SMALL TOWN AFRICA

Studies in Rural–Urban Interaction

Edited by
Jonathan Baker

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The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies

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Preface

In July 1989 the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies (SIAS) established a research programme entitled *Urban Development in Rural Context in Africa*.

The idea behind this new programme was conceived by Anders Hjort af Ornas, Director of SIAS, while additional support was provided by Claes-Fredrik Claeson and Gunilla Bjerén. Acknowledgments are due also to the Board of SIAS for their endorsement of the programme.

The Institute is grateful to SIDA, SAREC, DANIDA and FINNIDA for financing the conference on *Small Town Africa: Studies in Rural-Urban Interaction*, held in Uppsala and Enköping in September 1989, and also for their financial assistance in the publication of this volume.

The conference, and the preparation and publication of these proceedings involved the contribution of many people. Thanks are due to all the conference participants who made the three-day meeting such a rewarding experience, and to the contributors to these proceedings for their promptness and efficiency in responding to my queries and demands.

I should like to acknowledge the assistance of the many individuals at SIAS who contributed to the conference and to the publication of this book. Anders Hjort af Ornas and Juha Uitto identified and invited conference participants. Thomas Ridæus, ably assisted by Ingrid Andersson, had overall administrative responsibility for the conference arrangements. Kent Eriksson and Sven Jansson printed conference papers prior to the conference. The guidance and advice of Mai Palmberg and Sonja Johansson on editorial matters was invaluable. Christer Krokfors provided assistance at the conference and advice on numerous occasions thereafter. Outside the Institute, Nigel Rollison read the proceedings and gave useful stylistic and related advice, while Kjerstin Andersson drew two of the maps. Finally, I should like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Katriina Anttila, assistant to the *Urban Development in Rural Context in Africa* programme, for her patience and unstinting efforts in typing, re-typing and formatting the proceedings and for her ungrudging support and advice which enabled this book to be brought to fruition so quickly and efficiently.

Uppsala, May, 1990

Jonathan Baker

Introduction

Jonathan Baker
Claes-Fredrik Claeson

The Urban Development in Rural Context (UDRC) in Africa Programme represents a fresh attempt to address the issue as to how small towns can, and do, play a significant and positive role in promoting rural development and prosperity. A central feature of this research is that the growth of small urban centres is a necessary condition and prerequisite for rural transformation. Thus, the small town is perceived as a catalyst for rural improvement.

The analysis, however, goes further than the conceptualisation of a one-way process of rural development. In the formulation of the present research programme, the concept of integrated and mutual development of urban and rural societies is a vital concern. For example, the role of small urban centres may have a very positive influence on rural development and agricultural productivity through the provision of a great range of goods (agricultural inputs, consumer items, and so on), urban cash flows, and services (agricultural extension, welfare services, including health and education facilities, and the diffusion of innovation and ideas). And, in turn, the rural hinterlands provide resources (such as food, payment for public services through taxation, labour, and demand for urban goods and services) which enable small towns to expand their economic and social functions. In short, interdependence, mutuality of interests and complementarity are central issues.

A good deal of foreign assistance (including much Nordic aid) has been directed to rural development in the narrowest sense to imply agricultural change and this suggests that rural development is an autonomous process which can be divorced from the urban component. This dualistic approach must be rejected as it fails to understand the inherent and complex interplay of the rural and urban economy (Claeson and Hjort, 1988).

Having said this, it is highly encouraging to note that a number of African countries, including Botswana, Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, are implementing programmes which focus on the urban development in rural context approach. Moreover, Fair (1990) has recently provided a succinct review of the experiences of ten Sub-Saharan African countries regarding the problems of achieving rural-urban balance.

The justification for the establishment of the Urban Development in Rural Context Programme at SIAS is due partly to a lack of research and empirical studies at Nordic institutions which direct attention to this important theme (see *Nytt från Nordiska afrikainstitutet*, 21, 1988 which re-

views the state of research in the Nordic countries). With some notable exceptions, this lack of interest in the small town in rural context concept appears to be a general phenomenon. Funnell, commenting on the emphasis given to the study of large cities in Africa, states "that they impinge directly on only a small proportion of the population. Far less is known about the social, economic and geographical relations of the many small centres with which the majority of the population have more direct contact" (Funnell, 1976: 77). Similar sentiments were echoed almost a decade later when the United Nations Centre for Regional Development (UNCRD) was criticised because "UNCRD's research programmes seemed to pay greater attention to issues concerning metropolitan areas on the one hand, and integrated rural development on the other, bypassing almost entirely the smaller and intermediate-level of urban settlements" (Mathur, 1984: 3).

Furthermore, the research concept is not only stimulating intellectually, but with what appears to be a paucity of workable alternative development strategies and interventions, it certainly is very worthwhile pursuing since it may provide a key instrument for promoting rural development.

SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING **URBAN-RURAL** RELATIONS

It is beyond the scope of this introduction to detail the range of theoretical and conceptual contributions concerning the role of small towns in rural development and the nature of urban-rural interaction in Africa. It is, however, pertinent to review some general structural and dynamic features of that interaction and their theoretical interpretations.

At the outset, it should be stated that a good deal of ambiguity has surrounded the subject of the small town-rural relationship. Traditionally, the debate on rural-urban issues has been dominated by a consideration of very large cities, often primate cities and their influence (usually perceived as negative) on the development of national space. Moreover, much of the earlier literature was imbued with a sense of anti-urbanism (see, for example, the contributions of Redfield, 1930 and 1941), or with contrasting the supposedly clear-cut distinctions between rural and urban presented as so-called theories of contrast, and expressed so elegantly by Wirth (1938).

The specific understanding, however, of a complementary relationship between urban and rural phenomena and of reciprocity in urban-rural interaction was postulated by Walter Christaller (1933; 1966) with his central place and hinterland concepts. His theory therefore, has relevance for UDRC, although significance is not given to the geometrical properties which were originally assigned to the model. There are references in this volume to central place theory, but reservations are made that African

communities are not as easily encapsulated by the conventional model as Western communities, for which the model was originally calibrated.

In the post-war period the debate has become more refined and nuanced. One early and important contribution was that by Hoselitz (1955) who attempted a typology of cities on the basis of whether they are 'generative' or 'parasitic' in the sense that they produce beneficial or adverse effects on rural hinterlands. Hoselitz's contribution is important as it provides something of a conceptual prototype for later research in that it raised the important issue regarding the potential role of urban centres for rural development. Explicitly, however, Hoselitz's conceptualisation is indicative of a top-down or from above approach. The top-down approach to solving problems of regional underdevelopment and rural poverty, increasingly infiltrated the development literature as well as the framing of development projects in the 1960s and 1970s.

More particularly, the growth pole ideas of Perroux (1951), later to be modified in geographical terms by Boudeville (1966), became the dominant paradigm. In brief, growth pole/growth centre theory suggests that by concentrating investment and innovation in a few carefully selected centres, development would either spontaneously or by inducement 'trickle down' throughout the region.

The applicability of growth centres in the Third World has been justified on the grounds that these countries generally lack the resources to provide for the spreading of investment over national space, and that under these circumstances concentration of resources would be the most effective way to achieve development (Hansen, 1981).

On the evidence to date, however, the suitability of growth pole concepts in solving rural poverty is disappointing, to say the least. The 'trickle down' effects which were supposed to follow have not had the anticipated results and spin-off effects have benefitted, at best, large component suppliers and contractors in other large centres and the "spread effects to the immediate hinterlands of centres of innovation are minimal in comparison with linkages that connect these centres with numerous distant places" (Hansen, 1981). One should, of course, be cautious in rejecting, out of hand, the potential of growth centre concepts. In a very modified form, and this implies a radically different degree of scale, they could perform important functions; views on entrepreneurial activities expressed later in this chapter point in this direction.

More recent work has questioned the relevance and applicability of the top-down approach to solving problems of rural poverty and the focus has now turned somewhat to the utility of a bottom-up approach involving small centres and their immediate hinterlands. Amongst the best known and the most recent proponents of the bottom-up strategy are Stöhr and Taylor (1981) who argue:

Development 'from below' considers development to be based primarily on maximum mobilization of each area's natural, human, and institutional resources with the

primary objective being the satisfaction of the basic needs of the inhabitants of that area. In order to serve the bulk of the population broadly categorized as 'poor', or those regions described as disadvantaged, development policies must be oriented directly towards the problems of poverty, and must be motivated and initially controlled from the bottom (Stohr and Taylor, 1981: 1).

Accordingly, the approach sees the inherent validity of a basic-needs strategy which is labour intensive, small-scale, rurally-centred, using regional resources and relying upon 'appropriate' technology. Interestingly, Stohr and Taylor state that while such strategies have received intellectual and rhetorical support they "as yet have not been widely applied (Stohr and Taylor, 1981: 2).

Stohr (1981) provides examples of where bottom-up initiatives have been implemented, although no cases are drawn from Africa. Most of the local groups are based on rural communities and draw inspiration from autochthonous value systems, which may make their experiences difficult to transfer to other systems.

The greatest appeal of such a community approach is their belief in democratic procedures and decision-making which enables members to actively participate in solving their own problems. Obviously, a prerequisite for the success of the development from below approach is the need for self-reliance. However, according to Stohr, lack of support for local initiatives by national governments may be a major reason why they have not developed and diffused on a larger scale. As is discussed later in this chapter, powers of local revenue raising through taxation may be the solution to this problem.

A fundamental reservation which can be made against the bottom-up community approach as perceived by Stohr is the reliance upon the commitment of the grassroots, without concomitant support and guidance from a national (and top-down) leadership. For example, the success of the Sarvodaya Sharamadana Movement in Sri Lanka (mentioned by Stohr) owes a great deal to the charisma, organisational talents and fund-raising ability of its founder and leader based in Colombo. Without his talents, there is doubt if the grassroots of the Movement would have the determination or ability to continue.

Perhaps Stohr should have also mentioned some of the many traditional cultural and socio-economic associations, common in Africa, and which have provided valuable assistance, including funding and labour, in local community self-help projects (for a discussion which illustrates the Ethiopian experience see, Hailu, 1987).

In our view, the bottom-up concept suggested by Stohr has appeal but it does not go far enough. In the same volume as Stohr, however, Lo and Salih (1981) list what they see as possible new dimensions concerning regional development policy from a bottom-up perspective, and some of these relate to the need to consider the urban component for rural devel-

opment. In other words, they identify correctly the central role that small urban centres can play in rural development.

The bottom-up strategy has often been associated with so-called integrated rural (or area) development. Implicit in this should be the conclusion that town-country relations are one of the focal points in integrated rural development, and that there is an operational synergy to be obtained in joint efforts between programmes for urban development in rural context and integrated rural development when the two approaches are launched simultaneously, although this appears to be uncommon.

Michael Lipton (1977) has made an important and provocative contribution to the debate and is highly critical of urban-based, development from above policies. His point of departure, however, is considerably different from other scholars. Lipton, for example, rejects the 'dependency' school arguments which were common at the time that he was writing and focusses instead on "relationships internal to individual countries" as explanations for rural poverty (Moore, 1984: 15). His basic thesis is that

the most important class conflict in the poor countries of the world today is not between labour and capital. Nor is it between foreign and national interests. It is between the rural classes and the urban classes. The rural sector contains most of the poverty, and most of the low-cost sources of potential advance; but the urban sector contains most of the articulateness, organisation and power (1977: 13).

In a nutshell, the rural poor are dominated and exploited by powerful urban interests—the classic syndrome of urban bias.

Lipton views the phenomenon of urban bias from the viewpoint that all components of the urban hierarchy contribute to the diversion of resources from rural areas and thus are an integral part of the overall system which produces urban bias. This is in contradistinction to the often held view that primate city structures are generally responsible for urban bias in the Third World.

Lipton's work has been subjected to close scrutiny and criticism from many quarters (see, for example, Harriss and Moore, 1984, who edited a special issue of *The Journal of Development Studies*, which debates the concept of urban bias from Lipton's perspective).

Our purpose then is not to detail the critique concerning Lipton's work but merely to highlight some issues, in as much as they have relevance for this present study. The greatest criticism of Lipton's thesis can be levelled at the way he conceptualises the antagonisms between an undifferentiated urban and rural society. His portrayal of the urban classes versus the rural classes as representing the most important class conflict in the contemporary Third World is an oversimplification of the situation. Rural and urban societies are greatly differentiated internally and to suggest that "each have clearly defined politics and interests" is to gloss over a much more complex reality (Unwin, 1989: 17).

Secondly, **Lipton** views urban and rural societies as dichotomous entities when in reality the urban–rural relationship cannot be dichotomised because of the inherent interplay, overlap and **reciprocities** (economic, cultural, social and political) which integrate them.

Thirdly, **Lipton** draws much material to support his ideas of urban bias from India and from there extrapolates and generalises the situation for **all** poor countries. It is increasingly recognised that generalisations concerning the rural–urban relationship even within one region in a particular Third World country are difficult, if not impossible, because of the great variety of circumstances (**Hardoy** and **Satterthwaite**, 1986). Moreover, the selection of India to support his hypothesis is unfortunate in that it is, if anything, atypical of most Third World countries. It boasts, for example, a well-developed and balanced urban hierarchy, an important foodgrain sector, with tropical export crops playing a minor role (**Moore**, 1984: 18), and a sophisticated industrial structure. All these features are in **marked** contrast to the situation elsewhere, particularly Africa. If he had applied his analysis to a range of Sub-Saharan countries his findings may certainly have been quite different.

Finally, and perhaps most revealingly, **Mitra** (1977) was working at the same time as **Lipton** on the economics of rural–urban relations and operated with the same politico-economic model (India), and yet their conclusions are literally poles apart—with **Mitra** arguing that India is characterised by rural bias and **Lipton** the reverse! (**Mitra** cited in **Moore**, 1984: 18).

Regardless of the correctness of **Lipton's** ideas, his work certainly re-kindled an interest in urban bias concepts and, more generally, stimulated discussions on the nature of urban–rural interaction (for some recent and useful contributions which deal wholly or partly with this phenomenon, see **O'Connor**, 1983; **Peil** with **Sada**, 1984; **Funnell**, 1988; **Gould**, 1988; **Potter** and **Unwin**, 1989). From the discussions surrounding **Lipton's** thesis it is clear that there is a need for a clearer understanding of rural and urban class differentiation—for example, the existence of the rural poor alongside the rural elites whose interests are associated with urban society and often with an urban upper class—as this has much relevance for the **UDRC** concept. This stratification into rich and poor is given much attention by **Jamal** and **Weeks** (1988) in a seminal study which challenges many of the conventional wisdoms concerning urban and rural conditions and potential for interaction. **Jamal** and **Weeks** question the validity of a rural–urban income gap in a persuasive and crucial analysis based on empirical data from a number of Sub-Saharan countries. Their basic contention is that as a consequence of the deterioration of African economies since the 1970s (largely brought about by oil price shocks, Western recession, high interest rates, reduced demand for primary products and associated balance-of-payments deficits) domestic growth rates have declined, triggering a contraction in urban formal employment and declining real

incomes—with the result that the rural-urban income gap has substantially narrowed or, in some cases, even closed.

They itemise the effects that this economic deterioration has had on rural-urban income differentials in the form of a number of extremely well-argued statements which are derived from their empirical findings.

Firstly, with the exception of the so-called urban elites (professionals, high-level civil servants and entrepreneurs) all sections of the urban classes have experienced declines, sometimes substantial, in their real wages. While unskilled workers in the formal sector have apparently seen the greatest deterioration in their purchasing power, all wage-earning sectors have suffered. In addition, the security and stability of formal sector employment which was earlier considered as unalienable have also disappeared as a consequence of government cost-cutting measures.

In some cases, the falls in real wages have been so enormous that a growing proportion of wage-earning households are below the poverty level as measured by the ability to purchase a minimum diet. The authors cite the example of Nigeria where between 1973 and 1978 the number of households (in both formal and informal occupations) living in urban poverty has increased from 33 per cent to 38 per cent of all households (Jamal and Weeks, 1988: 278). In urban areas of Uganda, the minimum urban monthly wage in the 1980s (which had become the effective wage rate or many) had fallen to less than 10 per cent of its 1972 value and purchased the equivalent of only one week's supply of food! In circumstances such as these the question to be asked is how do households survive, given the fact that according to Jamal and Weeks (1988: 287) urban wage earners do not appear to be suffering from acute malnutrition as the two examples (and others) would suggest? We shall return later to the range of survival strategies that are used.

Secondly, the distinction between the formal and informal sectors is becoming blurred as income differentials between the two sectors are decreasing. Moreover, many former formal sector workers have shifted into the informal sector as a result of becoming unemployed, "where they probably fare worse than the average operator there because of their limited skills" (Jamal and Weeks, 1988: 274). It should not be overlooked, however, that these new entrants may bring with them skills not usually found in the informal sector, thus allowing newcomers the opportunity to establish for themselves a specialised niche within the market. Examples might include lower-level civil servants with the ability to read and interpret bureaucratic or legal documents, to certain kinds of technicians offering specialised know-how and advisory services.

Thirdly, the income gap between urban wage earners and the rural population has narrowed considerably and in some cases the peasantry now have an income advantage. This trend, however, has not led to an overall improvement in the distribution of incomes. Rather, the situation is characterised by a split between the rich and poor, with the former made

up of urban elites and wealthy farmers, while the latter include urban wage earners, informal sector workers and small peasants (Jamal and Weeks, 1988: 274).

Fourthly, rural-urban migration has not declined, and perhaps has even increased. The phenomenon of continuing in-migration to urban centres during a period which has seen a closing of the rural-urban income gap contradicts the widely held view postulated by Todaro (1969; 1971) that the rate of rural-urban migration is dependent upon two variables: the rate of urban unemployment and the rural-urban income differential. And yet, as Jamal and Weeks demonstrate, one of the key variables, the rural-urban income gap, is narrowing considerably or, in some instances, has closed, but rural-urban migration still continues at a persistently high level. Therefore they argue that migration cannot be explained in the context of the Todaro model and that it needs to be understood as an extremely "complex and dynamic struggle to survive in the face of falling real incomes for the poor, both urban and rural" (Jamal and Weeks, 1988: 274).

Fifthly, as a result of all the preceding trends the "dynamics of income distribution between urban and rural areas has changed" (Jamal and Weeks, 1988: 274) and, accordingly, many of the accepted precepts concerning urban and rural income differences and labour markets are in need of modification and revision. Jamal and Weeks follow up with a good example to illustrate this point. It has been, and still is, the commonly accepted view that government food purchasing policies benefit urban consumers if prices paid to farmers are below market levels. Consequently, "urban populations gain, and urban workers gain more than professionals, high-level civil servants and entrepreneurs because food accounts for a bigger proportion of the expenditure of lower-income groups" (Jamal and Weeks, 1988: 275). Because peasant farmers are poorer than urban workers, a regressive distribution of incomes occurs. However, the outcome of such policies may not have the intended distributional effects and entrepreneurs may pay lower money wages to urban workers and thereby obtain higher profits. Thus, the poorer segments of the urban population lose out while the urban rich reap the benefits.

The final finding of the study indicates that "the primary dynamic distributional relationship in Africa has been between rich and poor within both the urban and the rural sectors" (Jamal and Weeks, 1988: 275). By way of conclusion, Jamal and Weeks focus on the issue that during periods of depression it is always the weak and vulnerable who are least able to protect themselves against falling real incomes. In a final re-statement, the weak and vulnerable in contemporary Africa encapsulate the urban wage earners (particularly the unskilled), urban informal workers and smallholding peasants (Jamal and Weeks, 1988: 275).

Perhaps the categorisation by Jamal and Weeks of the urban elite as including professionals as a homogeneous group needs revising. There is no

doubt, for example, that salaries of certain groups of professionals, such as academics, in many African countries have declined considerably in real terms and consequently many have become involved in extra **income-generating** activities (such as farming or the hiring out of trucks and mini-buses) to supplement declining university salaries.

Yet in spite of the seemingly insurmountable difficulties, the rural and urban poor have devised interactive rural–urban survival strategies and other coping mechanisms which belie the apparent hopelessness of their situations. According to Jamal and Weeks (1988) the precise nature of these strategies is unclear although they offer some examples, as do some of the contributions in the present collection.

Among the strategies mentioned by Jamal and Weeks are the following:

1. *A change in life styles of urban wage-earning households.* As food absorbs a large percentage of declining income, households shift their consumption from preferred foods such as meat, milk or fruit to less expensive alternatives. In the case of Uganda there has even been a shift in staple foods, for example, from *matoke* (green bananas) to cheaper **maizemeal** (Jamal and Weeks, 1988: 287).
2. *Increasing the production of food in and around cities.* This is an aspect of African urban studies which has been neglected and under-researched until very recently. Some recent studies which discuss this phenomenon are Guyer, 1987, Rakodi, 1988 and Swindell, 1988. Indications are, however, that for the urban poor (and also for higher income groups) this may provide a significant supplement to household supplies and incomes. In some instances urban food production can be extremely significant as the case of Kampala illustrates, where the city increased its degree of calorie self-sufficiency from 20 per cent in 1972 to 40 per cent by the 1980s.
3. *Intensification of rural–urban links.* This is, of course, of fundamental importance in the African context and forms a central component of the current SIAS research programme on urban development in rural context. As Jamal and Weeks correctly state "it was never correct to divide African labour markets into neat **categories—rural/urban, formal/informal.** Most workers have always straddled both the rural and urban sector ('circulatory migration') and the formal and informal sector ('moonlighting'). And now, as a result of the deepening economic crisis, that kind of 'doubling' has become more the rule than the exception" (Jamal and Weeks, 1988: 289).

In short, while both urban and rural households have traditionally been multi-occupational, this pattern will presumably intensify as households spread their risks and their members—both geographically and occupationally. Consequently, the economic crisis will create processes which, in

turn, will further complicate the identification as to who is rural and who is urban—if such a distinction was ever **possible**—and strict class distinctions will give way to a large and amorphous group that (to paraphrase Jamal and Weeks, 1988: 288) might be termed the “trader-cum-wage-earner-cum-shamba-growing” class.

SOME MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEBATE CONCERNING SMALL TOWNS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

It is appropriate at this juncture to provide a brief review of some of the more recent and specific issues on urban development in rural context and to comment on the debate which has arisen between some of the most representative actors involved. At the outset, it should be stressed that this section is no more than a brief outline which does not do justice to the many complexities behind the concept or the intensity of the debate.

At the risk of over-simplification, it is possible to categorise the main protagonists within the debate as reflecting views along a continuum. At one end of the continuum we find those who may be called the optimists and who suggest that the idea of UDRC, conceptually and empirically, is highly attractive and meaningful, and therefore should be pursued. Perhaps the most influential representative of this stance is Dennis Rondinelli.

The opposing end of the continuum is occupied by the pessimists who argue that while the UDRC approach is sound conceptually and useful as a theoretical construct, empirically the results do not give grounds for much optimism. Perhaps the main proponent of this view is Aidan Southall.

Somewhere between these two opposing poles are to be found those who subscribe to an intermediate position and who feel that the UDRC approach is valid, logical and of value but that more studies need to be undertaken and more experience accumulated before definite conclusions can be made. Jorge Hardoy and David Satterthwaite are representative of this position.

The optimistic view

The publication of an influential book by Rondinelli and Ruddle in 1978 entitled *Urbanization and Rural Development: A Spatial Policy for Equitable Growth* provides the point of departure for a renewed interest and policy involvement in the UDRC* approach. The book, which was commissioned

* For the purposes of this discussion the acronym UDRC is used which reflects the title of the SIAS programme. Others (including Rondinelli) use the term “urban functions in rural development” (UFRD).

by USAID, is a "reworking and reformulation" of earlier works on central place systems, periodic market systems and public service location concepts (Bromley, 1983: 429).

The appeal of the book has much to do with the way the main arguments favouring a UDRC approach (i.e. the simplicity and inherent common sense of the concept) are presented. In addition, the fact that it was commissioned and enthusiastically accepted by USAID must have lent weight to the book's attraction (Bromley, 1983).

Rondinelli has come under attack from various quarters although his harshest critic appears to be Southall (see, for example, the exchange between the two in Rondinelli, 1979-80, 1982 and Southall, 1982).

It is worth quoting Southall's critique of Rondinelli from what appears to be Southall's farewell statement on the study of small towns in rural development.

Rondinelli's argument is not susceptible to disproof because it does not relate to the real world. It harps upon imagined theoretical rationales, on potential roles and functions, on programmatic plans and hypothetical effects. It is belabored at such length and repeated in so many publications, often sponsored by the very organizations whose policies it supports, that the reader ends up in danger of mistaking shadow for substance and aspiration for achievement. (Southall, 1988: 12).

This is a rather damning indictment of Rondinelli's scholarship and analysis. To be sure, Rondinelli has provided a good deal of stimulation and positive analysis for future research concerning the role of small towns for rural development. Recently he has provided some valuable insights and recommendations for both aid agencies and African governments as to how these can influence the pattern of urbanisation and the rate of agricultural development by selective investments in small market towns (see Rondinelli, 1988).

A general and perhaps more justified criticism can be leveled at USAID's earlier selection of countries for UDRC pilot projects, including Guatemala, Bolivia and The Philippines – countries characterised by denial of human rights, repression and gross social and economic inequalities (Bromley, 1983). These examples do not, however, invalidate the inherent value of the UDRC concept.

The pessimistic view

Let us now turn to the observations provided by Southall concerning small towns in rural development. Much of Southall's analysis and a number of his criticisms are relevant and well-founded. Southall was responsible for convening two conferences and assembling a range of scholars from the USA, Africa and elsewhere to report their research findings on the role of small towns in African development.

The tone of the first conference, held in 1978, was largely uncommitted (Southall, 1979a and 1979b). On the one hand, Southall viewed small urban centres as "the most strategic key to *problems* of rural development" in that small towns would provide the incentives and innovations necessary to increase rural productivity and incomes. At the same time, this optimism was tempered by the recognition that rural development was not yet taking place because of the stifling impact and influences of national bureaucracies and over-centralisation.

In 1988, the proceedings of the 1986 conference were published and the message was clear: under present circumstances rural development via small towns could not take place (Southall, 1988). Indeed, it was stated explicitly that the negative process of rural underdevelopment is not only widespread, but that small towns contribute to this impoverishment.

However, one remarkable and positive observation to emerge from the various empirical studies by Southall and his colleagues is the idea that "where the stimulus to urban growth results in activity primarily by the people and for themselves ... small scale urbanization may be beneficial locally" (Southall, 1988: 5). The caveat to this, according to Southall, is to assume a "relatively egalitarian class structure", i.e. where all families have free access to land to provide for basic subsistence and reproduction.

One gets the impression that Southall has resigned himself to the fact that further research and enquiry concerning small urban centres in rural development in Africa is probably fruitless in present circumstances.

While one can sympathise with Southall's sense of frustration, to support his position is to capitulate too early and too easily. Why not, for example, investigate more closely the importance of local actors and mediators and other local initiatives and indicate, wherever feasible, ways in which this vitality can be strengthened and broadened. Moreover, his view that small towns are merely part of a larger (viz. national and international) structure of rural exploitation whereby little can be achieved under prevailing conditions, is not only unhelpful but leads us into an intellectual cul-de-sac.

The intermediate position

Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1986, 1988) are perhaps the most representative proponents of the intermediate position. Their findings and conclusions, largely derived from empirical studies, are of great utility particularly since they deal with examples and case studies from Latin America, Asia and Africa, which permits cross-cultural comparisons to be drawn.

The following, then, is an outline of some of their major conclusions including some suggestions on how to avoid pitfalls in further research and policy interventions.

One major conclusion, which contrasts sharply with the findings of other researchers, is that universal generalisations and prescriptions con-

cerning small town development are simply not valid (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1986). Hardoy and Satterthwaite stress the uniqueness of individual small (and intermediate) centres, "and analyses of the factors which underlie the development of different urban centres ... point to the phenomenally rich and diverse set of circumstances particular to each" (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1986: 399).

However, for purposes of comparative analysis, research operationalisation, planning and policy interventions it would appear essential to derive groups or classes of urban centres. This could be achieved by classifying towns on the basis of a number of basic development components common to each class.

Hardoy and Satterthwaite extend their argumentation further by suggesting that because of these peculiarities and specifics there is a need for a large degree of decentralisation in development planning and implementation, and that national planning models and prescriptions which assume comparability and similarities between small towns in their development potential are misguided.

Thus, a case is made for the encouragement and development of strong, effective, representative and resourceful local government with investment and revenue-raising capabilities at the local level. If real decentralisation of decision-making occurred it would provide the means through which the articulation of local needs and priorities could be made and would stimulate both rural and urban development.

A second conclusion, which is a re-emphasis of earlier ideas, takes up the issue of power relations at the urban-rural interface. Consideration is given to the nature of land tenure systems, government crop purchasing policies and taxation, and how these influence the levels of rural and urban prosperity and deprivation.

The existence of inequitable land tenure systems is one of the forces which certainly is not conducive to a sound agrarian sector and this would obviously have negative spin-off effects on small rural towns. Hardoy and Satterthwaite put the issue as follows:

If within any agricultural area, only a relatively small group of people earn high incomes with the majority engaged in largely subsistence farming or low paid wage labour, this small group may find that their demand for goods and services, both for production and consumption, cannot be met by enterprises in the nearest small urban centre (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1986: 298).

As a result, demand from the wealthy and powerful few benefits more distant larger towns and cities which are functionally more diversified. It follows, therefore, that one of the prerequisites for an integrated and healthy rural-urban economy would be the existence of a land-owning peasantry with the necessary income level to create demands for local urban goods and services. These foregoing remarks have greatest relevance

for Latin American and Asia. In Africa the "relatively egalitarian class structure" (to quote Southall) has presumably not had similar impacts.

A third conclusion or recommendation concerns the distortion or imbalance in the national urban system whereby the primate city and a few other large cities grow rapidly often as a consequence of in-migration from the countryside. Hardoy and Satterthwaite argue that if governments are concerned about this phenomenon and the contribution of migration to it, attempts should not be made to control or direct the migration stream, but measures should be adopted to alleviate the causes behind it. The issue, then, is not of attacking the symptoms (i.e. the movement of people) but rather the imperative behind this movement, which is rural underdevelopment.

A final point which deserves attention, and which Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1986, 1988) state has been little researched is the social dimension of small towns. They suggest that urban-rural milieux are integrated through networks of friendship, kinship and family ties. And it could be added that these networks are invariably complex and often blur the social distinctions as to what is urban and what is rural.

This theme could provide a useful line of enquiry for future research partly because it may allow for an evaluation of the importance of small towns as centres for social interaction and partly because it may provide an indication of the degree to which small towns act as mechanisms for articulating the diverse social and cultural demands and facets of their rural hinterlands. By extension, small towns may act as centres for the expression and promotion of social solidarity and continuity, particularly during periods of transition and change.

A SUMMARY OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS

The wide range of topics dealt with in this volume exemplify the wealth of material and also the complexities inherent in the concept of urban development in rural context. An interdisciplinary approach was used so that contributions by various disciplines could add weight in improving our understanding of the nature of interactive processes between the town and the countryside.

Although our approach has been eclectic, we feel this is appropriate as it does illustrate the diversity and scale of the material available and this will hopefully allow for a concretisation of central issues and for fruitful conceptualisations and theorising to emerge.

While the majority of the contributions focus on the case of the small and intermediate town in Africa, three contributions provide material for the primate cities of Lagos, Harare and Bamako. We feel this latter focus is useful in that it may allow for comparative analyses of the processes influencing smaller urban centres. It could also be added that some of the is-

sues are common for urban-rural relations, irrespective of the size of the urban centre.

Planning for small urban centres in the national context

The three contributions by Robson Silitshena, R.A. Obudho and G.O. Aduwo, and Layi Egunjobi provide examples of national planning policies within the context of development of small urban centres for rural development.

Silitshena describes the case of Botswana where there is a comparatively elaborate settlement system which ties rural areas to towns. He deals in particular with Botswana's unique Tswana agro-towns which "have always been the pivot of social and spatial organisations". Silitshena describes the agro-towns as historically well-established regional centres which, in addition to political functions, have always acted as commercial nodes. The relationship with their rural hinterlands has been both exploitative and growth inducing. Moreover, "because of large populations, they possess the thresholds for a variety of functions that are not usually associated with rural areas in Africa".

Silitshena draws attention to two weaknesses associated with the present and future development of agro-towns. First, they do not have their own administrative or political structures and second, their economic foundations are weak because of low incomes and lack of investment, which restricts their attraction for the establishment of manufacturing. Despite these deficiencies, agro-towns will continue to act as important central places offering a range of services to their rural hinterlands.

Obudho and Aduwo provide an account of urban development in Kenya, explaining its primate nature and regional imbalance, and analyse Kenyan urban policies as they relate to regional and rural development since independence. During the colonial era a socio-spatial polarisation occurred resulting in a marked regional urban imbalance. These imbalances have continued to the present as a result of Kenyan laissez-faire industrial policies which have favoured locations in existing major urban centres.

The paper reveals a strong, well-motivated belief in the urban factor. It recognises settlement patterns as the infrastructure in the development process in which small and intermediate-sized centres can play an important role in "reshaping the country's space economy".

Obudho and Aduwo discuss the growth centre model which has influenced government strategies. They suggest that adherence to this approach is largely responsible for shortcomings in urban approaches to regional and rural development in that rural needs and resources as well as local initiatives have been neglected. The current policy of the government to overcome these weaknesses and bridge the rural-urban gap is to use a bottom-up planning approach as reflected in the recently introduced Dis-

strict Focus Policy for Rural Development (DFPRD). They suggest how such a policy can best be implemented and stress the importance of strengthening and empowering local governments. Obudho and Aduwo draw attention to the very important consideration that policy makers "must recognise that each settlement will have its own range of skills, resources, links with the surrounding areas, and links with the national and subnational economy" and implicitly that development plans must allow for a large degree of flexibility.

The Nigerian experience of development planning reflects, as Egunjobi shows, the common dichotomous view of urban and rural phenomena where emphasis on rural development has been interchanged with emphasis on urban development. Thus, a clear policy of recognising the interaction between the rural and urban sectors has been absent.

Administrative centres have constituted a system of official growth points in Nigeria and these have grown in accordance with the increasing political decentralisation that has occurred in the country. These are first-order (regional capitals before 1963) and second-order centres (more recent state capitals) which reached a total of twenty-two in 1987. Egunjobi draws attention to the fact that while these centres have attracted a good deal of investment which has stimulated their development, the spin-off effects on rural hinterlands have been minimal and "a substantial proportion of the hinterland is so distant to the state capitals that meaningful urban-rural interaction is hardly feasible".

In the 1980s, the Nigerian government established the Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI) which has responsibility for improving rural infrastructure and increasing food production. The results have been disappointing and Egunjobi identifies a number of weaknesses of such a policy, including lack of a conceptual planning framework, lack of surveys to identify local needs and priorities, and failure to devise mechanisms for the effective linking of rural and urban areas.

Egunjobi proposes an alternative strategy which involves the devolution of administrative powers to third-order centres, and suggests the strengthening of the existing 449 Local Government Headquarters as a means to provide development stimuli to rural areas. The objectives of this policy would be to improve the growth pole and central place attributes of these centres so as to transfer "urban influences into the remote rural areas".

Economic networks, small enterprises and entrepreneurship

The importance of networks, enterprises and entrepreneurship is focused upon by Poul Ove Pedersen, Jesper Rasmussen and Kadmiel Wekwete. In Pedersen's analysis, the small town can be viewed as a way of organising enterprises in space. He argues that if we want to understand small town development then more attention should be given to the differentiation of

enterprises and the way in which they interact with the local environment. Pedersen challenges the analytical power of classical location theories in that, while they attach much importance to the local interaction between enterprises, they do this in a very aggregated manner as reflected in the concept of agglomeration economies. Moreover, Pedersen notes that newer Marxist location theories consider the local environment and small entrepreneurs of little consequence and instead focus upon the organisation of multinational, and other large, companies.

He stresses the value of using network methodology for elucidating the complexities of interaction between large enterprises (often as branch offices of large multilocation enterprises) and networks of small service and production enterprises, and how their activities often complement each other. Furthermore, small enterprises often develop and occupy market niches considered too small and thus uneconomic by large enterprises. Pedersen highlights the point that growth and development are essentially local processes, where the role and dynamism of local actors as entrepreneurs are essential elements in providing stimuli for a prosperous urban and rural economy.

Rasmussen's paper provides a case study of the important building sector in Zimbabwe and discusses the variety of problems facing the small entrepreneur as well as some policy promotion issues. In this respect, his empirically-oriented study complements Pedersen's more theoretically-oriented contribution. Rasmussen draws on material collected in Gutu, a district centre in the communal lands in Masvingo Province to illustrate why local, small-scale entrepreneurs have failed to expand their activities, at the expense of larger enterprises, and carve-out a larger market share for themselves.

Rasmussen notes that small, local building contractors lack the necessary skills and capital to improve their production. He argues that "the market is there; it is then a question of having qualified artisans ... to exploit it". However, additional conditions or services are necessary if a small enterprise employing a couple of employees is to succeed, including access to basic machinery repair facilities, foreign currency allowances, staff housing, banking and accounting services and a suitable work site for the business activity. Thus, there is a need for a more favourable response from decision makers in their support of small entrepreneurs; at present local authorities often view such activities with hostility.

One reason given for the inability of small enterprises to develop and play a more decisive role in small towns is related to the nature of and attitudes towards entrepreneurship. Generally speaking, most small-scale entrepreneurs have limited formal schooling and lack technical training. As a result, many have problems with running a business and communicating with influential and necessary contacts such as local authorities, banks or large firms. Historical reasons are also given for the lack of enthusiasm for an interest in technical and skilled manual work and invariably it was, and

still is, considered a low-status activity; "even successful entrepreneurs want their children to receive an academic education rather than to continue the family business".

Wekwete provides a useful review of urbanisation policies in rural context in Zimbabwe and consequently situates Rasmussen's work in a wider politico-economic framework. He traces the developments in urban and regional planning during both the colonial period and since independence in 1980. Under colonial rule the country was divided unequally into areas designated for Africans and Europeans—in many ways, a replica of the apartheid structure in South Africa.

In the post-colonial period, Wekwete shows how government policies have stressed rural development in the communal lands without a concomitant recognition of the importance of small urban centres. Instead a policy of encouraging and supporting 55 district administrative centres has been implemented in the communal areas which were, and are, supposed to provide services to rural hinterland populations. The point is made that these district centres are dominated by low-order economic and service activities and government offices. In reality, very few of these centres have the potential for "sustained economic activity". Despite government attempts to provide infrastructure in these centres, the flow of private sector investment has been limited.

Wekwete reflects some of the weaknesses indicated by Rasmussen and suggests that local entrepreneurship needs to be encouraged and stimulated, but adds that most local businessmen are generally 'risk averse'. He proposes that more support be given to the small-scale entrepreneur through the activities of the Small Enterprises Development Corporation which could, for instance, help young university graduates develop entrepreneurial expertise and assist them in establishing small businesses.

Urban-rural linkages, opportunities and survival strategies

The papers by Anders Hjort af Ornas, Jørgen Andreassen, Mariken Vaa, Ann Schlyter and Tade Akin Aina provide some interesting insights into the various ways in which different categories of rural and urban people, often under conditions of environmental stress or economic hardship, have developed a variety of coping mechanisms and survival strategies. These strategies take a number of forms and include the splitting of households into rural and urban components so as to maximise employment opportunities and incomes, migration to towns by females to find various kinds of low-paid work, and the options available to and constraints on the urban poor in finding accommodation in town. The contributions by Vaa and Schlyter analyse the important dimension of gender. This dimension has often been neglected in development research and in the literature, and their discussion of females, many as independent actors, redresses, to some extent, this failing. Pertinently, this collection of

contributions adopts an approach which takes account of structures, processes, actors and behaviour.

Hjort af Ornas deals with the role of small towns and the rural-urban behaviour of pastoralists in nomadic drylands, drawing on experience from Isiolo (Kenya), Port Sudan (Sudan) and Yaq Bariweyne (Somalia). Isiolo in northern Kenya is a rural town which has grown to a considerable size because of its role as a regional centre for trade and administration and, as important, as a survival resort for pastoral peoples in marginal drought-prone zones.

The town has received migrants from different ethnic groups and typical for these settlers are the contacts which are retained with areas of origin. The town and its region are also characterised by a dual economy where members of rural households have an urban occupation while urban migrants cultivate village lands. Hjort af Ornas describes Isiolo as "a link, or a filter, between two principally different economic systems", offering additional monetary income to a rural population through trade and wage labour in an expanding capitalist economy. Attention is also drawn to the way in which ethnic groups occupy and exploit different economic niches in the urban context, and how the intensity of rural ties differs according to ethnicity.

The importance of towns for pastoralist survival in drought afflicted areas has become manifest in parts of Sudan. In a case study from eastern Sudan, Hjort af Ornas highlights the situation of the camel-herding *Amar'ar* Beja located in an area between the Red Sea and the Nile Valley. This group has been the victim of drought since 1984 and has taken refuge in Port Sudan and other towns. Survival options in Port Sudan include relief assistance, food for work and stevedoring and, in the latter case, clan affiliation is an important consideration in obtaining dock work.

The case of Yaq Bariweyne in southern Somalia illustrates a phenomenon where small towns have grown in response to in-migration by pastoral people as a result of water scarcity. Rural-urban networks are highly elaborated and articulated; every other urban migrant household, for example, maintains a farm or livestock herd, in addition to performing urban activities. Moreover, the economy of Yaq Bariweyne is partly tied to Mogadishu, which provides a market for some of the town's camel milk production. Hjort af Ornas indicates that while the town has a poorly developed infrastructure (although water supplies are good) it is "well integrated into both rural and peri-urban systems". It is apparent that Yaq Bariweyne has evolved in response to local needs and not as a consequence of policy implementation—a conclusion with which Aidan Southall would concur (see above).

Andreasen analyses the housing market in Thika, a small town north-east of Nairobi, and shows how the maintenance of strong urban-rural links have shaped the pattern and nature of urban accommodation and tenancies. He shows that half of married families live separated between a

male-headed household in town and a female-headed household in the countryside and explains why this should be the case, and why the predominant form of urban accommodation is a rented room.

As a hypothesis Andreassen assumed that the renting of accommodation in town was a result of the strong linkages which people retained with their rural homes and that investment in an urban house would divert resources from the rural shamba. It was further assumed that rural-urban linkages were maintained for basically ideological and sentimental reasons, rather than on the basis of economic rationality. He demonstrates why there is such a strong attachment to family land in the countryside and this is rooted in cultural tradition and the importance of maintaining clan networks.

And yet, while *prima facie* economic irrationality would appear to be the case, Andreassen shows convincingly that household splitting is "perfectly rational from the point of view of costs of reproduction, maintenance of security in case of unemployment, or after retirement, and as a means to retain the benefits from the ethnic network in terms of mutual assistance, social prestige, access to an urban job etc".

Vaa adopts an actor-focused perspective to shed light on female migration patterns in Bamako. The individual migration histories of five married women currently settled in a poor Bamako neighbourhood are presented including the circumstances surrounding their initial moves to the city, why they live in the particular district of town, their current economic situation and ties to their areas of origin.

By way of introduction to the theme women and migration, she states that much less is known about female migrants than their male counterparts. Much of this bias is due to the fact that women have often been looked upon as non-migrants or associational migrants who were, therefore, uninteresting as a subject for research. Furthermore, conventional wisdom has it that women move short distances to marry, while men migrate long distances to find work. But as Vaa correctly reflects, the relationship between gender and migration is much more complex than has hitherto been assumed.

She indicates that her five histories are in no way atypical of women moving to Bamako mainly as associational migrants. But what her analysis does reveal is the central importance of women as income generators to maintain the survival of the household once in town; of the five women documented, two are the sole providers for their husbands and children.

Another central feature of the study is the importance of the help obtained from kith and kin, already established in the city, for the newcomer, and the importance of maintaining contacts with their areas of origin. The latter point, however, depends upon the economic status of the migrant household and, as Vaa indicates, poverty does limit the extent to which some urban migrants can assist poorer country relatives and this consequently effects the durability of urban-rural links.

Unlike Mariken Vaa's focus upon married female migrants in Bamako, Ann Schlyter discusses the survival strategies of migrant female-headed households in Harare and, thus adds another dimension to female migration. Moreover, in contrast to Vaa's findings, female migrants in Harare had weakly articulated links with rural areas. Many had been expelled from rural areas as a result of divorce often through childlessness, being widowed, or as a result of conflicts with their families often over the choice of husband.

For many women, Harare and other towns provide the opportunity to start afresh although, as Schlyter explains in her histories of three migrant women, life in town can be hard and often involves adopting a variety of survival strategies. For most women a return to village life is not an option, as land rights can only be obtained through men, and consequently attempts are made to acquire skills of use in town (such as dressmaking, trading and hawking) and also to accumulate sufficient funds to build a house. Schlyter also makes the point that hawking has become a widespread occupation among women migrants of rural origin in that they can exploit their knowledge of these areas as well as relying on contacts with village relatives. So the rural-urban network can fulfil a useful purpose even when women have decided to stay permanently in town. But for many female-headed households who have decided to reside permanently in town, it is imperative that they develop urban networks of a more limited nature from among political activists, church members, neighbours or workmates, to compensate for the loss of a rural-urban network.

Aina examines the implications of the process of the commercialisation of land for the urban poor in Metropolitan Lagos. Using the case of a low-income settlement in the city, the study examines the dynamics and problems of the process. The theme is important in that it illustrates how the urban poor, despite the limitations imposed by their poverty, gain access to land for shelter. He provides an overview of the dual land tenure system which prevailed in Nigeria until 1978 when the Land Use Act was promulgated. This act was introduced to create uniform land access to all and was intended to reduce litigation and confusion and was devised to promote "an equitable land-owning system". The results of the 1978 Act have generally benefitted the urban powerful and the elites and the law has often been manipulated and circumvented in such a way as to place the poor in an extremely disadvantaged position.

Aina focuses on land tenure and the commercialisation processes which have taken place in a low-income settlement, Olaleye-Iponri village, within the confines of Metropolitan Lagos. Most of the inhabitants of the settlement are migrants and are characterised as long-term residents. The majority of households are large with many children and 60 per cent of the households occupy one room. Economic life in the community is dominated by informal sector activities, and 80 per cent of the survey respon-

dents have monthly incomes of less than three hundred Naira. Nearly three quarters of the residents are tenants. It is against this backdrop that tenure relations should be viewed.

The most common form of tenure comprises short-term leases, particularly those of less than five years duration. Most of the non-freehold land is divided into *miniplots*, involving severe fragmentation, and is rented, leased or sublet. Moreover, short-lease tenures have the advantage for the few large landowners that the land can be quickly re-possessed, and this is aided by the fact that tenants are often not allowed to construct permanent structures. While this tactic provides the urban poor with some access to land and shelter, however tenuous, it does mean that the "process of consolidation, house-improvement and up-grading is seriously limited.

Aina concludes his discussion by alluding to the relevance of the large city experience for small and intermediate towns. While the processes in Lagos present the issue in an exaggerated form, similar processes are beginning to make themselves felt lower down the urban hierarchy. Thus, concentration of urban and rural land, along with the related problems of landlessness, have now become realities, and policies and strategies for the small town will have to address these central issues.

The constraints and distortions imposed by state policies

Jonathan Baker, Jeremy Gould and Gun Mickels, and Adil Mustafa Ahmad and Mohamed El Hadi Abu Sin investigate the limitations imposed on and distortions created by state policies with regard to small town development, thereby also exposing the need for appropriate government interventions, not least in infrastructure. Their contributions discuss the role of the state at three different levels. Baker views state policies, in both a historical and contemporary context, from the national perspective (Ethiopia), Gould and Mickels from the regional perspective (Zambia), while Ahmad and Abu Sin describe and analyse the implications, locally and regionally, of the establishment of a new town (Sudan).

The history and development of small urban centres in Ethiopia is discussed by Baker. He shows how the Abyssinian conquests under Menelik II to the south and east, in what is now Ethiopia, created conditions conducive to the establishment of towns in regions which previously lacked an urban structure. Originally, these centres were created as military garrisons but soon acquired a range of other functions including civil administrations, economic activities and welfare services. This pattern of urban growth is contrasted to the situation in Abyssinia, to the north. In these areas, urban development has had a long tradition, but the point is also made that for long periods political instability and warfare limited the evolution of an enduring urban landscape.

Haile Selassie consolidated Menelik's conquests and pursued a policy of "controlled modernisation" whereby selective innovations in the form

of health services, schools and roads were transmitted to the urban-rural interface via small towns. This strategy failed, however, because little attempt was made to address fundamental problems such as inequitable land tenure systems and **urban/rural** inequalities.

The revolutionary government which came to power in 1974 swept away imperial structures and introduced, among other things, a radical rural and urban land reform. The immediate post-revolutionary years can be generally characterised by genuine support for the ideals of the Revolution. In the rural sector, feudalism and landlordism were abolished and in the urban sphere landlords were dispossessed of their extra housing, which was redistributed to tenants.

The initial enthusiasm for the Revolution, however, was dissipated as the government pursued policies of agricultural collectivisation, obliging peasants to supply a proportion of their production to the state marketing board at fixed prices, and the increasing centralisation of decision making. Moreover, the democratic ideals manifested by the Revolution were abandoned and small towns should be viewed as an integral part of this over-centralised and non-democratic process of state control. As a postscript, President Mengistu Haile Mariam has recently proposed a complete turn around in government policies and has promised a wide-ranging liberalisation of the economy. It is far too early to indicate what effects these policies will have on small towns and rural development, but greater flexibility in economic policies may certainly lead to a significant improvement in rural-urban relations.

A regional case of **Zambian** problems regarding **rural-urban** relations is analysed by Gould and Mickels. They point to the economic and political forces which have led to marginalisation of Luapula Province in northern Zambia, and whose nearness to the **Zambian Copperbelt** and proximity to the **Zairean** border has played a decisive role in this process. With respect to centre-periphery relationships, they draw attention to a situation where the regional capital, Mansa, has experienced considerable development because of external connections, without providing stimulating influences within its region.

Mansa has strong economic and communication links with national industrial areas and economic centres, without providing adequate transfers of development inputs to its provincial hinterland. Gould and Mickels show that outward connections have been developed at the expense of an inner consolidation, and this is exemplified by the construction of long-distance, inter-provincial highways and the neglect of the secondary and Feeder road network with distance from Mansa, and a corresponding dearth of towns of lower-order status serving the dispersed rural population. They also perceive, however, of a development by which **Mansa's** reciprocal exogenous links are being reduced because of progressive marginalisation.

The case study illustrates their theoretical points concerning the development of production for a commodity market in a specific, and for Africa not unique, regional framework. They assign this production factor an extraordinary power in the development process under circumstances such as those in Luapula. By emphasising the production factor they also wish to underline a process which generates a socio-economic structure which is directly related to spatial structure. As regards the latter, they are anxious to avoid a classical location nomenclature, often understood in dichotomous terms.

The theoretical background to the observations regarding Luapula Province and its capital, Mansa, is important because it provides a logical argument for the statement that there are many "Mansas" in Africa. The study reveals a marginal pattern which is repeated in a number of geographically peripheral areas in Africa.

An interesting conceptual point is the notion of overlapping networks "which might succeed in integrating the elusive social, cultural, political and economic facts which play a constitutive role in the basic patterns of social life in a coherent model".

The construction of the Aswan Dam and the consequent flooding of Nubian villages in 1963 meant that a considerable population had to be resettled elsewhere in the Sudan. In their paper, Ahmad and Abu Sin discuss the creation of New Halfa Town built to house the majority of the displaced Nubians from the town of Wadi Halfa. The new settlement, located in eastern Sudan, is supported by the Khashm Al Girba irrigation scheme and watered by a newly-built dam across the River Atbara. New Halfa Town represents a special case of urban development; its rural context lies in the relationship between the new town and the surrounding villages, some established at the same time as the town and some having a longer history on the banks of the River Atbara.

By 1983, twenty years after its establishment, New Halfa had more than 37,000 inhabitants and had become the fourth largest urban centre in the Eastern Region. During this period its character and status have changed from its intended role as a central place serving an agricultural community into a multifunctional commercial centre serving the needs of a much wider hinterland population of 600,000. This urban-rural interaction can be illustrated by the fact that about 6,000 commuters from over 200 villages come daily to New Halfa to participate in the business activities of the town. Thus the town of New Halfa has, in a relatively short period of time, become "the focal point of interaction for a rural population of a wide complexity" and this development is explained by "the economic and service interests and the mutual benefits between rural and town people".

New Halfa Town, as a geographical concept with an urban and rural component, is characterised by dynamic growth in functional and spatial terms, although this has meant that planning has not kept pace with the

great demands created, with the result that welfare services, housing and job opportunities fall well short of requirements. Another major concern is the uncontrolled growth of the non-Nubian population in areas originally reserved for migrants from Wadi Halfa. This development is detrimental to the Nubians who feel that it goes against the agreement that they "should be resettled in a manner which would preserve the identity and unity of their community". Moreover, the attempt to re-settle agricultural labourers from the Western Sudan permanently in New Halfa and to re-plan and upgrade their neighbourhoods is seen by the Nubians as a manoeuvre which is politically inspired. In conclusion, Ahmad and Abu Sin make a number of constructive suggestions which might ameliorate the pressures in new Halfa in the hope that conflict can be avoided.

* * *

The papers in this volume contain a range of material of great variety and scale (from the local to the national) around the subject urban development in rural context in Africa. It is appropriate, therefore, to conclude this chapter by briefly identifying some of the main issues raised.

It is apparent from a number of the papers that government policies can do much to stimulate the development of small urban centres which may have positive repercussions for their hinterlands, provided that governments are willing to permit greater decentralisation and allow local authorities more power at the local level. Furthermore, the careful selection of investments in infrastructure may provide conditions to further encourage the attraction of small towns.

The influence of government can, however, also have negative consequences for urban centres and rural development as was shown with the examples from Ethiopia, Zambia and Sudan. The cases illustrate the ways in which governments, directly or indirectly, may use small towns to promote a particular political ideology or as a means of manipulating potential voters which may lead to conflict and disenchantment.

The central role of entrepreneurship is emphasised in a number of contributions and the point is stressed that support for small local enterprises is vital if small towns are to play a meaningful role and provide fruitful interaction with their local environments. At present, local authorities are often hostile to the small enterprise, while entrepreneurs lack the skills and support services necessary to create and maintain market niches.

The opportunities provided by the small town for rural populations in increasingly common situations of economic or ecological stress is emphasised by a number of writers. The development of multiactive households articulated by household splitting or selective rural-urban migration are seen as viable means through which households can, at least, survive or, more positively, accumulate capital to improve their rural homesteads,

finance their children's education, or invest in urban job skills or urban housing as is often the case with female migrants.

The intention of this volume has been twofold: first, to stimulate a further research interest on the topic urban development in rural context in Africa and, second, to illustrate some of the complexity, range and intensity of the small town-rural hinterland relationship. If we have succeeded in either of these intentions, our modest expectations will have been fulfilled.

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The Tswana Agro-Town and Rural Economy in Botswana

Robson Silitshena

This paper examines the oldest type of settlement in Botswana. These settlements have a minimum population of 10,000 and are popularly known as large villages. However, they are sometimes referred to as agro-towns indicating the fact that they are the towns of farmers. The paper explores the kinds of relationship these settlements have had with their hinterlands. The content and nature of these relationships may have changed with time but they have always been important centres for their hinterlands.

When the British imposed their rule over the country, they utilised the pre-existing system based on agro-towns. New functions were added to them and their economies became diversified. Their physical structures have also changed, especially since independence. The government would like to upgrade them to become major industrial centres. Government proposals are described and discussed in the context of constraints to industrialization and to prevailing low incomes in the rural areas. The paper begins with a background on Botswana, followed by a background on agro-towns. The third section deals with the inter-relations between the centres and their hinterlands, while the fourth section examines the government proposals.

BOTSWANA—A BACKGROUND

Botswana is 582,000 km², almost the same size as France but with a population of just over one million. The population is predominantly young and concentrated along the eastern strip of the country, one hundred km from the border with South Africa (Map 1).

Eighty percent of the country is covered by the Kalahari semi-desert and the climate is arid or semi-arid. Average annual rainfall varies from 650 mm in the extreme northwest to less than 250 mm in the extreme southwest and evaporation rates are very high. Drought occurs frequently.

The country achieved its independence on the 30th September 1966 in the throes of a most devastating drought that had nearly decimated the national herd, then the backbone of the economy, and reduced one quarter of its population to near pauperism. Botswana was one of the poorest

Map 1. Botswana: Population distribution, 1981

countries and only managed to balance its recurrent budget through grants in aid from the British Government.

The situation has been transformed dramatically as a result of the discovery and exploitation of mineral deposits, particularly of diamonds. The gross domestic product (GDP) increased from BP*36.8 million in 1966 to BP 997.1 million in 1982/83 (1983 prices). Much of this growth has been contributed by the mining sector, which developed in the early 1970s and constituted nearly 30 per cent of the GDP in 1982/83. The increased revenues from the mining sector and the customs pool, consequent upon the revision of the customs union agreement with South Africa in 1967, and from foreign aid have enabled the Government to decentralise the provisions of services away from agro-towns to smaller and to even remote settlements—a step towards achieving one of the country's development goals, social justice. The availability of funds has also enabled the government to improve and extend the road network in the rural areas, thus reducing the isolation and self-sufficiency of some communities.

The majority of the people of Botswana, and especially those living in the rural areas, have as yet to enjoy the fruits of this newly-created prosperity (Colclough and Fallon, 1983). In fact more than half of the rural households fall below the poverty datum line. The major reason for this is that the main source of rural income are cattle, the ownership of which is highly skewed, with an estimated 45 per cent of rural households owning none at all (Republic of Botswana, 1976). Income from crops is negligible and is correlated with livestock ownership since draught animals are essential for the practice of arable farming. Consequently, the poor derive most of their income from remittances, beer brewing, etc. The Rural Income Distribution Surveys found a stratification of income according to type of settlement, the highest being found in the agro-towns.

The people of Botswana live in different types of settlement. Five types of such settlement—seasonal, agro-town, dispersed, farmstead and modern commercial and industrial town—have been identified (Silitshena, 1982). For a settlement to be defined as urban it must have a minimum population of 5000 and have at least 75 per cent of the work force employed in non-agricultural activities. Some of the above groups are encompassed in the classification that was used by the 1981 census (Table 1).

The table shows four trends: 1. rapid urbanization; 2. the increase in the rural settlements of 20,000+ (i.e. the agro-towns); 3. the phenomenal growth of settlements under 500; and 4. the decline or stagnation of the number and shares of the rest. All the agro-towns, with the possible exception of Maun, experienced phenomenal growth in the period 1971–81 (Table 2) and their populations are expected to continue to grow. This

* BP = Botswanan Pulas. One Pula = USD 0.5080 (October, 1989)

growth of ago-towns is apparently a result of migration from the scattered rural areas, a reversal from earlier trends observed in the 1964 and

Table 1. *Defacto population by type of settlement 1971 and 1981*

Type and size of settlements	No. of persons	1971 Census		No. of persons	1981 Census	
		No. of settlements	%		No. of settlements	%
Urban:						
Non-mining towns	48,267	3	8.4	126,001	5	13.4
Mining towns	6,149	2	1.1	40,264	3	4.3
Sub Total	54,416	5	9.5	166,265	8	17.7
Rural:						
20,000+	0	0	0	85,153	4	9.0
10,000 - 19,999	38,443	3	6.7	46,320	3	4.9
5,000 - 9,999	39,215	5	6.8	30,101	5	3.2
1,000 - 4,999	85,494	50	14.9	145,139	87	15.4
500 - 999	88,709	120	15.5	79,502	112	8.4
Under 500	14,641	45	2.6	52,161	206	5.5
Sub Total	266,502	223	46.4	438,378	417	46.5
Other Settlements (lands, cattleposts)	253,176		44.1	336,384		35.7
Total Country	574,094		100.0	941,027		100.0

Note: Percentages may not sum exactly to 100 per cent due to rounding.

Source: Republic of Botswana (1985).

1971 censuses. One possible explanation may be drought which is most likely to force people from the remote water-deficient and poorly served settlements to the larger settlements, where accessibility to all services is good.

The line separating a large village from an agro-town may be a thin one. In this paper agro-town refers to settlements of over 10,000 people, which are invariably district capitals. Agro-towns usually have a large number and variety of functions. Large villages, while resembling the agro-towns in character, are smaller, with populations of less than 10,000 people. They form part of the hinterland of the agro-towns.

Table 2. Population growth of the 20 largest settlements, 1971–1981

Rank	Name	1981 Population	Percent Increase Since 1971	Classification
1	Gaborone	59,657	22	Modem Town
2	Francistown	31,065	67	Modem Town
3	Selebi Phikwe	29,469	497	Modem Town
4	Serowe	23,661	54	Ago-town
5	Mahalapye	20,712	82	Ago-town
6	Molepolole	20,565	118	Ago-town
7	Kanye	20,215	90	Ago-town
8	Lobatse	19,034	59	Modem Town
9	Mochudi	18,386	165	Ago-town
10	Maun	14,925	9	Ago-town
11	Ramotswa	13,009	63	Ago-town
12	Palapye	9,693	84	Large Village
13	Tlokweng	6,653	70	Large Village
14	Moshupa	6,612	112	Large Village
15	Thamaga	6,520	77	Large Village
16	Tonota	5,930	26	Large Village
17	Jwaneng	5,567		Modem Town
18	Mmadinare	5,234	82	Large Village
19	Orapa	5,229	333	Modem Town
20	Lethakane	5,169	151	Large Village

Source: HHC Team Consultants, Inc. 1984.

THE AGRO-TOWNS: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This is the most studied settlement type and one for which considerable baseline data have been provided (see, for example, Schapera, 1943). This settlement type is characteristic of Setswana-speaking people, who have a tradition of living in nucleated settlements. The early European travellers into the interior of Southern Africa were very impressed by these settlements and Tuter, writing in 1806, described one of the Tswana settlements as follows:

We estimated the city to be, in its circumference, as **large** as Cape Town, with all the **gardens** of the Table Valley; but it was impossible to ascertain the number of houses, on account of the **irregularity** of the streets, and lowness of the **buildings**, but we concluded they must amount to somewhere between two and three thousand . . . the whole population we considered to be from ten to fifteen thousand souls (quoted in Hardie, 1980: 3).

There are various explanations for the tendency of the Tswana to live in nucleated settlements—the general unfavourable physical environment which favours concentration of settlements and exploitation of a wider area, limited water points, defence needs, and culture (Silitshena, 1979).

Internally the town was usually divided into overlapping geographical, social and administrative units called wards (*dikgotla*). Each ward (*kgotla*) had its own headman who owed allegiance to the Paramount Chief (*Kgosi*). Immediately outside the town was a zone of fields (lands), followed by that of grazing (cattle posts). Beyond that was the hunting zone.

The agro-towns have always been the pivot of social and spatial organisations of these societies. In the past, it was from here that the chiefs exercised control of their states and it was there that some resources, such as tribute generated from within the state, were consumed—some of them from the peripheries. Parsons (1982) has described vividly how the Ngwato capital in the nineteenth century, Shoshong, was a hive of the various 19th century activities resulting from mercantile capitalism based in the Cape:

At the centre of the State stood the capital town or city, Shoshong. The town was the administrative, trading, and cultural centre of the Kingdom and a crossroads of major wagon routes (Parsons, 1982: 120).

From the capital the chief controlled the surrounding areas through a system of local government that ensured the control and security of the state and the flow of some resources to the centre (Parsons, 1982). Colonial rule 'downgraded' the Tswana agro-towns from being state capitals into district (reserve) headquarters. Under the system of indirect rule that prevailed under colonial rule, the paramount chiefs became the servants of the Resident Commissioner, based in Mafikeng—collecting taxes (Nasha, 1976) and enforcing whatever regulations came from there. But they did exercise a limited autonomy and it has been argued that this is one of the factors in the continued existence of these settlements in Botswana (Silitshena, 1979).

One effect of colonial rule was the stabilization of settlements. Parsons has observed that "Tswana centralisation in large agro-towns promoted a cycle of depletion of local grasslands, cultivated soils, wood and water supplies" (Parsons, 1982: 120) and therefore settlements moved fairly frequently. The British put a stop to these movements. People themselves in due course started to build bigger houses using new and durable materials and public services such as schools and post offices were also provided, both factors further encouraging stabilization. Therefore, with the possible exception of Serowe, most agro-towns have been occupying their present sites for about a century.

With population growth, but a persistent extensive agriculture, cultivation extended further and further away from the settlement. As distances increased, it became impossible to walk daily from the town and consequently a second (and seasonal) home had to be established at the lands. Some households find it costly to operate from the town and therefore tend to settle close to their fields (Silitshena, 1983), although some of the abandoned fields may be cultivated later. The lands settlements have

rudimentary services and their populations depend, certainly for higher order services, on the district town—which emphasises the role of the latter as central places (see below).

For some people, however, the agro-town remains, as it has been for time immemorial, the focus of rural life. These people still practise seasonal circulations between settlement and lands. Kooijman has observed:

... all occasions of social significance, i.e. rituals, court cases, *kgotla* meetings, etc., take place in the village and all amenities, traditional and modern, are found there. Beliefs emphasize that the bush is the abode of wild animals and that any decent human being, respected by his kinsmen, is buried in the village (Kooijman, 1978: 65).

It is the amenities that make the agro-towns a permanent feature of the rural landscape. They contain considerable social and economic investment—Government and District Council offices, shops, schools, hospitals and clinics, hotels and bars, churches and halls, etc.

All these factors contribute to further growth of these settlements and this growth is now planned and directed by new institutions, notably the Department of Town and Regional Planning and the Land Boards. The principles governing the allocation of plots have changed and so have the resultant patterns (Hardie, 1980; 1982; HHC Team Consultants Inc., 1984; Hillberg, 1988). Now land is set aside for other activities such as manufacturing, administration and community services (Department of Town and Regional Planning, 1986).

The impact of the actions of these institutions are certainly marked as the following examples show. Hardie (1982) has described the decay of central Mochudi, which is symptomatic of the change of institutions—from the chiefs to the land boards:

No longer does the *kgosi* have the authority to contain or direct the people as to where they should live. No longer is the status of ward or individual reflected in a person's residential location in town. No longer is security and protection required and water, which once was available only in the centre of town, is now equally available to the house on the periphery. The control of land has moved from a centralized authority to a democratically elected one and the former rules of status and precedence, reflected in the spatial expression, have now been swept aside. The ease with which land is attainable makes the disintegration and spread of the town that more rapid and Mochudi, for example, has experienced tremendous growth (Hardie, 1982: 210).

And according to Hillberg (1988):

The plots are much larger today than in the traditional land allocation system.... Most of them are square and arranged in lines. This creates a very different pattern than the old horseshoe-shaped clusters. According to the Land Boards, it is done to facilitate future provision of infrastructure (Hillberg, 1988: 47).

The infrastructure, e.g. reticulated water, telecommunications and electricity, are relatively better developed in the town than in the smaller villages

and surrounding areas. Further, all of them, with the possible exception of Maun, have good road connections with the North–South trunk route. Their economies are in transition between the modern towns with almost all the employed active labour force in cash employment and the small rural settlements, whose economies are dominated by traditional agriculture (Table 3).

Table 3. Population, labour force and employment in selected settlements in the Serowe Region

Settlement	Total Population	Labour Force	Total Active	Activity Rate	% Active in Traditional Agriculture	% Active in Cash Employment
Serowe	23,661	12,665	6,080	48.0	38.5	61.5
Moibana Village	1,407	702	262	37.5	62.1	17.9
Paje Village	1,216	607	362	59.6	87.5	12.4
Mogorsi Village	554	394	113	28.7	54.0	46.0
Serowe Lands	5,984	2,981	1,950	65.4	82.8	17.2
Paje Lands	943	494	235	47.6	90.6	9.4
Serowe Cattle Posts	1,208	621	360	58.0	68.0	32.0
Sandveld Cattle Posts	7,604	4,092	2,070	50.6	49.0	51.0

Source: Department of Town and Regional Planning, 1986.

TOWN AND REGION

It has been mentioned that the Tswana capital was the nerve centre, from whence controls were exercised and resources from regions consumed. Campbell (1982) has described the Tawana system centred on Maun as follows:

The whole area under Tawana thralldom was divided into 'counties' with senior Tawana in charge of each. These were subdivided and were nominally under the charge of the senior local person, normally Yei of royal descent, to supervise the areas and to ensure that Tawana property — attle, ivory and furs — was properly guarded. Several times a year they would visit their counties; then the local Yei headmen had to give a reckoning of the property under their charge, produce children to be used as serfs at the capital, and take instructions for the following few months (Campbell, 1982: 134).

With some variations and modifications, this was the system over which colonial rule was imposed. It was suitable for control and extraction of surpluses from outlying regions, which was ideal for the British who wanted to exercise indirect rule.

The chiefs used this system to collect taxes for the British and to mobilise labour and funds to provide community facilities, such as schools

and churches and execute development projects, such as **borehole** drilling (Schapera, 1970). Funds were limited and, therefore, the facilities were usually concentrated in the capital, which in due course had "national schools" and hospitals (usually a joint effort with some missionaries). Secondly, the first shops were set up in these capitals.

At the risk of repetition, the points that are being emphasised here are: 1. that the role of Tswana towns as centres of large regions is **well-established**; 2. that in addition to political roles, the centres have always acted as commercial nodes; and 3. that their relationship with the regions has been an exploitative one. However, they have also been 'growth centres'; they have always acted as sources of diffusion for any ideas reaching the rural areas. Because of large populations, they possess the thresholds for a variety of functions that are not usually associated with rural areas in Africa (Table 4).

Table 4. *Facilities found at Mahalapye, 1981*

Facilities	Number
Primary Schools	6
Technical and Professional Institutions	2
Secondary Schools	2
Hospitals	1
Clinics	4
Commercial Banks	2
Post Office Savings Bank	1
National Development Bank	1
Public Library	1
Post Office	1
Telephone & Telegraph Office	1
Community Centre	1
Central Government Departments	28
Senior Tribal Authority	1
Wholesalers	3
Retailers (General Dealers)	35
Specialist Shops	16
Filling Stations	2
Motor Showrooms	2
Sport and Social Organisations	16
Churches	14
Hotels	2

Source: Central Statistics Office, 1983.

Because of its large population, relatively long history of development, good links with other settlements in the district, the district capital invariably has the largest number and variety of functions. An examination of

the distribution of functions in the Kweneng District revealed a five order hierarchy (Table 5).

Table 5. *Settlement hierarchy in the Kweneng District*

Settlement Order	Number of Settlements	Range of Functions
District Centre	1	over 70
Sub-District Centre	2	31-37
Regional	6	23-26
Local	23	11-20
Sub-Local	51	1-9

Source: Department of Town and Regional Planning, 1983.

The settlement hierarchy shows the district capital as a primate settlement *par excellence*. The attractions of agro-towns are inherent from their role as administrative centres and providers of services to the regions. As a result, they account for most of the employment in the formal sector (Central Statistics Office, 1983). This is because the formal sector activities are concentrated in these settlements (Central Statistics Office, 1983).

A more recent and very detailed study looked at this question in relation to Mahalapye and its region (HHC Team Consultants Inc., 1984). Among the findings of the study were the following: 1. Mahalapye is an important marketing point for both livestock and crops from the region. In the six years preceding the study at least 65 per cent of the cattle from the region, worth at least BP 5 million, had been loaded at Mahalapye. Mahalapye is an important market for certain "green" crops such as melons, pumpkins and sweet reeds, which are sold directly to the public. Further, Mahalapye has a large Botswana Agricultural Marketing Board (BAMB) depot, which buys cereals and pulses from the farmers in the region and distributes imported grain during drought. 2. Mahalapye is the main commercial centre in the region, responsible for 55 per cent of total sales, and is the main wholesale centre for the shops in the region. 3. It is a major rail and road transport centre. The transport sector "is the key to the growth and development of Mahalapye as a wholesale, retail and cattle marketing centre" (HHC Team, 1984: 18). 4. Of the 17 manufacturing businesses found in the region, 16 were found in Mahalapye. All the 16 companies marketed their goods and services in the Mahalapye region. 5. Many construction companies working in the smaller settlements take labour and artisans from Mahalapye. 6. The study concludes:

With the exception of commercial and traditional agriculture, Mahalapye dominates every other sector far above its 23 per cent of Sub District population. In these other sectors Mahalapye has an average of 67 per cent of the employment and 70 per cent of

the value added for the Sub District (HHC Team Consultants INC., 1984: 20) (See Table 6.).

Table 6. Summary of Mahalapye's role in the sub-district economy

	Employ Sub-Dis. Total	Mah.	% in Mah.	Value Added Sub-Dis. BP,000s	Mah. BP,000s	% In Mah.
Commercial Livestock	587	0	0	912	0	0
*Communal Livestock	963	212	22	3960	871	22
Commercial Arable	109	0	0	354	0	0
**Communal Arable	700	162	23	797	797	23
Communal Horticulture	22	19	90	22	19	86
Government-National	1146	1004	94	2826	2673	88
Government-Local	717	235	33	2338	729	33
Commerce	615	462	71	3040	1694	56
Transport	241	221	93	601	506	92
Manufacturing	88	73	63	270	170	63
Construction	282	136	48	518	250	56
Finance	43	43	100	150	150	100
Mining	17	0	0	23	0	0
Tourism	30	22	63	160	100	73
Non-Govt. Service	80	50	62	263	164	63
TOTAL	5676	2639	44.6	16134	7512	46.6

* Difficult to include because of low wages and family involvement. Estimated at 5,500 jobs. The **input/output** provided 1,550 person years of income for both commercial and traditional arable agriculture.

** Estimated at 24,250 jobs for the whole Sub-District. The **input/output** model produced 700 person years of income.

Source: HHC Team Consultants Inc., 1984: 21.

Unfortunately, there is a dearth of studies that examine the movement of consumers along the settlement hierarchy. One such study found that people in one lands area purchased their requisites, even of groceries, from their district town during the agricultural seasons (Table 7).

The town remains a major central place even for those who have migrated to the lands, where facilities are minimal. Table 8 shows that more than half of the people visit the town to go to the hospital and to shop.

Table 8 shows that a few people still maintain a dwelling in the town even though they no longer live there. This is left vacant for accommodation when people visit the town or is used by their children attending secondary schools in the town.

Table 7. Where grocery supplies are obtained by the *Molepolole* people *when* they are at the lands

Source	Number Obtaining	Per cent
Own Village	80	45.45
Village Near the Lands	34	19.32
Hawker	62	35.23
TOTAL	176	100.00

Source: Silitshena, 1983.

Table 8. Reasons *for* visiting former home village by households permanently settled at the lands

Reason	Number Giving Reason	Per cent
Visiting relatives and friends	160	32.38
Going to hospital	134	27.13
To shop	125	25.30
To maintain own dwelling	36	7.29
To attend weddings and funerals	23	4.66
To attend <i>kgotla</i> meetings	16	3.24
TOTAL	494	100.00

Source: Silitshena, 1983.

THE GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS

Currently, the Government looks at agro-towns at three levels—national, district and settlement. At a national level the major goals are development, particularly rural development and job creation. These goals are to be achieved through the distribution of investment according to settlement size, population, economic potential, level of infrastructure and roles of settlement as service centres to surrounding regions (Republic of Botswana, 1985: 84).

The investment/settlement framework has given rise to the formulation of the National Settlement Policy (NSP). The NSP has divided the settlements into three levels—primary, secondary and tertiary. The primary centres are the large towns of Gaborone, Francistown, Selebi-Phikwe and Lobatse and the following agro-towns: Molepolole, Kanye, Mochudi, Maun, Mahalapye and Serowe. These centres have populations ranging from nearly 20,000 to about 100,000 and account for an estimated 27 per cent of the national population. The idea is to attract investment to some of

these settlements so as to reduce concentration on Gaborone, "thus bringing employment opportunities more in balance with population distribution" (Republic of Botswana, 1985: 84).

The secondary centres comprise the mining towns of Orapa and Jwaneng, the administrative centres of Kasane, Masunga, Tsabong and Ghanzi, the agro-towns of Palapye and Ramotswa, and sub-district centres of Bobonong, Thamaga, Moshupa, Gumare and the large village of Tonota. The populations of these settlements account for about 9 per cent of the total population. These settlements have important roles as district and sub-district centres and are links between primary centres and smaller settlements in their catchment areas, particularly in terms of marketing and commercial activities.

The tertiary level comprises small villages and settlements at the lands and cattle posts, which together account for at least 60 per cent of the country's population. At this level, the focus is on providing services such as water and social services and to support production efforts. At the tertiary level, the emphasis is to be put more on areas than on individual settlements, and on production.

Although, according to the NSP, some ago-towns are expected to play a national role as points of potential investment, they will still be looked upon as district centres and, in this regard, their administrative and economic roles are to be strengthened (Dept. of Town and Regional Planning, 1986). Further, the links with other settlements in the district are to be improved.

To ensure the agro-towns fulfil their expected roles, government has launched an upgrading scheme (Republic of Botswana, 1985). The upgrading programme envisages the improvement of infrastructure—roads, servicing of commercial and industrial areas, sewerage systems, water supplies, abattoirs,—the strengthening of local administration and the introduction of programmes for housing and sanitation assistance. With respect to housing, traditional land tenure has been modified through the introduction of elements of common law to make it possible for people in rural areas to borrow money from financial institutions to finance housing. However, Bruce (1981) has argued that:

Village land has in itself little or no market value, and even for land with improved buildings, the sale/rental market is small and uncertain (Bruce, 1981: 32).

With the increase in central functions, however, the demand for housing is bound to increase and with it its market value.

The Presidential Commission on Housing recommended the introduction of the self-help housing schemes like those run by the town councils [Self-Help Housing Agencies] in urban areas. But the *Mahalapye Upgrading Feasibility Study* concluded:

The implementation of an urban SHHA **type** policy in rural areas is not recommended in the rural areas. Findings strongly reflect that residents do not want and cannot afford this **type** of housing and plot development programme (HHC Team Consultants Inc., (Vol. 3) 1984: 32).

This emphasises the need to maintain the character of the agro-towns. Indeed, fears have been expressed that the NSP might, in fact, not achieve this and accelerate rural-urban migration (Silitshena and McLeod, 1989: 202). If the planning is guided by sound principles, the negative impacts should be contained. Attempts are already made in this direction as revealed by the current planning principles of Serowe, which include the following:

1. maintenance of the traditional characteristics of the settlement;
2. avoidance of polarisation of socio-economic groups;
3. allowance for upgrading of services;
4. allowance for flexibility of growth; and
5. adaptation to existing conditions and conservation of the environment
(Department of Town and Regional Planning, 1988: 73).

A more fundamental question is whether it is possible to turn the agro-towns into industrial centres. It is not likely that manufacturing will develop for a long time. It is difficult to attract industries to Botswana in general; it is likely to be doubly difficult to attract them to centres outside modern towns which lack some of the essential facilities. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry is also trying to encourage local entrepreneurs to move away from trading to manufacturing. Their officials, based in Mahalapye, have identified several problems hindering industrial development in rural areas. These problems include the following:

1. inadequate infrastructure;
2. unavailability of raw materials;
3. high prices of imported raw materials resulting in high pricing of products;
4. lack of technical and management skills;
5. lack of protection of local infant industries against cheap South African imports;
6. lack of business attitude;
7. inadequate credit institutions;
8. lack of security back-up for loans; and
9. lack of organised marketing boards.

One major drawback to the development of the agro-towns is lack of administrative institutions. Agro-towns do not have independent administrative or political structures of their own, such as town councils, that run

modern towns. They are treated as part of a sub-district. While this may be sufficient for small settlements, it is not adequate for agro-towns with thousands of people and numerous government departments and other activities that need to be coordinated and controlled in their interest (HHC Team Consultants Inc., 1984). The only local institutions are the Village Development Committees, but they are not appropriate for very large settlements.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Unlike many African countries, Botswana has relatively well-developed settlements which can serve as a basis for urban development in rural context. The agro-towns are part of Tswana culture and have for ages served as political, social and economic centres. Whether they can be transformed further into modern urban centres, will entail considerable investment (HHC Team Consultants Inc., 1984). Incomes are very low and in Mahalapye, for example, only 30 per cent of the plot holders could contribute towards cost recovery of upgrading the town.

It is not likely that manufacturing will develop for a long time. In the event, it appears that agro-towns will continue, for the foreseeable future, to function as central places, providing services to people living in their hinterlands. The key to improving any of these settlements lies in providing effective local administration.

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Small Urban Centres and the Spatial Planning of Kenya

R.A. Obudho

G.O. Aduwo

Most Less Developed Countries have increased their awareness of the issues which relate to the continuing population growth affecting them. However, they have little recognition of the fact that the distribution of the population within their national territories is equally important. Consequently, they have paid little attention to the questions of population distribution, urbanisation and settlement patterns. Instead, efforts are mainly geared towards persuading the growing rural population to remain in rural areas and/or trying to keep those who leave the rural areas away from the large urban centres. These strategies sometimes take the form of integrated rural development programmes and secondary urban centre programmes, both of which have had only a limited impact on trends of population growth and distribution.

There is, therefore, an urgent need to make a review of the role of small and intermediate urban centres in national development in order to identify the potential and limitations of these settlements and to suggest steps which would be needed to establish realistic goals and programmes for their management (UNCHS, 1985; Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1986). The way in which households shift between rural areas and urban centres of various sizes has to be understood if investment efforts are not to be misdirected. It is because of this that governments should have a proper appreciation of where small and intermediate urban centres can fit into the overall pattern of population location as a component of the total settlement system.

The colonial nature of Kenya's urbanisation resulted in the development of urban centres which have a weak relationship with their hinterlands. This has also resulted in a core-periphery dichotomy in which Nairobi, the capital city, has a weaker relationship with small and intermediate urban centres than it has with the metropolitan centre of the former colonial power (Obudho, 1979b, 1982, and 1983; Obudho and Taylor, 1979). Today, the Government of Kenya has recognised the need to change this relationship using the growth centre approach. This approach seeks to expand on the role which small and intermediate urban centres can play in facilitating agricultural production and also in stimulating the growth of agro-industries and related jobs in marketing, processing and the exchange of goods (Kiamba, 1983). This paper evaluates the important

role played by such urban centres and identifies their potentials and limitations so as to suggest measures which can be taken to establish realistic goals and programmes for their management. However, before analysing their role in planning, it is important to discuss the growth of small and intermediate urban centres and their origin in Kenya.

THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF SMALL AND INTERMEDIATE URBAN CENTRES

There is no consensus among researchers as to the correct definition of small and intermediate urban centres. Instead, different researchers use a variety of universal population size categories (UNCHS, 1985; Rondinelli, 1983). Each country's settlements form a continuum, when ranked by population size. At a first glance, the rank by population size might be expected to correspond to the role in national development, in terms of contribution to production, trade and service provision. However, this is not always the case since population size is an unreliable indicator of the scale and nature of an urban centre's economic role. The economic function of any urban centre is often reflected by, or influenced by, a mix of such factors as the resources, population, social and economic structures in its immediate hinterland, its links with the subnational and national economy, the country's political and administrative structure, and even the urban centre's link with the world market.

These factors make it rather difficult to establish a clear definition for small and intermediate urban centres, but according to UNCHS (1985: 4) they have the following main characteristics:

1. A substantial proportion of their labour force is engaged in non-agricultural activities.
2. They have a relatively small administrative role and usually some concentration of low-order public services such as health centres, schools, police posts, etc.
3. They play a relatively small role in subnational and national production but an important role as centres where goods and services are available to the hinterland populations and as centres through which populations are linked to subnational and national transport networks.
4. They represent the category of centres with which the rural and agricultural population have most of their links.

In Kenya, these centres have been designated as "growth centres" through which innovation and all development resources are expected to spread to the rural areas (Kimani and Taylor, 1972). It has frequently been observed

that rural-urban migrants are attracted by the prospects of employment, and the growth of these centres appears to be consistent with this feature. Indeed, there is survey evidence that most migrants go first to the town nearest their rural residence and prefer remaining there if they can find adequate employment (Moseley, 1973). Thus they are becoming increasingly important centres of opportunity for rural-urban migrants, and catalytic nodes for more effectively linking rural areas to the national economy. The small and intermediate urban centres in Kenya can, therefore, be defined as those centres with a population of between 2,000 and 100,000 which perform the functions indicated above.

SIZE, GROWTH AND PRIMACY OF THE URBAN POPULATION

Though the current urbanisation process in Kenya is a cumulative result of some basic trends such as demographic explosion, rural over-population, increased mobility and rise in personal aspirations and expectations, the framework for the spatial pattern of urban development was provided during the colonial period. This period was responsible for the current spatial polarisation. The ports and railway towns which form the nuclei of the present burgeoning urban centres in Kenya were of colonial creation. Following the colonial spatial integration of production and trade, the towns which grew from this pattern of space economy constituted the core areas while the rest of the country remained isolated and experienced, only very slowly, the effects of development (Obudho and Waller, 1976; Taylor, 1972; Obudho, 1983).

Thus the urban system that emerged in Kenya during the colonial period was due to historical causes much more than to geographical determinants and, in many cases, to entirely arbitrary historical decisions by which some towns were favoured over other centres. Moreover, the socio-spatial polarisation of the colonial period was further accelerated by post-independence models of development. This tends to be the pattern in most other African countries where, in spite of political independence, the colonial model of spatial organisation has persisted. In Kenya, the colonial administrative and industrial urban centres were given more impetus for growth as a result of a *laissez-faire* industrial policy which has encouraged the concentration of industries in the few existing major urban areas (Obudho and Taylor, 1979; Taylor, 1981).

The last population census (1979) indicated 91 urban centres with an urban population of 2.3 million. The urban population grew at the rate of 12.6 per cent per annum during the 1969–1979 intercensal period, and the increase in the number of urban centres took place in all size groups (Tables 1 and 2). Of the total 1979 urban population of settlements of 5,000 or more people, 76.0 per cent was accounted for by Nairobi and Mombasa. Based on total urban population over 2,000, however, Nairobi and Mom-

basa accounted for 50.5 per cent of the total urban population (Muganzi and Obudho, 1987).

Table 1. *Urban centres by size of urban population, 1948-1979*

Size of Urban Population	Number of Urban Centres			
	1948	1962	1969	1979
100,000+	1	2	2	3
20,000-99,999	1	2	2	13
10,000-19,999	2	3	7	11
5,000-9,999	3	11	11	22
2,000-4,999	10	16	25	42
Total	17	34	47	91

Source: Obudho, 1987.

Table 2. *Kenya: Distribution of urban population by size groups, 1948-1979*

Size Group	1948	1962 (in thousands)	1969	1979	Annual Growth Rate in the 1969- 79 Intercensal Period
100,000+	119	523	756	1322	55.6
20,000-99,999	85	62	80	568	13.9
10,000-19,999	29	41	91	140	7.1
5,000-9,999	20	0	72	154	4.8
2,000-4,999	23	49	83	123	4.9
Total	276	670	1082	2316	12.6

Source: Obudho, 1987.

An examination of the spatial distribution of these urban centres reveals a marked imbalance and an uneven distribution of the large, medium-sized and small urban centres across the country's present provinces. The geographical distribution of urbanisation is illustrated by a marked concentration in the highland areas and along the coast (Map 1). The degree of urbanisation in Kenya varies with natural resource endowments, and proximity to central transportation networks.

On the basis of data from the 1979 census the distribution of urban population in Kenya has changed only slightly since the previous census in 1969 (Table 3 and Map 2). The level of urbanisation in Western Province was low in relation to the total population. Western Province accounted for 12.0 per cent of the total national population but had only 4.6 per cent

of its urban population. Nyanza Province at the same time accounted for 8.9 per cent of the urban population but 17.2 per cent of the total population. Rift Valley Province, the largest province in Kenya and with the largest area of ecological zones, had 21.1 per cent of the total population and a relatively high level of urbanisation (15.3 per cent), compared with Western Province and Nyanza Province. Central Province, with a high agricultural potential and a relatively high level of agricultural development, had 15.3 per cent of the total population and accounted for 5.4 per cent of the urban population. Eastern Province, like Rift Valley Province, is large and accounted for 17.7 per cent of the total population, with 9.2 per cent of the urban population. The Coast Province, with relatively low agricultural potential, had 8.7 per cent of the total population; it is the most urbanised province in the nation, second to Nairobi. Its share of urban population was 17.8 per cent. This high level of urban population can be explained by the fact that the municipality of Mombasa alone accounted for 83.1 per cent of the urban population in the province. North Eastern Province, with the least agricultural potential and with nomadic or semi-nomadic populations, is also the least populated province. Its share of total population and urbanisation was 2.4 per cent and 2.9 per cent respectively. Nevertheless, North Eastern Province had the highest rate of urban growth between 1969 and 1979. The province had no urban population in 1969; however, by 1979 the province accounted for seven urban areas with a total population of 67,617. One of the major reasons is that the government has developed a few selected urban centres and provided services which has lessened the need for nomads to move from place to place to seek out services.

The Central Highlands Region has a high urban concentration, enjoys the highest rainfall, and has the most fertile land in the country. The resource allocation and transport concentration are the highest in Kenya. There is a wide hiatus between the traditional central places and the colonial centres. This *internal polarisation* can be considered the main effect of urbanisation in Kenya. The fertile lands in the Kenya Highlands and the urban enclaves stretching from Mombasa on the Coast to Kisumu in Lake Victoria constituted the *core region* of the country where maximum investment was concentrated. This core region was used for "... production and export of a few raw materials for processing in the factories of the developed industrial countries; and the import of manufactured consumer goods with a significant share of foreign exchange earned" (Seidman, 1970: 14). The unbalanced development restricted the overall urbanisation of the country and, as a result, the majority of Africans have not benefited from the process.

Map 2. Kenya: Administrative boundaries

Table 3. *Kenya: Distribution of urban centres with a population of over 2,000 by province, 1969 and 1979*

	Number of Urban Centres		1969		1979	
	1969	1979	Total Urban Population	Urban Pop. as a % of National Urban Pop.	Total Urban Population	Urban Pop. as a % of National Urban Pop.
Nairobi	1	1	509,286	47.2	827,775	35.9
Central	6	13	45,955	4.3	128,932	5.4
Coast	8	11	283,652	26.3	406,991	17.8
Eastern	7	15	37,965	3.5	233,316	9.2
Nyanza	4	7	43,829	4.1	207,757	8.9
Rift Valley	19	31	148,576	13.8	338,141	15.3
Western	2	6	10,645	1.0	105,743	4.6
North Eastern	–	7	–	–	67,617	2.9
Kenya	47	91	1,079,908	100.0	2,316,272	100.0

Sources: Based on 1969 and 1979 Population Census.

Table 4. *Expected growth rates for Kenya's urban population by province, 1979–2000*

	Annual Growth Rates in %	
	1979–1990	1991–2000
Nairobi	4.5	4.0
Central	4.2	4.3
Coast	2.8	2.8
Eastern	3.2	3.1
Nyanza	3.6	4.0
Rift Valley	4.3	4.1
Western	4.6	4.6
North Eastern	4.2	4.3
Total	4.0	3.8

Source: Kenya, 1984.

The colonial policies divided Kenya sharply into growth nodes and lagging areas. The majority of Kenyan urban centres are concentrated in a wine-glass shaped region with a north-west to south-east axis and distinctively broader at both extremities (Map 1).

The primate urban centres of Nairobi and Mombasa together accounted for between 70 and 74 per cent of urban population during the 1948, 1962,

and 1969 censuses but only about 50.5 per cent according to the 1979 population census. The rate of annual increase of population in Nairobi has always been higher than that of Mombasa. The annual rate of population increase of all urban centres during the period 1969–1979 was at least over 10.0 per cent per annum, except for Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru, Thika, Malindi and Nanyuki. These urban centres whose annual increases were below 10 per cent are also those whose percentage share of urban population over the years has been the highest. High rates of increase were recorded in Kisumu (16.8 per cent), Nyeri (13.6 per cent), Kericho (11.4 per cent), and Eldoret (10.7 per cent). The population of other urban centres grew by 15.6 per cent per annum, while their share of urban population increased from 5.3 per cent in 1948 to 28.9 per cent in 1979 or doubling in the last decade. After adjusting for the boundary changes which took place during the period 1969–1979, the pattern of urban growth looks somewhat different; with Kitale recording 7.9 per cent, Eldoret, 7.3 per cent, Nakuru, 6.2 per cent, Thika, 5.9 per cent, Kakamega 5.8 per cent, Nyeri 4.7 per cent, and Kisumu 3.2 per cent. Boundary expansion in Machakos and Meru was so great that apparent growth rates are meaningless.

The future vital role of urbanisation in Kenya must be seen against overall population prospects. With the projected population of Kenya expected to rise from about 23.5 million in 1989 to just over 30 million in the year 2000, the low projection for the urban population suggests an increase to 7.1 million by 2000, while the high projection indicates an urban population of 9.7 million. Thus by the year 2000, the urban areas of Kenya will have to accommodate between 26 per cent and 32 per cent of the total population. Most of this will be concentrated in small and intermediate urban centres which today witness higher rates of annual population increase.

THE ROLE OF SMALL AND INTERMEDIATE URBAN CENTRES FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT CREATION

This analysis of the colonial and post-colonial urbanisation process reveals the early dominance of major urban centres and the slow emergence of small and intermediate urban centres. This condition has helped to put in place an unbalanced population distribution which originally gave Nairobi and Mombasa an undue advantage in the attraction of migrants and socio-economic functions. The primacy role of these two major centres has been decreasing since independence. The smaller and intermediate centres have, on the other hand, been strengthened, and have increased in numbers. Their greater spread across the country has also considerably improved the re-distribution of urban population (Richardson, 1980; Obudho, 1979a; Wescott and Obudho, 1982). The rural-urban migratory

movements which previously were meant for the large urban centres have been diverted to small and intermediate centres. These centres are more closely linked to the basic aspects of life and work of new migrants, and they play an increasing role in facilitating the adaptation of migrants from rural to urban life (Tribe, 1970). The current urban policy of the Kenyan Government is to bridge the rural-urban gap which can hopefully spread modernisation to the rural areas. Since all the urban centres in Kenya were established and sited to meet the needs of the colonial power, they were imposed from above and from outside, and were not a natural growth as a result of internal socio-economic development. While we support the policy of development from below either from the small or intermediate urban centres, what is needed in Kenya is a rural-urban policy which is centralised upward from the rapidly emerging intermediate centres rather than a centralising down process from the two major urban centres. The small and intermediate urban centres potentially fulfil an important role in integrating urban and rural functions into national spatial systems. This is especially true of the small urban centres as they can provide important linkage effects down the spatial hierarchy to farms and villages as well as upward to major urban centres. Farm-to-market roads generally pass through these small urban centres, which in turn serve as staging areas for agricultural marketing, retail trade, migration, centres of manufacturing, government, administration, planning and service delivery.

The current focus of the Kenyan Government on district planning responds in part to the same political concerns that motivated industrial dispersal in Kenya during the 1970s. According to the 1979–1983 Development Plan, "there are clear **differences** among the average incomes earned and received in different districts of Kenya. It is the government policy to identify viable projects and programmes which will accelerate development in those districts that have been lagging behind" (Kenya, 1979b: 21). However, this set of policies also responds to a broader concern—the pervasiveness of rural poverty in all districts in Kenya and a belief that improving local capacity for decentralised, participatory planning and implementation of development activities is a necessary process towards alleviating that poverty in Kenya. The increasing importance of secondary urban centres over the last three decades is consistent with cross-sectional data from other nations, suggesting an inverse relationship between economic development and primacy. Some argue that in the earliest stages of development, urban concentration increases because development does not occur fast enough, or evenly enough, to support many large, intermediate-sized urban centres. The nature of the colonial experience, the lack of a tradition of urbanism, the economics of industrial location, and a small national area are some factors that may lead to high levels of primacy. As levels of economic activity continue to increase, political conflicts between the largest urban centres and its periphery are resolved in favour of the rural periphery, and intermediate urban centres

become more economically viable and begin receiving a larger proportion of public resources. Secondary urban centres have played an increasingly important role in planning in Kenya during the last few decades and will probably continue to do so. The most obvious symbol of their importance is their rapid rates of growth, paralleled by the corresponding increases in formal and informal employment. The government has played a major role in stimulating the growth of intermediate and small urban centres and their resultant impact on rural hinterlands by promoting industrial dispersal and administrative decentralisation. This is particularly true in terms of encouraging investments in intermediate activities in the urban informal and rural informal sectors of the economy.

A major characteristic of the relationship between settlements is that the larger and more coherently organised ones acquire a greater share of available resources than those lower down the hierarchy. Certainly this situation is in accord with the central place theory (Christaller, 1966). Accordingly, a major consequence of this is the high cost of movement consequent on the long distances between many remote villages and the few large urban centres. This factor has placed many rural dwellers at great disadvantage in terms of obtaining the most modern public services such as secondary education and hospitals, the marketing of their agricultural products and the purchase of manufactured goods.

The existence and increased role of small and intermediate urban centres, on the other hand, has initiated growth impulses which will, to a great extent, reshape Kenya's space economy (Kiamba, 1983). The era of very few large urban centres has meant that the spread mechanism of developmental impulses is very slow in effecting structural changes far away from the core areas. Moreover, a matrix of back-wash effects have been seen to reduce the beneficial influence of any spread effects. Such back-wash effects include, highly selective labour migration, steady rural skill drains and capital migration from the rural sector.

In response to these, the government has made attempts to stimulate urban and industrial development in small and intermediate urban centres usually under the name of the growth centre policy (Kenya, 1979a). Certain settlements have been designated growth centres and through the concentration of public investment there in the form of infrastructure and services, and even in public sector enterprises, it is hoped that these settlements will achieve some level of self-sustaining development. This policy has arisen out of the desire to lessen subnational imbalance in *per capita* income or *per capita* production and to steer productive investment away from the large urban centres. But, so far very little success has been achieved despite the increasing number of small and intermediate urban centres.

This is because, over the last decade, Kenyan growth centre policies have tended to concentrate on stimulating industrial development in the designated settlements through the diversification of industrial locations.

Consequently, there has been a relative lack of attention to agricultural and rural issues (Kabwegyere, 1978). As a result, the growth centres have often provided much smaller stimuli to surrounding areas than expected. In some cases, as has been observed in Kenya, the stimuli are often outweighed by negative effects. The establishment of large-scale industries in some of the centres has led to dramatic increases in their population mainly due to migration. The result of this is that these centres cannot provide sufficient infrastructure and services to this population. They have become victims of some of the problems faced by larger urban centres. Examples of this effect can be seen in the sugar plantation areas in Western Kenya where the establishment of industries has created urban centres which today have sprawling slums and squatter settlements. In most cases, the establishment of these rural industries has not been accompanied by the provision of infrastructure such as housing to cope with the rapidly increasing population in the new urban settlements.

Another reason for the lack of success of growth centres in meeting social goals, such as stimulating development in poor areas, has been the confusion between social and spatial equity. While governmental intervention might enhance the role of a settlement in national production, this has not always meant that there are important social and economic benefits for most of the population living there. As Stuckey (1975: 40) comments:

regional theory and the notion of growth poles or growth centres were derived from the observation of growth and development in North America and Europe, but ... they were marched off into the world of underdevelopment in the fifties and sixties and asked to solve the problems of poverty.

Growth centres need to be selected on the basis of their potential role in promoting major rural activities. As a whole the failings in growth centre policy to stimulate small and intermediate centres can be summarised as follows:

1. Imprecise diagnosis of existing conditions in such settlements and their zones of influence.
2. Simplistic and piecemeal understanding of factors behind development.
3. A lack of integration of settlement policies with macro-development policies and sectoral priorities.
4. Inadequate recognition of factors and aspects specific to each settlement.
5. Unrealistic and imprecise projections of needed investments to implement proposed policies.

THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF SMALL AND INTERMEDIATE SETTLEMENTS

Despite the above mentioned problems of implementation the government has identified small and intermediate settlements as having a major role to play in the spatial planning process. According to a UNCHS (1985:69) report "the human settlements cannot be regarded merely as a sector; they are the physical context within which development plans must operate and the location of all **sectoral** activities". In any given space, people, resources and economic activities are distributed and can only be interconnected through a settlement system. This system increases the access to many facilities and services and it is through these settlements that both agricultural and non-agricultural activities can have access to national and subnational transportation and communication systems. It is also through the different levels of local government in small and intermediate urban centres that local needs and resources can be assessed and many government policies most effectively implemented.

In Kenya this can be done through the District Focus Policy for Rural Development (DFPRD) which has recognised the settlement system as the infrastructure of development (Obudho, Akatch and Aduwo, 1988: 158–181). The development of small and intermediate urban centres cannot be considered in isolation from those of the rural economy which this policy seeks to promote. Instead, these urban centres should be considered as only part of an array of settlements ranging from small clusters of farm households through to large urban centres or cities as has been discussed in this paper. When such settlements are considered collectively, their contribution to national or local production, trade or service provision is considerable. Thus, all government plans and programmes for small and intermediate centres must recognize that each settlement will have its own range of skills, resources, links with the surrounding areas, and links with the national and subnational economy.

Policies for small and intermediate centres cannot be effective if they assume that all growth centres have similar functions, occupational structures or developmental potentials. In Kenya, most such centres do not have such similarities. Some have developed because of an administrative role as centres for provincial or district government, some serve expanding agricultural hinterlands and food processing in their micro-region, some meet demands for goods and services from agricultural populations, some are important nodes on transportation systems, while others fill a specialized niche in the national or international market producing just one good or service.

But their overall role in providing a useful tool to help achieve social equity should be recognized. Since independence all the country's development plans have emphasized the goal of providing better living conditions for all (Kenya, 1979b, 1983 and 1989). This demands that health, so-

cial, educational and recreation services as well as the essential infrastructure associated with them—be provided directly to, and with the direct involvement of, the poor and underprivileged. This can be achieved through small and intermediate urban centres. A high priority should be given to improving each district's population access to protected water supplies, hygienic disposal of human and household waste, primary health care and educational and training possibilities. The effectiveness of such provision will be examined and unit costs minimized by the location of each service in an appropriate level of settlement and small and intermediate centres will be important locations for such services.

The national government should rely on local governments located in these centres as the most effective level of government for articulating these local needs. Hence powers and financial resources should be allocated to these local governments. The decentralisation of development tasks, as is argued for in the DFPRD, should be seen as a valuable way of decreasing the burden on central ministries and agencies and stimulating efficient and appropriate development initiatives through the involvement of small and intermediate urban centres (Bird, 1978). The local governments based in these centres can mobilize resources efficiently, thus providing a capacity for development, hence the severe limits on their revenue raising powers should be removed. While doing this, the national government should identify appropriate institutional supports, training programmes and incentives which can optimise the development potential of local governments. Among the facets of local government which generally need this support are:

1. billing methods for utility- and other services;
2. accounting and financial management techniques;
3. project identification, appraisal and management methods; and
4. revenue-generating capacity.

In doing these, emphasis should be laid on simplicity and ease of compliance in formulating the needed standardised operating procedures for all local government institutions in the small and intermediate urban centres.

Since not all such centres have the same potential for strategic economic growth the government will have to discriminate in selecting the centres to be supported. At any one time, only a few small urban centres will be able to assume a strategic role in national development and only those with the most promising prospects should be so designated. Many government programmes which have sought to decentralise industry to small and intermediate urban centres have not proved effective either in providing a stimulus to the development of such settlements, or in meeting social goals related to income and job generation. Some industries have been located in urban centres which are ill-suited to their efficient operation and,

therefore, frequently perform well below capacity and do not suit local social and economic needs.

There is a need to first improve infrastructure and the facilities for industry in these urban centres based on a careful assessment of each centre's potential. In the economically backward regions such as North Eastern Kenya, special programmes to stimulate development in these urban centres should rely mainly on local initiatives, but they can be helped by a careful analysis of local skills, resources and constraints. Tapping this potential would be both cheaper and more successful at an earlier stage than attempting to promote industrial investment. Usually, the implementation of a programme in such unexploited areas requires the establishment of a "new" population in the area. This can be done by initiating a major socio-economic activity based on the local resources available. For example, attempts could be made to introduce more economically viable pastoral activities, by encouraging pastoralists to market some of their livestock through cooperatives based in small and intermediate urban centres. This will motivate the "new" population and create impetus for further development. For the other rural communities emphasis should be laid on promoting the rural informal sector to increase employment and income earning opportunities, and improve their general standard of living. The first step should, therefore, aim at strengthening the role of small and intermediate centres so as to facilitate the flow of production inputs and extend the range of services available to the development area.

All these processes would require the collaboration of both the Kenyan Government and international organisations. Multilateral and bilateral aid agencies should give high priority in their policies, programmes and projects to small and intermediate urban centres which can support low-income groups with improved housing and living conditions. At the moment, most such aid projects have been directed to integrated rural development projects which give little attention to the urban component. But there is a need to integrate the two. Research organizations should be supported in compiling case studies of innovative ways in which local governments have raised their revenue base and in developing quick evaluation methodologies for assessing the development potentials and constraints of these urban centres.

International assistance provided to the Government of Kenya should be used to improve the planning skills and the managerial and administrative capability of the local governments. Two priority areas for such training include the 1. training of planners and managers of subnational planning systems to provide more professionals in the spatial aspects of development policies and programmes; and 2. training of urban managers for small and intermediate urban centres or growth centres. Such measures can make it possible for the local authorities to mobilise resources efficiently and provide a capacity for development.

CONCLUSION

The above analysis of the current and potential role of small and intermediate urban centres in Kenya presupposes that efforts being made along the DFPRD strategy cannot be successful without considering the role of such centres. This paper has sought to identify their contribution in this process and starts by tracing their history and growth. It is suggested that the relative paucity of these urban centres is largely related to the colonial socio-spatial polarisation whose momentum has been too powerful to counter by post-independence regional development plans. However, the current DFPRD strategy makes it necessary to reappraise their role as growth centres, a process which has so far encountered a number of problems. The broad suggestions made in the last section of this paper should be helpful and provide valuable and crucial guidelines towards the success of any future regional development efforts in Kenya.

In order to reorganise and re-orient space in Kenya, we have proposed a planning scheme which is based on intermediate and small urban centres. Planning at the grassroots level would help in bringing jobs to the rural areas where the majority of the population reside, help re-orient the urban centres from parasitic to generative roles, and help in reducing the gap between urban centres and rural areas. In order to reorganise and re-orient the spatial structure of Kenya, a planning strategy should deliberately emphasise the emerging role and transformation of the numerous small and intermediate urban centres which are the growth poles of their respective local areas. Taking advantage of, and building upon, this existing structure of grassroot-level centres would help to induce development in the rural areas, re-orient urban centres toward their hinterlands, increase local participation, ease the pains of transition, and reduce the gap between the rural hinterland and the export enclaves. The approach suggested is not a radical new strategy but a substantive modification of an existing one. It contains elements of both bottom-up and top-down approaches, but it suggests a direct attack on rural poverty rather than a trickle down approach which may not help alleviate existing disparity.

The policies for balancing development in Kenya's spatial system must have the following objectives: national integration, participation of the total population in the development process, equitable distribution of the benefits of development, transformation of the traditional social structure, and the improvement of the quality of the human environment for future generations of Kenyans. These objectives can best be achieved within the concept of planning from below, with special emphasis on selected small and intermediate urban centres.

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The Development Potentials of Local Central Places in Nigeria

Layi Egunjobi

The existing spatial pattern of socio-economic development in Nigeria is characterized by a high degree of polarization around the urban centres. The emergence and sustenance of these enclaves of development have evoked considerable interest in the past two to three decades. In particular, concerns have been shown about the relatively poor socio-economic health of the rural areas where—despite the phenomenon of a high rate of urbanization in the country—an estimated 70 per cent of the people still live.

A look into the past exercises in development planning shows that efforts were first concentrated on the urban areas, and later on the rural areas. Both were not treated to reflect their interdependency. Initially, the thrust of the development plans is the achievement of higher rates of growth. For instance, the First National Development Plan (1962–1968) aimed at achieving 4 per cent growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product (Nigeria 1962), while the Second Plan (1970–1974) targeted the attainment of a growth rate of 6.6 per cent (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1970). To a very large extent, these objectives were achieved; but the major beneficiaries of the growth achieved were the urban areas. This pattern of development facilitated the setting in motion of a high wave of migration from the rural to the urban areas to the extent that the latter were beset with the problems of congestion, unemployment and overloaded public utilities.

In the early 1980s, the focus of public policy attention started to shift to the rural areas. The various programmes that were designed in this regard culminated into the establishment of the Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI) in 1986. However, recent developments have not done much by way of narrowing the gap between the city and the village (Egunjobi, 1986).

The contention of this paper is that the dichotomy between the urban and rural sectors has persisted because of the fact that no conscious and systematic efforts have been attempted to utilize the system of settlements as a basis for spatial planning and development. It contends further that the existing spatial structure which gives prominence to some urban regions owes much to the evolution of administrative organisation in the country. Essentially, the earliest administrative centres and the subsequently emerging state capitals respectively formed what can be described as first- and second-order settlements.

Owing to the limited influence of these urban centres in terms of their ability to transmit the impulse of development to the distant and sizeable hinterland, this paper advocates the need for a further decentralisation of administrative impetus from the state capitals to new local centres of growth. The premise on which the arguments are based is that "the initial distribution of governmental power within a country will ... tend to guide the subsequent evolution of the space economy" (Friedman, 1972: 49). Accordingly, this is capable of influencing major transformations in administrative settlement hierarchies (Okoye, 1985: 59), if and when desired.

In developing this thesis, the paper is divided into six sections: following this introduction is section two which outlines the evolution of Nigeria's administrative units from 1914 to 1989. Section three discusses the emergence of urban administrative centres as a concomitant of the evolution of the administrative units. In section four, a demonstration is made of the primacy of the urban centres *vis-à-vis* rural underdevelopment. This is followed up in section five by a proposal to harness the potentialities of local administrative centres as facilitators of rural development and vital links between the cities and the villages. The last section recapitulates the text and makes some concluding remarks.

THE EVOLUTION OF NIGERIA'S ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS

Between the period 1914 and 1987 there were six milestones in the evolution of Nigeria's administrative units (see Maps 1–6). From about 1900, the geographical area now known as Nigeria had started to assume the present shape as the British influence started to take root. Initially, the geographical entity was administered as three distinct units. These were the Lagos Protectorate which had its headquarters in Lagos; the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria with Calabar as the headquarters, and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria with its headquarters first in Lokoja, then in Jebba and eventually in Zungeru. In 1906, the Lagos Protectorate was merged with the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria as a unit.

In 1914, the first significant event occurred, namely the amalgamation of the Protectorates of Southern and Northern Nigeria into a single administrative entity. In other words, the country known as Nigeria came to be proclaimed (Map 1). Lagos was at the same time designated as a crown colony headed by an Administrator but making use of the departmental staff of Southern Nigeria. Each of the two Protectorates was sub-divided into Provinces and respectively known as Northern Provinces and Southern Provinces. While the former was administered from Kaduna, the latter was administered first from Lagos, and later from Enugu. This was the administrative arrangement until 1939 when the southern group of provinces was divided into Eastern and Western groups of Provinces with

the River Niger as the boundary. The East was governed from Enugu while Ibadan was designated the headquarters of the West.

Within the framework of the colonial Ten Year Development Plan (1946–1956), and the **Richards** constitution which came into effect in 1947, the groups of provinces were given some legislative and economic functions and were to be known as Regions. The Regions became the constituent units of the Federation in 1954 with legislatures based at the regional capitals (Ibadan, Kaduna and Enugu), as well as a federal legislature based in Lagos (Map 2). One significant event that needs to be highlighted at this time is that much of the powers of the Native Authorities were transferred to the regional governments (**Adejuyigbe**, 1982: 35).

The next significant administrative change in the federal structure took place in 1963 when the Mid-Western Region was created from Western Region with the capital in **Benin** City (Map 3). This arrangement followed protests of domination by a majority group and the attendant neglected minority. One notable thing about this exercise is that it is the only one thus far that has followed a democratic procedure (**Egunjobi**, 1982). Other exercises were carried out by decrees under various military regimes. This was the administrative structure until 1967 when the first military administration in the country divided the country into twelve states—six out of the Northern Region, three from the Eastern Region while the Western and Mid-Western Regions as well as Lagos remained as they were. Accordingly, a new set of twelve state capital towns was designated (Map 4).

Further exercises in administrative reorganisation took place in 1976 and 1987 respectively. By the 1976 exercise, the 12-state structure was increased to nineteen (Map 5). The most recent reorganisation brought the number of states in the country to 21 (Map 6). As it were, there are twenty-one state capital towns. Taking into consideration the new Federal Capital City of Abuja, there are twenty-two urban centres with administrative status.

THE EMERGENCE OF URBAN ADMINISTRATIVE CENTRES

The series of reorganisations in the country's administrative structure as described above has meant the capital towns or seats of government increased from two in 1914 to twenty-two (including the Federal Capital) in 1987. Table 1 and Maps 1–6 show the process of the evolution of the capitals during the period. Since the beginning of colonial administration in the country, those capital towns and cities so designated have always thrived as centres of activities providing educational, health, administrative, commercial, industrial and informational services as well as wielding considerable political power. The earliest set of settlements serving as growth centres up to the early 1960s are Kaduna, Lagos, Enugu and Ibadan. In addition to being an administrative centre, Enugu owed its im-

portance to coal mining. Of course, there are other centres that grew at considerable rates for reasons other than administrative. Jos for example, had been an important centre as a result of tin mining. Calabar and Port Harcourt assumed their initial significance because they were ports. In 1963, the creation of the Mid-West State out of the old Western Region brought Benin City into the category of capital cities. Before this time, Benin had been the most historically important centre in the old Benin Empire. But its designation as a capital conferred on it increased status and additional attraction for infrastructural facilities and economic activities. Kano is another city that owed its eminence to its role as a commercial centre. The creation of twelve states in 1967 saw the emergence of seven additional capitals to the five hitherto existing. These are Sokoto, Kano, Maiduguri, Ilorin, Jos, Calabar and Port Harcourt. The 1976 administrative restructuring increased further the number of capitals by seven to nineteen. The towns so added to the list in 1976 are Minna, Bauchi, Yola, Makurdi, Owerri, Abeokuta and Akure. The latest two additions, i.e. Katsina and Uyo, were made in 1987. This exercise has increased the number of state administrative centres to twenty-one, while Abuja the new Federal Capital has increased the number to twenty-two.

Table 2 shows the population growth of some major urban centres, most of which are state capitals between the inter-census years 1952 and 1963. It shows further the 1984 estimated population of the centres. The table shows that the average growth rate of the urban areas between 1952 and 1963 was 6.9 per cent. This varies between 3.0 per cent and 11.5 per cent for Ibadan and Lagos respectively. In the eastern parts of the country, high growth rates are concentrated in Port Harcourt (10.5%), Enugu (7.4%), Aba (7.6%) and Onitsha (7.0%). In the northern part, Jos, Kaduna, Kano and Zaria appear to have formed a core area of growth with rates ranging between 5.5 per cent in Zaria and 10.6 per cent in Kaduna. In the southwestern part are found Lagos and Ibadan which are the largest cities in the country. Although the growth rates of Ibadan and Ilorin between 1952 and 1963 are the lowest (3.0% and 4.0% respectively), subsequent estimates indicate much higher rates. Lagos, on the other hand has always maintained a high rate of growth. Both Lagos and Ibadan had hit the 4 million mark in the 1984 estimates.

Once the growth has been triggered off, the centres had continued to grow at even higher rates. The fifth column of Table 2 shows that most of the urban centres have doubled their populations several times over between 1963 and 1984.

A noticeable concomitant of the rapidly increasing populations of the centres is their growth in areal extent. For example, the built-up area of the city of Ibadan was only 39 sq. km in 1935. By 1977, it had expanded to 152 sq. km thus recording a physical expansion rate of 6.9 per cent per annum

1914	1939	1946	1963	1967	1976	1987
1. Northern Provinces (Kaduna)	1. Northern Provinces (Kaduna)	1. Northern Region (Kaduna)	1. Northern Region (Kaduna)	1. North-West (Sokoto) 2. North-Central (Kaduna) 3. Kano (Kano) 4. North-East (Maiduguri) 5. Kwara (Ilorin) 6. Benue-Plateau (Jos)	1. Sokoto (Sokoto) 2. Niger (Minna) 3. Kaduna (Kaduna) 4. Kano (Kano) 5. Borno (Maiduguri) 6. Bauchi (Bauchi) 7. Gongola (Yola) 8. Kwara (Ilorin) 9. Plateau (Jos) 10. Benue (Makurdi)	1. Sokoto (Sokoto) 2. Niger (Minna) 3. Kaduna (Kaduna) 4. Katsina (Katsina) 5. Kano (Kano) 6. Borno (Maiduguri) 7. Bauchi (Bauchi) 8. Gongola (Yola) 9. Kwara (Ilorin) 10. Plateau (Jos) 11. Benue (Makurdi)
2. Southern Provinces (Lagos/Enugu)	2. Eastern Provinces (Enugu)	2. Eastern Region (Enugu)	2. Eastern Region (Enugu)	7. East Central (Enugu) 8. South-East (Calabar) 9. Rivers State (Port Harcourt)	11. Anambra (Enugu) 12. Imo (Owerri) 13. Cross River (Calabar) 14. Rivers (Port Harcourt)	12. Anambra (Enugu) 13. Imo (Owerri) 14. Cross River (Calabar) 15. Akwa Ibom (Uyo) 16. Rivers (Port Harcourt)
	3. Western Provinces (Ibadan)	3. Western Region (Ibadan)	3. Western Region (Ibadan)	10. Western State (Ibadan)	15. Oyo (Ibadan) 16. Ogun (Abeokuta) 17. Ondo (Akure)	17. Oyo (Ibadan) 18. Ogun (Abeokuta) 19. Ondo (Akure)
		4. Lagos Colony (Lagos)	4. Mid-West Region (Benin-City)	11. Bendel State (Benin City)	18. Bendel (Benin City)	20. Bendel (Benin City)
			5. Capital Territory of Lagos (Lagos)	12. Lagos (Lagos)	19. Lagos (Lagos)	21. Lagos (Lagos) 22. FCT (Abuja)

Notes: The names of capital cities are in brackets; FCT: Federal Capital Territory

Map 1. *Nigeria: The two protectorates, 1914*

Map 2. *Nigeria: Three regions, 1954*

Local Central Places in Nigeria

Map 3. Nigeria: Four regions, 1963

Map 4. Nigeria: Twelve states, 1967

Map 5. Nigeria: Nineteen states, 1976

Map 6. Nigeria: Twenty one states, 1987

over the 52-year period (Egunjobi, 1981: 64). In like manner, Enugu increased its built-up area from 73 sq. km in 1963 to 204 sq. km. in 1985 averaging an expansion rate of 8.0 per cent per annum during the 22-years; and within a short period of three years, Kaduna increased its area at a rate of 12 per cent per year from 100 sq. km in 1982 to 135 sq. km in 1985 (Onibokun *et al.*, 1986: 12).

Table 2. *Growth of urban centres in Nigeria*

Urban Centre	Population		Annual	1984
	1952 Census	1963 Census	Increase % 1952-63	Estimated Population
Ibadan*	58,251	131,003	7.6	364,977
Benin City	54,017	100,694	5.8	563,680
Calabar	46,935	76,410	4.5	427,783
Enugu	63,212	138,457	7.4	933,585
Ibadan	460,206	635,011	3.0	4,230,278
Lorin	71,296	106,692	4.0	1,167,428
Os	39,050	94,451	8.5	506,065
Kaduna	42,647	129,133	10.6	1,010,811
Lano	131,316	295,432	7.6	1,653,812
Latsina	52,756	90,538	5.0	252,241
Lagos	267,407	665,246	8.6	4,485,607
Laiduguri	83,514	139,965	4.8	783,201
Linitsha*	77,087	163,032	7.0	454,210
Port Harcourt	59,548	179,563	10.5	1,005,183
Okoto	47,947	89,817	5.9	502,791
aria*	92,434	166,170	5.5	462,953

Urban Centres that are not state capitals.

Source: Physical Planning Department, Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER), Ibadan, Nigeria.

The most notable factor explaining the high rate of growth points, most of which are administrative centres, is the high level of investment that goes into them. Whenever a settlement is designated a state capital—usually the largest in the new state created—public investments are directed into the city to provide new housing units, establish a new water scheme or expand the existing one, increase educational and health facilities at primary, secondary and tertiary levels, as well as increase the capacity and distribution of energy. The acquisition of a new status as seat of government confers on the city an enhanced image with correspondingly 'befitting' paraphernalia. Designation of a new capital is always associated with the mass movement of civil servants to fill the new administrative posts created. Equally important is the movement of contractors and pro-

professionals in various fields into the new capitals; they depend largely on government contracts and consultancy jobs for a living. The designated capital therefore becomes a thriving city attracting increased commercial and industrial activities.

URBAN ADMINISTRATIVE CENTRES AND RURAL UNDERDEVELOPMENT

The phenomenon of accelerated growth experienced by the urban centres has rendered the rural areas relatively deprived. Even though there are disparities in levels of socio-economic development among the different geographical areas of the country, the imbalance between the urban and rural areas appears to have assumed a greater dimension. "The concentration of high income occupation and high income earners in the state capitals and other large towns has meant a more than proportional concentration of purchasing power in them" (Isong, 1985: 46).

The primacy of urban centres can further be explained by the pattern of public expenditure which tilts heavily towards the urban areas. In respect of the items listed in Table 3, the proportion of urban based investment is 82.1 per cent as against the 17.9 per cent for rural areas.

The widest gaps between the urban and rural areas occur in Town/Country Planning, Social Welfare and Industry. The rural share of investments in each of these sectors is less than 10 per cent; and in none of the sectors is the rural share up to 30 per cent.

The location of industrial establishments reinforces the general pattern of the disparity between the urban and rural areas. Of the 2,215 industrial establishments employing ten or more workers in 1975, the leading seven centres (Lagos, Kano, Port Harcourt, Benin City, Jos, Ibadan and Enugu) together accounted for 68.2 per cent of all the establishments (Isong, 1985: 46).

In Oyo State, for example, Ibadan which is the capital accounts for 34.5 per cent of the total number of industrial establishments in the state, whereas it accounts for 12.0 per cent of the state's total population.

The same trend has been observed in Bendel state where Oredo Local Government Area (LGA) in which the state capital (Benin City) is located accounted for 59.29 per cent of the doctors in all the state's twenty LGAs. This has been ascribed to "the tendency of state capitals often attracting disproportionate shares of public goods and services" (Okafor, 1987: 343).

The observed phenomenon of concentration of socio-economic investments in the foremost administrative centres (First-Order Settlements) and more recently designated state capitals (Second-Order Settlements) have created circular regions of development around these centres of power (Sada, 1977: 269). This has again been observed in Kano State where Kano City constitutes a primate city with a dominant thriving urban region

amidst a large area of underdeveloped countryside (Filani, 1981: 29). The broad pattern that has thus emerged is that of a number of islands of relative development around the administrative centres with correspondingly deprived rural areas.

Table 3. Urban–Rural investment allocations in selected sectors of the Nigerian economy according to the 1970–74 Development Plan

	Total Planned Capital Investment (₦ million)*	Urban based Investment (# million)	%	Rural based Investment (#million)	%
Industry	172.2	155.4	91.2	16.8	9.8
Electricity	90.6	80.6	89.0	10.0	11.0
Education	277.8	196.8	70.9	81.0	29.1
Health	107.6	90.4	84.0	17.2	16.0
Town/Country Planning	38.2	36.0	94.3	2.2	5.7
Water/Sewage	103.4	84.4	81.6	19.0	18.4
Social Welfare	24.0	22.0	91.7	2.0	8.3
Agriculture	746.2	615.4	82.5	130.8	17.5
TOTAL	1,560.0	1,281.0	82.1	279.0	17.9

* Nigerian Naira.

Source: Filani, 1981.

A major factor that appears to have explained the limited area of influence of the urban administrative centres is the size of the states which are still relatively large both in area extent and in population sizes. Table 4 shows that the areas of the states vary from 3,345 sq. km (Lagos) to 116,400 (Borno) with a mean of 41,989 sq. km.

With respect to population sizes, these vary between 2,053,000 in Niger State to 9,926,000 in Kano state. The average state population size is 5,086,000. It can be observed that Niger State with the smallest population size is twice the size of Botswana (1,070,000), three times the size of Cyprus (665,000), and two and a half times the size of The Gambia (748,000) (See Zachariah and Vu, 1988). Moreover, the most populous state is nine times the size of Botswana, fifteen times the size of Cyprus and thirteen times the size of the Gambia.

The point intended for emphasis is that even though a considerable degree of administrative decentralisation has taken place over the years, the sheer size of the states (population and area) under the present administrative structure is a major constraint limiting the capacity of the state capitals in spreading developmental impulses to the rural areas. A

substantial proportion of the hinterland is so distant to the state capitals that meaningful urban-rural interaction is hardly feasible.

Table 4. Nigeria: Administrative divisions, according to 1976 *arrangement*

States & Capitals (with FCT*)	Area (Km ²)	Population			
		1963 (‘000)		Estimated 1985 (‘000)	
ANAMBRA (Enugu)	17,675	3,597	(138)	6,182	(240)
BAUCHI (Bauchi)	64,605	2,431	(38)	4,179	(65)
BENDEL (Benin City)	35,500	2,461	(101)	4,230	(174)
BENUE (Makurdi)	45,174	2,427	(54)	4,172	(94)
BORNO (Maiduguri)	116,400	2,997	(140)	5,152	(243)
CROSS RIVER (Calabar)	27,237	3,478	(76)	5,978	(129)
GONGOLA (Yola)	91,390	2,605	(17)	4,478	(30)
IMO (Owerri)	11,850	3,673	(21)	6,313	(37)
KADUNA (Kaduna)	70,245	4,098	(150)	7,044	(260)
KANO (Kano)	43,285	5,775	(295)	9,926	(512)
KWARA (Ilorin)	66,869	1,714	(209)	2,949	(362)
LAGOS (Lagos)	3,345	1,444	(665)	3,434	(1,153)
NIGER (Minna)	65,037	1,195	(60)	2,053	(104)
OGUN (Abeokuta)	16,762	1,551	(187)	2,666	(325)
ONDO (Akure)	20,959	2,730	(71)	4,692	(123)
OYO (Ibadan)	37,705	5,209	(627)	8,953	(1,087)
PLATEAU (Jos)	58,030	2,027	(90)	3,484	(157)
RIVERS (Port Harcourt)	21,859	1,720	(180)	2,956	(312)
SOKOTO (Sokoto)	10,254	4,539	(90)	7,802	(156)
* Fed. Cap. Territory	7,315	—		—	
TOTAL	923,768	—		—	

Note: Figures in brackets are for state capitals; **1963** figures are derived from the census taken that year. **1985** figures are projections.

Source: Federal Office of Statistics, **1986**.

Another factor of note that helps to explain the limited growth influence of the administrative centres of the rural hinterland is the national transport network. In the first place, the colonial transportation network was sketchy and mainly north-south in orientation; they were designed to facilitate administration and the evacuation of export crops to the coastal ports. After independence, some efforts were made to develop lateral routes (west-east) linkages to complement the north-south routes. Even so, the focus of attention was the transport needs of the state administrative centres. In effect, the transport network is one that has not adequately responded to the country's internal needs. The implication as Isong (1985) has observed is that "many rural communities remain as cut off as ever from the economic life of the country".

A visible consequence of the lack of balance between the administrative urban regions and the rural areas is the movement of population over the years from the latter to the former. The dreary socio-economic climate of the rural areas has been responsible for the rural-urban migration that has been taking place over the past four decades. As a result, the bulk of the remaining farming population in the rural area is the elderly whose productivity has declined with time to a very low level.

On the other hand, the rate of job creation in the urban areas has not matched the rate at which migrants moved into the cities. In the same way, the rates of urban utilities provision have not matched the demand for them. This is to say that all is not well with the urban areas. However, the situation is relatively better. The urban utilities may not be functioning properly most of the time, but the services are in general terms available. Schools are better staffed while more people have access to health care services. On the other hand, the facilities and services are essentially lacking in the rural areas.

In the past four years, the policy response to the problem of rural underdevelopment is the establishment of the Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI). This government agency is charged with the responsibility to improve the rural areas through increased food production and development of all facets of rural infrastructure. DFRRI was established and funded by the Federal Government. Although a substantial amount of money has been expended especially on the construction of feeder roads, DFRRI has been criticized on the grounds that:

1. it has been saddled with too many responsibilities;
2. programmes do conflict with the Local Government functions;
3. its activities are not preceded by socio-economic surveys to determine local needs and priorities;
4. its activities are not based on any planning conceptual framework; and
5. its approach fails to incorporate the required mechanism for effective linkages between rural and urban areas (Egunjobi, 1986a; Olokesusi, 1987).

In general, the adopted past and present approaches to development have addressed urban and rural problems separately at different periods of time. In other words, both areas have not been conceived in the way they are interdependent. The need therefore arises to develop a planning strategy that will recognize the interdependency between urban and rural environments and assign this the desired weight.

It is against this background that the development of local administrative centres (Third-Order Settlements) is being advocated to serve as a driving force in shaping the pattern of rural development and as a mechanism to integrate the urban with the rural regions.

POTENTIAL ROLE OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE CENTRES IN DEVELOPMENT

Following the discussions in the previous sections concerning the evolution of urban administrative centres in the country, the polarisation of development around them and the relative deprivation of the rural regions, it is proposed that a deliberate policy be adopted to develop the existing Local Government Headquarters (LGHQs) as local growth centres. The points discussed below have to do with the theoretical basis for this proposal, the envisaged overall structure of administrative centres as growth points, the objectives of proposed local growth centres, the requirements for the attainment of the local growth centre objectives, and the justifications for the proposal.

Theoretical framework

The theoretical foundation upon which this proposal rests is the central place theory integrated with growth centre theory (Hansen, 1972).

The central place theory deals with the size, number, function and distribution of human settlements. A central place, according to Christaller who put forth the theory in 1933, is a place which has central functions that extend over a large area in which other smaller central places exist. Thus, there are categories of central places performing varying functions and exerting influence on regions of various sizes. There is an observable pattern in the relationship between sizes of settlements and their location, between sizes and functions, and between settlement sizes and sizes of their hinterlands. Central places of a higher order perform more specialized functions (in addition to non-specialized ones), and extend their influences over larger areas. Such places are fewer in number and located further apart than central places of a lower order. Several low order centres and their complementary regions will be found within a higher order centre and its complementary region. In summary, the central place theory is a model of spatial organization which helps to "understand the interdependency and hierarchy of settlement, hierarchy of functions, interdependent and hierarchy of functions, interdependency of city and region, market range and threshold population" (Sharma, 1984: 135).

Since the central place theory has been criticized on the ground that it is static in conception (among other criticisms), attempts have been made to integrate it into some version of the growth pole theory (Hansen, 1972). The growth pole (centre) explains that growth does not occur everywhere and at the same time but manifests itself at certain points or poles of growth with variable intensities. These growth centres play major roles in the development of their hinterland. Thus, the growth centre is concerned with aspects of points of development and their impact in the surrounding areas, and therefore satisfies the dynamics of growth condition, which ap-

years to be lacking in the central place theory. In this regard, Hermansen (1972) concludes that "the French development pole theory and the German theory of location appear to supplement each other in a fruitful way". In general, both theories are important especially in their harmonized form, in the determination of the desirable hierarchical organization of human centres and their hinterlands.

The structure

Conceived within the context of the central place theory integrated with the theory of growth centres as briefly reviewed above, the proposed national spatial structure recognizes three human settlement orders as a starting point. The first-order settlements are the foremost administrative capitals in the country up to 1963. These according to Table 1 and Map 3 are Lagos, Kaduna, Ibadan, Enugu and Benin City. The second-order settlements are the recently designated state capitals as they have existed since 1987. These are twenty-two in number including the first order settlements as they are expected to perform second-order functions as well. They include all the twenty-one state capitals plus the City of Abuja (see Table 1 and Map 6).

The first- and second-order settlements are already existing as high order central places as discussed earlier on. They evolved following a political process through which major administrative divisions developed from two big units in 1914 to twenty-two in 1987. These series of decentralization have induced development through concentration of socio-economic investments in the various administrative centres. However, the impact of the centres is not actually felt in the distant rural regions. It is therefore proposed to extend the devolution process of administrative centres as experienced in the country a step further by designating a set of third order settlements. It is proposed that instead of choosing a set of new settlements to perform this role which may be fraught with political obstacles and constraints, the existing LGHQs which are 449 in number be designated to perform this role. These centres correspond with the 449 LGAs in the country. The LGA is thus the area of influence in respect of each third-order settlement. The areas and population sizes of the LGAs, many of which are larger than some countries, are considered large enough to warrant growth centres.

Objectives

The goal of a deliberate policy of strengthening the existing LGHQs to become local growth centres (third-order settlements) is to create avenues to improve the urban-rural relationship.

In more specific terms, the following objectives are intended to be achieved:

1. to raise the status of the LGHQs to enable them to serve as local growth centres;
2. to facilitate the transference of urban influences into the remote rural areas; and
3. to limit the volume of migration to the cities.

Requirements

The attainment of the stated goal and objectives is dependent upon the following requirements:

1. The Local Governments are to be ascribed increased powers and their relationship with the state governments more clearly defined. Although the 1976 Reforms recognized Local Governments as distinct tiers of government with some measure of autonomy, a lot still needs to be done to minimize undue influence of state governments, especially over those functions that traditionally belong to the latter.
2. The upgrading of LGHQs to enable them play the role of growth centres is a function of the economic capability of the Local Governments. In order to strengthen this capability, there is need for the existing revenue allocation formula which shares the least proportion of the federated pool to the 449 LGAs to be revised. The functions which Local Governments are expected to perform have been observed to be inversely related to the percentage of revenue accruing to them (Egunjobi, 1986b).
3. The provision of water, electricity, roads, health services, educational facilities, housing and banks are fundamental to the strengthening of LGHQs as new local growth centres. The provision of these needs to be accorded priority in the process of upgrading the centres.
4. There is need to identify the resource potentialities of each locality and evolve projects that will tap the resources in order to generate employment and raise income.
5. Policy instruments, such as tax incentives and development of industrial layouts, should be devised to direct private capital flows to the newly designated areas.
6. The opening up of the remote LGAs through skillfully designed and properly constructed transportation routes is basic to the attainment of the objectives of improving the urban-rural relationship. Construction of all weather roads from the state capitals to the LGHQs and from one LGHQ to the other should be accorded priority in the process of developing new local centres.
7. The integration of the local centres with other settlements within the LGAs and the designation of even lower order settlements requires the preparation of physical development plans. This, according to Mabo-

gunje (1981), is the most critical task for resolving the crisis in rural development as it gives real meaning to all the other tasks while it guarantees their chances of success.

Justification

The establishment of third-order settlements as a way of improving the spatial structure in Nigeria is justified on administrative, political, economic, cultural and historical grounds.

1. Administratively, it is convenient as the designated growth centres and their spheres of influence correspond with the existing LGAs. Secondly, the objective of using the centres as a mechanism for developing rural areas is in accordance with the existing government policy through the activities of DFRRI.
2. Politically, the designation of local growth centres implies a decentralization of public decision-making. It satisfies the political realities of the country while it affords citizens the opportunity to participate in the political process. Local Governments have been known to be weak in relation to other levels of government and have not been brought into the development process (Mabogunje, 1972: 4; Kudiabor, 1977: 87). The envisaged policy of strengthening the political and economic base of the LGHQ is expected to reverse this trend.
3. Economically, it allows for cost-effectiveness in the distribution of investable funds. Development projects are not distributed indiscriminately in space; rather a tacit policy of 'dispersed concentration' is adopted. This is a policy whereby an attempt is made to disperse development to more areas. However in doing this, initial investments are concentrated in selected centres which in turn are expected to influence their complementary regions.
4. Culturally, the potential and actual inter-ethnic conflicts are likely to be minimized when the Local Government is used as the basis for redistributing resources. No matter how small a group may be, it is almost certain that the group would be able to control at least one Local Government (Salau, 1985: 110).
5. Historically, the designation of local growth centres is consistent with past trends. It will be recalled that more administrative centres emerged as more states were created; the centres assumed improved status attracting increased economic activities and attracting migratory movements. A further decentralization of the power base to a lower level would mean that the people will be witnessing a phenomenon they are already familiar with.

CONCLUSION

The process of the evolution of administrative centres in Nigeria has influenced, to a great extent, the general pattern of socio-economic and physical development. The earliest settlements designated as administrative capitals and the subsequent ones are characterized by concentration of public and private sector investments. They therefore constitute distinct growth centres. The more administration is decentralized through creation of more states, the higher the number of administrative growth points which are spread in the space economy.

However the spacing of these settlements and the general pattern of development show that the impact of development emanating from the centres has not reached those rural areas which are located at considerable distances from the centres. The implication of this is that the catchment areas of the administrative growth centres are still as large as to make fruitful urban-rural interaction difficult. At the same time, the rural development efforts presently put forth are not informed by any physical planning conceptual framework, while investments allocated for projects are neither prioritized nor rationalized.

A suggested option therefore is the pursuance of the administrative decentralization process which has increased the number of administrative growth centres from two in 1914 to twenty-two in 1987. While the foremost centres perform the roles of first-order settlements, and the more recent ones perform the roles of second-order settlement~the LGHQs are proposed as the third-order settlements. The LGHQs enjoy some degree of autonomy as a constitutionally recognized third tier of government. The designation of their headquarters as local growth centres will necessarily confer on them the imperative to further strengthen their administrative apparatus, boost the infrastructural facilities and services, establish effective communication links between them and other growth points particularly the state capitals, as well as establish strong economic bases.

It is expected that the injection of development investments in the LGHQs will produce stimulating effects on their rural hinterlands as well as facilitate the desired interaction between the LGAs and the state capitals.

Finally, in order to sharpen the policy focus further, there is the need for more in depth and systematic research. This will throw more light on the system of settlements in the country (both urban and rural), their characteristic features, structures, dynamics, interrelationships, levels of socio-economic progress, physical development and their management systems.

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The Role of Small Rural Towns in Development

Poul Ove Pedersen

THE ROLE OF THE SMALL TOWN

The perception of the small rural town in development has in Africa, as elsewhere, been shifting dramatically during the last 30 years.

During the 1960s, the small towns were in general positively perceived as the most peripheral link of the urban system, through which innovations and urban services are diffused to the surrounding rural areas. Though the small peripheral centres were often not seen to grow, it was hoped that such a growth could be achieved through service and growth centre policies (see, for example, Darwent, 1969 and Kuklinski, 1972).

However, the hope was too often not fulfilled. Innovations and services did not spread out from the larger towns as expected. Large enterprises transferred to the small towns and rural areas rarely led to the multiplication and growth which were hoped for. Instead they remained enclaves in the local economy without much local impact other than the direct wage multiplier (see, for example, Kongstad, 1974).

Thus, during the 1970s, the image of the small towns shifted almost from white to black. They were now seen as points of exploitation through which the capitalist system in general and especially the colonial powers sucked resources out of the rural areas.

It had long been recognized that the urban system in many developing countries was dominated by one or a few primate cities. The primate cities developed during colonial times as seats of colonial power and as export harbours for the resources extracted from the colonies. Independence, in most cases, did not change that. The primate city still was the seat of power and control of resources. In order to be able to govern, the new states had to extract resources from the rural areas, just as the colonial powers had previously done.

Thus, the small towns in the urban system were viewed as administrative centres for resource extraction and control rather than service centres for rural development. This has been especially clear in Africa, where there was only a fragmentary urban system at the time of colonization. Here, the different administrative hierarchies (mission, police, civil administration) tended to locate their networks of branches independently of one another. Thus, a diffused pattern of functions emerged rather than a network of small "multi-purpose" centres (Soja, 1968; Funnell, 1976).

Consequently, during the 1970s, small towns were generally not considered to be a positive force in the development process. Non-agricultural activities operating in the rural areas and small towns were viewed as part of the administrative and corporate hierarchies to which they often are attached rather than as part of the small towns or centres where they are located.

Growth or decline of the small town was viewed as the result of restructuring processes decided upon in centralized ministries and headquarters of large national or multinational corporations. Both research and development policies focused on the rural district as a whole and did not recognize the small town as playing any distinct role in the development process.

This has gradually been changing during the 1980s. A number of developing countries (for example, Kenya (Republic of Kenya, 1986) and Zimbabwe (Wekwete, 1987; Gasper, 1988)) have introduced new urban policies favouring the development of small rural towns. The small towns are here seen as necessary and important to the development of the rural region. The small town functions as a link between the rural areas and the large towns, but especially the role of the small town as a service centre for the rural region is emphasized. It is stressed that small towns with efficient services are necessary to increase the productivity of agriculture (for example, Jones, 1986; Wanmali, 1987; Haggblade, Hazell & Brown, 1987). It is also hoped that the small towns may be able to absorb some of the rural population surplus which otherwise will crowd into the large cities.

The new urban development policies differ distinctly from the growth and service centre policies of the previous decade. Where the urban growth centre policies of the 1960s hoped to generate growth in the peripheral region by allocating national investments to large-scale infrastructure and industrial projects, the new urban policies focus rather on developing local initiatives and resources for local development. The links between the small town and the rural areas are in focus rather than the link between the small and large towns. The new urban policies also tend to be more concerned with smaller centres than the old policies were.

Just as small towns and their services may have a positive influence on rural development and agricultural productivity, the development of the small towns depends on the growth of rural incomes. However, recent research indicates that it is also a prerequisite that the incomes generated are spread fairly evenly. Where land ownership is very concentrated, incomes tend to leak out of the local area to non-local landowners. Thus, the small towns seem to grow especially where agricultural reforms have taken place, because only here will growing incomes lead to growing local demand (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1986a).

The new focus of urban policies is of course partly a result of the lack of national resources to allocate, but it is also in line with the increasing research and policy interest in participation and decentralization. The theo-

retical basis for the new urban policies, however, is still rather weak. The old growth and service centre theories are certainly not applicable without large modifications.

SMALL TOWNS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: LACK OF STATISTICAL EVIDENCE

It is popularly believed that the process of urbanization in the Third World is more rapid than it ever was in the now developed countries and more highly centred in the large cities; however, this is not supported by recent empirical investigations. In a world-wide study, Preston (1988) shows that the rate of urbanization (the percentage of the total population living in urban areas) in the developing countries increased from 17 per cent to 28 per cent during the 25-year period 1950-1975. This is almost the same as the increase in the rate of urbanization from 17-26 per cent found in the developed countries during the period 1875-1900, when they experienced their most rapid urbanization.

Preston (1988) also shows that the rates of urbanization and industrialization are highly correlated both over time (1950-1970) and space (21 different regions of the world). Thus, there seems to be very little justification for a general claim that "over-urbanization" has been taking place in the developing countries, even though it may hold true for some parts of the developing world, especially Latin America.

Although the rate of urbanization in the developing countries has not increased more rapidly than it did in the now developed countries, the growth of the urban population has been more rapid. However, this rapid urban growth is caused primarily by a very rapid natural increase of both the rural and urban populations. Rural-urban migration seems in many cases to have been even smaller than it was in the developed countries.

Finally, Preston shows that the claim that the largest cities grow most rapidly does not hold true. This claim stems from aggregated analyses where groups of cities within specific size limits are compared from census to census. Such aggregated analyses give too high growth rates for the group of the largest towns, because the number of large towns tends to increase from census to census. By analysing the growth between the two last censuses of 1212 cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, he shows that the urban growth rate increases both with the total national rate of population growth and with the national income per capita level. When these variables are controlled for, the urban growth rates tend in fact to be higher for small cities (100,000-250,000 inhabitants) than for large cities. The most important exception is that capital cities tend to grow more rapidly than others. Thus, within the group of cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, there seems to be little justification for a general claim that the largest cities grow more rapidly than smaller ones.

Unfortunately, there are no broad comparative investigations of the growth of small towns in developing countries. The difficulties of studying small towns are partly that statistics are scarce and partly that the statistical definitions of small towns have tended to vary both from country to country and from census to census. Statistically, small towns in many cases are not treated as towns at all, while in other cases, data for the registered towns often include large rural areas around the town. In general, this has probably led to an underestimation of the small town population (see, for example, Hesselberg, 1986; Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1986b), but to an overestimation of the medium-sized towns.

Most of our knowledge of small towns in developing countries is therefore based on monographs on individual towns, which are mostly not comparable and do not permit broad comparative studies.

However, though the empirical evidence is limited, there are indications that small towns have actually been growing fairly rapidly in a number of developing countries during the 1970s and 1980s (for Africa see, for example, Rasmussen and *Ærøe*, 1987). But the growth rate of small towns is not uniform, as it seems implicitly to be assumed in many urban studies; it varies greatly over time and space from stagnation or even decline to rapid growth.

THE ROLE OF SMALL TOWNS DURING THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF DENMARK¹

The small towns as well as the urban system as a whole reflect the process of economic development. Thus, the actual role of small towns will vary over time and space. Therefore, it is not possible to generalize about the future of small towns in specific countries. Still, it may be interesting to present a specific account of how small towns developed in that industrialized country where small towns have perhaps played the largest role during industrialization, namely Denmark. The experience of the present developing countries is not likely to be the same, but the Danish experience may give some indications of the upper limit of what may be achieved through a small town policy.

Danish economic historians have discussed when the industrial breakthrough in Denmark more precisely took place. The 1850s, 1870s and 1890s have been candidates, but the latest detailed study shows that in fact industrialization was a fairly even process spread over the whole period 1840–1914 (Hyltoft, 1984). However, three phases can be distinguished during which the structure of the industrialization process was very different, namely 1840–65, 1865–96, and 1896–1914.

In 1840, most industry was located in Copenhagen where the industrial scene "was dominated by textiles mostly under the domestic system, and numerous small firms engaged in traditional crafts alongside a few large

state enterprises" (Hyldtoft, 1984: 425). Technology was simple manufacturing, only few steam engines were in operation, and growth was very slow.

The industrial growth which started around 1840 was based on an upswing in agriculture and commerce due to a rapidly growing grain export to Britain. This upswing led to rapid growth in population and incomes in the rural areas and an increasing demand for inputs and machinery to both agriculture and construction. This demand was supplied partly by a growing group of part-time rural artisans and traders and partly by a number of new brick works, iron foundries, and machine industries in the larger provincial towns (Hansen, 1972; Willerslev, 1952), which as a result grew a little more rapidly than Copenhagen (see Table 1). However, urban growth was generally not very rapid, and the small towns (800–1600 inhabitants) even lost population. In Copenhagen, there was an increase in both the number and size of private industrial enterprises producing both old and new commodities. The role of the textile industry fell from 41 per cent of all industry in 1839 to 9 per cent in 1873. In many sectors, new machinery was introduced and increasingly operated by steam engines; however, the majority of small enterprises were still operated without machine power, and a certain product specialization among the enterprises took place, both horizontally and vertically. Both investments and employment grew rapidly, but investments more rapidly than employment, and the period 1840–65 can be characterized as one of capital deepening.

Due to falling grain prices on the world market, the second period from 1865–96 was a period of crisis in Danish agriculture. Still, the industry continued to grow quite rapidly, interrupted only by short recessions; but the structure of growth changed. It was now Copenhagen and the large provincial towns which grew most rapidly. Growth was caused by a combination of the agricultural crisis, which made people superfluous in the rural areas, and an industrial development in the towns which took advantage of the cheap labour provided by the migrant workers.

A number of large labour-intensive industries grew rapidly to exploit the female migrant labour (female migration to Copenhagen was much larger than the male, at times twice as large).

In general, already known technology and organizations spread into the industries, but relatively few new products and production methods were introduced. In terms of average enterprise size it was a period of stagnation, but a certain ownership concentration took place during the period, and many of today's largest Danish industrial corporations were created during this period. The most significant innovations were organizational, first and foremost the establishment of a labour movement and a labour party.

Table 1. *Population growth rates per year between population censuses in towns of different size, Denmark 1801–1981²*

Year	Rural areas		Towns by size class							Greater Copenhagen	Total Denmark
			800–1600	1600–3200	3200–6400	6400–12800	12800–25600	25600–51200	51200–>102400		
1801–34	0.77	1.07	0.78	0.36	(2.66)					0.51	0.83
1834–40	0.78	-0.37	2.33	0.67	0.77					0.21	0.75
1840–45	0.94	1.86	-1.26	6.02	1.51					0.97	1.05
1845–55	0.84	-0.39	0.35	3.39	2.21	(4.56)				1.25	1.03
1855–60	1.01	-4.07	4.16	3.33	2.11	1.97				2.61	1.28
1860–70	0.80	-0.03	-0.40	0.78	2.32	8.42				1.95	1.00
1870–80	0.49	-1.19	2.24	0.78	0.39	2.38				2.81	0.91
1880–90	0.14	-3.56	-2.38	3.66	2.49	-3.11	(4.79)			3.25	0.87
1890–01	-0.16	6.35	-0.28	1.06	2.87	5.75	1.63	(6.56)		2.87	1.05
1901–06	0.38	4.13	0.35	-0.66	3.30	6.48	0.62	1.92		1.84	1.12
1906–11	0.50	6.63	1.04	-1.53	4.29	-0.22	7.39	2.51		1.80	1.26
1911–16	0.28	3.66	2.10	0.90	0.45	5.05	-8.47	14.00		1.81	1.09
1916–21	0.04	3.10	3.62	0.33	0.09	3.78	8.25	2.80		2.01	1.16
1921–25	0.53	3.85	2.97	3.77	-3.08	3.03	-4.32	9.69		1.31	1.24
1925–30	-0.11	-0.45	2.33	-1.46	2.40	-0.07	6.72	2.26		1.23	0.66
1930–35	-0.72	1.05	-0.89	-2.11	1.90	1.80	1.87	-8.08		3.25	0.86
1935–40	-0.10	0.40	2.53	-3.32	-1.82	3.84	1.08	2.55	2.10	1.53	0.73
1940–45	0.18	2.25	1.13	0.10	0.94	2.39	5.13	-13.97	13.66	1.09	1.02
1945–50	-0.23	0.23	2.05	5.82	-0.72	0.60	6.93	1.62	1.96	1.88	1.14
1950–55	-0.19	1.12	1.22	1.54	-0.99	3.30	-2.94	17.66	1.60	0.99	0.77
1955–60	-0.87	3.21	1.64	4.74	-1.02	1.83	1.46	1.11	1.41	1.00	0.61
1960–65	-0.99	4.25	3.40	-0.24	2.88	-2.84	7.89	1.08	0.85	1.33	0.78
1965–70	-1.27	1.88	8.68	2.72	3.33	0.99	2.96	0.51	0.98	0.04	0.70
1970–76	-1.04	2.59	4.98	6.73	1.59	0.21	3.09	-0.26	-0.43	-1.09	0.45
1976–79	-1.19	2.78	2.30	0.63	-2.43	-5.62	-0.04	-17.43	9.80	2.59	0.26
1979–81	-1.32	0.20	0.91	4.09	5.32	0.31	-0.14	0.50	-0.00	-0.49	0.12

Source: Based on Matthiessen, 1985.

From the middle of 1890, the picture changed again. Through a shift from grain production to dairy and pig production, the agricultural crisis had been turned into a new upswing. In industry, new types of products and new methods of production broke through on a broad front: electric motors, new steam and gas engines, diesel engines and many new types of machinery. A considerable amount of capital was required for the introduction of this new, often labour saving technology, and the average employment of industrial enterprises grew rapidly. Copenhagen continued to grow, although at a slower rate, but at the same time, a number of new small towns in the rural areas started to grow very rapidly, producing services and products to agriculture and the rural population, and processing agricultural products.

The new towns were often located approximately midway between the old provincial towns at points of good access, for example, railroad stations or road crossings. In some cases, it was an old village which started to grow, but often the new town was started on an open field.

The new small towns primarily grew from concentration of people from the rural areas, but there was a tendency for craftsmen in the new towns to come from the rural hinterland while more of the businessmen came from the larger towns (Clausen and Dragsbo, 1982; Stilling, 1987).

The growth of small rural towns was to a large extent a consequence of the agricultural restructuring which took place from the 1880s. The new agriculture, based on dairy products and pigs, required both more work from the farmers throughout the year and large investments. Thus, there was no longer time for part-time artisan or trading activities on the farms, and since farm incomes also rose, nor was there need for them. As a result, specialization took place. Farmers concentrated their time and capital on agricultural production, and many of the rural artisans with little or no land moved to the small towns to provide the growing rural markets with products and services. At the same time, the new agriculture required a number of new services, inputs, and processing activities which to a large extent became located in the new small towns.

However, the growth of small towns was not only based on enterprises serving the surrounding rural areas, and for some of the most successful of the small towns, the success was caused by industrial enterprises producing at least partly for a non-local market (Tork, 1950).

For small towns as a group, the growth meant that they were able to increase their proportion of the total population, even though some of the largest of the small towns grew into the larger size classes, and even though the population of their rural hinterlands lost out relatively (not in absolute terms) to the larger towns and the capital (see Table 2). However, the small towns were only able to absorb a part of the surplus population from the rural areas. Most of the surplus migrated to the larger towns or to America (Stilling, 1987; Tork, 1950). But they served a very important role in raising the productivity of the agricultural sector. Organizations based

in the large towns might have provided the necessary inputs and machinery to agriculture and often **did**, but it was the small craftsmen and traders in small towns who secured the maintenance of the machinery and an efficient feedback between agriculture and the large production and commercial organizations.

Table 2. The Danish population in rural areas and towns, 1801-1981

Year	Rural areas*	Towns with: >800-12,800 inh.		12,800-51,200 inh.		>51,200 inh.		Greater Copenhagen	Total Denmark	
	%	%	no. of towns	%	no. of towns	%	no. of towns	%	%	mio. inh.
1801	81.6	8.6	(45)	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)	9.8	100	1.029
1834	80.1	11.1	(66)	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)	8.8	100	1.349
1845	79.9	11.6	(72)	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)	8.5	100	1.487
1855	78.3	12.2	(74)	0.8	(1)	0.0	(0)	8.9	100	1.648
1860	77.3	12.5	(74)	0.8	(1)	0.0	(0)	9.3	100	1.756
1870	75.8	12.3	(75)	1.7	(2)	0.0	(0)	10.2	100	1.939
1880	72.6	11.6	(75)	3.4	(4)	0.0	(0)	12.3	100	2.123
1890	67.5	12.0	(74)	5.0	(5)	0.0	(0)	15.5	100	2.316
1901	59.3	13.0	(100)	6.7	(8)	2.0	(1)	18.9	100	2.598
1911	55.0	14.3	(131)	8.4	(11)	2.2	(1)	20.1	100	2.924
1921	50.0	14.4	(161)	9.6	(15)	4.4	(2)	21.7	100	3.270
1930	46.8	14.3	(183)	10.0	(18)	6.5	(3)	22.4	100	3.551
1940	41.4	12.9	(186)	11.6	(21)	7.8	(3)	26.2	100	3.844
1950	37.1	13.1	(218)	14.3	(26)	8.3	(3)	27.3	100	4.281
1960	32.9	13.8	(264)	13.9	(28)	11.3	(5)	28.1	100	4.585
1970	27.2	17.8	(371)	15.6	(30)	11.4	(5)	28.0	100	4.938
1981	23.1	23.5	(501)	15.5	(31)	10.9	(5)	27.0	100	5.124

*Include towns with less than 800 inhabitants.

Source: Matthiessen, 1985.

This review of the history of the small towns during the first 75 years of industrialization in Denmark shows that their role changes dramatically throughout the period from stagnation to rapid growth depending on the development of both agriculture and industry. Consequently, one cannot generalize on the role of the small towns in development, not even in one country. It is likely to change over time. However, if we look at the role of the small towns over the very long run, they still show, as a group, a remarkable stability. Only during the most recent decades have they increased their share due to the process of suburbanization. Up through the last century (from 1834-1890), towns with populations between 800 and 12,800 inhabitants made up 11-12 per cent of the total population. From 1890, the percentage gradually increased to above 14 per cent in the first

decades of the 20th century. From 1940, it dropped again to 13 per cent and since the 1960s, it increased rapidly up to 23 per cent in 1981. This great stability of the small towns during one and a half centuries, when the rural population (including towns with less than 800 inhabitants) dropped from 80 per cent to 23 per cent of the total population, of course covers many structural changes within the group of small towns (see, for example, Mathiessen, 1985), but it illustrates the importance of small towns during the development process. On the other hand, it also shows that though small towns may play an important role in the development process in the developing countries, they are not likely to become more than a partial solution to the problems of unemployment and migration to the large towns.

THE SMALL TOWN AS A SPATIAL ORGANIZATION OF ENTERPRISES: THE UNDERSTANDING OF SMALL TOWNS IN THE LOCATION THEORIES

The small town can be seen as a way of organizing economic activities or enterprises in space. Thus, the theoretical view of the small town depends to a large extent on the view of the enterprise and the way it interacts with its environment.

In the classical location theories, enterprises were assumed to be independent entities operating in a homogeneous free market. To explain the spatial concentration of enterprises in towns they invented the concept of agglomeration economies (see, for example, Weber, 1929; Christaller, 1933; Losch, 1954; Mulligan, 1984).

In Weber's industrial location theory, the agglomeration economies are production-oriented, based on the economic interaction among specialized and vertically integrated enterprises. The agglomeration economies consist of those advantages, in terms of reduced costs or increased intensity of interaction, that enterprises may obtain by joint location. Subsequently, the idea of industrial agglomeration economies in combination with input-output models has been developed into industrial complex analysis (see, for example, Isard, 1960) and by a further combination with innovation theory, into Perroux's (1955) growth centre theory. In the socialist economies similar considerations have led to development of the concept of territorial industrial complexes.

The basic problem with this line of reasoning is that technical innovations, both in transport and communication and in production (Pedersen, 1987), have led to reduced interaction costs, which in many cases, made it possible to exploit production-oriented agglomeration economies over long distances. At the same time, the vertical specialization has been carried out to such an extent that the local market of a small town seldom will be sufficient to support specialized enterprises. Thus, the Weberian ag-

glomeration economies among vertically integrated enterprises will rarely be relevant in small towns. They will be found only in large metropolitan areas or city regions.

Another type of agglomeration economies, which may be either production-oriented (backward linkages) or market-oriented (forward linkages), may occur where many similar enterprises agglomerate to exploit and develop a common resource base, a common labour market with specific qualifications, or a common market. They are sometimes termed location economies. They may be found, for example, in market towns, where all enterprises in a specific trade are located in the same street, quarter, or market place to attract as many costumers as possible. They may also be found in traditional textile regions or in certain mining areas where many small enterprises agglomerate to exploit a common qualified labour market or a common mineral resource.

However, Christaller's and Losch's service centre theories are the most specific attempts to explain the existence of small towns. Here, the agglomeration (or urban) economies are market-oriented (though they might also be oriented toward a dispersed resource base or labour market). They are based both on a horizontal specialization among local enterprises interacting with the same local market (rather than with each other), and on a vertical specialization and interaction with enterprises at higher levels of the urban hierarchy. The small town here becomes a service centre which serves the surrounding rural area and smaller towns with products and services, but which on the other hand receives inputs from the larger higher-order centres.

Christaller's and Losch's theories give one explanation of the development of small towns. When used in a non-planned market economy, the theories assume the existence of independent enterprises operating in a perfect free market with relatively easy entry. If this assumption is not fulfilled, and that is often the case in the Third World, small towns may not develop as expected. Very low rural incomes and efficient long-distance transportation also tend to reduce the role of small towns.

In the newer Marxist-inspired location theories, the role of the local environment has on the other hand been largely discarded. Industries, especially in underdeveloped regions, are often considered to be enclave industries with little or no local interaction except with the labour market. Instead, location is explained in terms of internal enterprise and concern structure. Production takes place in footloose production plants which can be moved around the world at will and located in those regions which offer the lowest labour costs (see, for example, Massey, 1984; Maskell, 1984). The small towns are not viewed as service centres, but rather as locations for dependent branches of multinationals and other large organizations attempting to exploit rural resources and labour markets. Attempts to engage the local rural population in local market trade and production are viewed as deemed to failure, because this will only be possible for activi-

ties with very low entry requirements; and here, the competition will be so fierce that no accumulation will take place.

The role of the local environment is viewed very differently in the two theoretical frame works. In the classical location theories, considerable importance is attached to the local interaction between enterprises. But it is only discussed in a very aggregated way as expressed in the concept of agglomeration economies. In the newer Marxist location theories, the local environment is, on the other hand, considered of little importance. Instead, they focus on the internal organizational structure of the multinationals and other large organizations.

Consequently, the different location theories have very different or even opposing views of the role of small towns. But until recently, most authors have tended to have a rather skeptical view of the role of the small town in future development. Thus, whenever small towns have started to grow in the developed countries, it has usually come as a surprise. One of the reasons for this is that the location theories have not been able to explain when interaction among enterprises, and between enterprises and their markets, leads to growth and prosperity, and when it leads to exploitation. Neither do they give any clear indication of the conditions for growth of small towns.

To be able to understand the development of the small town we need a much more differentiated view of the local enterprise and its interaction with the environment both vertically and horizontally. Such a new understanding is on its way with the so-called network theories which are now being developed in, for example, the Scandinavian countries (NordReFo, 1987: 4).

In these network theories the interaction among the enterprises and between the enterprises and the state is viewed as much more differentiated and complex than in the classical theories, where the small enterprises are looked upon as either completely independent enterprises operating on free markets, or as completely dependent on the large/formal enterprises or concerns and on state policy. Dependency between enterprises is seen as determined not only by ownership and size, but also by many other often qualitative factors such as technology, market and financial relations. The small enterprises are seen as complementary to the large rather than alternative to them. They will often be dependent on one or more of the large enterprises. But at the same time, the productivity of the large enterprise will often depend on the existence, not of a specific small enterprise, but of a network of small service and production enterprises. The small/informal enterprise is viewed as operating in interaction with other small and large enterprises and public authorities, in an interplay which in some situations may lead to dependency, but in others may lead to considerable autonomy (NordReFo, 1987; Johanson and Mattson, 1986).

This new conception of the enterprise not only changes the understanding of the small enterprise; it also changes the understanding of its local

environment, for example, the small town. The paradox of location theory is that the cheaper transport and communication becomes, and therefore the more footloose production becomes, the more important local production costs will be for the location of industry. And these production costs are increasingly determined not only by labour costs, but also by easy access to services which can secure a high productivity and capacity utilization of production. It is this paradox that must be explained if we are to understand both the individual enterprise and the role of the small town in the development process of the developing countries.

A NETWORK APPROACH TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL TOWNS³

A necessary condition for the creation of urban places in a **non-metropolitan** region is the existence of a sufficient economic surplus in the region. That economic surplus may come from the local (agricultural) production, or it may come from external sources, for example, wages to the administrative hierarchy, pensions to local citizens, visits to the region by pilgrims or tourists, development aid, government services, construction projects or military establishments. The structure of the urban system, of course, depends on the structure and size of its economic base. The urban system may be viewed as a way of organizing economic activity in space. Seen from the local area, the local economic activities may be concerned with:

- local distribution of local production,
- collection and processing of local (agricultural) products for export out of the region,
- distribution of products produced outside the region, both consumer goods and inputs and investment goods to the local production,
- local processing of non-local inputs for a non-local market (often called enclave industries).

These functions may be carried out by formal, large scale, multi-location organizations or by small, formal or informal, single-location enterprises. Collecting and processing of local export products will usually be carried out by the large enterprises and organizations, because these activities often require a large capital and are often based on technologies with large scale economies. The small enterprises will primarily supply products and services which are both produced and distributed locally, while goods imported to the region may be distributed by both small and large enterprises. Finally, the enclave industries may also be both small and large enterprises, but usually they will in any case be closely linked to larger external enterprises.

However, the line of demarcation between small and large enterprises is not fixed. Small and large enterprises develop in response to each other and under the influence of the available technologies, the national and regional policies, and the general level of development. The development and structure of the urban system depends to a large extent on the resulting balance between small and large enterprises. At the same time, the development of the enterprises, and especially of the small enterprises, depends also on the structure of the urban system.

The large organizations and the urban system

The large, formal, multi-location organizations may be governmental, parastatal, cooperative or private; they may be national or multi-national; but they will usually be hierarchical in structure and have a more or less centralized management located in a metropolitan area or some other large town. The large enterprises may be able to attract important resources in the form of capital and qualified labour to a peripheral region. On the other hand, they are often operated in such a way that production surplus is extracted from the peripheral region, as profits if they are private large enterprises and as taxation if they are governmental.

The advantage of the large enterprises is their ability to exploit scale economies. To be able to do this effectively, they tend to standardize their activities and productions. Product standardization will also often be necessary to sell the production on the export markets. However, such standardization tends to be determined by the situation in the centre region or by some average conditions, and may, therefore, be less favourable to some of the peripheral regions. Thus, at the same time as the large enterprises increase their competitiveness by exploiting scale economies, they often also open up new local markets which may be exploited by small local enterprises.

Especially where transport and communication infrastructure is less developed and management personnel is scarce, the large organizations tend to concentrate as many functions as possible near their headquarters, where control functions are most easily carried out. Also, structural rationalization within large, multi-location organizations, for example, parastatals, often result in centralization and the closing of local services and activities in small towns, even in situations where the local demand would be sufficient to justify the activity, if all the large organizations operating in the town joined their demand. Consequently, such concentrations often go much further than can be defended by scale economies, with the result that the lower levels of the urban hierarchy will be less developed.

A possible solution to this problem would be to let one of the large organizations open their local service activity (for example, transport, communication, administration or repair services) for other users on a market

basis. In this way, one might both obtain better utilization of scarce resources and an increase in the availability of local services for both small and large enterprises. This has recently been attempted in the peripheral regions of Sweden, where regional authorities have persuaded local branches of large corporations to open some of their local service functions for other local users.

The small enterprises and the urban *system*

The small, formal or informal, single-location enterprises are usually private, but they may be public or collective. They usually cater primarily to the local market in the town and its hinterland, and are better able to adapt to local market conditions. They are often also more dependent on the local supply of inputs and services than the large enterprises and their local branches which often obtain such services from their own hierarchy.

However, the fact that the small enterprises cater primarily for the local market does not mean that they only operate with local contacts. Rather, they function often as mediators between the local market and outside sources of consumer goods, production inputs and information. These outside connections may be provided by a series of middlemen or wholesalers up through the urban hierarchy, or they may be provided by one of the large organizations (Freeman and Norcliffe, 1985; Kongstad and Mønsted, 1980; Schmith, 1979). Ideally, the large organizations may cheaply provide a limited range of standardized services, while the small middlemen are often more expensive, but on the other hand may offer a wider range of different services. This may of course not hold true in situations where the large organizations are subsidized, where the supply of resources is insufficient, and where the operation of the small enterprises is restricted or illegal, as is often the case in the Third World today.

The small enterprises typically operate in market niches where it does not pay for the large-scale sector to operate. This may be in markets where standardization of the large enterprises and organizations is not suitable, or it may be in markets where purchasing power is so low or dispersed that it becomes too costly for the large organizations to exploit them. This means that the small- and large-scale sectors often do not compete directly. However, if the market for the small enterprises expands, it may become attractive for the large organizations to go in direct competition and attempt to take over the market, for example, by establishing local branches. The large-scale sector may also, especially where it is governmental or parastatal, attempt to monopolize the market through legislation. In other cases, the small enterprises may be directly linked to the large enterprises or organizations, either as subcontractors or by processing inputs or distributing products produced by them.

The contact between the peripheral rural region and the outside world, and the development or exploitation it results in, thus follows either the

"open" urban network and the infrastructure and agglomeration economies it offers, or the internal and often closed networks of the large organizations. Of course, these organizational networks follow in many cases the structure of the urban system; but in other cases, the large formal organizations may be large and powerful enough to create their own networks, often short-cutting the lower levels of the urban hierarchy. Thus, although the urban network and the large organizational networks are linked together, they are not identical, and both are decisive for the development of the peripheral region.

SMALL TOWNS IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS—NATIONAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION OR LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES

When the local market for non-agricultural activities is very small, they will develop only as part-time, informal activities by agricultural households. Periodic markets or seasonal travels to the larger market (for example, with livestock) may develop when market density increases. However, only with a relatively large market density will permanent full-time jobs, which are the basis for development of urban places, be created in the non-agricultural small scale sector.

When small towns grow, and the local market expands, some of the small-scale artisan producers get a chance to increase their scale of production. For Kenya, Hosier (1987) shows that a consequence of this tendency is that while small enterprises in the regional centres primarily produce to order, the small enterprises in Nairobi, to a larger extent, produce longer series for the market. This tendency is, of course, limited by the competition from standardized goods delivered by large enterprises within or outside the town. On the other hand, the growing local market means also that the market for specialized goods and services is likely to increase and thus open the way for an increased diversification of the local economy.

This growing diversification of the local economy will especially benefit, on the one hand, the middle-income households which have sufficient money to use the new services and still have a demand which is sufficiently simple to be satisfied locally; and on the other hand, the small enterprises which are more dependent on the local supply than the large enterprises, because they obtain their inputs to a large extent through their internal hierarchies. This is one of the reasons why the growth centre policies of the 1960s did not succeed. These policies attempted to generate local growth in peripheral regions by implanting one or a few large enterprises in the region. However, these are exactly the type of enclave enterprises which have proved to generate very few local contacts besides employment of cheap labour.

Also, the theories from the 1970s, about the restructuring of the world economy and its negative impact on many peripheral regions hit by plant closures during recessions, were primarily based on studies of regions dominated by a few large, mass-producing enterprises and without a diversified economy. Although the trend toward centralization and product standardization in the large organizations and enterprises tends especially to hit the peripheral regions and their towns, it also creates new local niches in the production system which may be exploited by the small enterprises. Therefore, viewed from a small-town perspective, potential strategies always exist for small-scale improvement of the local production system in response to external changes.

Such strategies will, in the short run, seldom be sufficient to offset the losses from closures of large plants in small towns. However, in the long run, there seem to be much better prospects for success with local development policies based on small enterprise networks and a mixture of small and medium-sized enterprises. Of course, such policies will not lead to a small town growth without limits. Rather, there seem to be strong limits to the growth of small towns. Even where the conditions for small town growth are very favourable, as they were in Denmark around the turn of the century, small towns are not likely to increase their proportion of the total population very much. This is partly because success in one town often generates success in the neighbouring towns and thus limits the growth of its hinterland, and partly because the most successful of the small towns will grow out of the group of small towns. The strong limitations to growth of the individual towns mean also that the rank order of towns tends to be surprisingly stable, even over very long periods of 50–100 years (see, for example, Gould and Tornquist, 1971; Pedersen, 1975).

Although small towns may not look very important when seen from a national perspective, this is hardly true. The experiences with regional development policies during the 1960s and 1970s clearly show that long-run regional development cannot be achieved through reallocation of national resources alone. Growth and development are basically local processes, where local actors attempt to develop the local area in response to and in competition with other regions and the large organizations. Reallocations of resources may of course have a positive impact on the benefitting regions, just as structural rationalizations may have strong negative impact on the regions effected. However, no amount of external subsidy is likely to have any lasting effect on local development if there are no actors in the area who are able and willing to exploit the subsidy for the benefit of the region. On the other hand, a positive development of the activities in the small towns is likely to have a positive effect not only on the towns themselves, but also on the efficiency of both the rural areas and the large-scale activities in the large cities. The small towns and their activities, therefore, may play a crucial role in the development process, even though their relative importance may not grow.

NOTES

1. A more detailed account of the Danish case is presented in Pedersen, 1989.
2. The table should be interpreted with care as the growth rates shown include both growth of individual towns and shifts of towns into the next size class. Especially in size groups with few large towns, such a shift may result in unreal, small or even negative growth when a town grows into the next size group, and correspondingly to a too large growth rate in the next size group. This is especially a problem in the largest size group when one or more of the towns in the group during the intercensal period grow into a size group which was not represented at all at the beginning of the period. In these situations, we have shown in brackets the growth rate for the sum of the two size classes.
Since the table is based on the census figures, collected some time in the middle of the year, the time series appear to overlap.
3. The network approach, and especially the interaction between small and large enterprises, is discussed in more detail by Pedersen, 1989.

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Small Urban Centres and the Development of Local Enterprises in Zimbabwe

Jesper Rasmussen

This paper presents the problems associated with small town and local industrialization in Zimbabwe in the light of the present problems with employment and centralization. The discussion will be substantiated by data recently collected from the local building sector in one of the small towns studied in Zimbabwe in 1989. Data from the other study locations are still to be processed. The conclusions are therefore subject to adjustments, and must be regarded as preliminary.

The need for the development of smaller towns and decentralized industrial activity in Zimbabwe must be seen in the light of the present problems in the economic and geographical structure. The economy is harassed by growing "unemployment", or rather exclusion from formal wage employment, and a high degree of centralization of the existing industrial activity.

The increasing recognition of the limited success of small town and small industry programmes (see Wekwete, 1988 for a policy review) has resulted in a kind of stalemate situation where nobody is quite sure which way to go. This is also difficult to say, as long as the problems of local industrial development are understood in a rather superficial manner in various government departments.

Before discussing solutions, it might therefore be helpful to identify and reconsider the problems by asking some questions. Is local industrial development basically a question of a "technical fix", solving the enterprises' supply problems with a packet of inputs consisting of capital, equipment, materials etc.? Or is the problem rather the demand which is too limited to support local production at all? Or is it rather a question, not of external demand/supply constraints, but of weak personal entrepreneurship and capability which does not utilize opportunities? Or is it simply economically unviable for local industries to compete on the market, given the historical structural constraints of urban agglomeration advantages and an already well developed formal industrial sector? The next sections will attempt to answer some of these questions.

CONDITIONS FOR LOCAL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Previous findings and methodology

Several studies have been carried out which focus on the issue of small town and rural industrialization (Helmsing, 1986, 1987; Wekwete, 1987; Gottlischer, 1986; Becq and Foucher, 1985; ITDG, 1988; Oekotop, 1984; UNIDO, 1983; CARD and ARDA, 1984; Moyo et al., 1984).

The conditions found by these studies are not very different from those revealed in other countries in Southern and Eastern Africa on most issues. Local industries are quantitatively rather weak, and the activities are closely related to the family and to agriculture, utilizing the seasonal fluctuation in agricultural demand to **optimize** the use of labour. The enterprises lack working capital, credit, machinery and input materials. The entrepreneurs have a low level of academic and technical education and lack both technical and managerial skills. One "unusual" finding which is, however, not quite clear (see Helmsing, 1987), is that many entrepreneurs have been working in the formal sector in the city for years before returning to the family and starting on their own, using some of the skills learned in the city (Moyo et al., 1984).

Having listed all the possible problems and deficiencies, the studies are, however, rather inconclusive as to what are the key issues of enterprise development. The issues are often presented as equally important.

Methodologically, furthermore, the validity of asking entrepreneurs about problems as they perceive them can be questioned. Poor people can always be expected to respond affirmatively to questions of whether money is a problem, but that does not necessarily explain anything as long as it is not clear whether lack of money is a cause or an effect of other more substantial problems.

An issue which has been overlooked in many of the studies is the differentiation of the enterprises (see Helmsing, 1986 for an attempt to differentiate). When such studies emphasize the common features, the presentation often blurs the great variations between the enterprises concerned.

The study undertaken by the author aimed at supplementing previous knowledge. Therefore, a different methodology was applied. First, only *one* particular *sector* was studied, interviewing both local and non-local enterprises **operating/selling** on the local market, whereby the boundaries and competition between local and outside city-based enterprises could be identified. The building sector was chosen as perhaps the most important local industrial sector in quantitative terms. Enterprise interviews were supplemented with a market study of the demand and preferences for buildings and materials.

Second, the study aimed at identifying the diversity of the local industrial scene by looking at as many different types of enterprises as possible.

Thus the survey is not representative in a statistical sense, but shows the strengths and limitations of the local industrial base.

Third, by looking at the strategies of the entrepreneurs, how they perceived themselves, their personal aims and their business environment, the intention was to understand the entrepreneurs as individuals acting purposefully rather than as passive respondents to the structural conditions in which they work. These questions could also give some idea of important attitudes towards small-scale production (See Rasmussen, 1988 for elaboration of the role of network and actors' strategies in enterprise studies).

Two district centres/growth points with good prospects were chosen, with the argument that if development is constrained in these centres, other centres are likely to face even larger difficulties. In order to assess the relative prospects of rural towns, a medium-scale town was also included in the study. Here, only evidence from the district centre, Gutu, in Masvingo Province is presented.

Industries in Gutu district and Gutu district centre

Gutu district is in terms of population dominated by communal lands, the former "labour reserves", which in fact still function like the old name suggests (see Map 1). 73 per cent of the households have constantly at least one migrant worker absent from home (CARD and ARDA, 1984: 9). In terms of non-farm incomes, the study found that 15 per cent of the economically active population were involved in such activities. Other studies (Göttlicher, 1986; Jackson and Collier, 1988) found between 24–26 per cent involved in non-farm activities, so a figure between 15–25 per cent can be considered reliable.

Relying on the CARD and ARDA study, enterprises involved in the building sector (i.e. builders, half of the carpenters, some welders, plumbers, etc.) constitute one-third of all 1,200 manufacturing enterprises, employing a total of 670 people. This is only surpassed by bakeries (870 employed) and followed closely by tailoring (600 employed). The carpenters and metalworkers tend to cluster around the district and business centres, while many of the other activities (bakeries, etc.) and the footloose builders are living and working in the hinterland. A large share of the better builders' work is found in the district centre and business centres: While a hut can cost Z\$^{*} 30 and a modern rural house Z\$ 250 in labour cost, an urban low-cost house costs Z\$ 1,000–2000 and a shop costs Z\$ 5,000–10,000 in labour only. This indicates the importance of small town work compared to rural jobs.

^{*} Zimbabwean Dollars

In the survey of building enterprises in Gutu district centre (10,000–12,000 inhabitants) in 1989, roughly one-third of the 66 enterprises which have operated in Gutu had 134 employed, thus bringing the total employment figure up to more than 200 persons, albeit not on a permanent basis (see Table 1). This is a substantial number compared with the identified 70 retail and service enterprises in Gutu (Herald, 13.10.88), and also reflects a significant growth compared with Gottlischer's identification of 3 carpenters and 2 **builders/contractors** in 1982 (1986: 70 and 130).

In short, the building sector has the district's largest number of manufacturing enterprises and is, in terms of employment, only surpassed by bakeries. The building sector activities seem to a large extent to be concentrated in the commercial centres, where most of the well-paid jobs are, and where it provides work for a considerable number of people, even when compared with commercial sectors.

The enterprises and market structure in the building sector

Although most of the professions are not yet consolidated as full-time jobs, there is a significant diversity among enterprise activities in the building sector, as can be seen in Table 1. Among the most important professions in terms of magnitude of work (**builders/contractors** and material suppliers), there is a further diversity where the enterprises specialize in certain products or customer groups. Among carpenters and welders there are also signs of a diversification **beginning** as soon as there are several enterprises in the same location (see also ITDG, 1988).

As regards **builders/contractors**, new or untrained entrepreneurs construct low-cost houses and rural houses, while better trained or long established builders undertake construction of shops, small schools and medium-cost houses. The local contractors build larger shops, schools and high cost houses, and finally, outside contractors build houses/offices for parastatal companies and large nationwide firms (post offices, branch banks, large department stores). Before and around 1980, external contractors also built mass-produced, low-cost housing schemes, but these are now organized along self-help lines, where each houseowner hires his own builder.

The critical boundary between the market share for the local and external contractor is established by the client's demands for certain materials and quality of finish. The local contractors have neither the skills nor the working capital to fulfil these requirements (see Table 2 for the local market structure in building construction).

Table 1. The building sector in Gutu District Centre, Zimbabwe, 1989

Diversity of activities	No. of enterprises operating in Gutu	No. of enterprises interviewed	No. of employed in interviewed enterprises
Builders (unregistered)	24	2	7
Registered contractors	6	3	64
Plumbers	3	1	1
Electricians	6	1	1
Painters	5	1	1
Plan-drawers	2+(2)	(2)	(4)
Carpenters	9	4	14
Welders	4	3	17
Brick-makers	1+(1)	1	11
Sign-writers	1	1	1
Building material suppliers	5	5	28
Total	66	22	134

Note: Only welders, carpenters and material suppliers are permanently located in the centre. The others mostly reside outside the centre although they have a substantial part of their work in Gutu.

Figures in brackets indicate double counting, as some carpenters are also plan-drawers. The number of employed persons is at the time of the interviews and includes the entrepreneur.

Regarding building materials, Tables 3 and 4 shows consumers' preferences, and the relatively limited importance of local manufactures versus city-based production. The bulky brick-making is mostly done close to the building site, although a considerable number of homeowners in Gutu have also purchased bricks in Masvingo, 90 km away. It looks quite different in the metal and woodworking sub-sectors. Here, local producers have only a tiny market share in Gutu centre, while some rural homeowners buy gum-poles for their huts/houses from the local woodlot-owner. In roofing, cement and glazing, nothing is commercially produced in the local area, although grass for thatching can be gathered in the bush.

What is worth noting is the large share of customers both in Gutu centre and especially in the hinterland, who acquire materials directly from the towns and cities. This is no great practical problem as many family members work in towns and the buses run frequently (for example, from Harare there are 11 daily buses to Gutu centre and 4 of them continue all the way to Basera 50 km in the hinterland). The role of Gutu centre, where 5 suppliers are located, is still quite strong compared to the smaller business centres. This can be explained by the fact that several of the suppliers either deliver directly to the door (if possible) in the whole district or deliver through their own smaller sales outlets in the business centres.

Table 2. *Zimbabwe: The market structure in building construction in a district*

Group	Product bought	Predominant clients	Contracted enterprises
1	Key-ready building (fix and supply)	Central govt. and parastatal offices/ houses & non-local large private firms	Large city-based contractors
2	Labour and labour management only. Clients arrange materials	High cost houses, small/medium-scale shops	Local contractors
3	Labour only. Clients manage and arrange materials	Low-cost houses, district council houses/offices, rural shops, rural schools	Informal builders operating in the district centre
4	some labour only. Clients manage, arrange and contribute with labour.	Rural houses	Informal rural builders
5	All self-built	Uncommon, unless a family member is a builder	

Table 3. *Acquisition of materials, Gutu Rural District, Zimbabwe*

	Bricks	Metal frames and burglar bars	Timber and doors	Other
Non-market	3	1	0	3
Local producer	17	2	6	0
Retail business centre	1	1	2	3
Retail district centre	1	12	10	14
Town/city	1	9	10	6
Total	23	25	28	26

Note: "Other" includes cement, roofing and glazing. Number of interviews: 21, whereof 17 were "modern" rural houses. The sums are more than 21 because many homeowners buy materials from several sources.

Table 4. Acquisition of materials, Gutu Centre, Zimbabwe

	Bricks	Metal frames and burglar bars	Timber and doors	Other
Non-market	2	2	2	3
Local manufacturers	14	1	0	0
Retail Gutu	1	15	16	18
Town/city	8	6	7	4
Total	25	24	25	23

Note: Number of interviews: 20.

The explanation for the insignificant role played by local carpenters/welders can thus not be found in limited demand. The demand for window frames, burglar bars, doors, timber, etc. is there, but is at present met by the city-based manufacturers and distributed through sales outlets. Nor is the explanation uncompetitive local production costs due to the effectiveness of city-based mass-production. The local welders and carpenters are in fact 10–20 per cent cheaper than the merchants if they sell directly from the workshop and thus save on distribution costs.

The main explanation is rather to be found in the poor quality of their products, which often has very little to do with lack of sophisticated tools and machinery, but rather with lack of finish and poor craftsmanship. A few good carpenters, using only hand tools, demonstrated that it was possible to produce good quality products without sophisticated equipment. The most common reason given for not buying window frames from the local welder, was that the measurements were not sufficiently exact for the standardized glass sizes, which indicates elementary deficiencies in the welders' capabilities (for other examples of technical deficiencies, see ITDG, 1988 and CARD and ARDA, 1984).

Having said this, it would then be possible to change the present marginal role of the producers who make low quality, low price products for the poorer segments of the population, often with necessary credit (ITDG, 1988), if skills were improved. The market is there; it is then a question of having artisans qualified both technically and mentally/businesswise, to exploit it.

This conclusion must be somewhat modified in the case of the contractors. Although improvement of their skills in finishing, etc., is a precondition for capturing market shares from the external large contractors, they cannot undertake the jobs unless they have access to working capital to procure material (see Rasmussen, 1989). For the informal builders who experience no external competition, demand is the ultimate constraint, and

their role is bound to continue to be marginal unless they improve quality and are gradually able to undertake more complex jobs.

Business relations and local network

In official speeches, the private sector is often criticized for not decentralizing its activities to district **centres/growth** points now that the government has provided roads, electricity, industrial stands and sewage systems and thus cleared away the obstacles to industrial establishment. Since the **Whitsun** report in 1980, it has, however, rarely been discussed in official statements whether these **infrastructural** provisions really are the main obstacles, or whether there might be other more important aspects.

A manufacturing enterprise, which is just a little above the one-man-firm stage, operating with unsophisticated **electrical/mechanical** equipment and a couple of employees, is dependent on a range of important relations in the geographical vicinity of the enterprise.

First, basic machinery repair facilities are needed. These are not found in Gutu except for basic welding. Motor rewiring, repair of welding equipment, sharpening of saw blades and planes, let alone more complicated machinery repair, is only found in Masvingo or even in **Harare**. Similarly, acquisition of spare parts is almost impossible in Gutu. Most of the merchants who have been granted import licences for spares are located in Harare,—spares cannot be obtained even in Masvingo. A local Gutu bus operator has now decided to sell his **3 4** buses and his licence to a city-based operator because he cannot obtain spares to keep his buses on the road.

Second, despite the official preference of 'growth point enterprises' for foreign currency allocations, several businessmen who applied for allocations years back had not even received confirmation of application, let alone an answer from the Ministry of Commerce. Businessmen in the provincial town of Masvingo, who experienced the same problem, explained that it was necessary to visit the Ministry's office and personally meet the officer in charge of the application in order to get an answer. In effect, the entrepreneur has to leave his business for considerable periods which consequently leads to declines in productivity.

Obviously, larger firms intending to establish manufacturing branches in district centres can utilize their (most commonly) **Harare** head office for such lobbying and pressurizing. However, if they want to establish a local branch they face a third problem of attracting and housing permanent staff. They need to find a manager willing to live "out there". Most managers consider that neither personally attractive nor a merit to their careers. Due to the weak and undifferentiated local labour market (which the company does not know and trust in any case), several key-persons, such as skilled artisans and clerks, will have to be imported from the towns. All these people need a place to live, and due to the lack of "decent" (i.e. Harare-

standard) houses for rent, the company will have to construct houses for its own staff. The initial costs and staff problems for a district centre investment are thus quite considerable for a city-based firm.

As one of the few district centres, Gutu now has a *branch bank*. The local branches of larger firms and the medium-scale local enterprises use this bank for financial transactions. But for very small enterprises, the existence of a bank has no immediate importance. Their flows are smaller than the minimum acceptable withdrawals in the bank, so they use the post office bank. Many enterprises do, however, have an account both in the bank (for larger withdrawals and building up trust for future borrowings) and in the post office bank (for small transactions), whereby the advantages of both systems were fully utilized.

Fifth, there are no free-lance *accountants* or *accounting firms* in Gutu. Most smaller enterprises do some bookkeeping themselves and only a few have relations with professional accountants in Masvingo or Harare, so this aspect might seem rather insignificant. But as financial management is one of the biggest problems (most entrepreneurs are practical people), the existence of professional accountants could result in substantial improvements in businesses—and in credibility when approaching the bank for loans. Similarly, there are no *auditors* or *lawyers* in Gutu to assist local enterprises in legal aspects, debt collection, easier access to bank credits, etc. The branches of city-based firms, of course, use their own hierarchies for these professional services.

Sixth, the local authorities have provided large and medium-scale industrial stands for expected larger investors who do not show up. *Smaller stands for service industry* with low building and investment requirements are, however, in short supply. As other observers have noted (Gasper, 1989), many local councils are keen to "keep up (urban) standards", insisting on modern types of buildings inside the designated urban boundary. This obviously tends to screen out, rather than invite, small and new entrepreneurs from establishing themselves near the market and bus centre. Consequently, there is a kind of hostile attitude from local authorities towards the demands and problems of the small enterprises.

The issue of a lack of *title deeds* to residential and commercial stands has often been the main focal point when the various business associations point out obstacles for local enterprise development. The issue of getting some kind of collateral for bank loans is indeed important for local enterprises' resource mobilization, but it is hardly the key-issue. First of all, Gutu is one of the few district centres that has title deeds, but that is not a sufficient condition to get a loan. In order to get a loan, the bank has to recognize that the property in question actually has some value for the bank in case of repayment default. Secondly, what is not often recognized is that many small entrepreneurs are not at all interested in becoming too indebted. Due to the general uncertainty of their market and operation, many prefer to save, thus avoiding the risk of getting displaced by the

bank in the case of business failure. Obviously, entrepreneurs always mention capital as a problem, but that is not the same as actually wanting to take the risk involved in borrowing.

Summarizing the importance of business relations and network, we need to distinguish between branches of city-based firms and different types of local industries. The branches can utilize the internal network in the mother firm for all supportive measures, but on the other hand, attracting and accommodating staff in a district centre might be prohibitively expensive. In the end, it might therefore be less costly and more flexible to keep the production process near the head office than to separate and decentralize the production process. The existence of cheap industrial stands is, in this respect, a minor issue. There is plenty of industrial land in Zimbabwe. The local enterprises, on the other hand, operate within a quite weak local network, where support services generally are absent or rather hostile (banks and local authorities). Technically, the industrial potentials in district centres are rather limited for local enterprises and confined to simple processes, while they are rather unattractive for most city-based firms. On the other hand, the study of the building sector has shown that there is potential for some simple local production, and perhaps even more important for repair/service activities, which is not yet utilized.

The next section examines more closely the issue of why the local potential has not yet been fully utilized despite the above mentioned constraining factors. As we have already seen, poor craftsmanship is one of the constraining factors, but this has deeper roots touching upon wider issues of the local culture.

Industrial production: Actors, attitudes and aspirations

When discussing small industrialists, the questions normally posed concern the problems and prospects of the present entrepreneurs. In order to reach a comprehensive understanding, it must, however, also be asked why so few of the many potential entrepreneurs and well-off business people enter into production activities. In other words, it is important to identify the apparently unattractive conditions which keep entrepreneurial people away from industrial production.

The relevance of this question becomes apparent when looking at the number of new shops, bottle stores and trading businesses mushrooming in Gutu and other district centres. The capital invested in these shop buildings and stock easily amounts to more than Z\$ 50,000, or the price of a fully equipped carpentry workshop. The capital is there at the local level, but not the intention or ability to venture into production. An important part of the answer is to be found in the knowledge about technical work, and ultimately, in the attitude towards technical work.

The entrepreneurs in commerce come from two sources: The more recent established entrepreneurs come from a job with the central or local authorities with limited or no experience in trading. They have, however, good personal contacts in the bureaucracy and perhaps know suppliers, professionals, etc., in town who can assist them in business. The older businessmen are the best and richest in the local business community, and can exert considerable power in the local community. In Gutu, there are four big businessmen who dominate the local scene. These entrepreneurs are not academically educated, but have been working their way up in business during the last 15–30 years, i.e., from well before independence.

Neither of these two groups are very keen to enter into production (there was only one exception: an entrepreneur who had a technical background and who subsequently entered commerce). The reason given is that they lack experience in production and, more important, that they cannot get a good production specialist to come to Gutu to run the activity. A "joint-venture" idea with local small industrialists (where the big businessman could invest capital and the industrialist could run the daily business) was regarded with scepticism by businessmen.

By contrast, the entrepreneurs in production mostly have a practical background from many years of work in city firms, and supplemented occasionally by formal training from a technical school but with only very limited basic education. Not surprisingly, these people have managerial problems because they have never been trained or worked with such matters. The often mentioned lack of capital is perhaps better conceived as a symptom of such poor management and low education than as the prime cause for stagnation (Staley and Morse, 1965: 233). Furthermore, they have problems communicating with influential people in local government, banks, big firms, etc., who are all more or less academically educated.

If a small industrialist has been successful, he/she, like most Zimbabwean parents, will often strive to give the sons (and occasionally daughters) an "education" (i.e. academic education). This again makes family succession less likely, because children who are educated and socialized in the city get other aspirations. With the threat of academic unemployment, technical education and training is, however, likely to gain respectability among parents now as we enter the 1990s.

An explanation of this rather hostile attitude towards and low status of, technical work and industrial self-employment can be found in the history of colonial Zimbabwe (and perhaps in general in the British way of colonizing). Before 1980, the only possibility for social mobility for blacks was to become a policeman, nurse or teacher. All higher order desk jobs, technical jobs and apprenticeships were taken by whites, leaving only the dirty, manual, monotonous jobs to the black migrant workers. The number of schools where blacks could achieve some technical skills was very limited. Therefore, on the eve of Independence, Zimbabwe had a very poorly

skilled black population both in technical terms, but also in terms of entrepreneurial capability.

After the change of government, the most obvious way for social mobility in economic terms, away from rural drudgery, was to enter the rapidly expanding public sector, which many whites had left. And entry to higher order public sector jobs is only possible with academic merits. The basic school system was dramatically expanded (from 177 secondary schools in 1980 to 1400 in 1989) without a similar expansion of basic technical schools. In fact, some of the old schools were closed down, since they were considered to offer "colonial" education. In numbers, there is approximately only one basic technical training centre for each 50 academic secondary schools in Zimbabwe today.

There are some official ideas of integrating technical subjects in the secondary schools, but the experiences hitherto have not been encouraging: "We have only partly succeeded and I can say on the whole we have failed, said the Minister of Education, Fay Chung, on the issue of promoting technical training (Herald, 11.5.89).

To sum up, the aspirations of the 1980s have primarily been directed towards academic jobs, also reflected in the actual possibilities for rapid social advancement when government opened its doors. Technical jobs have a low status to the extent that even successful entrepreneurs want their children to receive an academic education rather than to continue the family business. This phenomenon has also been identified in Kenya, where entrepreneurs saw the production activity as a means to getting into trade, which was the ultimate goal (Kongstad & Mønsted, 1980: 146). Within this context, it is perhaps less surprising that the full potential for local production has not been utilized. The existing pool of local technical entrepreneurs is deprived of the most talented local youth, who hurry into academic education—in the cities.

POLICIES: TOUCHING THE FRINGES OR TRANSFORMING THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE?

Objectives for small industry and small town support

Following the rather limited results of the policies in this field up to now, it might be appropriate to attempt to reformulate some basic objectives of small town and local enterprise development policy once again. Two basic principles are here suggested:

1. Creation of structures where the financial flows keep circulating within the local area to a much larger extent, in contrast to the present situation where most cash resources flow to the towns (Reynolds, 1988a, 1988b).

2. Creation of a favourable environment and conditions for entrepreneurs and production in the local area in order to utilize the local production potential and gradually expand this potential.

The means to reach the first objective must be particularly concerned with increasing the farmers' spending in the local area instead of in town. One approach is the growth point/service centre combined with smaller rural service centres, but this has proved to be both expensive and incapable of reaching the rural population living far from the centres (Reynolds, 1981; Gottlischer, 1986). An alternative approach, proposed by Reynolds, places the main emphasis on the lower level rotating periodic markets, which can reach the whole rural population. By letting the actual local demand determine the number of market days needed in a given area, commercial centres will develop from below along with the local need, instead of having substantial investments tied up in fully equipped district and rural service centres before the economic circulation can sustain and justify the costs. (The recently established "rural market society" is currently running a pilot scheme with such periodic markets in one of the districts' communal lands).

Such a flexible and bottom-up approach is likely to increase the demand and thus the opportunities for local production vis-d-vis city-hired manufacturers, although not guaranteeing it. The local producers will have to fill the space left for them; therefore, creating a favourable environment is necessary to motivate the entrepreneurs to fulfil the potential market.

As regards the second objective, the conventional approach to develop local rural and small town industries has been centred on micro-policies on the supply-side problems (credit, machinery, workshop space, material supplies). But international experience (Levitsky, 1989; Gasper, 1989), as well as Zimbabwean, has been rather disappointing in terms of cost-effectiveness and reaching a significant proportion of the target group.

Rather than looking solely at the existing entrepreneurs, it seems important to ask whether it is possible to attract new and better equipped groups into industrial production by examining more closely the "largely unreformed national economic structure (Reynolds, 1988a: 22) and removing some of the factors which make entrepreneurship relatively unattractive. This is important, not only to expand the entrepreneurial group, but also because it is much more difficult, politically and technically, to support isolated and politically weak groups. Bannock and Binks arrive at a similar proposal, saying that small-scale enterprise policies "should be primarily concerned with removing barriers to enterprise, correcting in so far as that is possible, market imperfections arising from lack of information, government regulation monopolies, and so on, and eschewing narrowly based size or sectoral policies" (1989: 16).

The following section will look into some of the policies which, directly or indirectly, affect the environment of the smaller enterprises *vis-à-vis* the large enterprises.

General policies regulating the small and large enterprise sectors

Five policies, several of which are not commonly associated with small enterprise development, will be mentioned briefly here.

1. *Interest rate policy.* During recent years, the commercial banks have increasingly been attacked for being unwilling to provide loans to small and especially rural businesses. Few would dispute this fact about the banks' very conservative and risk averse attitude towards new and small clients. But the point is also that there is no incentive for the banks to lend small (and high-risk) amounts when they can lend large amounts to consolidated larger firms.

The present interest rate ceiling, determined by the Reserve Bank, is rather low both for loans, regardless of the size, and savings. This forces small enterprises into the hands of informal money lenders and credit unions (Herald, 11.5.89). In the rural areas there are informal credit unions which take from 40–200 per cent in annual interest for small and short-term loans, and even registered credit unions can charge a 120 per cent effective annual rate (Reynolds, 1988a: 77). These credit unions keep local capital circulating on the local market in a flexible, although expensive, manner. The people's and enterprises' dominant relation to the commercial banks is as savers, receiving only low interest rates, while the money saved is transferred to the city and then lent to larger enterprises, etc.

The present financial system thus consists of a dual system with banks, on the one hand, borrowing from rural areas and lending to urban firms, and on the other hand, informal credit unions, etc., demanding and giving sky-high interest rates on the uncertain local market. A deregulation of interest rate control, as suggested by the industrialists' association (Herald, 11.5.89), would allow banks to raise the interest rates as a premium for the increasing risk in rural lending, but these rates would never be as high as the present informal credits. Such a carrot for the banks (deregulation) could then be combined with a stick, which obliged banks to lend a certain percentage to rural areas, as is done in, for example Nigeria (Edet, 1988: 146).

Despite an official intention to the contrary, the present distortion of interest rates benefits, *defacto*, large industries with cheap loans. By deregulating, the present sharp boundary between formal and informal credit will be blurred and more local enterprises will have access to capital at a realistic rate. Such a solution seems much more sustainable than creating new (donor financed) institutions for lending capital at subsidized rates to rural businesses. Alternatively, informal credit arrangements could be encouraged (Reynolds, 1988a; Bannock and Binks, 1989).

2. Labour legislation. As a natural reaction to an exploitive colonial regime, the minimum wages were raised considerably after Independence and it became much more difficult to fire employees. This was an attempt to protect the working class in the formal sector, and especially restriction of the right to fire has been a major irritation for the large private employers. A side-effect of these restrictions has been that many, especially agricultural, employers have substituted labour with capital.

The relatively capital intensive formal industry, however, pays high wages not primarily because of minimum wage regulations, but rather because the formal sector needs a stable work force to operate the expensive capital equipment. Smaller local enterprises, with their flexible and uncertain environment, however, are hit hard by the imposition of these urban/formal sector regulations which are actually often imposed in the smaller towns, and make the enterprises hesitant to employ new people.

Again, there is a discrepancy between the rules for the formal sector, which are also imposed on and affect the small local enterprises, and the rural and urban informal economy with extremely low wages and no job security, pension schemes, etc. In the rural areas, the "alternative minimum payment" for unemployed or drought-ridden peasants is Z\$ 2 a day food-for-work aid. If the labour laws were somewhat relaxed for small enterprises, they would most likely be more willing to take additional risks and employ young people.

3. Import allocation procedures. Import of necessary equipment and spares is controlled and regulated through an allocation system inherited from the former government, because the demand far exceeds the foreign currency resources. However, this is again a result of an over-valuation of the Zimbabwe dollar by approximately 80–100 per cent.

In effect, only those enterprises with good economic arguments (and good personal contacts) can get an allocation, as is also the case in many other countries (Levitsky, 1989: 23). The lucky ones thereby obtain very cheap capital imports, thus replacing labour with (foreign) capital. Although large industries also complain about lack of allocations, they normally get more than small enterprises.

If capital were imported at a realistic higher exchange rate, or tariffed by the government to reflect the scarcity of capital in Zimbabwe, it could be freer from allocation control. Labour intensive enterprises and enterprises far from personal contacts in Harare—in short, rural small enterprises—would benefit, both in terms of easier access to vital spares and better competitive terms *vis-à-vis* the large firms operating with more expensive capital equipment.

These three issues (interest rates, labour laws, foreign exchange) illustrate the present "formal/large-scale sector bias" in Zimbabwe. Ironically, this trend seems to continue in the new Investment Code in 1989, favouring capital intensive investment and production which again squeezes out the smaller enterprises.

4. Decentralization of decision-making. The present highly centralized decision-making structure makes it very hard for local enterprises to deliver to the public sector, including the parastatals, which are often the single largest potential local consumer (for buildings, furniture, fences, vehicle repair, uniforms, etc.). The parastatal companies, for instance, decide who wins the contract of constructing their rural and small town houses in Harare, thus making it impossible for local contractors to even get knowledge of the building job before the day they see the large urban contractor show up in the area (Rasmussen, 1989).

In general, the more decentralized the procurements of the public sector, the more likely it is that local manufacturers can deliver, because the orders would be much smaller. Admittedly, this already happens with regard to local councils' building jobs and school furniture demand, which are always done by local builders and carpenters. Especially in the light of the still weak technical skills among local enterprises, it is important to support them with the demand that they actually can satisfy.

Deregulation or relaxation of local development control, especially in the designated smaller towns, would furthermore facilitate local production initiatives. As mentioned previously, small enterprises have difficulties in obtaining appropriate stand sizes where the minimum building requirements are also set to meet the capabilities of the entrepreneurs, because local authorities and/or the Department of Physical Planning exercise tight control to ensure that new development is "up to (urban) standards".

5. Technical *education/training*. As mentioned previously, there are very few technical schools at the local level, but in addition to this fact, the existing technical training institutions and apprenticeship programmes are designed to train students for a job in the formal sector. For instance, all recognized apprenticeships and industrial exposure periods have to be in a "decent" firm or government institution, where students might learn the technical aspects but definitely not how to run a business.

As long as not only the location, but also the syllabuses, of the technical training schools remain unchanged, it is very difficult to create a local pool of talented youth who can and will enter into local production activities. There are now signs that the government is starting to realize both the seriousness of the problem and the difficulties of changing parents' attitudes (Ministry of Higher Education, Herald, 6.1.89). But the task is huge and strong initiatives are needed.

Previously, schools were located in one place, clinics/hospitals in another place, and the business centre in yet another, according to the preferences of the physical planners (Gasper, 1989: 8), thus losing the agglomeration effects of concentrating such institutions in the district centre. For the purpose of network creation, it would be important to locate such technical schools in district and rural service centres.

Other small enterprise policies

While this paper has purposely emphasized the often forgotten indirect policies, it must also be admitted that some direct policies can have a positive effect. Credit or especially guarantee provisions by SEDCO or CGC (Credit Guarantee Corporation), do of course assist the enterprises which are lucky to get assistance (although SEDCO's cost-effectiveness must be critically assessed). CGC's guarantees have effects beyond the loan itself, as they help the enterprises to maintain proper banking relations.

Various business training and advisory functions (ILO, SEDCO, Rache House College, Management Training Bureau, etc.) can serve an important function, although one of the big questions of how to bring such services to the local level often remains unresolved. If such advisory services could be brought to the local level in the form of a Rural Industrial Officer, as in Botswana (Ascough, 1985), the local enterprises could have the opportunity of establishing more permanent advisory relations than is the case with some scattered courses.

The conventional "factory shell" or "industrial estate" model has not yet been tried in Zimbabwe. Again, most international experiences are rather bleak, essentially because such industrial estates have been far too costly, serving more the purpose of being showpieces for donors and the host government (Levitsky, 1989: 17) than of building for the needs of local small enterprises. Smaller, simple and unsubsidized buildings can, however, be useful in promoting industries in provincial and rural towns. Perhaps the most important function is not to bring many enterprises together under one roof, but to create an agglomeration of enterprises which can be assisted by some of the services presently lacking in rural towns. In Swaziland, the Small Enterprise Development Company is assisting enterprises with accounting for a reasonable fee, whereby they can approach a bank for loans etc. with correctly audited books.

ZONCLUSION

In the preceding section, it has been shown that there is a need—and a potential—for local industrial development, where the urban system, i.e. provincial, district and rural urban centres, constitute important nodes for such activities. Depending on the activity, the customer groups and the complexity of production, the activity can be rationally located in either provincial centres (more complex production), district centres (e.g. production dependent on external supplies), in rural business centres or periodic market centres (simple production, milling, etc.), or even at the farm-house level (pottery, weaving, etc.).

The issue raised in the title of this paper, "Small urban centres in the development of local enterprises", is thus not easy to articulate. Every lo-

cality has its own potential and the small district centres are seen here as having the potential for some smaller scale production, initially serving the hinterland and later perhaps for export out of the region. There is, however, a danger in concentrating all activities (or donor money) in district centres only. Such a policy may have the effect of eroding the market for similar rural enterprises in the hinterland as has been observed with carpenters in Gutu (ITDG, 1988).

Reviewing the constraints for development of local industries, the basic problems are creation of an environment conducive for would-be entrepreneurs, in order to attract more well-trained and educated groups to manufacturing. This would embrace on the one hand a reconsideration of important macro-policies, and on the other hand, an attempt to change the attitude toward and knowledge about technical work. It is important to note that it is not only a question of changing some social conditions, but that people's attitudes, behaviour and actions also matter. These attitudes are, however, very difficult to change in the short term, but through the establishment of local vocational training facilities, and along with increasing academic unemployment, it is envisaged that practical jobs will gain some respect. Several consultancy reports have suggested establishment of Rural Small Industry Development Centres under the auspices of SEDCO (UNIDO, 1983) or Rural Technology Centres on the sub-district level (Oekotop, 1984), but these ideas have never materialized.

Such political interventions in the economy are likely to be more sustainable than a new array of subsidized measures of cheap credit, material supplies, fancy workshops and imported machinery, although effects are almost impossible to measure.

The role for donors in small town and local industry development

This conclusion, of course, also indicates the prospects and appropriate role for donors in small town and local industrial development. Injecting large amounts in "up-to-standard" urban development in small towns and rural business centres by building sewage processing works, urban roads, industrial estates, housing, etc., might make the town appealing and solve some pressing problems. But economic development effects should not be expected,—except for the additional work given to local enterprises, which rarely happens even in donor-financed projects! Investments in mobile markets are more likely to generate effects on the rural economy, because of their much wider coverage. When these markets gradually become permanent as a consequence of local needs, assistance to infrastructural development in such centres would not hurt.

With respect to small industries, substantial effects cannot, and must not, be expected when just patching the holes of a largely hostile macro-economic environment by supplying subsidized credits to entrepreneurs, many of which only strive to get away from production.

All experience suggests that if it is not possible to change the overall interest rate policy as has been argued here, and some credit arrangements should be established, commitment from the borrower and sustainability must be ensured. This can be done in two ways, either by interest rate support, if banks will take the risk, or by taking a greater share of the risk from the banks. Or, more radically, by finding ways of assisting local informal credit unions.

Support could be given directly to the banks (say, a couple of percentage points) for the loans they provide to rural/small town enterprises, as a kind of risk premium. Not only would the local bank manager ensure much better repayment rates (or he would not be manager for very long), but the enterprises will have respect for the loan because it is or appears commercial and will learn to build up relations with their long-term financial partner—the bank.

Alternatively, loan guarantee arrangements, like the CGC in Zimbabwe, with risk-sharing between the bank and the guaranteeing institution would still keep the enterprises in touch with the bank. The CGC repayment rates are impressive (99 per cent), but the 50 per cent risk share is still too high for the banks, in the light of the high risks and relatively low interest rates.

The most obvious field for donor assistance is perhaps to build up local training facilities, either in existing schools, or perhaps better, in new technical training schools, designed for training would-be self-employed artisans. There is a substantial pool of experience among NGOs on appropriate technical training from which lessons could be learned.

Studies and evaluation reports might show that many of the newly trained artisans in fact will rush to the city to get a job (and get away from the rural areas), but that is not necessarily regrettable. First of all, very few graduated artisans, in Europe as well as in Africa, are in a position to start their own business right away (what the term journeyman also indicates), because they lack both savings, experience and a network (see Berry, 1983). A large number of the artisans who migrate to town will, however, return sooner or later, and if they return better equipped, financially, with technical experience and with a larger network, then the time in town has actually improved their potential.

Finally, small town industrial estates, if designed in a modest and appropriate manner, might be worth supporting, but this issue is perhaps best regarded as a minor addition to a range of other measures to promote local industries and enterprises.

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Rural Urbanisation in Zimbabwe: Prospects for the Future

Kadmiel H. Wekwete

The majority of the population in most Sub-Saharan African countries live in rural areas and are mostly engaged in agricultural related activities. The proportion of rural dwellers in most countries ranges from 60 to 70 per cent. Despite this dominance, however, urbanisation is a potent force and rates of urban growth are very high. The rural-urban dynamic is a key feature in most developing countries, resulting in rural-urban migration, diffusion of innovations from urban areas, and the general problem of balancing investment.

There has been a tendency in most countries to react negatively to the phenomenon of urbanisation, resulting in policies emphasising rural development. It has been argued that rapid urbanisation results in distortions of economic development and, hence, there is a need to devise policies to curb it. In most cases the policies failed because urbanisation is an inevitable consequence of economic development. Increasingly, however, there has been an acceptance of urbanisation in most countries and this is also reflected in the policies of major international organisations including the World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and so on.

The main outcome of this acceptance is that policies have to be devised to manage urbanisation and, in most cases, to mitigate some of the negative consequences of rapid urbanisation. This is particularly evident in the field of housing and infrastructural development in existing urban centres. There was also a focus on rural areas in the late 1960s and 1970s, through the implementation of what can be broadly termed growth centre policies. These growth centres have, in most cases, been designated for infrastructural development in the hope that they would attract investment and even become major urban areas.

In practice, these centres have become small towns providing services to their rural hinterlands. They have also facilitated decentralisation of government services and, in a limited number of cases, attracted industrial and commercial investment. In most countries these rural growth centres have not been seen explicitly as part of an urbanisation policy, but rather as a way of curbing the concentration in existing urban areas. The primary function of small towns in the urban hierarchy has not been positively viewed as part of the urbanisation process, but as preventing large-scale urbanisation particularly associated with the growth of primate cities.

More recently, however, the development of a network of secondary small towns has been viewed as an important prerequisite for rural development. Small towns have been linked to policies of providing a variety of services and agricultural inputs to farmers. The towns also tend to bridge the continuum which stretches from small villages to capital cities. It is a continuum which needs to be managed through a variety of measures from both local and central government.

This paper will briefly review policies which have evolved in Zimbabwe designed to promote urban development in rural areas. The policies vary from those which are explicit to those which are implicit. The former are those where the development of the rural centres are viewed directly in terms of urbanisation policies, whereas the latter are designed for other purposes but end up promoting 'rural urbanisation'. Policies within the context of Zimbabwe evolved during the colonial period and some have continued in the post-independence era. The major commitment to rural development is, however, largely a post-independence feature in terms of the volume or scale of public sector investment devoted to the development of rural infrastructure.

It will be clear from such policies that there have been ambiguities and, in some cases, contradictions associated with policies concerning rural development. The image of towns has also varied depending on the perception of the different policy makers. Some have tended to view the future in a rather romantic rural perspective which stresses the need to de-emphasise an urban image. This view has been reinforced by some donors for whom rural development is the answer to all problems. Those promoting urban development have done so in an indirect way by supporting fully-fledged industrialisation of the economy. They call for new investment particularly in the capital goods sector to reinforce the largely consumer oriented industries.

BACKGROUND TO THE ZIMBABWEAN ECONOMY

Outside South Africa, the Zimbabwean economy is probably the most developed and diversified in Sub-Saharan Africa. The economy is comprised of viable agricultural, mining and manufacturing sectors. The sectoral contribution to gross domestic product in 1984 is shown in Table 1.

The most significant aspect of the sectoral distribution is the relatively high contribution of manufacturing (23.0%), which is significantly higher in terms of contribution to exports (41.4%). There is also a very well developed services sector—construction, real estate, finance and administration. By standards of most developing nations, Zimbabwe ranks relatively highly, and in world statistics is classified as a middle-income developing country.

Table 1. *Zimbabwe: Sectoral contribution to GDP, 1984*

Sector	% Contribution to GDP (at constant 1980 prices)
Agriculture and forestry	13.6
Mining and quarrying	8.3
Manufacturing	23.0
Construction, distribution, hotels	12.9
Transport and communication	6.5
Finance and Insurance (including real estate)	6.8
Public administration	10.2
Education	9.4
Health	2.7
Domestic services	1.7
Other services	6.1

The Zimbabwean economy, however, has a relatively distorted structure. These distortions are a result of colonial development policies which created structural imbalances particularly along racial lines. The imbalances relate to income, availability of social and economic infrastructure, and levels of participation in the production process.

Policies relating to land tenure and distribution are most indicative of these imbalances. From the time of the first arrival of colonial settlers, a process of land alienation from the local Africans was instituted. A number of legislative measures governing land settlement were implemented in 1894 through the institution of native land reserves and this was followed by the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, the Land Husbandry Act of 1951 and the Land Tenure Act of 1969. As a result of these legislative measures, more than 50 per cent of the land was designated for European use and the rest for the majority of the African population. This totally disregarded the population differential of 96 per cent African and 4 per cent European, which prevailed throughout the colonial period.

The Land Tenure and Apportionment Acts reinforced the basis on which public sector investment programmes were implemented. The African communal areas (tribal trust lands) were largely neglected, receiving infrastructure that was considered only necessary to allow for the 'civilising mission' and administrative control. The African areas were seen as a labour reserve for the monetised sector; in terms of policy they were not supposed to develop beyond certain levels, lest the labour would not flow or become more expensive. This resulted in absolutely no urban development in rural areas although a few administrative centres emerged with significant commercial activity, but never enough to become urban

centres. There was limited public sector investment which flowed to these centres.

It was in the European sector that commercial agriculture, mining and manufacturing developed. All urban areas were located in these areas which were linked by a variety of infrastructure—roads, railways, posts and telecommunications. Within the context of the 'European economy' there was a high degree of urbanisation; up to 90 per cent of the European population was urbanised on the eve of independence in 1980. However, if the whole population is taken into account, the level of urbanisation was only 25 per cent. The Africans residing in the urban areas were classified as 'temporary sojourners' who would retire to their tribal homes, although in terms of overall urban population they constituted the majority.

There were legislative controls on migration to the urban areas, which ensured that only those Africans with remunerative employment were permitted to stay. An important form of control was in the field of housing where all urban houses were built and owned by the municipality and central government. There was, therefore, a direct control on accommodation, allowing municipalities sweeping powers over residents, including regular inspections.

For a large portion of the colonial period urban and rural development were viewed largely in terms of control. The differentials between the European modern sector and the African peasant sector were deliberate and meant to result in a certain form of development. The Europeans enjoyed a high standard of living which was reinforced by a wide array of discriminatory policies and these extended to education, health, public utilities and social services. It was in the 1960s that the colonial government began to pay some attention to rural areas. This 'colonial realisation' was not accidental because there was increasing political pressure internally for change. The growing nationalist upsurge forced the colonial government to devise some new policies geared towards the tribal trust lands.

The intended reforms of the 1951 Native Husbandry Act were rejected and provided an important nationalist rallying point against colonial policies. It was an attempt to reform the 'husbandry' practices of African farmers and particularly to strengthen the individualism of small farmers. The proposed reforms did not, however, tackle the fundamental problems of land pressure and overgrazing. There was also increasing youth unemployment which could not be absorbed in the urban areas.

The failure of the husbandry reforms led to a variety of community development approaches. These were intended to mobilise the peasants to initiate self-help programmes. They were also intended to thwart the growing political mobilisation in the rural areas. The results were disappointing and called for new approaches. In the 1960s, the colonial government's image of tribal trust lands was closely shaped by the *apartheid* policies of bantustans for Africans which were being consolidated in South Africa. These policies aimed to consolidate separate development between

racess politically, economically and otherwise. Inherent in this philosophy was the consideration that it was important to develop African homelands with their own towns and industries. The 'Natives' could therefore be artificially confined to their own areas, whilst the European areas and towns could develop separately.

In 1969 the colonial government in Zimbabwe established by Act of Parliament the Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation, whose main objective was to develop towns, industries and viable agriculture in African areas. The Corporation (commonly referred to as TILCOR) pioneered in drawing up feasibility studies for setting up towns in rural areas.

Sanyati in Mashonaland West Province was chosen as a prototype and it received investment in physical and social infrastructure which was followed by a cotton ginning industry based on a cotton growing hinterland. The Sanyati experience, it was hoped, would form the basis for urban development in rural areas.

As Sanyati was being developed in the early 1970s there was, at policy making level, a full incorporation of urban development in rural areas as a national policy. The 1978 Integrated Rural Development policy document (prepared as part of the 1979 public sector investment plan) identified 10 centres in tribal trust lands which were to receive an investment of up to Z\$* 2.5 million each to become urban areas. There were also several studies on service centre locations and development, which influenced policy making. However, it is in the 1978 policy plan that a clear programme for urbanisation in the rural economy emerged.

At Independence in 1980, the results of the colonial rural urbanisation policy were difficult to evaluate as a result of the major disruptions which had taken place during the war of independence. Sanyati, the prototype, had developed significantly largely due to the location of the cotton ginnery. It had also attracted a variety of commercial services—banks, stores and small groceries. Most services, however, were of a relatively low-order nature, and no significant non-farm employment had been created.

POST-INDEPENDENCE POLICIES ON URBANISATION IN THE RURAL CONTEXT

There is no evidence in the policy documents between 1980 and 1985 of a conscious urbanisation of the rural countryside policy. In fact, it could be argued that there was generally an anti-urbanisation theme. It was rural development which was in vogue. Government was committed to uplifting living standards of the rural poor by investing in social and physical infrastructure.

* Zimbabwe Dollars

The public sector investment programme reflected this major policy drive. Investment was directed at schools, health centres, roads, agricultural extension, resettlement and developing district and rural service centres. There was no conscious desire to urbanise the rural areas, although one of the reasons for such investment was to stop rural migration to the main cities. The image of development could be roughly categorised as 'agropolitan' in vague Maoist terms, i.e. the focus was on developing centres which would provide services for the agricultural communities in the rural areas.

There was a major revival of the growth centre policy, which resulted in the designation of 55 district administrative centres which would be the 'capitals' of the reorganised district council areas. Each district had service centres and smaller business centres, which all formed part of the settlement hierarchy. The pre-independence growth centres (the ten urban-designated centres) were retained under the jurisdiction of the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA), a government parastatal. These centres, however, did not receive as much attention as the newly-designated district centres whose role was seen as more politically relevant for the new order. There was a recognition that the pre-independence notion of growth centres (resource based) was more likely to create urban centres than the district and service centres. However, the choice of the latter (district and service centres) as a priority meant that urbanisation *per se* was not considered as the key issue—rather it was decentralised distribution of services which was considered a priority.

The concept of 'urbanisation in the rural context' in post-independence Zimbabwe is not a direct outcome of an urbanisation policy, but rather an outcome of a variety of rural development policies. The policies have resulted in the need to group services and other activities in centres, some of which have developed into urban (or potential urban) centres. This is an important issue in understanding urban-rural interactions and dynamics. Most of the rural centres which can be categorised as urban, according to the 2,500+ population indicator, are not administratively urban centres as they are still under the district council jurisdiction which, until amalgamation with rural councils has been fully achieved, have no provision for administering urban centres. At most, they are rural growth centres (or growth points) which allow them certain privileges in terms of attracting investment.

In practice, therefore, there has been no official creation of urban centres since 1980. The hierarchy of urban centres inherited at independence has not been restructured and definitions of what is 'urban' have been retained. This is likely to change with the current reorganisation of rural government (1988 Rural District Council Act). The 1986–90 National Plan proposed the formulation of a National Physical Plan which would include a national urbanisation policy. Progress in the formulation of this has, so far, been limited.

GROWTH CENTRE POLICY AS AN IMPLICIT 'URBANISATION IN THE RURAL CONTEXT' POLICY IN ZIMBABWE

The latest survey carried out by the Department of Physical Planning in 1987 reveals that 36 per cent of the designated district centres have a population above 2,500. Using the 1982 census of population definition of an urban area this means there are now 20 urban centres in the rural areas. In contrast, according to the 1982 census, there were approximately 5 centres which had a population of above 2,500 in rural communal areas and therefore on the basis of the estimate from the Department of Physical Planning, there is a rapid urbanisation of the rural areas.

Such a statement has to be qualified because the definition of 'urban' is not only bestowed on the basis of resident population. There are other factors which have to be taken into account including complexity of economic activity, existence of a rateable or taxable basis and other traditional urban features such as a civic centre. Most of the rural 'urban' centres lack a complexity of activity and are largely dominated by low-order activities (Wekwete, 1987). These include small grocery shops, grinding mills and very small-scale industrial activities. Most of the centres are important because of their hinterland which have made them important centres for service distribution. Government offices have been located in the district centres as part of the decentralisation process.

Of the 20 centres whose population are above 2,500, there are only 5–10 which have a meaningful potential for sustained economic activity. The centres include those with high population thresholds in their hinterlands, which constitute a huge potential market for commercial and industrial activity, for example, Gutu, Murewa, Mutoko and Gokwe; those whose location is more favourable compared to the main centres in terms of significantly shorter distances, for example, Kotwa and Nkayi; and possibly those with a relatively good economic base, for example, Gokwe, Sanyati and Hurungwe. In most cases the centres with the best potential combine these factors (See Map 1).

In general, however, we can argue that the Z\$ 20 million which has been spent on establishing basic infrastructure (roads, water supplies and sewerage systems) has created a potential for urban development in the rural areas. The potentials vary from centre to centre but, in general, the planning standards used have assumed future urban development. A major criticism which has arisen is that most centres have received infrastructure which they do not require and hence there is a major problem of underutilisation. This problem arose out of the need to implement a policy of equitable development and, therefore, resources were allocated on the basis of administrative and political units.

Since 1980, when the rural growth centre policy was adopted, the major thrust of both central and local government has been to create *de facto* a physical basis for future urban development in rural areas. The motivation

has been primarily rural development, although a related policy has been the attempt to curb the drift of population to the major towns. What has not happened so far is location and generation of new investment in the planned centres. This is despite the granting of tax incentives for entrepreneurs locating in the 'growth' centres as envisaged in the income tax and sales tax incentives of 1987.

Map 1. Zimbabwe: Location of Communal Land and District Centres

Sources: Drakakis-Smith, 1987; Wekwete, 1989.

FACTORS INFLUENCING GROWTH IN RURAL 'URBAN' CENTRES

The phenomenon of rural 'urbanisation' occurring in Zimbabwe is influenced by a number of socio-economic factors. These include local, national and international impacts. The first important factor is that although the rural centres are located in areas of relatively high population, they are also areas of low incomes because of the dependence on largely subsis-

tence agriculture. Commercial trading is therefore constrained because of the limited surplus the majority of rural people have for consumer spending. In most cases, the spending from locally-generated incomes tends to be seasonal (during harvest times). This, however, should not mask important urban-rural transfers which are a crucial feature of rural incomes. The dependence for families where the husband is in the urban area and the wife is together with dependants in the rural areas, can exceed 50 per cent of the total expendable income for food, school fees, clothing, etc.

The second important factor related to urban-rural transfers is that sometimes major consumer items are bought not at local centres but directly shipped from the main urban centres. This direct shipment hampers local development which tends to concentrate on low-order consumer items which are also manufactured in the main towns. The fundamental feature of the Zimbabwean economy is that the 'effective' market for consumer goods is very limited. It tends to include wage earners, the urban informal sector, and certain categories of the farming community. The majority of small peasant farmers are very marginal to it and are linked only in terms of consumption of basic consumer goods. The small consumer market has resulted in the concentration of manufacturing plants and wholesale distribution outlets in the main urban centres. The rural areas, although an important potential market, are largely dominated by small-scale retailing.

In terms of the market chain, the rural district centres tend to attract distributors and retailers from larger urban centres. There is also a direct link which manufacturers and wholesalers maintain, through truck sales operations. These operations enhance the market dominance of a few monopolistic or oligopolistic firms.

An important factor in the growth of the rural urban centres has been decentralisation of government activity. Since 1980, government has been committed to a programme of decentralising the operation of sector ministries and parastatals. This has resulted in the growth of the resident population of most centres. Previously, the colonial government did not encourage residential development in African townships, as they were commonly referred to. Therefore, the resident population tended to be made up of shopkeepers. However, all the plans which have been prepared have a residential component, of which the largest customers have been government ministries and agencies.

The growth of a resident population has improved the 'urban' component of the centres and has also boosted the buying power for consumer goods. The long-term prospects, however, depends less on decentralised ministry bureaucrats, than on resident populations which will be generated or limited according to local economic activity. Currently, good prospects are only found in a few centres which have a distinct resource base associated with their growth, for example, Sanyati. For most centres

the level of commercial activity is still small-scale and tends to generate employment only at the family level.

FUTURE PERSPECTIVES ON URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN RURAL AREAS IN ZIMBABWE

Urban development in the rural areas is going to continue at a rapid pace due to increased provision of services and the general nodal foci they provide for location of both public services and private sector investment. The original policy intention was that district service centres were to be the focal point for their district council areas, serving a population of between 10,000 and 50,000. Although not serving an entirely economic purpose, they were envisaged to develop higher-order commercial activities. District centres have in fact become the *de facto* growth points, a category which had initially been reserved for centres linked to a specific resource base.

The merger of the growth point and district service centre concepts was largely a result of the emphasis which was placed on the role of local government as a vehicle for development. The development of centres was therefore closely associated with their jurisdiction with one district authority or another. Growth points, a category of centres which really was part of the colonial growth centre policy, did not receive the attention which was given to district centres. In most cases where a growth point was located in a district, there was also a district centre. This anomaly has been corrected with most of the growth points now being adopted as district centres (for example Sanyati, Hauna, Muzarabani) thereby achieving a congruence between the administrative and resource-base criteria.

Officially, however, the distinction, which exists, causes more confusion than clarity. In terms of understanding urban development in rural areas, the basic identifying factor is that the centres are located in communal areas. We can then move on to conceptualise the basis for such urbanisation.

Firstly, government policy of rationalising the provision of rural services has been outlined. Post-independence policy emphasised the development of rural infrastructure, located within the context of a settlement hierarchy — village, business centre, rural service centre and district service centre. This rational planning of services within the context of a hierarchy forms the basis of an urbanisation policy.

Secondly, the role of small towns has been further reinforced by the setting up of other government agencies to promote development. In the early 1980s government established the Small Enterprises Development Corporation (SEDCO) by Act of Parliament (1983). The terms of reference of the Corporation centred on providing financial and technical assistance to small entrepreneurs, particularly those located in communal areas. This was a move aimed to strengthen and stimulate commercial and industrial

activity. The Corporation has since assisted many small entrepreneurs, but its criteria has tended to facilitate those who are already established in business with some form of collateral security. Another agency, the Urban Development Corporation, was established in 1986 and its terms of reference centred on providing assistance to urban areas in the preparation of plans, management and implementation programmes. Although not specifically targeted for the rural urban centres, it has a potentially important role to play in future planning of these centres.

Despite government efforts, the flow of private sector investment has been limited. Most private sector investment is in the area of services, not new industries. Important progress has been made in the spread of rural banking services. The big rural centres have branches of the main private sector banks. The smaller centres are serviced on a mobile basis. This has been very beneficial to the farmers, who are now able to open accounts and transact regularly. An important clientele are the many civil servants (teachers, nurses, agricultural extension workers, etc.) who benefit from such services.

The other important commercial service is the location of wholesale agencies and depots distributing urban manufactured goods. This is particularly so for high-bulk goods and agricultural implements which benefit from such a decentralisation of retailing opportunities. Such decentralisation, however, is limited by virtue of the relatively good accessibility to the major centres, allowing for relatively easy movement. The only noticeable decentralisation of production is represented by the establishment of bakeries at a few centres. Interest has also been expressed by milling companies to decentralise.

The role of small towns cannot be viewed only in terms of investment flowing from existing urban centres. There is a need to look at local potential. Current research has tended to survey existing activities which in most cases are very small. The conclusions have therefore tended to be pessimistic. A potential exists for agro-based industries of a small-scale nature. What seems to be lacking is initiative by existing and potential entrepreneurs to venture into productive activities. Most rural businessmen tend to enter lower-order retailing as a starting point (groceries, grinding mills). Because of the competition in these fields the chances of rapid capital accumulation are limited which also restricts the potential for expansion. Most businesses tend to be based on family savings and businessmen are generally 'risk averse'.

The future of the small town depends on the emergence of different forms of entrepreneurship. This involves a need for government investment in training and in helping establish the infrastructure for possible industrial development. Such a service can be integrated with the role which the Small Enterprises Development Corporation is providing. The Corporation has to establish joint ventures in a few designated centres which have to be 'nursed' in their infancy. The proposal for establishing 'nursery'

factories requires a feasibility study conducted nationally. This will establish what industries can be feasibly established and the costs involved. Such a proposal requires other forms of government intervention. These could involve tax exemptions and, where necessary, curbing adverse competition. However, there are problems of trying import substitution in a market already dominated by 'import substitution' monopolies and oligopolies at the national level. In the long term, the emerging industries cannot escape being absorbed by normal capitalist take-overs.

An important target group for setting-up new industries are young graduates, who should be encouraged as soon as they leave university. The SEDCO could provide post-graduation experience leading to entrepreneurial expertise. Interest of the private sector in such schemes has to be encouraged, particularly by the financial sector. A traditional weakness of existing financial institutions is that they do not encourage risk taking and this rules out support for young entrepreneurs and the informal sector.

A projection of population figures for the existing district centres into the year 2005, shows that more than 20 will have a population of 5,000 and above. Gokwe, the largest centre, will have an estimated 31,000, whilst Mutoko, Gutu, Wedza and Chivi will have populations above 10,000. These centres will, therefore, have substantial market potentials for consumer and industrial goods. A large bulk of the estimated population is related to central and local government personnel working in the centres. Moreover, most central government ministries will be represented, together with the key parastatals. However, an important role of these centres will be to cater for a largely expanded communal lands population. The population estimate for communal areas by the year 2005 will be 3,931,338 which is more than double the 4,374,895 recorded in the 1982 census.

Finally, an important policy issue is the formulation of an integrated urban policy. Although historically, the communal areas developed more or less as an entity, a variety of post-independence policies have created a case for integrated policy formulation. It is therefore important to review the definition of what is considered 'urban' in Zimbabwe. This will also highlight the possible ideal patterns and policies for urban development. At the moment, the population guideline is totally inadequate and there is no legislation which specifically deals with urban policy matters. In the long-term this results in many forms of unanticipated occurrences including, for instance, the way in which limited resources should be shared among the up to 100 urban centres.

CONCLUSIONS

The discussions in this paper reveal the complexities of analysing the concept of urbanisation in rural areas. Probably the concept is too all embracing and needs to be more sharply focussed. What emerges, however, is that a variety of policies have contributed to the current process of rural 'urbanisation' in Zimbabwe of which the foremost is the growth centre policy. Most of these policies have been formulated in the name of rural development. However, even with such policies, the inevitability of urbanisation as part of the socio-economic processes of development has emerged.

The lack of a clearly articulated policy hampers future planning. There is an important need for more research into the processes of urbanisation in rural and existing urban areas. Such research will guide policy formulation particularly as it pertains to investment. The traditional tax incentives do not seem to make much impact given the internationalisation of capital which operates globally and sometimes does not really take into account small intra-country differences. Even where local capital is involved, it might have one manufacturing location in the primate city serving the whole national market.

Future research should also aim to understand and help to integrate national policy perspectives. More often than not, small case studies can result in misguided conclusions. International agencies should fund broad based research which will support into policy making. Once clear policies exist, feasibility studies can be undertaken to identify projects. On the whole, the field of urban development is currently poorly researched because of fragmented perspectives.

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Town-Based Pastoralism in Eastern Africa

Anders Hjort af Ornäs

Small towns were given little attention in the planning processes in East Africa during colonial days. Since then they have gradually emerged as a focus of attention. This goes also for development aid (cf. Claeson and Hjort af Ornäs 1988). Arguments for such a trend are ambiguous, but there seems to be a general feeling that supporting small towns as growth centres will be an extended form for rural development. Small towns should be a means to counter one of the major global problems; the dramatic growth of large cities. A viable alternative to city life has to be established by improving a rural/urban sustainability.

This essay¹ examines such an argument for drylands. It looks at the contents of rural ties from small towns, and it considers urban opportunities. Its prime concern is with pastoralists and former pastoralists. How do they go, which principles operate in the decision on temporary or permanent migration, and is there such a phenomenon as town-based pastoralism?

Pastoralists of course, like other rural inhabitants, do go to town. In the three cases discussed, the pastoralist quality remains valid to the extent that the individual maintains contacts with a rural homeland. We are concerned with multi-active households. As for resource management, the long-term interest concerns family herds, not fragmented land as is the typical case for landless farmers in town.

The three situations illustrate the complexity of a small town concept, the interplay between rural and urban cultural systems and the economic integration between town and countryside.

1. First, the concept of a "small town" varies for different groups of pastoralists, depending on the history of the township but also on the rural situation and, not least, on cultural factors in the pastoralist's own particular ethnic group. This is illustrated with the experience from Isiolo. The case is one where ethnicity is a significant asset for the migrant's access to subsistence resources.
2. Second, the essay gives a brief example of how permanent wage employment in town can be turned into a collective resource for a rural pastoral group by operating cultural rules for collective solidarity. The case is Port Sudan, and it also illustrates how this traditional system be-

comes further distorted through an emergence of patron–client relationships of a Godfather calibre.

3. The final illustration is Yaq Bariweyne in Somalia, and its economic role as a growth centre. The place is a focal point for milk collection and distribution further into an urban system (Mogadishu). It also serves the conventional market and consumer function. The thesis from this Somali case would be that urbanisation is quite common in rural areas, and that it is integrated with prevailing pastoral practices. The case has a bearing on one of the principal positions in the concluding section; that the "town" concept is a "cultural transfer" and that we must account better for local circumstances and needs before propagating "development solutions" generally through growth centres or the like.

Map 1. *The locations of Isiolo, Port Sudan, Musmar and Yaq Bariweyne*

The concluding discussion dwells upon this issue, *inter alia*, by evaluating the hypothesis that urban centres function as safety valves for pastoralists against negative effects of increased population pressure and against prolonged periods of drought. Is it at all relevant to use "small town" as an analytical concept? And is it appropriate to ascribe pastoralists a unique role in what is often a web of complex migration patterns from and between both rural and urban situations?

ETHNIC SETTLEMENT AND RESOURCE ACCESS; THE CASE OF ISIOLO, KENYA

Isiolo is a small multiethnic town in northern Kenya which developed during colonial days, especially as a centre for trade and administration. The opportunities for making a living in town are limited. Access to subsistence resources is often tied to social contact networks, built by means of relations in the surrounding rural areas. These tracts are inhabited by pastoralists to the north and farmer/agropastoralists to the south. Typically, households in the rural areas send an occasional member to town more or less for the purpose of maintaining the economic carrying capacity of the rural household by relieving it of a member. Other townsmen are more permanently pushed out of a rural context. These differences in backgrounds mean that townsmen will have very different expectations on urban life. Different settlement strategies follow. The varying contact networks create an economic and social integration between the town and the rural tracts involved.

Map 2. Northern Kenya and migration routes to Isiolo
Source: Hjort, 1979: 142.

Those areas are dominated by different ethnic groups. To the north are found Borana, Samburu, Somali and Turkana, to the south Meru. Ethnic affiliation, i.e. how others classify an individual in ethnic terms, is reflected on various levels in the community, not least in settlement pattern and interactions. Ethnicity, an individual's own indication of ethnic membership, becomes particularly important for most newcomers to town as a means to establish contact with individuals who are likely to feel obliged (socially, culturally) to give support in accordance with prescribed conventions for proper behaviour. This possibility is established through the fact that the number of ethnic groups is limited, each being associated with important resources. In this sense ethnicity becomes a means for survival in the perspectives of **pastoralists** turned townsmen.

The small town of Isiolo north of Mount Kenya with about 12,000 inhabitants in 1979, has become a link, or a filter, between two principally different economic systems. It offers increased monetary income to a rural population through trade and wage labour. At the same time it forms a link in an expanding capitalist economy. In its periphery, raw materials are attractively cheap, and access to low-cost and temporary wage labour good. Thus Isiolo town offers, on the one hand, possibilities for subsistence to poor strata of a rural population, and, on the other hand, opportunities for an exploitation of the town inhabitants, predominantly recruited from those ethnic groups just mentioned.

Settlement in town is very much ethnic based. This is illustrated in a survey (Hjort 1979:47ff) of the unregistered settlement, "shanty town"; see Map 3. The ethnic distribution was very marked, as Table 1 shows.

Table 1. *Ethnic composition of the various unregistered settlements*

	Borana	Somali	Meru	Turkana	Other	Total
Marire	0	13	60	27	0	100
Kula Mawe	0	0	22	71	7	100
Kampi Ya Shauri Yako	9	27	55	9	0	100
Bula Besa Juu	0	31	46	23	0	100
Bula Besa Middle	27	55	9	0	9	100
Bula Besa Chini	3	97	0	0	0	100
Bula Bao	88	4	4	4	0	100
Overall	23	36	20	16	5	100

Source: Hjort, 1979: 51.

Map 3. The Isiolo unregistered settlement pattern
source: Hjort (1979:52-3).

The major resources in town are found within a subsistence sector (predominantly irrigated farming in combination with keeping small stock) and the monetary sector (wage labour or other forms of employment, activities in an informal sector). Individual households normally combine income from both sectors. Many poor inhabitants have very limited cash income and are forced to produce their own food. One third of the inhabitants of the non-registered settlements keep small stock (in a few cases only for trade purposes). Another third of the households derive income from farming (average farm size in town is slightly below one hectare). Of these farmers, only 28 per cent have cash income from small scale marketing of products. As many as 40 percent of all households have cash income from employment. Townsmen are employed at various levels by local, district and province administrations as workers, messengers, drivers, secretaries, etc. Within commerce, labour is needed at the maize mills, for loading and unloading lorries, building houses and many other activities. Affluent households have a demand for servants. The tourist traffic further north gives rise to souvenir production; over 10 percent of all households have an income from this business.

Economic niches in town are ethnically dominated. The situation is summarized in Table 2.

Since many impoverished migrants arrive in Isiolo, competition over these subsistence resources is, naturally, hard. In some instances it has taken an ethnic shape. And seemingly, ethnicity looks like a prime factor for mobilization of actors in any one niche. The correlation, however, could also be interpreted through the actual recruitment pattern as indicated by the ethnic history of town. A migrant looks for more narrow principles than ethnicity when looking for help in town; a relative, a father's friend, a former neighbour "back home", a clan brother, etc. New-comers use personal relations, albeit within their own particular ethnic group. In spite of this process, the aggregated picture is that ethnicity is significant. Outsiders of a group claim that it has been the case, ethnicity is accordingly used to interpret the situation, and opposition may easily grow between different groups.

PASTORAL HISTORY, MIGRATION AND THE ROLE OF A SMALL TOWN (ISIOLO)

Isiolo illustrates the multitude of expectations regarding the role of a small town. This can be illustrated by investigating migration decisions and patterns for the Borana, Meru, Somali and Turkana.

The Borana have their original home areas in southern Ethiopia. The expansion of the Abyssinian Empire and the concomitant suppression of the local population forced livestock rearing groups of Borana to seek protection on British territory around 1910. Some of these were later moved to

Isiolo District. Many pastoralists lost their livestock in the 1960s during the so-called *shifita* war. Others were badly hit by prolonged droughts immediately following the war. The disasters are reflected in Isiolo town by the fact that most of Bula Bao is inhabited by impoverished Borana households. On the edges of town the Borana also play a significant role in irrigated agriculture, established by the authorities after the war.

Table 2. *Economic niches and ethnic dominance*

	Borana	"Old" Meru ¹	"New" Meru ²	Sanburu	Geri Somali	Herti & Isaq Somali	Turkana	Kikuyu	Asians
Firewood gathering for Somali restaurants				x					
Firewood gathering for trade in town						x			
Charcoal burning				x		x			
Tourist trade	x					x			
"Prostitution"	x	x							
"10 cent trade"	x	x							
<i>Miraa</i> trade		x	x						
Cattle trade			x		x				
Trading wild life products			x		x				
Market trading in kiosks		x	x						
Market trading in the open	x	x	x	x		x			
Selling milk			x	x		x			
Selling traditional medicines	x			x					
Retail trade in cement <i>dukas</i>			x		x				x
Taxi			x						x
Farming in Isiolo town	x			x		x			
Selling local <i>shamba</i> products	x					x			
Artisans	x						x	x	

1. Migrated around the 1940s; 2. Migrated essentially after independence

Source: Hjort, 1979: 207.

Thus, the Boran townsmen are predominantly recruited from among subgroups whose pastoral economy was entirely destroyed. A number of today's inhabitants, however, also come temporarily from pastoral households whose economy is out of balance.

The labour force for Isiolo's administrative and trade "elite" was recruited, to a fair extent, from among poor Meru in the Nyambeni Hills during the early Isiolo history. This area is very different from the semi-arid Isiolo; fertile soils, reliable rainfall and high population density are

typical traits in this area of farmers and agropastoralists. Land ownership was traditionally clan-based. Nowadays individual tenure is established throughout. There are great problems with land fragmentation, and the growing number of **landless** has contributed to the Isiolo migration. When the demand for labour grew after World War II, many Meru from Imenti (a part of Nyambeni Hills, and also a Meru subgroup) moved to Isiolo to seek employment with townsmen or to carry out small-scale trade. The early recruitment for people in these fields was carried out through networks of kinship and friendship, a fact which explains how one particular group, Imenti, could dominate at that time among the early Meru migrants. They settled in a part of town called Kampi Ya Shauri Yako ("The Mind Your Own Business Settlement") next to the major shanty part of town (Bula Besa). The latter was at that time inhabited solely by Somali, and non-Somali only had safe access there during daytime.

At the end of the *shifita* war a new Meru migration wave to Isiolo followed, this time from Tigania, another subgroup being more of agropastoralists than the Imenti farmers. As many as 84 percent of the Meru traders in town in 1974 had come after Independence (1963). Over half of that group had even arrived after 1970, i.e. after the war.

The "early" Meru have maintained few links with their home area, since their prime reason for moving was land shortage. In contrast, the "new" Meru normally own farmland in the Nyambeni Hills, often enough for household subsistence. Many single Meru women combine small-scale trade with prostitution, since this is a prime income source for a woman without permanent employment.

The Somali groups in town are partly urban descendants of soldiers in British pay from World War I (Isaq and Herti), and partly impoverished pastoralists (mostly Geri). The British colonial authorities had two purposes when Isiolo was established as a centre in the 1930s. Apart from the military-strategic and administrative considerations, where Isiolo was to become a "gateway to the north", one idea was to establish a locality where the former soldiers could be given land (they had chosen land instead of cash as *diia* payment² for those soldiers who died in the war). It so proved that Isiolo town happened to be placed outside Isiolo District due to confusion over the location of two roads on a map. This caused delays; land registration was halted and no permanent buildings were permitted in town. Ever since, the "Alien Somalis", the descendants of World War I soldiers, have lived in Isiolo, and their livestock have been herded on the outskirts of town. At independence the case of the "Alien Somalis" was definitely closed. The independent government has naturally not had a reason to assume responsibility for a colonial government's commitment.

These town Somali identify themselves as totally urbanite. Their lineage solidarity gives rise to a high degree of mobility between various centres throughout eastern Africa. Their outlook is clearly cosmopolitan. The Geri, in contrast, come from very arid tracts in northern Kenya and represent

clearly the category impoverished pastoralists. Their economy is beyond a return to a pastoral system.

The Turkana subsistence base is nomadic pastoralism. They keep camels, cattle, donkeys, goats and sheep. Wherever possible, this is supplemented with farming; millet or maize is grown particularly along the Turkwell and Kerio Rivers. During the first years of British rule the Turkana were on the move southwards. The prime reason for this was a series of very serious drought years at the end of 19th Century. This expansion was made easier by the fact that neighbours to the south were heavily struck by the severe epizootic outbreaks in the 1890s. Ever since the first decades of the 20th Century, Turkana have migrated on an individual basis to Isiolo town looking for jobs. When the town grew, it increasingly offered a means of survival for Turkana pastoralists. Many were employed either locally in town as wage labour, or recruited further south to the then White Highlands as farm hands (especially during the Mau-Mau War when white farmers dared not employ Kikuyu or Meru workers). The Turkana today have a good reputation as labourers, and find it fairly easy to get a job. A great number of Turkana households, especially female headed ones, carry out irrigated farming along the Isiolo River.

The migration pattern of Turkana to Isiolo differs from that of other pastoral groups (Cf. Hjort, 1981). There are no marked peaks in the flow which can be attributed to external circumstances. Rather, a fairly constant number of predominantly young people have emigrated over the years from Turkana District. They do not have aspirations to return to a pastoral lifestyle, often being younger children with limited hope of inheritance in families trying to keep together family property in the form of pastoral herds.

The distinction between a town inhabitant and a migrant is difficult to make, since the social and cultural bonds to the home rural areas can be so decisive for access to urban resources. Of course, the attraction of the survival resources of the small town is also linked with the economic circumstances in the rural area. It is relevant to note that culturally, different principles in wealth redistribution also occur. For instance, the more "individualistic" Turkana, emphasizing a small network of stock friends for livestock redistribution in times of need, contrasts with the Borana's more "collectivistic" clan based solidarity. A Turkana network is smaller but more effective for temporary redistributions. This shows also in town for the newly arrived. Other culturally given principles operate for other groups in Isiolo; neighbourhood for Meru and lineage solidarity for the Somali.

DROUGHT DISASTER, REFUGEES AND URBAN GROWTH; THE CASE OF PORT SUDAN

In the area between the Red Sea and the Nile Valley, in one of Africa's hottest and driest parts, live the Amar'ar Beja, a Cushitic speaking people. Many subsist on camel herding in combination with sheep and goats, some sorghum cultivation and, in town, wage labour. The natural conditions for farming could hardly be more difficult. Accordingly, ecological stress is more or less built into the system for the inhabitants, and their case illustrates what can be done when room for manoeuvre decreases and when the risk for disaster increases. In essence the principal approach is risk spreading through a high degree (as far as access to labour permits) of economic multiplicity.

The problem for the Amar'ar is to maintain a balance between the household and family herd. It is clearly expressed through a dispersal of activities in livestock rearing and other economic fields with the aim of keeping the family together. The quality of herding suffers as a consequence of this need to diversify activities, but also as a result of faulty decisions in an ecologically difficult situation where the distribution of rainfall is rather variable.

The situation in the area today is still precarious after the 1984 drought disaster, leaving as many as two thirds of a population as temporary refugees in towns and cities such as Port Sudan (Walker, 1988). It will take another few years (according to OXFAM projections, until 1992 or 1993; Walker, 1988: 199) before production capacity of family herds has reached a position of food security.

Meanwhile there has been a dramatic urban settlement of Amar'ar pastoralists. Looking more in perspective we see a continuing urbanisation process at least throughout the 20th Century. Going more into details it is possible to note that certain groups tend to be more urban than others. Furthermore, patterns for settlement vary between the groups (an observation which is verified by Ruppert, 1988). Clearly, access to resource systems are different depending on contacts, which in turn have an ethnic bias, like in the case of Isiolo. There are, in other words, cultural principles in operation which determine what assets a migrant is likely to be able to claim.

The Musaiab way of managing port stevedoring is an illustration. It also demonstrates the "non-linearity" of a cultural transfer. Work in port is carried out by gangs of ten persons. Each group has a leader. The design is such that workers are recruited for each loading or unloading of a ship, similar to the system in other ports. The possibilities for an individual to participate is connected with an agreement with a group leader. The group leaders operate on a clan basis. Thus, there is a direct connection to life in rural hinterlands. Pastoralists normally have to go to town a few weeks per year in order to enough earn cash for purchasing coffee, tea and

sugar. Thus a job opportunity becomes a clan collective asset to be individually distributed according to subsistence needs of a rural household.

Assets such as dock work are limited in relation to the number of job seekers in town. The case is significantly different from the pastoral rural/urban continuity found in Isiolo. The Port Sudan case is one of modern industrial activities. It is also one with a collapsed pastoral system and permanent establishment in town by former pastoralists. Survival is based, not least, on relief and food for work.

Different donors seek sustainable solutions to the subsistence problem. These are along the lines of small-scale income generating activities, such as vegetable production. Most people hope to rebuild family herds and return to livestock rearing. The future will show whether the disaster was of such a massive scale as to render a return impossible.

RURAL/URBAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION; THE CASE OF YAQ BARIWEYNE

Southern Somalia is characterised by agropastoral production systems in the interriverine area. Variations are great, but on the whole most households rely on **rainfed** farming in combination with substantial degrees of livestock rearing on free range. Cattle are marketed, not only in Somalia but also to Kenya. Bananas are grown in the best watered areas (under irrigation). Maize is the most important crop. Camel milk is marketed on regular basis.

Households are organized to meet food production needs. As in the case of Sudan, the individual household seeks to be independent, accounting for subsistence and cash needs of its members. The situation leads to risk spreading and great diversity in economic and production undertakings. Social organisation and movement patterns reflect these prerequisites.

Southern Somalia is, however, a very different case from Port Sudan. Here are a few towns but with only limited employment opportunities for pastoralists. Still, the degree of urbanisation is high. This is a Somali conundrum, spilling over also to Kenya. In a study of the rural-urban exchange in the Kismayo Region (Evans et al., 1988) this phenomenon has been surveyed. Slightly above 40 percent of the entire population live in urban areas. Scarcity of water is claimed to be a major cause for people to settle in small towns with over 2000 inhabitants. The case is one with a highly elaborated rural/urban network, so that individuals operate in both networks.

Characteristic features of the small towns in the area are a growing business activity in commerce, services and, to some degree, transportation. Marketing systems lead to distribution of commodities such as manufactured shoes and clothing, thus hampering the job opportunities within

such enterprise. Exchanges between rural and urban areas, according to Little *et al.*, are built around marketing, purchasing agricultural inputs and household consumption expenditures. The monetary turnover is extremely low in comparison, for instance, with neighbouring Kenya. This reflects not only a disastrous national economy, but more specifically a strong emphasis on a subsistence economy. In terms of spending, rural households are poorer than large town inhabitants, herders, and small town inhabitants (this is the order of poverty established by Evans *et al.*: xii). However, self-sufficiency follows the reverse pattern, and small town inhabitants come out on top when combining subsistence and cash economies. The pattern is reflected in the fact that roughly every other household, apart from its urban activity, maintained a farm or a herd of livestock. Hence, this was a pattern very congruent with that of Isiolo.

Yaq Bariweyne has a population of slightly above 2000 inhabitants. The township is, in many respects, rather typical for the area. It is located in the bushland belt parallel with the Somali coast which has farming areas on both sides. Rainfall in the area is between 500 and 600 mm, and water availability is scarce. The town is formed by a permanent centre with its tea houses, shops, market and other social facilities. Here are also found administration, permanent housing and other urban features. Semi-permanent settlements are located around this centre.

The town has a reliable well with a diesel pump which came into operation in 1974. This reflects an untypical history in comparison with other small centres in the area. The road improvement and proximity to Mogadishu (two hours away) has brought Yaq Bariweyne into an inter-urban system where camel milk is marketed to Mogadishu. Due to the accessibility, resort buildings for Mogadishu families have also been erected in Yaq Bariweyne and similar towns on the road to Mogadishu. Still, there is no health facility, and a number of other characteristics of a central place are lacking.

Herren (1988) lists a number of professions in the town; hunters, charcoal producers, farmers/pastoralists, affluent herders. Again a rural/urban continuity is clearly discernible. The town in its location offers both livestock and milk trade opportunities. Of these, milk sales clearly dominate. The milk trade follows a common pattern (cf. Mohamed S Samantar, 1987) of local trade within the centre, barter trade between producers and townsmen, and the cash oriented abakaar trade. The latter is largely operated by women. It delivers camel milk from the Yaq Bariweyne area on lorries to the market in Mogadishu. In terms of volume the latter trade dominates. It is economical for the trader, less so for the producer, according to Mohamed S Samantar. Evans *et al.* have reached a different conclusion, claiming that there is little surplus in the trade, the benefit of the activity is to provide jobs for women (ibid: 127).

Whatever the conclusion may be in such a controversy, the role of the small town is clear. It forms an important dimension of rural life and a

rather marginal one of urban life. Also, such recently established towns as Yaq Bariweyne are well integrated into both rural and peri-urban systems. Such patterns have developed out of needs, not as a result of policy implementation. Dissatisfaction is great with social and veterinary services. Due to the location of the well, great numbers of nomadic pastoralists and their livestock pass by, and there is strong argument for a service improvement when the national economy permits. The role of the small town is limited to the services it can provide; livestock marketing, retail trade and marketing of farm products.

RURAL TIES AND URBAN OPPORTUNITIES

The discussion so far has concerned settlement in small towns, involving pastoralists in Eastern Africa. Ethnicity can play an important role, not only for settlement patterns but also for resource access. The number of economic niches in the small town is limited, and this limitation follows social and cultural rules or boundaries. In the Isiolo perspective the small town seems to be a relative notion, depending on context; it means something different for the Turkana than for the Borana, Meru, Sarnburu or Somali. The Port Sudan case brings up a more conventional urban situation with wage labour in trade and industry (the illustration is primarily from port work). It shows how a pastoral community converts a Western notion of "job opportunities" into a cultural asset. It also illustrates the effects of a drought disaster with a chronic dependency on relief aid. Yaq Bariweyne gives an illustration of a rather conventional trade network where the small town forms the anticipated link between a rural and an urban environment, featuring especially a **producer/consumer** relationship. The small town is the perfect point for a middleman as a boundary person to **exploit** both systems. A rural system is extracted of food products at low prices, while the small town is the entry-point to national and international markets. The products marketed are at times a surplus in the local perspective, and at other times a commodity acutely needed for the rural consumption.

Obviously rural and urban intertwine in all three instances discussed in this essay. There are aspects of the small towns mentioned which certainly have to do with economic growth and development. Significant for them all in a pastoralist's perspective is that the small town rather forms an asset, either being part of a pastoral production system, or an alternative to outmigration from the own community, if such was needed. Instead of turning into a farmer, the pastoralist turns into a townsman. Administration and trade form a backbone for the existence of small towns, and a question to be addressed is whether the existence of a small town has something to do with rural development. The cases have indicated that it

has; better infrastructure for milk deliveries to Mogadishu, improved live-stock trade, access to wage earning are illustrations.

But we have also seen how the pastoralist in town very often also remains active in the rural setting. In actual fact, we should distinguish between two categories of town pastoralists. One is formed by those who are away from home temporarily in order to relieve the household of one mouth to feed for a period or in order to earn cash income for a pastoral household. The other category is illustrated by that livestock owner who settles permanently in town, employs herdsmen and exploits a system with private herds on collective land. He or she can lead an urban life and be an "absent pastoralist". In the latter case, we are concerned with a totally different system. The role of a small town changes, from being an additional arena for pastoralists in their struggle to diversify, to being the motor for market oriented intensive livestock rearing systems.

Maybe this is the point where one should locate the shift from rural to urban. The shift is away from rural ties and urban opportunities in a multi-faceted manner to a one-dimensional resource utilisation perspective. It is interesting to note that only in the latter case can we use Western analytical concepts, such as a central place theory. Otherwise the notion of a small town should rather be one of an urban aspect found in a rural-focussed life-style.

THE SMALL TOWN CONCEPT; CENTRAL PLACE OR RURAL ASPECT?

Okpala (1987: 137ff) has a point when claiming that more attention has to be given to indigenous sociocultural and value systems. Such a position should have implications for policy responses. There certainly are some conclusions for the case of pastoralists to be drawn from the current essay.

First, one could hoist a flag of warning for policy makers; be cautious with the phenomenon "town-based pastoralists" They might imply a foreign production system which should first be evaluated in political terms, perhaps rather like the Swedish phenomenon *trottoarbonder* (part-time farmers who can manage a farm on a part-time basis through high technology input and can remain primarily urban with a town wage employment). One political worry has to be that these individuals by being boundary persons can exploit both a rural and an urban niche in an unfair manner, derived from extra support from the urban or rural side respectively. Attention should therefore be given to the kinds of activities which town-based pastoralists propose.

We may look at the Latin American *hacienda* phenomenon as a principal illustration. Here the dependent peon clears land for farming, land which is taken over by the patron when it is highly productive. The analogy for the pastoralist setting would be a stratified production system, consisting of poor herders who "borrow" animals from a patron, who in turn takes

them over at times for slaughtering or who selectively chooses the best livestock for his own usage. Thus there is a potential for exploitation, but also for production improvements through "employment" of poor herders.

The town pastoralism in the cases given in this paper are less of a *hacienda* type of production system, and more of a transformed pastoral production system. This should make them ideal for development activities. By supporting the vitality of a small town economy one also improves opportunities in a rural system to make use of migration to town as a regular or reserve employment strategy; by sending individual household members to town temporarily, the capacity to uphold sustainable pastoral production increases. And the spin-off benefits are vital for the function a state has to fulfill in terms of providing social services and proper administration.

Thus: Social and cultural structures can manage it. Economic structures benefit from it. But what is actually the small town? And how should it contribute to improved life quality, for pastoralists or others? We can, to mention it again, utilise the two perspectives, one more of a town planning approach, and one more actor oriented, focussing on resource systems in a local, household or even individual perspective. Two studies from the areas mentioned in this essay are Vorlauffer (1986) and Ruppert (1988). They have very different messages.

Vorlauffer is concerned with Marsabit town in Kenya, a northerly neighbour to Isiolo. He notes that there is already a Kenyan policy to develop a system of service centres in order to improve living conditions. Although, as he notes, Marsabit lacks most of the features of a central place, it has the potential to develop into one. This is also the content of his conclusion:

This study formulates the thesis, that in spite of these constraints, in the future the central places will have to play a vital role in stopping the process of desertification and in improving the meagre livelihood of the pastorals. The integration of the pastoral economy into the national economy, a better access to markets for livestock and consumer goods, and especially the improvement of the supply of maize on the basis of fair 'terms of trade', are prerequisites to reduce the pastorals' dependency on their staple food, milk, and to relieve the overstocking. The improved marketing of camels is of greatest priority;... (Vorlauffer: 178)

This seems to be a policy recommendation based on a preconceived notion that central place theory has a capacity in its own right. Reality should adapt to its requirements, it seems. The first issue is whether a town like Marsabit will develop into a medium sized town. This issue is not really related to the one brought up by Vorlauffer, concerning improvements in pastoral production systems. True, a central place will provide social services on a scale not thought of otherwise for pastoralists. But in their own view it might be more beneficial to have mobile units, or smaller market

places equipped to meet basic needs. A proposal for a central place has the policy implication to settle nomads, to introduce entirely new subsistence systems. And this is a political matter that should be thoroughly discussed and communicated to the local population concerned before policy is recommended.

Ruppert (1988) deals partly with Port Sudan. His approach is quite different from that of Vorlaufer, maybe because he has a comparative approach (involving also Omdurman). Ruppert, though dealing with two urban settlements by nomads, and not one like Vorlaufer, still warns against generalising on a basis of urban centres. He departs from differences in migration patterns depending on ethnic identity (as in the Isiolo case) but also other cultural traditions and value systems. He then says:

It must be pointed out, however, that the discussion of such a topic (as migration behaviour) must avoid generalizations and should instead consider the socio-cultural structure of each ethnic group separately. (Ruppert: 211; example in parantheses added by Hjort)

This observation is more on par with Okpala's (1987), already referred to. What does it mean in a pastoral perspective? To do any justice to the question one has to look into the needs of a local population before condemning their behaviour as unecological, irrational, irresponsible, traditional, or the like. We can then raise the issue whether the requirements can be met in a fashion that could be termed sustainable in environmental or social terms.

This is how one should look at town-based pastoralism; to deal with the small town and its potential as a back-up for existing production and cultural systems. They are localities for social services, for marketing and for retail trade. They will remain important administrative centres. To some extent, of course, they will host manufacture, but on the whole it might not be advisable to look upon small towns or growth centres as proper localities for inputs geared towards pastoral production. They are probably not the most suitable localities for veterinary activities, technological equipment, etc. For such supportive services, a cooperative or some other form of farmers' union would be more recommendable. Perhaps one could even use a modern petrol station as a thought model, with its retail function, equipment for hire, etc.

But even if small towns will not have a production implication in a pastoral system, they are vital for economic (marketing), political (mobilisation, administration) and social (mobilisation, service) purposes. The tendency for a system with affluent "spare time" urban pastoralists should be avoided through proper production supportive measures.

Maintaining ecological balance, or sustainability as is fashionable now, has to be a prime consideration. Fuelwood consumption is a case in point. The uproar about deforestation has been followed up not only with tree planting but with an emphasis on fuelwood production. This must be an

appropriate response to a consumers' perspective. The next step is, of course, to pursue the ideas of Schramm (1987) who proposes a strategy to continue and improve the supply of woodfuels to urban centres, observing not only that this is a necessity but also that it is in the best economic interests of entire nations (Schramm: 60). The issue about the potential of a resource base and management practices in drylands still seems to be open.

In a town planning perspective, such a consideration as the ecological one is difficult to make. For instance, Kaul (1988: 218) argues how natural resource management considerations have a "weak negotiation position" *vis-à-vis* market forces in town planning, and suggests decentralized responsibility as the only solution. Further, one is not encouraged by Southall's (1988: 1) observation that decentralisation moves, in connection with small town planning (the case is China), seem to have been a centralised design.

However, the integration of an ecological perspective through a process of decentralisation is more easy to follow if we use an actor perspective—not in order to find a few particularistic cases, but rather to comprehend how resource systems operate (Cf. Hjort af Ornäs, 1989). The dynamics are already present, they need not be planned in a centralised fashion. It is the set-up of resource systems, weaknesses in such systems, degrees of availability, and the like that should be in focus for our attention. Small towns have emerged over the last few decades in pastoral areas quite independent of policy. We must comprehend the processes behind the phenomenon, because it expresses the needs of people "operating" today's production systems. Only then can we see shortcomings, and suggest alternatives or supportive measures to be included in policy recommendations.

NOTES

1. It builds on experience from fieldwork in Kenya (*Isiolo*) 1973–74, plus several brief follow-up visits; Sudan (Port Sudan and *Musmar*) 1979–80; and a number of brief visits to Yaq Bariweyne in Somalia since 1984; see Map 1. These localities have not been selected for the purpose of the current study, and thus they cannot be used for systematic comparison. But they do provide illustrations on the problematics indicated for the current paper.
2. *Diia* payment of "blood-money" is made on kinship basis for a member to compensate relatives of a killed Somali. Payment from each member is made according to wealth and degree of closeness to the offender. The system was applied also for the recruited Somali soldiers.

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Urban–Rural Linkages and Their Impact on Urban Housing in Kenya

Jørgen Andreassen

In Thika, a small town 40 km to the north-east of Nairobi, over 90 per cent of the population rent their dwellings mostly from private owners. In this respect it does not differ very much from other towns and cities in Kenya. The level of home ownership is, however, very low compared with other Third World countries including those in Africa.

While reference to Kenya's fame as the capitalist country *par excellence* may explain why housing has been commercialised and why it is now consumed as a commodity, it does not explain why it has taken the form of rented dwellings and not commercially produced housing for owner occupancy. Furthermore, owner occupancy in urban Kenya has not increased since independence, and it was rare throughout the colonial period when employer housing schemes and, later, public housing schemes, dominated the picture.

This paper argues that the explanation should be sought in the strong attachment of the urban inhabitants towards their rural home, the origin of which lies further back in history in the development of big European farms and plantations structurally connected with labour supplying 'native reserves' of small farms producing less than subsistence.

The research into the development of Thika takes its point of departure in surveys related to a Danida* assisted planning project during the years 1969 to 1973. The research studies the impacts of this effort based on periodical monitoring of Thika through aerial photography, culminating with intensive surveys in the period 1983–85 (Andreassen, 1987).

THIKA

Thika has grown from 23,000 inhabitants in 1969 to over 85,000 today. It has a strong, mostly foreign industrial base in *inter alia* textiles, garments, canning of vegetables and fruit, car assembly and paper production. Over 50 percent of registered employment is in manufacturing. There is a growing number of Kenyan-owned small-scale industries, while the informal sector is less significant.

* Danish International Development Agency.

Already in 1969, discussions over housing programmes with the Town Council revealed the contradiction between the housing policy based on nuclear families and the reality of numerous single men believed to be bachelors. The term 'town dweller', with an implicitly negative connotation, was commonly used to characterize the unfortunate few without access to land at home. The pride with which people described their *shamba* at home contrasted with their commitment to their urban dwelling. Many better off Town Hall officers commuted daily by car from their rural home.

One hypothesis of the research completed in 1987 was that the predominance of renting was related to the strong linkages which people retained with their rural home. Hence, the study of urban-rural linkages became a major issue of the research. It was further assumed that these linkages were based on ideology and sentiment rather than on economic rationality. While the former assumption appeared to be substantiated by the research, the latter was not.

Case study 1

In March 1981, just after marrying, K.M. came to Thika with his wife. 'We were two for one year', but his wife and children are now at home "because here the things are too expensive ... if they are there and I am here alone, I can save a lot." He remits KSh* 300 per month to his wife and also some to his parents. "If my economy goes well, ... then I can manage to buy land somewhere else, where I can keep my family."

The family comes here twice per month. The *shamba* is two acres and is divided among six brothers. K.M. has already built a little house there. If he can maintain job or business he will stay in Thika, but after retiring he intends to go home.

Case study 2

P.G. lives in a very miserable timber room, squeezed in at the end of a gully between rental barracks. The room has no window. The plot is one of the most exploited in the Kiandutu slum. Rooms are back-to-back and in places with only 10 cm between the roof overhangs. He lives here with his wife (who in periods goes home to find casual work) and a relative. His six children are permanently at home. He works casually in the building sector. Both he and his wife have completed standard seven and he speaks a fluent English.

P.G. was born in 1949 in Kangema, Murang'a District. His father had one quarter of an acre. P.G. has a room there for his wife and children, but

* Kenyan Shillings.

also his mother, three married brothers with two–three children live there, in all 18 people. "There are so many brothers, there is only a room. You can go there and sleep, but there is nowhere to take you like here."

In 1965, P.G. left home for Nandi Hills. "Somebody was staying there saying that I could get a job as tea-picker." The job stopped after six months and P.G. went home again. He remained there, married in 1970 and the wife came to live on the small *shamba* of his parents. In 1972 he left for the tea estate once more. This time he succeeded in remaining up to early 1975, when he had to go back home. In 1976 he was employed on a coffee plantation near Thika, where a friend also worked and lived. This job lasted until 1980, when "the owner said that they could manage on their own". P.G. went home for a short period and returned to the Thika area, now working as a casual labourer in a coffee farm at Mangu.

P.G. is engaged in petty trading giving no surplus, and his wife cultivates some vacant roadside land nearby. He has to keep three children at home with school uniforms and to pay the *Harambee* funds (KSh 400 last year). He cannot afford to have all the children in school. P.G. is determined to take his share of the quarter acre plot: "On the small land we will all get a space to build a house." He has no idea of, or plans for, the future, but hopes to get the possibility to live in any rural area. He would like to start a small trading business here in Kiandutu, but he has never been able to set aside the KSh 500 needed to start. P.G. observes that "if you do not have a permanent job, you cannot start a business."

MIGRATION PATTERNS

The once and for all migratory step is unusual. Most women move to Thika upon marriage and many move back to the husband's home after getting children. Men move between towns or back home should luck (=income) fail in the urban environment. After a period there they again try the urban areas. Even those born in urban areas migrate. Only four per cent of Thika's adults were born in Thika. Nairobi has a higher level of out-migration than any other district in Kenya (this is, of course, offset by high in-migration).

LAND

The sanctity and ideological importance of land ownership in Kenya is demonstrated in numerous studies. In contrast to the town, which to the Luo represents the forces of economic production, the home area "represents the forces of biological reproduction, in the idiom of self- and cultural reproduction" (Parkin, 1978)—girls move there to be married,

wives to give birth and the rural home is the ancestral burial place. It is the place to return to after retirement. "Land is not merely a means of subsistence; it represents a person or persons. It can be thought of as ancestors, mother, bride or unborn descendants." (Sluiter, 1960). Land is "the source of life, the mother of human kind ... It contains the ashes of the ancestors and hence the roots of the present" (Chodak, 1971). "If a (Kikuyu) does not have a piece of land ... such a person is not known; such a person is not well liked and admired by his own people" (Dutto, 1975).

Although the strong attachment of men to land is reflected in 'irrationally' high land prices, the process is not irrational. Kongstad and Mønsted (1980) observe that the process around land acquisition and ownership goes beyond conventional 'economics'. "Kenyan peasant families and their members act in a quite rational manner within the concept of the 'market game', but also tend to preserve their own ideology, for example that of the inseparability of man and land."

Facts ~~from~~ the survey:

Five per cent sample of *Thika's* population

- 84 per cent of all men have access to land at home (less among the poor, all among the better off).
- 60 per cent of Thika families with access to land have their members split in two households, one at home (mostly wife and children) and one (mostly the husband) in Thika.
- Circulatory migration is common, only four per cent of adults were born in Thika.

TIES OF THIKA'S POPULATION TO THE RURAL HOME

The study of 1,200 households in Thika shows that most men have access to land. Most Thika men have access to land in rural areas*although often it only amounts to a very small part of a family *shamba* or is the expectation to inherit it one day. As many as 84 per cent of the men interviewed have access to land. Among the youngest, only 45 per cent have land, but access to land is no less attractive for the young. While some young persons have lost out due to overfragmented farms at home, many obtain land through purchase from an urban wage surplus.

Said one Kakamega migrant: "If a person has no land, if he is young, he has to go to town to get money to buy his own land. This is the reason why I live here." A Kikuyu unmarried woman with two children at the

* Single women are, with few exceptions, landless.

home of her parents bought one acre of land: 'We buy such acres if somebody is having a male **kid**, more than for me.'

Access to land varies with ethnic group and with social group. The poorest in town are all landless, and the rich are, without exception, landowners. But with the exception of the extremes in the social spectrum, around two-thirds of all urban families, at any social level, have access to land. Whilst the social and ideological importance of land is unquestionable, the immediate economic significance of land access is generally low. Many have a fragile connection to a fraction of a tiny *shamba* which they expect to inherit one day. Therefore, a few urban residents interviewed, for example, industrial workers, have waived their inheritance rights in view of the size of land and the number of brothers, and instead plan to buy another piece of land at home or elsewhere.

The Thika study confirms that there are strong ideological elements in the ties to the rural area, in particular to the land and the clan, and that in many cases the maintenance of a small piece of land at home is irrational in strictly economic terms. However, the study shows that the geographical separation of the family and the possession of land at home is perfectly rational from the point of view of costs of reproduction, maintenance of security in case of unemployment, or after retirement, and as a means to retain the benefits from the ethnic network in terms of mutual assistance, social prestige, access to an urban job, etc. In other words, the strong ideology linking the urban resident to his rural home is not perpetuated in contradiction to, but in agreement with, economic rationality.

SEPARATION OF THE FAMILY INTO TWO HOUSEHOLDS

The separation of families had its origins in seasonal work on big European farms and plantations. The urban job became increasingly a lifetime commitment, yet without the economic possibility, or the wish, to give up the rural household. Even with economic possibilities for a conjugal family life in town, having the wife and the children at home has many advantages. They can look after the land which is considered the necessary base for maintaining the ties to the ethnic group. The land and house at home represent the security in case of failing employment in town, and the place to return to after retirement. Living at home means reduced reproduction cost of the family compared with costs in the town. It is, however, a myth that food prices in the countryside are exceptionally low. Often the husband brings home maize and other commodities bought in town where competition deflates prices.

Living in two separated households is very common among the residents of Thika. 81 per cent of the married in Thika have access to land at home, and in 48 per cent of the cases the wife lives at home. 40 per cent of the 'families' in Thika consist of the husband alone. Such data are not

recorded by the conventional type of censuses. Projected to the national level, the implication is that 13 per cent of Kenya's rural population are wives or children of urban-based male family heads.

The probability of a married male respondent having his wife in the rural area increases with the number of years the couple have been married. The wife tends to live with the husband in Thika in the first years after marriage and then move to the rural home, especially when the couple have children, or when they manage to buy adequate land. The majority had no intentions of bringing their family to Thika, now or in the future; they are typically without permanent jobs, and have no plans to remain for more than a couple of years. The remainder, who may bring their families to Thika, are in permanent jobs, and most of them plan to remain in Thika for the rest of their lives.

The social costs of permanent geographical separation, however, are high for the family, and I believe, in the long run, also for Kenyan society. It is commonly argued that women suffer from being left alone at home. It is certainly true that they often receive insufficient financial support from the husband in town. And it is also true that conflicts with the mother-in-law are common. The women, however, live in their traditional environment, where they fulfil the role providing subsistence and bringing up children.

The husband, in my opinion, is in an even more difficult position, deprived of the traditional role as head of family, as the one bringing up the children, and having responsibility for cultivation. He lives a miserable life in town, characterised by hard labour, poor housing shared with others, and an environment in which social life is often reduced to visiting bars and prostitutes. This is not meant to imply that the family would have been better off had he remained at home!

The survey in the rural hinterland of Thika brought to the surface deep conflicts penetrating the families and the old kinship networks, and severe internal distrust between parents and sons over land issues, partly nourished by many reported cases of sons mortgaging the land without the knowledge of the family. There is no doubt that the image of life in rural areas which urban residents maintain, often is an illusion referring to a situation as it was many years ago, and perhaps sustained under the influence of the hardships of urban life.

Case study: respondent from Kiandutu slum area

Peter lives in Kiandutu in a rented room of a mud-and-pole tenement. His home, parents, wife and seven children are in Kandara division, not very far from Thika. The farm is very small, 1.25 acres and inhabited by 21 persons. The land was acquired during the 1962 land adjudication. The grandfather had lived there, but he had very little land. The family had no

land there before the Emergency in 1952. Peter has five brothers and five sisters.

Two brothers are in Nairobi in search of jobs, forced by the poor economy of the farm and the recent drought. One lives with neighbours from Gaichanjiru. The other has his wife and two children on the shamba. Peter accommodates in Thika a younger brother also in search of employment. The oldest brother has a portion of land and a house there, but has given up circulating to more or less permanent employment with coffee picking at Nanga where he has settled with his wife and children. Two sisters are married and live elsewhere in the same location.

Two unmarried sisters live on the shamba, one with two children, the other with one child. The fifth, an unmarried sister has died and left eight children behind, the youngest six years old. Four of her children live on the shamba, one is married and lives with his wife and two children. They all survive on coffee picking, including the children and have no land. They are paid KSh 10–15 per day and may work 80 days a year.

The farm is obviously in a critical economic situation, but nevertheless the poorest households on the farm are unable to get access to alternative jobs except very low paid casual work on the farms. Without the economic assistance of Peter, the extended family would collapse. The father has half of the land with 320 coffee trees each yielding no more than 5–6 kg. Food production is insufficient and the father has to buy food for at least KSh 200 per month. He does not receive remittances from the children regularly. Peter has one-tenth of an acre, i.e. 3–400 square meters like his brothers (the oldest brother has more), which provides very little food.

In town, Peter remits to his wife KSh 400 monthly. His income is three times the official minimum salary. He has fixed monthly expenditures for school uniforms, *Harambee* 'donations', the National Security Fund, Kenya Leyland Savings and Credit Union, and he services a loan taken earlier for *Harambee* 'donations' and school uniforms. This leaves him with a net income of KSh 960.

Peter is ashamed of living conditions at home (for example, that the children sleep on the bare floor) and would like to have the family in town, not least to bring up the sons. But he is unable to take the family to Thika. His wife can not live with him because his brother lives with him. Also, the struggle for accommodation and food is very hard in town. However, during the drought his wife used to visit him regularly. The large number of children would certainly be confronted with the urban housing problem. The children were born in 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1984. Peter has a house at home, but it is uninhabitable due to dilapidation of the roof. The family borrows the house of the oldest brother. Peter has plans to build a new house and has accumulated over the years timber from car component despatch boxes from the Leyland factory. He has no intention of building a home in Thika.

The migration process of Peter lasted 10 years before he found the present job at the Leyland factory. In 1966, he left home at the age of 20, and headed for Nairobi. Initially he lived with a kinsman from this location. He found a job in construction after a short time, but lost it and returned the same year. After one month he was back in Nairobi, where he survived on "casual jobs for food." In 1969, he was back home again for three months, and then returned to Nairobi: "You know, in Nairobi there are so many contractors, where you can get a job". In 1971, he was employed by a construction company for a continuous period. In 1973 he was sacked, and went home for a short period before returning to Nairobi. Building was then going on. Then, in 1976, "in November I heard by rumours that they (Leyland) are going to employ people, so I borrowed for bus fare. When I came there I was selected. Since then I have been there".

He lived in the beginning with somebody in Starehe. "His wife came there, so I still got struggles for sleeping. A lot of coming here (to Gaichanjiru) daily, but I didn't have the money." In 1977 Peter could marry, and the wife came to live on the farm of the father in Gaichanjiru. "So in 1977 I thought of going to Kiandutu, because there are so many houses and they are very cheap." In 1978 Peter moved into the room where he has since lived, now accommodating his job-seeking brother.

COMMITMENT TO THIKA AS A HOME

Lack of commitment to Thika is a corollary of strong social, economic, and ideological ties to the rural home. People are in Thika for the money to be earned. Although the big majority hope to get a chance to live in rural areas, most of the people interviewed expect to remain in Thika or in another town until they retire. If there is money left from the low wages at the end of the month, they are sent home for the parents, for the children's school fees, or for the building of a house.

Little energy and resources are used for political, organizational and home-building activities in town.

THE IMPACT OF RURAL TIES ON URBAN HOUSING

The Thika study suggests that urban residents' rural commitments discourage investment in the urban area, for instance in housing, and that they prefer or accept rented rooms. The rented room is quite appropriate, and should the family be allocated a plot or a house it can be sold or used as an asset to produce a rent. They, however, give highest priority to building a house at home. The study of the hinterland of Thika shows a strong dependency of rural families on off-farm wage income and the

linkages to the urban areas in the form of male family heads working and living there or commuting daily, albeit not exclusively to Thika. It is not surprising to find that high priority is given to the house at home, and not to a house in town.

The survey in Thika shows that 85 percent of the residents there have access to land in rural areas. It is a fact that extremely few residents with access to land at home are house owners in Thika—among the low-income majority as few as one per cent—but that the majority have built or are building a house at home. This is perhaps the strongest evidence of the impact of rural ties upon the housing sector.

Due to the restrictions in access to the housing supply system the urban majority does not have a real choice between rented housing and self-help house construction, whether formally or informally. Therefore, a comparison between people with land and landless urbanites in Thika is not an effective method to gauge variations in housing tenure.

However, among the urban dwellers without access to rural land, the percentage of owner-occupiers of urban property is relatively high, five times as high as among those who have access to rural property.* This supports the thesis that the landless are more inclined to invest in an urban dwelling, in spite of the legal and economic obstacles, but the percentage of house owners, nevertheless, is still very small among the rural landless. It is my impression, on the basis of interviews, that if savings were at all accumulated by landless families, the first thing they would do would be to buy a piece of land in a rural area and not invest in an urban dwelling. The study also shows a relatively higher incidence of female house-owners, corresponding to the fact that only very few unmarried women have rural property.

There is a strong bias of ownership towards ethnic groups originating from the hinterland of Thika. Thus, the 23 per cent of residents from Western and Nyanza provinces are, without exception, tenants. The Luo and the Luhya are certainly strongly committed to their rural areas, with 95 per cent of married respondents having access to rural land. This is one explanation of the low incidence of urban house ownership, but it also reflects the long distances to the home areas for the Western and Nyanza people, who may be justified in feeling that Thika belongs to others.

In summary, the study suggests that urban-rural linkages are reflected in a low commitment to investment of resources in the urban setting. This does not in itself result in the development of commodity relations in the supply of housing, but it provides an ideal market for rented housing. Once having consolidated their position as promoters of housing for the rurally-tied residents who find rental accommodation appropriate, the promoters may extend the supply also to the landless. Promoters were, until the late 1980s, small and middle businessmen, politicians, traders

* 7.6 per cent and 1.5 per cent respectively.

and coffee farmers. Larger scale developers appeared in the late 1980s. They do this, for instance, by various mechanisms excluding poor people from unauthorized 'subsistence-production' of their own houses (for example, squatting) through political control of land, of planning, and through the enforcement of building by-laws. In Nairobi more than in Thika, this has resulted in extensive demolitions as the ultimate solution to force low-income families into privately rented housing.

Therefore, although strong urban-rural linkages discourage residents from investing resources in urban housing and hence contribute to the development of a rental housing market, this market is, first and foremost, shaped by the interests of the middle class and the strong political intervention in planning.

CONCLUSIONS FOR PLANNING

The study shows that ties existing between the urban and the rural areas are strong and lasting, and that planning of rural as well as of urban development should be approached in an integrated manner.

For many years to come, improved transportation and the lack of assistance in developing proper conditions for human settlement in urban areas, will induce many people to settle on fertile farmland at home while commuting to urban jobs. In parts of rural Kenya population densities and land subdivision have reached levels which result in reduced agricultural output per acre. The sustained tradition of urban residents keeping a piece of land and building a house at home adds to this. If this process continues, physical planning will be urgently required in order to secure a more rational use of land in rural areas.

There are many reasons for questioning the conventional wisdom of reducing rural to urban migration. There is little or no relevant research producing substantial arguments to support the thesis that the continued growth of Nairobi should be disadvantageous to Kenya and the Kenyans. There could be reasons, however, for investigating the possibilities of alternative settlement in small towns which would permit the non-farming population to live close to their home area and, not least, to reduce the incidence of split families.

For decades, the Government of Kenya has advocated an integrated approach to planning of urban and rural areas, but it has not been implemented. Donors, indeed, do not contribute to this strategy. Most donors prefer sectoralised approaches, and the urban problems appear to be untouchable. Maintaining this one-sided approach is partly explained by perpetuation of agriculture-focused staff in the donor organisations. It is certainly not justified by reference to the population in Kenya and in most other African countries which, with few exceptions, spread their activities and depend on opportunities in the integrated urban-rural space.

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Paths to the City: Migration Histories of Poor Women in Bamako

Mariken Vaa

MIGRATION AND URBAN GROWTH

In general, West Africa is characterized by rapid population growth and redistribution of population through migration. The data base for studying migration patterns is very uneven between the various countries of the region. In some cases, several censuses including information on migration have been conducted. For most countries, however, the type of data needed to disaggregate migration flows into its various forms, such as rural to rural, rural to urban, and urban to urban, as well as gender differentials, are not available. Mali falls into this category (Adepoju, 1983).

Some useful observations, however, can be made. The following paragraphs are based on information gleaned from historical studies, analyses of the 1976 Census, several demographic surveys, and a few recent studies by foreign and Malian researchers.

For several generations, Mali has, together with the other inland states of the Sahel, constituted a labour reserve for the coastal states of West Africa (Amin, 1974; Amselle, 1976). The Malian census of 1976 showed that as much as 7 per cent of Mali's population were residing abroad. The overwhelming majority of these migrants—80 per cent—were found in the Ivory Coast, but Ghana and Senegal were likewise important poles of attraction (Zachariah and Condé, 1981). International migration is becoming more difficult, partly due to economic recession in host countries, partly because of increasing resistance towards the employment of foreigners from the governments of these countries.

Internal migration is far from being a new phenomenon, but earlier it often had a group character, and was linked to war, conquests, or the opening up of new areas for settlement. In colonial times, it took the form of forced labour and conscription. Since independence, individuals have increasingly left their home area to seek temporary or permanent employment in regional centers and in the capital. Cityward migration within Mali is now more important than international migration (PUM, 1984; van Westen and Klute, 1986: 42). Until recently, Mali was one of the least urbanized countries in Africa. In 1965, only 9 per cent of the population lived in urban areas, defined as centers of more than 5,000 inhabitants (Gugler and Flanagan, 1978: 39). Estimates based on a survey from 1985 show that this proportion has now risen to 24 per cent. The primacy of the capital,

Bamako, has also decreased recently, while it accounted for 40 per cent of the total urban population in 1976, this figure was 36 per cent in 1985 (DNSI, 1986: 19).

BAMAKO'S GROWTH AND POPULATION STRUCTURE

For the first half of this century, Bamako grew fairly smoothly. It tripled its population from 1926 to 1958 (from 26,000 to 76,000). Then came explosive growth. In the next twenty-five years, it grew tenfold (Gugler and Flanagan, 1978: 41; DNSI, 1986: 19). In 1983, a survey undertaken by the World Bank supported Programme Urbain de Mali (PUM) estimated Bamako's total resident population to be 675,000, which gives an overall annual growth rate of 7 per cent since 1976. Natural increase represented 3.3 per cent, and net in-migration 3.7 per cent (PUM, 1984: 3). The Enquete Démographique undertaken in 1985 estimated the city's population to be 710,000, with an annual growth rate of 6.4 since 1976 (DNSI, 1986: 20).

Bamako has a very young population. The 1983 survey referred to above found that 54 per cent of the total population was under 20 years of age. The proportion of women of fertile age is high, 44 per cent of the total female population was between 15 and 39 years, so a high natural increase must be expected to continue. The sex ratio in the city is fairly even, with some variations between age groups. According to the 1976 Census, women outnumber men among the under 20 years olds and those over 60. There is no evidence in the age pyramid that women are not migrating to town, since in almost every age group women are about the same in number as men (DNSI, 1985, 111: 41 ff). The high proportion of female teenagers probably reflects the practice of sending girls to be fostered by relatives in town, or to work as housemaids.

The proportion of the total resident population born elsewhere was as high as 42 per cent in 1985. There are only insignificant differences by gender, but more important between age groups. Only 15 per cent of the children under 10 are reported as being born outside Bamako, but almost 50 per cent of the 20–24 year olds are. In the older age groups, from 67 to 89 per cent are life-time migrants. More than 70 per cent had come from the southern regions surrounding Bamako, while the regions of Gao, Mopti and Tombouctou in the north had supplied 17 per cent. Over 10 per cent were alien immigrants, mainly from neighboring countries such as Burkina Faso, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Senegal. Gender differences in area of origin are also small (DNSI, 1988: 22–24).

The population increase was quite unevenly distributed between different parts of town. Illegal, or unauthorized, settlements are estimated to have absorbed 45 per cent of Bamako's population growth over the last decade. The District of Bamako¹ is made up of six communes, and those three communes where the most recent, unauthorized settlements are lo-

cated had growth rates from 10 to 14 per cent, while those of the older parts of town ranged from 1 to 5 per cent (DNSI, 1986: 20). These differences reflect a higher absorption capacity of migrants in poor, peripheral and unauthorized settlements. More rooms are available, and rents are cheaper than in the more central parts of town. Since a large proportion of the new-corners are young couples, the areas where they settle will also experience a high rate of natural increase.

WOMEN AND MIGRATION

In general, much less is known about women than about men as migrants. Demographers have predominantly studied economically motivated, voluntary migration, with the result that women sometimes have been excluded altogether from migration surveys. They have been assumed to be non-migrants or non-economic migrants, or associational migrants who are economically uninteresting (Findley and Williams, 1986: 6; O'Connor, 1983: 69). A synthesis of West African studies concludes that men are more often long-distance migrants, women short-distance. The implication is that men migrate to look for work, while women migrate to get married. Long-distance migration of women is taken to be sequential to that of men, they move to join their spouses or to follow their fathers (Adepoju, 1983). There is, however, a growing realization that the relation between gender and migration is more complex than has been commonly assumed (Gregory, 1988).

Several studies from both East and West Africa show that women also move on their own, to find work or for other reasons (see, for instance, Bjerén, 1985; Diop, 1988; Findley, 1988; ISH, 1984 and Obbo, 1981). A fairly recent phenomenon for West Africa (it is a well established pattern in Asia and Latin America), closely associated with rural poverty and urban growth is that young girls go to the cities to enter domestic service. They go on their own, but their departure is usually based on a family decision and is part of a family survival strategy.

In some regions in Mali, the proportion of young girls who are away at a given time to work in the cities is very high. Usually, they are seasonal migrants, but some turn into permanent urban dwellers, who "graduate" from housework into small-scale trade (ISH, 1984; UNICEF, 1989; van Westen and Klute, 1986). Case studies and detailed surveys also show that many women who, in migration surveys, would typically be considered associational migrants, engage in economic activities which are of considerable importance both to their dependents in town and to their relatives left behind in the countryside (Vaa, Findley and Diallo, 1989; Findley, 1988).

SOME INDIVIDUAL MIGRATION HISTORIES

In the following, we shall have a closer look at the migration histories of five women from an unauthorized settlement a few kilometers from the center of Bamako². They are all linked to each other in various ways, through friendship, work, or residential proximity. The focus is on the circumstances of their initial move to town, how they came to live in this particular neighborhood, their economic situation and their ties to their area of origin. The names used are fictitious.

Penda Diallo, age 22, is a housewife. She lives with her husband, who is a policeman, and her two children in a compound where they rent two rooms. There are four other households living in the same compound: the owner, a widow who lives with her grown-up daughter and a teenage fosterdaughter, a young couple with a child and two young bachelors. None of the residents are Bamako born, but they come from quite different parts of the country.

Penda came to Bamako with her husband some years ago, when he was transferred from the post he then had, in a regional capital. He had been living in Bamako some years earlier. After leaving school, he came to town to stay with an uncle while he was looking for work. It was this uncle who helped him obtain admittance into police training. The couple got married some time before his transfer, but did not take up residence together until the move to Bamako. Penda's father is a railway worker and her mother is a trader at the railway station in the small town where they now live, about half-way between Bamako and Kayes. Penda had been staying with them after she got married, and as custom prescribes, she gave birth to her oldest child in her parents' home.

She was well acquainted with the section of Bamako where she now lives, when she came there with her husband. She first arrived at the age of six to accompany an elder sister who had married. She stayed with her sister until she reached marriageable age herself at which time her parents sent for her. The sister still lives here, and Penda and her husband lived with her for some weeks while they were looking for rooms to rent. Penda returns to visit her parents at least once a year, and occasionally sends them money. She also gets news from them fairly regularly through people who travel back and forth. Penda knows several people from her home area who have taken up residence in Bamako.

Her husband is likely to get transferred again soon. "It is the government and my husband who decides where I live", she says. She would prefer to stay in Bamako, partly because she would like her children to go to school, partly because she would like to continue the small soap-making business she has developed. Her earnings are a necessary supplement to her husband's salary. Getting supplies and finding customers is much harder in a small town or in the countryside than it is in the capital. She is

also very attached to her sister, whom she visits whenever she has the time.

Fatima Sissiko is 20 years old. In the summer of 1988, she worked as a housemaid for the owner of the compound where Penda lives. She came from a village only an hour's bus-ride from Bamako. She was married, and had a small daughter who accompanied her. This was her second trip to Bamako. Her older sister lives here, and Fatima had once before enlisted her help in finding work. But her first trip was unsuccessful. Fatima had left without her husband's permission and after a few days he turned up and told her to leave her post and return home. Some months later, he left to look for work in the Ivory Coast, so she had returned to her parent's home. They were farmers, but without sufficient land to feed the family. Fatima and her mother supplemented their earnings by collecting dead wood and selling it in bundles by the roadside to people from Bamako. The father occasionally earned some money as a day labourer at a nearby commercial farm.

When the mother fell ill, she could no longer collect wood, and required expensive medication. The father decided that Fatima should go to Bamako to look for work. Her sister helped her find her present employment. Fatima slept at her sister's place, but she and her daughter had all meals with her employer. The workday was about 12 hours, and the salary CFA franc^{*} 3,500 (FF 70) per month.

In the three months she stayed in town, Fatima never visited her family in order not to squander money on the bus fare. But she got news from them regularly, from people who travelled back and forth. One morning, a neighbor from home came by and said she had to go home immediately, since her mother had taken a turn for the worse. When she returned to her employer a few days later it was to pick up her earnings. Her mother had died and her husband was on his way home. She did not expect to return to work in Bamako, since she would be needed at home.

Awa Coulibaly is 36 years old and a dyer. She was born in a small administrative center in the Kayes region, close to the Mauritanian border. Her father is a cattle owner and a trader. Awa's mother died when she was a baby, and her father remarried. At the age of ten, her father took her to Bamako to stay with his mother, who had joined her eldest son in town when she became a widow some years before. Awa suffered from rheumatism and needed medical treatment. She stayed with her grandmother until she got married at the age of 18. Her rheumatism had responded well to treatment, and she was able to attend school for some years.

Her husband is also from the Kayes region, but he has several close relatives in Bamako. The couple first lived with his family in an older, more central part of town, but the compound became too crowded and they had

* The common currency of the *Communauté financière africaine*.

to look for a place to rent. They moved to the present neighborhood about eight years ago. A colleague of Awa's husband lived here, and told them about a vacancy. There are three other households in the compound where they now live, all consisting of lodgers and immigrants to Bamako. It was here that Awa learned the dyeing trade, from an old woman who used to live just across the road from them. She worked with her without payment for several years, and feels she has picked up the most important aspects of the craft.

The couple have four surviving children, four others died at birth. The husband is a lorry driver, but at the time of the interview, he had been out of work for several months, so the family lives on what Awa manages to earn. But her income is small and irregular, and they frequently have to go without food. Awa also tries to keep her two older children in school, which is expensive. Her only relative in Bamako is a paternal uncle who lives on the other side of the river. She visits him now and then, but he does not earn enough to help her out much.

Awa has visited her home village only once, about ten years ago. Her father used to come to Bamako every year, but he is too old to travel now. If she had money, she would put some aside to give him when he came to visit. Only once has she been able to send money home.

Another immigrant from near the Mauritanian border is Oumou *Sylla*. She grew up in the town of Nioro, where her father is a farmer and her mother is a trader. Oumou's husband, who also comes from Nioro, is about 15 years older than her. He used to be farmer, but was also engaged in trade. Together with his sister, who lives in Abidjan, he sold wood sculptures from the interior to tourist shops on the coast. After some time, they switched to importing plantains and yams from the Ivory coast to Bamako. Although the trade is seasonal, it turned out to be so lucrative that Oumou's husband decided to give up farming altogether and move to Bamako.

The couple have no children. They rent rooms in a compound where there are two other households. But Oumou's husband has been able to put money aside for buying a plot of land a little further out of town, and they will soon move into a house of their own. Oumou herself has regular, if small, income from doing traditional Kayes embroidery for tie-dyeing. If she works on average three hours per day, she may earn about CFA 12.000 (FF 240) per month. The money is spent on clothes for herself, gifts for her parents.

Oumou had never travelled before she came to Bamako ten years ago, as a bride. She was then eighteen. Her younger sister who then was seven years old, came with her to help her and keep her company. She is still staying with her. In addition to helping around the house, she goes to the main vegetable market every morning to buy fresh mint, which is used for tea. She goes from door to door to resell it, and nets about CFA 500 (FF 10) daily, which she puts aside for her trousseau.

A few years ago, an older sister moved into the same neighborhood. She had come from Nioro with her husband, their own baby and two foster daughters. The husband is a lorry driver doing the Bamako–Nioro stretch and his employer had transferred him to Bamako. The three sisters see each other daily, and are able to keep regularly in touch with their parents. Oumou often sends plantains and yams, as well as money, with her brother-in-law when he goes to Nioro. She also has had two prolonged visits at home since her arrival in town.

Now 48 years old, *Sadio* Ba came to Bamako thirty years ago from a village located some miles west of Segou. Her father had recently died and she came with her baby son to enlist the help of an uncle in getting divorced from her first husband. She had been married against her will to a much older man. She soon remarried, and has six children from her present marriage. Only two of her children are old enough to fend for themselves. The son from Sadio's first marriage has gone back to her home village to work the land, not having been able to find work in Bamako. Her eldest daughter, who is 22, now and then takes trips to the Ivory Coast, selling Malian and Mauritanian tie-dye cloth and bringing back industrial products to sell to friends and acquaintances in Bamako. She may stay away for several months at a time.

Sadio's present husband arrived in Bamako from a village near the Guinean border at about the same time she did. He worked for many years as a guard in a shop, but is now retired and has no income. He spends most of his day at his old place of work and at the mosque. The family is dependent on what Sadio manages to earn with the help of her daughters of 13 and 15. Together they prepare dishes of food which they sell at the big sheep market near their home.

The son is expected to bring back some sacks of millet after the harvest, and the elder daughter occasionally sends money home for medical expenses and school fees. Sadio tries to keep her children at the Franco-Arabic school, the Medersa. She comes from a devout family of traditional scholars, and wants her children to be able to read and write French and Arabic.

For the first year of her marriage, Sadio and her husband rented a room in the central city, close to her uncle's compound. Her husband had managed to save money for building a house, but it had to be outside the city where land was affordable. They moved to their present dwelling fourteen years ago. Sadio rarely visits her Bamako relatives, since she is too poor to bring the expected gifts to weddings and other family ceremonies. She has not visited her home village for many years. Earlier, when she was better off, she used to visit quite regularly, and also sent back money, clothes and various manufactured goods, like soap and sugar, which are far more expensive in the countryside.

DISCUSSION

There is nothing in the available documentation on Bamako nor in my own data from this particular neighborhood to indicate that this five women are in any way atypical. Together, their migration careers and present situation highlight themes which are known from other studies of African urban settings, such as the importance of the help of relatives when first arriving in the city, and how migrants go to considerable efforts to keep close ties with their rural areas of origin (Locoh, 1988; Gregory, 1988).

But we are also reminded of features which are well known from the general literature on urbanization, but which often are overlooked in many of the recent commentaries on the relation between rural-urban migration and the explosive growth of African cities. At least in more popularized presentations, one often gets the impression that African shantytowns are populated by the rural dispossessed, and that depopulation of the countryside is imminent. In fact, many towns and cities draw the majority of their new arrivals from their surrounding region. It is not always the poorest who migrate, but also people who have some education and hold non-agricultural occupation. After thirty years or more of unprecedented population growth in the cities, the majority of West Africans still live in the countryside. In rural areas it is exceptional that net out-migration is higher than the natural increase (O'Connor, 1983: 62).

It is commonplace that the city is a pole of attraction for rural migrants due to better income-earning opportunities. Yet a city is much more than a labour market. Most cities and towns of a certain size are also educational centers and places to receive medical treatment, as exemplified in the case of Awa. Work related migrations are not necessarily individual, "voluntary" decisions, or based on strategies in the families of migrants. As witnessed in the cases of Penda's husband and Oumou's brother-in-law, job transfers are not something confined to the higher echelons of business and administration.

The city may also offer an escape from intolerable personal circumstances. Sadio had to wait for the death of her father to break away from her first marriage. She obtained a divorce through the help of an uncle in town. Thus, traditional authority was upheld, while she herself was set free. Her case also reminds us that migration to the city does not necessarily imply upward mobility. Her son exemplifies the widespread but little studied phenomenon of return migration.

Fatima may be seen as the proverbial "target worker", who comes to town for a short period because money is needed for a specific purpose. Her going to Bamako has nothing to do with city lights or with emancipation, she is firmly under the control of her husband and her father. The economic circumstances of her family is an example of the increasing shortage of land for small-holder farming near the city, through the ex-

pansion of large commercial farms belonging to city merchants and civil servants.

The city offers opportunities for women to earn money, even if they do not enter the labour force as it is conventionally defined. Penda, Awa, Oumou and Sadio all have created incomes for themselves by acquiring new skills or applying skills that are part of their role as housewives. Awa and Sadio are also the sole providers for their families, and represent a growing trend among the poorer strata in all Third World cities.

Obviously, no conclusions about overall patterns can be drawn from five individual migration histories. But through detailed, "thick" descriptions of individual cases we may acquire both a better understanding of what mechanisms are at work, as well as tools for constructing meaningful categories and elements of models for quantitative studies.

NOTES

1. Administratively, Mali is divided into "regions", "cercles" and "arrondissements". Until 1978, Bamako was part of the Koulikoro Region. It was then renamed District de Bamako, given regional status and its area extended. It is divided into 6 Communes, and each commune into "quartiers" and "sous-quartiers".
2. For a presentation of the study from which these cases are drawn, see Vaa 1987.

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Women in Harare: Gender Aspects of Urban–Rural Interaction

Ann Schlyter

'Women householders in Harare are more urban than men'. This was a conclusion drawn by a Zimbabwean friend in a discussion based on my research (Schlyter, 1989) and her own experience of how central the interaction with rural areas was in the survival strategies of men or women householders. Being 'urban' referred to the frequency and character of rural contacts but also to a commitment to urban life.

It is generally acknowledged that urban people in Africa maintain close ties with their villages of origin. I am not arguing that this is a myth, but in this paper I would like to pay attention to the fact that there are also large groups for whom such contacts are few or weakly articulated. One of these groups are women who head households.

This paper addresses three of the themes identified for discussion in the conference *Urban Development in Rural Context in Africa*:

- how people combine involvement in rural and urban activities,
- opportunity structures for an individual to permit an engagement in rural and urban sectors,
- the cultural assets of kinship and neighbourhood networks.

The themes are problematized by introducing the gender dimension to the discussion.

The paper is based on findings drawn from a research project on how poor women in Harare, who head households, elaborate strategies in order to improve their living and especially their housing conditions'. The focus of the research was, thus, not on urban-rural interaction, but, nevertheless, my material provides a basis for some discussion on this theme. Three women's histories are presented in order to illustrate the complexity of the urbanization process on an individual level and to visualize some women's experiences in this gendered process.

LOOSE RURAL TIES

The interviews with people in Harare having loose rural ties reveal that they usually have one of four characteristics in common. One group of people consists of those with roots in neighbouring countries. Since the beginning of this century people have migrated for work over national boundaries. In 1971, fifteen percent of the population in the suburb of

Highfield, were non-Zimbabwean (Stopforth, 1971). Today, refugees from wars and repression in neighbouring countries in the region are finding their way to Harare, and the figure is likely to have increased.

Another group with weak rural ties consists of people originating from farm or mine areas. Their relatives might have been workers for generations, and not uncommonly they have a mixed ethnic background. The village of their ancestors might have been situated where there is now commercial farmland. Though they might be ethnically defined as a group holding 'common land', they have no experience of life in a village of peasants, even if they are new-comers to Harare.

The rapid growth of Harare during the last few decades implies that a majority of the adult population was born outside the city. But a growing number were born in town, and it is the way this group develops its rural contacts, which might provide pointers to future development. Some of the interviewed young women and men who had grown up as town children had close rural contacts, while others had been to a rural area only for short visits in connection with funerals.

Non-Zimbabweans, former farm workers, city-born people, are all identified as groups with weaker ties than the average. Many of the interviewed women belonged to these groups, but in addition there was a large group of women for whom social practices based on patriarchal Shona traditions appear to have caused their exclusion from the rural areas.

WOMEN HEADING HOUSEHOLDS

According to national census data (Zimbabwe, 1984), one third of all households in Zimbabwe are headed by women. According to the definition used in the census, a woman is a head of the household only if she has no spouse. In rural areas, women often constitute around half of all householders, reflecting the history of male migration. In towns the rate of women householders is between fifteen and twenty percent in low-income suburbs (Zimbabwe, 1986). The rate of women householders is often higher in middle-income areas than in low-income areas reflecting the greater opportunities for educated women to support themselves. To form a household women must find a place to stay and a means of support. Numerous women remain as dependants with relatives, not because they like it, but because they cannot find housing. It is only in a limited number of very poor emergency housing areas that the rate of women householders reaches the national average of one third of all householders.

Women have been *de facto* heads of households for half a century as a result of male migration, but according to customary law, women were never recognized as such. A woman was under perpetual supervision of a man—a father, husband, brother or son. It is only since 1982, that a

woman has attained majority status and contractual capacity, but in many cases customary law is still applied.

THREE WOMEN'S HISTORIES

I will retell extracts of the life histories of three women in order to illustrate a variety of rural interaction.

Rhoda

In 1975, when Rhoda came to Harare she was eighteen years old and had a boy child of two. She did not tell me any details, only that she ran away leaving her child instead of submitting to the wishes of her father regarding marriage. She moved *from* something rather than to something. Her only contact in Harare was her aunt, who was married and lived as a lodger with a family of five persons in Highfield. Rhoda describes her year there as a difficult one. As her aunt had only one room they asked the owner to let Rhoda sleep in the same room as his daughters. The following year her aunt died and Rhoda went back to the rural area.

Rhoda's family wanted her to marry her aunt's husband, but she rejected this and ran away again, this time taking her son. She went to Bulawayo, where she found work as a domestic servant. She liked the family and they allowed her to stay, despite her having two more children and keeping them all in the domestic quarters. She stayed with the same family until 1980, when they left for South Africa. "By this time my father was dead, so I could go back to the rural areas." She found it easier to stay there now. She had a house of her own, but cooked together with her mother. She stayed for almost a year—but then her savings were exhausted and she went to Harare, leaving all three children with her mother. She found work as a domestic servant—the only way to solve employment and housing problems at the same time. She would have liked to bring the children to town, but her room in the domestic quarters was so small, and she did not know if her employer would allow them to stay.

"The quarters is a nice place", she said, "though it could be better maintained, and I don't like to live with a man directly next door. I haven't had any problems with this gardener so far, but one might never know". She would love to have a place of her own, "a three or four roomed house for me and my children", but she saw no way to realise the dream. As long as the children were in school (the youngest was in her first year) she had no possibility of saving money for this purpose. By the time of the interview in 1986, all three children were at school in the rural area, and she sent all her limited savings to her mother to use for fees, uniforms and books.

Asked about what she would do if she got sacked, Rhoda said she would go to a cousin in Zengeza (a suburb of Harare) and stay there while looking for another job.

Dorothy

Born in the workers' compound of a commercial farm Dorothy was her parents' first child. Her parents were born on farms nearby. In 1959 her mother died giving birth to a second child and Dorothy, being only nine years old, had to take on the role as a mother and housekeeper. "I used to dream of leaving the farm. I wanted another life, but when my father died, I did not know where to go. I was only fourteen. I was also in love with one of the farmworkers, and I wanted to marry him in order to get some security." She moved together with this man who was quite well paid as a truck driver. They stayed together, but he did not marry her and instead he disappeared after a couple of months. After he was gone she realized that she was pregnant. In order to be able to stay on the farm she married another man.

"He was a wife beater. He almost killed me when I got my child and it was obvious that he was not the father." Nevertheless, the man wanted to marry Rhoda and pay *roora* (brideprice). "But my grandfather, who was a wise man, did not accept *roora* from that man, he arranged that I could move to the farm where he worked. I worked by washing clothes and cleaning for the farmer. After two years I married properly in church and with *roora*. He was a teacher, I loved him and was very happy. But in five years I did not give him a child and he asked me to leave. Then he got caught by another woman, therefore I could divorce him properly, without my relatives paying back the *roora*."

I left the children (her brother and her son) with an aunt and went to Harare. I knew nobody here, but anything would be better than farm-work. I became a house-keeper to a man working as a watchman, living in a lodging room. He was jealous, always accusing me of having other men. Then I found work as a cleaner in a church. I talked with the priest and he found a room for me to rent, so that I could leave the watchman. The priest gave me extra pocket money if I did not go out with other men. All men keep talking about money and other men. Now I am happy to be single. No man decides what I am doing. I am a good Christian and God has helped me. I have a good job in a hospital. I am building a house of my own."

Before this happy end she had worked as a domestic servant. When her brother and son after two years could not stay with the aunt but came to her, she had a difficult time moving between domestic quarters and lodging rooms. During one period she lived on the employer's premises while the boys had a lodging room in a township. "The boys were only 16 and 11 years old, and I was constantly worried about their coming in bad

company. I wanted to live together with them, but found no way to do so." At the time of being able to build a house of her own, her son was married.

"They came and lived with me. It was nice to have a family around, but my daughter-in-law — I cannot live in the same house as she. She is giving my son love-medicine. My son has been so ill. I went to a witch-doctor who told me that my son was poisoned by his wife. I told my son, and he asked her to leave. She has moved back and forth between us and her brother. Half a year ago my son moved with her and their two eldest children to a lodging room. Their first born stays with me. He is six and goes to school. I have to leave at five to go to work. My son comes every morning after I have left, wakes his son, cooks for him and takes him to school. My son is out of a job, so I share my food with them."

The year before the interview Dorothy had tried to supplement their subsistence by cultivating a part of the vacant land opposite the house. There is a lot of vacant land for future shopping centres, churches and other buildings. But people are not allowed to cultivate outside their small plots, and her maize had been slashed just before harvest. She will not try again. She had not been back to the farm since her grandfather died, and she has no contact with her relatives.

Myra

Like Dorothy, Myra was born on a commercial farm. Her father was from Malawi, and he deserted his family including Myra, who was ten years old, and her younger sister. Her mother returned to the village of her parents. Times were hard. Myra married and got her first child in 1968, a daughter.

"My husband moved to town, and as soon as he had accommodation I followed. My husband was earning well, and after a year we got a three-roomed house to rent. We lived a happy life. I gave my husband two sons. Then came the bad times. First, my fourth baby died, then my mother, and soon after my husband. It was in 1975. I was evicted from the house, which was tied to my husband's employment. I went back to my mother's village, her house was empty, so at least I had somewhere to live. But I could not survive in the village, and I went back to Harare.

It was difficult to find a room. Landlords try to avoid tenants with children. And I had troubles with landlords who did not respect me. We were moving from one room to another. It was so distressing. My children's schooling suffered. I had to persuade my sister who also lived in Harare to take my children, but she, or rather her husband, was reluctant, as they were already four in two small rooms. I paid regularly for the children."

She was desperate for a place, and when she was offered a plot for self-building by the council in 1974, she accepted. She had hoped for a rent-to-buy house, but realised that her only chance of getting a house was to

build it herself. The building period was difficult, and she was cheated by the builders she employed. After two years she managed to build three rooms.

"I am happy to live with my children now. I let one room to a lodger, a single woman. Next year I will build another two rooms to let. I need the income as business is deteriorating. I am a dressmaker and a hawker. I buy material for dresses in Harare, sometimes scrap material from factories. I bought the sewing-machine already when my husband died, for the money I got from his company. Once a month I travel to the same mines and plantations to collect money from my customers and hopefully sell more. The competition is hard, and I have to give credit in order to get customers."

WOMEN EXPELLED FROM THE RURAL AREAS

Many unmarried women, like Rhoda, with households of their own in the city came alone to town because of conflicts with their families, often over the choice of husband. Rhoda left her parents twice due to conflict over partners and marriage. Many divorced women saw no alternative to urban migration.

Childlessness, as in the case of Dorothy, is often a reason for divorce. Three reasons for women to take the initiative to divorce were frequently given by the divorcees. It was lack of support, the introduction of a second wife, or that they were battered. These women saw no possibility of staying in their husband's village when divorced, and they were often not welcome back to the village of their parents. The parents were supposed to pay back the roora, if the daughter returned, and often it had already been consumed. Therefore parents frequently tried to persuade their daughters to reconcile with their husbands. Lack of land in most areas made their brothers and cousins very reluctant to let them have land of their own. Women have a right to land only through men, therefore divorced women often come to town, and often they have to cope all alone. Most of them reconsolidate the network with their own families after some period. Nevertheless, many women find themselves expelled from rural areas when divorced.

It is not unusual that widows also find it difficult to stay in the village of the deceased husband. According to customary law, all property and the wife were inherited by a brother. Nowadays, widows as well as the brothers often reject such arrangements but without it, the position of the widow in the village is unclear. Many widows leave for Harare, especially the young ones, and those with their own adult children in town.

MARRIED WOMEN COMMUTE

Regardless of migration history it seemed impossible for women householders to maintain two places simultaneously as a survival mechanism; they were urban, or they left and resided for a longer period in rural areas. In a household with husband and wife it was easier to keep one foot in each sphere. Some men had one wife in the village and one in town, but such arrangements were referred to as a reason for divorce by several women. Much of the rapid urban migration since independence is due to wives with children joining their husbands who have been working in town for years. These women had lived close to their husbands' families and managed the farm as a defacto head of household.

The interviews conducted with married and formerly married women, show that it is the husband's family the wife in the urban household is mostly interacting with. It is not uncommon that the wife spends some months in the village of his parents every year to cultivate and harvest.

Attitudes to this commuting life varied. Some women saw it as an unwanted arrangement necessary during a limited number of years, until the household had become fully capable of supporting itself in an urban environment. Other women viewed urban living as too insecure and wanted to maintain cultivation in order to have the option of returning to the village. Still others were maintaining their rural identity and viewed the period in town as temporary. But the latter attitude seemed to be quite unusual.

Asked about plans for retirement, few had made any concrete plans, as they were still too young. The dominating attitude was "if we can survive in town, we'll stay."

CONTRIBUTIONS TO SUBSISTENCE

Sadza, a maize porridge, is the everyday meal in Zimbabwe. The married women who return to the village of the husband, do so in order to grow maize. Within the rural-urban networks there is a continuous exchange of commodities from the city with maize, but the size of this exchange is difficult to estimate. According to my interviews, starving mothers could seldom expect to receive maize from rural relatives, but they could send their children to live with relatives for periods.

Studies in other cities in Africa have shown that urban inhabitants have begun to cultivate within or outside the cities, to a degree which has led some observers to talk about 'ruralization' of cities (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989).

In Harare, informal cultivation within the city boundaries is not accepted by the authorities, though there are huge areas of unused land. Some women nevertheless cultivate in scattered areas, but not provok-

ngly close to roads and places from where they can be seen. And like Dorothy most women do not take the risk.

Since council housing in the suburbs has been transferred to home ownership, women cultivate on the private plots. But the plots are small. Only in core housing areas, or in self-built areas, where houses are not yet completed, is there sufficient space for small gardens. When houses are completed to the standard six or seven rooms only a small front garden and narrow lanes between the houses remain unbuilt. It is the only outdoor space for the inhabitants, often about twenty-five persons including lodgers. If anything at all is grown, it is for the owner's family only.

The so-called urban cultivation is not recognized as an asset in Harare. There are no plans for allotments for cultivation and little land is, in fact, available for planting. On the other hand, there are vast areas of unused land on sites planned for services and institutions which have not been implemented, and the total area of all strips along roads is considerable. The private plots are too small to make any substantial contribution, and enlargement of plots cannot be recommended due to the enormous transport problems in the already widespread city.

WOMEN'S WORK FOR INCOME

The labour market for uneducated women in town is limited. Domestic work dominates. The textile and tobacco industry employ women, and there are women working as cleaners in hospitals and other institutions. There is also a variety of work in the service sectors. In all sectors, except domestic work, uneducated women have to compete with men and unemployment is widespread. Self-employment is therefore the form in which women have to earn an income. Most women become market traders, vendors or hawkers, sometimes in combination with production of the commodities offered for sale, for example crochet work.

To be a hawker in farm and mining areas has become a very widespread occupation among urban women. It is also a new form of urban-rural interaction. Like Myra these women often originate from mining and farming areas. They exploit their knowledge of these areas in another way than the traditional contacts with relatives in a village of origin.

As arrangements are necessary for child-minding and housekeeping in her absence, she relies on her networks of urban relatives or neighbours for help. Sometimes two women regularly help each other. This occupation is very common among women householders as well as among married women. Indeed, married women often have an advantage over unmarried women in that they can get credit from their husbands in order to invest in a larger stock. The women complain that the market has become so competitive and consequently to be able to sell they have to give

credit. Then they have to make the same journeys regularly to collect the payments.

THE IMPORTANCE OF NETWORKS

On the one hand, married women often complain about the heavy responsibilities their husbands have towards members of his family, while on the other hand, they themselves were the ones actively maintaining the network. Once *roora* is paid to a Shona woman's parents, she is not supposed to have much to do with her own family. Sons are obliged to cater for their parents, but if a woman gives gifts to her parents, it is almost regarded as theft from her husband's family. The strictly regulated pattern of family relations as formalized in customary law, is undergoing rapid change, due to urbanization and also to new laws. Nevertheless, married women also maintain a network with their own relatives, motivated by love and affection. In times of crises, such as separation or divorce, it is to her own relatives a woman turns. As has already been said, women are not always welcome back to their village of origin, but it should also be stressed that mothers, grand-mothers and sisters do provide support. The life histories of women who head households are full of examples where mothers and sisters are ready to help in cases of emergency. Like Rhoda's mother, they raise their grandchildren in rural areas, and sisters or cousins in town provide accommodation etc.

Women also engage in purely urban networks, formed among political activists, church members, neighbours or workmates. While networks based on kinship and the interaction between urban and rural areas can be characterized by reciprocal arrangements and long-term strategies from both sides, the urban networks are more limited in scope and reciprocal arrangements are more shortsighted. Women lacking the support of an urban-rural network of relatives try to compensate by being active in an urban network, but in terms of subsistence an urban network cannot compensate for a rural one.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The urban-rural interaction is obviously an important part of the survival strategy of urban households in times of economic deterioration. The dominant survival strategy among low-income women householders in Harare was an urban strategy; the aim was to be able to stay in town, and rural interaction was regarded as a means for doing so. As a means the exchange with the rural areas was important for many women, but there

were also many women for whom such contacts were weak or non-existent.

Also among households headed by men an urban strategy was dominant. Unfortunately, the empirical basis for conclusions regarding this group is weak. Though low-income, all the interviewed households owned houses and were well established. There are reasons to assume that "rural strategies", which were only exceptionally represented in the interviews are more widespread. In a rural strategy the aim is to return to the village. The work in town is a means to accumulate funds for investment in a house or means of production in the village. Women householders do not have access to land in their own right and can not apply a rural strategy. Many women also rejected the patriarchal authority in the village.

This paper presents empirical observations and does not theorize the urban-rural interaction. By assessing the differences in rural-urban interaction between men and women householders and discussing the grounds for them, the paper illustrates the need for including the gender dimension into urbanization studies.

NOTES

1. In 1985 and 1986 a considerable number of interviews were conducted with women householders, selected on the basis of residential situation. The life histories of women were reconstructed, regarding household composition, housing arrangements and means of income. No questions were specifically put in order to reveal all their rural contacts, but any contacts of importance to the survival strategies of women were bound to be exposed in the life histories. For comparative reasons a limited number of married women were also interviewed.

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The Urban Poor and the Commercialisation of Land in Nigeria

Tade Akin Aina

Africa, as a result of its colonial experience, has since the turn of the twentieth century experienced significant social change and transformation. These have occurred in all spheres of life ranging from politics, culture, technology and administration, to production, consumption and settlement-formation. A major feature of these changes possessing far-reaching consequences is the process of urbanisation which is occurring on the continent at a rapid pace.¹ Along with it are other processes such as monetisation, commercialisation and alienation, all of which have affected and transformed pre-colonial social practices and relationships in Africa.² The urbanisation process in Africa has further brought about a wide range of problems which in recent times have attained crisis proportions in such areas as urban management and administration, the provision of shelter, basic services and infrastructures, the factor of urban environmental degradation and the issue of distributive justice and equity as it relates to the conditions and the situation of the poor who often constitute the majority of urban dwellers in Africa.

Africa's urban poor, in spite of the limitations imposed on them by their deprivation and poverty, have not remained passive with regards to the conditions of inadequacy of shelter, services, infrastructures and livelihoods which they encounter. Rather they have responded with what has been termed the popular responses to the urban crisis (Akin Aina, 1989a: 57).

These responses have involved innovations and adaptations not only in the way they construct their houses, the economic and social processes and institutions they generate and use, but also how they gain access to land—which is perhaps the central element of the provision of shelter and building of settlements. It is this latter point, how the poor gain access to land for shelter, what it involves, and its impact on, and implications for urban development in the rural context that is the concern of this paper. Certain trends are, of course, discernible empirically and argued about here.

It is argued here that a modification and transformation of the customary and rural basis of relationship to land and tenure through the process of commercialisation is necessary and central to the attempts of the poor in gaining access to land for shelter. The commercialisation process which occurs, it is further argued, contains dual implications. These are in the

sense that while it provides the poor the only alternative access to land for building in the face of the inept efforts of the State and other public institutions, and the limitations and incapacity of customary tenure, it also contains serious negative implications in terms of the issue of security of tenure, the nature of ownership and the definition of standards for the shelter provided.

It is these different trends that the experience of Metropolitan Lagos demonstrates that are offered and examined in terms of the lessons they constitute for other small and intermediate towns in Africa. This however is done with full cognisance of the extensive diversity of the African condition both in terms of history, culture and ecological conditions. The trends are offered to show and examine the nature of the processes that accompany urban development particularly as it relates to land.

In pursuit of these arguments, the rest of this paper is structured into the following sections: 1. an examination of the process of the commercialisation of land in its most general terms, 2. an examination of the nature of urbanisation and settlement-formation and the land question in Lagos, Nigeria; 3. the presentation of the case study of the Commercialisation of Land for the Urban Poor of Lagos, and 4. finally a discussion of the implications of these features for the process of urbanisation in the rural context, especially as it affects small and intermediate towns.

THE PROCESS OF COMMERCIALISATION OF LAND

As the literature on housing the urban poor reveals, one of the emergent long-term trends in the responses engendered by the urban crisis is that of the commercialisation of land and housing tenure (Moser, 1982; Amis, 1984 and Akin Aina, 1989b). What is meant by commercialisation here refers to the imposition of transactions based on exchange value rather than use value.

In an earlier work it was pointed out that commercialisation implies that land and housing become a source of income or revenue, turning them principally into commodities of some form and thereby creating a rental housing and land market (Akin Aina, 1989a: 58). This is essentially what it is although the process operates at two ends, that of a well-developed land and housing market controlled by established capitalist firms, large-scale speculators, and medium-scale entrepreneurs and that of the petty and small-scale efforts of the low-income themselves.

As far as the provision of land for the urban poor is concerned, commercialisation, has received some attention in the work of Baross (1983: 180–217) who provided a discussion on the issue of the articulation of land supply for popular settlements in Third World cities. In detailing the practices through which prospective house builders get access to land in urban areas, Baross identified three types of articulation, namely: non-commer-

cial, commercial, and administrative articulation. What concerns us here is the commercial articulation which Baross identifies as consisting of the provision of miniplots, land rental, and the use of substandard subdivisions; each of which involves a supply through the market mechanism. The provision of miniplots involves mainly the fragmentation of land within existing settlements and their sale in a "once-and-for-all transaction". Land-rental, on the other hand, involves the rental of the land to prospective users either for residential and other purposes for some period of time at definite rates.

The use of substandard division, that is the division of land into regular but unserviced plots for low-income home-builders, represents the last type of practices. As is shown in this paper, all these forms of commercial articulation of land are utilised, albeit in modified forms, for the low-income settlements of Metropolitan Lagos. The modifications are themselves the product of specifically local conditions and culture. They are perhaps best understood when situated in the context of the nature of the land question in the urban development of Lagos.

URBANISATION AND THE LAND QUESTION IN LAGOS

Urbanisation

Lagos, the current capital city³ and perhaps the most important urban settlement in Nigeria, if not on the West African coast, typifies a case of urban development in a rural context. The settlement has grown from a 19th century fishing and agricultural settlement to become a late 20th century metropolitan centre. This growth has included the emergence of a complex of ports, industrial estates, commercial houses, small-scale industrial activities, and the acquisition of the multiple status of the administrative, commercial, cultural and economic capital for both Nigeria and Lagos State.

The changes have also involved both massive population and spatial growth, so that the settlement with an estimated population of less than 5,000 persons in 1800 (Ohadike, 1968: 71), has grown to an estimated population of over 4.5 million in 1980 (Lagos State Regional Plan, (1980–2000): 3). Most of the changes that occurred are traceable to the colonisation of Nigeria and the choice of Lagos as the administrative, political and economic headquarters since the amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914. This choice ensured massive development of infrastructures and services and the siting of several economic and other socio-cultural institutions and facilities.

Concomitant spatial development has occurred, evidenced by the fact that Lagos up till 1901 covered no more than 4 square kilometres.⁴ By 1911, it was identified as covering 15 square kilometres which expanded to

51.8 square kilometres in 1920, about 62 kilometres in 1927 and 63 kilometres in 1931.5 As of 1967, the total land area was 70 square kilometres while most recent available figures show that the current land area is about 1,088 square kilometres, of which some 209 square kilometres are covered by water and unreclaimed mangrove swamps.⁶ This growth in land area reflects the expansion from an aggregation of settlement—mainly on Lagos Island and Ikoyi first to the farming and fishing lands of Ebute-Metta, Yaba and Apapa, and in more recent times the engulfing of the previously predominantly agricultural lands of Ikeja division and movement towards Ikorodu Town, Badagry Road and Abeokuta Road.

According to Adalemo (1981: 16–20), specific areas of Metropolitan Lagos can be seen as experiencing phenomenal and sustained growth. He points out that while older settlements within the Metropolis such as Lagos Island, Ikoyi, Iddo, Ebute-Metta, parts of Yaba and Surulere seemed to have stabilised, growth points on the West and North East of the Metropolis exist. In fact, such is the growing nature of the Metropolis that in some of the settlements identified by Adalemo (1981) as growth points, land values have risen from between 75 per cent to 400 per cent within the past five years (1985–89). In fact this growth pattern has been confirmed by other writers who studied the expansion of Metropolitan Lagos in relation to its adjacent small and intermediate settlements. One such study pointed out the growth of Lagos towards both Otta and Badagry, and how the city in that process has engulfed adjoining small villages and towns. Although no detailed investigation of the land question was carried out, available evidence on other issues pointed at a strong unfolding of the processes of monetisation, commercialisation, alienation and industrialisation (Aradeon, Akin Aina and Umo, 1986: 225–278). These specifically urban processes were therefore transferred into the contexts of these adjoining rural areas thus creating changes within them. In the context of Lagos, Nigeria, these processes and their effects demonstrated some of the internal dynamics of the urbanisation of rural areas.

The land question

The land question is, of course, best understood within the context of the nature of the urbanisation of any settlement, its history, political economy and socio-cultural conditions. They all provide the basis for the workings of administrative, legal, economic and socio-cultural definition of the land question. Central to any analysis of these are the nature of tenure, the extent of commercialisation and the costs of land.

Tenure

Up till 1978 when a land-use law was promulgated to provide a uniform mode of access to land in Nigeria, land tenure consisted mainly of two forms—that of customary law and received colonial law. The customary land tenure system refers essentially to the modes and ways by which rights are held in land under the indigenous predominantly agricultural social structures. It is based essentially on the specific patterns of inheritance, lineage system and location within any community. It operated mainly in the southern regions of Nigeria and vests absolute ownership of land in the stool which is the authority of the chief, the entire community which may include more than one village, the family, or the individual.⁷ The system, while ensuring the rights of members of the community or family to the use of the land restricts the capacity to dispose of the land except through the consent of the relevant corporate unit. The problem that this has always posed is who is the effective representative of the unit with the authority to dispose of the land. The result of this lack of clarity and at times the failure by the person disposing of the land to gain the consent of the rest of the corporate unit was a situation of endless litigations and violent disputes in Lagos. Another norm of the customary land tenure which often posed problems is the distinction made in all indigenous communities between 'strangers' and members of the community.⁸ Again this distinction contributed to the restrictions placed on providing land to migrants for building.

The other form of tenure that applied in Lagos was that of Statutory Law. This refers to the received British Law governing land transactions. One of the main objectives of this legal system was to protect individual's rights to freely acquire or dispose of land. It was also meant to ensure the access of the State to land through the powers of acquisition. This legal system in colonial times operated mainly in all transactions between indigenes and foreigners or between indigenes who so choose.

The Land Use *Act* of 1978 which aimed at creating a uniform law governing access to land with the objectives of making such access available to all, reducing the confusion in ownership of land, minimising rancour and litigations, and creating an equitable land-ownership system was again mainly to the benefit of the elites and the better-off members of society. They took advantage of the Land Use Act which has ceded the ownership of all land in the State and where such an arrangement proved troublesome, they found loopholes in the law. They often effected this with the active connivance of lawyers, the landowners and the public officials responsible for land-registration. The most common strategy being to back-date their transactions so that they appear to have been carried out before the Land Use Act came into effect in 1978. In such manner, they by-pass the restriction on the size of holdings and other such terms of the 1978 law.

For the poor the new system was more difficult. They were not used to negotiations with officialdom. There was too much paper-work and the land costs were considered too high with no provision of instalmental payment. Also, applications involved paying what seemed to them a substantial fee which still does not guarantee the allocation of such a land. Apart from the problems surrounding allocation such as the qualification of stable jobs and income, there was also the knowledge that it always took some time before effective occupation of allocated government land could be taken. In the meantime, such an allottee would have paid the full costs and maybe even other 'development charges'. For the poor, purchase or securing of land involved the need for immediate occupation and building of some sort of structure. The means to wait while government officials complete their allocation, subdivision and provision of services do not exist. It should also be remembered that the standards of construction for government sites tend to be those that the poor can neither reach nor actually wish to attain. Thus, neither the customary land tenure nor the statutory law system favours or benefits the urban poor whose only resort is to informal means of land acquisition for attaining access to land. Access to land for the urban poor is therefore attained through a combination of informal though commercialised means such as those described earlier on. It is to how this operates in the context of a low-income settlement in Metropolitan Lagos that we now turn.

THE COMMERCIALISATION OF LAND FOR THE URBAN POOR OF LAGOS

The case of Olaleye-Iponri Village

Source of data

The data presented here are from a study of two low-income settlements in Metropolitan Lagos carried out between mid-1984 and early 1985. A total of 700 heads of households selected through systematic sampling were studied although use is made here of materials from only a sample of 438 which come from the Olaleye-Iponri settlement. The data were collected through multi-instrumental media which included 1. free interviews with strategic informants, 2. life-histories, 3. documentary analysis, 4. a structured observation check-list and 5. a 98 item interview-schedule.

Brief history of site of study

The site of study is Olaleye-Iponri Village. The title village which accompanies its name is a reflection of the development of Metropolitan Lagos which we have discussed above. Olaleye-Iponri Village is located in the

Lagos Mainland Local Government area (see Map 1). Although, it is now referred to and considered as one settlement, it was originally two communities, Olaleye and Iponri, which have gradually been merged over the years for administrative and political purposes. However, in response to the continuing perception of the residents, who talk as if there are two settlements in one, the data presented here are under the headings of Olaleye and Iponri.

The settlements, located in a terrain which consist of flooded depressions which slope into swampy land, were originally founded about 150 years ago (Olaleye Village around 1830, Iponri around 1878). Initial growth began with the construction of the various phases of the railway line particularly the extension to Apapa around the 1940s and 1950s. It is with this that the first wave of migrants who served as construction workers, labourers and staff of the railways and petty traders, came. Official figures for Olaleye Village showed the extent of this growth. In 1967, the Lagos Executive Development Board, in a survey, estimated the total population at approximately 2,500 persons. These lived in 279 buildings on 31.6 acres and consisted mainly of "... labourers, vagrants, and many people of the low income group".⁹

The settlements have grown since the end of the Nigerian Civil War in 1970 and the period of the economic boom occasioned by the revenue from petroleum exports. As of 1983, it was estimated in another survey conducted by Government officials as containing over 20,090 inhabitants on a total land area of 35,316 hectares.

Socio-economic characteristics of residents

The residents of Olaleye-Iponri are mainly migrants with those who claim Lagos State origin making up less than 5 per cent of the sample. The majority, over half of the sample, are Yoruba from the States adjacent to Lagos. Igbo respondents from the Bendel and Eastern States account for another quarter, while the rest are mainly members of smaller Nigerian ethnic groupings.¹⁰ Most of the respondents can be described as long-term residents, with about three-fifths of them having lived in the settlement for over ten years, while another fifth had lived for between 5 to 10 years. Large households are most common. Two-thirds of the sample consist of households of not less than 5 persons and in certain cases, these go up to eleven persons. The tendency also is for large numbers of children. Families with three or more children constitute a majority, while those with 6 or more children account for an important proportion. About 60 per cent of the households occupy just one room.

Economic life in the settlement is dominated by what has been called either the "informal sector" or petty commodity production. It consists mainly of petty production, petty services, petty artisanal, maintenance and crafts activities and casual work. It is therefore mainly a settlement of

Map 1. Metropolitan Lagos, Nigeria

the self-employed and workers. Those who are self-employed constitute almost forty per cent of the respondents, making up the largest single category of employment. Formal employment accounts for the rest, but the Civil Service is the most important sector of this as it makes up about 30 per cent. The rest is shared between those employed either in the private sector or in the parastatals. Respondents are predominantly low-income earners, with about 3 out of every 5 earning less than two hundred and forty Naira (₦ 240.00) per month and at least 4 out of every 5 earning less than three hundred Naira (₦ 300.00) per month.¹¹

The majority of residents are tenants, consisting of nearly three-quarters of the sample, while landlords account for about 23 per cent. Residents who claim family compound or communal dwelling status amount to about 4 per cent.

Land conditions in the settlement

The main features here are discussed under: 1. a brief description of land-use in the settlement 2. land tenure and access to land, and 3. land-owner-tenant relations.

Land-use

In Olaleye-Iponri, land is mainly used for providing residential dwellings, commercial activities, and public use such as the adjacent Iponri police barracks and the school. The land is also used for places of worship such as churches and mosques. The available official figures provided by the Department of Urban and Regional Planning of the Lagos State Government for the area for 1983-84 are as follows: 65.6 per cent of the land or 23.18 hectares are used for residential purposes, while 2.4 per cent or 0.85 hectares are used for commercial purposes. This figure is, however, susceptible to further questioning as our observations in the field revealed a vast mixture of residential and commercial purposes in the use of dwellings. About 9.24 per cent of the land, or 3.23 hectares are used for public and semi-public purposes. These include the school and the police barracks on the periphery of the settlements and the places of worship. Roads, on the other hand, account for about 2.24 hectares which is about 6.3 per cent. Undeveloped land and open spaces account for 6.90 hectares or 19.5 per cent while the category service industry come to 0.516 hectares or about 1.5 per cent.¹² All in all, land-use in the settlement is mixed and varied.

Land tenure and access to land

The earliest basis of tenure on the land derives from the customary system. The folklore of the settlements tells the story of the origin of each of the settlements.

Since the early beginnings of customary landgrants in these settlements, available evidence points at the intense commercialisation of the land. The main customary landowning families have, since the initial period of offering land-grants, leased out large portions of the land. This process of commercialisation has involved some modification of the forms of articulation described earlier. It consists mainly of mini-plots and extensive fragmentation of land not sold outright but either rented out, leased or sublet. Of course, the whole area in terms of its relationship to the definition of standards by the State consists mainly of what can be termed 'substandard subdivisions'. A brief examination of the structure of tenure in the settlement might illustrate these points better.

On the whole, freehold titles of all types come to just over one-fifth of land-holding in the settlement. This accounts for about 17 per cent in Olaleye and about 28 per cent in Iponri. Most of these, of course, belong to the descendants of the Olaleye family and the earliest settlers.

The most common form of tenure are short-term leases. Such leases, particularly those of less than 5 years, account for over half (about 56 per cent) of all responses in Olaleye and half of those in Iponri. Other short-term leases of between 5 to 10 years account for about 6 per cent of the Olaleye-Iponri sample. There are also leases of medium-term duration of between 11-50 years which account for about 8 per cent of the responses, while long-term leases of between 51 and 99 years represent just about 12 per cent of the sample. The prevalence of very short-term leases in the settlement requires some explanations, particularly when it is realised that annual lease-holds for shelter or those of less than 5 years are an unusual phenomenon in customary Yoruba land tenure practice.

The very short term leases, it was revealed to us, are mainly a post-1970 phenomenon in terms of common occurrence. Part of it represents a specific response of the urban poor to the cost and availability of land. This is expressed through extensive subletting of the land, a situation which accounts for a number of landlords not having any direct links with the original land-owners but paying rather to co-landlords from whom they derive access. In such arrangements, a single standard plot of between 120 to 100 ft. by 60 ft. is shared between two or even three persons. The resultant 'mini-plots' thus come in sizes of 80 by 60 ft, 60 by 60 ft, 60 by 40 ft, and 40 by 20 ft, and this, of course, restricts what can be built on them.

The short-term leases are also accounted for by a process of land-renting. This is reflected in the activities of one of the few large land-owners in the settlement. This particular family rented out a large portion of their land-holding for residential and commercial purposes to tenants who are

instructed not to construct any permanent structures on them. The result is a line of shanties and shacks built of corrugated iron sheets, zinc, wood-boards and planks. True to the purpose of the land-rent mechanism, this device represents part of the family's attempt at protecting their land from government acquisition, squatting, and encroachment by other landlords. Also, it ensures that the family can respond rapidly to speculative bids for their land through the capacity to repossess at very short notice. Such response would not be possible with more durable structures.

This last phenomenon of short-term leases due to sub-letting and land-rental can be seen as containing far-reaching implication both for the security of tenure and also the nature of structures that are erected. It is quite clear that such arrangements, while providing the urban poor with some form of immediate access to land and shelter, limit what they can do. For instance, a process of consolidation, house-improvement and up-grading is seriously limited by the very short tenure and more importantly by the stipulation in some cases that no durable structures be erected on the land.

Land-owner-tenant relations

Although most of the large landowners neither live on, nor regularly frequent the settlement, a form of relationship exists between them and the owners of the dwelling-units. The most general form of this is that of limited or no contact. For a significant number of the owners of dwellings, their landowner is represented by a caretaker who lives on the settlement either as a small-plot owner or a dwelling-unit owner. In some other cases, the contact with the landowner is further removed by the fact that the dwelling-unit owner has sub-let the land from another owner who himself does not pay directly to the landowner but only to a caretaker.

Some of the other land-owners make their presence in the settlement obvious on a regular basis. An interesting case is the land-renting family mentioned earlier that has a representative on the settlement virtually on a daily basis. This is to ensure the prompt payment of its rent and compliance with its 'no durable structures' order. This in brief is the nature of land conditions and access to land in Olaleye-Iponri. The next task is the examination of the implications of the dynamics and relationships described above for the improved access of the urban poor to land particularly in terms of the ongoing process of urbanisation in the rural context.

Options and implications for ongoing urbanisation in a rural context

First, it needs to be clarified that we understand, the theme of urbanisation in the rural context as referring to development of small and intermediate towns. Three important issues examined in the Lagos context that are relevant for the process of urbanisation in the rural context are as follows: 1.

the process of commercialisation, 2. the land question, and 3. the factor of poverty, the conditions of the poor and what can be done for transforming these conditions. Even though we have focused empirically on Metropolitan Lagos which, because of both its size and other characteristics does not appear as the norm for small and intermediate African urbanisation, the examination of this experience in its exaggerated and complicated forms in Metropolitan Lagos perhaps best shows what sorts of problems are contained in the urbanisation process in Africa. Let us examine the implications of each of these elements for small and intermediate urban settlements.

Commercialisation

The tendency towards commercialisation has been present in most African social systems that generated surpluses even in precolonial times (Freund, 1985: 16–38). Commercialisation of various aspects of customary precolonial social life has, however, developed as a result of colonisation and the consequent monetisation of the economy. Even in the most isolated rural areas of contemporary Africa, there is some evidence of monetisation. This has affected the gradual commercialisation of various assets and transactions such as land and labour. However, the pressure towards commercialisation tends to be related to the balance between demand and supply of customary assets. Land for shelter or agricultural production becomes commercialised, if demand exceeds basic supply. The same applies to labour, etc. In terms of the urbanisation of rural areas in Africa, the evidence for commercialisation can be found in all spheres; even in the sphere of agricultural land, although the pressure is less in the rural areas, or in small and intermediate towns where the competing sources of land-use are less.

Commercialisation as a process associated with the modern economy is therefore to be seen as a necessary aspect of economic development across the range of all, if not most human settlements in Africa. Its pace, however, is determined by the pace of economic growth and the attendant pressures these generate. The negative and positive implications of commercialisation for welfare and common good during the process of urban development in the rural context therefore requires closer examination which is perhaps more effective through the treatment of the issues of the land question and the condition of the urban poor.

The land question

Land, by its very nature, is not only an important factor of production particularly for rural communities but also a central determinant of settlement-formation. In African rural societies, land, in fact contains significant

spiritual and ritual implications in terms of symbolising the essence of the group. In such circumstances, it is communal and governed by the customary norms and laws which we have discussed earlier. However colonisation and economic development have affected transactions in land in both rural and urban areas all over Africa. For one, commercialisation and alienation have occurred contrary to the principles of customary ownership. Also population pressure and modern economic processes discussed above have created landless rural and urban dwellers alongside a concomitant process of land concentration. In the situation of urban development in the rural context in Africa, the issue of access to land for shelter and sustainable livelihoods can no longer be taken for granted. Although it might not appear on the same scale as that of say Metropolitan Lagos, Nairobi or Abidjan, landlessness and scarcity remain not only as an ever-increasing possibility but as a reality. Thus policies for the growth and development of small and intermediate towns need to take cognisance of the land question as an issue and to design appropriate and culturally-relevant strategies from the wide range of institutions, actions, policies and legislations that have been utilised worldwide in ensuring land reform and transformation of relationships to land.¹³

THE FACTOR OF POVERTY AND THE CONDITIONS OF THE POOR

Poverty remains a problem and condition of most of contemporary Africa. It is also both a rural and urban phenomenon. Without becoming embroiled in its definition, it is both a structural and an actor-based phenomenon.¹⁴ In contemporary Africa, the overwhelming structural poverty tends to complicate the situation of the actors, the poor, in a cycle of deprivation and domination that it has created and which it sustains.

But central to the factor of poverty and the conditions of the poor are issues that derive from the principles of distributive justice and equity. These are political issues that are found both in urban and rural settlements. They affect the allocation of resources and the management and provision of basic services and infrastructures such as health, education, water, drainage, roads, employment and adequate nutrition. The problems of access to and provision of basic needs and services exist both in rural and urban areas. In fact the most effective basic services and infrastructures are said to exist in urban areas for the urban elites while both the rural and urban poor suffer varying degrees of deprivation of these. In the situation of urbanisation in the rural context, it is expected that for most African settlements, urban management is grossly inadequate for the large towns and cities and virtually non-existent for the smaller urban and rural settlements. When these inadequacies are coupled with the structural inequality that exists, then the conditions of the poor in these contexts cannot definitely be said to be satisfactory. It is therefore both a policy and

political issue that the urbanisation of rural areas should contain attempts at resolving the problems of urban management, alleviating poverty and transforming the conditions of the poor. The strategies for effecting these are, however, beyond the scope of this contribution as they depend on the varying specific historical and cultural conditions of the different African societies.

NOTES

1. Recent documentation of this experience of rapid change in Africa's urbanisation is available in Hardoy, J. E. and David Satterthwaite, 1986, "Urban Change In The Third World: Are Recent Trends a Useful Pointer to the Urban Future?", *Habitat International*, 10, 3. See also: United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), 1986, *Global Report On Human Settlements*. Oxford University Press for Habitat, 1987, Ch. 5.
2. For a historical study of the development and working out of some of these processes in Africa, see: Freund, Bill, 1984, *The Making of Contemporary Africa: The Development of African Society Since 1800*. London: Macmillan Press.
3. Nigeria at the moment operates a system of two capital cities. Abuja, the new Federal Capital Territory is still under construction although it has now begun to perform some of its intended functions.
4. Sada, P.O. and A.A. Adefolalu, 1975: 79, "Urbanisation and Problems of Urban Development", in A. B. Aderibigbe (ed.), *Lagos: The Development of an African City*. Lagos: Longman.
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6. Lagos State Development and Property Corporation, *50 Years of Housing and Planning Development In Metropolitan Lagos: Challenges of the Eighties*. Lagos: LSDPC, n.d.
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8. Olawoye, 1974: 23.
9. This was from an unpublished report of the Lagos Executive Development Board, *The Abule-Nla Redevelopment Scheme*, n.d.
10. There are about 250 ethnic groups in Nigeria and most of these are small in population when compared with the big three groups, Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa-Fulani.
11. At the time of study 1984–1985, One Naira (₦ 1) was about one US dollar (USD 1.00). But with the devaluation that has occurred since 1986, one dollar (USD 1.00) is about Seven Naira (₦ 7.00) as of mid-July, 1989.
12. Urban and Regional Planning Division, Lagos State Government, p. 11, *Master Plan for Metropolitan Lagos (Implementation Phase): Final Report on Olaleye-Iponri Urban Renewal Plan*. Department of Lands and Housing, Office of the Governor, Lagos State. N. d.
13. Although, I do not agree with all the positions, some of the very useful recent contributions on strategies and policies for the land question include: Doebele, W. A., 1987, "Land Policy" in Lloyd Rodwin (ed.), *Shelter, Settlement, and Development*. Boston: Allen and Unwin. See also: Doebele, W. A., 1983, "The provision of land for the urban poor: concepts, instruments and prospects" in Shlomo Angel *et al.*, (eds.), 1983; McAuslan, Patrick, 1985, *Urban Land and Shelter for the Poor*. London: IIED/Earthscan;

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The Growth and Functions of Small Urban Centres in Ethiopia*

Jonathan Baker

The aim of this paper is to provide a review of the processes which have shaped urban development in Ethiopia since the end of the nineteenth century. Emphasis will be placed on the role and functions of small urban centres, and an assessment will be made of their importance particularly within the context of the urban-rural interface.

OVERVIEW OF ETHIOPIA'S URBAN POPULATION

Ethiopia's first national comprehensive population census was conducted in May 1984 and the results were published in September of the same year.¹ The census covered an estimated 85 per cent of the population. Areas where population was estimated rather than enumerated included parts of war-torn Eritrea and Tigray and nomadic regions, particularly in Harerge, the country's largest administrative region.

According to the preliminary results, the population of Ethiopia in 1984 was a little over 42 million, of which the rural population accounted for 88.7 per cent (37.3 million) and the urban population 11.3 per cent (4.7 million). The national growth rate of population is estimated at 2.9 per cent a year (Office of the Population..., 1984).

Surprisingly, the urban growth rate has declined considerably from about 6.5 per cent in the early 1970s (Prost-Tournier, 1974) to about 3.7 per cent by the mid-1980s (World Bank, 1988). The reason for this decline is apparently a result of a major downturn in rural-urban migration, and this is discussed in a later section of this paper.

In common with the situation elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, the urban system in Ethiopia is characterised by a high degree of primacy whereby the capital city, Addis Ababa, has a dominant position within the urban hierarchy. On the basis of the urban population given in the 1984 Census, Addis Ababa (population 1,412,575) accounts for approximately

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30 per cent of Ethiopia's urban population. **Addis Ababa's** dominance is not particularly surprising since it is, *inter alia*, the political, administrative, service, industrial and educational centre of the country. In addition, it houses the headquarters of the UN Economic Commission for Africa and the Organisation of African Unity, and thus is an important diplomatic centre in Africa.

Ethiopia also has a fair number of medium-sized cities (by Ethiopian standards) and some have experienced explosive growth rates while others have seen relative or even absolute declines. It is, however, the small town (with a population between 2,000 and 5,000) which is the typical settlement and which provides contact with the outside world for much of Ethiopia's rural population. Of 324 urban centres, small towns number 186 or 57 per cent of the total, and yet only account for 13 per cent of the total urban population (Office of the Population..., 1984).

This small percentage figure, however, belies the significance of small towns, particularly in rural areas, as the following will illustrate. According to data published by the Imperial Highway Authority in the late 1960s, it was estimated that about 45 per cent of the Ethiopian population lived more than 16 kilometres away from an all-weather road (Baker, 1974). It is doubtful whether this situation has improved much, and reinforces the role played by small towns as centres of economic and social interaction between rural and urban people. Moreover, for many rural people the first contact with the "modern world" is often through the small town environment.

To attempt to present a comprehensive picture of small town opportunities for rural people in Ethiopia is fraught with difficulties. Nonetheless, it is possible to indicate some of their more easily definable traditional roles. Small towns act as central places providing goods and services to rural hinterlands, and to provide rural people with the possibility of disposing of an agricultural surplus. Small towns also act as the final link in the political, administrative and bureaucratic process from the decision-making centre. Thus, they are the foci for the maintenance of law and order in a more usual sense, and more specifically as defenders and promoters of the revolutionary faith under the present regime, as they were of imperial autocracy under **Haile Selassie**.

These centres provide an important range of economic and social services including grain milling facilities, personal services such as entertainment and accommodation and, under the *ancien regime*, legal services and an extensive judicial paraphernalia in view of the enormous amount of litigation over land rights.

Small towns are communication centres and provide bus, telephone and, occasionally, postal services. They are the locations for government health stations, clinics and schools, and these institutions have been of benefit to both urban and rural people, although poor accessibility in the latter case has made the utilisation of these facilities problematic.

THE CONCEPT OF URBAN FROM THE ETHIOPIAN PERSPECTIVE

A central problem when dealing with the concept of urban in the Ethiopian context is the apparent lack of unanimity as to what, in fact, constitutes "urban". This lack of agreement even extends to agencies and ministries of the central government. According to the Ministry of Planning and Development, a settlement is considered urban if it fulfils the following criteria:

1. if it is a chartered municipality;
2. if it comes under the jurisdiction of the municipal department of the Ministry of the Interior;
3. if it has a local officer for collecting taxes; and
4. if it is taken to be a town by the chiefs and elders of the area.

The issue is further complicated by the fact that the Central Statistical Office (1968) defines a place as urban if the following conditions are met:

- if the buildings are contiguously aligned;
- if there is at least one public bar selling alcoholic beverages;
- if there is at least one hotel, i.e. a place where a stranger can pay for a bed for a night;
- 4. if there is at least one permanent shop selling different types of goods; and
- 5. if there is a weekly market.

Apart from the divergence of these definitions, which makes a consensus impossible, what they both omit is reference not only to a minimum threshold size, but also some indication of the percentage of population engaged in non-agricultural activities which would provide some indication of the degree of urbaness.

The problem of a minimum size criterion was overcome in 1971 when a figure of, at least, 2,000 inhabitants was introduced. With this, the inconsistencies of earlier urban definitions were apparently resolved. This attempt at refinement has, however, been discarded and according to data presented in the 1984 Census (Office of the Population..., 1984) many places are classified as urban although they do not satisfy the minimum size requirement. For example, of the 636 settlements classified as urban, only 324 (50.9 per cent of the total number) met the size criterion. Moreover, the smallest centre classified as urban (Haro Debe in Bale Region) had a population of only 57 people!

HISTORICAL REVIEW OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA

In order to obtain a clearer understanding of the processes which have culminated in the contemporary urban system in Ethiopia it is appropriate to review a number of historical trends. Most emphasis, however, will be placed on events since the Revolution of 1974 and the impact that this has had on urban-rural relations.

Imperialism, state formation and urban development

A useful point of departure is to consider urban developments under Emperor Menelik II, the founder of present-day Ethiopia. Through a process of imperial expansion, Menelik extended greatly the boundaries of historic Abyssinia² into large areas to the south and east, and in so doing incorporated a myriad of religious, ethnic and linguistic groups into the Empire.

To facilitate the control and administration of the newly conquered territories, Menelik established a number of military garrisons (*ketemas*) and between 1887 and 1910 at least 37 such garrisons were established (Akalou, 1973). When a garrison was established, military governors were appointed who were supported by soldiers of the imperial army, who in turn were accompanied by their families. Soldiers were rewarded for their services in expropriated land (*rist-gult* and *gult*) and according to rank, were assigned a certain number of tenants (*gabars*) from among the conquered peoples who were obliged to cultivate the *gult* lands and to provide a range of other services.³

Gradually, these garrisons outgrew their purely military *raison d'être* and became functionally more diversified and acquired new roles including civil administrations, judicial functions, markets, schools, transport, hotel and catering services. There is no doubt that these garrison towns created an enormous impetus for urban growth in those areas which, prior to the conquests, lacked an urban texture.*

Moreover, the increasing centralisation of the Empire both economically and administratively spurred the urbanisation process in the south. The establishment of Menelik's new and permanent capital, Addis Ababa (New Flower), sometime in the 1880s,⁵ and the creation of an emerging national administrative structure meant that frequent attendance at the imperial court by the rurally-based local nobility was required and this demanded the utilisation of considerable resources (extracted from the peasantry) to maintain a satisfactory standard of urban comfort while at court.

The upshot of this centralisation was to bring about a change not only in the traditional patron-client relationship between peasants and the feudal nobility but also it changed or 'modernised' the nobility itself as it became more and more a part of Menelik's administrative control and revenue collecting apparatus and was paid by the imperial treasury. This re-

sulted in the transformation of traditional patterns of authority and, indeed, behaviour as the co-opted nobility now became articulators of imperial policies and aligned themselves with the newly-established civil administration which was urban based. Increasingly, the nobility took up urban residence and acquired a taste for imported luxury goods and adopted urban norms and mores (Pausewang, 1983).

Imperial consolidation and centralisation also meant that Menelik had to maintain a large and well-equipped army and imports of military *matériel* on a large scale from Europe were necessary. Thus Ethiopia became integrated into the world market and to pay for increasingly large imports of manufactured goods and weapons it was necessary to increase exports (coffee, hides, spices, civet, ivory and gold) and this meant essentially extracting more of the rural surplus. Many southern towns, as an integral part of this system of rural extraction, grew through the expansion of their trade functions as points for the collection, bulking and distribution of rural produce for export.

Another major stimulus to urban development was the construction between 1897 and 1917 of the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway. A number of stations were built and some of these gradually developed into sizeable, well-diversified settlements, and good examples (with their 1984 population~) include Dire Dawa (98,104: Ethiopia's third largest city), Nazret (76,284), Debre Zeit (51,143) and Mojo (13,945).

The foregoing discussion has focussed on urbanisation in the southern regions of Ethiopia; the north of the country, experienced a radically different urban history. In the Amhara-Tigre heartland of traditional Abyssinia the process of urban development has had a long, although far from uninterrupted, history dating back to the rise of Axum in the fourth century A.D. At the risk of oversimplification, the history of Abyssinia until the nineteenth century was characterised by a lack of unity, internal warfare and foreign invasions, and this meant that conditions conducive to the growth of permanent urban centres were generally absent.

As a result of relentless warfare throughout much of this long period, Abyssinian capitals were often mobile and constructed with largely strategic considerations in mind and have been termed 'wandering capitals' (see, for example, Horvath, 1969). There were some notable exceptions to this urban impermanency and the magnificent stone city of Gonder (in Gonder Region), built in 1636, provides an excellent example of a large and permanent urban centre, which remained the seat of government for nearly two centuries. It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century, however, that more stable conditions were created which allowed for the emergence of an enduring and expanding urban landscape (Akalou, 1967). More recently, however, Abdussamad has challenged this long-held view that Abyssinia was characterised by a lack of permanent urban centres prior to the nineteenth century, and suggests that, on the contrary, there "were a plethora of plain and ordinary towns ... ranging in

size from 1,000 to 2,000 in population and characterized by large weekly or permanent markets and artisan centers" (Abdussamad, 1989).

From Imperial Consolidation to the Italian Occupation

From the death of Menelik in 1913 the process of consolidating the fruits of the newly-acquired Empire was continued by Haile Selassie. By extending political control throughout the country he created conditions under which newly-established towns could further evolve and long-established ones could continue to grow. Communications were improved and the country was linked by a telegraph system.

The one area, however, which prevented the really effective unification of the country and hindered the interchange of goods between the various parts of the Empire was the absence of an efficient road system. Prior to the Italian invasion in 1935, Ethiopia had only one all-weather road from Addis Ababa to Addis Alem, a distance of 58 kilometres (Baker, 1974). The rest of the country was linked by dry-weather roads, which were often impassable during the rainy season (see, for example, Pankhurst, 1961).

With the Italian occupation of Ethiopia between 1935 and 1941, the pace of urban development was dramatically accelerated. In an attempt to control their new conquest, the Italians prioritised road construction and it is no exaggeration to suggest that they transformed the communication network; by 1941, they had built a total of 7,000 kilometres of road, of which 3,450 kilometres were tarred (Baker, 1974).

The intensity of road construction was almost equalled by the rate at which they altered cities and towns. Addis Ababa was selected as the capital of Italian East Africa⁶ and was re-designed to exemplify the "splendour" of Fascism. Elsewhere in the country regional centres underwent a Fascist facelift. For example, the city of Gonder, which was designated as the capital of Amara Territory, was rebuilt along Fascist architectural lines, and wide avenues, monumental steps, and large public buildings were constructed.

This pattern of urban development was duplicated throughout the country and, almost as if to parallel the imperialism of Menelik, a number of new towns were established around Addis Ababa (Horvath, 1968).

Even the smallest urban centres felt the colonial influence, and the Italian military presence and ideology was reflected in remodelling and segregation of towns (for a short description of a small town during the occupation, see Baker, 1986). Moreover, the occupation also had impacts at the urban-rural interface. Many occupational groups such as blacksmiths, weavers, potters and other skilled artisans, who hitherto had resided and worked in dispersed rural homesteads, were encouraged to settle in towns. Rural periodic markets were relocated to urban centres. Grain-milling became much more of a central place function as generators were introduced, and many urban and rural people who formerly had hand-

ground their grain brought it to mills located in urban areas. The improvements in the road system meant that formerly inaccessible towns were given a new impetus to their development and long-distance lorry and regular bus services stimulated the growth of transport and associated functions such as vehicle maintenance, repair and petrol services, as well as hotels, restaurants and bars.

One of the most significant and certainly one of the most lasting influences of the Italian presence was the encouragement of prostitution on a large scale in towns. To cater for an army of nearly 700,000 men the colonial authorities encouraged single, divorced and widowed women to come to town and set up bars and brothels (Pankhurst, 1974). While it would be incorrect to suggest that the Italians introduced prostitution, they nevertheless created a demand on a much larger scale than previously and commercialised it to a much greater extent. The legacy of prostitution has been profound and long-lasting. To be sure, it is still a vital survival mechanism for a great many poor and unskilled women, often from rural areas, who migrate to town.

From Liberation to Revolution

With the Liberation in 1941 and the departure of a great number of Italians, many of whom had fulfilled important urban functions and had generated a great demand for urban goods and services, urban development experienced a sudden decline and, in some cases towns were completely abandoned.

The problem was further compounded by the paucity of local capital and skilled personnel. With the breakdown of rural food supply networks to towns, townspeople moved to the countryside to take up farming. The road system fell into a state of disrepair because of neglect and consequently many small rural towns suffered through isolation and the fact that they became divorced from regional and provincial markets.

Gradually, however, with the emergence of a peacetime economy, the return of trained administrators from abroad, an inflow of foreign assistance and the implementation of the First Highway Programme (1951–57), the process of decline was halted and reconstruction began. Existing settlements grew as population returned, and old functions were re-established. The political and bureaucratic apparatus of the imperial regime was restored. Provincial, *awraja* (sub-provincial) and *woreda* (local-level) governors were appointed or reinstated.

New agencies of the imperial government were set up, such as the Imperial Highway Authority and the Malaria Eradication Service. As a result, many small towns acquired a broader range of service activities which created opportunities for an increase in low-paid employment and an improvement in disease control, benefitting both urban and rural people.

Thus, the period leading up to the Revolution in 1974 can be characterised as reflecting a process of controlled modernisation, whereby an attempt was made to diffuse selective innovation (for example, health services, schools, road maintenance schemes) from the centre to the urban-rural interface. Such a strategy was bound to fail because little attempt was made to grapple with some of the real and fundamental issues such as rural-urban inequalities and the inequitable land tenure systems which prevailed over large areas of the Empire.

Urban and rural relations since the Revolution

In 1974 the imperial and feudal system created basically by Menelik and refined by Haile Selassie was overthrown and a new order was established.

The new regime quickly introduced one of the most radical urban and rural land reforms ever attempted in Africa. In 1975 and 1976 the government enacted two pieces of legislation relating to the organisation and ownership of urban land and housing (*Negarit* Gazeta, Proc. 47, 1975 and Proc. 104, 1976). All land within the boundary of a municipality or town is covered by this legislation and the centrepiece of urban life is the Urban Dwellers' Association (UDA) or kebele. All kebeles have strictly defined rights and duties and, in theory, are self-governing, democratically elected bodies. Kebeles have important functions and have responsibility for the construction of schools, mother-child clinics, roads and pathways, and for protecting kebele property. Kebeles maintain waste disposal facilities, carry out hygiene and vaccination programmes and conduct literacy and political education campaigns.

One additional and crucial feature of the urban land legislation was the stipulation that house ownership was to be restricted to one house per household. Thus the ownership of extra houses was declared illegal and confiscation occurred. Surplus housing was transferred to the kebele authorities who, in turn, had responsibility for letting the surplus housing stock to those in need. Simultaneously all rents were reduced, reflecting the official ideology of social justice and socialism (*Negarit* Gazeta, Proc. 47, 1975).

In Addis Ababa there are 284 kebeles which range in size from under 2,000 to over 12,000 inhabitants (Central Statistical Office, 1983, unpublished data). Ethiopia's remaining 635 urban centres (as defined in the 1984 census) would have, at least, one kebele each, although larger centres would have considerably more depending upon population size.

Concomitant with the urban land reforms, the government implemented a far-reaching rural land reform whereby all rural land was nationalised and usufructuary rights to land were redistributed to the landless and to tenants. Large landowners were dispossessed of all but the legal maximum area of land permitted per farming household of one-quar-

ter of a *gasha*, about 10 hectares (*Negarit Gazeta*, Proc. 31, 1975 and Proc. 71, 1975).

The result of this land reform was to replace the great myriad of land tenure systems which prevailed throughout the country. In the southern regions of Ethiopia (i.e. those regions which had been incorporated into the empire at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries by Menelik) the sharecropping system (*gult*) under which tenants (*gabars*) were often obliged to pay more than 50 per cent of their harvests to landlords was abolished. In the north of the country in the traditional Amhara heartland where communal systems (*rist*) were the rule, the nationalisation and redistribution of land meant that the power of the landed elite was severely diminished, if not eliminated (Wood, 1981).⁷

One commentator has suggested that the rural land reform, especially in southern Ethiopia, went beyond the mere redistribution of land and presents the view that "it was a rural revolution of a suppressed, exploited, and to a large extent expropriated peasantry" (Pausewang, 1986). Furthermore, the revolution was seen by the peasants as a revolution of great expectations whereby their lives were to be fundamentally transformed through "better living standards, better social conditions, more equity and participation" and where they expected to have a greater influence on local and national affairs (Pausewang, 1986). In short, the peasants, it seems, were to be de-marginalised.

To implement the land redistribution and to provide for the eventual collectivisation of Ethiopian agriculture: peasant associations (PA's) have been established throughout the country. In all, 23,500 PA's have responsibility for administering and directing the lives of 38 million rural Ethiopians (Cohen and Isaksson, 1987). Peasant associations vary in size, both regarding population and area, although a minimum area of 20 *gashas* (about 800 hectares) is legally stipulated for the formation of an association. The rights and duties of PA's are clearly stated in the legal code and explicit in a number of statements is the provision for the safeguarding of the political, economic and social rights of the peasantry (see, for example, *Negarit Gazeta*, Proc. 71, 1975). In theory, at least, PA's are democratic organisations at the grassroots where the leadership is elected by members and where the leadership reflects the wishes of its members. Whether ideological rhetoric always coincides with the reality is another matter.

Nearly 15 years have passed since the implementation of the land reforms and it seems appropriate to pose two related questions. One, to what degree have peasant aspirations been fulfilled and two, what influence have these reforms had on urban-rural relations?

It should be stressed at the outset that lack of reliable data and detailed field studies make an assessment of what has been achieved difficult. Having said this, some outstanding studies have been conducted on the organisation of rural life and much of what follows is based on this work

(Pausewang, 1986, 1988a, 1988b, 1989; Cohen and Isaksson, 1987; Cohen and Jonsson, 1987; Cohen, 1987; Ståhl, 1977 and 1989). The greatest lacunae, however, exist in the area of the development of small urban centres since the revolution. The little that has been written on urban development focusses on urban organisation in Addis Ababa. The studies by Koehn and Koehn (1979) and Cohen and Koehn (1980) provide a useful guide to the immediate post-revolutionary situation (i.e. until the late 1970s) while my own work (Baker and Baardson, 1987 and Baker, 1988) is based on surveys of two *kebeles* in Addis Ababa in 1985.

The studies by Aynalem and Kloos (1987) and Kloos and Aynalem (1989) are important in that they discuss the contemporary situation regarding urban and rural growth rate differentials and the spatial distribution of Ethiopia's population at the *woreda* level, the smallest administrative unit in the country.

The revolution when it came in 1974 unleashed an enormous amount of pent-up frustration and simultaneously released tremendous energies. During the years immediately following the revolution, particularly in the period 1974-76, peasants, the urban poor and intellectuals took literally the ideological statements of the government concerning solidarity, self-determination and democracy.

In the south of the country where land tenure systems had been most onerous, peasants formed associations and organised themselves, and in the process dispossessed the land holding elite of their land (Pausewang, 1988b). This process was paralleled in urban centres where landlords were evicted and the homeless took control of vacated properties.

As a result, the government realised that it was in danger of losing control of events and reacted by establishing order through a variety of measures including police and military enforcement and by establishing a structure of administrative controls which enabled the government to gain the upper hand.⁹

From then on, the banner of local self-determination and democracy at the grassroots was replaced increasingly by centralisation of decision-making, and the interests of the centre gained precedence over individual and local initiatives.

As indicated earlier, an assessment of what has been achieved in the urban sector is limited to Addis Ababa. Notwithstanding this emphasis upon the primate city, it is possible to make a number of generalisations which may have validity for smaller urban centres further down the urban hierarchy. Below is a brief review of the impact of *kebeles*, particularly in Addis Ababa.

The *kebele* system has eliminated most of the land speculation and racketeering which characterised urban life under the *ancien regime* and this has certainly helped the poor, although housing is still of poor quality and overcrowding severe. These latter problems are unlikely to be ameliorated in the near future because of lack of resources although *kebeles* are

legally bound wherever possible to construct new housing and maintain existing ones. The legislation pertaining to extra houses has been implemented fairly successfully, although as Bjérén (1985) observes some landlords managed to circumvent this by placing relatives and clients in their extra housing. On the basis, however, of my observations in Addis Ababa in 1985 this strategy was apparently neither widespread nor successful.

Kebeles have, without doubt, made some impressive strides in the area of welfare services. The kebele education committees have responsibility for conducting literacy campaigns using the skills of volunteers, often high school students. The success of these campaigns can be gauged by the fact that according to official sources the literacy rate for Addis Ababa is stated as being over 98 per cent (The Ethiopian Herald, 2.6.85). Although the official figure is an exaggeration, there is no doubt that the literacy campaigns have achieved good results. The data collected by me from the two kebele surveys indicate a literacy rate for heads of households of over 85 per cent.

Special attention is paid to the needs of children and infectious diseases have been reduced through mass vaccination campaigns. As recently as 1988 a mass vaccination of children against meningitis was carried out in Addis Ababa under the auspices of the kebele health system (Helmut Kloos, 1989: personal communication).

Each kebele has its own shop where basic food and other necessities can be purchased at fixed and low prices. As most commodities are in short supply a rationing system is in operation, but nevertheless this does allow the poor to obtain essential goods at reasonable prices. As is discussed below, however, the fixing of prices, particularly of food for urban dwellers, has repercussions for peasants who are obliged to supply the state-run Agricultural Marketing Corporation with grains at prices which are considered far too low. So, in effect, the countryside subsidises urban food consumption.

The creation of employment opportunities is limited because of insufficient resources, although some kebeles have been more successful than others and have managed to create handicraft cooperatives (in tailoring, for example) where members have benefitted substantially (Alemu, 1983). A considerable number of job opportunities have been created in the enlarged state sector and while incomes are often low, this sector does provide a vital and secure economic support for many.¹⁰ Notwithstanding the "safety-net" of the enlarged state sector, for many the large informal sector is still the only employment option. Common jobs in this sector include casual labouring, small trading, domestic service, handicraft production and repairing and prostitution.

Each kebele has a revolution defence committee which has responsibility for maintaining public order within the confines of the kebele and for the physical protection of the kebele and its property. This committee has the task of coopting kebele members to participate in the revolution defence squad (RDS) which acts as the kebele police force in maintaining the peace.

As a result, criminal activities have been severely curbed in Addis Ababa and one gets the impression that it is a very safe city.

The RDS, however, also has powers to apprehend 'counter-revolutionaries' operating within the *kebele* and acts as an important instrument for political control within the *kebele*. According to Michael Ståhl (1989: personal communication) one very negative aspect of RDS activities has been their role in the forcible conscription, at night, of youths for service in the armed forces.

While the above section describes the situation in Addis Ababa, there is no reason to believe that the organisational characteristics of small towns is much different. What is in stark contrast to the pre-revolutionary situation concerning the urban hierarchy is the role of the state as a provider of employment and a supplier of services.

One very real impact of the rural land reform has been to reduce the rural-urban migration rate. In view of insufficient data at the national level it is not possible to provide anything more than some very general and tentative statements regarding the magnitude and causes of this downturn. What is certain, however, is that the growth rate of Addis Ababa has declined considerably (from about 6.5 per cent in 1967) and is at present about 3.0 per cent a year, which is only marginally above the national growth rate of 2.9 per cent (Solomon, 1985).

The reasons for this decline must be seen in the context of the redistribution of land which provided potential migrants with new economic possibilities and options in rural areas. An additional factor may be the greater difficulties involved in moving from rural areas as a result of a system of administrative controls.

Information regarding the contemporary situation of other urban centres is complicated by the lack of data, statistical inconsistencies and contradictions. The broad trend, however, suggests a growth rate for smaller urban centres (i.e. in the size range of 2,000–5,000) which is greater than that of larger centres. What this might indicate is that small centres in rural areas have grown in response to newly acquired administrative functions such as agricultural extension services, Agricultural Marketing Corporation activities, political offices and *kebele* bureaucracies.

The Revolution turns full circle: from rural liberation to rural exploitation?

Any discussion of the role of small towns in post-revolutionary Ethiopia must be seen in the broader context of the ideology and goals of the Government. There is no doubt that the Government is committed to the socialist transformation of the country and emphasis on industrialisation and the eventual collectivisation of agriculture (implying also mechanisation) are evidence of this.

And yet, the only area where sufficient internal resources can be generated and extracted, to act as the driving force for such a transformation,

is peasant agriculture. Thus by extension, it is obvious that if this strategy is to succeed, the peasantry must be in a position to generate the resources required and must also be committed to the changes envisaged. On present evidence it appears that neither condition is present and this can be attributed to two problem areas.

The first area of concern regards the system of fixed prices and quota obligations which have been imposed on peasants. In 1976 the Government established the Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) and from 1978/79 an obligatory grain quota was established whereby all peasant associations are obliged to surrender a percentage of their produce to the AMC at officially fixed prices which are generally considerably below the open market price (Clapham, 1987). This quota system was intended to overcome a number of problems including, *inter alia*, the avoidance of exploitative profits made by traders, to allow for improved control over food production and supply, and to provide cheap food for the urban population (Pausewang, 1988a).

There is no doubt that the distribution of cheap food to town dwellers via kebele shops has been the main benefit of the AMC system and obviously must be seen as part of the Government's policy of social justice and the improvement in welfare levels, especially for the urban poor. However, the negative implications of such a marketing arrangement outweigh the advantages. For example, one very significant function of the small town, local and free markets, has declined as a consequence of the removal of such a large amount of grain from the open market, although exact figures are impossible to determine.

More importantly, however, the fixed price quota system has certainly had a disincentive effect on peasants, and this reflects the situation in other African countries with similar pricing policies. Peasants are faced with a situation whereby their terms of trade have deteriorated as the prices they receive do not keep pace with prices they pay for fertilisers and other inputs necessary to increase or even maintain production.

The following examples will illustrate the above point. In a study of a peasant agricultural area in Gojjam Region, it was shown that fertiliser use had declined by 44 per cent between 1975/76 and 1982/83, due to unfavourable prices paid by the AMC (Mengistu, 1986). In another study from Arsi region, the AMC buying prices were lower than the open market price by 53 per cent for maize, 52 per cent for t₀, 29 per cent for wheat and 19 per cent for barley (Alemayehu, 1984).

It should be noted, however, that these figures refer to 1984, a year of poor rains and crop failures. By comparison, the 1986/87 harvest was good as a result of sufficient rainfall, and there were marginal differences between prices on the free market and those offered by the AMC (Michael Ståhl, 1989: personal communication). In spite of this, the government probably feels that AMC price levels are too low and so, in an attempt to boost production and create greater incentives to farmers, it raised AMC

purchasing prices in the spring of 1988 by about 10 per cent (Pausewang, 1988a).

The second problem area concerns the issue of peasant commitment to rural socialism. But before proceeding to discuss this issue, it must be stressed that it would be misleading to suggest that the Ethiopian peasantry have not benefitted in some important ways as a result of the Revolution. As indicated earlier, the 1975 land reform was widely welcomed. Furthermore, the Government has made great efforts to improve rural services especially in the fields of agricultural extension, health care, and education (Pausewang, 1989), although the provision of agricultural extension services is heavily biased in favour of peasant associations that form producer cooperatives — agricultural collectives (Ståhl, 1989). For a discussion of Ethiopian cooperatives, see Ståhl (1989) and Tegegne (1988). Moreover, the recently implemented programme for rural villagisation must also be seen partly as an attempt to bring services to a vast and often inaccessible peasantry.¹¹

In spite of these improvements, many peasants feel that their interests have been disregarded, or subsumed by urban interests. Peasants, for example, feel frustrated and estranged from an official ideology which preaches local democracy and popular participation but which practises what is perceived as the reverse. Siegfried Pausewang expresses the core of the conflict succinctly by stating that "there appears to be a huge communications gap in Ethiopia today, between the central hierarchy and the rural population at large. And while peasants complain that they have no influence whatsoever on decisions even concerning their own affairs, the top strata of leaders are sincerely convinced that Ethiopia is practising local participation on the basis of democratic socialism, and that nothing much is left to be done to give all peasants a maximum of self-determination and influence in their everyday lives ..." (Pausewang, 1988b).

The interesting question is why this situation has arisen? A good deal of the explanation would seem to lie in the imperfect workings of the hierarchical nature of the bureaucratic structure of the present regime.

In theory, centrally-made suggestions and decisions are passed down through the administrative hierarchy to the lowest administrative levels, including *woreda* and other towns, and villages, which contain respectively *kebeles* and PA's. At this stage discussions take place and suggestions for amendments are proposed by all members of *kebeles* and PA's. The results of these meetings are then translated back to the centre. Moreover, suggestions for change and improvements can also be initiated at the grass-roots and passed upwards through the hierarchy. Conceptually, the system allows for a top-down and down-up interchange of ideas so that all views can be expressed and considered.

But the reality is, it appears, quite different. The flow of ideas both from the top and from the bottom is manipulated and distorted by lower level bureaucrats, political cadres and other officials. This results in a process

whereby central directives or suggestions are translated into detailed orders, and where complaints or recommendations for improvements from the grassroots are ignored and reports supporting and applauding the efforts of the regime are presented as reflecting the general consensus (for an excellent presentation of this discussion, see Pausewang, 1988b).

The upshot of these processes has been to transform small towns into instruments of political and economic control, when instead they could have performed an exceedingly vital role as filters and communicators for innovation, mass participation and local democracy at the rural-urban interface.

If this process of political, economic and cultural marginalisation of the rural population continues, it has been suggested that peasants will "opt out" of the system because they see little advantage in it, and only maintain production at the minimum necessary for subsistence. This process is what Fantu Cheru calls the "exit option" (cited in Pausewang, 1989) and Dessalegn Rahmato (1984) refers to as "agrarian involution". Should this occur the effects would be devastating for national food production. By contrast, Ståhl (1989) argues that the Ethiopian peasantry cannot withdraw as they have already been 'captured' by an all pervasive system of state control.

In conclusion, it would appear that the interests of the Ethiopian peasantry have been overshadowed by the imperatives of the central state, and the demands of the urban sector for low-priced food. Until recently, it appeared doubtful if there would be a reversal of present policies and the regime stated explicitly that it would intensify the establishment of producer cooperatives or collective farms (Documents of the 9th Plenum..., 1988)—a programme which, on the available evidence, is opposed by the majority of peasants.

Furthermore, in 1989, President Mengistu Haile Mariam stated that "Perestroika is not a solution for Ethiopia" (*Indian Ocean Newsletter*, 7.1.89) and consequently that the greater economic and political flexibility introduced into the Soviet Union and other socialist states was unsuitable for Ethiopia.

But at the 11th Regular Plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Ethiopia in March 1990 Mengistu proposed a complete volte-face in government policies, which may have major and far-reaching repercussions in both the economic and political affairs of the country (see *The Ethiopian Herald*, 8.3.90, which carries the full text of the new policy directions). It is beyond the scope of this discussion to analyse the various factors which prompted the Ethiopian leadership to change course so dramatically but a deteriorating internal economic and military situation, and greatly reduced support from the Soviet Union and its erstwhile allies must be seen as some overriding considerations.

In summary, the proposals grant much greater freedom for private enterprise, including foreign capital, in all aspects of economic life. Peasants

are to be given more freedom regarding the use of land including the right to hire labour and transfer ownership to heirs. Trade in agricultural produce is to be liberalised and the grain quota and fixed-price purchasing systems are to be abolished. This will mean the resurrection of free market principles which should inevitably lead to the re-emergence and growth of markets throughout the country. *All* these measures should stimulate economic activities and create new opportunities to the benefit of both the small town dweller and the rural peasantry.

In the urban housing sector, the renting and selling of property is to be allowed apparently without limitations on the amount of invested capital. It is to be hoped that this will not lead to the development of a speculative housing market which characterised urban life in feudal Ethiopia.

To mirror the new economic realities of a mixed economy, and to mark a shift away from the principles of Marxist-Leninism, the Workers Party of Ethiopia is to be renamed the Democratic Unity Party of Ethiopia and will be restructured to reflect the diverse interests within society.

It is far too early to indicate what the overall effects of these policies will be regarding small towns and rural development, but more flexibility and democracy, coupled with greater economic freedoms including a substantial improvement in the terms of trade for peasants, would provide major stimuli for reaching the goals of an empowered and healthy peasantry. In this regard, the small rural town could provide a major catalyst for rural prosperity.

NOTES

1. The 1984 Census was a major achievement, not least regarding the speed with which the data were collated and published. This was quite unlike the situation concerning previous (sample) surveys which had often taken years to publish. It has been suggested unofficially that demands from foreign aid and relief agencies for an accurate and comprehensive population statement was the factor which prompted the authorities to release the information so quickly and efficiently.
2. Abyssinia refers to the historic **Solomonic** Christian kingdom which today encompasses the Administrative Regions (formerly Provinces) of Tigray, Gonder (formerly **Begemder**), Welo, **Gojjam** and Shewa.
3. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the great variety and complexity of land tenure systems which prevailed in the south of Ethiopia. Two useful references which discuss land tenure systems in Ethiopia are Cohen and Weintraub (1975) and Pausewang (1983).
4. The walled city of Harer to the east of **Addis Ababa** in Harerge Region provides the one exception to the rule regarding the absence of major urban centres in the newly occupied territories. In some ways it is unique within Ethiopia as it is a Muslim city in form and function. Dating from the sixteenth century, it served as the centre for Islamic influence and politico-economic power in what is now south-eastern Ethiopia until it was integrated into the Empire in 1887.
5. There is a lack of agreement among **scholars** as to the exact year when **Addis Ababa** was founded.

6. Under the Italians, Ethiopia was divided into four administrative territories: Scioa (Shewa), Arnara, **Galla-Sidama** and Harerge. Each territory had a capital at Addis Ababa, Gonder, Jima and Harer respectively. The other two Italian colonies of Eritrea (capital **Asmara**) and **Somaliland** (capital **Mogadiscio**) were federated with Ethiopia to form Italian East **Africa**.
7. However, in some areas of Gojjam the peasants resisted land reform because they perceived it as a measure to deprive them of their lands. In some cases local landed elites managed to organise peasant resistance against land redistribution, until 1980 when the Government regained control (Pausewang, 1988b).
8. Although the aim of the Government is eventual collectivisation of agriculture, the vast majority of land (94.7 per cent) is still cultivated by small-holders; only 3.5 per cent is **under state farms** and 1.8 per cent under collectives and agricultural settlements (Cohen and Isaksson, 1987).
9. In an important sense the Government had no alternative but to interfere as peasants, who were freed of the obligation to deliver a large percentage of their harvests to landlords, were eating and saving more food. Consequently, urban food supplies were reduced and if the situation had deteriorated urban riots may have resulted (Pausewang, 1988a).
10. Civilian government employment increased from 109,322 to 167,860 between 1977/78 and 1982/83 or at an annual average rate of 9.5 per cent. Furthermore, the army has increased over the same period from 45,000 to 300,000 men (Clapham, 1987).
11. But it is also suggested that the villagisation of Ethiopia's rural population will make agrarian socialism and political control of the **peasantry** easier to achieve (Cohen and Isaksson, 1987). Furthermore, in view of the fact that some of the new villages have populations which run into the thousands, it is somewhat puzzling that government guidelines prohibit them from developing a wider range of 'urban' functions. Traders, craftsmen, small shops, tea houses and other services are not allowed to operate in the villages and people still have to go to town to obtain basic consumer goods and for entertainment (Cohen and Isaksson, 1987).

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Regional Development in Marginal Africa: Luapula Province, Zambia

Jeremy Gould
Gun Mickels

During the last decades, the failure of capitalism to make significant advances in the transformation of most African economies has become more than obvious. Many of the "dependent" social formations of 15 years ago have undergone a rapid deterioration as a number of factors in the development of the world market have combined to further weaken the revolutionizing impact of capital on the periphery. The economies that were defined as "dynamically stagnant economies" (Mafeje, 1973: 46), have lost much of the paradoxical dynamism that more intense market involvement stimulated in the past.

These economies are coming to approximate more clearly than ever a situation which Y.V. Mudimbe has recently described as "marginality". In the abstract, marginality defines the intermediate ground between the modern and the traditional generated by colonialism (Mudimbe, 1988: 4-5). In more concrete terms, marginality describes a specific relationship with the world system characterized by the involuntary delinking of commodity production in Africa from former international markets.

MARGINAL SOCIAL FORMS AND PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCTION

With progressive marginalization over the past decade and the relative contraction of the wage sector of the economy, an underlying economic stratum of small scale producers has been exposed at the roots of contemporary African social formations. This stratum comprises two spatially distinct yet structurally isomorphic groups which have received an increasing amount of attention over the past several years. These are the petty entrepreneurs of the "informal economy", residing in the urban compounds, and the small-scale, semi-subsistence agricultural producers of the village communities.

Similarities between itinerant cash-croppers and informal sector entrepreneurs are based in their common economic form of "petty commodity production", clearly the predominant form of production in Africa today. Petty commodity producers (PCPs) are distinguished in the literature as distinct from the "simple" commodity producing units of primitive agriculture (for example, Scott, 1986), and the classical forms of "peasant"

production (Friedmann, 1980) by virtue of their routine market linkages. Production for the market combines with production for autoconsumption and labor is typically unwaged, drawn from a domestic pool. Petty commodity producers own or control their means of production, but their means of subsistence is partially market-mediated. In other words, PCPs consume their own produce but cannot produce everything they would consume (Smith, 1986).

Because of the prevalence and resilience of petty forms of commodity production in many corners of the "Third World", there has been a growing interest in specifying their status within a general conceptualization of peripheral economies. Recent discourse has rejected the earlier conception (Chayanov, 1966; Wolf, 1966; Sahlins, 1972) of PCP as its own subordinated mode of production distinct from the dominant capitalist mode (for example, Bernstein, 1988). Instead, an avenue of thought is emerging which seeks to redefine the nature of peripheral capitalism in terms of its persistent relationship with petty forms of commodity production.' In the following we sketch out a cursory framework for analyzing contemporary forms of commodity production. After the brief conceptual presentation we attempt to illustrate the mode of analysis via a discussion of the changing conditions of commodity production in one corner of northeastern Zambia where we have recently carried out fieldwork.

CONCEPTS FOR THE STUDY OF COMMODITY PRODUCTION

There is a long tradition in both political economy and liberal economics of adopting the household as the unit of analysis in the study of local development (Friedmann, 1980; Guyer, 1981; Low, 1986; Scott, 1986). In many empirical contexts this causes tensions between the conceptual framework and the data. There are great discrepancies in household constitution over time, and (what is partially the same thing), a wide dispersion over space of household members. Jane I. Guyer succinctly summarizes a number of critiques of the household concept in survey research:

Although the house and the **farms** just sit there to be visited and counted, people come and go—on business, on visits, or for **seasonal** migration (1981: 98).

Another problem with utilizing the household as a basic analytical concept is the non-correspondence of the units of production and reproduction with the household, or with one another (Friedmann, 1980). Primary forms of production (crops, fishing, livestock), whether of (market) commodities or (subsistence) goods is often undertaken — "managed" — individually, by members of either sex. This is a function of a division of labor based on gender. Cooperation in production occurs almost universally, and while

this collaboration usually involves relatives of some category, these are not necessarily members of the **producer's** household.

Networks of mutual assistance in commodity production can also encompass individuals with no kinship ties whatsoever, classificatory or otherwise. Thus one large farmer in our data invokes his friendship with the primary school headmaster to employ school children for post-harvest chores (for nominal remuneration) and reciprocally proffers support for the headmaster's political aspirations, and will assist his friend in transporting inputs or produce. Otherwise, marketing is perhaps the most individualistic element in the production system (see below).

Reproduction, on the other hand, always involves a corporate group, often encompassing individuals with kinship ties far beyond the limits of what would normally be considered the household. In Luapula, Zambia a woman or group of women and their offspring and possible matrikin are generally at the core of this group which also includes a male spouse when one is present. All manner of non-resident kin can and do participate in the reproduction of the corporate group via remittances of goods and cash. Other participants in the reproduction circuit of the group are the ever present visitors and guests—members of one of the two lineages intersecting the household—whose presence in the compound can vary from one night to many months in duration. While such a guest is present, labor, goods, and food are shared freely.

This much-documented spatial mobility within African societies confirms a structural porousness of marginal social formations. People and goods flow through society with little resistance. On the one hand, this is a function of the open and inclusive nature of African social institutions; systems of classification are extremely flexible to allow for the establishment of the specific rights and obligations of all those present in a given social situation. On the other hand, the porousness of marginal society has a strong material dimension. Actors in a marginal economy with little access to convertible currencies have few if any means of retaining and accumulating wealth (value) over time, i.e., from one season to another. Natural produce rots or spoils, local currencies are subject to rapid devaluation, and aside from forms of real estate and productive commodities far beyond the initial investment thresholds of all but a very few, there are virtually no reliable repositories for capital accumulation.

Producers, strategies, networks

With such a fluid situation within the conceptual field of the household it may be more useful to employ an atomistic construct of a dependent producer when defining the basic unit of the commodity production economy²—"dependent", of course, because their conditions of production are fully contingent upon collaboration with other individuals in all three spheres of the economic system (production, circulation, reproduction).³

These dependent producers, which can be individuals or corporate subjects (as in the case of closely allied siblings, or a married couple with strong joint business interests), are the subjects of economic strategies which define the means of resource mobilization and allocation by which they seek to achieve their goals or survival or prosperity (see Guyer, 1981, concerning the importance of focussing on resource mobilization).

Strategies are carried out through the vehicle of production, circulation and reproduction networks, i.e., through various forms of alliances with other individuals to meet strategic goals. Networks can be constituted according to principles which are naturally very context and culture specific. In Africa, kinship relations are the most frequently invoked criteria of network formation. In fact, most networks seem to operate on the basis of relationships in which some sort of "metaphorical kinship" is present to some degree (in Zambia, for example, Munali "brothers", or a joking relationship defined "by tribe"). But certain kinds of "organic solidarity", for example, that of social position or class are also invoked in network formation. In the course of our field work the small waged stratum of one rural community was found to be interacting and cooperating to an extent which was hardly spurious.

A commodity producing unit⁴ may be seen, then, as a specific configuration of production, circulation and reproduction networks. Its success in achieving the strategic goals of the subjects (dependent producers) it encompasses will determine its longevity and stability. Households (definitional issues aside for the moment), are a special type of network dedicated to the reproduction of labor power (among other things). Naturally, in many cases, a household and a commodity producing unit will correspond. Is it then merely a capricious semantic game to substitute an atomistic concept of mutually dependent producers for households in a model of a commodity producing economy? Not, we suggest, if we can better describe the internal dynamics of the CPU in terms of complementary and conflicting strategies; and not if we can more clearly define the conditions for the formation and operation of CPUs; and not, finally, if we are able to eliminate essentially ideological/subjective conceptions of "household and "family" from our repertoire of analytical categories.

MARGINALIZATION AND COMMODITY PRODUCTION IN RURAL ZAMBIA

We now proceed to interpret a specific process of regional development with the aid of the framework outlined above. The area of study is Luapula Province, part of the present day economic and political periphery of Zambia.

The role of Luapula in Zambian history may be seen as a series of attempts at politically incorporating into the colonial/national context what

at the outset of colonialism became defined as an economic periphery. Economically, Luapula has been caught in a crossfire between Zairean (Belgian Congo) and Zambian (Northern Rhodesian) interests, and especially in the independent era, this competition of interests has become an important factor affecting regional development.

Colonial interests defined the peculiar pattern of administrative and national boundaries in northeastern Zambia in the late 19th century (see Map 1).

Within a generation of the economic upsurge following the opening of mines in the Katanga area and the Copperbelt in the first decades of this century, Luapula became economically orientated towards the mining areas. At Zambia's Independence in 1964, Luapula retained its position as primarily providing the mines with labour and trading fish to feed the growing urban populations. In the late 1970s and 1980s the attempts at incorporating Luapula into the national context took new forms as the national economy plunged into regression and transformation.

Development during the colonial period established Luapula as a peripheral and dependent labor reserve area with a single, enclavic sector exhibiting any economic dynamism situated in the artisanal fisheries. This situation was more a result of inattention and disinterest on the part of the British colonial government than of any systematically pursued policies (Gould, 1989). After Independence in 1964, the role of the state in regional development in Luapula became considerably more active.

Installing an extractive infrastructure

The primary interest of the independent government under the United National Independence Party (UNIP) was to maintain and further intensify the extraction of primary produce from the province established during colonial days. This interest has manifested itself in massive infrastructural investments, especially in the post-1975 period after an initial period of relative neglect. The Mansa-Mufulira road and the Mansa-Samfya trunk roads had been constructed as parts of the area development policies of the 1950s. The developing pattern of a starshaped road network centering on the provincial capital was, during independence, further manifested by the construction of the main artery along the plateau, the Mansa-Kawambwa trunk road in the 1960s facilitating administrative development.

Infrastructural development in the 1980s has in a similar way sought to establish easy access and direct communication to the national centres, for example, through the multi-million Kwacha construction of the Mansa-Serenje road and the asphaltting of the Luapula Valley road between Mansa and Nchelenge. The trends in infrastructural development provide a point of intersection for the extractive and security interests of the state. The Mansa-Serenje road needs to be interpreted as an attempt at securing

Marginalization in Luapula Province, Zambia

Map 1. Luapula province, Zambia

access to Luapula whilst lessening dependence on the road intersecting the pedicle in case of deteriorating political relations with Zaire. The latter may be seen as mainly facilitating flows of **commodity** products (i.e. fish) feeding the urban markets from the Luapula valley to the Copperbelt.

From the petty commodity producer's point of view (unless located nearby a major artery), infrastructural development has taken place at the expense of developing and maintaining the feeder and secondary road network in the province. The consequences of this are well known: increased geographical isolation, lesser access to production inputs and markets, etc. The distorted road network has been coupled by the deterioration of transport services all over Luapula province. As a result of the economic regression, regular transport services run by the parastatal United Bus Company of Zambia (UBZ) are being suspended along secondary roads, further aggravating the situation of the remote petty producers.

Colonial economic policies characterized by the lack of productive investments have continued during independence (Baylies, 1984: 179; Gould, 1989). Major productive investments continued to be made in areas along the line-of-rail, while state intervention to promote or regulate private enterprise and **labor** markets in Luapula have centered primarily on the administrative capital of the province, and to a lesser extent on district administrative capitals.

The role of Mansa as a **distributive/extractive** node in flows of commodities in and out of the province has been confirmed with the establishment of retail distribution networks, banking and credit facilities, parastatals, etc. These infrastructural investments and the growth of the white collar **labor** force in Mansa have, in turn, strengthened the role of Mansa as the main **center** for commercial services in the region. Baylies (1978: 734–735) has shown that capital generation in establishing urban commodity production and entrepreneurial activities in Luapula are closely linked to wage employment and trading in fish, indicating investment circuits that further underline the apparent structural problems of accumulation in the agricultural sector on all levels.

Subsidiary to the extractive interests of the state there were some efforts at boosting production; first, via a disastrous cooperative development campaign in the initial post-Independence years, later through various crop promotion programs for tea, bananas and rice in the 1970s and, more successfully, for maize in the 1980s.

The most pervasive government intervention during Independence has been the national agricultural policy which, since 1967, has promoted the development of a formalized system of cultivating and marketing hybrid maize. The extractive nature of the agricultural policy can hardly be questioned. As the primary interest of the government is food security in the urban centers, agricultural policy has been geared towards the promotion of maize at the expense of promoting the cultivation of local staple crops,

the establishment of an agricultural extension system and a credit and marketing system revolving around hybrid maize only.

Apart from the emphasis on the promotion of maize production, government attempts at influencing the preconditions of commodity production have been few and highly focussed on larger-scale business operations within a limited sphere of activities. Such enterprises are Mansa Batteries, the Kawambwa Tea Estate and the Mununshi Banana Plantation, which locally have generated employment and a market for agricultural produce. In a provincial context this impact has been negligible.

Consolidating control

The second preoccupation of the Party and its Government has been to maintain the security and integrity of the region *vis-d-vis* its huge southern, western and northern neighbor of Zaire.

This has had two manifestations: One has been the promotion of Zambian business interests in relation to their Zairean competitors. In Luapula, business invariably translates as trade, primarily in fish, a trend with roots in the colonial era. As many if not most Luapulan businessmen and women are based on the Copperbelt (Baylies, 1978: 729), accumulation in the tertiary sector tends to benefit line-of-rail development rather than that of the region. In recent years the involvement of the Government in promoting local business has taken very convoluted turns as an increasing part of local trade has come to comprise the illegal smuggling of essential commodities (mealie meal, cooking oil, salt, sugar, soap, etc.) over the Luapula River into Zaire.

A second, even more important expression of the state's concern with regional security is manifested in efforts to consolidate general political and administrative supervision and control over the region. This imperative of consolidating political control is motivated by other factors as well. Baylies (1984) has given a detailed account of the background to Luapula's reputation as a politically volatile and "difficult" region. Indeed, an ever present subtext underlying all regional development discourse concerning Luapula evokes the Government's neglect of the province. In other words, there is constant political pressure being brought to bear by infamously militant Luapulans on behalf of increased public expenditures in the region. This has had more affect on the rhetoric with which plans and policies are justified than on the development content of the policies themselves. A recent example of the government's primary aspirations at political penetration at the expense of economic development is the adoption of the ward as the economical and planning unit (see Waern, 1984).

In 1986 the ward was introduced as the basic unit for cooperative development in Luapula, and two years later the agricultural extension system was to be restructured on a ward basis. There was a remarkably strong local response to the ward cooperative policy as the local popula-

tion saw the possible economic gains (e.g. in terms of credit) that the party-backed cooperative societies could provide. The total number of primary cooperative societies in the province more than doubled between 1986 and early 1988.

That the priority of the government, however, lies in controlling rather than developing rural areas in Luapula is clearly shown by the fact that the cooperatives were to be established in the wards as outlined in 1983–84 after the 1983 general election. No boundary alterations had been made and consequently many of the ward cooperative boundaries would divide functional economic regions and sections of villages into different wards. Equally, the government emphasis on the establishment of a new ward cooperative society was not followed by any major investment in supportive structures, such as the improvement in the previously inadequate transport capacity of the cooperative union or improvement of management advisory services of the Provincial or District Offices for Cooperative and Marketing. In short, the ward policy must be seen as legitimizing state control by attaching a layer of developmental gloss to a system of political control of economically marginalized areas.

CHANGING CONDITIONS OF COMMODITY PRODUCTION

As we have seen, the overall limitations on commodity production are determined to some extent by the scope of government interventions. More substantially the conditions of production are influenced by the marginalized position of Luapula vis-à-vis the major commodity markets. The way these preconditions influence commodity production can be illuminated through an examination of the economic system through the operations of its three spheres of production, labor reproduction and circulation.

Obviously, there are intra-regional variations in the way the economic system has developed. Spatial differentiation has taken place as a result of variations in the resource base, for example, in terms of availability of fertile land and the type of commodity production (fishing, agriculture) as well as location in relation to areas of commercial or infrastructural development. The development of commodity production, for example, in terms of linked production chains may be also assumed to show a similar pattern of differentiation. Instead of explaining the differential success of various types of commodity production on the basis of regional structuration alone, we suggest that these differences can be better understood through focussing on the differential access of different social groups to resources crucial to the operation of their CPUs.

Access to resources is mediated by the networks of production, reproduction and circulation through which the producer operates. Naturally, the kind and quality of resources which can be mobilized, and the power

ncumbent in various networks to mobilize these resources do not vary arbitrarily in space. Relative advantages are associated with certain locations. Mansa, the provincial capital is endowed with a disproportionate number of powerful allies. Access to this power is a function of social, and spatial, proximity.

In the following we will try to make a rough sketch of the preconditions for commodity production in the province, in lieu of a model of regional development dynamics. Our sketch is limited by the scope of our primary data which concerns exclusively petty commodity producers in a rural context.

Production

Paradoxically the deterioration of the national economy has contributed to a new level of mobility of the factors of production, bringing with it new opportunities for production. The continual cutting back on employment in the mining and associated sectors over the past 15 years has altered the general migration patterns for the province. Luapula continues to be a net labor exporter, but compared with the situation prevailing until 1969, immigration, largely from the Copperbelt, has risen noticeably. This seems to reflect a tendency for retired and out-of-work miners and other wage-earners to return to their homes in the rural areas. With them they bring experience, skills and capital (Gould, 1989: 40). Much of the capital appears to be fuelling a real estate boom in Mansa and other residential centers, but to some extent savings are being invested in agriculture and other forms of commodity production.

In quantitative terms, this return migration has had little visible economic impact. Yet there are indications of certain changes. A labor market (in cash and kind) is beginning to emerge in some rural communities to cater to the labor needs of the new breed of maize producers. Growing emphasis on maize as a cash crop is also generating tensions over the use of female labor of household spouses to which men generally claim privileged access. This has probably already affected the domestic food security situation adversely (IRDP, n.d.), a condition aggravated by a growing demand for traditional foodstuffs in the urban markets (see below).

The land market is also being affected. Aspirant farmers with some accumulated capital can apply for a title deed to 250 hectare tracts of land, thus fundamentally modifying the traditional usufruct basis of land access through traditional leaders. Since these large tracts are only available in remote places, far from existent marketing infrastructure there is also intense pressure on land in the vicinity of crop collection routes and depots. In concert, these trends are exacerbating a structural problem of soil degradation with the abandonment of the extensive land rotation system of shifting (*citemene*) cultivation (Stromgaard, 1985). Correspondingly, forested land for burning and gardening is becoming increasingly rare (or

distant) as land near settlements falls under permanent cultivation. Female labor productivity is diluted by the growing proportion of walking hours to get to and from the garden.

In addition to inflows of accumulated savings, the capital access situation has improved dramatically during the 1980s (for small-scale maize producers) through the instigation of state-guaranteed (but donor-funded) credit facilities. Credit is issued in kind (seeds and fertilizers) and deducted (in cash) from the producer's payment, so the only way to default on a loan is to fail to market a crop through the cooperative channel. By the same token, the only way to get credit for farming is to affiliate with the cooperative. Local, informal credit is only available through highly personalized networks; there are no private moneylenders in Luapulan villages.

These remarks imply certain strategic networking options: The only technological options available in the rural setting are the hoe, animal draught power and the tractor. The demand for oxen is great but it far outstrips supply. Thus access to oxen requires methodical lobbying with personnel of the Department of Agriculture, or with expatriate technical advisers who control their allocation of the animals. Tractors are generally unavailable through government channels. The only means of access to one is through a local private owner. Unless the producer operates at a level which allows for a cash outlay for tractor rental it is best to appeal to the owners' political ambitions.

To ensure the availability of inputs and credit--or better, to improve the possibility that these might be available at the appropriate time, it is necessary to be in the good books of the cooperative chairman, board members, manager, credit supervisor or other well-situated individual. It is best to be a member of the board oneself. Even this is insufficient, however, if the chairman, manager or other responsible person doesn't have a good contact at Luapula Cooperative Union where delivery schedules are worked out.

Failing to obtain tractor hire, the only way to increase production beyond a hectare or two is to employ casual laborers. Payment can be made in cash, or preferably in a valuable commodity such as salt or cooking oil. The productivity of hired labor is low and it must be obtained in quantities. The best sources of labor are schools and church congregations. Goods for payment in kind are almost impossible to obtain without access to private transport (or a government vehicle on off hours) and a reliable contact at a wholesaler in Mansa.

Land access in larger amounts is a tricky and involved process, and is virtually impossible without a powerful ally in the political or administrative hierarchies. It is of course also necessary to have the support of the traditional leadership. Malicious neighbors can wreak havoc on a title deed application by issuing misleading statements about the current or recent use of the land in question.

Circulation

The Luapula tertiary (trade) sector is distinctly hypertrophied in comparison with primary production and manufactures. This is reflected in the economically and politically powerful position that traders enjoy. Commodity producers in Luapula deal with these traders within the context of three interdependent macrosystems of commodity circulation. First, there is a national marketing system which supplies the line-of-rail and national centers with agricultural produce and fish. The market links with the line-of-rail operate through two distinct groups of actors.

The most visible group consists of the private traders, a large and powerful economic and political force in the province and nationally as well. A survey of Luapulan businessmen carried out in 1974, indicated that while the great majority of traders were born in the Province, their main base had shifted to the Copperbelt (Baylies, 1978). The bulk of the trade has historically been in fish, with other commodities (hardwood logs, cassava meal) playing a varying role. Larger traders own their own lorries and make regular runs between the Copperbelt towns and the northeastern Zambian fisheries. Smaller traders run pick-up trucks between the fisheries and Mansa, or buy from Mansa wholesalers for sale on the Copperbelt. In some cases this trade is mediated by middlemen at one or both ends of the market. Seldom are there any contractual agreements or advance payments between producers (artisanal fishermen) and the traders or middlemen.

At the smallest end of the scale, a third level of informal traders (predominantly women) interfaces with direct food producers (also women) in a barter trade involving dried fish, legumes and other foodstuffs (honey, oranges, caterpillars) in exchange for textiles, kitchenware and other dry goods. Traders move their goods on hired transport and deal on a very personal level with the producers. One or more women in a group of traders often have family links in the areas they cover, and buying is done on a door to door basis through clusters of villages. Due to the nature of the trade, quantities are usually small.

The state marketing apparatus, currently through the auspices of the primary cooperative societies, is also active in the marketing of commodities to the Copperbelt. Producers market their produce through the society which also provides them with inputs. The state has a virtual monopoly in the maize trade, although current levels of production are below local demand (urban consumption and the border trade in milled maize). With respect to other crops and fish, the cooperatives' share of the market is negligible.

The second trade network is a transnational border trade marketing system supplying Zaire with fish and other foodstuffs in exchange for beer, second-hand clothing, fishing gear and a variety of luxury goods. This network interfaces with the producers only in the instance of fish,

over which there is fierce competition between the Zambian businessmen described above and large Zairean vessels which buy fish on the lake directly from the producer. The trade in other goods (maize meal, cooking oil, sugar, etc.) involves commodities originally imported through Mansa for the Luapula market to cover production deficits, and is mediated by a subgroup of the trader population who obtain the goods on false pretences, by virtue of their political weight or through bribes. Along the river there is probably a certain amount of direct trade across the border in agricultural products but this is not documented.

Thirdly, there is a local, intra-regional commodity market which is probably substantially smaller than either of the other two. The bulk of this market involves large quantities of locally brewed beer, as well as the millet which is used in beer production. Other commodities in circulation are game meat, agricultural implements, carpentry products (furniture, coffins, door and window frames), and so on. Much of this market is only semi-monetized. Exchanges of millet for fish and beer for labor probably constitute the bulk of the exchanges. Exchange is on a very personal basis involving calculi of value which incorporate various so-called "non-economic" elements (the interpersonal relation as a whole).

While all of these personalized commodity markets are limited in terms of scales of operation, they usually involve complicated sets of less formal networks and chains of middlemen and retail traders, a variety of modes and means of exchange, and a farm-gate option for the producer. The government marketing system, on the other hand, is larger in terms of scales of operation, but highly dependent on institutionalized networks, formalized modes and means of exchange, formalized spatial organization (co-operative depots) and government bureaucracy.

To establish a government marketing system centered on hybrid maize in a region where maize was a secondary staple there was a need for heavy investment not only in establishing a marketing structure, but also in the form of support facilities for the provision of inputs, credit schemes, agricultural extension, and subsidies on producer prices. These marketing and supportive facilities were highly dependent on distribution networks and flows of goods from the national center to the periphery. This dependency has recurrently been expressed in organizational problems of crop collection, late arrival or inadequate supply of inputs, late payments of sales, etc.

Petty agricultural producers have thus been proffered the option of engaging in the cultivation of an unfamiliar crop requiring relatively high investments in inputs, taking the risk of subordinating production to the organizational shortcomings of the input supply system, while benefiting from the access to credit and relatively high producer prices.

In terms of networking options, the circulation sphere is relatively individualistic. For agricultural producers, cooperative membership in itself is of little importance unless one has the contacts to manipulate the orga-

nizational structure to personal advantage. Networks linking an area of rural production with urban markets are essential in the case of vegetables and fowl. Otherwise, association with urban traders can cause jealousy and retribution from neighbors who may suspect that the best of the barter goods have been taken off the top of the pile.

Reproduction

The "household" provides the conceptual locus for the reproduction of commodity producers' **labor** power, but its boundaries are difficult to define (see above). The conceptualization of this locus is nonetheless vital since the analysis of the development of commodity production hinges on the relations between individual dependent producers in the reproduction process. The key question concerns the nature and use of the surplus product: how is it constituted and how does it accumulate?

Gender relations stand at the forefront of this dilemma. If we posit individual production strategies and yet observe **labor** sharing in practice (as is invariably the case), the possibility of exploitation of the **labor** of one producer by another begs attention. Gibbon and Neocosmos surmise that within the unitary capitalist structure of African economies the petty commodity enterprise encompasses both aspects of the **capital/wage-labor** relationship. Within the petty commodity production process some household members (men) may occupy the "place" of capital, while others (women and children) the "place" of **labor** (1985: 178, 202–3; Bernstein, 1988: 266).

Behind this simplistic notion, however, is a complex empirical menagerie of intra-producer relationships which encompass various degrees of dependence, cooperation, exploitation and autonomy in internally contradictory and "indeterminant" constellations. Surplus extraction without a money form of wage, indeed without the full commoditization of the relations of reproduction, presents virtually insurmountable methodological problems for concrete analysis. This is not to dismiss the problem on the grounds of theoretical impotency; indeed there is a very real and often tragic struggle being waged over the control of female **labor** power in Luapulan CPU's, while the issue of child **labor** has yet to be systematically addressed (for example, Allen, n.d.).

Government support to maize production has generated a lot of tension over **labor** use and remuneration within the CPU. Men are far more frequently members of a cooperative society—in which they are assumed to represent the household, and are thus alone eligible for agricultural credit. Subsequently men also control the marketing of the crop and receive the payment check in their names. Men's "traditional" right to their wives' **labor** is nevertheless invoked throughout the production process, with weeding especially considered a female task.

Men do contribute labor to food cultivation. Under the traditional *citemene* method the arduous cutting and lopping of trees for burning is a man's responsibility. As far as we know, there are no systematic data on intra-household commodity and cash flows in this region; certainly such data would be extremely difficult to come by.⁵ Barry Sharpe's study of the relation of nutrition to market integration in the Mpika area indicates that when the resources and labor of the whole household are allocated to the hybrid maize farming of one (male) farmer this can have serious consequences for child welfare in the family (IRDP, n.d.: 94). This means that while women's "surplus" labor is extracted from food production to commodity production, either she is not given enough payment to cover the shortfall in food production or food is not available for purchase on the local market. A complementary interpretation might focus on the seasonality of remuneration. Cash transfers from the man to the spouse that occur in August when the maize check comes will certainly be consumed by the hungry months of February and March before the next harvest.

Qualitative data, indeed, suggests that there are serious problems of accumulation within the CPU which restrain expanded reproduction. This seems to be an especially grievous situation within agricultural enterprises but affects CPUs on all levels. The accumulation crisis at the CPU level reflects a complex conglomeration of difficulties of the marginal regional and national economies. On the one hand, this ties in with inflation and the general weakness of the national currency; on the other hand, it reflects the undeveloped service infrastructure which makes a superhuman effort of maintaining the most modest of mechanical devices.

For a Luapulan producer, accumulation options are minimal. Tractors, motorized equipment (mills, saws) and vehicles are, when available, sold at astronomic prices; pump irrigation is mechanically doubtful and expensive to operate; there is no tradition of animal draught power in this tsetse-infested region. For those who can mobilize the resources, urban building (shops, bars, houses) is perhaps the Luapulan ideal. It suits the petty commodity producer and the wage earner alike for it provides a virtual bank account into which small sporadic amounts of surplus cash and labor can be deposited over a period of several years.

One can perhaps generalize from this observation. Under the circumstances prevailing in such marginal economic systems the process of commodity production itself is used as an accumulation mechanism. The intermittent storing of small amounts of capital in a production process is undertaken not so much in the hope of profit, or surplus as in order to realize a single cumulative sum of capital for productive investment or consumption. This process is "accumulation" in the sense that otherwise—lacking the possibility of storing capital and labor in the commodity production process—the values involved would dissipate through normal process of consumption. Both maize farming and house-building are examples of this on differing levels of capitalization. The problem is that

once this intermittent capital is accumulated, the options for its productive investment are still limited.

Networking options in the reproductive sphere translate primarily as the choice of spouse. Marriage is naturally an area in which many factors other than labor allocation considerations prevail. We have stressed here the individuality of producers and the need to understand the discrete economic strategies of the different actors involved in commodity production. Nonetheless, field observations in rural Luapula suggest that the most successful CPU's are those in which management decisions are informed by a corporate strategic subject, that is a couple or group of adults collaborating in resource mobilization and sharing the rewards of production. The cultural and ideological factors which allow for network constitution on this basis are "syncretic" in the extreme and any attempt to understand them soon demonstrates, once again, why a methodology of oppositions (modern/traditional) must give way to a theory of unities and their constitution.

CONCLUSION

Throughout this paper the point of reference has been informed by two assumptions:

First, that the primary problem in a marginal regional context is of *insufficient domestic production* (of both goods and commodities). Low production levels interact in a complex way with problems of the *accumulation of wealth* within producer units, thus limiting their expanded reproduction, as well as the amount of extractable surplus for regional development. Hence, one might say that the conditions of commodity production are the single-most important indicator of the extent of the development process in any given region (although by no means the only one).

Second, different patterns of accumulation, i.e., of *differentiation* can have varying implications for development. The most crucial kind of differentiation from a development perspective is that which produces new groups (or classes) of actors capable of generating dynamic economic structures (social differentiation). Spatial differentiation (the concentration in space of actors and structures) becomes pertinent and understandable as an integral part of processes of social differentiation.

What now might be said about "urban development in rural contexts" as a focus for research?

The above discussion represents an attempt at deconstructing the dualistic modes of thought underlying classical urban and regional development models. The dichotomous relationship between urban and rural structures was superseded by a conception of regional development based on a *process* of the development of production for commodity markets. The

presentation included a suggestion for the conceptualization of this production process (in terms of producers and their strategies linked in overlapping networks) which might succeed in integrating the elusive social, cultural, political and economic facts which play a constitutive role in the basic patterns of social life in a coherent model.

Underlying the methodological discussion is an assumption about the progressive "**marginalization**" of many African economies. **Marginalization** implies the reduction of *reciprocal* links with the world market and has had an immense impact on the structure of national and subnational regional economies. One implication is that secondary urban settlement~ (like Mansa in Luapula Province, Zambia) have lost all theoretical pretensions of performing the role of an integrative node in a gradually modernizing society. Instead, the **Mansas** of Africa are becoming more and more transparently dependent upon both milking their "rural contexts" and on national budgetary allocations for survival.

In developmental terms, the regional conditions of commodity production are revealed as a key to the future of local communities in both urban and rural settings. Basic to an understanding of these conditions is the analysis of how producers formulate their strategies and network for their implementation. A subsequent problematique for empirical study concerns *linkages* between commodity production units (enterprises) on differing levels of capitalization, with different social constitutions and in divergent sectors of the economy within a specific regional framework. With reference to the Luapula example (which may be idiosyncratic in this respect), *traders and transporters* (themselves often itinerant commodity producers) appear to inhibit the interlinking of production units.

Reasons for this might be best sought in the spatial differentiation of prices between Luapula and Copperbelt which make export and import to and from the province far more lucrative than any intraregional commerce. Yet as has been noted above, initial capital for establishing trade and transport businesses is accumulated in the sphere of production. This area is poorly researched and could provide a rich terrain for further enquiry.

Urban centers such as Mansa encompass endless opportunities for interesting and relevant analysis in their own right, and it has certainly not been the point of this paper to reject studies of "urban development" out of hand. Yet Mansa's role in northeastern Zambia (and southeastern central Africa) cannot be understood without situating it in a richly and complexly conceptualized process of regional development (or **marginalization**). Hopefully this paper has made some progress in this direction.

NOTES

1. A number of contributions over the past few years to the discussion on petty commodity production have been moving in this direction (E.g. Gibbon and Neocosmos, 1985; Scott *et al.*, 1986; Bernstein, 1988; Binford and Cook, 1989). Much disagreement persists about central issues like the empirical criteria for including various categories within the category of petty commodity producers (Friedmann, 1980; Llambi, 1989) and the theoretical status of PCP within the general category of commodity production or a theory of capitalism (Bernstein, 1986).
2. See Bernstein, 1988, who notes: "PCP [petty commodity production] enterprises may, of course, consist of single individuals as well as 'household' or other groups" (p. 269); and elsewhere, in connection with conflicts within production units: "[T]his can take particular forms when a single 'household' comprises several distinct commodity-producing enterprises, partly overlapping or combined with distinct spheres of use-value production, as is common in African peasant economy" (p. 267).
3. On the concept of "economic system" see Burawoy, 1985.
4. For further discussion of the concept of commodity producing unit in the framework applied here see Binford and Cook, 1989.
5. For example, George Kay's (1964) meticulous study of cash and labor budgets in Chief Kalaba's village over one annual cycle gathered information on all cash transactions, but remarks "no details are available of the domestic division and use of cash by a man and his wife".

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Urban Development in a Rural Context: The Case of New Halfa, Sudan

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The experience of the Nubian people of Halfa, whether in their exodus and resettlement following the construction of the High Dam at Aswan or their perseverance in their old afflicted home, is unique in recent Sudanese history. New Halfa started as the largest known planned resettlement project in the country and is continually acquiring new dimensions in the face of changing circumstances. Having evolved in a rapid manner not initially anticipated, it provides invaluable experience which should be of benefit for both the new and old communities in the context of resettlement planning and should enable a clearer understanding of the complexities of rural-urban linkages and the imperatives behind this interaction.

This paper, dealing with New Halfa Town as its main subject, will examine two aspects:

1. the evolution of the town as an intermediate centre in the area, and
2. the social, demographic and physical change imposed on the resettled Nubians.

It will review the progress of the town at different stages, analyse some recent problems, and suggest priorities for development.

THE CREATION OF NEW HALFA

When the construction of the High Dam at Aswan was finally decided, the agreement between the Sudan and Egypt, concluded in November 1959, dictated that the affected Nubians of Northern Sudan were to be resettled in another site before June 1963. By that date the water would start its steady rise to submerge Wadi Halfa Town and continue to an estimated 67 metres above it. (This deadline was postponed more than once and the emigration did not actually begin until January 1964.) The population involved was about 50,000 coming from a stretch of some 160 kilometres of the river (Map 1).

Out of six alternative sites the location of Khashm Al Girba was selected (Map 2). The new settlement, consisting of New Halfa Town and twenty-five villages, is supported by the Khashm Al Girba agricultural scheme covering 125,000 faddans (54,500 hectares) and irrigated by the newly built dam across the Atbara River. The dam was designed to hold 1.3 billion

Map 1. *Wadi Halfa and Lake Nubia:*
Approximate locations offlooded regions

New Halfa, Sudan

Map 2. The locations of Wadi Halfa and New Halfa

cubic metres of water but has been used to hold only about 0.85 billion. At present the scheme includes the whole irrigated project of 500,000 faddans (218,000 hectares) in addition to the sugar estate, the second largest in the country. At the periphery of this development there are the self-constructed villages of the indigenous ex-nomadic tribe, the Shukriya, built to much lower standards than the Nubian villages (Map 3). The scheme now includes also the second largest cotton ginning factory and mills in the country.

The scheme is based on a tenancy system of irrigated agriculture common in the country. Each tenant is granted a standard size plot of land to cultivate according to regulations set by the administration which represents the state in this partnership. A multi-ethnicity is formed with the Nubians, the ex-nomadic tribes, and the agricultural workers as its main communities.

Rural-urban linkages are typical of agricultural communities with a single urban centre. Such links are characterised mainly by daily commuting and long distance migration patterns—the former is seen in the increasing daily movement to and from New Halfa Town, and the latter in the recent influx of migrants from Western Sudan as workers in the town, the sugar estate, and in tenancies—with the hope of eventual permanent settlement.

Stretching to the east and west of the Atbara River, the Butana plain in which Khashm Al Girba lies is a flat, featureless but fertile natural pasture, home to several nomadic and seminomadic tribes—the Shukriya, Zubaidiya, Hadandawa and others. It contrasts sharply with the dramatic setting of Wadi Halfa with its desert, mountains, grand archaeological monuments and date palms. The present dissatisfaction and nostalgia of the resettled Nubians are further exacerbated by the previous homogeneity (immensely valued by the population) in their original home and the relative isolation of Wadi Halfa in common with all northern Sudanese settlements.

Not all those who left the flooded villages headed for the resettlement area—a significant number went to settle in Khartoum and in other large urban centres forming fairly coherent neighbourhoods.

To complete the picture, those who refused to leave the Wadi Halfa region amount to about 23,000 of whom 7,900 live in the town (1983 census). A quarter of a century of suffering and hard work has enabled them to develop some agriculture and fishing while other feasible projects remain unaccomplished. But the damage is by no means irreversible. Worried about the adverse effects of water storage up to the 179 metre contour as originally planned, Egypt is said to be thinking of reducing the amount of stored water, possibly to the 165–166 metre contour at Wadi Halfa.¹ That would liberate large areas of fertile soil from the dangers of seasonal flooding. An ambitious project is now being devised to create new villages as close to the submerged ones as possible, as well as to better exploit the

New Halfa, Sudan

Map 3. *Khashm Al Gharb* resettlement scheme

Source: Halfa Resettlement Board 1970, corrected 1980.

potentials of the region: agriculture, fishing, port facilities, tourism, brick-making and other activities. This need not concern us here except in so far as the development of the two areas, Wadi Halfa and New Halfa, are strongly linked and are invariably viewed together by the development agencies.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature on New Halfa as a town is almost non-existent when compared to that on the economic development aspects of the project. There is a dearth of data on the area totally incompatible with the significance of the whole project, a lack of reliable demographic statistics, of up-to-date maps and aerial photographs. We relied on our experience and observations and on interviews with officials and citizens besides the listed references. We can briefly review some relevant studies.

In his *The Nubian Exodus*, Hassan Dafa'alla, then Commissioner for Emigration (1958–64), gave a lucid account of the exodus with a detailed description of the history of the dam project, the choice of the resettlement site, the building of the new settlements, the Khashm Al Girba Dam and agricultural project, compensation, evacuation, emigration and eventual settlement in the new land. While admirably detailed and sympathetic, the account has been criticized for skipping some unpleasant, but not insignificant, incidents and sweeping lightly over others.² Dafa'alla died at 50, in 1974, before many of the present problems could have been predicted.

Gunnar Sørnbø analyses the exploitation phenomenon advanced by Tony Barnett (1977) in his study of the Gezira Scheme: that tenants in the scheme survived on very low incomes augmented by the credit arrangements from wealthy tenants who, as a rule, have sources of income other than their tenancies. This, Barnett claims, is what allowed the scheme to be run at minimum cost and the cotton to be sold at low prices. Sørnbø concludes from his own field work in New Halfa that there are similarities between the two situations lying in the very poor conditions of the tenants in both schemes with even lower incomes for the New Halfa tenant. But credit arrangements are much less prevalent in New Halfa and he draws the conclusion that it is the off-scheme pursuits and extra incomes which allow the tenant to survive. He analyses the high absentee rate, the holding of double tenancies, the wakil system (person in charge appointed to represent an absentee tenant), and the attraction of urban jobs in New Halfa town — particularly for the Nubian population. For the Nubian, the town is competing with the tenancy. Tenants, he argues, are not highly motivated to devote their full time to agriculture as there is not a "clear, unmistakable correlation between labour inputs, yields and income" (Sørnbø, 1977a: 38).

Abu Sin, dealing mainly but not exclusively with the nomadic population, argues for an integrated development which pays livestock more attention than it currently gets in agricultural schemes. He studies the Khashm Al Girba and Rahad schemes and criticizes the exclusion of livestock from agricultural activities even when nomads are included as tenants. His survey results conclude that projects with livestock are more rewarding than others concentrating on crops alone. He suggests approaches to improve livestock economy in both schemes either through measures within each or through the integration of both projects within the regional economy of the whole Butana area which includes natural grazing, mechanised crop production areas and irrigated areas (Abu Sin, 1970).

More recently, *The National Conference for the Attainment of Healthful Drinking Water, Safe Water Supply and Raised Standards of General Health in New Halfa* was held during March 1988. The participants included experts from the various related ministries, commissions, corporations, universities and similar bodies, in addition to representatives of sixteen international organizations like the WHO, UNICEF and the World Bank.

The conference discussed issues related to health and focused on those of drinking water (Proceedings of the National Conference ..., 1988). A report had proved the unsuitability of the available drinking water for human consumption due to its pollution with pathogenic bacteria.

The recommendations were summed up in six major issues:

1. to make available a safe and hygienic drinking water supply for the whole population;
2. to upgrade the blood bank to comply with the increased density of population in the area;
3. to upgrade the main hospital and improve and extend the peripheral hospitals in the area;
4. to improve the mother and child health and family planning services in the area by:
 - a. carrying out a maternity mortality rate study in the area as a basic means of evaluation,
 - b. instituting a village midwifery school to serve the whole area;
5. to improve the community health services in the area with the aim of:
 - a. eradicating water-borne diseases especially bilharzia, malaria and leishmaniasis which are the main endemic diseases of the area,
 - b. combating epidemic diseases such as infective hepatitis and HIV infections, which are endangering the area through the influx of refugees;
6. to improve laboratory services in the area in order to help in:
 - a. diagnosing diseases,
 - b. providing a safe water supply.

THE EVOLUTION OF NEW HALFA TOWN

The town was planned on the familiar grid-iron pattern with a central business district (CBD), and housing units of standard size and layout, giving it a uniform morphology, structure and strict functional zoning (Map 3). The residential area amounts to 70–80 per cent of the total built-up area, the rest is occupied by the commercial and trade centre, the administrative and social services and a small industrial area.

It seems that this planning was intended initially to provide higher-order services not available in the resettlement villages. Gradually, however, the town, being the only urban centre in the project, has developed and is at present providing urban amenities to almost ten times the initial planned population. It is responding, albeit in an unplanned manner, to the new developments in the project. The market has changed in function and size in response to the needs of a wide range of population groups from the Butana nomads to the Nubian settlers to labourers from Western Sudan and West Africa. The residential area has been restructured to meet the needs of the increasing number of government officials. House selling is increasing and even Nubian houses are changing hands between new residents and speculators. Illegal settlement is now stretching over most of the land allotted for future expansion.

The town has shown a rise in population, putting it among the fastest growing towns of its status in the country (Table 1 and Map 4). Its evolution is characterized by three distinct phases.

Phase I 1964–1968

This was a phase of standard structure and function, uniform activities and slow growth trends. It covered a more or less rectangular area about 35 km in length including the 25 villages with the town centrally located to serve them. The villages were provided with most of the basic services while the town was meant to provide higher-order services in health, education, wholesale trade and administration solely for these villages. During this initial period the town reflected the status originally intended by the planners.

Phase II 1968–1978

In this decade the second phase of the project was completed and a new sector of the population, a different subculture with different needs, appeared and started to share the town facilities. The town structure and function began to change from the intended stereotypic form and was beginning to serve not only the 50,000 resettled Nubians but a population of some 300,000, resident in the whole project area. Though the town struc-

ture underwent no basic change, New Halfa was rapidly acquiring the status of a regional town.

Phase III 1978 onwards

This period marks the stage in which the town acquired a real regional urban status with population diversity and an intermediate town characteristics and the cropping up of illegal settlements, overcrowding and shortage of basic amenities typical of Sudanese intermediate towns subjected to increasing migration and daily commuting. New Halfa has acquired a primate rank in the project area; the absence of low-order urban centres has accelerated the primacy process and the town seems to have passed its threshold since it is now serving a population of about 600,000. Buses from over 200 villages with an average capacity of 30 people each come daily to town, i.e. about 6,000 people commute daily to participate in the business life of the town and strengthen the rural-urban links. Functionally and demographically, New Halfa is now the fourth urban centre in the region.

A few indicators will show this change of status of the town from a central place to provide some services to a purely agrarian, settled community to the only multifunctional, commercial town in the whole project area. These indicators include:

1. the increase in commercial rents in the CBD from £S* 100 to £S 500 per month for a 4x4 metres shop, and the purchase price from £S 4,000 to £S 40,000 from the early seventies to the present;
2. the increase in the cost of a 3-room house from £S 18,000 in 1980 to £S 70,000 in 1988;
3. the rise of illegal settlements to account for 25–30 per cent of the built-up area of the town in 1988 compared to less than 5 per cent in the early 1970s and their total absence in the mid-sixties;
4. the purchase and ownership of originally Nubian houses by non-Nubians, mostly merchants and some Sudanese working in rich Arab countries;
5. land disputes between the original inhabitants, illegal squatters, merchants and the Shukriya tenants who claim some right to, at least, some of the vacant land in the town;
5. a mounting pressure on the basic services originally designed to meet the needs of a far smaller population. This has evidently reflected on the urban environment, hygiene, economy and the town's ability to cater for the growing needs of the residents and daily commuting population.

As a result of these dynamic forces, New Halfa Town has developed some new characteristics. Though by national standards of classification of

* Sudanese Pounds.

towns it is an intermediate-size town, it is, however, performing primate functions in the irrigated scheme. The town is undergoing a gradual functional transformation to meet the increasing needs of the scheme's rural population, mostly the non-Nubian population. The commercial, administrative, transport and service functions are the main flourishing activities in the town. The town is now properly connected to its hinterland through a heavy daily commuting of rural people with a peak of activity between 08:00 and midday.

Table 1. *Population of the towns of the Eastern Region**

TOWN	POPULATION 1983	POPULATION 1988
Port Sudan	212,741	262,735
Kassala	142,909	168,631
Gadarif	119,002	153,512
New Halfa	37,232	45,050
Khashm Al Girba	19,962	28,645
Al Hawwata	15,110	20,096
Doka	12,208	17,839
Tokar	12,190	11,641
Al Masna' (Sugar Estate)	11,516	13,300
Ash-Shuwak	8,639	11,144
Sinkat	7,718	8,750
Waggar	7,148	9,650
Jabeit	7,002	8,052
Qal' An-Nahal	5,780	6,907
Al Faw	5,157	6,137
Haya	3,795	—
Al Mafaza	2,926	3,262

* 1983 data are census figures; 1988 figures are projections.

Trends in development as an intermediate town

Over the last twenty years, the life span of the scheme, the town has had to cope with the needs of the whole scheme area covering close to half a million people and perform a complex administrative, commercial and service role. The result has not been a change in urban characteristics but more a development of the basic characteristics and functions. The commercial activities have increased ten-fold, the administrative, five-fold, the health, educational and transportation more than ten-fold. This expansion is met by a limited spatial capacity and meagre room for development. The 289-bed hospital has to serve the needs of half a million inhabitants of the scheme. The two secondary schools provide limited chances for a large number of pupils graduating from the intermediate schools scattered in

New Halfa, Sudan

Map 4. Settlements of the Eastern Region, 1988

the town hinterland. The limited capacity of the residential area is hardly compatible with the growing need for shelter. As a result, illegal settlements have emerged of a size rarely comparable with a town of similar size, function and status. Commercial activities are expanding into vacant places at the expense of parking lots and open spaces. Administrative departments are competing with residential needs in buildings designed originally for residence.

New Halfa rural hinterland

The rural hinterland of the town falls under four categories:

1. *An inner circle* around the town comprising the resettlement area. The inhabitants are almost exclusively Nubians living in villages that provide their everyday needs. For higher-order needs of health, education, administration, etc., they have to turn to the town; their contact with the town tends to be specific, regular and systematic. Their relationship with the town has undergone no substantial change for the last twenty years.
2. *An outer circle* covering the rest of the scheme area. This zone includes the Shukriya and other ex-nomadic tenants, the agricultural seasonal labourers, and the sugar estate. This outer circle has grown to comprise the majority in terms of population and demand for the town services. Its complex and diverse needs now direct the functional change, growth and morphology of the town which have been manifested in some recent features. One is the expansion of the market and the growth of wholesale and specialised quarters in the market, for example, livestock, grain, building materials, agricultural tools, petty trade, etc. Another feature is the growth of the CBD horizontally and vertically into a multi-functional sector including banks, clinics, hotels, etc. A third feature is the appearance of a new class of merchants from Central Sudan owning shopping centres, controlling businesses and buying residential buildings and plots. The business activities of the town have started to reflect the typical characteristics of central Sudan's fast growing intermediate towns, rather than the typical northern Sudanese town. All this has resulted in a blend of the population showing a complexity in ethnicity, lifestyles, interests and behaviour.
3. *The Central Butana nomadic area* which forms the outermost circle outside the scheme boundary. The movement of the people of Central Butana is a seasonal one, between April and July. The majority settle in the Shukriya villages and contribute to the daily flow into the town during this period.

4. The *refugee camp area* to the south of the scheme area. Refugees come to town to work as casual, mainly unauthorized, labourers and for shopping purposes.

The total population of the town's hinterland has shown a remarkable increase in the post-1983 census period.

Table 2. *Population of the rural hinterland of New Halfa Town 1983 and 1987*

	1983	1987
New Halfa (rural)	87,856	101,047
River Atbara	158,765	182,293
Refugees	—	55,140
Central Butana	—	50,000

Source: 1983 census and projections.

Table 3. *The number of villages of the rural hinterland, 1987*

New Halfa Rural Council	41 villages including 25 of the Shukriya
Khashm Al Girba Rural Council	22 villages
As-Sab'at Rural Council	26 villages
The Sugar Estate (Al Masna')	10 villages (mainly labour camps)
New Halfa Town	18 neighbourhoods

Rural-urban interaction and reciprocity

To detect this process, further research is essential but there are some relevant broad points that could be mentioned here based on empirical evidence and observation.

The town has provided *the focal point* of interaction for a rural population of a wide complexity. As a result, it has become a melting pot for ethnically, culturally and economically diverse sectors of a purely agrarian population (the Nubians), ex-nomads (the Shukriya and others), ex-peasants (the Western Sudanese and West Africans), traders, government officials and refugees. The economic and service interests and the mutual benefits between rural and town people are naturally the main force behind this interaction.

The town, benefitting from the inflow of cash provided by the rural people, has responded by expanding its functional capacity to absorb this cash. In the absence of proper planning to cope with hinterland needs the

town has had to adjust to meet such needs. The result of this interaction is a noticeable change in growth rate, trends and even morphology.

OPENING UP A CLOSED AREA

The Nubians are not taking all these changes without reservation. To them, the area is primarily a *resettlement* and compensation area, not one for normal development and investment; moral and psychological elements should not be overlooked. Perceived essentially as a "closed area, the new settlement was phased into different stages to cater for present and future generations of Nubians (Map 3). To them, proud as they are of their culture of several millenia, maintaining their identity and homogeneity was a fundamental condition. In fact, as early as December 1959, barely a month after the agreement was concluded, representatives of the people of Wadi Halfa handed the Head of State a petition with twelve demands. Among them:

1. "the people should be resettled in a manner which would preserve the identity and unity of their community"; and
2. "the geographic and social unity of the villages should be preserved with their existing characteristics" (Dafa'alla, 1975).

The idea of "opening up" the region and declaring it a "national" urban centre is seen by Nubians as a grave violation of the fundamental agreement and one that will dramatically affect their future in their new home.

At the physical level, the major problem is that they are now locked between the river on the east and the non-Nubian settlements and tenancies on the other sides with little hope for natural expansion. The Nubians' 7,000 tenancies (120,000 feddans or 52,300 hectares) are overwhelmed by 14,000 tenancies of the non-Nubians. To the resentment of the resettled people, residential land and shopping space in town are gradually being taken over by non-Nubians. The hopes of creating a new home environment are fading away and the resettled people are becoming a smaller and smaller minority.

Even more serious, New Halfa is now full of spontaneous settlements and camps sheltering (seasonal!) agricultural labourers who come mainly from the Western provinces. Government officials have on some occasions declared their intention to settle these labourers permanently in the region, and replan and upgrade some neighbourhoods to legal status. Both the Nubians and the Shukriya disapprove of the idea and they have come to the inescapable conclusion that the move is politically motivated. Eastern Sudan is known to be an area dominated by supporters of the Democratic Unionist Party, the second largest party in the country, while Western Su-

dan is a domain of the Mahdist Umma Party. With the approach of the 1990 elections the Umma Party is keen to 'plant' some of its supporters in the east to counter the huge support for the competing party. This encourages the replanning of spontaneous areas and official recognition of land tenure to secure voting rights. The suspicion is strengthened by the fact that no such conflict had ever arisen during the one-party military regime, although most of the dynamic evolution of the scheme took place then. The whole matter is now before the courts. Among the main reasons for choosing the area, in fact, was the absence of a settled population, hence the elimination of the possibility of conflicts later.³

PRIORITIES FOR DEVELOPMENT

In common with all Sudanese towns, New Halfa lacks adequate infrastructure and services and fails to provide acceptable shelter to part of its residents. Non-governmental organisations, mainly the National Commission for Development and Reconstruction of Wadi Halfa and Lake Nubia, play a leading role in raising issues, formulating projects and attracting funds in both Wadi Halfa and New Halfa. At present, they are seeking ways to motivate the unemployed youth of New Halfa to overcome the sharp labour shortage in Wadi Halfa. They have recently secured loans from FINNIDA (Finnish International Development Agency) to extend the electricity grid to the ten villages that have remained without electricity. Credit must go to the people in their spontaneous efforts at diversifying the economic base and creating employment opportunities; they have established about one hundred small factories and workshops producing ice, cheese, sweets, **cooking** oil, soap, macaroni and other products.

Under such conditions all fields are in need of development but some projects, from our discussions and interviews, seem to take a higher priority. These are:

1. the provision of safe drinking water;
2. a hospital with all specialisations since the existing hospital is unable to cope with the growing number of patients and is not well equipped to play an effective role;
3. a vocational training centre keeping in mind the number of unemployed and underemployed frustrated youth and the presence of the sugar factory, the ginning factory, the mills and smaller enterprises;
4. a secondary school;
5. an adequate road network.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

New Halfa was created as a resettlement town, i.e. a new home for the agrarian Nubian people; it was meant to be shared by them and the indigenous ex-nomadic population—mainly the Shukriya. The town has developed in a persistent manner to perform an intermediate town function, but a primate one at a micro-regional level, and is moving rapidly up the regional urban hierarchy.

Although it is not undergoing any structural changes in its functions, it is experiencing fast growth and intensification of its commercial, administrative, service and transport functions. Its linkages with its rural hinterland are becoming more strongly articulated, more elaborate and frequent, and highly reciprocal.

Now a melting pot for different sub-cultures, it has deviated from its original purpose and no longer reflects the culture and lifestyle of the resettled Nubians.

The original idea to plan the whole scheme to cater for future generations of Nubians has apparently been overlooked and now the Nubians are practically squeezed between the river and the peripheral settlements with no room for expansion. Worse, the government is declaring the town "an open area" and is attempting to settle permanently some communities from the Western provinces for obvious political reasons.

At this juncture it may be tempting to explore the prospects of another urban centre, or other urban centres, in the scheme to release some of the pressure on New Halfa and attain a more balanced development at the regional level. One could suggest here that *Sab'at* in the extreme north-west of the scheme and New Sufiya, thirty kilometers north of the sugar estate are two settlements potentially suitable for lower-order urban centres (Map 4). Naturally, each has its advantages and disadvantages. But the exercise is obviously beyond the scope of the present paper and will be the subject of a subsequent paper.

New Halfa needs consolidated action at several levels: to go back to the original agreement and control the population structure of the town; to replan the area to allow for future expansion for the resettled Nubian population; to develop the structure of the town to cope with the new functions; to develop the inadequate infrastructure and services in common with all Sudanese towns; to maintain and intensify the existing links between the two sectors of the Nubians in New Halfa and in Wadi Halfa and attempt an integration of resources; to explore prospects for another urban centre in the region to release pressure and attain some urban balance within the scheme area.

Only thus can New Halfa aspire to fulfil its envisaged aims, effectively lead to development at the national level, and avoid the paths leading to racial conflicts which have plagued other parts of the country.

NOTES

1. Sayed Ahmed Sherief Daoud, Head of the Halfa Integration and Development Committee, personal communication.
2. Sayed Ahmed Sherief Daoud and others.
3. Since this was written another military coup d'etat has toppled the democratically elected government.

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The above authors contributed with others to a conference on Small Town Africa: Studies in Rural–Urban Interaction, which was arranged by the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies in Uppsala in September 1989.

Small towns have often been considered as unimportant or even as anomalous phenomena and consequently have been largely ignored by policy makers and researchers. Instead, attention was focussed on the large city or on rural development and agricultural change without consideration being given to the positive contribution that small towns can make to rural transformation.

But for the overwhelming majority of Africa's population which is rural, it is the small town with which they have the most frequent and intense contacts and which provides the foci for economic, social, political and cultural rural–urban interaction. The papers in this book address a wide range of issues relating to the small town in rural context from both the macro perspective, including the role of the state, to the micro perspective where attention is given to the vitality and adaptability of individual actors through their utilisation of rural and urban opportunities. Case studies are drawn from Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

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