The Agrarian Question in Southern Africa  
and "Accumulation from Below"

Economics and Politics in the Struggle for Democracy

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“In the same way as there can be no victorious socialism that does not practise full democracy, so the proletariat cannot prepare for its victory over the bourgeoisie without an all-round, consistent and revolutionary struggle for democracy.”

(Lenin, *Collected Works*, 22, 144)
INTRODUCTION

In an address to intellectuals in Zimbabwe a few years ago, Issa Shivji engaged in a self-criticism of the practices and theories of the Left in Africa since independence (Shivji, 1988). The main point of his argument was that the political practices of the Left had been largely statist in perspective and that the Left had thereby identified itself closely to the ruling class and its state in post-independence Africa, thus distancing itself from the masses of the oppressed. An element of this statism, Shivji maintained, was what he called the "ideology of developmentalism", whereby popular politics and democracy were displaced in political discourse in favour of narrowly conceived state directed policies of economic development which in some instances, were said to provide the necessary pre-conditions for a future advance to socialism.

In this argument, which is in its essentials correct, Shivji drew attention to the fundamental manner in which state power and oppression in Sub-Saharan Africa have been reproduced since independence. More generally as we now know, the ideology and state practice of statist "development" have provided at one and the same time, the vehicle of accumulation for large sections of the ruling classes as well as the systematic economic plunder and political oppression of the masses of the people of Africa. In brief this ideology and its attendant practices provided the conditions for the reproduction of the political economy of neo-colonialism. Yet this reappraisal exemplified in this instance by Shivji has been a relatively recent historical phenomenon.

The desire to achieve "development" and "economic independence" embodied in Nkrumah's famous slogan, was until recently uncontested in Africa in Left political discourse. The recent contestation of the dominant ideology of petty-bourgeois nationalism which has been dominant on the Left in the post-independence period, has correctly begun to reappraise the condition of neo-colonialism itself. Rather than seeing this as a purely externally imposed economic condition of dependency against which there is little recourse apart from one form or another of "delinking", neo-colonialism is now beginning to be concretely understood as systematically reproduced by oppressive class structures and internally repressive states within imperialist conditions. It has begun to be recognized that the de-
struction of civil society and democracy in the post-colonial period has been one of the main features of neo-colonialism which has systematically stifled not just political activity, but also popular economic initiative.

In parallel with this understanding, although lagging somewhat behind, have been the beginnings of the recognition that the parasitic and bureaucratic forms of accumulation so prevalent in Africa, are not the only forms of accumulation to exist in such conditions, but that despite intense political oppression, extra-economic coercion and unequal exchange, capitalist relations have produced, however meekly, however mildly, however partially, class differences among the oppressed. It is in this context for example that Mamdani (1987a; 1987b) uses a notion of "accumulation from below" to distinguish the "voluntarily" entered into unequal relations characteristic of "free" commodity production, from the forms of accumulation based on extra-economic coercion (accumulation from above). Any genuine attempt to address the question of the democratisation of African politics will in one way or another have to confront the issue of alternative forms of accumulation, of "development".

It is not adequate in the context of the political economy of contemporary Africa to restrict oneself to simply counterposing popular democratic politics to repressive developmentalism, whether this be in academic discourse or in political agitation. This is not only because of the reality of conditions of life for the majority of the people who are in desperate need of economic advancement. It is also because the very issue of the democratisation of state structures will in practice put the question of accumulation from below on the agenda, precisely because the lifting or reduction of oppressive state coercion which such democratisation implies, can, in one way or another, enable such accumulation to take place. In actual fact, the question is not so much whether accumulation from below will or will not take place under a process of democratisation of state structures, but the most appropriate forms of democracy to enable such accumulation to take place.

In brief what is being readdressed in Africa at the moment, is the relationship between economics and politics. It is important to comment briefly on the overall context within which this reappraisal is taking place. Three major processes stand out in this regard. First and foremost, despite the undoubted increased resistance of the oppressed in Africa and their yearning for democracy, exemplified in particular by the struggles in South Africa, in Zambia and elsewhere, there is as yet little evidence that the masses have impre-
ssed their character on these processes which seem largely to be firmly under petty-bourgeois or bourgeois leadership.

Second, the dominant threat to the reproduction of existing forms of state in Sub-Saharan Africa seems at present to come from imperialism itself which, due to its restructuring on a world scale, has undermined the "international social-democratic consensus" on which statism and developmentalism, i.e. neo-colonialism in Africa, had hitherto been based. The fact that the present discussion is being offered within the context of a collective project on "structural adjustment" and not within a context of mass popular upsurge is itself indicative of the political weakness of the Left.

Nevertheless, this crisis has laid bare once and for all the nature of neo-colonialism, which like its predecessor, colonialism, is primarily a political phenomenon (with economic effects of course). By neo-colonialism I here mean a condition whereby state power in the Third World is dependent for its reproduction on the participation of imperialist interests. A threatened or actual transformation in the form of participation of imperialism in the reproduction of state power, threatens or undermines the basis of the neo-colonial state itself.

Third, the collapse of "actually existing statist socialism" in Eastern Europe and the USSR has undermined the ideological support of statism in Africa which—whatever its political persuasion—based itself substantially on the Stalinist "alternative". This collapse has also fundamentally affected Marxism itself and not just "statist Marxism". This has taken place because at the very moment when imperialism is releasing on a world scale what is undoubtedly its major offensive since 1945 (if not earlier), the Left is ideologically ill-prepared to respond, for it has had little time to develop ideological alternatives. As such a major problem of offering ideological leadership to the African masses exists (this is particularly obvious in South Africa at the moment).

These points are not made in order to encourage despair. On the contrary, the fact that the above questions are being addressed from the Left in Africa is a major step forward. They are made in order to stress the context of political and ideological weakness within which such reappraisals are taking place, in order to obviate the tendencies towards wishful thinking regarding the imminent arrival of socialism in Africa which have hitherto been so prevalent on the Left. We now know better. Rather than engaging in wishful thinking we should be analyzing the developing objective contradictions which the current crises of the state in Africa have given rise to and
re-analyze those for which we thought we already had the answers. Insofar as the current trend towards re-examining our erstwhile assumptions and assertions continues, there is no cause for pessimism.

It is the overwhelming dominance of the state in post-colonial African society (statism) which has been correctly identified by Left intellectuals (e.g. Shivji, Mamdani) (as well as to a lesser degree by the ideologists of the International Financial Institutions—IFIs) as the central problem of the African political economy. As a result, it is the issue of democracy and democratic transformation which forms the core of the Left intellectuals' critique of statism in Africa. This to my mind is a correct identification of the central issue. The "only" difficulty consists in giving precise content to the term "democracy". For the ideologists of the IFIs, this has tended to mean a (more or less qualified) "withdrawal" of the state from the market, so that accumulation can proceed, "hopefully" untrammelled by state intervention; for the spokesmen of (some of) the Western Powers it has tended to mean at best a form of multipartyism and possibly a bill of rights (Gibbon, 1992a).

Left intellectuals on the other hand, have started to develop much more sophisticated notions of democracy from a different class perspective. Mamdani (1987b) has gone the furthest in this project, arguing correctly that in addition to multipartyism—in the present historical context a form of democracy organized "from above"—democracy in Africa must principally be concerned with democratization "from below" whose object would be the removal of extra-economic coercion and its attendant state repression of the peasantry in particular.

It is this last argument which is taken as the point of departure of the present work, for Mamdani is correct to stress that the current bourgeois solutions to the crises of statism, as outlined above, cannot possibly confront the oppressive forms of class and state formation which have characterised the continent since independence. Neither, for that matter, can the state or its judicial apparatus "guarantee" civil rights. Only the working people can do that through struggle. It is therefore paramount for the Left in Africa to develop and demarcate a clear position on the democratisation of the African state as an alternative to statism if it is to be taken seriously by the masses of the people. It is the argument here that such an alternative conception of the state and democracy must start by rethinking the political economy of Africa within the context of the epoch of imperialism. It is also in the context of such rethinking that some of
the writings of the classics of Marxism can be useful for they have important points to make regarding democracy which have hitherto been consistently overlooked in the literature.

In what follows below I concentrate on some of Lenin’s writings on democracy and economic development because they seem to be particularly pertinent to our own predicament in (Southern) Africa. In particular I stress that for him there are different forms of democracy which differ not simply according to ways in which popular representatives are chosen, but more fundamentally according to which class or class alliance’s interests such democracy represents. In particular for Lenin, (various) bourgeoisies always have a tendency to compromise on democracy, so that a form of democracy which is in the interests of the majority has to be popular and revolutionary in content. It has to be popular because it has to be in the interests of the people (itself an alliance of different classes); it has to be revolutionary because such democracy must be attained in a revolutionary way—i.e. through the independent struggle of the people themselves and not through some deal in smoke-filled rooms. In fact the manner of achieving democratic demands was as important for Lenin as the demands themselves. For him, democratic laws and rights could only be reasonably secure if they were achieved by the independent struggle of the working people (independent that is from the bourgeoisie), for the bourgeoisie always had an interest in restricting (bourgeois) democracy as much as possible due to its exploitative class position.

The present article therefore, consists of an attempt to re-examine some assumptions regarding the relationship between economics and politics in Marxist theory or in Marxist-influenced theory. In particular the intention is to readdress the question of the relationship between democracy and, what I have called following Mndani, “accumulation from below” as an alternative to “structural adjustment”. This discussion, which is largely preliminary, will take place within the context of an assessment of the agrarian question which, along with the national question to which it is closely related, is one of the two fundamental democratic questions in Africa today (incidentally as the representatives of international finance capital and imperialism have clearly recognized—see Bates, 1984). The dis-

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1 The author is indebted to Björn Beckman, Peter Gibbon and Henry Bernstein for detailed comments on earlier drafts. Responsibility for errors and omissions lies with the author alone.
discussion will be concerned primarily with questions of theory. Moreover, it is arguably the ignorance or distortion of the agrarian question by petty-bourgeois nationalism which most obviously shows the theoretical and political limitations of this position.

The paper is divided into three parts. The first deals with the notion of accumulation from below as it features in classical Marxism-Leninism—particularly in the work of Lenin, and the forms and extent of democracy associated with it. In particular it concentrates on the importance of a correct understanding and hence political attitude to this question for a future transition to socialism. The second part deals with a critical analysis of the agrarian question in Southern Africa and the petty-bourgeois nationalist manner in which this question has been conceived in the dominant literature, both academic and political. In the final part, the historical specificities of the agrarian question in Sub-Saharan Africa are readdressed in the context of an argument for the need for democracy within and despite imperialist conditions. Throughout, the attempt is made to interrogate the relationship between politics and economics at a general theoretical level in the context of contemporary African political economy. Given the scale of the issues covered, the complex details of social processes are often, of necessity, glossed over, while the discussion is often much more schematic than would normally be required by scientific endeavour. While such shortcomings are unavoidable in a paper such as this, the evaluation of broad trends and the presentation of pointers towards a possible alternative should not be fundamentally affected.
DEMOCRACY AND ACCUMULATION FROM BELOW IN CLASSICAL MARXISM

In this section I shall concentrate primarily on the work of Lenin, for it is arguably in his writings that one finds the most clearly developed position regarding various forms of democracy and the forms of accumulation or capitalist development corresponding to them. These forms of democracy and accumulation are mainly concerned with the agrarian question, for it was the dominance of the latifundia and landlordism which formed the economic basis of autocracy and tsarism, which in turn were the mainstays of oppression and reaction in Russia at the time. It was in his writings surrounding the (bourgeois) democratic revolution of 1905 that Lenin initially developed a genuinely Marxist and proletarian position on the democratic revolution, which he would later apply to all democratic struggles in the period of imperialism. Shortage of space precludes a total analysis of Lenin's theory of the democratic revolution. Rather I will have to restrict the analysis to the most important points.

Moreover I shall ignore the important contributions of other Marxist theorists (e.g. that of Mao on New Democracy) and shall restrict myself to Lenin's work, for the reason that Lenin developed his arguments in opposition to formulations and theories (basically different forms of economism) which have very strong parallels in the contemporary dominant position on the Left in Africa: namely in petty-bourgeois nationalism. This was not the case with Mao. I would maintain that Lenin's criticisms of such positions have a direct application in Africa today. It is this point which has governed my approach to Lenin's work in this paper. I have discussed Mao's views on New Democracy elsewhere (Neocosmos, 1982).

Lenin, the democratic revolution and the agrarian question

Lenin's earlier ideological struggles with the Narodniks and his work on the Development of Capitalism in Russia had shown in detail the development of capitalist relations among peasant producers and a trend towards the class differentiation of such producers. By 1905 Lenin had entered into an ideological and political struggle with the line propounded by the Mensheviks which argued for support of the liberal bourgeoisie's (vacillating) “struggle” against reac-
tion "lest the bourgeoisie should recoil" from the revolution (Lenin, 1905). This latter view assumed the necessity for bourgeois leadership of the democratic revolution. This argument was largely founded on the (economistic) conception that because the capitalist evolution of the large latifundia was economically progressive, it would inevitably lead to progressive political changes.

To this Lenin retorted that these forms of bourgeois democracy and capital accumulation were not the only forms in existence in Russia. To such forms, which amounted to bourgeois transformations "from above", should be counterposed forms of democracy and accumulation "from below". The former had their origins in the gradual bourgeois transformation of landlord economy and left the political superstructure of that economy (autocracy) in large measure intact; the latter had their basis in the capitalist transformation of peasant economy and amounted to a clear sweeping away (in a "Jacobin or plebian way") of the remnants of serfdom and of tsarist autocracy. These latter forms amounted to a deeper and more extensive kind of democracy and to a clearer demarcation of classes in the economic, political and ideological senses. It is these forms of capitalist development, those "from below", based on the democratic transformation of peasant production, which the proletariat and its party should be supporting and even leading.

Central to Lenin's conception of the bourgeois democratic revolution are two internally related conceptions. First, that a number of forms of state and democracy are possible under capitalist conditions, and that a number of forms or paths of economic development are also possible under the same conditions. Second, that the character of these political forms or economic paths is largely determined by the class which leads and stamps its character on the process of revolutionary change. A bourgeois democratic revolution, being in the interests of a number of classes (bourgeoisie, petty-bourgeoisie, peasantry, proletariat)—the people—need not necessarily be led by the bourgeoisie (Lenin, 1905, 50). To assume this as the Mensheviks did was to adhere to an economistic position.

Does not the very concept 'bourgeois revolution' imply that it can be accomplished only by the bourgeoisie? The Mensheviks often fall into this error, although as a viewpoint it is a caricature of Marxism. A liberation movement that is bourgeois in social and economic content is not such because of its motive forces. The motive force may be, not the bourgeoisie, but the proletariat and the peasantry. Why is this possible? Because the proletariat and the peasantry suffer even more than the bourgeoisie from the survivals of serfdom, because they are in greater need of freedom and the abolition of landlord oppression. (Lenin, 1907d, 335)
Rather, different forms of the democratic revolution are possible depending on the class forces leading that revolution:

He would be a fine Marxist indeed, who in a period of democratic revolution failed to see this difference between the degrees of democratisation and the difference between its forms and confined himself to ‘clever’ remarks to the effect that, after all, this is a ‘bourgeois revolution’, the fruit of ‘bourgeois revolution’. (Lenin, 1905, 52)

Moreover,

...the very position the bourgeoisie holds as a class in capitalist society inevitably leads to its inconsistency in a democratic revolution. The very position the proletariat holds as a class compels it to be consistently democratic. (ibid., 51)

In Russia during the 1905 period, the democratic revolution centred on struggles over the latifundia and landlordism, which provided the economic basis of the autocracy. The peasant revolts against large landed property were therefore the foundation of the democratic revolution. Given the tendency of the bourgeoisie to compromise with reaction, for the bourgeoisie “to spare the ‘venerable’ institutions of the serf-owning system (such as the monarchy) as much as possible” (ibid., 91), and thus to restrict democratic changes, it would ultimately sacrifice the peasants to landlord-controlled change in agriculture. Ultimately the oppressed people (the peasantry and the proletariat) as a whole would be betrayed to the ugly compromise between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. The proletariat should therefore support the peasantry as a whole who were consistently democratic in their struggle against large landed property.

The only force capable of gaining ‘a decisive victory over tsarism’, is the people, i.e. the proletariat and the peasantry, if we take the main, big forces, and distribute the rural and urban petty-bourgeoisie (also part of “the people”) between the two. ‘The revolution’s decisive victory over tsarism’ means the establishment of the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. (ibid., 56)

The forms of (bourgeois) democracy to which the revolution would give rise if led by the people, would be much more extensive, more “popular” in content and less restrictive than any form of democracy instituted “from above” by the compromising bourgeoisie.
Accumulation "from above" and accumulation "from below"

The two general political forms of bourgeois democracy identified by Lenin, in his view corresponded to two antagonistic forms of capitalist development in agriculture coexisting in Russia.

One alternative is evolution of the Prussian type—the serf-owning landlord becomes a Junker; the landlords' power in the state is consolidated for a decade; monarchy; 'military despotism, embodied in parliamentary forms' instead of democracy; the greatest inequality among the rural and non-rural population. The second alternative is evolution of the American type—the abolition of landlord farming; the peasant becomes a free farmer; popular government; the bourgeois democratic political system; the greatest equality among the rural population as the starting point of, and a condition for, free capitalism. (Lenin, 1907a, 356)

These two forms of development amounted of course to two quite distinct forms of accumulation taking place simultaneously. The Prussian or "Junker" road was a form of accumulation "from above" as it was undertaken at the expense of the masses of the people. Under this path, accumulation among the people was restricted by retaining forms of oppression inherited from feudalism but adapted to capitalist conditions, such as extra-economic coercion, emphasis on absolute surplus value extraction and so on (Neocosmos, 1986). Accumulation "from above" was one in which landlords gradually transformed themselves into capitalist farmers by slowly altering their reliance on labour-rent to one based on wage labour. It amounted to a form of the capitalist development of agriculture under the leadership of landed property (ibid., 32–8).

The "peasant" or "American" road ("American" because of the lack of landed property and the possibility of free colonisation in the United States—Lenin, 1907b, 247–54) had, on the other hand, been Lenin's major object in the Development of Capitalism in Russia (1899) which represented a critique of an earlier, "romantic socialist" trend—Narodnism. Against the Narodniki's insistence on the purely urban and landlord character of Russian capitalism, and therefore on the incipient "socialist" character of peasant relations, Lenin argued that peasant economy contained within it the seeds of capitalism and the class struggle. This was manifested by the differentiation of the peasantry into a minority of rich and a majority of poor peasants.

Peasant farming also evolves in a capitalist way and gives rise to a rural bourgeoisie and a rural proletariat. The better the conditions of the "village commune" and the greater the prosperity of the peasantry in general, the
more rapid is the process of differentiation among the peasantry into the antagonistic classes of capitalist agriculture. (ibid., 241–2)

In view of the contemporary debates on land reform in Southern Africa, it should be added that despite the fact that peasants demanded land which was being monopolised by the latifundia, for Lenin the land question was not the primary issue. It was not just a question of providing land to the peasants but, through the provision of land, of destroying the politically repressive relations of landlordism. Thus he makes clear that providing land to the peasants through colonisation, would not solve the agrarian question as it would leave the latifundia and political oppression intact (ibid., 250). From a proletarian perspective therefore, the demand for land is inseparable from democratisation. The latter is the primary issue.

The Narodnik economists, of course, did not recognise capitalist “accumulation from below” as they saw peasant production as basically “traditional”, “communal” and “egalitarian”. Thus “...a cardinal mistake of the Narodnik economists was that they believed that landlord farming was the only source of agrarian capitalism, while they regarded peasant farming from the point of view of ‘people’s production’ and the ‘labour principle’” (ibid., 241).

At the same time, the Mensheviks, following in the footsteps of Second International economists (and especially in those of Kautsky in his Agrarian Question), came to basically the same conclusion as the Narodniki, although by a different route. For the Mensheviks, it was not so much that peasant production was non-capitalist but that, inter alia, because the latifundia were large enterprises and because they were “efficient” and evolving towards capitalism, it would be a backward step to break them up by redistributing land to the peasants who were seen as small-scale, backward and inefficient. It was the latifundia which provided the closest expression of bourgeois progress. This position according to Lenin, was a form of economism because it reduced politics to economics. It deduced from a correct assessment of “economic progress”, the false conclusion of a politically progressive development:

Let us take the Stolypin programme, which is supported by the Right landlords and the Octobrists. It is avowedly a landlords’ programme. But can it be said that it is reactionary in the economic sense, i.e., that it precludes, or seeks to preclude, the development of capitalism, to prevent a bourgeois agrarian evolution? Not at all...there can be no doubt that it follows the line of capitalist evolution, facilitates and pushes forward that evolution, hastens the expropriation of the peasantry, the break-up of the village com-
mune, and the creation of a peasant bourgeoisie. Without a doubt, that legislation is progressive in the scientific-economic sense.

But does it mean that Social-Democrats should support it? It does not. Only vulgar Marxism can reason in that way, a Marxism whose seeds Plekhanov and the Mensheviks are so persistently sowing when they sing, shout, plead, and proclaim: we must support the bourgeoisie in its struggle against the old order of things. (ibid., 243)

It should not be assumed here that because Lenin advocated the break-up of the large latifundia, he was an advocate of small-scale production. Rather, the point was that large-scale production could only be politically progressive as well as economically so, when it was based on democratic capitalist forms of organisation and not on repressive relations adapted from feudalism:

In breaking up the medieval latifundia, capitalism begins with a more ‘equalised’ landownership, and out of that creates large-scale farming on a new basis, on the basis of wage-labour, machinery and superior agricultural technique, and not on the basis of labour-rent and bondage. (Lenin, 1907b, 236)

For Lenin, unlike for the Mensheviks, advanced large-scale production was, in itself, of little value for the proletariat unless it was founded on productive norms which were as democratic as possible under bourgeois conditions. Through its mechanical understanding of the relationship between economics and politics, Menshevism betrayed the democratic aspirations of the masses and future democratic socialist advance.

The error of both the Narodniki and the Mensheviks of exclusively recognising or privileging “accumulation from above”, of confusing capitalism with one of its forms, is, as we shall see below, reproduced in contemporary Africa by “Radical Political Economy”, the ideology of petty-bourgeois nationalism. The only way this error could be overcome for Lenin, was by recognising the development of divergent class interests in the democratic revolution. It followed that class analysis was central to a correct understanding of the various processes associated with such a revolution.

2 It is also important to note that this same economistic error was made by Luxemburg in her review and critique of the Bolshevik agrarian reform (Luxemburg, 1961, 41–6). For Lenin’s own position see, in particular, his references to the communist parties’ attitude to large estates in Western Europe in his Preliminary Draft Theses on the Agrarian Question for the CI second congress in 1920 (pp. 159–61). For a discussion of Kautsky’s Agrarian Question on this point, see Neocosmos (1982, Ch. 6, 417–29).
A concrete analysis of the status and interests of the different classes must serve as a means of defining the precise significance of this truth [the Russian revolution of 1905 is a bourgeois democratic revolution—M.N.] when applied to this or that problem. (Lenin, 1907c, 32)

The democratic revolution and socialism

Either accumulation and democracy “from above” under the leadership of the bourgeoisie and landed property, or accumulation and democracy “from below” under the leadership of the proletariat and the peasantry; these were the two alternatives which Lenin saw as the outcome of the democratic revolution in Russia (1907c, 32–3). The proletariat and its party had to choose, and the choice was the peasant road. The question however remained, what was the relationship if any between the struggle for democracy and the struggle for socialism? For Lenin the solution to this problem started from the premises that the proletariat must keep its independence and not become the tail of the bourgeoisie, and that the struggle for democratic demands should be subordinated to the struggle for socialism (1905, 48–63; 1916a, 149).

One should know how to combine the struggle for democracy and the struggle for the socialist revolution, subordinating the first to the second. In this lies the whole difficulty; in this is the whole essence. (1916c, 239)

There could be for Lenin no road to socialism outside the route of (bourgeois) democracy (1905, 112), a position he was to adhere to throughout his life.

...socialism is impossible without democracy because:

(1) the proletariat cannot perform the socialist revolution unless it prepares for it by the struggle for democracy;

(2) victorious socialism cannot consolidate its victory and bring humanity to the withering away of the state without implementing full democracy. (1916b, 74)

The importance of the struggle for democracy under both capitalist and socialist conditions cannot be overstated for Lenin. It is not so much a question of the necessity of passing through a capitalist stage before a socialist revolution is undertaken. This crude “stagist” view is a systematic economistic distortion of Lenin’s position which came to dominate “orthodox Marxism” after his death. Rather it is a question of passing through a necessary struggle for democracy where, amongst a number of reasons, the proletariat and its party
could be trained in democratic practices, and the possibilities of political struggle would be infinitely more advantageous to the oppressed.

Nevertheless, Lenin goes further than this. His advocacy of this relationship is not simply tactical, it is fundamental as it is only in a period of (bourgeois) democratic struggle that the lines between classes become clearly demarcated. The importance of the democratic revolution for Lenin is precisely that it is during this struggle that a proletariat in particular becomes more clearly demarcated from other classes, and that the class struggle between it and the bourgeoisie is more clearly defined. It is in this political sense that the importance of the differentiation of the peasantry must be understood, and not just in the usual sociological sense.

To clear the way for the free development of the class struggle in the countryside, it is necessary to remove all remnants of serfdom, which now overlie the beginnings of capitalist antagonisms among the rural population, and keep them from developing. (1902, 148)

The freeing of these class antagonisms (in all economic, political and ideological senses) is not just to be restricted to the peasantry, but to classes throughout the social formation.

Classes will emerge from the [bourgeois—M.N.] revolution with a definite political physiognomy, for they will have revealed themselves not only in the programmes and tactical slogans of their ideologists but also in open political action by the masses. (1905, 18)

Lenin’s position is clear, oppression restricts the development of class demarcation and class struggle. It must be stressed that it is not so much because feudalism is an earlier/backward mode of production that this differentiation or demarcation of classes is restricted. It is rather the oppressive undemocratic nature of social relations (feudal or otherwise) which are the main causes of this restriction. This is shown by the fact that the politically reactionary aspects of imperialism (the most advanced form of capitalism for Lenin) have similar effects. Thus he states in 1916 in a discussion of imperialism and the national question, for example, that “Marxists know that democracy...makes the class struggle more direct, wider, more open and pronounced, and this is what we need” (1916b, 73). Moreover in 1919 (two years after the revolution) he stresses against Bukharin that the democratic slogan of the right of nations to self-determination must be retained and recognized for all nations (including the most
capitalistically advanced, Germany) precisely in order to facilitate the process of differentiation of the proletariat from the bourgeoisie (1919a, 116–20).

Lenin does not stop at stressing the effects of bourgeois democracy on class demarcation. He also maintains that the greater and more extensive the form of bourgeois democracy, such as that embodied in the peasant road, the clearer the demarcation between classes and the easier the transition to socialism. Under such conditions

...the contradictions of capitalist society—and the most important of them is the contradictions between wage-labour and capital—will not only remain, but become even more acute and profound, developing in a more extensive and purer form. (1907e, 457)³

In sum the democratic revolution represented by the peasant road had three important consequences for Lenin: a) it led to clear class differentiation in agriculture and throughout society; b) it trained the proletariat and its party in democratic practices; c) it led to a form of accumulation from below which was instrumental for the development of the productive forces in a way which was advantageous to the masses (1907b, 243–4).

It should also be added that for Lenin, there was never any question that accumulation from above totally eliminated accumulation from below, or differentiation among the people. Rather, it meant that the democratic revolution could not be finally consummated and class demarcation was truncated. It followed under these conditions that the advance to socialism was retarded and that the likelihood of revolutionary democratic crises still prevailed (1911, 255). As we shall see below the dominant Marxist-influenced position in Africa has diverged substantially from this viewpoint.

For Lenin the agrarian question in Russia referred to the political and economic oppression of all peasant classes—of the peasantry as a whole—although it affected these peasant classes in different ways. It was for this reason that the proletariat had to ally with the peasantry as a whole, and not because the peasantry was somehow

³ For a discussion of these points see Levin and Neocosmos (1989). With P. Gibbon, I have argued elsewhere that a proletariat understood as a discrete economic, political and ideological entity is not given by capitalist conditions but has to be produced (Gibbon and Neocosmos, 1985). Such a process of production takes place to a great extent during the struggle for democracy.
homogeneous. \(^4\) Like all supra-class dimensions of a capitalist division of labour, the petty-commodity producing peasantry contains a tendency to divide along class lines (Gibbon and Neocosmos, 1985). The blanket oppression of these rural producers does not abolish this tendency, it merely renders it less noticeable and less clear.

*The epoch of imperialism*

As is well known, for Lenin imperialism was a particular stage or form of the capitalist mode of production where monopoly dominated. What is perhaps less frequently discussed is that for Lenin, even though imperialism was in many ways economically progressive, politically it was highly reactionary: “democracy corresponds to free competition. Political reaction corresponds to monopoly...imperialism is indisputably the “negation” of democracy in general, of all democracy...” (1916b, 43). In addition, imperialism develops unevenly and among other consequences, restricts growth and class differentiation within agriculture.

It follows that for Lenin democratic issues were not only present in the new form of capitalism represented by imperialism, but that these issues acquired a new importance, for they were now not products of an age on the way out (feudalism), but products of the highest stage of capitalism itself. Therefore in a sense, such struggles became so much more urgent, as the alternative seemed to be a collapse into barbarism and world wars (the possible collapse of human civilisation itself). While in his political analyses from around 1914 imperialism largely plays a similar role to that played earlier by reactionary landlordism, the leadership of the proletariat now becomes imperative in the bourgeois democratic revolution in order to push it to its socialist conclusion and avoid barbarism. Related to this is the view, even more insistently stressed at this stage, that there is little meaning in bourgeois democratic change in itself, and that it only makes any sense in relation to a future socialist advance. The two stages of the revolution feed into each other.

All ‘democracy’ consists in the proclamation and realisation of ‘rights’ which under capitalism are realisable only to a very small degree and only relatively. But without the proclamation of these rights, without a struggle

\(^4\) Later, during the socialist revolution, the proletariat would ally with the poor peasants against the peasant bourgeoisie (1907b, 84–6; 1918b, 300–5).
to introduce them now, immediately, without training the masses in the spirit of this struggle, socialism is impossible. (1916b, 74, emphasis in original)

Only in the colonial and semi-colonial countries (of the East) is it still possible for the bourgeoisie to play any kind of progressive role; in most other countries the bourgeoisie is hopelessly allied to imperialist reaction.

Most of Lenin’s writings on the question of democracy after 1915–16, tend to be concerned with the national question rather than with the agrarian question, although he does return to the latter on several occasions mainly in documents for party or Communist International (CI) congresses. These latter basically insist inter alia that the analyses of 1903, 1905 and 1907 of the agrarian question are still valid (1919a), although the disparity between agriculture and industry is increased (1917a, 208), and that coercion should not be applied to middle peasants (e.g. 1919b).

There is no space here to discuss Lenin on the national question, nevertheless a few remarks may be pertinent given the close link in Africa between the agrarian and national questions. Lenin was again arguing against a form of economism (imperialist economism) which maintained that as an economic trend of capitalism was to form large empires, national self-determination (secession) was either impossible or reactionary, and would encourage national chauvinism in the colonized country. For Lenin the right of oppressed nations to self-determination was fundamentally a political question and not an economic one. It was a question of democratic rights which it was important to struggle for in order to demarcate a proletariat and move to socialism, as I have already noted. It was also fundamentally important because only if this right were guaranteed would nations unite on the basis of free choice and not compulsion (1916b, 67). Adherence to such democratic rights obliged any Communist Party in power not to coerce nations into uniting but, if it was in favour of such unity, to undertake political work among the masses to convince them of the benefits of unity (1919a, 119–20). The parallels here with the right to strike and the independence of civil society in general should be obvious.  

Lenin understood perfectly well that economic control or “anne-

\[5\] It is important to note that this particular issue of the need for the party of the proletariat to struggle for the independence of popular organisations from the state (even their “own” state), is one to which Lenin returns insistently after October 1917. See for example Lenin, 1918d, 275; 1919c, 25.
xation” was possible under conditions of political independence (1916b, 44). The point about supporting the rights of oppressed nations and the struggle of democratic movements for national liberation was that this was the only consistently democratic and anti-imperialist position to take. Moreover as imperialism was a form of capitalism, such struggles would weaken capitalism itself. Thus, democratic struggles under imperialist conditions always have a certain anti-capitalist content. Nevertheless this should not be taken to mean that monopoly capitalism could exist independently of free competition, that it could be equated with capitalism tout court, that the only form of capitalist accumulation under imperialism was monopoly accumulation or that there was such a thing as “integral imperialism”:

Nowhere in the world has monopoly capitalism existed in a whole series of branches without free competition, nor will it exist. To write of such a system is to write of a system which is false and removed from reality. If Marx said of manufacture that it was a superstructure on mass small production, imperialism and finance capitalism are a superstructure on the old capitalism. If its top is destroyed, the old capitalism is exposed. To maintain that there is such a thing as integral imperialism without the old capitalism is merely making the wish the father to the thought. (1919a, 114–5)

Interestingly, Lenin makes this remark in order to show that peasant production, accumulation and differentiation are still taking place in Russia after the revolutionary measures of 1917–18. The destruction of monopoly oppression only reveals and encourages what was taking place all along: accumulation from below. In the imperialist epoch, the forms of development or accumulation associated with monopoly control, unequal exchange and extra-economic coercion are not the exclusive forms of development. Others are also in existence as we shall see. The free development of these other forms of capitalism also requires for Lenin a different form of state and a “destruction of the bureaucratic-military state machine” (1918a, 265). Thus he notes:

Agrarian reforms, by and large, can be successful and durable only provided the whole state is democratised, i.e., provided, on the one hand, the police, the standing army, and the privileged bureaucracy are abolished, and provided, on the other hand there exists a system of broad local self-government completely free from supervision and tutelage from above. (1917b, 103)

I have no space to discuss Lenin’s conception of the people’s state in the democratic revolution here, other than to say that for him, it gen-
erally corresponded to a state of the *Commune* type with its well known democratic characteristics (1918a), and to stress that the "smashing of the state machine" was for Lenin a task of the "people's revolution" i.e. the democratic revolution and not one restricted to socialism as is usually maintained.

Finally of course, as socialists have maintained ever since, if economic forms which develop under bourgeois-democratic conditions are to be transformed into genuinely socialist forms, they must possess a collective (as opposed to a private/individualistic) quality. Lenin discusses in particular state capitalism and co-operativism as two examples of such forms. The problem in Russia was that the absence of independent popular organisation in the rural areas was such that very little inventiveness and experimentation in this regard were undertaken.

After the October Revolution we finished off the landowner and took away his land. That, however, did not end the rural struggle. Gaining the land, like every other worker's gain, can only be secure when it is based on the independent action of the working people themselves, on their own organisation, on their endurance and revolutionary determination. Did the peasants have this organisation? Unfortunately, not. And that is the trouble, the reason why the struggle is so difficult. (1918b, 172)⁶

In this respect the experience of the Chinese rural struggles of the 1940s and 1950s where co-operative/collective enterprises were built up gradually step by step, from mutual aid teams to elementary co-ops, to advanced co-ops, to people's communes (and where land was not redistributed by the state but through mass mobilisation) is much more instructive; but then the Chinese Communist Party had a strong presence in rural areas. Clearly such collective enterprises cannot be prescribed in advance but largely depend on concrete conditions, including popular traditions of struggle. What is reasonably certain is that in the absence of independent popular organisation in rural areas, they are either stillborn or distorted in the interests of the bourgeoisie.

⁶ In 1918, the Bolsheviks made an attempt to ally primarily with the poor peasants, rather than with the peasantry as a whole. This change of strategy failed because of the absence of party organisation in the rural areas, and the revitalisation of the *Mir* due to the role the latter played in the land redistribution process. This led to a consolidation of village unity which benefitted the rich and middle peasants. See Bettelheim (1976, 223–4).
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN AFRICA AND
PETTY-BOURGEOIS NATIONALISM

It is during the colonial period that the characteristics of the contemporary agrarian question in Africa developed. The central aspect of this relation, as Mamdani (1987b) has noted, was unlike that in Latin America and Asia, or for that matter pre-revolutionary Russia. Apart from some exceptional cases, the peasant in Africa did not confront an immediate overlord in the form of a landlord nor with the possible exception of the South, has the agrarian question been synonymous with the land question. Even in the South, as we shall see below, the shortage of land has not always been the only problem confronted by the peasantry. The thesis that the agrarian economies of the South are primarily "labour reserves" has at best been only a very partially accurate representation of the crisis of peasant production, and at most has amounted to a systematic distortion of social reality. Rather, the agrarian question in Africa has been concerned with direct oppressive relations between the state and the peasantry. The economic bases of these relations were planted in the colonial era and consist of forced contributions in terms of money, commodities and labour, the forced production of cash crops and the forced extraction of labour power. Whether this extraction of resources was undertaken via an unequal exchange mechanism or directly, its coercive character has been central.

Thus the relations between the state and the peasantry in Africa have been overwhelmingly coercive. It is perhaps in Southern Africa that this coercion has been the most extreme. Here policies of land alienation and the creation of reserves along with extreme processes of exploitation and oppression, systematically undermined the very conditions of existence of much peasant production, to such an extent that the very concept of peasant production is often said to be inapplicable to the region. At best we are told that in Southern Africa we can only refer to a semi-proletariat on the road to full proletarianisation (or to a "peasantariat"). And yet the agrarian question has anything but disappeared in the South, neither is the region overwhelmingly proletarian and thus "ripe for socialism".

In what follows I shall concentrate primarily on Southern Africa. This for two main reasons: first because the agrarian question possibly takes its most extreme form in the region, thus giving rise to
theoretical arguments which have only been apparent in a weaker form in other parts of the continent; second because the political consequences which have been deduced from the analysis of the supposed disappearance of the peasantry in the South, tend arguably to be clearer examples of a problematic of petty-bourgeois nationalism which is general to Africa. Moreover, it could be argued that the relatively late "resolution" of the national question in the South has meant that the literature is still heavily influenced by such a problematic, which has had the opportunity to become more sophisticated in its arguments than elsewhere in Africa. It has also been in the South, given the apparent proletarianisation of peasant production, that the identification between national liberation and socialism has been the most apparent. In this section, the problematic of petty-bourgeois nationalism and its view of the agrarian question will be subjected to critical scrutiny.

Radical Political Economy and the Linear Proletarianisation Thesis

From the late 1960s, a number of stimulating texts were published which took as their object of inquiry the development of capitalism in Southern Africa, and in particular the historical transformation of rural relations. The writings of Arrighi (1973) and Van Onselen (1976) on colonial Rhodesia, those of Trapido (1971), Bundy (1972; 1979), Wolpe (1972; 1975), Legassick (1976), and Morris (1976) on South Africa and those of Murray (1981) on Lesotho, Arrighi and Saul (1973), Palmer and Parsons (1977) and Kowet (1978) on the Southern African region as a whole, all dealt with a process of capitalist development which directly affected rural producers. This body of literature which was overwhelmingly of a radical Left persuasion has been substantially added to in the decade of the 1980s, especially in South Africa where it has come to be considered a specific school of thought.

I have referred to this literature elsewhere as "Radical Political Economy" (Levin and Neocosmos, 1989). While there have been important and significant differences between various writers within Radical Political Economy, most notably those pertaining between the more "structuralist" political economists (e.g. Wolpe, Morris) and the more "relativistic" historians (e.g. Bundy, Keegan) my argument is that this literature has overwhelmingly been written within a common theoretical terrain or problematic. This problematic has come to constitute the conventional wisdom of "Left" academic discourse on the history of the agrarian question in Southern Africa. It
has coloured to a greater or lesser extent, the overall view which any-
one on the Left holds of the social formations in Southern Africa
today, including our view of the classes at play in such formations
and the nature of the state. As I shall argue below, Radical Political
Economy provided the academic side of a discourse which also pre-
vailed within the Southern African liberation movements. These
two arguments, the academic and the political, both fall within a
single overall problematic which I have qualified as petty-bourgeois
nationalism.

The position of Radical Political Economy within which the
above writings overwhelmingly operate, maintained inter alia that
the peasantry in Southern Africa had, on the whole, been systemati-
cally proletarianised during the colonial period (at the latest by the
1930s). This process had taken place primarily in order to serve the
mining industry (and White settler agriculture) ("in the interests of
capital") in South Africa and Rhodesia, and was a direct effect of
state intervention in the economy (e.g. in South Africa through the
Land Acts of 1913 and 1936). Overall proletarianisation was held to
be the direct result of a number of repressive colonial measures such
as land alienation and the creation of reserves, taxation, forced
labour and so on. As a result even if the peasantry had not been fully
proletarianised, the trend towards proletarianisation was abun-
dantly clear. Such a trend might be held up especially in South Africa
through the reproduction of pre-capitalist modes of production in
the bantustans, but this amounted to a temporary aberration created
by apartheid.

This process of linear proletarianisation led, over time, to the
countries of Southern Africa being dependent on the South African
economy in particular. The principal aspect of this dependency was
said to reside in the provision of labour-power for South African
capitalism. Thus, the countries in the region were said to be "labour
reserves" or "labour producing economies" (e.g. Amin, 1972; Kowet,
1978) while the South African bantustans were seen as compounds
for a "reserve army of labour" (e.g. Legassick and Wolpe, 1976). This
analysis was said to hold, with appropriate variations, for the then
colonial countries of Rhodesia and (especially southern) Mozam-
bique, for the "BLS" countries (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland)
which had achieved independence in the late 1960s, as well as for the
South African bantustans.

Of course the above is only a schematic outline. Nevertheless it
seems to me that it accurately portrays the general orientation of this
problematic which was one of the destruction (full or partial) of peas-
ant producers in Southern Africa. The details of these arguments are well known and need not be repeated here. Indeed, while to some extent they have been contested empirically (e.g. Ranger, 1978), their theoretical and political consequences have not always been explicitly drawn out. In what follows, I shall not restrict myself to discussing the empirical evidence; rather I shall also be concerned with an elucidation of some of the theoretical and political problems or consequences of these arguments.

One of the effects of the position of Radical Political Economy in the academic sphere at least, was a proliferation of studies on labour migration in the Southern African region, particularly insofar as the mining industry was concerned. The political economy of rural petty-commodity production was systematically ignored, or at best relegated to a subsidiary position despite the obvious fact that it provided the source of the migration process and that this was even acknowledged in the concept of "semi-proletarianisation". This was the result of what might be termed a kind of fetishism of the working-class (what in South Africa is sometimes referred to as "workerism") whereby an ideal future of a preponderance of proletarians is seen as already in existence or at least "just around the corner".

This wishful thinking had a number of consequences, two of which are worth mentioning. The first was that, as the radicals deserted the field of agrarian relations in Southern Africa (apart from considering rural areas negatively in relation to capitalism, as "traditional" or dominated by a largely unspecified "pre-capitalist mode", as in Wolpe, 1975), it was left wide open for the ideologists of the state and imperialism to monopolise with their superior resources.

The second consequence was the fact that when an upsurge of peasant production occurred, as it did after independence in Zimbabwe for example, it was not possible to explain its origins. Thus what has been referred to as the "peasant miracle" in Zimbabwe,

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7 This visualising of the peasantry as proletarianised in all but name has parallels elsewhere in Africa. Recall for example Bernstein's (1977) notion of "wage-labour equivalents" as applied to the Tanzanian peasantry. Nevertheless, in East Africa, much more sophisticated analyses of the plunder of peasant production have been undertaken than in Southern Africa where the peasantry has been largely ignored. In East Africa the thesis of the disappearance of the peasantry was never maintained, rather the peasantry as a whole has been seen as exploited as a class; see e.g. Shivji (1987).
where peasants have produced a regular crop surplus in most years since independence, dealt a heavy blow to the linear proletarianisation thesis (Phimister, 1986). Although it is becoming more and more evident that this surplus is being produced by a small stratum of the peasantry (in both regional and class terms), it is obviously leading to a re-examination of the assumptions of the linear proletarianisation thesis, in Zimbabwe at least (Cousins et al, 1990). Evidently, such a successful rich peasantry does not arise from nowhere and certainly not from a supposedly homogeneously immiserated semi-proletariat. It implies that a certain amount of "accumulation from below" must have been already in existence in the Zimbabwean countryside before independence.

It is ironic that Zimbabwean history should provide the first clear example of the fallacy of the linear proletarianisation thesis in practice in Southern Africa. After all it had been the radical studies of colonial Rhodesia by Arrighi (1973) and Arrighi and Saul (1973) which had provided, through a systematic critique of the colonialist devised ideology of dualism, the seminal studies of proletarianisation in Southern Africa which were to develop into the dominant trend we still know today. It must be recalled that they argued that:

...unlike the situation elsewhere on the continent, the African peasantry here [South Africa and Rhodesia—M.N.] has been effectively proletarianized in the sense that the balance between means of production outside the capitalist sector (mainly land) and the subsistence requirements of the African population has been severely and irreversibly upset. (Arrighi and Saul, op. cit., 64, emphasis added)

From this assessment, Arrighi and Saul derived a number of important political conclusions which I shall have occasion to refer to below. For the present it is only important to note two points: first the equation which they made between the proletarianised peasantry and the African population, thus obviously conflating class and racial divisions; second the denial of any fundamental socio-economic class differences amongst the oppressed peasantry—in other words a denial of the possibility of existence of accumulation from below. It must be stressed that such views are not peculiar to Arrighi and Saul. Rather, they are the necessary consequences of seeing the overwhelming majority of the population of Southern Africa (whether in the colonial or post-colonial periods) as proletarians or proletarians-in-the-making. The proletariat is not usually seen as divided into classes. Thus a recent text on the political economy of Swaziland maintains that:
...the majority of the population living in the Swazi Nation areas are conventionally described as 'peasants'. However...80% of such households are dependent for their existence on the regular sale of the labour-power of one or more homestead members in the wage sector at any given moment. This very high incidence of continuous migratory labour outside of these areas...suggests that the process of proletarianisation of such rural producers is very far advanced. Thus, far from constituting a 'peasantry', the large majority of the population of these areas are a semi-proletariat who make up a reserve army of labour for South African capital. Increasingly, they are coming to constitute part of the absolute surplus population which the development of capitalism in Southern Africa has scattered across the region. (Davies et al., 1985, 37, emphasis in original)

In an even more recent text where he deals with the Southern African region as a whole, Mafeje asserts that:

...extensive labour migration is an index of poverty among rural Africans...the reserves were not meant to, and could not have been meant to guarantee the subsistence of the African labour whose services were needed elsewhere. They were only meant to supplement at a very low level the starving wages that the Africans were receiving from their exploitative employers. It is therefore ... nonsense to have expected Africans to develop or even sustain subsistence agriculture in the Reserves. (Mafeje, 1988, 101–2)

And yet, the incredible thing is that some Africans have succeeded from their position in the reserves not only to sustain subsistence agriculture, but also to accumulate as the Zimbabwean "miracle" and other evidence from the region shows (as we shall see below). The masses of the people are obviously more resourceful than some intellectuals allow.

Mafeje's remarks illustrate that one of the major problems with "Radical Political Economy", as with the Dependency Theory of which it is a variant, is that it gives such an overwhelming power to the economic structures of imperialism and capital that the African people seem powerless to affect their own destinies in any meaningful way. The result is that history lies beyond the control of the masses.

I have shown at length elsewhere (Neocosmos, 1987a; Levin and Neocosmos, 1989) how this view of an overwhelmingly proletarianised population implies a homogeneous view of the population of the countries of Southern Africa. Indeed the linear proletarianisation thesis is usually justified—as in one of the quotations above—with reference to aggregate data. This purported homogeneity of the population has a number of fundamental consequences for political analysis to which we must now turn.
The political analysis of Radical Political Economy and the national liberation movements

The first consequence of the purported homogeneity of the population is the fact that it becomes almost impossible to account for the existence of an indigenous ruling class and its state other than by reference to extra-social or extra-national forces.

This has led to considering the ruling class as a simple "clique" or "stooge" of imperialism, much as under colonialism itself, thus denying the importance of explaining the basis of the ruling class and of the reproduction of state power within the context of national social relations. Mafeje (op. cit.) is an admirable example of this kind of reasoning. He refers to the ruling classes of Southern Africa as a "petit-bourgeois elite" (pp. 97, 106), a "governing elite" (p. 106), or a "ruling elite" (p. 121). The term elite is not used accidentally, nor for that matter is it ideologically neutral. As is well known, the notion refers to a psychological attribute of individuals or political organisations theorised by bourgeois sociologists such as Weber, Michels and Pareto (the so-called "iron law" of oligarchy). It refers to an essence given beyond the social relations in which people live and exist. Thus these ruling classes are not accounted for by Mafeje in terms of the contradictory material social relations of the societies of Southern Africa—they cannot be as the population is theorised as overwhelmingly homogeneous—rather they are parachuted from "outer space" so to speak on an unsuspecting population. Their extra-social nature means that they cannot be removed by collective agency.

In addition, Mafeje does not use the term "petty-bourgeois" in its scientific sense—as a contradictory combination of bourgeois and proletarian class positions and practices—but rather, as is common among African intellectuals, as a term of abuse denoting a parasitic character.

...while colonialism is responsible for these distortions [in the agricultural economy—M.N.], African governments stand indicted for having pursued the same policies after independence and for having, thus, instituted neocolonialism in their countries. During their tenure things got worse because, unlike the colonial administrators, they lacked self-discipline and a sense of organisation. Above all, they were too eager to accumulate material wealth before they had learnt how to produce it. Their petit-bourgeois greed or crass materialism meant not only wanton waste of resources but also super-exploitation of the direct producers. This had to be the case because, unlike the bourgeoisie in Europe, they had neither alternative sources of wealth nor a viable economic and political project. Theirs became a pathetic example of fishing by emptying the pond. (ibid., 96–7)
Rhetoric aside, Mafeje uses the term "petty-bourgeois" to refer to a kind of pseudo-bourgeoisie which lacks the supposed attributes of a fully-fledged bourgeoisie. The important point to make is that bourgeoisies do not act as wilful subjects affected by psychological motives, but within the context of social relations imposed beyond their will. Super-exploitation as we shall see, is not to be attributed to the wilful actions of capitalists (petty or otherwise), or even to the "structural needs of capital" as some of the more sophisticated versions of this argument maintain; rather it is to be accounted for in terms of the existence of contradictory relations of capitalism in its imperialist form. Mafeje is ultimately forced into employing such extra-social determinants in order to account for the existence and characteristics of African ruling classes because of his underlying assumption of an overall homogeneous population bereft of historically determined socio-economic differences.

Insofar as explanations of the post-colonial state are concerned, similar problems are encountered by Radical Political Economy. I have shown elsewhere (Neocosmos, 1987a, 36; 1987b, 102–3) how in Swaziland for example, the view of Swazi society as essentially lacking in any visible social contradictions, implies that an explanation for the existence of the state has to be found outside the country itself. The state thus ends up being seen as an external imposition on Swazi society much as under colonialism itself, so that the fact of political independence is to all intents and purposes denied, and neo-colonialism is equated with colonialism. The notion of a "comprador state" as used by Daniel (1985) inter alia, implies that it is the "dependent" economic position of Swaziland, its location in the international division of labour, which of necessity, leads to the identity of interests between the state and imperialist capital. This is a common position of dependency theory. Under such conditions it evidently becomes impossible for the masses of the oppressed to change their own situation. Their oppression is given by forces beyond their control.

Two main points need to be made in relation to a notion of the "comprador state" (or "comprador bourgeoisie")—the first, rather provocatively, is that there is rarely such a thing as a "dependent economy" (with the obvious exception of Lesotho, although it is doubtful to what extent that country has a national economy anyway). There are only dependent forms of capital accumulation. What do I mean by this? I mean principally that the fact of economic dependency must be understood not as a given state of affairs, but as a necessity for capital accumulation, in Africa, under the leadership of
the bourgeoisie, in the period of imperialism. It is produced only because different kinds of bourgeoisie when in power as ruling classes, are forced to compromise with reaction (imperialism), both in order to accumulate and to repress the masses of the people thus restricting democracy. In Leninist terms this amounts to accumulation from above in a neo-colonial country in the period of imperialism. We may say that the bourgeoisie (or petty-bourgeoisie) when in power is forced to take the "dependent road" to capital accumulation. There is no strict overriding necessity for a people's state in a period of National Democratic Revolution to take such a road (although it is obvious that the social and economic structure inherited by such a people's state will always impose limits on the activities of such a state). 8

It also follows from the above that neo-colonialism can no longer be understood as a situation of "political independence with economic dependence", but as I have already noted, as a form of state which is dependent for its reproduction on the participation of imperialist interests. This constitutes a major move away from the economism of dependency theory and follows, it seems to me, from the current concerns regarding popular democracy and the independence of civil society in Africa.

Second, while the compradorial (and bureaucratic) character of the ruling classes in Africa is undeniable, surely both the extent and form of compradorisation (as indeed the bureaucratic character of the ruling class) depend on the class which rules. These will be different under the rule of a petty-bourgeoisie (e.g. as in Tanzania in the 1970s or in Mozambique), different under the rule of a national bourgeoisie and it will be different again under a clearly pro-imperialist (fully compradorised) ruling class (e.g. as in Swaziland, Lesotho or Malawi). 9 The features of compradorisation will also be affected by the degree of combativity of the masses. To refer to all these bourgeoisies as comprador and bureaucratic will tend to obscure the differences between them and obviate the need for class analysis.

In any case, the important point is that these remarks imply a necessity to investigate the class character of the state and the repro-

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8 For a discussion of the notion of National Democratic Revolution in Africa (as indeed for a discussion of compradorisation), see Shivji (1985; 1988b).
9 By "national bourgeoisie" I am not referring to an industrial bourgeoisie, but to that class which is caught between imperialism and the people and hence vacillates between the two (Gibbon and Neocosmos, op.cit., 191).
duction of state power through an analysis of the changing political economy and structure of class relations pertaining in the social formation in question. This is what Peter Gibbon and I attempted in our analysis of the Tanzanian state in the 1970s (Gibbon and Neocosmos, 1985), and what I attempted to analyze with reference to Swaziland in Neocosmos (1987b). It should be evident that such analyses are precluded by the position taken by Radical Political Economy.

A further consequence of the position of Radical Political Economy is that accumulation from above (compradorial and bureaucratic) is seen as the only form of accumulation. This is obvious in the Southern African case where the peasantry is seen as proletarianised. It is also obvious in the literature from East Africa where the peasantry is seen as exploited as a class. The parallels with the positions against which Lenin was arguing should be obvious. Moreover, it follows from this that imperialism (monopoly capitalism) and capitalism are equated, with the result that the only alternative to accumulation from above becomes socialism itself. This could be a form of “African Socialism” or a more “ordinary” form of socialism. In either case the conclusion is false. These points should be developed at some length.

Radical Political Economy maintained that the then colonial countries, such as Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique in the early 1970s, could and would move after liberation straight from colonialism to socialism, as the two main social forces were the proletarian (or semi-proletarian) masses on the one hand, and colonialism/ reaction on the other. The importance of the “middle groups” (such as the petty-bourgeoisie which it should be recalled, was later berated for taking power!) between these two extremes was substantially ignored in favour of a kind of manichean dualism. While this argument obviously led to a conflation of racial and class divisions, as I have already noted, it also led to a much more important political problem.

The central issue in any liberation or transformation process, that of democracy (i.e. of the control of the state by the people) was not addressed, partly because such a question did not arise for a viewpoint which saw democratic struggles as primarily necessitated by “backward” social relations—i.e. in the present context, relations in which a majority of peasants dominate the social formation. In the absence of such a peasantry, capitalism was thought to have already overcome the pre-capitalist social relations against which democratic struggles were to be fought. Economism thus “overlooked” an assessment of democratic politics.
It should be recalled that the "orthodox Marxism" which came to dominate after Lenin's death in the international working-class movement and which exercised such a strong influence on Radical Political Economy, was a mechanical vulgarisation of classical Marxism. For this orthodoxy, democratic struggles were simply equated with increased capitalist development without the contradictions attendant in such development, so that the issue of the class leadership of such struggles was no longer posed. Hence usually "democratic" revolutions were (falsely) seen as only relevant in pre-capitalist conditions. The issue then became whether a "capitalist stage" was necessary or not in Africa, or whether a "non-capitalist road" was possible. Such questions it should be clear, are posed within an economistic problematic and largely miss the point. They however dovetailed nicely with the economistic conceptions of dependency theory and Radical Political Economy.\(^\text{10}\)

Now, in the absence of a predominant "traditional" peasantry

\(^{10}\) It should be noted that the numerous criticisms of the South African Communist Party's "two stage thesis" are largely written from such an economistic perspective. It is simply noted that national liberation means "more capitalism" under the leadership of the petty-bourgeoisie, while socialism is possible in South Africa given the large number of workers and the high level of industrialisation. No attempt is made to analyse the contradictory material relations in which the masses live in South Africa, or else it might have been realised that the dominance of racial contradictions has meant that a proletariat is far from being demarcated as a class in that country. These contradictions have to be overcome correctly for such class constitution to take place.

At the same time, while the SACP has understood the importance of a democratic transformation as a prelude to socialism, it has not theorised the content of that democracy, the nature of the state during this period, its class character and so on. While this transformation is being seen less and less in revolutionary terms, even when terms such as "democratic revolution" were being used, the SACP never seemed to have been able to clearly comprehend, in theory or in practice, the necessity for proletarian leadership of that revolution, even less had the content of such leadership been analysed. Having followed orthodoxy by equating class leadership with party domination, the SACP eschewed this leadership in favour of that of the ANC within the "Congress Alliance". In this way, the class character of the transformation process in South Africa was reduced to questions of organisational dominance, and was thus, for all practical purposes, ignored. In general, the above problems derive from the SACP's inability to undertake a serious class analysis of the oppressed in South Africa and from its overall populist approach. I return to a brief discussion of the SACP's position below. Insofar as criticisms of the SACP's "two stage thesis" are concerned, these are too numerous to be cited here, but see Freund (1986) and Bundy (1989) for example.
and in the presence of a seemingly ideal opposition between capitalists (albeit White and foreign) and an overwhelmingly proletarianised population, the issue of popular democratic struggles was seen as largely irrelevant for the overcoming of dependency (economic dependence). Only socialism and “development” (state-led, of course!) could do that. Hence there developed at independence, what Shivji (1985; 1988a) calls the “ideology of developmentalism”, a state ideological discourse whereby the masses of the people (who were the ones to have fought for independence in the first place) were systematically depoliticised, while the state itself was seen as the agent of “development” and of “socialist transformation”. In addition, as the masses were seen as homogeneously proletarianised, there could be no detailed class analyses from the perspective of “Radical Political Economy”, as a prerequisite say to developing a debate on the kinds of democracy which could be pertinent or strategically advisable in such conditions.

This argument regarding the practical equation of liberation/independence and socialism was maintained by academics and also by most liberation movements (with the notable exception of the African National Congress, ANC). Thus Arrighi and Saul (op. cit.) derive two conclusions from this argument that the peasantry has been effectively proletarianised in South Africa and Rhodesia. First they assert that there is “little, if any, room for a neo-colonial solution” in these countries, and that in the then Portuguese territories “the neo-colonial solution has been blocked by the “ultra-colonialism” of Portugal” (ibid., 87). This particular statement can only raise a smile today given events in those countries since independence. Their second point is that “the revolution in South Africa and Rhodesia, if it is to come, can only be a proletarian and a socialist revolution” (ibid., 65).

The emphasis here is not based on an overestimation of the influence of academic work, it is rather to underline that academic discourse formed part of an ideological trend. This trend was also heavily dominant in the liberation movements. Thus Frelimo (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA, and Zimbabwe African National Union, ZANU, argued in a similar vein) was talking through its leadership about “abolishing the exploitation of man by man”, as the sacrifices of the people were not undertaken in order to replace Portuguese exploiters by their Mozambican counterparts, but to abolish exploitation as such. Thus Marcellino dos Santos stated in 1970:
If we examine the capitalist economy, we find that the Mozambicans are not really represented in the capitalist structures and do not belong to the bourgeois class, except in agriculture where we find a limited number of Mozambican landowners, but their economic power is small and they do not represent a social force. Therefore the majority of the population would be favourable to a system without the exploitation of man by man. (de Braganca and Wallerstein, 1982 Vol. 1, 73)

Bourgeois nationalists and political representatives of (among others) the rich and middle peasants, whose accumulation had been drastically restricted by colonialism (and who thus held an objective anti-colonial position), were either purged or left Frelimo which at liberation took on a rather sectarian character and eschewed a broad-based front (Hanlon, 1984; Hermele, 1988, 22–6; Wuyts, 1989; de Braganca and Wallerstein op.cit., Vol. 2, 122–8). No detailed class analysis of the people emerged from the ranks of the Frelimo leadership, with disastrous consequences (see Hermele, op.cit.; Wuyts, op.cit.).

This problem of failing to understand or even to realise the importance of undertaking a class analysis of the oppressed population (however restricted class differentiation may be among the oppressed), has been a common one in African liberation movements. It has contributed to the transformation of social relations in the interests of the (petty) bourgeoisie rather than in those of the masses. Even the most theoretically sophisticated political leader that Africa has so far produced—Amilcar Cabral—was to see the oppressed as forming a “nation class”. He commented in 1971 that the struggle in Guinea Bissau was “essentially based not on a class struggle but rather on the struggle led by our nation-class against the Portuguese ruling class” (de Braganca and Wallerstein, op.cit., Vol. 1, 20).

Even the ANC and the South African Communist Party, SACP, which have correctly maintained a “two stage” thesis which distinguishes national liberation from socialism, and who also maintain that the liberation struggle is based on a multi-class alliance, seem to concentrate exclusively on mentioning the dominant role of the working-class in South Africa and to all intents and purposes ignore the existence of other classes (ibid., 84–6). In its recent programme, the SACP (1989, 22–31) shows a slight move away from this position. It recognizes the existence of different classes among the oppressed but predictably overemphasises the proletarianisation of the rural (and for that matter the urban) population and the labour reserve nature of the bantustans. I shall briefly (re-) examine the evidence for this view below, but it is also important to point out that nowhere in
this document are the different objective reasons for the opposition to apartheid of each class or sector clearly elucidated. It is thought sufficient to show that different classes have a common interest in the abolition of the apartheid state. Neither for that matter is the link between national liberation and socialism coherently theorised. Therefore, the position espoused by the SACP on this point remains more akin to radical populism than to Marxism-Leninism.

By the 1980s it was becoming more and more obvious (especially in Zimbabwe) that far from developing socialist relations, the newly independent countries of Southern Africa were conforming, or were being forced by real material relations to conform, to the neo-colonial pattern which prevails in the rest of Africa, obviously contrary to Arrighi and Saul’s expectations. It has also become clearer that bourgeoisies and petty-bourgeoisies have emerged as ruling classes since independence; evidently such classes did not emerge from the semi-proletarianised masses.

It must also be noted that this demarcation of classes (and hence clarification of differences) between the new ruling classes and the people, as well as that amongst the people themselves (as evidenced, for example, by the rise of a rich peasantry in Zimbabwe), is one of the most important consequences of political independence which distinguishes neo-colonialism from colonial domination. It is a clear effect of relative democratisation. At the same time, for example, the Mozambican state has had to give greater emphasis in recent years to market relations, given the poor performance of state farms and the economy in general under war conditions. It has thus had to retreat from its earlier “optimistic” line of immediate socialist transition, to one which takes the existence of a rich and middle peasantry and other sectors of the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie more seriously (Hermele, op.cit.). In sum, the reality of material social relations has been placing the identification of classes more and more into the centre of debate in the post-independence period.

The ideological trend which I have been discussing tends to see capitalist development in the region in purely destructive terms. While there is no denying the extremely destructive content of capitalist development, especially in colonial conditions, capitalist relations are much more contradictory than this position allows. We shall see below that even in its most extreme forms, colonial capitalism was not able to suppress accumulation from below or a tendency towards differentiation among the oppressed. The exclusive concentration on the destructive side of bourgeois relations is linked, in Radical Political Economy, with the view, implicit in De-
pendency Theory as a whole, of the oppressed masses as being unable (or incapable of making) to make their own history precisely because of the overwhelming power of capitalism in its imperialist phase.

The view that change is beyond the control of the masses is common to all bourgeois ideologies, as Marx brilliantly showed in his work. As a result bourgeois theories always have recourse to extra-historical (or extra-social) modes of explanation in order to account for socio-economic reality. Radical Political Economy combines a critique of capitalism/imperialism with an adherence to bourgeois forms of explanation. This contradictory combination is also to be found in its socialist orientation and its fear of popular democracy; in its wanting to construct socialism under statist conditions; in its vacillation between "revolutionism" and its advocacy of statist "development"; in its conflation of socialism with national liberation.

These contradictory combinations, in conjunction with its anti-imperialism, clearly define this discourse as a variant of petty-bourgeois nationalism. It can be described as petty-bourgeois because it combines, in ideology, the contradictory class positions of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; or we may say that it combines in ideology the problems and solutions which correspond to the contradictory location of petty-commodity producers in the economy (Gibbon and Neocosmos, 1985, 192). It is a form of nationalism, primarily because of its adherence to an anti-imperialist stance. A bourgeois nationalist position would not equate national liberation with socialism for example.11

The (petty) bourgeois, rather than proletarian, character of this ideology is to be seen also in the fact that it treats population groups as homogeneous and fails to account for class differences (other than those introduced and "imposed from outside" by imperialism itself). Concurrently, it has the tendency to see the ideal future opposition between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in the present, to "make the wish the father to the thought" as Lenin used to say, rather than analyzing objective reality. At the same time, this ideology removes the petty-bourgeoisie, rather conveniently it may be added,

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11 While I have concentrated on describing a "Left" version of petty-bourgeois nationalism which, I have assumed, takes socialism seriously, there is a "Right" variant which advocates socialism in words and capitalism in deeds. Both these variants exist within the Zimbabwean state apparatuses for example, although the latter is dominant.
from its class configuration of society, precisely by seeing the only important classes as imperialism (and its internal representatives) on the one hand, and the proletarianised masses on the other. If a more objective understanding of the political economy of Africa is to be developed, this view should be superseded.

**Petty-commodity production under imperialist conditions**

It must be made clear that it has not been my intention to argue that the proletarianisation of the peasantry under colonial (or neo-colonial) conditions did not occur, or that this was not an important effect of the development of commodity relations under colonialism. Rather my point is that it is theoretically and empirically illegitimate, as well as politically disastrous, to elevate the proletarianisation process above all other aspects of the historical development of capitalist relations in the rural areas of Southern Africa. Nor for that matter is it accurate or theoretically correct to restrict a conception of capital accumulation to accumulation from above, despite the fact that this process may dominate, and to ignore accumulation from below; or for that matter to ignore even the objective conditions for a future process of accumulation from below. Such objective conditions are evidenced by the existence of petty-commodity production in the region and by the differentiation of such producers. I turn below to a brief summary of these developments in Southern Africa. However, before I do so some theoretical clarifications are necessary.

Two sets of questions are important here. First, what I term the production of petty-commodity production in agriculture as part of the reproduction of commodity production in Southern Africa, and second, the simultaneous differentiation of petty-commodity producers into classes, or implicit class formations (Gibbon and Neocosmos, op.cit.).

It must be understood that it is not a question here of finding evidence for the supposed “persistence” of “traditional” peasant producers in Southern Africa. Such a view does not move us forward in any meaningful way, as it sees proletarians and peasants as polar opposites (conceptually and historically) and the latter as essentially pre-capitalist left-overs. This dichotomous opposition provides, after all, the two poles of the linear proletarianisation thesis. I am aware that the view of the contemporary “peasantry” as essentially pre-capitalist is a common conception, but I would argue that such a view is one which restricts itself to a phenomenal understanding of the peasantry and does not ask questions as to its conditions of exis-
tence. Such an analysis is based on a Weberian ideal-typical methodology, and not on a Marxist one (Neocosmos, 1982; Gibbon and Neocosmos, 1985; Bernstein, 1987).

It was an understanding of the "persistence" of peasant production which Articulation Theory attempted to capture, especially in the writings of Wolpe (1972; 1975), with their notion of the "preservation-dissolution" of pre-capitalist modes of production derived from Meillassoux's work. Wolpe argued, in the case of South Africa, that the state slowed down (or interrupted) the process of proletarianisation of the peasantry through reproducing so-called "pre-capitalist modes" (their partial "preservation" and partial "dissolution" in the interests of capital), in order to enable the super-exploitation of labour through its subsidisation by the pre-capitalist mode. It is as though the proletarianisation process would have operated "normally" if some crisis of South African capitalism had not "required" a political intervention by the state (conditioned by struggles of course) to put the brakes on the "normal" proletarianisation process—hence segregation and apartheid. Now, while this argument lends a certain sophistication to the linear proletarianisation thesis, it merely theorises a delay or temporary interruption to the ineluctable process of proletarianisation, which presumably is seen as resuming its course once the apartheid state is finally removed.\footnote{12}

It seems to me however that, apart from other criticisms (and there have been many), this argument errs in assuming a radical distinction between capitalism and apartheid (while maintaining that the latter is functional to the former) as a result of an understandable and correct desire to avoid conflating the two in a spurious notion of "racial capitalism" for example. Apartheid thereby appears as a historical accident, a kind of freak mutation on an otherwise predictable capitalism. In this, "articulationism" takes a position much closer to the liberal accounts of apartheid than is usually understood.\footnote{13}

\footnotetext[12]{12 Unfortunately, more recent studies which have attempted to update this analysis suffer from similar difficulties. Thus Hindson (1987) suggests that in South Africa a working class has been created which is reproduced exclusively in urban areas without subsidisation from the bantustans. However, he unwittingly equates urban residence with the existence of a "pure" working-class, totally ignoring the importance of urban petty commodity production (the so-called "informal sector") in South Africa in the reproduction of labour-power, thus conflating spacial divisions/locations (urban-rural) with class.}

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The problem arises because of the error of recognising only one form of capitalism, and hence because of the failure to identify the correct features of capitalism in the present epoch. This is the fundamental problem with the linear proletarianisation thesis as a whole. We are not living simply under capitalist conditions, but since the late 1890s we have been living under monopoly capitalist conditions (imperialism). Monopoly capitalism in Africa in general, and in Southern Africa in particular, has given rise to specific relations which substantially and systematically modify the phenomenal social conditions and forms of capitalism in general (although not its essential relations). It is these modified conditions which largely explain colonialism and apartheid. They also explain the oppressive nature of state-peasant relations as well as the apparent contradiction between the destruction and reproduction of petty-commodity production.

I shall return to a discussion of some of these questions below. For the present it is important to stress the point that articulationism fails in its attempt to rescue the linear proletarianisation thesis. Rather than talking about the “persistence” of peasant production in Southern Africa, we should be referring to the production of (agricultural) petty-commodity production (a necessary prerequisite for accumulation from below), as an aspect of the development of

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13 Wolpe’s argument which theorised segregation/apartheid as a result of the “need” for capital to reproduce labour-power below its value, is a variant of the objectively nationalist position discussed here which theorises the social relations of imperialism as consisting primarily/exclusively of a relation between capital and labour. After all it is imperialism and not just capitalism which provides the conditions of existence of apartheid. As such, this position ignored the important modifications which imperialism imparts to the phenomenal forms of capitalism in the Southern African region and which I discuss below. It should also be recalled that apartheid has affected not only (arguably, not even primarily) the Black working class, but also Black property owning classes. In particular, the denial of the “right” to own property to the Black population is central to an understanding of the kind of state referred to as apartheid. The forced removals enacted by this state were able to receive widespread support not only because they were morally outrageous and racially inspired but, especially when these removals were from places such as Sophiatown and District Six, because these areas were inhabited by large numbers of property owners. Wolpe’s position has the effect of treating the Black petty-bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie residually. As a result a class analysis of the oppressed population is largely precluded. In this context a notion of apartheid as internal colonialism is superior as it does not, of itself, privilege one class over others among the oppressed people.
commodity relations in general. This is both more historically accurate and more theoretically valid. One of the important aspects of Bundy's work (1972; 1979) for example, despite its obvious nationalist perspective and its argument of linear proletarianisation, is precisely the fact that he clearly shows the development of peasant production in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (the period of competitive capitalism preceding imperialism), through the dissolution of lineage societies under colonial capitalist impact—a process which has been rightly termed "peasantisation" (Cohen, 1976).

For Bundy and most historians of Southern Africa, the destruction of the process of accumulation from below is equated with that of proletarianisation and is said to take place during the period of imperialism, as a result of state intervention in capitalist relations in the interests of the development of the mining industry and that of "White" agriculture. The destruction of the peasant road in Southern Africa undeniably takes place during the epoch of imperialism and is a clear result of extra-economic coercion. At the level of theory however, there is little indication that monopoly conditions necessarily lead to the destruction of accumulation from below.

If agricultural petty-commodity production develops as a result of capitalist relations in the region then, though these relations may be somewhat modified by monopoly conditions, there is no theoretical reason why this form of production should cease to exist, unless it can be shown in theory that imperialism undermines its conditions of existence. This has not so far been shown and, to my mind, cannot be shown. This is because, as I have argued at length elsewhere (Gibbon and Neocosmos, op.cit.), petty-commodity producers (whether agricultural or not) are founded on a contradictory combination of capital and labour in a single enterprise (individual or household). As long as the essential relations of capitalism—capital and wage-labour—exist (a fact which is not modified under monopoly conditions), then the likelihood is that their combination in petty-commodity production (PCP) will also exist, although perhaps in a modified form as we shall see below.

Because PCP is an effect of an otherwise not directly experienced relation between capital and wage-labour, it also contains the seeds of its own differentiation. This differentiation need no longer be seen as solely the effect of forces external to such production as is the case in all theories of a supra-historical "peasantry". In any given situation, the possibility of the production of rich or poor "peasants" (semi-proletarians) is given by the greater importance of either capital or labour within the social relations of PCP, while the reproduc-
tion of a middle "peasantry" can be accounted for theoretically in terms of an unstable equilibrium between these two forces internal to PCP.

The development of PCP can, in this manner, be understood as paralleling its own differentiation as part of the overall process of commoditisation as Bundy inter alia shows in the early part of his work. Some producers always manage to gain and retain control over means of production while others (usually the majority) lose such control. This is a general law of all forms of capitalism. This theoretical argument is largely corroborated by the empirical evidence from Southern Africa.

I have already noted that accumulation from below or at least its possibility, is indicated by the existence of PCP and the process of differentiation. To terminate the present section I will provide a summary of the evidence for this process in the Southern African region.\(^{14}\) I have outlined some of this evidence in greater detail elsewhere (Neocosmos, 1990–91).

If we first turn to an examination of these processes during the colonial period, especially in the 1890s, it is perhaps appropriate to begin with a reference to Zimbabwean history. In a recent reassessment of the linear proletarianisation thesis in Rhodesia, Phimister shows that not all Black agriculturalists were proletarianised by state oppression in the 1890s. Rather, administratively repressive measures were mediated by a process of differentiation already under way in rural areas (Phimister, 1986, 244).

In the early twentieth century, such a process of class differentiation continued, and while middle and rich peasants were often indistinguishable from the poor in terms of relations of distribution (their consumption levels were similar), they were starting to demarcate themselves as a specific class grouping in terms of relations of production (ibid., 250). As a result of this, the attacks by the state on the peasantry had far from uniform effects, Phimister argues. Even the rate of proletarianisation differed from district to district principally according to local class structures and configuration of class forces (ibid., 251–2).

Indeed, if the important Zambian work is excluded, Phimister’s work constitutes a practically unique account of the class differentia-

\(^{14}\) A recognition of the differentiation of the peasantry has been instrumental in undermining dependency theory in East Africa also, especially obviously in the case of Kenya; see Kitching (1985).
tion of the peasantry in Southern Africa during the colonial period. He not only argues that proletarianisation was not a uniform process and that differentiation occurred even during the periods of most intense state oppression, but he also shows that state activities themselves were conditioned by social relations “on the ground”. It follows that the colonial state and imperialism did not have the overwhelming power attributed to them by Radical Political Economy. It also follows that the oppressed classes were able to determine history often even under the most intense attacks of the state.

In contrast to Phimister’s reassessment of Zimbabwean historiography, historians in South Africa are still very much under the spell of the linear proletarianisation thesis. Most of these historians seem preoccupied with debating the precise date of the completion of the proletarianisation process (e.g. Beinart, 1988), or with the apparent “complexity” of social differences, including primarily non-class, but also some class divisions (e.g. those between chiefs, headmen, wealthy families, Christian families, “traditionalists”, “modernisers” and so on, as in Beinart, op.cit. or Beinart and Bundy, 1987). The result of all this has been a relativistic abandonment of theory which has produced a wealth of historical detail but ultimately analytical confusion, as no way is provided to make sense of the apparent “complexity” or of prioritising the analytically more important processes from the relatively secondary ones. This state of affairs has not always been helped by more theoretically informed writers such as Morris (1976) who have tended to adhere to a linear mechanical conception of capitalist “transition” whereby the proletarianisation of labour tenants in the 1930s and 1940s is seen as “completing the phase of transition in capitalist agriculture”. There is little conception here of the possible reproduction of petty-commodity production.  

In the case of Swaziland during the colonial period, I have argued elsewhere that agricultural PCP was developing in tandem with proletarianisation as part of an overall process of commoditisation which undermined lineage forms of social production (Neocosmos, 1987b). More specifically, I show in some detail how the introduction of the plough and the process of creation of reserves had differential

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15 Bundy draws an explicit parallel between the English enclosures and the dispossesssion of the peasantry after 1913 in South Africa. In his work and in that of Morris (op.cit.) this transformation is understood theoretically as concerning capitalism and not imperialism. See Bundy, op.cit., 231–2.

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effects, transformed the division of labour on Swazi homesteads into a typically "peasant" division of labour, and forced a transformation in the content of state power. By the last point I mean that there developed a change in the basis of the power of the chieftaincy which now came to control the rural population through its control over land rather than its earlier control over cattle. The so-called "traditional" form of the state was enhanced in parallel with this transformation in the power of the chieftaincy (ibid.).

The extent of the differentiation process in Swaziland during the colonial period has yet to be studied in detail, and it can so far only be gleaned from ad hoc information. Clearly, the extent of colonial oppression would have limited such a process, but this should not be confused with its absence. Just across the border, for example, in southern Mozambique where colonial oppression was, if anything, more severe than under British tutelage, Hermele finds evidence of a process of differentiation among the peasantry through access to cash from mine wages (Hermele, 1988, 15). Indeed this point is largely applicable, although to different extents to be sure, throughout the region. The "fall" of the peasantry was not felt uniformly, in a similar manner to which its earlier "rise" also had differential effects.

If we now turn to the post-colonial period, the extent of differentiation is more apparent although equally understudied. In particular, the work of Ruth First (1983) is central to an understanding of the role of mine wage remittances on the rural differentiation process. It was such remittances which formed the main basis for the separation between middle and poor peasants which First found in her investigation of the Inhambane Province. The former peasants depended on mine wages for agricultural production, while the latter did so for simple subsistence purposes (First, op.cit., 128–131). In other words, the temporary migration so typical of Southern Africa can be said to take place for different reasons for different strata of peasants or worker-peasants.

The importance of First's findings is that they radically undermine the linear proletarianisation thesis. In the case of the middle peasants at least, wage-labour is subsidising PCP, although the reverse process stressed by Wolpe and others is also taking place. In other words, super-exploited labour on the mines and petty-commodity production in rural areas have tended to mutually condition each other's existence. It follows therefore that high levels of migration cannot be uniformly visualised as an "index of poverty among rural Africans", as Mafeje stressed.
These findings are not restricted to southern Mozambique. My own research on the differentiation of the peasantry in Swaziland (Neocosmos, 1987a), reveals similar processes at work. Out of a sample of around 200 homesteads, 20 per cent were found to be poor peasants (i.e. semi-proletarians proper), 36 per cent were lower-middle peasants, 36 per cent upper-middle peasants, and 7 per cent rich peasants (ibid., 48). It was also found that the lower the peasant stratum, the greater the reliance on wage-labour (ibid., 51), and that all classes had some family members away at work, with the result that the rich and upper-middle strata utilised the proceeds of that labour for accumulation (not necessarily in agricultural production, given the lack of alternative avenues for accumulation from PCP in Swaziland) (ibid., 72). Thus these results largely corroborate First’s conclusions.

Black Gold and my own work on Swaziland, are the only two works that I know of to investigate explicitly the differentiation process among the peasantry in the region by studying production relations, although I am aware of research in progress which follows similar lines of thought in Zimbabwe and Mozambique.16 In Lesotho too there is evidence of differentiation, although Murray (1981) ascribes it to the Chayanovian biological forces of the “life cycle” and eschews social explanations of the phenomenon. In Botswana, the trend seems to be to employ a notion of “peasantariat” (e.g. Parson, 1984). Although this term does overcome some of the problems of linear proletarianisation as it is an attempt to avoid its assumption of necessary “downward mobility”, it conflates those producers who are forced to sell their labour power to ensure their reproduction with those who sell it as a source of accumulation.

In Zimbabwe, as I have noted, there is increasing evidence of differentiation in regional and class terms, although the latter is largely measured in terms of distribution relations (e.g. Coudere and Marjisse, 1988; Weiner, 1989).17 Interestingly enough, recent research has been suggesting implicitly or explicitly that during the independence war in Zimbabwe, ZANU relied most heavily on the “tradi-

16 See CEA (n.d.) and Cousins et al. (1990) for example. On the problems of ignoring the differentiation process in Mozambique, see in particular Hermele (op.cit.), Mackintosh and Wuyts (1987) and Wuyts (1989).

17 Such studies of the differentiation of the peasantry, or worker-peasants in Southern Africa, in terms of distribution relations are the most common; see De Vletter (1984) on Swaziland; Spiegel (1980; 1981) on Lesotho; Colclough and Fallon (1983) on Botswana for example.
tional leaders" who were among the better-off peasants, while Hermele (op.cit., 24) makes the same point with regard to Frelimo in the liberated zones during the liberation war. Such practices were far from being supportive of the most oppressed sections of the peasantry and obviously not the most democratic possible. Thus by ignoring the differentiation of the peasantry, such organisations automatically took the side of the more dominant peasants so that their mobilisation was undertaken in a far from democratic way. "Traditional leaders" were visualised as convenient vehicles for "delivering" mass support. Social relations in rural areas were rarely democ-
ratised as their oppressive nature was rarely recognized. Such errors are currently being repeated in the South African bantustans where the ANC is engaged in wooing chiefs to its side rather than organising the oppressed to democratise the state in rural areas.

In South Africa we are confronted with a literature which almost uniformly stresses the dispossession of the African peasantry in the interests of White-owned mines and farms, from the early twentieth century to the present. The effects of state policy are seen as governed by a simple logic of the creation of wage-labour for expanding capitalism, and its effects as monolithically destructive on the African population. While this literature served and continues to serve the valid purpose of demythologising segregationist and apartheid ideology, it is still largely framed within the nationalist problematic inaugurated by Plaatje's (1982) seminal work, and is thus largely limited in its ability to elucidate the contradictory effects (let alone content) of state repression (whether legislative or otherwise). This dominant tendency, which has been overwhelmingly moralistic rather than scientific in character, largely reflects the objective fact that in South Africa, we are confronted with historically the most repressive state in the region. It is also limited by the equally objective fact that the national question has still to achieve the first stage of its resolution there. Thus the South African literature on the agrarian question seriously lags behind that which is beginning to emerge from the independent countries of the region (let alone that which has been produced in East Africa for example).  

18 Among others Cobbett (1988) from a Social Democratic perspective is more recent advocate of the linear proletarianisation thesis. As usual, aggregate official statistics are used uncritically to "prove" the overwhelming disappearance of peasants in South Africa. As I have argued already, but especially in Neocosmos (1987a), aggregate statistics can do nothing of the sort.
As is well known, it was the 1913 Land Act, later consolidated in 1936, which laid the foundation for the African reserves which were from the 1960s to be transformed into "homelands" or "bantustans". It was under these acts and a panoply of legislation which was to follow, that peasant owners, sharecroppers, money tenants, and later labour tenants, were to be removed from "White" agricultural land and dumped into the reserves. While the historical literature is beginning to chronicle the resistance of the peasantry to this dispossession and to similar attacks by the state (e.g. Beinart and Bundy, 1987; Bradford, 1987), such struggles are largely being portrayed as interesting episodes, but ultimately losing battles or even as individual resourcefulness. Very little attempt is made to understand the contradictory nature of class formation among the oppressed. At the same time, the Surplus People's Project, the main chronicler of the destructive effects of forced removals, estimates that between 1960 and 1983, about 1.1 million "farm workers" and 475,000 peasant owners were removed from White agricultural land (Platzky and Walker, 1985). Although the category of "farm worker" is confusing because it tells us nothing regarding the nature of that labour, it is reasonably clear that this refers primarily to peasant labour tenants (TRAC, 1988, 26).

We should be wary of the categorisations employed in South African statistics. Thus, when we are told (Wilson and Ramphele, 1989, 24) that in 1980, just under 30 per cent of Blacks lived on White-owned farmland 19, we should be careful not to assume that all these people constitute different kinds of wage-labourers (as Marcus, 1986, for example seems to do), especially as so many White farms are organised in a highly paternalistic and repressive manner reminiscent of Latin American latifundia. Farms have their own schools and shops and, not surprisingly, there is evidence of the use of debt bondage as a form of social control of unfree labour.

Claasens (1990, 15) notes that "there are vast numbers of Black people (living on White farms) who are not wage labourers or their dependents. This number is increasing". It seems that the ratio of Africans to Whites has soared since the 1950s and that the total number of rural Blacks outside the bantustans increased, in absolute terms by two million between 1951 and 1980, despite the high levels of removals noted above (ibid.). If reliable, these figures certainly testify

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19 As opposed to 53 per cent in the bantustans and 18.5 per cent in the metropolitan areas (ibid.).
as Claasens notes, "to a process of tenacious resistance in the face of overwhelming odds" (ibid.). They also evidently testify to the fallacy of the linear proletarianisation thesis and the determinism inherent in Radical Political Economy in general.

Unfortunately we have little detailed information regarding production relations on White farms and we have to rely primarily on impressionistic accounts by activists. Thus TRAC's (1988) description of labour-tenants in one of the obvious pockets of "survival" in South Eastern Transvaal and Northern Natal, notes that tenant families sometimes employ labour to pay their labour dues to the farmer and that this practice "is very common" (ibid., 10), a process which implies differentiation among labour tenants and which is similar to practices recorded elsewhere in the world (e.g. in Chile in the 1960s). We do not know how common this practice is, but we do know that such labourers receive wages of between Rands (R) 60 and R 130 a month (R 30 from the farmer, and between R 30 and R 100 from the tenant family) (ibid.). This practice is clearly not understandable from within the parameters of the linear proletarianisation thesis; how can proletarianising peasants employ wage-labour?20 The same account of these tenants also notes:

It is not uncommon for families to have bred cattle of excellent stock which are coveted by other farmers, Black and White alike. I have seen big oxen change hands for over R1000 apiece and goats and sheep for R80. Often people own ploughs and sometimes even tractors which they have acquired and maintained over generations. (ibid., 12)

This account also notes that farm workers sometimes also have access to their own arable land as well as being allowed to keep stock (in one instance 25 cattle and 9 goats) on the farm (ibid.). I do not wish to imply that these instances are somehow generalisable, but only to suggest the deficiencies of conventional wisdom and the desperate need for serious investigations of production relations on White-owned land.

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20 I have argued in my Ph.D. thesis (Neocosmos, 1982, part two) that the parties of the Left in Chile during the 1960s and early 1970s, also misrecognised the class nature of labour tenants, confusing them with labourers paid in kind. This had disastrous consequences for Allende's Popular Unity government during the early seventies, as these parties relied on this class for their agrarian programme and ignored the real semi-proletarians and agricultural wage-labourers. This was one of the reasons for the failure of the class struggle in the countryside and the ultimate success of the coup.
As far as Black peasant owners outside the bantustans are concerned (the so-called “Black spots” as they are known in racist state terminology), Claasens notes that most have been removed to the bantustans and that there are fewer than ten “Black spots” left in the Transvaal for example, all of which are resisting removal. However the fact that the state was until recently removing peasant owners (mainly communities), bears testimony to the resistance of the peasantry which is certainly not abating. It also shows that the application of oppressive state legislation is never unproblematic.

The bantustans are usually described by Radical Political Economy as “labour reserves” or bases for a “reserve army of labour”. Attention is drawn to their environmental degradation due to over-grazing, soil erosion, and water shortage so that a strong case is made for the “non-viability” of agricultural production in these areas. The classical statement of this argument is Yawitch (1982). While such arguments do provide a strong corrective to the crass notions of apartheid ideology, they are limited by their moralistic approach and by their inability to comprehend the contradictory nature of social relations in the bantustans, which have meant that state policy, even when uniformly applied, has had contradictory effects. Thus Yawitch (op. cit.) makes much of the disaster of the so-called “betterment schemes”, a kind of forced villagisation programme (which, inter alia resulted in overcrowding on too little land) which the state implemented in the reserves, in various phases, from the 1930s to the 1950s.

While there is no denying the destructive effects of such programmes, precisely because they are enforced by state agencies, they do not have uniform effects. Cooper (1988, 95) for example, notes that land was not divided equally and that larger plots were allocated to chiefs, headmen and their supporters. In addition, he notes importantly that there is a large amount of variation between bantustans. In Qwa Qwa and Kwandebele, 80 per cent are landless, while in less crowded areas such as northern Transkei, 40 per cent have no plots.

The overcrowding in relation to land availability in the bantustans is a fact. However, it is also a fact that the bantustan authorities have been restricting access to land by land-hungry peasants, preferring to lease it out to ambitious large-scale capitalist (so-called “commercial”) farming schemes under the pretence of “development” exigencies. Also, it must not be forgotten that the majority of the land in the bantustans is under so-called “traditional” tenure and thus allocated and controlled by chiefs (ibid., 92), a point to which I shall return below.
There is little question that there is substantial agricultural (and non-agricultural) PCP in the bantustans (Beinart, 1988). The difficulty consists in ascertaining the nature and extent of the differentiation process. Different conceptions and extents of this process are used by Mbeki (1984, 109–10) and Moll (1988) for the Transkei in the 1960s, while for the more recent period, figures discussed by Innes and O’Meara (1976) indicate some kind of differentiation among Transkeian rural households. In the same bantustan, the emergence of a bourgeoisie, part of which has a basis in landownership, is discussed by Southall (1983) and Josana (1989). While this amounts to a classical case of accumulation “from above”, the process is not unrelated to differentiation among petty-commodity producers.

In several bantustans, accumulation by large or small tractor owners (Black or White) who plough peasants’ fields in return for a percentage (anything between 50 per cent and 90 per cent) of the crop is a common occurrence (Keegan, 1988, 151). This process of accumulation by some (who have often purchased mechanical equipment from savings from mine wages) is a common feature in Lesotho where it appears under the guise of “sharecropping”. This process of differentiation arises from a shortage of means of production and not of land. Under these conditions, the “owner” of the land ends up working de facto as a labourer on his/her own plot (Neocosmos, 1993).

In Kwazulu, the existence of socio-economic differentiation is described by May (1987) in distributionist terms, while Vaughan (1989, 34; 1991) documents the expansion of sugar PCP in outgrower schemes in Natal over the past fifteen years. Finally, it is worth noting the importance which the land has had for urban Blacks, for whom other avenues of accumulation are closed. Cattle ownership in particular has been a common way of investing the incomes of an urban petty-bourgeoisie (Keegan, 1988, 150).

There is perhaps no better indication of the fallacy of the linear proletarianisation thesis than the well-known widespread popular demand for land in South Africa, whether from the urbanised petty-bourgeoisie as Keegan notes, or from the peasantry and the agricultural labourers themselves. The extreme land shortage in the bantus-

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21 Innes and O’Meara (1976) do not draw a conclusion of differentiation from their paper. For a brief discussion of their figures, see Levin and Neocosmos (1989, 235–6).
tans obviously has effects at the level of consciousness. It would be a strange proletariat indeed which clamours this vociferously for land redistribution, even though this demand is not organisationally articulated by an independent peasant movement, for example. On the other hand, all liberation movements contain sections in their programmes regarding land redistribution, despite the fact that this struggle has (with rare exceptions) been largely urban based in the 1970s and 1980s.\(^{22}\)

This extensive demand for land has been manipulated by the ruling classes of most bantustans who have attempted to acquire more land from the central apartheid state by negotiating for “consolidation” of their territories. Such “consolidation” so-called, has its equivalent in demands by the Swazi and Lesotho governments for the return of parts of South African territory to “redress historical grievances”. This demand for land is quite undemocratic and reactionary. In the case of Swaziland, such land transfer was opposed by the majority of the Swazi speaking population in South Africa.

In sum, there is an abundance of evidence from the Southern African region—only part of which has been discussed here—which points indisputably to the reproduction of PCP and to differentiation in the countryside. It should perhaps be pointed out that to refer to all the forms of production outlined above as “petty-commodity production” is in no way intended to subsume important differences under a general rubric. Rather, it is crucial to understand that there exist different forms of PCP whose conditions of existence and reproduction differ. Sugar outgrowers in Natal organised by agribusiness, “Black spot” landowners and labour tenants for example have different precise conditions of existence which need to be recognised and analysed. Yet a recognition of such diversity would simply be relativistic and hence descriptive if it were not accompanied by an understanding of the commonality of these productive forms. It is the object of this study to point to the existence and extreme importance of a commonality of petty-commodity production in Southern Africa. It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper to analyse its innumerable forms.

THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY

In this section I shall attempt to draw together various strands of the theoretical and empirical arguments outlined above. In particular, I shall be concerned to argue that an objective analysis of the agrarian question in Africa must recognise a process of accumulation from below, or at least a potential for such accumulation in the contradictory nature of social relations. Moreover, it is important to understand the reasons for both the reproduction of PCP even in the most oppressive conditions characteristic of Southern Africa, as well as the reasons for the restriction of such accumulation and hence its apparent non-existence under the same conditions. These reasons are largely to be found in the social relations which imperialism has produced in Africa. In addition, it is these latter relations which provide the key to an understanding of the struggle for democracy on the continent. As above, I shall provide examples primarily from the Southern African region.

The social relations of imperialism and the question of democracy

The fact that Radical Political Economy has not recognised the production and differentiation of rural PCP in Southern Africa is not simply due to its theoretical deficiencies; nor is it simply due to the conscious espousal of a specific political position. This misconception was (and still is) partly due to the real facts that a large proportion of the oppressed population reproduce themselves (although not exclusively) on the basis of the sale of labour-power, and that class differentiation is restricted among the oppressed. The fact that the process of differentiation is indeed restricted is, to a great extent, due to intense political repression most evidently prevalent under colonial and apartheid state rule.

The relative process of democratisation which the struggle for independence unleashes, tends to lead to a clearer demarcation of classes from among the peasantry and the oppressed as a whole. It is not surprising that peasant accumulation and class differentiation among the peasantry became so much more apparent after independence (most obviously in Zimbabwe). At the same time in Africa, the extent of demarcation/differentiation has been restricted by
the ruling classes' compromises with reaction (imperialism) thus producing neo-colonialism. The maintenance of pre-independence repressive legislation in the post-independence period for example, is a common occurrence in Africa.

The openly repressive states associated with colonialism and apartheid thus restrict class demarcation. In particularly oppressive conditions, it is not difficult for the oppressed as a whole to appear as a proletariat in the making. At the same time, it is imperative to note that it is fundamentally mistaken to confuse the statements or intentions of the state and its agents for reality. This often seems to be the case in "radical" analyses of apartheid (and its previous state forms) whose intention, we are told, was to procure labour-power for various branches of the South African economy.

It should be recalled first, that explicit state policy was not always motivated by a "desire" to proletarianise. Rather, this policy often alternated between "proletarianisation" and "peasantisation", as the state attempted to regulate economic fluctuations. The shift in policy towards the South African bantustans, first as labour reserves, then in more recent years, as "rural development areas" to restrict the flow of migration to the cities, is a case in point (Unterhalter, 1987). Similar processes also operated throughout Zimbabwean history.

Second, state policy did not simply vacillate between these two alternatives, but had at times to pursue both simultaneously, despite the obvious contradictions. This seems to constitute the essence of the South African state's "betterment" policy for example, in spite of the fact that the Tomlinson Commission's recommendations for the creation of a rich peasantry in the bantustans were not followed (Yawitch, 1982; Levin and Weiner, 1991).

Third, it should also be recalled that the South African racists' ideal, represented in Verwoerd's attempt to socially engineer W.A. Lewis' "dual sector model" in the real world, required the separation of the commodity labour-power from the labourer himself, a point explicitly made by state representatives.²³ Now, the separation of labour-power from the labourer in social, and not just in geographical terms, requires the ability of the said labourer to reproduce himself partly independently of the wage form, otherwise the pressure to increase wages and thus overcome this separation would be too

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²³ A prominent National Party MP declared at the time that "the Bantu...are only supplying a commodity, the commodity of labour...It is labour we are importing not labourers as individuals...Numbers make no difference" (cited in SAIRR, 1966, 1–2).
great. To that extent the "ideal" racist policy required at one and the same time, the partial freeing of labour from the land and the partial tying of labour to the land.

It is this process which Wolpe and others have seen as one of "preservation-dissolution" of "pre-capitalist modes", but as recent research shows, unfree labour is perfectly compatible with and often produced by, capitalist relations so that it is not necessarily "pre-capitalist" in content. On the contrary the control of unfree forms of labour (which often take pre-capitalist repressive forms) is a necessary product and a specific attribute of capitalism in its imperialist form in the region. At the same time, it should be noted that these unfree forms of labour have developed historically hand in hand with new forms of relations to the land which formally resemble pre-capitalist left-overs but which are essentially capitalist in content (Neocosmos, 1987b).

How is it therefore possible to offer an alternative account of these contradictory phenomena? An initial pointer is provided by First (op.cit., 130) when she notes that, although in some areas of Mozambique, peasant production had been virtually destroyed as a result of land alienation, in other areas where mining capital had extensive influence, the peasantry was systematically reproduced alongside wage-labour. This is a very important remark, for it seems that in many instances, mining capital reproduced PCP to an extent which other forms of capital could not. Thus it is reasonably apparent that, far from just having a "proletarianising effect", the development of mining capital in particular, had much more contradictory effects, one of which was to produce and reproduce PCP.

The causes of these contradictory formations and effects, briefly sketched above, are not simply to be laid at the door of the "desire" of capitalists (or the "needs" of capital) to secure for themselves the supply of extra-cheap labour-power. However, there is no doubting that this conforms to what capitalists always "desire" (and to what capital always "needs"), and that labour is super-exploited in the region. Nevertheless, capital has historically known other ways of reducing wages and increasing its profits (e.g. by reducing the value of labour-power through increasing relative surplus value extraction, or by increasing absolute surplus value extraction, or again through a process of de-skilling). Accounts which refer to the "will" of capital or the abstract "interests" of capital can never explain the particular strategy employed other than with reference to an accidental choice. Such accounts are obviously steeped in voluntaristic assumptions.

The conditions of existence of super-exploited labour and the at-
tendent production and reproduction of PCP are to be found in the social structure of imperialist relations in the region, rather than in the "will" of capitalists or the "interests" of capital. It is this fundamental nature of imperialism which the linear proletarianisation thesis fails to comprehend, which accounts for its inability to see the simultaneous production of a proletariat and PCP either separately or especially in its relatively stable combination of "worker-peasants". This combination must not be seen as just a temporary stage on the ineluctable road to full proletarian status, but as a necessary product of current social relations which could thereby "dissolve" in either direction once these relations are systematically democ-
ratised.

As Shivji (1988b) has recently remarked, the operation of imperialism—as a specific form of the capitalist mode of production—systematically modifies the laws of motion of capitalism in some fundamental ways which are central to the reproduction of the social formations of the region. As imperialism is monopoly capitalism, its form of operation is geared not just towards the formation of profits but of super-profits. What this means is that it cannot be assumed that in general, commodities are bought and sold at their value. In Africa a process of "cheating" on the market takes place systematically (not as a matter of accident, but as a matter of course) in some dominant markets and is usually referred to as "unequal exchange". Its operations have been discussed at length in the literature, in at least three different areas:

- internationally (between countries) whereby capital accumulation is restricted in the neo-colonial countries and dominated by imperialist/monopoly interests—a system discussed at length by dependency theory;
- between town and country (or the state and the peasantry, or industry and agriculture) whereby a so-called "surplus" is systematically extracted from the peasantry. In this relation generally, the majority of peasants are exploited (i.e. they are only able to reproduce themselves below value levels, so that they may appear as "wage-labour equivalents" (Bernstein, 1977), while a minority have their profits reduced or are forced to subsist as middle-peas-
ants. This process receives extensive treatment in the literature from East Africa in particular (e.g. Shivji, 1987);
- on the labour market, where wages are systematically depressed below the value of labour-power, the typical Southern African condition.
Some of the effects of these relations of imperialism need to be discussed at greater length. First as I have noted, the systematic extraction of value from rural petty-commodity producers is felt differentially. Some will be exploited, others will have their levels of accumulation reduced and will “squeeze” their workers, others still will be confined to middle-peasant status. Clearly, this unequal exchange mechanism depresses the differentiation process so that PCP may take the appearance of homogeneity, especially under severely repressive conditions, either as “wage-labour equivalents” or as middle peasants (Gibson and Neocosmos, 1985 on Tanzania; Neocosmos, 1987a on Swaziland) or even as poor and middle peasants (First, 1983 on southern Mozambique). But this does mean either a lack of differentiation or an ineluctable process of proletarianisation. If total proletarianisation took place, the extraction of “surplus” could no longer operate and this feature of imperialist relations would cease to exist. The existence of unequal exchange would be threatened, hence as has been observed, this process stops short of full expropriation (Bernstein, 1977). At the same time, given that rural PCP is the main indigenous source of value—as the working-class is relatively small in Africa—the exploitation of the countryside by the town becomes central to African political economy.

Second, if the super-exploitation of labour is to be systematically reproduced by paying for labour-power below its value, then some link to PCP must be reproduced, either by tying labour to the land, or through the reproduction of other forms of PCP (such as the so-called “informal sector” in towns). These links to PCP imply a relatively effective limit to the proletarianisation process. In the present context of social relations, this is the most effective way for capital to reduce wages on a large scale, compared to say the reliance on relative surplus value extraction which would necessitate, inter alia, the capitalization of agriculture, or to deskill or through capitalization (as in Western countries), although these methods are also employed in a subordinate way in the Southern African region. At the same time, this dual reproduction of wage-labour and PCP “in combination” (worker-peasants) will tend to allow for the reproduction of “pure” wage-labour and “pure” PCP “at the margin” so to speak. This is simply because the operation of the capitalist mode of production is only modified and not fundamentally transformed by monopoly conditions. Ultimately it creates the prerequisites for the reproduction of the essential relation between capital and wage-labour, and hence for the appearance of the latter in its “purer” forms.
Third, systematic unequal exchange goes hand in hand with systematic extra-economic coercion as it overrides the market (Mamdani, 1987a, 1987b). Pre-capitalist forms of state, law and custom (e.g. the chieftaincy, land tenure) shorn of their pre-capitalist democratic content, and adapted to imperialist conditions have provided useful vehicles for extra-economic coercion and the reproduction of unfree labour. These have been recreated in new forms by repressive states in Southern Africa, and make it appear as if rural relations do not just take pre-capitalist forms, but also have a pre-capitalist content (as in articulationism) (Neocosmos, 1987b).

Fourth, the systematic process of unequal exchange has the effect of giving a greater centrality to the market in society, so that market relations assume an overriding importance in social life. Simply put, it appears that the market itself is the source of exploitation as "cheating" becomes the norm. Incidentally, this is obviously the source of the error of dependency theory. It is also the source of the error which equates capitalism with the "inequalities of the market" so that the redressing of these inequalities becomes equated with anti-capitalism, and national liberation becomes equated with socialism. More importantly, as exchange relations operate between entities defined by a capitalist division of labour (e.g. between specialised enterprises, between sectors of the economy such as agriculture and industry, between employers and owners of specialised useful labour in Marx's sense, and so on—Gibbon and Neocosmos, op.cit.), this division of labour assumes an even more prominent position within the political economy of Africa as a result of the inequality of exchange relations. The effects are that obviously identifiable classes are relegated to a somewhat secondary status and what is often referred to as "uneven development" becomes more noticeable.

The expressions of such uneven development as Shivji (1988b, 10) notes, such as geographical inequalities (we could also add inequalities between nationalities), distinctions between town and country, industry and agriculture, mental and manual labour and so on, become more acute. It follows that under these conditions, class divisions do not obviously dominate the social formations in question. Classes are displaced in importance by nationality and regional differences, sectoral differences, and countless distinctions between buyers and sellers, so that the primary objective of the struggle of the oppressed becomes one of redressing capitalist market inequalities and the arbitrariness of the state corresponding to them—a struggle for bourgeois freedoms and rights, rather than against capitalist exploitation as such.
Further consequences of what might be termed the "centrality of the market" and the consequent primacy of divisions of labour over class divisions, are the apparent identity of class with economic sectors (à la Lipton) and/or the apparent equation of classes with national or racial groupings (as is often the case in South Africa). Moreover, under these conditions, the state does not appear qua class state but as the state of a particular nationality, of a particular regional grouping, of a particular racial group, or even of a particular family. Thus the overtly repressive state appears to represent phenomenally one section of the division of labour, one section of society, and does not appear as existing above society, as seemingly "neutral" as it does under conditions of bourgeois democracy. Thus, as has been frequently noted, there is no apparent distinction in Africa between state and civil society. This latter dimension of the bourgeois division of labour is paradoxically less pronounced under repressive conditions.

We are driven in this way to a discussion of the question of democracy. We have seen that for Lenin, imperialism was politically, the "negation of democracy in general". Clearly, systematic unequal exchange requires extra-economic coercion and such conditions tend to produce highly repressive states. While colonial and apartheid states are typical of an earlier phase of imperialism, Shivji (ibid., 9) argues that "the anti-democratic nature of imperialism finds its most concentrated expression in the neo-colonial states of Africa" which are overwhelmingly repressive in character. Given the characteristics of the political economy of the state just outlined, it follows that democratic struggles in Southern Africa in particular have had particular characteristics. Although these struggles have a class content, the dominance of the division of labour (e.g. between Black and White in South Africa) ensures that they are fought out between organisations which represent a number of classes (and/or sections of classes). Insofar as the peasantry resists state oppression, it is still (because of the lack of clear differentiation) on the basis of communities as a whole (which of course include several class groupings).

As Lenin's work argued, it is in such processes of democratic transformation, that it is possible for classes to become more clearly demarcated and play independent roles in civil society. Moreover, it also follows that a future socialist project requires the most democratic resolution possible of such struggles. The agrarian question is one of those issues, the democratic resolution of which is necessary for future advance. Moreover, there is little doubt that the petty-bourgeoisie (or the bourgeoisie when it has existed) in Africa has
proved incapable of resolving or of leading the people towards a resolution of democratic questions in general and of the agrarian question in particular. It could not and cannot do so because it is obliged to compromise with reaction for a number of reasons, as pointed out above. The issue of democracy in Africa can therefore only be resolved from a different class perspective—from the point of view of the working people under different ideological leadership. That ideology must be a genuine proletarian ideology, as the proletariat is the only class in whose interests it is to be consistently democratic. Such a democratic ideology would also contribute, through the practices associated with it, to the constitution of the proletariat as a class in the full sense of the term.

In sum, it can be argued that in the Southern African region in particular, the dominant tendency has been for monopoly capitalist conditions to produce not a clearly demarcated proletariat, neither a proletariat in the making—nor for that matter a large "pure" peasantry—but a strange amalgam as Wallerstein (1976) for one recognised some time ago. This semi-proletariat is a specific and necessary product of these conditions, and cannot simply be visualised as a "creation" of the state or an effect of the interests of capital. Neither is it an aberration nor a stage to full proletarian status. Although oppressed as a whole by the state, the worker-peasantry in Southern Africa contains a tendency towards differentiation as the evidence shows. Increased differentiation and hence accumulation from below will require a thorough process of democritisation from below.

The contradictions of the state and rural PCP in Southern Africa

The institutional forms, strategies and practices associated with "statism" have been dominant in Sub-Saharan Africa this century. Whether the state in Africa has been colonial, neo-colonial or of an apartheid/racist nature, its fundamental structures have been similar. While significant political and economic differences have existed between (and within) all three types of state (largely due to the configuration of ruling classes and struggles which account for their variations in form), each was also characterised by a combination of extra-economic coercion, state-based accumulation strategies and intense political repression.

These common attributes, I have argued, were derived from the constitution of capitalism in Africa on the basis of monopolistic forms of surplus-value extraction. At the same time and in particular,
in each of these cases, the economic conditions for accumulation from below were reproduced, irrespective of whether such accumulation did in fact take place. When it has occurred, such accumulation has obviously been highly restricted and subordinated to accumulation from above, often to the extent that its effects were economically negligible. However, accumulation from below has only been restricted because of extra-economic coercion—i.e. fundamentally because of political repression.

Unlike in the conditions of primitive accumulation in Europe where, by and large, state coercion had ultimately progressive effects in the economic constitution of a proletariat in particular (the state itself could thus be seen as a "productive power"), in Africa such extra-economic coercion has taken place within a framework of imperialist social relations. These have undermined productive accumulation and have overwhelmingly restricted such a process to one "from above" where the "economy of plunder" is reproduced to the exclusion of the manifestation of vigorous productive accumulation from below.

Nevertheless, this did not mean that the economic conditions of existence of accumulation from below were destroyed. These could not be destroyed under generalised commodity production. To maintain that they were is to conflate capitalism with one of its forms, imperialism; it is to maintain that monopoly relations can exist independently of competition on the market, or that there is such a thing as "integral imperialism".

In Africa, the economic conditions of existence of PCP have been reproduced not just by the reproduction of capitalist relations, but by imperialist relations and by the state itself. As already noted in the case of Southern Africa, the successful reproduction of labour-power below its value went hand in hand with the reproduction of PCP on the land (and to a significant extent in towns too). The objective economic effect of development aid programmes in the region along with that of the more general state provision of infrastructure, extension services, soft loans, health and educational services and so on, has been precisely the reproduction of PCP and the restriction of the proletarianisation process. Even in the most extreme forms of statism (colonialism and apartheid), such conditions were reproduced, although at a "less adequate" level than under neo-colonialism.

Statism in Africa, therefore, had a contradictory character. While on the one hand it reproduced the economic conditions of accumulation from below, it contributed to the overwhelming dominance of
accumulation from above, the plunder of the direct producers (workers and peasants) and hence to the subordination and often to the apparent destruction of a process of accumulation from below. This contradictory character of the state corresponds, it could be argued, to the contradiction between the capitalist mode of production and its imperialist form in the continent.

So far I have treated the political economy of Southern Africa in rather general terms. In this section, some comments will be made on the more concrete aspects of the relations between the state and rural petty-commodity producers in the region. The agrarian question consists of the economic and political oppression of such producers as a whole, as unequal exchange and the extra-economic coercion associated with it do not affect a single class, but the oppressed people.

Mamdani shows how in Uganda, forced labour, forced contributions and forced crops are regularly impressed on the peasantry through a process of extra-economic coercion by the state, and how this leads to a form of accumulation from above which is bureaucratic and compradorial in character (Mamdani, 1987a, 198–209). The agrarian question in Southern Africa shares some of these features with Uganda and the rest of Africa. The fact that these forms of exploitation exist at all, is an additional indication of the importance of PCP in Southern Africa; indeed, I have argued elsewhere that their history is one which parallels the development of PCP in the region (Neocosmos, 1987b).

In particular, the reproduction of the conditions for PCP in Southern Africa, on whatever restricted terms, was made possible by the reproduction of “traditional” forms of access to land and means of production in the bantustans and in the independent countries of the South African “periphery”, as well as by the subsidisation of PCP by wage remittances. This process has been particularly evident in those countries such as (southern) Mozambique and Swaziland where the physical land base of PCP was not as undermined as in others. It is also apparent in Lesotho and in the Transkei (as well as in Kwazulu) for instance, where accumulation in agriculture is taking place without always direct access to the land, through “sharecropping” arrangements and/or access to “communal” grazing areas.

In my work on Swaziland, I have shown principally the political side of this oppression which serves to reproduce state power in the rural areas. A few comments on these issues are important in the present context. The main state agent which the peasantry faces in
Southern Africa is the chief, and it is through a “tradition” remodelled and recreated by colonial capitalism that the state reproduces its power over rural petty-commodity producers. While colonial states in the region, engaged in systematic policies of “tribalisation” and invented tradition (often wholesale) which increased the powers of the chieftaincy, it was mainly during the period of imperialism that the powers of the latter were entrenched (Neocosmos, 1990–91).

The creation of reserves, from the late 1890s onwards, not only had the effect of proletarianising large sections of the peasantry, it also strengthened the power of the chieftaincy to allocate and remove land from peasants. In pre-colonial Southern Africa, the powers of the chieftaincy over the population were not founded on their control over land, but principally on their control of bridewealth (cattle) within lineage modes of production. I have argued in the case of Swaziland, that the creation of reserves in a period of rapid and increased commoditisation, helped to transform the powers of the chieftaincy from ones founded on the control of cattle to ones based on the control over land (Neocosmos, 1987b). This new form of control, could only operate satisfactorily because it occurred simultaneously with a process of peasantisation or the historical production of rural PCP. At the same time, the chieftaincy cooperated with the mining industry in controlling migrant labour, while a so-called “traditional” induna system was used to control labour on mines as well as to reproduce nationality divisions there.

While I have used this argument to show that the Swazi state is fundamentally capitalist, that its “traditional” features do not constitute a simple left-over from the past, I have also used it to suggest that the formally traditional aspects of the Swazi state are explained by the fact that state power is fundamentally reproduced through its control over the peasantry, which is then generalised to cover the population as a whole (ibid.). Thus the chieftaincy and the whole panoply of “tradition” of which this institution is the custodian, forms the foundation of the ultra-repressive Swazi state. Similar points can be made regarding the reproduction of “ethnic” states in the bantustans of South Africa.

It must be recalled that on assuming power in 1948, the National Party went about systematically increasing the powers of the chieftaincy under the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act and the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1952. In terms of these laws, chiefs became paid government officials and their powers of land allocation and withdrawal, and those of settlement of disputes were codified in law so that “traditionalism” was entrenched. Previously, chiefs had been
responsible to local government officials. The chiefs constitute the principal aspect of apartheid state power in Black rural areas.

Throughout Southern Africa (with appropriate variations) the importance of the chieftaincy’s control over land is manifold. In the first place, it not only enables them to extract bribes from the peasantry in return for allocating them a plot on which to produce (justified by reference to “traditional” culture, of course), but the threat of banishment from the land constantly hangs over the peasantry, especially in conditions of land scarcity, thus enabling the development of patronage relations which systematically fleece the people of their resources. In addition, this provides the basis for the mobilisation of unpaid labour or cash for the construction of public works (roads, contours, dipping tanks, schools, clinics, water points and so on) (Neocosmos, 1987b; Mbeki, 1984; Haines and Tapscott, 1988). Chiefs can also require payment for any official function and can regularly utilise free labour and extorted funds for personal accumulation. Chiefs of course also have judicial functions of legislating bye-laws and the power to try cases under customary “traditional” law.

The important point regarding these relations is that they provide the framework for the operation of all state agencies in the rural areas, including most importantly the NGOs involved in rural development programmes. These agencies are all engaged, in various degrees, in extorting funds from the rural population and in mobilising unpaid labour, or super-exploited labour, justified by an ideology of “popular participation”, “self-help” or “self-sufficiency”. In Lesotho, the current “Food for Work” programme whereby rural women are enticed to build roads in return for paltry food handouts, is only one small example of these relations. In Swaziland these practices are so extreme, that I have referred to them as “systematic institutionalised plunder” (Neocosmos, 1987b). It is this direct form of exploitation, rather than the indirect one through pricing mechanisms which is dominant in the region. Moreover of course, this direct form of extraction of resources is felt differentially by different classes of peasants as poor peasants are forced to provide free labour, while the richer peasants can get away with providing cash in lieu.

In Swaziland these practices are coupled with a mobilisation of the rural population into a plethora of state run “development committees” which accord with the ideology of “popular participation”, leave no room for democratic control, and hence contribute to the reproduction of state power (ibid.). In addition, PCP in the countries
which are part of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) finds it impossible to compete with subsidised South African farmers. In sum a combination of political and economic forces combine to restrict accumulation from below in the region (while SACU payments provide one of the main sources of state revenue and of accumulation from above). The unremitting intense political oppression, coupled with the unrestricted importation of South African food products in a number of countries in the region, combine to depress class differentiation and to produce a seemingly homogeneously proletarianised (semi-)peasantry.

In South Africa, these oppressive relations have not been addressed officially by the ANC which has confined itself to enticing the support of “progressive chiefs”, and to addressing the land issue independently of such oppressive relations. In this, the ANC is following in the footsteps of other liberation movements in the region. The ANC is clearly handicapped by the weakness of its support organisations in the rural areas, but it seems singularly uninterested to develop these, preferring to wheel and deal with bantustan leaders and to “attract them to its side” thus preserving the institution of the chieftainship on which the powers of these leaders rest.

The agrarian question cannot be reduced to the land question in the region, and I have already noted how the latter has been manipulated by the ruling classes of the bantustans to suit their own interests. A genuinely democratic transformation of the social relations of apartheid in the rural areas of South Africa in the interests of the majority of the oppressed is not just a question of “redressing historical/national grievances” through land redistribution. It is a question of democratising the social relations under which land is held and exploited. It involves of necessity a democratic restructuring of the land tenure system(s) and a democratisation/abolition of the chieftaincy (i.e. a withdrawal of all political powers from chiefs and the vesting of these in popular organisations). This amounts to a restructuring of PCP-state relations in a democratic way.

In any case land is in itself of little use to those worker-peasants who are short of means of production, and who as a result, enter into “sharecropping” arrangements with tractor owners, as in Lesotho and the Transkei (see also Neocosmos, 1987a on Swaziland). The land question can only be resolved adequately through a democratic resolution to the agrarian question. While in most countries of the region, a thoroughly democratic land reform (including land redistribution) is necessary, such a reform needs to address the issue of
the democratisation of state power in the absence of which the land question itself (let alone the agrarian question) cannot be thoroughly resolved. At the same time, the Southern African working-class needs to be freed from its ties to the land which allow for its super-exploitation. The free development of differentiation in rural areas is ultimately the only solution to this issue.

Moreover, it should be noted that it is in the countryside of independent Southern Africa that the neo-colonial character of the state is most clearly visible, for it is here that multinational and foreign agencies are involved in adding to, or substituting themselves for state agencies in the most direct fashion. Indeed, the main effect of rural development programmes is arguably to reproduce state power in rural areas (Ferguson, 1990). Democratisation is not a question of transferring the powers of state agencies to supposedly more neutral NGOs, nor is it a question of organising more state directed "self-help" programmes. It is about providing the conditions in which the oppressed majority in the rural areas can build their own economic and political organisations as independently as possible from state regulation. As Mamdani (1987b) argues, such democratisation must involve more than multipartyism if it is to benefit the oppressed majority.

While the relations between the state and the peasantry in Africa have been overwhelmingly repressive, this has not prevented several African states from engaging in policies (e.g. subsidies on inputs, some development programmes, etc), which have been to the advantage of PCP (and which have often restricted total proletarianisation), along with other policies (e.g. monopoly marketing boards and low producer prices) which have not. These contradictory practices should be attributed to the contradictory nature of the state in Africa.

One of the problematic tendencies of the arguments of the ideologists of the IFIs (e.g. Bates, 1984), is to reduce state practices to policies. These arguments note that (e.g. pricing) policies have largely been detrimental to the peasantry and then note that these are the result the "bias of the interest groups" which control the state. They then use the arguments of "neo-classical" economics to suggest that the market should be "freed" from state intervention, and tend to conflate democracy with economic liberalisation and multipartyism. Apart from anything else, what is overlooked here is that the oppressive relations between the state and the peasantry are not fundamentally the result of policy decisions. They exist indepen-
dently of policy, and in conditions such as those in Southern Africa where the main method of “surplus” extraction is direct, these oppressive relations will in no way decrease in intensity unless they are genuinely democratised. Moreover, if the various social subsidies and rural assistance/development programmes (however minor and biased their effects) are also removed as a result of economic liberalisation policies, the likely result can only be increased pressure towards the proletarianisation of the African peasantry under continued repressive conditions. If the problems of statist development are to be overcome in Africa, there is no genuine alternative to a process of democratisation from below.

The explicitly articulated policy of the World Bank insofar as creating an “enabling environment” for rural accumulation is concerned, is simply to advocate land privatisation and thereby apparently, the destruction of the “traditional” land tenure systems (Gibbon, 1992b). As I have noted, the effects of such land tenure systems in Southern Africa have been basically threelfold: they have enabled the state control/oppression of the worker-peasantry as a whole to be reproduced; they have restricted accumulation from below, and they have also restricted total proletarianisation. As such, land tenure is not simply a legal relation of access to land, but it reflects important class relations within rural areas as well as relations between the state and the people. Land tenure therefore cannot be altered as a simple act of will by the state, but only through struggle.

Indeed, the advocates of private land tenure in Southern Africa have found themselves “compromising” their stated belief in private ownership so as not to undermine state control in agriculture, or in countries such as Swaziland, state power itself (see Neocosmos, 1987b). As a result, various undemocratic compromises have been reached between the chieftaincy and the imperialist advocates of privatisation. In Swaziland in particular, the “traditional” form of land tenure has been retained while private land deals between the “traditional” state and (usually) agribusiness interests have been enacted. These have expressed a compromise between these interests to the detriment of “traditional” popular rights to natural resources (pasture, arable land, water, etc.). It is therefore quite possible to have a situation where private land ownership exists de facto for some, while the appearance of “traditional” land tenure is maintained, not just to reproduce ideological appearances, but in order to reproduce state power over the worker-peasantry.

In Lesotho, the powers of the chieftaincy have been systemati-
cally reduced from the colonial period onwards so that today, chiefs have become paid officials of a "modern" state. Land is in theory nationalised (although a limited market exists) and the chiefs' powers of land allocation have been subordinated to "development committees" which have been historically dominated by political parties. As in other African countries, the power of such parties has been exercised through political patronage and the monopoly access to state resources. Although formally different from the case of Swaziland, the relations between the state and the rural people are essentially equally oppressive.

Under these kinds of conditions, the arbitrariness of state power cannot be removed by the mere privatisation of land. If the land were to become fully privatised what is likely to happen as recent evidence from other parts of Africa shows, is that trading in land will tend to be dominated by urban "non-farming" interests which are the groups with sufficient resources to take advantage of such privatisation (Gibbon, op.cit.). Whether land is used productively or not then becomes the result of other than purely agricultural considerations. At the same time, proletarianisation is likely to increase under conditions highly injimical to the self-organisation of labour, because oppressive social relations, state institutions and practices would have been retained.

It must be clear therefore that from the perspective of the working people, the mere privatisation of land ownership can provide no solution to the agrarian question. It cannot provide an "enabling environment" for accumulation from below for the simple reason that it does not of itself address the issue of the oppression of the peasantry by the state. In order for this issue to be adequately addressed, the power of the state in rural areas must be confronted "from below". While as I have noted in particular, the political power of the chief-taincy must be completely withdrawn and vested in popular organisations, this cannot be done administratively or "legally" by self-appointed "organisations of the working people". The only justifiable option is to provide the conditions for popular organisations to burgeon in rural areas.

It should be clear that genuine land reform in Africa at the present historical conjuncture, is about the development of popular initiatives—about the development of civil society—in rural areas. The issue of the legal ownership (privatisation, nationalisation or whatever) of land is if anything, purely secondary in the absence of independent popular organisations in the countryside. To use Lenin's
words: “if you wait until the law is written, and yourselves do not develop revolutionary initiative, you will have neither the law nor the land” (Lenin, 1917c, 99–100, emphasis in original). Therefore, in the absence of the development of independent popular organisations in rural areas, democracy from below and accumulation from below are inconceivable in contemporary Africa. The first step in the struggle for a democratic resolution to the agrarian question is the struggle for such independent organisations. This constitutes the only genuine “enabling environment” for accumulation from below.
CONCLUSION

The debate on democracy in Africa has only just begun. If this debate is not to be dominated by those who equate democracy with economic liberalisation, it is imperative that the Left in Africa is able to engage in self-criticism and re-examine many of its cherished assumptions, especially, as Shivji notes, given its role in supporting “statist developmentalism”. The Left must move beyond countering state-led development to “free market forces”; so much is clear. The issues are rather: what kind of state, what kind of democracy, what kind of accumulation are pertinent for the people? I have argued in this paper that classical Marxism theorises different forms of capitalist development and democracy which co-exist in the process of agrarian change. I have also suggested that similar forms also exist at present in Southern Africa in particular, despite the denials of Radical Political Economy. I have also drawn attention to some of the problems which flow from ignoring “accumulation from below”.

The IFIs and their ideologists do not ignore accumulation from below. In fact they purport to argue that the withdrawal of the state from the market and the “freeing” of market forces will, of itself, un-leash such accumulation. As Mamdani (1989) argues in the case of Uganda, such strategies are likely to benefit precisely the “unproductive rent-seeking” sectors which the IFIs spend so much time criticising, and hence to reproduce state oppression and extra-economic coercion. Given the social relations of capitalism in its imperialist form in Africa, there is very little chance of accumulation from below developing further unless these relations are systematically democratised. This can only happen if democracy goes beyond the narrow form of multipartyism currently advocated, to a democratisation of state structures themselves.

At the intellectual level, this requires a move beyond the confines of the petty-bourgeois nationalism of Radical Political Economy. Such a new theoretical approach would have to start by recognising a number of points:

1. The national question (the contradiction between imperialism and the people) is still the dominant contradiction in contemporary neo-colonial Africa, and although such a contradiction is dominant, it is not the determinant contradiction—i.e. it is itself determined by the essential contradiction of capitalism (capital/
wage-labour) which manifests itself in specific forms during the epoch of imperialism in Africa. In particular this imperialist form of capitalism means that extra-economic coercion is central to the operations of the political economy of Southern Africa. It also means that, inter alia, the national contradiction is accompanied in the region by a contradiction between rural and urban, or town and country whereby rural producers are the main classes to suffer from this extra-economic coercion and its attendant oppressive political practices.

2. Cleavages between oppressors and oppressed follow the lines of already historically established divisions of labour. It is therefore necessary to understand, in fact as well as in theory, that both oppressors and oppressed (especially the latter) are composed of different classes. These have a temporary convergence/congruence of different interests vis-a-vis oppression/imperialism. Both on the side of the power bloc (state/imperialism) and on the side of the people (sectors of the urban petty-bourgeoisie, peasants, workers, women, urban PCP) there are secondary contradictions which will become more prominent as transformations in form affect our societies. Although such contradictions have been restricted by political repression, unequal exchange and extra-economic coercion, they have not and cannot be wiped out.

3. Intermediary classes (or elements thereof) exist between the state/imperialism and the people which vacillate between these two poles: e.g. elements of a national bourgeoisie (or national bourgeois politics) and elements of a national petty-bourgeoisie (petty-bourgeois nationalist politics and ideology).

4. It must be understood that the state/imperialism cannot be equated with the bourgeoisie, and that the people cannot be equated with a proletariat or with a proletariat in the making. Unequal exchange and extra-economic coercion, which affect the masses of the people, cannot be equated with capitalism as such, but only with the specific form of capitalism associated with monopoly (imperialist) relations in our continent. In particular, this means that the current crisis of the state in Africa is a crisis of a particular state form under conditions where the proletariat is not clearly demarcated as a class (economically, politically and ideologically). As such it is a particular form of capitalism which is being contested by the masses and not capitalism as such.

5. The primary political objective is one of a (bourgeois) democra-
tic transformation (under proletarian leadership if possible, especially at the level of practices) as a prelude to a future socialist transformation. There is no question/objective possibility of socialist struggles as such in our region at the moment. These will arise (if at all) during the democratic struggle or thereafter. This possibility depends, among other things, on the form of that democratic struggle itself.

6. The political issues that have to be raised are ones which can acquire majority support from the various classes of the oppressed. The central issue is to counterpose popular forms of democracy and accumulation to democratisation from above (e.g. multipartyism) advocated by imperialism as a result of its own restructuring and of its crisis with the African state. At the same time it should be clear that the “solution” advocated by the IFIs for the encouragement of accumulation from below—namely state “withdrawal” from the market—cannot succeed in its intentions, for it does not confront the political economy of imperialism which is the source of statism and extra-economic coercion. Only genuinely popular forms of democracy can start to do that.

7. Recognition of the existence (however limited) of forms of accumulation among the oppressed people must take place and counterposing these in opposition to the currently dominant forms of accumulation from above (via state connections), i.e. bureaucratic/compradorial forms of accumulation.

8. Recognition of a different role for the popular state/party as a provider and defender of conditions in which such popular forms of accumulation and independent popular democratic politics can flower must also take place—i.e. popular organisations must be independent of the state, civil society must be strengthened, the democratic state must be accountable to civil society, etc.

9. Recognition of the contradictory nature of popular democracy and accumulation from below is necessary, and thus the development of classes from among the people. Hence it also includes recognising the necessity of a future transition to a democratic form of socialism.

10. Structural adjustment implies, at most, a change in forms of state rule and in forms of economy which, although they may not alter fundamentally the balance of class forces, will substantially alter the forms under which democratic struggles are experienced and fought.
11. Finally, recognition of such changes in form largely represent an increased offensive against the people, but they also give rise to new contradictions, some of which may hold the possibility for the development of popular initiatives.

These are some of the points which would need to provide the background to an objective study of the current processes of transformation in Africa from the perspective of the oppressed. It remains to be seen whether intellectuals on the Left will be able to take up the challenge of these transformations.
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