovernmental mission to Malawi stressed, no amount of formal sector intervention will work if the prevailing economic conditions are unsatisfactory (Government of Malawi 1988). Conversely, for refugee aid to produce developmental impacts there must exist viable economic conditions and opportunities of which both refugees and hosts can take advantage.

Turning from strategic and policy considerations to the lessons from implementation, there are several conclusions.

As a result of the physical planning process, many of the housing estates have been located close to new employment centres on the urban periphery to provide an integrated pattern of land uses. Moreover the size of the estates has enabled scale economies to be reaped in the developments. The urban locations have, on the whole, permitted an efficient extension and development of urban infrastructure and services. These are further benefits from a planned approach to the needs of the displaced and host community. In the rural areas, smaller housing estates have been developed and are more widely distributed. Access to farm land was limited, given the salience of the agricultural economy and the intensity with which private property interests are safeguarded.

Effective project implementation was a priority to cope with the emergency situation. This led to the establishment of expedited land acquisition, housing and estate design and tendering procedures as part of a rapid response philosophy.

Finally, as already discussed, houses and of course farm land left by the displaced Turkish-Cypriots have been leased to and gradually rehabilitated by the displaced Greek-Cypriots (Chapter 4.2.2). Like so much of the programme,
this policy, too, has served multiple objectives. More than just a component of the housing strategy, the reuse has been part of an integrated programme for economic development, especially in the remoter rural areas. The new occupants have received preferential loans and grants to expand previously underutilised agricultural potential and to rehabilitate some of the housing for the growing market in rural tourism.

Mistakes were made in the early stages—construction methods were poor, the estates were too large and the allocation of housing has generated social discontinuity. But modifications have been adopted, most notably in the switch to self build housing (Chapter 2.4) which now demonstrate exceptionally high levels of investment and standards of construction.

Whilst from a different perspective the Greek-Cypriot refugees have been incorporated into the hegemonic interests of state, far from a burden, they have literally and metaphorically rebuilt the south of the island in which the housing programme has been the leading sector. Here is a forcibly displaced population for whom an uncompromisingly long-term developmental approach to their needs has established self sufficiency.

6.4 Conclusion

Very few countries have attempted to implement an integrated approach to the provision of assistance for refugees and hosts within a developmental framework. Zimbabwe and, more especially, Malawi are recent examples where institutional structures were revised—an initial requirement for this to happen—but these are of limited success. In Malawi, from about 1987-1991, the Government was moderately effective in coordinating the assistance programme at central government level and in ensuring that aid was channelled through line ministries and District Offices to achieve a form of sub-regional level programme management (Zetter 1995). In the integrated provision of infrastructure, there is some evidence of developmental approaches (Tamandong-Helin 1990; Zetter 1992(a)). These are essential building blocks of a developmental model. However, programme coordination at a national and sub-regional never extended to a fully integrated planning process of the kind adopted in Cyprus.

To date these ambitions remain largely frustrated, with only fragmentary evidence of integrated methodologies for refugee assistance and, with the exception of Cyprus, no experience of the comprehensive reformulation of economic development plans at a national level to tackle the impacts of refugee influxes. The international agencies have recognised that a development approach to planning is essential in refugee situations, but have been unable to implement this. This failure, it has been argued, is partly the failure to develop appropriate tools and methodologies. Mainly it is the failure to recognise that shelter provision and settlement planning provide the conceptual means to bridge emergency humanitarian and developmental needs. Underpinning these findings are the political dilemmas which these agencies and the host governments face in dealing with refugee crises—a resistance to implementing long term durable solutions within a host countries. To quote from the introduction to this review ‘in the search for durable solutions, shelter and settlement policies are a powerful indicator of...the humanitarian will of the international community to address a basic right of refugees’.
7. Conclusions—Lessons Learned and Future Options

Of the many lessons arising from this overview, the following constitute a series of recommendations for the reconceptualisation of shelter and settlement policies for refugees.

7.1 Human Resources: Skills, Expertise and Training

7.1.1 The Need for Spatial Planning

Refugee assistance programmes have ignored the contribution which land use/spatial planning can make to shelter and settlement needs and policies, to programme coordination and to the implementation of developmental strategies in conditions of limited resource availability. Planning has been conceived, in this review, as an enabling process which supports the resources and skills of refugees and their hosts in determining their own options and requirements. These requirements are acutely experienced in refugee situations. A model of planning which offers integrated and developmentally orientated approaches for the benefit of hosts and refugees has been argued. These needs are often sacrificed to dictates of emergency situations and pragmatic pressures. Conversely this review has identified many benefits of a systematic or planned response in terms of, for example: maximising the efficiency and scale economies of investment in physical and social infrastructure; mitigating negative environmental impacts; ensuring the locational distribution of refugee settlements which are compatible with the longer term developmental policies of the host country. Within limits, a more effectively mobilised planning framework can introduce international comparative experience and provide the basis for maximising returns on international development aid for host and refugee programmes.

7.1.2 Training Needs and Professional Knowledge

Necessary to achieve effective implementation of spatial policies, is the redeployment of existing skills and some retooling of the methods and strategies successfully used in less stressed policy environments—settlement upgrading, self help and enabling strategies, action planning techniques. Retraining is best developed and conducted within countries already hosting refugees, or as part of refugee preparedness policies so that a skills resource base is built up prior to emergency needs. Desirable would be the provision of additional specialist modules or courses attached to existing degrees, technicians’ diplomas and para-professional qualifications in planning, architecture, housing management, engineering—if these are available. Appropriate expertise
developed in the context of informal and low income group urban settlements of the developing world is particularly relevant to refugee situations. This includes professional capability in upgrading programmes and projects, accelerated land provision, community development and mobilisation, self help enablement, action planning. These are, in any case, conventional planning requirements necessary in most developing countries even without large scale refugee influxes. To date, the much needed radical revision to the needs of refugee settlement planning has been constrained by two factors: the dominance of an overly narrow, technocratic praxis and a critique of practice based largely on anthropological and sociological perspectives. In contrast, the model of planning offered in this review for the needs, impacts, distribution of and options for refugee settlements, is predicated on a multidisciplinary approach in which the professional skills of management, evaluation and institutional coordination are as necessary as detailed design and engineering skills.

7.1.3 Institutional Structures

Shelter and settlement planning for refugees should be conducted, as far as possible, within the existing formal and informal institutional structures of the host country. This includes, in the formal sector, the governmental institutions at central and local levels; and in the informal sector, agencies like churches, community organizations and so on. They offer important benefits for hosts and refugees in the development of a planned shelter and settlement policies. They facilitate a comprehensive and integrated appraisal of the burdens and opportunities presented by refugees at different spatial scales. Existing structures can provide a framework for the coordination of government, relief and intergovernmental agencies’ interests and expertise. They can help to ensure integrated policy planning and project programming for hosts and refugees at local, regional and national scales. They allow developmental and strategic policies and action to be generated thereby countering the pressures to mobilise programmes driven primarily by emergency needs and the sectoral specialisms of donors and agencies. Existing governmental structures enable the implementation tasks to be integrated into the operational practices of line ministries. They encourages local organizations to administer and service refugee settlements within a broader framework.

Host country institutions almost always need strengthening to cope with the unique pressures of refugee influxes. It is unlikely, for example that there will be the statutory or professional base to develop and regulate policies for refugees, especially in the shelter and settlement sector. Thus an important component of international assistance must build up the institutional capacity and generate the political will, especially at the local level to plan and administer refugee settlements. This will only occur if there is a framework of plans within which the host population can see their own needs integrated with provision for refugees. Refugee assistance can only truly be called developmental if it contributes to the institution building capacity of the host country.

7.2 Information and Knowledge Base

7.2.1 Improving the Information Base

Evidence in this paper suggests that the transfer of experience and information in the refugee shelter and settlement sector has been very limited. Rather than
shelter provision and settlement policies for refugees

stockpiling materials and supplies it is information and research which needs to be stockpiled and distributed. Thus, PTSS Field Reports, although they often reflect a very constrained remit, provide a valuable source of information, but their circulation is limited and there is little ex post facto evaluation of the implementation of their proposals. Similarly, agency project evaluation missions are usually kept in-house. The lack of the information base is a reflection of the competitive arena within which the agencies work and the short term environment within which they work. These factors combine to create the situation where there is a premium on pragmatic responses to immediate demands, rather than the development of methodologies which can become the information base for replicable experience.

Useful to tackle this shortfall, and to avoid reinventing the wheel in each refugee crisis, would be for UNHCR and/or a research-based institution to establish a much more accessible information network, of the kind provided by UNCHS in the field of (non-refugee) shelter provision. This would allow for the collection and dissemination of experience, evaluations, technologies and policy initiatives in the refugee shelter sector.

7.2.2 Research

Another major shortfall in the information and knowledge base in this sector is the lack of a well developed research enterprise and the effective dissemination of research findings, although this is changing. The restructuring of the current refugee assistance regime, called for in this review, is contingent on practice being informed by much more independent research in the sector. This research should have a much stronger multidisciplinary basis than at present and should have a strong policy orientation. More detailed evaluation of current practice and experience—projects, programmes, institutional structures, application of methodologies and interventions from other fields like disaster relief, squatter settlement upgrading, action planning—would assist in refining present assistance policies and responses. It is a prerequisite for the development of more appropriate spatial policy responses and interventions in future refugee crisis. Similarly, if refugee preparedness planning is to be seriously considered, it must be based on authoritative research which would indicate and anticipate the potential consequences of preparedness plans on refugee and host communities.

7.2.3 A Refugee Settlement and Shelter Audit

A number of countries already have disaster preparedness capability, in government or academic institutions, in the shelter sector. This in-country capacity provides an important information base which could be extended to cope with refugee influxes or a model which could be replicated for refugee preparedness. The knowledge and data which such an audit might include are: land availability (preferably serviced); overview of regional environmental capacities/potential impacts of given numbers of refugees; local/vernacular/cultural typologies and building technologies; capacity and shortfalls of indigenous housing market; local contracting capacity; availability of building materials supplies; purchasing procedures. As with other interventions in this sector, it is important that refugee needs are not elevated over those of the host population. The poorest sections of host communities, themselves often have limited access
to resources like land and building materials. The audit should thus encompass their needs as well. As already explained it is likely that these data already comprise inputs into national development planning for the sector. What is needed is for them to be extended to encompass refugee needs.

7.3 Materials and Technologies

7.3.1 Indigenous Technologies

Shelter and settlement policies must be conceived within the materials and skills resource base of the host countries and the refugees. Refugee influxes may accentuate local shortages, although a planned response through region-wide assessment and provision can assist in overcoming these constraints. In-country manufacture, supply and purchase can provide important economic multipliers. Indigenous solutions and technologies have repeatedly been shown to be more adaptable, more rapidly responsive and more culturally sensitive than imported technologies. Prescriptive standards should be avoided; indigenous responses, the presenting situation and the environmental characteristics of the locality should determine the implementation process, not predetermined ‘standards’.

In some instances technical cooperation with ex-patriate professionals is necessary to help in the reintroduction of local skills and the use of local building materials and technologies which may have fallen into disuse. In some cases too, the introduction of building components can create additional employment opportunities. The import of managerial expertise may also be desirable to overcome supply and manufacturing blockages caused by rapid rises in demand from refugees. It is also the case that by supporting new technologies new markets, other than for refugee, can be exploited. There is a balance to be struck; but reliance on indigenous technology must be the starting point for interventions in the shelter sector.

7.3.2 Stockpiling Shelter and Materials

Stockpiling is not recommended for more than emergency requirements; and even for emergencies it is unlikely that sufficient provision, adaptable to actual needs, can easily be made. The exception is the provision of building tools. Building materials and commodities such as tents or prefabricated shelter cannot easily be stockpiled. This ties up development capital, involves expensive storage costs and, with the inevitable degradation of stock, leads to wastage; it may well create local shortages; it involves expensive transport and break of bulk costs, especially if it involves overseas suppliers; there can be difficulties if crucial components have been lost or inadequately requisitioned.

Limited stockpiling may be desirable; but only where it is clear that refugee needs will cause extreme shortfalls of building materials and commodities, which cannot be remedied within the impacted country. Preferable to stockpiling is the mobilisation of local plants for the speedy production of building materials. Expanding in-country capacity would again be developmental, by creating local employment, stimulating local contracting capacity and the productive base of the host economy.
7.4 Planning Processes and Modes of Intervention

7.4.1 Macro-level Planning and Economic Policy: A Developmental Approach

Because refugees have largely been conceived as a burden, the potential which they can contribute to the aggregate demand for and supply of goods and services in a national economy has been largely ignored in policy formulation. A reconceptualisation of refugees as a positive resource, would open the door to new and much more positive policy interventions of the kind elaborated in this review at all spatial scales. Especially in the shelter and settlement sector, these could mitigate the negative disequilibrium effects of refugee impacts on the host economy. Moreover, since the sector is far more ‘developmental’ than any other component in refugee assistance programmes, it is a powerful vehicle for achieving the developmental opportunities that can exist in refugee situations. Major changes in the policies of donors are required to fund developmental rather than emergency assistance in this sector. Reshaping of host countries’ national development plans would be required and this might be effectively achieved by adapting the previous experience of development. As this review has emphasized, experience suggests that many of the problems of refugee impacts at regional and national levels could be more effectively tackled by better coordinated macro level policy making and implementation.

Eastern European countries are a special case. The transformation from command to mixed economies and their generally poor experience with development aid projects, confirms that the restructuring of macro economic policies and the establishment of new institutional structures are a particularly important priority. The large scale inflow of refugees to some of these countries accentuates these needs.

7.4.2 Regional Context

Where refugees locate, or are located by policies of encampment, has a fundamental impact on their capacity to survive and the economic well being of their households. It has a similar impact on the economy and social structure of host communities. In addition, the environmental impact of refugees is usually experienced over an extensive area. These three considerations indicate that regional strategic planning should constitute a crucial level of policy making in the context of refugees. To date, however, there has been a lacuna in assistance policies at the macro spatial level. Regional planning methodologies provide: the means to conduct resource audits of refugee impacted areas; the basis for the coordination of infrastructure provision and investment allocation necessary to underpin the regional economy for refugees and hosts; the tools to ensure that settlement patterns of refugees are compatible with the existing distribution of settlements, infrastructure networks and resources; the opportunities to promote development through private and public sector investment strategies. These are essential aspects of policy making for refugees.

7.4.3 Self Help and Enablement

The review has emphasised crucial resources which refugees bring to the shelter and settlement process—skills, technologies, adaptability, locational preferences. These should be much more closely documented, evaluated and incorporated in planning responses. The concepts and practices of enablement,
drawn from the experience of shelter provision strategies in the urban sector of the developing world, provide valuable experience relevant to policy making in the context of refugee assistance. This experience indicates the different capabilities and needs as between urban and rural locations, as related to different cultural practices and local conditions. Similarly for refugees, it will be necessary to give detailed consideration to the capabilities of different refugee groups and the support which might be appropriate to sustain self reliance and an enabling assistance programme.

7.4.4 Alternative Strategies for Shelter and Settlement

Generally, a limited and pragmatic range of shelter and settlement strategies is adopted in the context of refugee needs. However, most refugee influxes lend themselves to a great variety of potential interventions at different spatial scales. These need to be investigated and more effectively articulated through strategic and land use planning mechanisms. In addition to the conventional planning processes, there are several appropriate planning methodologies and processes which are adaptable to the refugee situations—action planning, mixed scanning, rapid appraisal at local and regional scales. These and other methods should be evaluated in order to provide relevant interventions. Alternative strategies to cope with refugee needs in this sector include: settlement upgrading processes as a clearly stated objective at the start of the planning cycle; site and services projects; rental housing provision; adaptation and revision of planning and building codes; reuse of vacated buildings. These strategies must be deployed from the perspective of reducing the potential conflict between refugees and hosts for scarce housing and other resources and to reduce the environmental investment and maintenance costs for the host economy.

In this context there should be a continuum between the emergency and protracted phases of refugee assistance programmes. A well conceived set of planning policies and should distinguish between responses and interventions that are suitable for emergency phases and those that are capable of being developed into durable shelter provision. For example in some situations the temporary occupation of public buildings could lead to renovation and rehabilitation in the protracted phase. Evaluation of the alternative shelter options should take into account environmental impacts, developmental and infrastructure costs in different locations and the opportunities for refugee self help in shelter construction.

7.4.5 Integrating Refugee and Host Communities

Planning processes provide a framework for mediating the interests of refugees and hosts in terms of environmental impacts and competition for scarce resources like land, housing, infrastructure services and employment. They enhance the capacity for evaluating the developmental opportunities and pressures which refugees create. An integrated planning approach facilitates the evaluation of potential areas of conflict, and the preparation of land use and spatial development policies which might help to minimise the conflicts and pressures and maximise the developmental opportunities. An integrated approach facilitates the transition from emergency aid to developmental planning. There is always the danger that appropriate and effective planning
interventions might be frustrated by a set of planning responses which are over elaborate in terms of professional capability, institutional capacity and techniques and methods, especially given the pressures of the emergency phase. Considerable skill is necessary to design planning responses which: are relevant to the local situation; tackle the different spatial scales at which refugee impacts are experienced; capable of being implemented.

7.5 Durable Responses and the Will to Return

Would a reformed policy of shelter and settlement provision for refugees—durable housing and integrated planning—lead to permanency of refugees? This is the dilemma set out in the introduction. All the available evidence suggests that repatriation—from countries of first asylum at least—is crucially dependent on prevailing conditions in the refugees’ home country and, contingent to this, duration of exile. Durable, in other words, developmental responses such as those advocated in this review are not, by themselves, likely to be a major variable in the refugee’s decision to remain or repatriate. On the other hand, developmental strategies rather than emergency assistance more effectively serve both the needs of refugees and their hosts. For the refugees, invariably protracted exile demands planning policies for shelter and settlement which offer durability, stability and continuity. For their hosts a developmental model, by integrating refugee and hosts’ needs, will help to ensure that their long term aspirations for improved physical and social infrastructure, economic opportunities, community development, environmental sustainability are less likely to be undermined by short term and pragmatic responses. As a Cypriot refugee said of perhaps the most advanced formulation of the model advocated in this paper, ‘We would not accept these houses, even if they were gilded: they are not ours’—the will to return remains.


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