REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

A Post-Apartheid Perspective

Edited by
Bertil Odén and Haroub Othman

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The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala 1989

Cover: Detail from On the other side of the border, a small tapestry made **by** Mmaphala Koboyatshwene and Mosire Morake from the weaving cooperative in Oodi, Lentswe la Oodi Weavers, Botswana

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Abbreviations

AAC	Anglo-American Corporation
AACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (signatories of the Lomé Conventions)
AED	Africa Economic Digest
AET	Africa Educational Trust
ANC	African National Congress
BOLESWERA	Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland Educational Research Association
CFTC	Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation
CMI	Chr Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway
CONSAS	Constellation of Southern African States
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CSM	Church of Sweden Mission
CODESRIA	Council for the Development of Social Research in Africa
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DANIDA	Danish International Development Authority
DUH	Norwegian Ministry for Development Assistance
ECOWAS	Economic Commission of West African States
ECLA	UN Economic Commission for Latin America
EEC	European Economic Community
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
ELOK	Evangelical Lutheran Ovambo-Kavango Church
ESA	Europe-Southern Africa Conference
ESARG	Europe-Southern Africa Research Group
FINNIDA	Finnish International Development Authority
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
IATA	International Air Transport Association
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDAF	International Defense and Aid Fund
IFU	Industrialization Fund for Developing Countries
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISAK	Isolate South Africa Committee, Sweden
ISAS	Institute of Southern African Studies , Lesotho
ISI	import substitution industrialization
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MFN	most favoured nation
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NMS	Norwegian Missionary Society
NSMS	National Security Management System
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for International Development
OAU	Organization of African Unity

ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PTA	Preferential Treatment Area (Eastern and Southern Africa)
SAARC	South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SADIS	Southern African Documentation and Information System
SADRA	Southern African Development and Research Association
SAECS	Southern Africa-Europe Container Service
SALC	Southern African Labour Commission
SAREC	Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries
SATCC	Southern African Transport and Communications Commission
SAUSSC	Southern African Universities Social Science Council
SIAS	Scandinavian Institute of African Studies
SIDA	Swedish International Development Authority
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organisation
SWEDFUND	Swedish Fund for Industrial Co-operation with Developing Countries
TAZARA	Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority
TNC	Transnational Corporation
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNIDO	United Nations Industry Development Organization
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WCC	World Council of Churches
WUS	World University Service
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union

Preface

The need for cooperation between scholars from the Southern Africa region and the Nordic countries has been recognized for some years. As Nordic relations with SADCC and its member countries were strengthened cooperation in the research field was put on the agenda. Hence SADRA and SIAS undertook to initiate a conference.

The conference theme was "Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa with a Post-Apartheid Perspective". These proceedings contain the results of this joint effort. The conference was convened in Harare, Zimbabwe, 21-23 September 1988, bringing together scholars from the Southern Africa region and the Nordic countries, interested in Southern African issues.

From the SIAS' point of view the conference formed part of the Southern Africa Programme, one of three ongoing thematic programmes at the Institute. One main aim of this programme is to strengthen Nordic research on Southern Africa, and this obviously cannot be done without a wider and deeper cooperation between researchers in the Nordic countries and their colleagues in Southern Africa.

SADRA was founded with one of its objectives being to make an intellectual contribution to the efforts of the Southern African countries to distance themselves from the apartheid regime of South Africa, and to bring about a closer cooperation among themselves. It was felt therefore that the research community of the two regions, working on Southern African questions, should get together to look at the possibilities of cooperation and to complement each other's efforts. Thus the conference was informed of ongoing and planned research in both regions in the field of regional cooperation; discussed papers relating to various aspects of regional cooperation in Southern Africa; and identified research projects where scholars from the two regions can cooperate.

The conference was financed by SIDA, the Swedish International Development Authority, and part of the practical arrangements were carried out by the Regional Office of SAREC, the Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries, and ZIDS, the Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies. We acknowledge this support with gratitude. We would also like to thank Karin Andr and Susanne Ljung, SIAS, for their careful and unflagging efforts to make the manuscripts correct and coherent.

Uppsala, February 1989

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Introduction

Bertil Odén and Haroub Othman

In order to provide a more substantive basis for the discussions on future research cooperation a number of papers were commissioned for the conference in Harare. They are included in these proceedings and they cover a wide area of topics, exemplifying the diversified research activities that are going on in the two regions.

In the first paper *Tor Sellström* presents some factors behind the present intense relations between Southern Africa and the Nordic countries, revealing also a number of Nordic-South Africa relations as late back as the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Elling Njål Tjønneland discusses in his paper South African regional policies. While he analyses the vast possibilities for social and economic development of the entire region after the liberation of South Africa he also points out that there will remain difficulties to escape from the dominance and dependency relations inherited from the past, and suggests areas of importance on a common research agenda.

Gabriele Winai Strom in her paper on labour and migrant labour in the region discusses some of the aspects of the present mining labour structure in a post-apartheid perspective, including the different factors that will possibly increase and decrease the demand for migrant labour in the South African mines after apartheid.

Both C.K. *Brown* and *Ansu Datta* discuss the need for strengthened and improved regional cooperation in their respective papers. Brown argues that the synchronization of SADCCs developmental objectives calls for the coordination of research activities at the regional level and that this requires effective regional information service and data base. Datta discusses the options and constraints when it comes to developing regional cooperation between the non-governmental organisations. He argues that cooperation among NGOs may be effective when based on certain broad ideological tenets, and that the biggest problems that may afflict attempts at regional cooperation through grassroots organizations concern finance and leadership.

In his paper *Hans Abrahamson* discusses options and strategies for developing the shipping sector of the front line states, dealing with the present structure of line conferences etc. He argues that Nordic aid has to include more of soft ware support for national transport entities in shipping and forwarding, and suggests a number of issues requiring further research.

A comprehensive analysis of Nordic aid to the SADCC region is presented in the paper by Tom Østergaard, as a background to a discussion of the so-called Nordic initiative and its implementation as a new feature in the cooperation between SADCC and the Nordic countries. Another background to this initiative, taking as the point of departure the concept of a New International Economic Order is presented in the paper by Helge Hveem. Both papers are looking into the prospects for future regional cooperation, also outside the aid sphere.

This is also partly the perspective of the paper by Jan Isaksen. However, he concentrates on a discussion of possible development in South Africa and the impact on the regional cooperation of those assumptions. The paper concludes by presenting a number of important issues for further research.

Gwen Malahleha's paper analyses the present and possible future effects of the South African education system of today and points out the obstacles that are created also in the post-apartheid perspective, as it denies blacks access to the kind of education which should empower them with the necessary skills so as to be participants in the control and transformation of their country.

One paper which was presented at the conference, but not included here, was Bertil Odén's and Kenneth Hermele's paper on the effects of international sanctions on South Africa and the neighbouring states. One main conclusion in the paper being that also partial sanctions are important, perhaps not in themselves, but as part of a cumulative pressure which reduces the scope of manoeuvre for the apartheid regime. This paper was published as Discussion Paper No. 1 from the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.

There seems to be no area that is not on the research agenda of the researchers of the two regions. What also seems to distinguish both the papers included here and the discussions that took place, is the commitment of those present in Harare to radical change of the Southern African societies so that they are able to extricate themselves from the apartheid grip and to create sound, self-reliant economies and forge regional cooperation.

Since apartheid is known to be the destabilising factor in the region, hampering both independent national development of these countries and closer cooperation among themselves, it was natural for the conference to see the end of apartheid as a precondition for whatever dreams of the future one might have for this region.

The papers by the Nordic scholars presented in this volume show only a small part of the research interests of the Nordic "Southern Africanists". The inventory that was presented at the conference, but which unfortunately cannot be reproduced here, indicates the research undertakings that are going on in the Scandinavian countries on Southern Africa. It is hoped that the inventory, once updated, will be circulated widely and thereby give an idea of the intellectual pursuits of the Nordic scholars. A

similar inventory, indicating the research pursuits of the Southern African scholars, is being prepared.

The research topics, appended to the volume, were the ideas thrown around at the groups' discussions. Unfortunately, the concluding plenary session of the conference did not have time to go through each of them and pronounce itself on its soundness and feasibility.

We reproduce all of them here, without even an attempt to edit them, in the hope that they will indicate the range of interests both of the conference participants and their colleagues in the research institutions they represented. In no way should it be understood that the research community in the two regions is being asked to concentrate only in those areas.

One of the things agreed and appreciated by everybody present at the conference was the urgent need for intellectual cooperation and collaboration between the researchers of the two regions, not only coming from the institutions present at the conference.

It is our great hope that the researchers will seize this opportunity, and that institutions such as SADRA, SIAS and the research institutes in each of the countries of the two regions will make such cooperation possible.

But such kind of cooperation will definitely require financial support. While the research institutes themselves might not be in a position to fund such activities, it is hoped that the funding organisations of the Nordic countries will financially support such endeavours, and that countries of the Southern African region, when requesting aid from the Nordic countries, will include the element of research in the aid programme. SIDA, in financially sponsoring the conference, has indicated that there is already an awareness and an appreciation in the North of the need for research cooperation. Let us hope that others, too, will come to that view.

Some Factors behind Nordic Relations with Southern Africa

Tor Sellström

We all have a role to play in opposing apartheid. (...) The organizers of today's meeting are (...) a further example of how widespread the interest is today in Southern African issues. This is exceedingly gratifying. (...) It is by taking joint responsibility that we can contribute towards abolishing the apartheid system, (which can **only**) live because it gets support from outside.

(The late Swedish Prime Minister Olof **Palme** in his last speech, held at the "Swedish People's Parliament Against Apartheid, organized by the non-governmental Isolate South Africa Committee (ISAK) in Stockholm, 21–23 February 1986).

Public Nordic engagements in contemporary Southern African political and economic affairs are considerable. Why Southern Africa? Are there any particular reasons for, or factors behind, this involvement? What is it based upon? How did it develop?

Most observers agree that political considerations have been decisive in the elaboration of official Nordic policies towards the Southern African region, while economic concerns have played but a minor **role**.¹ In his paper to this conference (Aiming beyond conventional development assistance: An analysis of Nordic aid to the **SADCC** region), **Østergaard** concludes that "the Nordic countries have virtually no economic interests (trade and investment) in the **SADCC** region" and that "it was the political support and humanitarian assistance to the liberation movements in Southern Africa which, from the late **1960s**, formed the basis for the present Nordic **commitment**".²

Hence, the engagement should primarily be understood as a political stand on two obsolete and inhuman regimes still existing in Southern Africa after the second World War, i.e. colonialism and apartheid.

Policies opposing colonialism and apartheid are not only pursued by the Nordic countries. What is particular to—or, at least, more pronounced in—the Nordic countries is that these policies are broadly anchored in the public opinion and that they are non-divisive from national political points of view. In the Nordic countries, political parties, trade unions, churches, sport, cultural and youth organizations etc., do not limit themselves to non-committal declarations, but are—albeit to varying degrees within and between the countries—actively involved in campaigns supporting those who struggle against colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa.³

In Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden it is today—in a generic sense—relevant to speak about broadly based National Solidarity Movements for Southern Africa, within which various political currents flow together,⁴ that advocate a principled support to the true opponents of apartheid⁵ and from which the respective governments confidently can draw support for internationally advanced policies, such as sanctions against South Africa and assistance to the liberation movements, as well as for the granting of considerable aid resources to the majority-ruled States in the region.⁶

A dissenting voice is, however, represented by Nordic business interests (and their political organizations and parties), who lobby in favour of maintained economic relations with South Africa, while at the same time showing but a lukewarm interest in economic undertakings in the SADCC region.

In this paper, I shall try to point toward some possible explanatory factors behind a relationship between regions that geographically are "poles apart", but which on a series of fundamental issues relating to international politics, humanitarian questions, development problems, to a large extent have become "concerned partners". In so doing, the author—who is not an academic researcher—is aware of the fact that he is entering into **unmapped** territories. The impressionistic loose threads that follow would, thus, have to be woven into a fabric, whose strength remains to be tested, hopefully through joint research by institutions in the Nordic and the Southern African countries, such as **SIAS** and **SADRA**.⁷

DIMENSIONS OF NORDIC INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Pending mandatory sanctions by the Security Council, the Nordic countries have decided to take unilateral measures in order to restrict their economic and other relations with South Africa and Namibia.

The Nordic countries are of the opinion that assistance to South Africa's neighbouring countries must be increased in order to alleviate the effects of **destabilization**, to strengthen their power of resistance and to reduce their dependence on South Africa. Likewise, assistance to the opponents and victims of the apartheid system must be increased. The Nordic countries consider assistance to be a complement to sanctions, not an alternative.

(From the Nordic Programme of Action Against Apartheid, adopted by the Nordic Ministers of Foreign Affairs, **Tromsø**, Norway, 23–24 March 1988.)

When the Swedish government in mid-March 1987 announced its decision to present a bill on prohibition of trade with South Africa and Namibia, the reaction of the Pretoria regime was, not surprisingly, far from indifferent. In a language representative of Pretoria's mode of conduct, the English-speaking daily *The Citizen*, mouthpiece of the Afrikaner Nationalist majority within the white minority, told Sweden "to go to hell!"

Aware of the fact that sanctions do work and that they are an effective instrument for change, particularly if coupled with support to the positive

forces inside South Africa, as well as assistance to the Frontline States, in the following weeks *The Citizen* set out to drum up opinions against Sweden. Thus, in the editorial of 8 April 1987, *The Citizen* commented that "the Swedes should stop mucking about in a sub-continent in which they have no real stake. (...) One day, when Sweden's hostility becomes too dangerous, and its direct interference in our internal affairs too much to bear, it should not be surprised if "Swedes go home!" becomes a popular slogan".⁸

Apartheid is not only a South African concern. It is a socio-economic system in which the major Western powers have fundamental interests, as was, for example, documented when they in February 1987 blocked the UN Security Council's draft resolution on mandatory selective sanctions against South Africa. It is, therefore, not surprising to encounter similar attitudes to the one expressed by *The Citizen* also among representatives of these powers, who seem to think that the "mucking about" in Southern Africa of countries without a colonial past in the region, huge investment or other tangible interests only serves to "confuse the issues" and to "disrupt the orderly process of change", as presupposed in policies such as "Constructive Engagement". Thus, at a SADCC conference in Swaziland in 1985, the leader of the delegation from a major Western power complained to the Swedish delegation about the Nordic call for sanctions, support to the liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia and their "idealistic" view of development assistance to the majority-ruled States in Southern Africa. "It is so easy for you Nordics", he said. "You have no interests at stake." And with reference to what he evidently saw as an impotent group of Frontline States: "You are just another Backline State".

A recurrent argument used by the South African regime and other defenders of *status quo* in Southern Africa is that the Nordic countries are outsiders, without historical links to the region and no interests to defend there. While this may seem apparent to many observers of contemporary events in South and Southern Africa, such arguments do not, however, tally with the realities that since a long time back have influenced the Nordic peoples and governments in their abhorrence of the apartheid system and their solidarity with the democratic forces in the region. Actually, Nordic engagement both in the history of South Africa and Namibia and in the nation-building of the Frontline States is probably greater than that of many Western powers, such as the United States, West Germany or France.

Historic relations between the Nordic and the Southern African regions will be discussed below. Before entering into this rather wide arena, it seems, however, appropriate to illustrate the extent of contemporary Nordic engagement in Southern Africa, thereby placing Nordic contributions to the progressive process of independence and nation-building in perspective. Three dimensions of this engagement should merit particular attention, namely (i) the weight of political considerations; (ii) the size of

economic assistance; and (iii) the role of coordination within and between the Nordic and the Southern African regions.

As was stated in the Introduction—and as can be seen from the "Nordic Programme of Action Against Apartheid" quoted above—it is political considerations that have influenced Nordic decision-makers and legislators when formulating policies towards the Southern African region. Yesterday, it was the struggle against Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique, as well as against British colonialism and settler usurpation of power in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, that motivated support to MPLA, FRELIMO and the Patriotic Front (ZANU and ZAPU).

Today, it is—still—the South African occupation of Namibia, the apartheid system in South Africa and Pretoria's destabilization of the Frontline States that motivate humanitarian and development assistance. Sanctions against South Africa, humanitarian support to the liberation movements and—once independence has been achieved—economic assistance to the new nations for the development of the fragile economic entities left by colonialism and threatened by Pretoria are part and parcel of overall foreign policy considerations.

Thus, in the case of Sweden, public engagement in the form of development assistance to Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zambia was initiated towards the end of the 1960s in response to a call by the United Nations to support these countries' prospects for economic and political independence from South Africa, while the engagement in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe grew out of the humanitarian support extended to the liberation movements (MPLA, FRELIMO and the Patriotic Front) during the struggle for independence.

With regard to the two remaining SADCC member states, i.e. Malawi and Tanzania, reasons for the next-to-nil relations (Malawi) and the very considerable Swedish engagement (Tanzania) are, likewise, first and foremost political. The relations with and role of Tanzania will be discussed below. Malawi has never received bilateral development assistance from Sweden, and the reason is quite explicit: Through its close relations with South Africa, Malawi—although one of the poorest countries in the region—has in the opinion of parliament and government not been eligible for such assistance.⁹ A similar conclusion was in late 1982—i.e. after the death of King Sobhuza II—reached by the Swedish government with regard to Swaziland. Both Malawi and Swaziland are, however, eligible for Swedish regional support through SADCC and the Nordic/SADCC Initiative.

The importance of political considerations for Nordic engagement in Southern Africa is, finally, illustrated by the well-known fact that the Nordic governments over the last 10 years have severed relations with Pretoria. This process started in 1979, when Sweden as the first Western country legislated against new investments in South Africa, and culminated in 1986-87, when all the Nordic countries—beginning with

Denmark—decided to introduce bilateral prohibitions against investments in and trade with South Africa and Namibia.¹⁰

When contemporary relations between the Nordic and the Southern African countries are discussed, what is most conspicuous to the observer is, probably, the *size of the Nordic development assistance* to the region. In his paper, Østergaard concludes that together "the Nordic countries provide almost one third of Western aid disbursements to (the nine SADCC countries)".¹¹ Thus, according to statistics by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the share of each Nordic Country.¹² in total bilateral aid disbursements from OECD member states to the SADCC member States during the five-year period 1981-85 was the following:

Sweden:	14.2%
Norway:	7.9%
Denmark:	5.1%
Finland:	2.7%
NORDIC:	29.9%

All in all—adding the allocations for emergency support, humanitarian aid and bilateral and regional development assistance—as a group the Nordic countries provide today approximately 1 billion US Dollars per year to Southern Africa.¹³ This is a considerable amount not only in the economies of the Nordic countries.

Between 40 and 60% of the bilateral development assistance budgets in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are allocated to the region, which means that some 0.2–0.3% of GNP of each Nordic country is voted by parliament in favour of Southern Africa. In the case of Sweden, this figure has during fluctuated during recent years around 0.3% of GNP. In order to illustrate the extent to which Nordic development assistance is concentrated upon Southern Africa, this commitment should be compared with the share of overall development assistance in the economies of other industrialized countries. Such a comparison is, indeed, revealing.

Thus, according to DAC/OECD statistics, in the two-year period 1985-86, the share of global development assistance as % of GNP was for the United States 0.23; for Japan 0.29; for the Soviet Union 0.32; and for the United Kingdom 0.33.¹⁴ In other words, what the Nordic countries are extending in the form of development assistance to the Southern African region corresponds to—or exceeds—what major economic powers such as USA, Japan, USSR and UK are extending to the entire developing world.

It is, however, perhaps not through quantity that the development cooperation between the Nordic and the Southern African region stands out, but through quality. It falls outside the scope of this paper to make a comparative analysis between Nordic and Western/Eastern development cooperation with Southern Africa,¹⁵ but it should be noted that the Nordic assistance—albeit, once again, to varying degrees between the Nordic

countries—to a predominant extent is in grant form, i.e. without commercial interests; that the portion tied to procurement in the Nordic countries is low; that the Nordic group by far is the major contributor to the Southern African Development Cooperation Conference (SADCC); that all the Nordic countries—directly or indirectly¹⁶—channel public funds to the liberation movements of South Africa and Namibia; that they are major contributors to the United Nations' development and humanitarian programmes in Southern Africa; and that they give considerable financial support to the main non-Nordic non-governmental organizations active in the region, such as the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), the World Council of Churches (WCC), the World University Services (WUS), the Africa Educational Trust (AET), the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC), the International Defense and Aid Fund (IDAF) and others.¹⁷

Noteworthy is, finally, the extent to which both Nordic foreign and development assistance policies toward the Southern African region during the last 10 years have become progressively coordinated. This coordination—which, of course, should be seen against the background of shared concerns regarding political developments in the region and of the exceptional concentration of Nordic development assistance resources to the area, but also against the political and economic coordination that has taken place between the Southern African countries¹⁸—has, as a more recent phenomenon, laid the basis for quite a unique "active promotion of a comprehensive region-to-region cooperation between the Nordic countries and the SADCC member States".¹⁹

Although the individual Nordic countries belong to—or stand outside of—different international security arrangements and economic organizations,²⁰ there is between them a long tradition of mutual consultation and of coordinated political stands, for example within the United Nations and other international fora. What is remarkable with regard to South and Southern Africa is that this coordinated outlook has been formalized into a joint Nordic political platform and that the Nordic countries as a group have entered into arrangements of mutual consultation with the Southern African countries on a series of political issues.

Thus, in 1978, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Nordic countries adopted a "Nordic Programme of Action Against Apartheid" (the so called Oslo Plan), which was reviewed in 1985 and—following the introduction of sanctions in 1986–87—was updated in 1988.

1984 also saw the first joint Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Nordic and the Frontline States,²¹ held in Stockholm, Sweden. It was followed by a second meeting in Arusha, Tanzania, in the beginning of 1988.

In the field of international development cooperation, there is, likewise, a tradition of mutual consultation and close coordination between the Nordic countries. As early as 1962—i.e. before the creation of the respective Nordic aid administrations²²—an agreement was entered into between the Nordic governments regarding joint development assistance

projects, and in 1976, the Nordic council of Ministers created a special committee of civil servants to facilitate such coordination, also drawing up a formula for financial contributions from each Nordic country in co-financed projects. At the end of the 1970s there were, however, only four joint Nordic projects, out of which three in Southern Africa (two in Tanzania and one in Mozambique).

The situation changed drastically with the creation of SADCC in 1980.²³ United by a common political stand on the problems facing the Southern African region and with a rich experience of cooperation with national liberation movements and individual SADCC countries, regional assistance to SADCC was by the Nordic countries viewed as a logical continuation of their respective bilateral cooperation programmes. And in order to pool resources and to render the regional support as effective as possible, a series of projects were identified for joint Nordic support, co-financed from two or more Nordic countries, particularly in the area of transports and communications, which in SADCC's Programme of Action had been identified as the key area in the strategy to reduce dependence on South Africa and to weave a fabric of regional cooperation and development in the region.

From the outset, Nordic assistance to SADCC represented a coordinated commitment, a new concept of "region-to-region cooperation". Thus, when the Finnish Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa, against a background of stalled international negotiations on the New International Economic Order (NIEO), in 1982 to his Nordic colleagues proposed the idea of identifying a developing region in the world with which the Nordic countries could enter into a inter-regional NIEO-relationship—or into a "mini-NIEO, as the proposal was called in Norway—it was, once again, quite logical that this concept should primarily be studied vis-a-vis the Southern Africa region, and not—for example—toward the Sahel area, the Andean countries or South-East Asia.

A formal decision to this effect was taken by the Nordic Prime Ministers at their annual meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, in December 1984, and upon consultations with the SADCC countries, a "Joint Declaration on Expanded Economic and Cultural Cooperation"—popularly known as the *Nordic/SADCC Initiative*—was on 29 January 1986 signed by the five Nordic and the nine SADCC governments in Harare, Zimbabwe.

Thus, through the adoption of the "Nordic Programme of Action Against Apartheid" in 1978 (1985/1988); the establishment of a forum for mutual consultations between foreign ministers of the Nordic and the Frontline states in 1984 (1988); the introduction of Nordic sanctions against South Africa in 1986-87; and the conclusion of an agreement on "Expanded Economic and Cultural Cooperation" in 1986, a series of political and economic protocols have been established between the Nordic and the Southern African countries, which—in North-South terms, and outside historical relations of Metropolis and Colony—have created the basis for a more mature relationship between regions that yesterday

were "poles apart" and today are "concerned partners", primarily with regard to apartheid South Africa, but also in relation to other political, economic, social and cultural issues.

HISTORICAL ASPECTS

It is important to recall that Swedish involvement in the region is based on tradition and history without any colonial background.

(Lena Hjelm-Wallén, Swedish Minister for International Development Cooperation, at the Conference on "Peace and Development in the Frontline States", organized by *War on Want*, London, 9 June 1988.)

Another dimension of Nordic involvement in Southern Africa is the historical, where relations over the centuries have been particularly close with South Africa and Namibia. Perhaps due to the strong repudiation of the Pretoria regime this is, unfortunately, an area which so far has been scarcely researched and evaluated by Nordic and Southern African historians alike.

Actually, the only comprehensive study carried out on Nordic relations with South Africa and Namibia (and, although only marginally, Zimbabwe) was made by the North American scholar Alan Winquist (of Swedish descent) in the mid-1970s. In his study—published in 1978 under the title "Scandinavians and South Africa: Their impact on the cultural, social and economic development of pre-1902 South Africa"²⁴—Winquist, referring to the European population, concludes that "in many respects, at least prior to 1900, Scandinavians were the fifth (after the British, Dutch, German and French) most significant group in South Africa. (...) What amazed the researcher is that there is hardly an occupation or historical event where some significant Scandinavian contribution is not evident".²⁵ The somewhat impressionistic, deviation through history is largely based on Winquist's pioneering and hitherto unique work.

The first Nordic immigrants to South Africa arrived as early as around 1630. During the following 200 years, those who settled in South Africa were almost exclusively men, who to a large extent were employed by the Dutch East India Company²⁶ and who in the new country married into Dutch, German or French families, thus being assimilated into what was to become the Afrikaaner, or Boer, population group. This pattern partially changed from 1850 onwards, through the establishment of Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish missionary societies in South Africa, Namibia and—later—Zimbabwe, as well as through direct Norwegian and Swedish collective settlements.²⁷

Individual immigration continued, however, to dominate and increased rapidly after the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley in 1867 and of gold in the Witwatersrand in 1886, when scores of Nordic adventurers, sailors, railway-workers, artisans, engineers etc., were lured by economic opportunities not easily encountered in the poor Nordic countries. This wave of

Nordic male immigrants was primarily integrated into the English-speaking European population group.²⁸

The emigration from the Nordic countries to South Africa culminated in the period 1890–1910. At the end of that period, the estimated number of South African immigrants *born* in the Nordic countries amounted to 4,000–5,000,²⁹ in more or less equal proportions coming from Denmark, Norway and Sweden (with a smaller group of mainly Swedish-speaking Finns) and nearly evenly dispersed between the Cape Colony, Natal and Transvaal. This period also witnessed the increasing conflict between the British and the Afrikaaner interests in South Africa, which culminated in the Second Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902. There was active Nordic involvement on both sides in the war, and in the Nordic countries themselves—where the conflict was well documented through military observers and war correspondents reporting from the battle scenes—opinions were divided, "although a large number of the common people viewed the Afrikaaners as a brave and God-fearing folk, worthy of the highest respect and admiration".³⁰ And of direct assistance.

Thus, a volunteer Scandinavian Corps and Ambulance Unit was organized in the Nordic countries, consisting of 113 men and 4 women and dispatched to fight on the Boer side.³¹ It participated in the siege of Mafeking and in the battle of Magersfontein, where 27 Scandinavian Corps-men were killed and other taken prisoners of war on 11 December 1899.³²

The Boer victory at Magersfontein occupies a prominent place in Afrikaaner nationalist history. So does the personality of Louis Trichardt, who—in 1835—was the first *voortrekk* to break away from the much-hated British administration in the Cape Colony, venturing inland to what is today the Orange Free State and Transvaal.³³ This "Hero of the Afrikaaner Volk" was of Swedish descent, his grand-father—Carl Gustav Trädgårdh (original Swedish spelling)—having emigrated from Ängelholm in the service of the Dutch East India Company in 1742. Other well-known South African families of Nordic origin—some prominent in Afrikaaner history and others more closely integrated into the British population group—are, for example, Bergh,³⁴ Stockenström,³⁵ Krogh,³⁶ Letterstedt³⁷ and Egeland.³⁸

The Nordic immigrants to South Africa were eventually integrated into either the Afrikaaner or the British European population group and their links with the Nordic countries soon faded away. More lasting imprints of Nordic involvement in South and Southern Africa were, instead, made by categories other than immigrants, such as natural scientists, explorers and traders,³⁹ but—above all—by missionaries and businessmen.

It is generally acknowledged by students of Namibian affairs that the *Finnish missionary activity in Northern Namibia (Ovamboland)* not only has played an important role in the establishment of particularly close relations between the Nordic and the Southern African regions, but that it also has influenced the Namibian struggle for national independence

from South African occupation and colonialism. Justin Ellis, a well-known church worker and educationalist, deported from Namibia in 1978, considers that "the early Finnish missionaries were undoubtedly severely puritanical, but they had no colonial interest in **Namibia**.⁴⁰ Their sincerity and devotion began to change attitudes, both among the Ovambo and among the Finns, and later created a Church—State tension (in Namibia), with the Church increasingly on the side of the people and increasingly distrusted by the (South African) **State**".⁴¹

Similarly, already in 1978, Gerard Totemeyer concluded that the Evangelical Lutheran Ovambo-Kavango Church (**ELOK**)—"born out of the Finnish missionary activity—"next to SWAPO has become the principal channel for those who feel dissatisfied, exploited, oppressed or neglected. The trust and credibility which this church has built up within the community makes it an important instrument in the development process of Namibia. The growth of Black consciousness, the search for a Black identity, the awareness of the resourcefulness of Black power and the formation of their own Black theology has found substance in the Ovambo-Kavango Church, with repercussions throughout **Namibia**".⁴²

Missionary activity began relatively late in Namibia. Around 1804, the London Missionary Society started to extend its field of operations from the Cape into Namibia. However, it was the Lutheran **Rhenish** Missionary Society that in earnest started the missionary endeavour, establishing a mission to the Herero people at Otjikango (Okahandja) in 1844.⁴³ Significantly for Namibian clerical and political history, the German missionaries decided to leave the Northern part of the country outside their area of activity and, instead, invited their Lutheran brothers and sisters in the Finnish Missionary Society to spread the Word there. The Society accepted the invitation and Northern Namibia (Ovamboland) was soon to become its most important field of activity.

The first nine Finnish missionaries arrived in Ovamboland in 1870, led by Martti Rautanen, who was to stay in the area for more than 50 years and who translated the Bible into the Oshindonga language. In the beginning, the Finnish missionaries found support in previously established Nordic links with Namibia, but soon established themselves in their own field of activity, also giving high priority to education and health programmes among the Ovambo people. Although the start was slow, from the turn of the century the Finnish Missionary Society became an important factor in Northern Namibia: "Apart from evolving Oshindonga and Oshikwanyama as written languages, translating the Bible and publishing religious literature and school books, attention was given to training of native teachers. Besides establishing many schools, (the Finnish missionaries) founded the first (Namibian) teachers' training college at **Oniipa** in 1913".⁴⁴

Their impact on Northern Namibian society—and the counter-reaction of the Pretoria **regime**—was considerable: "From the beginning, the Finnish mission gave high priority to the education of **Namibians**,⁴⁵ who

soon attained responsibility within the Church. Women were given status through the work of Finnish women in all fields, particularly medicine. Although the Finns saw themselves as religious and moral agents (...), they did not see their mission as political. Nevertheless, early South African commissioners were soon grumbling about their pervasive influence, which was blamed for the breakdown of traditional authority (...). The South Africans were particularly concerned about the spread of "bush schools", a wide-spread education system designed to make converts and their children literate. Further, their teachings on justice and brotherhood, however intended, were often perceived by the Ovambo people as necessarily leading to criticism of the secular political and economic order".⁴⁶

ELOK became structurally independent of the Finnish Missionary Society in 1954 and was from 1960 led by a Namibian bishop, Leonard Aulala. The importance of the Finnish missionary legacy can *inter alia* be judged by the number of ELOK Church members. This has for 1980 been estimated at 250,000 persons, corresponding to one fourth or one fifth of the total Namibian population.⁴⁷

While the importance of the Finnish missionary activity in Northern Namibia today is generally acknowledged, little is known—at least outside the Nordic countries—about the less pronounced, but similar roles played by Norwegian and Swedish missionary activities in the Natal and Zululand regions of South Africa.⁴⁸ Thus, in his study on Nordic involvement in pre-1902 South Africa, Winquist concludes: "The missionaries played an important part in opening Zululand for exploration and colonization. They informed the outside world of what was happening in Zululand. Much of the information historians know of the internal situation among the Zulus between 1850 and 1911 were from accounts written by Norwegian and Swedish missionaries and their sons and daughters. (...) They were significant in influencing public opinion, especially in Scandinavia (and) not only toward the Zulus, but also the Britons and the Boers".⁴⁹

There are many similarities between the Norwegian and the Swedish missionary activities in South Africa (as well as between them and the Finnish Missionary Society in Namibia). The Lutheran State Churches of both Norway and Sweden⁵⁰ became interested in overseas missionary work in the beginning of last century, the former eventually establishing an independent society in 1842 and the latter a church-run organization in 1874. In both cases, the first mission field selected by the Norwegian Missionary Society (NMS) and the Church of Sweden Mission (CSM) was Zululand, South Africa.⁵¹

Once established there, both the NMS and the CSM—like the Finns in Namibia—emphasized social work among the African population, particularly with regard to education and health care. Like the Finnish Missionary Society, both the Norwegian and the Swedish missionaries also pursued successful policies of africanization of the churches. Finally,

an important number of the Scandinavian missionaries—particularly in the CSM⁵²—were women, who through their work and example enhanced the status of women in African society.

The *Norwegian Missionary Society* is the oldest official Nordic missionary society in South and Southern Africa. Its first station was established by Hand Schreuder—later to be called "the apostle to Zululand"—at Umpurnulo, not far from the Zululand border in Northern Natal, in 1849. Two years later, the Zulu King Mpande—in exchange for medical assistance given to him by Schreuder—allowed the Norwegians to stay in Zululand and build a mission station there. Thus was founded Empangeni, the first permanent mission station in Zululand. The following year, Mpande gave permission to build a second station at Entumeni and a third station was founded at Mahlabatini in 1860, later to be followed by Eshowe, Imfule, Inhlazatshe and others. The religious work proper was, however, very slow in the beginning and the first baptism of the Norwegian Missionary Society did not occur until 1858.

In the meantime, Schreuder soon established close social contact with the Zulu nation. In 1850, he prepared a grammar of the Zulu language, the first ever scholarly attempt at analyzing the language.⁵³ He also compiled a Zulu-Norwegian dictionary, a book of hymns in Zulu and, in 1855, completed the translation into Zulu of Luther's Small Catechism. It was, however, in the political field that the Norwegian missionary was to exercise considerable influence. Over the years, Schreuder became a close friend and confidant of King Mpande's and "in fact, occupied a position analogous to that of a Prime Minister".⁵⁴

As such, Schreuder negotiated on behalf of King Mpande with Sir Theophilus Shepstone, Natal's Native Affairs Secretary. Schreuder was also able to develop an unique relationship with King Mpande's son, Prince Cetshwayo, who was installed as King of the Zulus in 1873. This unique friendship was later taken over by Schreuder's successor as head of the Norwegian Missionary Society in Zululand, Ommund Oftebro.

Hans Schreuder—who died at Untunjambili in 1882—was a pioneer in Zululand. "His mission was the first to begin occupying the map and later other groups, including the Swedes, were fitted around his work. (...) He displayed a sincere concern to raise the conditions of the Zulus (and) his reports and writings were indispensable in gaining knowledge of Zululand".⁵⁵ The close relations with the Zulu Royal House established by Schreuder and Oftebro were to be maintained by other Norwegian missionaries and their families throughout the stormy end of the 1800s and the beginning of the 1900s, when the Zulu nation was militarily defeated and conquered by the British. A particularly important role was played by Robert Samuelson, a son of the NMS missionary Siver Samuelson, born in South Africa in 1858. He was a close confidant of both King Cetshwayo's interpreter when he was imprisoned in Cape Town after the Zulu defeat in 1879, and later as part of King Dinizulu's defence

team at his trial in Greytown in 1908-09, when he was accused by the British of instigating the so-called Bambatha rebellion in Natal in 1906.⁵⁶

The first representative of the Church of Sweden Mission (CSM), pastor Otto Witt, arrived in South Africa in 1876 and was to start missionary work in the same area as the Norwegian Missionary Society. In 1878, the CSM bought a farm at Rorke's Drift on the Natal side of the Buffalo river, where the first mission station—called Oscarsberg in honour of the Swedish King, Oscar II—was founded. However, during the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, the station was the scene of the Battle at Rorke's Drift, and Oscarsberg was laid in ruins.

The work of the Church of Sweden Mission in South Africa had a sluggish start, but gained momentum in the 1890s, when 22 Swedish missionaries were employed in Natal and Zululand. Permission to carry out missionary work in Zululand had been granted by Dinizulu in 1882 and the following year the CSM founded the Ekutuleni station. Other stations were opened at Dundee, Emtulwa and Ceza. Also the Swedish missionaries had close contacts with the Zulu Royal House. While these relations in the case of the Norwegian missionaries were of a more diplomatic and political nature, the Church of Sweden Mission managed to establish spiritual relations through the conversion of King Cetshwayo's cousin, later to be called Josef Zulu, who was baptized in pastor Witt's home church in Halsingborg, Sweden, in 1878. For the next five years, Josef Zulu studied and worked in Sweden. Upon completion of his studies, he returned to South Africa. After a fifteen-year period as evangelist at the CSM mission stations at Oscarsberg, Amoibie and Appelbosch, Josef Zulu again went to Sweden in 1901, this time to be ordained a priest at Uppsala cathedral, making him the first African clergyman in the Swedish State Church.⁵⁷

The Swedish mission was from the outset embarked upon a course to allow the indigenous people of South Africa to take up leadership positions, therein following the example of the Norwegian Missionary Society.⁵⁸ Parallel to this, a policy of unification of the Lutheran communities in Natal and Zululand was pursued. This policy of africanization and unification culminated in the 1960s. Thus, in 1961, was created the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Southern Africa—Southeast Region, with Bishop Helge Fosséus of the CSM as its first leader. He was soon to be succeeded by an African, Bishop P B Mhlungi.⁵⁹

It should also be noted that the Church of Sweden Mission at an early stage decided to extend its work into Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), where the Swedes Liljestränd and Halldén together with the Zulu evangelist Makubu in 1902 identified the Mberengwa area in the South-western part of the country as suitable. From 1903—when the Mnene mission station was founded—the role of the Swedish missionary activity in the Mberengwa area has been of great importance in the history of Zimbabwe.⁶⁰

Trade and commerce was, finally, an area through which links at quite an early stage were established between the Nordic and the Southern African regions. Commercial contacts were both indirect and direct. In particular Norwegian, but also Danish and Swedish ships, called frequently at the major ports of Angola, South Africa and Southern Mozambique on their way to and from the Far East and Australia during the latter part of last century.⁶¹

More directly, a number of immigrants from the Nordic countries started business enterprises in South Africa. Combining private business careers with promotional activities on behalf of their countries of origin, some of them—like the Swede Jacob Letterstedt⁶² and the Norwegians Jacob Jacobsen Egeland and Abraham Larsen⁶³—exercised considerable influence with regard to the opening of regular Danish, Norwegian and Swedish shipping links and, in general, trade relations with the Nordic countries.

Various major South African commercial enterprises—with activities later extending into other Southern African countries—were founded by immigrants from the Nordic countries. This is, for example, the case with South African Breweries, which was created in 1956 through a merger of various breweries, in which Ohlsson's Cape Breweries, founded by the Swede Anders Ohlsson in the late 1880s, was the most important.⁶⁴

It is also the case with the Lion Match Company, which resulted through an amalgamation with the Rosebank Match Company, founded by the Swede Karl Lithman in Cape Town in 1887.⁶⁵ And it is the case with Thesen & Company, a multi-million Rand enterprise in shipping, saw-milling, timber and retail shops, built up in the Knysna area of the Cape by the Thesen family from Norway in the 1890s.⁶⁶ Other Scandinavians who started successful businesses in South Africa at the turn of the century were, for example, Charles (Karl) Johnson, the founder of South Africa's largest fishery, Irving & Johnson, and Jacob Jacobsen Egeland and Abraham Larsen, who in 1909 created South Africa's largest whaling company, Union Whaling.

Several of the most successful Nordic businessmen held consular positions for their countries of origin (Ohlsson, Lithman, Nils Peter Thesen, Egeland and Larsen) and some—like Karl Lithman—later returned to the Nordic countries. Their bonds with Scandinavia were, thus, strong and they were, as a group, instrumental in convincing Nordic companies—primarily Swedish—to get established on the South African market, a process that began with the Swedish ball-bearing manufacturer SKF (Svenska Kullagerfabriken) in 1914.⁶⁷

The volume of trade between South Africa and the Nordic countries was almost insignificant until the 1890s.⁶⁸ However, trade between the regions developed slowly, but constantly, during the present century and experienced sharp increases after World War II (coinciding with the Nationalist assumption of political power in Pretoria in 1948) and, again, during the first half of the 1980s. These developments in foreign trade

stood in evident contradiction to the foreign and aid policies of the Nordic countries and provoked strong reactions among large opinions, demanding economic sanctions against South Africa. In each of the three most important Nordic trade partners with South Africa (Denmark, Norway and Sweden), there were individual issues of particular significance in the sanctions debate. Thus, in the case of Denmark, it was the fact that still in the beginning of the 1980s approximately one third of the electricity supply was based on coal imports from South Africa. In Norway, it was oil that dominated the debate, Norwegian ships transporting an estimated one fourth of South Africa's strategic oil imports. In Sweden, finally, the sanctions debate centered on Swedish productive investments in South Africa and the role of Swedish companies in the region.

The Nordic countries have during the last 10 years severed their relations with Pretoria, a process which culminated in **1986-87**, when they introduced bilateral prohibitions against trade with and investments in South Africa and Namibia. Strong Nordic business interests, historically interlinked with the South African economy, either through trade (as in Denmark), shipping (as in Norway) or through investments (as in Sweden), opposed this process. However, as was noted above, in the Nordic countries it is political and humanitarian considerations that have prevailed with regard to South and Southern Africa, not economic and commercial. Some factors in the shaping of this dominant awareness will be discussed below.

TOWARDS NORDIC SOLIDARITY WITH SOUTHERN AFRICA ...

We recognize the fact that in the real world in which we live and in which we have to conduct our struggle, countries, and various factions within these countries, place our country as it is today and will be tomorrow, in the context of what are described as national interests. Olof **Palme** thought the national interest of his own country would best be served by the genuine liberation of South Africa and Namibia and the guarantee of peace, stability and social progress throughout Southern Africa (...). We yearn for the day when these issues (...) will be treated by the rest of the Western world with the same honesty with which Olof **Palme** approached them.

(**Oliver** Tambo, President of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa in his Olof **Palme** Memorial Lecture on Disarmament and Development, held in Riverside Church, New York, 21 January 1987.)

Nordic relations with Southern Africa were historically initiated through South Africa, where Nordic immigrants before World War I constituted a significant part of the European population, both with regard to the Afrikaaner and to the English-speaking communities. Of the two communities, the former felt a closer affinity with the essentially rural Nordic societies than the imperial Britons. Thus, when searching for a "true Afrikaaner culture", Afrikaaners began, for example, studying Swedish

folklore and cultural missions were undertaken to the Nordic countries in the beginning of this century.⁶⁹

Although not particularly close, the relations between the Nordic countries and South Africa were, on the whole, friendly. Thus, "in the 1930s and 1940s, people in both Scandinavia and South Africa were reading friendly newspaper accounts of each other's area. Swedish newspapers were depicting South Africa as a land of economic opportunity and South African journals were portraying Sweden as clean, friendly and courteous, and a good place to go on **holiday**".⁷⁰

After the Nationalist assumption of power in South Africa in 1948 and the subsequent implementation of the apartheid system, relations were, however, soon severed. The Nordic opinions were, of course, far from being mobilized against the Pretoria regime, but did—in a slow process of awakening of interest in Third World issues⁷¹—in the 1950s increasingly express solidarity with the oppressed African majorities, both in apartheid South Africa and in the European colonies in Southern Africa.

What influenced the public opinions in the Nordic countries? What made the Nordic countries at a comparatively early stage assume internationally advanced positions and policies with regard to apartheid, colonialism, national independence and economic development in Southern Africa?

Some of the answers to these questions are quite obvious. The Nordic countries did not have any colonial backgrounds in Africa⁷² and they all had—Denmark, Norway and Finland directly, Sweden indirectly—in fresh memory the horrors of Nazism, racism and foreign occupation. Healing the wounds from World War II, it was a moral obligation to condemn the coming into power in Pretoria of a regime whose loyalties during the war were with Hitler-Germany and who set out to implement a political and socio-economic system based upon racial criteria.

From the outset, the Nordic countries were also active members of the United Nations, strongly supporting its efforts to bring about **de-colonization** and to grant former colonies recognition as independent states. The first two Secretary-Generals of the United Nations were the Norwegian Trygve Lie (1946–53) and the Swede Dag Hammarskjöld (1953–61). Their terms in the United Nations coincided to a large extent with the de-colonization debate regarding the British, French and Portuguese colonies in Africa, which was followed with increasing interest in the Nordic countries.

The year 1960 was proclaimed **Africa Year** by the United Nations, indicating universal acceptance of the principle of African independence after decades, or centuries, of colonial rule. In South Africa, however, 1960 was the year of Sharpeville, when police fired at a crowd of peaceful demonstrators, killing 69 and wounding 176 persons. The massacre provoked outrage throughout the world, including the Nordic countries.

In recognition of the patience and political rights of the African majority, Chief Albert Luthuli, President of the banned ANC of South Africa,

was the same year granted the Nobel Peace Prize by the Norwegian parliament.

In the Congo (Zaire), the orderly process towards independence was — also in 1960 — violently thwarted through civil war and outside interference. Dag Hammarskjöld was killed under mysterious circumstances during the Congo crisis, when his plane crashed outside Ndola (Zambia) in 1961. The public opinion in Sweden — which, through the participation of Swedish troops in the UN peace-keeping forces in the Congo, had become more closely aware of the effects of colonialism and of the complexities of the de-colonization process — reacted strongly to his death. Thus, in the words of a contemporary Swedish historian, "interest in the man and his work helped increase the commitment to the Third World and its problems, that was especially strong in Sweden during the 1960s".⁷³

The de-colonization debate was coupled with the debate on apartheid South Africa, where — in the case of Sweden — various influential newspaper editors already in the beginning of the 1950s repeatedly denounced the regime. This was, for example, the case with the editor-in-chief of the liberal evening paper *Expressen*, Ivar Harrie, and with his colleague at the liberal morning paper *Dagens Nyheter*, Herbert Tingsten.

Tingsten's articles were later expanded into a widely publicized book, "*Problemet Sydafrika*" (The Problem of South Africa), published in 1954.⁷⁴ Per Wastberg, later to become editor-in-chief of *Dagens Nyheter*, continued this early liberal commitment when he, in 1960, published two widely read books on Southern Africa, namely "*Forbjudet område*" (Forbidden territory) on Rhodesia and "*På svarta listan*" (On the Black List) on South Africa.⁷⁵

A number of church representatives were, likewise, active in mobilizing Swedish public opinions against apartheid and colonialism already in the 1950s. One of them was pastor Gunnar Helander, later to be expelled from South Africa, where he was a missionary with the Church of Sweden Mission. Like other Swedish missionaries who had direct experience of South Africa, Rhodesia or other parts of the region, Helander was an active information campaigner and also published a series of novels set in apartheid South Africa.⁷⁶

In the case of Sweden, the role of these intellectuals, editors and churchmen in the shaping of public awareness regarding the situation in South and Southern Africa should not be underestimated. In fact, representatives of religious and what in Sweden is termed "popular movements" (trade unions, cooperatives, temperance societies etc.) were strongly represented on the preparatory commission for Swedish bilateral development cooperation.

This was set up in 1962, when the social democratic government presented — and won unanimous support in parliament for — a bill laying down policy guidelines for Swedish development cooperation. Thus, in this bill — later christened "the Bible of Swedish development assis-

tance"—it was explicitly stated that "a sense of moral duty and international solidarity" should motivate Swedish assistance. "The Swedish programme for development cooperation requires no motives in addition to these (and should be understood as) an expression of a (...) recognition that peace, freedom and welfare are not exclusive national concerns, but rather something increasingly universal and indivisible".⁷⁷

International solidarity was, of course, also a political credo for the social democratic government and movement in Sweden. Condemning apartheid and colonialism, it was, thus, quite logical that a broad majority in the Swedish parliament already in 1964 approved a government proposal for special funds for educational purposes in Southern Africa, and the setting up of a special committee to give advice on the development of a programme for this assistance.

This was to mark the beginning of Swedish support to the liberation movements in Southern Africa. Thus, one of the ingredients of the programme was support to the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which was initiated in 1964. This support was, in reality, support to the Mozambican liberation movement FRELIMO. Formally, however, the Institute—which cared for Mozambican refugees in Tanzania—was a Tanzanian institution and Sweden could claim that it did not interfere in Portugal's internal affairs and, consequently, that it was not in conflict with international law.

Direct support to the liberation movements in Southern Africa required, however, a statement by the Swedish parliament on what was acceptable from the point of view of international law. Such a statement was made in 1969. It is most relevant for the subject of this paper, as it not only paved the way for Swedish assistance to the liberation movements, but also clearly defined a community of interests with them: "Swedish development assistance", it was said, "cannot be allowed to conflict with the rule of international law, which lays down that no state has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another state. As regards liberation movements in Africa, humanitarian aid and educational support do not come into conflict with the said rule of international law if the United Nations has taken a clear stand against suppression of peoples who are striving for national independence. This can be considered the case regarding Southwest Africa, Rhodesia and the territories in Africa under Portugal's rule. With regard to assistance to the victims of the policy of apartheid, such support can *inter alia* be motivated by the explicit condemnation by the United Nations of the South African apartheid policy".⁷⁸

Following this interpretation by parliament, Swedish direct assistance was soon to be extended to MPLA of Angola, FRELIMO of Mozambique, ZANU and ZAPU (Patriotic Front) of Zimbabwe, SWAPO of Namibia and ANC of South Africa.

The end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s saw, in general, a shift to the left in Swedish and Nordic development cooperation policies.

This shift was, of course, in response to the general radicalization of the intellectual and ideological climate during the Vietnam war.

Strong anti-imperialist solidarity movements with Vietnam were created and "for a few years the debate in Sweden clearly went beyond the question of development assistance, regarded as an indisputable concern, to focus on Sweden's general policy towards developing countries. A main theme was that Sweden could not limit herself to providing aid and then just close her eyes when it came to the nature and effects of all other forms of *dependency*".⁷⁹ Thus, the Swedish government bill on development assistance in 1970 stated: "It is natural (...) that Sweden primarily seeks to cooperate with countries whose governments, in their economic and social policies, aim at such structural changes as will create the preconditions for a development towards economic and social *justice*".⁸⁰

It was under this policy that Sweden started to cooperate with Cuba, Chile, Vietnam, Laos, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and, later, with *Nicaragua*.⁸¹ "The political sympathy that Sweden extended to these countries was", in the words of a highly placed Swedish official of the time, "based on their struggle for political and economic independence and for their policy of social justice. Sweden's choice of partners for development and her appreciation of the aims of these countries in the social and economic field resulted in an identification of Sweden with progressive forces in the Third World. This did not mean that Sweden abandoned her policy of non-alignment, but it certainly had an impact on how this policy was interpreted, by Sweden herself and by *others*".⁸²

Angola and Mozambique gained political independence in 1975 and the support extended by Sweden and other Nordic countries to MPLA and FRELIMO was transformed into public development cooperation programmes with the new countries. During the struggle against Portuguese colonialism, MPLA and FRELIMO had received considerable support from Nordic anti-imperialist popular movements, such as the Norwegian Council for Southern *Africa*,⁸³ created already in 1967, and the Africa Groups of *Sweden*,⁸⁴ started in 1970, but set up as a national organization only in 1974.

Although these movements were more clearly identifiable with the political left in Norway and Sweden, the fact that they were channeling support to the same recipient as the official aid administrations of NORAD and SIDA facilitated cooperation between them. In the case of Sweden, this tendency was strengthened after 1978, when the Africa Groups created an organization for solidarity workers, mainly active in Mozambique, but also in Angola and in ANC and SWAPO *settlements*.⁸⁵ The cost of this important technical assistance was—and is—to a large extent covered by the Swedish development assistance budget.

Technical assistance in various forms and the direct contacts thus created between the Nordic and the Southern African peoples should not be underestimated as a factor behind Nordic involvement in Southern Africa. Through DANIDA, FINNIDA, NORAD and SIDA, thousands of

Danes, Finns, Norwegians and Swedes have from the late 1960s been working in Southern Africa, where they have been exposed to the concrete realities of the region.

This relationship has not been unilateral. Through scholarship programmes, exchange visits, training courses, seminars etc., funded by the Nordic aid administrations, a considerable number of Southern Africans have over the last 20 years become acquainted with the Nordic countries, % where—due to the policies of the Nordic governments—the major liberation movements of the region at an early stage were to open representation offices. Thus, the basis for political and moral engagement in Southern Africa that was modestly laid through the individual commitment of intellectuals, politicians, editors and representatives of the churches in the 1950s was in the 1970s "socialized" through the important debate on Third World issues and Nordic development assistance, the creation of popular anti-imperialist solidarity movements and the concrete experiences of Nordic personnel in Southern Africa, as well as of Southern Africans in the Nordic countries. Particularly important for this process was the role of Tanzania.

Tanzania is traditionally by far the biggest individual recipient of Nordic development assistance of the SADCC countries. In 1985, the three largest donors to Tanzania were Sweden, Norway and Denmark. If Finland is added, the Nordic share of total development assistance to the country this year was 40%.⁸⁷ Tanzania is an East African country. Although political considerations influenced the Nordic governments when bilateral development cooperation programmes with Tanzania were established, these considerations had, however, little to do with the struggle against colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa. Instead, Nordic involvement in Tanzania was primarily motivated by the country's position as one of the poorest African nations and, above all, by a shared "world view" between the Nordic and the Tanzanian governments.⁸⁸

Tanzania's commitment to socialism—proclaimed in the Arusha Declaration of 1967—was, of course, important in this context. It aroused broad interest and debate around a series of strategic questions such as socialist transformation in developing countries, dependence and self-reliance, and through the Nordic development cooperation programmes an important number of policy-makers, social scientists, aid workers, members of non-governmental organizations etc., from the Nordic countries could not only follow, but also participate in this debate. In short, Tanzania became at the end of the 1960s an important point of reference for broad segments in the Nordic countries.

Through Tanzania, the Nordic countries also came into direct contact with the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles in Southern Africa. Although an East African country from a geographical point of view, Tanzania was a Frontline State in relation to the White-dominated South. It committed itself strongly in favour of the national liberation struggles in the British and Portuguese colonies in Southern Africa, as well as in South

Africa and Namibia, and became the host country of the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

The liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), South Africa and Namibia were all represented in Dar es Salaam. It was also here that the first contacts were made between the Nordic countries—government representatives, voluntary organizations and individuals—and the liberation movements, which would later be translated into humanitarian assistance and—once independence was achieved—into economic development cooperation programmes. As was noted above, Swedish direct support to the liberation movements in Southern Africa was actually initiated through the support channelled to the Mozambique Institute in 1964.

Tanzania is still an important "meeting point" between the Nordic countries and the struggle in South Africa, in particular manifest through the considerable public and non-governmental Nordic support to the settlements of the ANC of South Africa at **Mazimbu** and **Dakawa**.

In the introduction to this paper, it was stated that in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden it is today relevant to speak about broadly based National Solidarity Movements for Southern Africa, within which various political currents flow together, that advocate a principled support to the true opponents of apartheid and from which the respective governments confidently can draw support for internationally advanced policies, such as sanctions against South Africa and assistance to the liberation movements, as well as for the granting of considerable aid resources to the majority-ruled states in the region. Some factors behind the emergence of this solidarity have been discussed above.

It is, of course, next to impossible to "measure" the importance of Nordic public opinions vis-à-vis Southern Africa. Between 40 and 60% of the bilateral development assistance budgets in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are allocated to Southern Africa and this share has been increasing during the 1980s. Against this background, it is interesting to note that opinion polls carried out in Norway and Sweden between 1980 and 1986 show that in general terms both the Norwegian and the Swedish people express considerable readiness to give development assistance and that this readiness has increased throughout the period. (The findings are remarkably similar in Norway and Sweden, and there is reason to believe that they, in general, could be valid also for Denmark and Finland.) Thus, in 1980, 71% of those interviewed in Norway and 65% of those in Sweden wanted either to maintain or increase the overall level of development assistance. Corresponding figures in 1986 were 79% for Norway and 85% for Sweden.

At the other end, those in Norway who wanted to decrease or terminate development assistance were 22% in 1980 and 35% in Sweden. In 1986, these percentages had decreased to 15% in both Norway and Sweden.⁸⁹

Closer to Southern Africa, it is in this context perhaps more relevant to illustrate the width of the public opinion by looking at membership of non-governmental solidarity organizations with the struggling peoples of South Africa and Namibia.

Thus, the Swedish Isolate South Africa Committee (*Isolera Sydafrikakommittén*—ISAK)—a national umbrella organization which "campaigns against (Swedish and other) companies, organizations and individuals who maintain relations with South Africa; (...) defends political prisoners in South Africa and Namibia; and supports the liberation movements ANC and SWAPO90 —had, for example, not less than 62 nationally organized member organizations in the beginning of 1987. These member organizations ranged from the Africa Groups of Sweden and the women's and youth wings of all the political parties represented in the Swedish parliament, except the conservative Moderate Party, to voluntary professional associations such as Artists Against Apartheid. Of relevance to the discussion in this paper is that one fourth of ISAK's national member organizations in 1987 represented the Church of Sweden or missionary societies with direct involvement in South and Southern Africa, and that friendship associations sprung from development cooperation with the countries in Southern Africa—such as the Swedish-Tanzania Association—took active part in its campaigns.⁹¹

This leads us back to the other side of the historical coin, namely the role of Swedish and other Nordic business relations with apartheid South Africa and independent Southern Africa. In the introduction above, it was stated that Nordic business interests (and their political organizations and parties) represent a dissenting voice in the process towards Nordic solidarity with Southern Africa and that they—in spite of the Nordic sanctions laws—still lobby in favour of maintained economic relations with South Africa, while at the same time showing but a lukewarm interest in economic undertakings in the SADCC region. In the case of Sweden, some companies have withdrawn from South Africa, but others—like SKF, Sandvik and Secoroc⁹²—remain.

Although quantitatively of minor economic importance, these Swedish relations with apartheid South Africa are of significance to the Pretoria regime and constitute an unfortunate fact when the question of Swedish—and Nordic—involvement in contemporary Southern Africa is assessed. While very broad sectors of the Nordic populations have come to share a community of interests with their brothers and sisters in Southern Africa, it is, thus, still the case—in the words by Oliver Tambo in the epigram above—that one faction in the Nordic countries view their national interest with regard to South and Southern Africa differently.⁹³

...AND AN IMPORTANT REMARK

There is no continent in which the presence of expatriate scientists is as pronounced as in Africa. It is thus still regarded as quite legitimate to write on African countries without any reference to local scholarship or, where the work of local researchers is used, without proper attribution of one's findings to these sources (...). One of the most humiliating experiences of African scholars is witnessing intellectual "debates" on their **countries** in which nationals are only marginally engaged, if at all.

(**Thandika** Mkandawire in his Foreword to **Ibbo Mandaza (ed): Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition 1980–1986**; Codesria; **Dakar**; Senegal; 1986 (p.xi).)

In this paper, I have tried to identify some factors behind the considerable Nordic involvement in contemporary Southern Africa, as well as behind the emergence of broad-based solidarity movements for Southern Africa in the Nordic countries. There is no concluding chapter to the paper. This is so, because the author is painfully aware of the fact that not only is the preceding presentation utterly **euro-centric**, but also primarily based upon Swedish sources and experiences. The paper should, thus, be read with some caution as to its Nordic relevance.

Secondly, no conclusion—however tentative—on the subject of "Nordic relations with Southern Africa" could be drawn until the voice of Southern Africa is heard. Against the background of the political and economic importance of Nordic involvement in Southern Africa, recently resulting in a unique North-South framework of "region-to-region cooperation", the subject merits to be seriously documented and researched. Of particular importance is here, of course, contributions by actors, interested parties and scholars in the Southern African countries themselves.

However, the non-accessibility to source materials in the Nordic languages limits such possibilities. To my mind, the onus is therefore on the research communities in the Nordic countries—such as SIAS—to prepare the terrain for and initiate joint programmes through which the Nordic—Southern African relationship can be assessed, explained and understood.

Thus, instead of concluding, I wish that I have *opened* the discussion.

NOTES

1. See e.g. Anders Mollander: *Sverige i Södra Afrika*: Minnesanmärkningar 1970–80 (Reminiscences 1970–80). SIDA, Stockholm, 1982 and Bertil Odén: *Sydafrika i Södra Afrika* (South Africa in Southern Africa). Nordiska Afrikainstitutet/SIDA, Stockholm, 1988.
2. Tom Østergaard: "Aiming beyond conventional development assistance: An analysis of Nordic aid to the SADCC region" (mimeo). Paper presented at the SIAS/SADRA Conference on Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa with a Post-apartheid Perspective, Harare, 21–23 September 1988 (pp 33 and 3). It should, however, be emphasized that Nordic economic interests have featured prominently with regard to South Africa, which falls outside the scope of Østergaard's paper. With regard to the SADCC region, he adds that "through the support to SADCC, the Nordic countries may strive to secure a foothold on the future market of Southern Africa" (p 34). To me it is undoubtedly so. The Nordic/SADCC Initiative on Expanded Economic and Cultural Cooperation should to a large extent be seen in this light.
3. It is, for example, interesting to note that the Liberal Party (Folkpartiet) of Sweden—one of the bourgeois opposition parties in the Swedish parliamentary elections of 18 September 1988—in its election manifesto stated: "Sweden's foreign aid must be increased and made more effective. (...) Sweden should direct more aid to efforts designed to promote human rights and democracy. This would mean more aid to those who struggle against racial discrimination in South Africa." Swedish Election Guide 1988, Stockholm, 1988, p 26.
4. The considerable Nordic solidarity movements in favour of the Vietnamese and the Chilean peoples' struggles were closely linked to the extra-parliamentary political Left and more militant in their actions and their criticism of governmental policies. The solidarity movements for Southern Africa have come to draw upon support from various national political quarters and have established working relations with their respective Nordic government.
5. It is noteworthy that the formal, non-governmental Nordic solidarity movements at an early stage decided to support the struggle in Southern Africa as a region and that they channel assistance to the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa and to the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia in their capacity "as representatives of their peoples and leading forces in the struggle in their countries", as is stated in the Programme of the Africa Groups in Sweden (AGIS). The solidarity movement in the Nordic countries has, thus, avoided splitting up into different support groups in favour of—for example—Angola, Mozambique or Zimbabwe, as has happened in other European countries, and has never been confused regarding its support to the real forces of liberation in South Africa or Namibia.
6. Rather than conflicting, relations between the solidarity movement and the Nordic governments have been mutually supportive, particularly with regard to technical assistance in and dissemination of information on Southern Africa, but also in other fields. Just to quote one example: When the Swedish (and Danish) rock artists in November 1985 held a two-day musical concert in favour of the ANC of South Africa, the late Prime Minister Olof Palme appeared on stage, announcing that the Swedish government had decided to support the initiative by extending an additional grant to the African National Congress.
7. It should here be noted that:
 - (i) although somewhat marginalized with regard to Southern Africa, Iceland is, of course, one of five Nordic countries. Thus, Iceland is a signatory both of the Nordic Programme of Action Against Apartheid (1978 and 1988) and of the Nordic/SADCC Initiative on Expanded Economic and Cultural Cooperation (1986), and
 - (ii) that the

author of this paper is Swedish and that my frame of reference primarily regards Sweden and Swedish relations with Southern Africa. This might not be so important from a Southern African perspective, where Danish, Finnish, (Icelandic), Norwegian and Swedish for quite obvious reasons often are brought together under a "Nordic" umbrella. It is, however, relevant from a Nordic perspective. Although closely knitted together into a socio-political region, the Nordic national communities do not seldom jealously uphold what is (considered) "particular" and passionately defend what is (considered) "national". When, in the paper, Nordic engagement in Southern Africa is illustrated by examples from Sweden, this is, therefore, due to the limited frame of reference of the author and should not be interpreted as an international transcription of "Swedish" into "Nordic".

8. *The Citizen*, 8 April 1987.
9. Finland, Norway and Sweden do not extend bilateral development assistance to Malawi, while Denmark has done so for a number of years.
10. For a discussion on Swedish sanctions against South Africa, see Tor Sellström: "Sanctions Against South Africa: The Case of Sweden". In *Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly* (SAPEM), No 1, Harare, October 1987, pp 11-13.

Iceland has not legislated against investments in and trade with South Africa and Namibia. According to the text of the revised Nordic Programme of Action Against Apartheid, of March 1988, "Iceland has found it unnecessary to adopt economic measures against South Africa, since most of the economic activities against South Africa, (outlined in the Programme of Action) are not relevant to Iceland and since there is minimal trade between Iceland and South Africa. Instead, Iceland has appealed to industry, the trade unions and the public in general to reduce exports to and imports from South Africa." Nordic Programme of Action Against Apartheid (mimeo), Declaration adopted by the Nordic Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Tromsø, 24 March 1988, p 3 of Appendix.
11. Østergaard *op. cit.* p 9.
12. Excluding Iceland.
13. Lena Hjelm-Wallén (Swedish Minister for International Development Cooperation): "Sweden's Role In Southern Africa" (mimeo). Statement at the Conference on Peace and Development in the Frontline States, organized by War on Want, London, 9 June 1988, p 5.
14. OECD: *Development Cooperation: Efforts and policies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee -1987*. Report. OECD, Paris 1988, table IV-3, p 55.
15. For example, some of the above-mentioned Western and Eastern powers debit military assistance against their aid budgets, while Nordic development assistance is strictly civilian and humanitarian. For a discussion on Nordic policies with regard to the developing countries in general, see Lars Rudebeck: "Nordic Policies toward the Third World in Bengt Sundelius (ed): *Foreign Policies of Northern Europe*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado 1982, pp 143-176.
16. In the case of Sweden, direct humanitarian support is extended to the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa and to the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia. Cooperation with the ANC started in 1972/73, while the support to SWAPO was initiated in 1970/71. No other liberation movement in Southern Africa receives direct support from Sweden.
17. In her statement on Sweden's Role in Southern Africa to the Conference on Peace and Development in the Frontline States, organized by the British NGO War on Want in June 1988, the Swedish Minister for International Development Cooperation, Mrs Lena Hjelm-Wallén, called for a better burden-sharing when it comes to donor support to organizations such as LWF, WCC, WUS, AET, CFTC, IDAF and others, adding: "I am sure (that) many of you are not aware that the Swedish share of the financing of most of these organizations exceeds 50%. And many of us, on our side, are indeed surprised to learn that these excellent organizations, most of which are

- based in London, still receive very minimal official contributions from the United Kingdom and other OECD countries." *Lena Hjelm-Wallén, op. cit.* p 4.
18. In his statement to the 1985 SADCC Conference, held in Mbabane, Swaziland, Gösta Edgren, Swedish Under Secretary of State for International Development Cooperation, on behalf of the Nordic countries noted that "*your* association within SADCC has influenced us in getting together to exchange information and experience from development assistance and to pool resources in order to render the support from *our* region to *your* region more effective!" SADCC 1985: Mbabane (Proceedings of the Annual Southern African Development Coordination Conference), SADCC, Gaborone 1985, p 36.
 19. *Hjelm-Wallén op. cit.* p 2.
 20. As is well known, Denmark is a member both of NATO and EEC, as is Iceland. Norway is a member of NATO, but not of the EEC. The security policy of Finland is conducted within the framework of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, concluded with the Soviet Union in 1948, while Sweden's security policy is based upon the principle of "non-participation in alliances in peacetime, aiming at neutrality in the event of war". Finland and Sweden are not members of the EEC and to the difference of the other Nordic countries they participate as *guests* within the Non-Aligned Movement.
 21. Members of the community of Frontline States are Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Lesotho was also represented at the Stockholm meeting in 1985.
 22. The Nordic aid administrations are DANIDA (Denmark), FINNIDA (Finland), NORAD (Norway) and SIDA (Sweden). DANIDA and FINNIDA are, respectively, part of the Danish and Finnish Ministries of Foreign Affairs, while NORAD and SIDA are autonomous public boards.
 23. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was founded on 1 April 1980. Members of SADCC are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
 24. Alan H Winquist: *Scandinavians and South Africa: Their impact on the cultural, social and economic development on pre-1902 South Africa*. Balkema, Cape Town 1978. The original dissertation—presented at the New York University—included a chapter on the period 1902–1948.
 25. Winquist *op. cit.* pp 2 and 10.
 26. Many Scandinavians—especially Swedes from the Western and Southern parts—found employment with the Dutch East India Company. This is not surprising, since the Dutch were dominant in the development of Sweden's chief seaport, Gothenburg (Göteborg). Thus, the construction of the port of Gothenburg in the early 1600s was directed by Dutchmen, the city's first burgers were overwhelmingly Dutch in origin and the first Gothenburg City Council consisted of 10 Dutchmen, 1 Scotsman and 7 Swedes.
 27. In the early 1860s, a plan was worked out to bring Swedish emigrants to the Transvaal and create a settlement along the Vaal river near Potchefstroom, which in 1846 had been named the capital of the Transvaal Republic (South African Republic). The organizer of the scheme was Oscar Wilhelm Forsman, who had emigrated from Kalmar 20 years earlier. Through this scheme, 35 men and women—mostly farmers from the Kalmar area—arrived in Potchefstroom in 1864 to work on the farm Scandinavia. After a devastating drought the following year, the scheme was, however, ruined and the settlers dispersed to other parts of South Africa. Forsman was more successful. By 1879, he was the largest landowner in the Transvaal and in 1880 he accepted a seat in the British-created Transvaal legislature.
- More successful than the Swedish settlement scheme was the Norwegian scheme in Alfred County at the mouth of the Umzimkulu river on the Southern Natal coast. This scheme was sponsored by the Natal Immigration Board in an effort to claim

land for Europeans and to create a buffer against the **Xhosa** population. The Natal Immigration Board advertised in Norwegian newspapers and set up a recruitment committee in **Ålesund** on the West Coast of Norway. The response was positive, and in 1882 a party of 34 families plus various individuals—totalling 229 **persons**—arrived in Alfred County, where they came to constitute the largest European **population** group. In 1957, when the settlement celebrated its 75th anniversary, the descendants of the **Ålesund** settlers numbered 2 000 in South Africa. As a group it assimilated rapidly into White South African society, especially with the **English**-speaking population group. The Norwegian presence is, however, noticeable in the area. Just outside Port Shepstone lies, for example, Oslo Beach with its main street, King Haakon Drive.

28. Many, however, maintained links with their countries of origin and a surprisingly high number wrote about their adventurous lives in South and Southern Africa in Nordic newspapers and magazines. Some even published their biographies in book form. These articles and books in Swedish and other Nordic languages contain a wealth of information, not only on Nordic emigration to Southern Africa, but also on political, economic, social and cultural affairs in the region at the turn of the century. To my knowledge, no systematic inventory of this kind of publications on South and Southern Africa has, however, been carried out. **Examples** of such books are:

Andy Andersson: *En hötorgsgrabb i Afrika: Tjugofem års pionjärlio och jaktäventyr i Rhodesia, Portugisiska Öst- och Västafrika samt Kongo* (A Haymarket-lad in Africa: **Twenty-five years** of pioneer-life and hunting adventures in Rhodesia, Portuguese East and West Africa and Congo). Wahlstrom & Widstrand, Stockholm 1924, in which—partly contrary to the title—the author covers the period 1896–1920 and relates how he participated in the crushing of the Ndebele rising in **1896–97**, how he volunteered in the Anglo-Boer War and how he contributed to the construction of the Beira railway, the railway line over Victoria Falls and the Benguela railway.

C T Eriksson: *Mitt Afrika* (My Africa). Holger Schildts Forlag, Stockholm 1932 (with many unique photos). Principally about **Rhodesia/Zimbabwe** during the period 1897–1918, but also contains reminiscences from the **Anglo-Boer War**, as well as on mining explorations in Northern **Rhodesia/Zambia**.

Charles G Hedlund: *Vatten och Guld* (Water and Gold). Albert Bonniers Forlag, Stockholm 1931. Covers the period 1890–1900, during which the author participates in diamond and gold mining in South Africa, in the construction of the Beira railway in Mozambique and in the **Anglo-Boer War**.

29. Winquist *op. cit.* p 77. This constituted only between 1.5 and 2% of the total European population in South Africa and may seem insignificant. If compared to the number of Europeans in other Southern African countries at the turn of the century or immediately thereafter, the size of the Nordic group becomes, however, quite considerable. In 1904 there were, for example, only 3 100 Portuguese in the Mozambican capital **Lourenço Marques** (= **Maputo**). In the same year, the total European population in both Nyasaland (Malawi) and in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) was less than a 1000, while the Europeans in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) numbered some 11 100 in 1901 and the total in Swaziland was 1 100 in 1911.
30. Winquist *op. cit.* p 4.
31. Of the 117, 45 were Swedes, 25 Danes, 22 Finns (mostly Swedish-speaking), 13 Norwegians, 7 Germans, 3 Dutch, 1 Russian and 1 Italian. The Corps was led by **Johannes Flygare**, son of a Church of Sweden missionary and the only member born in South Africa.
32. In the mid-1920s a book was published on the Scandinavian corps (H E Uddgren: *Minnesskrift: Hjältarna vid Magersfontein*. Hallmans Boktryckeri AB, Uddevalla 1925). A monument was raised at the Magersfontein battlefield in South Africa already in 1908.

33. Louis Trichardt died in **Lourenço Marques (Maputo)**, Mozambique, in 1838. As a revered Hero of the Afrikaaner **Volk**, he was commemorated by the South African government after the signing of the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique in 1984. And on the 150th anniversary of Trichardt's death, a South African delegation—led by Foreign Minister Pik Botha—held a ceremony at the grave in Maputo.
34. The Bergh family emanates from **Olof Bergh**, who emigrated from his native Gothenburg (**Göteborg**, Sweden) through the Dutch East India Company in the late 1670s. The **Berghs** played a prominent role in Cape politics during the Dutch period.
35. The founder of the South African Stockenstrom (still today **spell** with Swedish umlaut, "ö") family was Anders Stockenstrom, who emigrated from Filipstad, Sweden—also through the Dutch East India Company—in the 1790s. After 1795, Stockenstrom's name became closely associated with the Eastern Cape Frontier and, in particular, with the Graff-Reinet district. Having made his Cape career in the British administration, Stockenstrom was made Landdrost of Graff-Reinet in 1803. He died in 1811, in a confrontation with the Xhosa people. His son, **Andries** Stockenstrom, was also appointed Landdrost of Graff-Reinet (1815). Like his father he was heavily involved in the Border wars with the Xhosas, but was critical of the British government's policy toward the African population. Today, a Fritz Stockenstrom is executive director of the South African Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, while **Wilma** Stockenstrom is a well-known, progressive Afrikaaner writer.
36. Johannes Christoffer **Krogh** came from Bergen, Norway, and settled in the Cape in the mid-1790s. His grandson—bearing the same name (but called **Nkoseluhla** by the **Swazis**)—was for a long time the highest European official in Swaziland, first as Special Commissioner for the South African Republic (Transvaal, from 1895) and later as British representative (from 1903). He signed the Treaty of Vereeniging, which ended the Anglo-Boer War and was afterwards appointed Native Affairs **Commissioner**.
37. Jacob Letterstedt was Sweden's "earliest nineteenth century emigrant success story in South Africa" (Winquist *op. cit.* p 82). Born outside Norrköping, he emigrated to the Cape in 1820, where he soon was to become one of the wealthiest and most powerful citizens. He founded several businesses, among which the most relevant was **Mariedal** Brewery, which later was amalgamated with Ohlsson's Cape Breweries, founded by fellow-Swede Anders Ohlsson. This brewery is the origin of today's South African Breweries Ltd. Letterstedt was in 1857 appointed the first **Swedish-Norwegian** Consul General to South Africa. In this capacity, he was the first person to write officially to the Foreign Office in Stockholm, describing events in South Africa, including its economic development. Many Swedish businessmen, as well as scientists and explorers, came to South Africa and Namibia through contacts with Letterstedt.
38. One of those who individually joined the Norwegian settler community on the Southern Natal coast (see Note 27) was Jacob Jacobsen Egeland, from **Lyngval**, Norway. He **arrived** in Natal at the age of 14 in 1880 and to a large extent made a career **parallel** to that of Jacob Letterstedt, becoming a very wealthy South African businessman and at the same time maintaining **links** with his native country. Thus, after accumulating funds through a chain of trading-stores in **Zululand**, in 1909 he became the Managing Director of the Union Whaling Company, in joint partnership with his cousin, Abraham E Larsen (1880-1960), from Farsund, Norway. Egeland also became Swedish-Norwegian Consul in Durban in 1901 and four years later, Norwegian Consul. (Larsen became Norwegian Consul in Durban in 1946, later to be **succeeded** by his son, **Ernst** Larsen.)

J J Egeland's son, Leif Egeland, became a prominent South African politician. He was a member of Parliament for the United Party and was after World War II appointed South African High Commissioner to Great Britain.

39. The involvement of Nordic—particularly Swedish—natural scientists, explorers and hinterland traders in South Africa and Namibia (as well as Southern Angola) is important, indeed, and merits not a footnote, but a study of its own. What seems important to the author is that the scientists and **explorers**—many of whom condemned the colonial administration's policies toward the African majorities—wrote extensively about the lands and the peoples of South Africa and Namibia (as well as Angola) and that they were widely read in academic circles in Sweden and in the other Nordic countries. As is the case with the more adventurous Nordic immigrants to South Africa at the turn of the century (see Note 28), their writings—important for the understanding of political, economic, social and cultural developments of Southern Africa—are, however, not easily accessible. And, apart from some pioneering works—such as the major publications by Charles John Andersson—the majority of the reports, bulletins, newspaper articles and books are still only available in Swedish or other Nordic languages.

Some exceptions to this unfortunate situation do exist. Thus, the important book on Southern Angola and Northern Namibia by the Swedish explorer Peter Möller, published in 1899 by Wilhelm Billes Bokförlag, Stockholm, with the title *Resa i Afrika genom Angola, Ovambo, och Damaraland* was in 1974 translated into English (Journey into Africa through Angola, Ovamboland and Damaraland. I and J Rudner, Cape Town). However, Möller's travels took place in 1895–96 and his impressions became available to non-Swedish-speaking students only in 1974...

As was stated above, it is not possible to illustrate the role and achievements of Nordic scientists, explorers and traders in South Africa and Namibia in a footnote. Among the most important are the following:

Carl Peter Thunberg: Thunberg, a disciple of Carl Linnaeus at the University of Uppsala, Sweden, has been called "the father of Cape botany". He travelled extensively in South Africa during the period 1772–1774 and recorded his findings in his four-volume *Travels in Europe, Africa and Asia made between the years 1770 and 1779*, published in Uppsala 1788–1793.

Anders Sparrman: Sparrman was a classmate of Thunberg at the University of Uppsala. He researched into the Cape botany in 1775–1776 and recorded this, as well as other travels, in *A Voyage to the Cape of Good Hope, Towards the Antarctic Polar Circle, and Round the World: but Chiefly into the Country of the Hottentots and Caffres from the year 1772–1776* in 1782.

Johan August Wahlberg: It has been said that "what Thunberg and Sparrman were in botany to South Africa, Wahlberg was in birds and mammals" (Winquist *op. cit.* p 51). Wahlberg was sponsored by the Swedish Royal Academy of Science and travelled in Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal in 1841–1842 and again in 1843–1844.

Charles John Andersson: Andersson was born in Vanersborg, Sweden, and arrived in South Africa in 1850, attracted by exploring Namibia. In 1853, he became the first European to reach Lake Ngami—discovered by David Livingstone in 1849—from a westerly direction. He discovered the Okavango river on what is today the Angolan border and made numerous journeys into various regions of Namibia during the period 1850–1867. He was not only an explorer and a first-rate ornithologist, but also had economic, colonialistic and political ambitions. In 1857, he was appointed superintendent of the mining operations of the Walvis Bay Mining Company; in 1858, he founded the town of Omaruru (which became the residence of a number of Scandinavians) and in 1864, he was proclaimed/proclaimed himself Supreme Chief of the Damaras (=Hereros) in the ongoing war against the Namas. Andersson, who died on the Namibian–Angolan border in 1867, is said to have achieved for the Western part of Southern Africa what Livingstone achieved in Central and Eastern Africa. He published a series of books, of which the most well-known are: *Lake Ngami: Explorations and Discoveries during four years' wanderings in the*

wilds of South Western Africa (1856), *The Okavango River: A Narrative of Travel, Exploration and Adventure* (1861) and *Notes of travel in South Africa* (1875).

Axel Wilhelm Eriksson: Eriksson was born in Vanersborg, Sweden, i.e. in the same town as Charles John Andersson. Influenced by Andersson's exploits in Namibia, Eriksson **arrived** in Namibia in 1866. He soon became an influential trader, based in **Omaruru** and specialized in long-distance trade between Namibia, Southern Angola, Cape (where he linked up with the Swedish businessman **Anders Ohlsson**) and — through Botswana — Transvaal. Until his death in Grootfontein, Namibia, in 1901, Eriksson opened up and mapped trade routes in the Western part of Southern Africa, but was also important as a landowner in Transvaal and as an ornithologist. (He donated 1000 birds to the local museum of Vanersborg while on a visit to his native town in 1883.) Unfortunately, he did not keep an account of his travels. One of his sons, **Axel** Eriksson, became a successful painter, concentrating on the indigenous people, birds, mammals and landscapes of Southern Namibia.

40. In contrast to the German missionaries, who prepared the terrain for German colonial conquest of Namibia and remained silent when the colonial authorities in the beginning of this century unleashed the genocidal war against the Herero and the Nama peoples.
41. **Justin Ellis:** "The church in mobilization for national liberation" in Green, Kiljunen and Kiljunen (eds): *Namibia: The last colony*. Longman, Burnt Mill, Harlow, Essex 1981, p 133.
42. Gerhard Totemeyer: *Namibia Old and New*. C Hurst & Co, London 1978 (p. ix).
43. One of the first missionaries in the service of the German Rhenish Missionary Society was the Norwegian Hans Christian Knudsen, from Bergen. He compiled a legal code for the Khoikhoi in the Bethanie area and translated parts of the Bible into the Nama language.
44. Totemeyer *op. cit.* p 20.
45. The President of SWAPO, Sam **Nujoma**, born at Onganjera in 1929, received his first education at a Finnish mission school. The Finnish influence is also unmistakable in the surname of the Secretary General of SWAPO, Hermann Toivo ya Toivo.
46. **Ellis** *op. cit.* p 133.
47. *Ibid.*
48. Due to the activities of the Finnish Missionary Society, there is a wealth of historical material on Namibia in Finland, both in the Archives of the Society and in private hands. This material is particularly valuable as the Finnish missionaries were allowed to work in Northern Namibia almost on their own until World War I and the South African occupation. However, the Finnish language is internationally very insular, and mainly because of language limitations the Finnish material had up until 1982 not been available for international research on Namibia.

In that year, the Academy of Finland granted financial support to what has been called the Finnish Namibia Project, coordinated between the Universities of Joensuu and Helsinki in Finland, the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies in Uppsala, Sweden, and the United Nations Institute of Namibia in Lusaka, Zambia. One, very important, objective of the project is to make an inventory of the Finnish material on Namibia and, thus, make it available for international research. See Martti **Eirola** et al: "The cultural and social change in Ovamboland 1870-1915". University of Joensuu, *Publications of social and regional sciences*, No. 39, 1983.

Bearing in mind that the involvement of Norwegian and Swedish missionaries in the Natal and **Zululand** regions of South Africa also has been significant; that there is a lot of unresearched historical material in Norway and Sweden; and that the Norwegian and Swedish languages are not less insular than the Finnish, it seems to me that similar projects should be initiated in these countries.

49. Winquist *op. cit.* p 157.

50. The Church of Sweden Mission (CSM) is unique among missionary organizations in that it is an integral part of the Swedish State Church. It is also the only missionary organization in the world created by an act of parliament. This unique structure encouraged missionaries to be ordained as priests, receiving a university education, usually from the University of Uppsala.

The direct links thus existing between the missionaries, the public authorities and the academic institutions largely explain why the members of the CSM have been so influential in shaping Swedish opinion on South and Southern Africa and why so many of them have made valuable academic contributions on various African questions. One example is Bishop Bengt Sundkler's internationally renowned study on African separatist church movements in South Africa, *Bantu Prophets in South Africa*, published in English in 1961. Sundkler worked at the CSM mission stations at Dundee and Ceza in South Africa in the late 1930s and early 1940s. He subsequently became Bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanganyika (Tanzania) and, later, chief historian of the CSM in Uppsala, Sweden.

51. There were different reasons for **selecting** South Africa as the first mission field. One was the general knowledge in Norway **and** Sweden about South Africa, transmitted **through early** Nordic travellers. Another was the influence of the Swedish Moravian leader **Hans Peter Hallbeck** at Genadendal in the Cape during the period 1817–1840. Hallbeck—who also influenced John **Philip** of the London Missionary Society (LMS) upon his arrival in South Africa in 1819—**abhorred** slavery, emphasized a communal lifestyle at the mission station and worked for the establishment of an indigenous church. A third reason was the general guidance given by the LMS and some of its most well-known members, such as John **Philip**, Robert Moffat (in particular) and David Livingstone.
52. An exceptionally large number of the early CSM missionaries were single women. The most outstanding was Baroness Hedvig Posse, who came to South Africa in the mid 1880s as a teacher. She financed the Betania Hospital in Dundee in the 1890s and started the mission home "Svenskbo" (Swedish Home) in Durban in the 1920s. Miss Posse was an artist and also translated numerous Swedish hymns into Zulu.
53. **Schreuder's** Zulu grammar formed the basis for a later and more complete study by Bishop John **William** Colenso of the Anglican Church.
54. Winquist *op. cit.* p 129.
55. *Ibid.* p 133.
56. Samuelson was convinced of King Dinizulu's innocence and in order to emphasize his point he wrote a particularly critical booklet on British and European policies toward the Zulus, *The Native Question, Rules of Policy, Past Short-Comings, The White Man's Burden*, published in 1906. Samuelson was in favour of granting political rights to the indigenous people, advocated their enfranchisement and espoused equality of opportunity. Thus, 82 years ago, Samuelson wrote prophetically: "From my long and intimate acquaintances with the Natives, from the highest to the lowest, I say without hesitation that the gap between the whites and the blacks has been widening year by year, towards the Natives. And I say that if our policy of selfishness and hypocrisy is continued much longer, the gap will be unbridgeable. (...) This policy, of course, is bound to break down, sooner or later, with disastrous consequences." Samuelson was convinced that unless policies were changed, "generations to come will have cause to curse us." Quoted in Winquist *op. cit.* p 154.

It should be noted, however, that opinions such as those expressed by Samuelson were far from being shared by all Norwegians or Scandinavians. A considerable number of Norwegians—particularly from the settler community in Alfred County (see Note 27)—**participated** actively in the suppression of the Bambatha rebellion. Already upon their arrival in 1882, many younger Norwegians had joined the **Umzimkulu** Mounted Rifles, a military force created to protect the settler area. The

Norwegian commander of the **Umzimkulu** Mounted Rifles, **Bru-de-Wold**, later led many of the military operations against the Zulus during and after the Bambatha rebellion.

57. **Josef** Zulu remained an active pastor with various Swedish mission stations in South Africa until his death in 1927.
58. The NMS had ordained its first Zulu minister—**Simon Ndlela**—already in 1893.
59. The Lutheran Church is, thus, in African hands, but not the mission schools. As a result of the Bantu Education Act of 1954, they had been brought under the control of the South African government.
60. See Hugo Soderstrom: God *gave growth: The history of the Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe, 1903–1980*. Mambo Press, **Gweru** 1984, and Per Zachrisson: "An African Area in Change: **Belingwe** 1894–1946". *Bulletin of the Department of History* No. 17, University of Gothenburg 1978.

The mission in Zimbabwe was until 1934 regarded as a branch of the Swedish Lutheran mission in South Africa. In 1963, the church became structurally independent from the CSM as the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). The last missionary bishop, Sigfrid Strandvik, retired in 1975 and was succeeded by the Zimbabwean J C Shiri.

It should also be noted that several Scandinavian free church missions were established in South Africa at the end of last century, later to expand into Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Some of these missions are: The Swedish Holiness Union (Natal, Zululand, Transvaal and Swaziland), the Swedish Alliance Mission (in Natal, Transvaal, Swaziland and Zimbabwe), the Swedish Free Baptist Society (in Natal and Transvaal), the Norwegian Free Evangelical Mission (in Transvaal and Swaziland), and the Norwegian Mission Union (in Natal and Swaziland).

61. As an illustration, in 1903, a total of 634 ships called at **Lourenço Marques (Maputo)**, Mozambique, which at the time had a European population of some 4 500 inhabitants. Out of the total number of ships, not less than 90 came from Norway—corresponding to 14%—while 9 were Swedish and 4 Danish. With an average of two Nordic ships a week and in relation to such a small population, almost in its entirety composed of men, it is perhaps not so unexpected that the author—going through the Censuses in the Historical Archives in Maputo in 1983—found at least two unmistakably Scandinavian names among women domiciled in the "red-light" district of the city, namely a "Kitty" Lindstrom and a "Bianca" Berg.
62. See note 37 above.
63. See note 38 above.
64. Anders **Ohlsson**, who emigrated to South Africa from **Malmö**, Sweden, in the early 1860s, was initially in partnership with **Axel** Eriksson in Namibia (see Note 39) and later with Jacob Letterstedt in the Cape (see Note 37). He became one of the wealthiest persons in South Africa and was probably the most influential Scandinavian in the whole country in the 1880s, 1890s and 1900s. In 1882, he was appointed Consul for Sweden and Norway and in 1884 he entered Cape politics by being elected to the Legislative Assembly of Cape Town, a seat he held until 1893.
Ohlsson has given name to two well-known, contemporary brands of beer in South and Southern Africa, namely "Lion" and "Ohlsson's". (In 1902, he bought the Lion Brewery of Johannesburg, founded by a German settler. After Ohlsson's death the same year, his beer was known as "Lion".)
65. **Karl** Lithman from Gothenburg (**Göteborg**), Sweden, emigrated to South Africa in 1879 and returned to Sweden in 1921. He became a successful timber merchant, owner of a large saw-mill and founded the **Rosebank** Match Company.
66. The Thesen family from Stavanger, Norway, settled in **Knysna** in 1870. Involved in shipping in Norway, and upon economic misfortunes there, they emigrated with one of their ships (The **Albatros**) and accumulated funds through coastal shipping ser-

vices before expanding into saw-milling and timber industry in the 1890s. In 1905, Nils Peter Thesen became Norway's first Consul-General in South Africa.

67. The years of establishment of major Swedish companies in South Africa are as follows:

SKF	1914 (Production at Uitenhage in 1966)
Alfa Laval	1920
Electrolux	1926
Transatlantic	1927
ASEA	1946
Atlas Copco	1946
Sandvik	1948
Fagersta	1948
Secoroc	1948

68. In the case of Sweden, the nominal value of Swedish exports to South Africa was 15 million Kronor in 1891. It was 14.5 million in 1903, 16.5 million in 1925, 100 million in 1948, 325 million in 1970 and 1,575 million Kronor in 1984.
69. As a result, many Afrikaaner folk songs are based on Swedish melodies.
70. Winqvist *op. cit.* p 194.
71. Actually, this process of awakening was so slow that the first Swedish development cooperation institution—the Central Committee for Swedish Technical Assistance to Less Developed Areas, set up in 1952—had to actively promote the formation of strong public support for growing Swedish involvement in Third World issues. A campaign to this effect was launched in 1953. According to one of the initiators, "the campaign had to try to do many things. One was to turn the average Swede around so that he would look out across our borders and begin to understand the interplay between all parts of the globe, which so profoundly affected his daily life, too. In other words (...), an education in internationalism was required." Sixten Heppling: *The Very First Years*. In Pierre Frühlings (ed): *Swedish Development Aid In Perspective*. Almqvist & Wiksell International, Stockholm 1986, p 24.
72. Both Denmark and Sweden held, however, forts along the West African Gold Coast in the seventeenth century and were involved in the slave trade. By Royal Decree of 1792, the exportation of slaves from Danish possessions was prohibited, as well as the transportation of slaves on Danish ships. Thus Denmark was the first European state to legislate against the slave trade, although the prohibition did not take effect until 1803. Ten years later, Sweden followed Denmark's example.
73. Stig Hadenius: *Swedish politics during the 20th century*. The Swedish Institute, Stockholm 1988, p 117.
74. Herbert Tingsten: *Problemet Sydafrika*. Albert Bonniers Förlag, Stockholm 1954, translated into English as: *The Problem of South Africa*. Victor Gollancz, London 1955.
75. Per Wastberg: *Forbjudet område*, and *På svarta listan*. Wahlstrom & Widstrand, Stockholm 1960. Per Wastberg was the co-founder of both Swedish Amnesty International and the Swedish Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa. He has since 1964 been a member of the Preparatory Committee for Swedish Humanitarian Assistance.
76. Gunnar Helander's early novels on apartheid South Africa, published by the Church of Sweden, were: *Zulu moter vit man*, 1949 (Zulu meets White man); *Endast för vita*, 1951 (Whites only); and *Svarfsymfoni*, 1952 (Black symphony) Also, pastor Helander was for a long period of time a member of the Preparatory Committee for Swedish Humanitarian Assistance.
77. Quoted in Christian Andersson: "Breaking Through" in Frühlings *op. cit.* p 29, and in Thord Palmlund: *Altruism and Other Motives*. Ibid. p 110.
78. Quoted in Palmlund *op. cit.* p 118.

79. Börje Ljunggren: "Swedish Goals and Priorities". in *Frühling op. cit.* p 75.
80. Quoted in Palmlund *op. cit.* p 115.
81. At the beginning of 1969, Sweden recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and development cooperation between the two countries started in 1970/71. It is still ongoing. Swedish development cooperation with Cuba started in 1971. In 1976, the non-socialist coalition government under Thorbjörn Fälldin took the decision to transform the cooperation with Cuba into a more limited technical cooperation. Swedish development cooperation with Chile was discontinued in 1973, following the military coup under Augusto Pinochet.
82. Palmlund *op. cit.* p 115.
83. Fellesrådet for det sørlige Afrika—FsA.
84. Afrikagrupperna i Sverige—AGIS.
85. Afrikagruppernas Rekryteringsorganisation—ARO. The organization is since 1987 also represented in Zimbabwe.
86. Many of the Southern Africans that were in exile or studied in the Nordic countries were later to occupy prominent political positions in their home countries. In the case of Sweden and Zimbabwe, for example, Mrs Sally Mugabe spent several years in Sweden when Robert Mugabe was in prison in Zimbabwe, and the present Minister of Security, Sydney Sekeremayi, qualified as a medical doctor at the University of Lund in Sweden. He later worked in a Swedish hospital.
87. Østergaard *op. cit.* pp 16 and 22.
88. Also in the case of Tanzania, there existed pre-independence relations with the Nordic countries. Thus, the Church of Sweden Mission sent its first missionaries to the Bukoba region east of Lake Victoria in 1941. Barbro Johansson, former missionary, became a Tanzanian citizen upon independence, joined the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and was elected a member of the Tanzanian parliament.
89. For Norway: Kirsten Ringdal: "Hva mener det norske folk om u-land og bistand?" in Tore Linné Eriksen (ed): *Den vanskelige bistanden: Noen trekk ved norsk utviklingshjelps historie*. Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 1987, p 186; and for Sweden: Development Assistance Committee Aid Review 1988/89—Memorandum of Sweden (mimeo), p 11.
90. ISAK: "Vad gjorde ISAK 1986-87: Verksamhetsberättelse". ISAK 1987 (pamphlet)
91. Ibid.
92. See note 67 above.
93. In a recent article on Swedish companies in South Africa, published under the heading: "Business as usual", in the magazine *Svensk Export* (by the Swedish Export Council), Daniel Dube, President of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) and trade union chairman at the Swedish SKF factory in Uitenhage, states: "The Swedish companies in South Africa are allied with the apartheid regime. They exploit black labour in the same way as South African employers do. They do not set good examples." In response to this criticism, the Managing Directors of SKF, Delfos & Atlas and Fagersta/Secoroc jointly declare: "We are following the law, both here in South Africa and in Sweden. We could not do otherwise". *Svensk Export*, No. 8/88, pp 8 and 9.

South Africa's Regional Policies in the Late and Post-Apartheid Periods

Elling Njål Tjønneland

The widespread popular uprising since 1984 is unprecedented in South African history. The level of mobilization, organizational strength and political effectiveness of the mass organizations and liberation forces have led to the demise of the "total strategy — a grand scheme formulated in the late 1970's as the regime's response to intensified popular rebellion and disintegration of key mechanisms of power and privilege—as a coherent set of tactics and strategies. The apartheid state rapidly became defensive and inoperative in important policy areas and increasingly found itself dependent upon a massive use of violence and repression in an attempt to regain control and the political initiative.

The state's capability to suppress the resistance and opposition forces should not be underestimated, but any return to the past and the situation in the 1960's is highly unlikely. There may be disagreement among observers on the timing and the pathway to elimination of apartheid and change, but most would agree that South Africa probably now is going through its last violent convulsive cycle. The flourishing—especially in the 1985–87 period—of political and scholarly debate on the post-apartheid society, the many delegations travelling to Lusaka and the increased international legitimization of the African National Congress, are all indicators of a growing realization that the days of apartheid are numbered.

The present paper will, first, make some comments on the debate on the construction of post-apartheid.

Secondly, upon the realization that a key determinate variable behind the nature of the post-apartheid society will be the timing and the process of transition itself, the paper will highlight some key elements in the present conflict dynamic and the possible pathways to change emerging from that. The main focus of the discussion will be on the regional implications, and the possible future relations between the Southern African economies.

CONSTRUCTING THE POST-APARTHEID SOCIETY —THE DEBATE

An underlying assumption in this paper is that only universal franchise and majority rule in a unitary state can legitimate a future post-apartheid construction. However, it is important to take into account that a number of (politically) powerful contributions and debates have emerged over the past 2–3 years where the basic aim is not the realization of this democratic ideal, but rather how to secure the power and privilege of capital and the white minority in a post-apartheid future.

Even reformist elements within the state have begun to develop ideas and plans which go well beyond the formula of "old style" apartheid and the "total strategy" of the late 1970s and early 1980s. These plans are sharply at odds with the aims of the liberation forces, but they will influence and shape the process towards change and therefore merit a closer study.

The failed attempts by Pretoria—clearly evident by 1984—to manage the escalating conflict and regain the initiative led to a deepening of the tensions and cracks within Afrikaaner nationalism and to increased militarization of the apartheid state and society. Reformist elements within the state and segments of the Afrikaaner intelligentsia also responded by developing new and more far-reaching ideas and plans to manage and regulate the conflict. For the first time they began to realise the inevitability of the political incorporation of the Africans. Supported by major business organizations and corporations, Chief Buthelezi and his *Inkatha* movement, moderate blacks collaborating with the state as well as the parliamentary opposition on the "left", a number of political and economic models for the organization of a future South Africa emerged.

These models share certain common features; they all—but to varying degrees—accept the inevitability of political incorporation, they move in a federalist direction with notions of constitutional protection of group interests and minority rights, and they give prescriptions for minimal or limited government with reliance on the market forces as the main engine for growth and welfare.

Basically this sort of post-apartheid construction has emerged as an attempt to secure the principles of capitalism and private enterprise and to protect the general social and economic interests of the white minority. To some extent it has already found expression in state policy and constitutional reconstruction (e.g. the policy of "orderly urbanization" and the ongoing efforts to reorganize state administration at local and regional levels).'

Within the liberation forces, the mass movements, trade unions and the radical intelligentsia, the debate on the post-apartheid future also gained a new momentum during the 1980s. The tactics and strategy for revolution and change (especially the question of class alliances), the

perceptions of national democracy and the socialist future, and the role of the *Freedom Charter* as a guide and blueprint for the construction of post-apartheid emerged as the main themes and issues in the debate. A number of key documents (e.g. on the constitution of a democratic South Africa) are currently also prepared under the auspices of the ANC Research Department and others (e.g. the Southern African Economic Research and Training Project).²

The main political perspectives and different "schools" are perhaps best illustrated by the September 1986 York conference on *The Southern African Economy after Apartheid*, so far probably the main—and biggest—event in the academic debate on the future of South Africa. More than 40 papers covering a number of topics related to the post-apartheid construction in South Africa and written from liberal and radical schools of thought, were presented.³ Several observations—illustrative of the "state of the art" of the general debate about post-apartheid—can be made of the York conference.

First, a significant difference in emphasis in selection of topics occurred between the liberals and radicals. The radicals tended to focus on the opportunities available for a future post-apartheid society, the question of class alliances and the possibility of socialism. The liberals—and mainly economists by profession—were in the main concerned with the constraints of the past focusing on the practical "how to achieve" issues and the policy options available for a new regime under pressure to "deliver the goods" in a hostile economic environment inherited from the past.

The dissimilarity in selection of themes is, of course, partly a reflection of the underlying division between those calling for revolutionary change and a radical restructuring of the economy and society, and those believing in a more evolutionary change towards some sort of welfare capitalism and/or social democracy. Some in the "liberal" (or, rather, conservative) camp focused on the need to stimulate market forces (through reduced government spending, taxation, state interventions etc.) as the main recipe for a solution to what they identify as the main social and economic problems.⁴

Others—and well represented at the York conference—have, however, moved beyond these free market/monetarist approaches and have begun to reveal the underlying structural trends in the economy. They are seeking to resolve the "injustices" in South Africa's economic structure through a better distribution of resources (e.g. redistribution of income and fiscal spending through increased taxation on the rich and greater public spending on health services, education etc. for blacks).⁵

The contributors from the radical tradition argue that this sort of welfare capitalism (even combined with a more social-democratic political structure) does not address the main cause and location of the conflicts, inequalities and injustices. Their solutions will therefore only be partial and temporary. The issue of distribution of resources is important, but the main causes must be located in the realm of capitalist production

relations itself. The issue of class power and the question of class alliances in the struggle to eliminate apartheid will therefore have to be confronted directly.⁶

These issues will not be discussed further in this paper. One final remark must, however, be underlined. Whatever the class forces behind, and the strategy pursued by, an incoming post-apartheid regime, it will inherit an economy which is bound to impose a certain logic and rigidity on the course of the future development. An economy characterized by strong corporate concentration, large foreign capital and powerful **trans-**national corporations is bound to put formidable constraints upon an incoming regime eager to ensure state planning, public ownership and democratic control, anxious to secure basic needs and dependent upon rapid economic **growth**.⁷

A *second* observation to be drawn from the papers presented at the York conference was the limited attention paid to the regional dimension, to South Africa's role in Southern Africa after apartheid. This confirms to a general trend in the post-apartheid debate; the poor—and almost non-existent—discussion of the future organization of relations between the Southern African economies after the end of apartheid. The few contributions available have hardly moved beyond a listing of dilemmas and issues for discussion centered around the tensions and conflict of interests arising out of traditional economic dominance and dependency relations in the region.⁸

There seems to be a general understanding that controversies and conflicts may emerge between **SADCC** and a liberated South **Africa**—despite an assumed willingness to promote regional cooperation and a more balanced development—because of the economic constraints of the past and because the main priorities of a new regime in South Africa are likely to be consolidation of state power and domestic issues demanding immediate attention.

A greater understanding of the prospects and challenges posed by a liberated majority-ruled South Africa has, however, begun to emerge from another source: through the efforts of **SADCC** to promote regional cooperation. Partly because the **SADCC** members, through their cooperative efforts, have developed a deep understanding and awareness of the potentialities as well as the dangers involved in regional cooperation. This holds fruitful possibilities not only for the present members, but also for the prospects of a more balanced development for the whole region after the elimination of apartheid.⁹

Zimbabwe's role within **SADCC** is also providing a useful insight in the discussion of South Africa's possible future position within the region. As a country with fairly diversified economic structure compared to her **SADCC**-partners and with socio-political features (political power in the hands of the majority and economic power to a large extent still in the hands of the white minority and a few major corporations) probably not too dissimilar from a post-apartheid South Africa, some lessons may be learned from an examination of Zimbabwe-**SADCC** relations.

SADCC and Zimbabwe have so far succeeded well in redirecting regional infrastructure. However, while everybody has gained from improved functional coordination along these lines, class interests have become more important when projects have implied reconstruction of national economies. Attempts to promote production complementarity and improved intra-regional trade have proceeded far more slowly with emerging tensions and conflicts of interests becoming evident; important class forces—such as international capital in Zimbabwe—have less to gain—and may lose out—from improved regional cooperation along these lines.¹⁰

Similar conflicts of interests will—most likely—become even more important after the demise of apartheid South Africa. SADCC's achievements will provide important lessons for any post-apartheid regime and attempts to restructure South Africa's relations with her neighbours.

SOUTH AFRICA'S STRATEGY IN THE LATE-APARTHEID PERIOD

After these remarks it is, however, important to stress that the general shape of post-apartheid Southern Africa simply can not be predicted because it depends too heavily on a process of transition whose form is unclear. It depends a lot whether, e.g., the end of apartheid will come after an economic collapse or after a period of poor economic performance.

The remaining and main part of this paper will therefore look more closely upon the process of change itself; based upon an analysis of the current situation and some assumptions regarding the short-to-medium term development, some conclusions relating to the future development of South African—Southern African relationships will be made.

Let us first look at the restructuring of the apartheid state and recent changes in state policy. It is generally recognized that the rise of P W Botha to the position of Prime Minister in 1978 led to a process of strong centralization of state power, a rapid militarization and the emergence of an increasingly military-bureaucratic regime. A parallel process of growing realignment in white politics based on a developing split along class and ideological lines also developed. Internally this led to continuities as well as changes in apartheid politics, in particular it signalled a **rethink**—but slow and contradictory!—regarding the position of urban Africans."

Basically, the political strategy initiated in the late 1970s was centered around three dimensions. In order to regain control attempts were made to facilitate the emergence and consolidation of new allies among the blacks. Attempts were made to incorporate the two black minority groups (the Asians and Coloureds) into the political system, and to obtain support from the privileged "insiders" among the urban Africans through improvement in their material living conditions, reforms of local government structures etc.

support from the privileged "insiders" among the urban Africans through improvement in their material living conditions, reforms of local government structures etc.

Secondly, new and more advanced forms of control and repression were introduced. This meant a rationalized and modernized apartheid machinery to ensure that the vast majority of Africans, "the outsiders", remained outside in the "Homeiands" and only moved "inside" in accordance with economic needs and legal procedures. Finally, and underlying much of the Botha regime's thinking as to the need for change and adaptation to new realities, was a number of ideas and policies inspired by monetarist ideology and liberalist conceptions of the role of the state and the market forces. Through improved relations with the private sector, greater reliance on economic forces and reduction of public expenditures the aim was to stimulate economic growth, to secure private funding of the reform policy, and to promote the ideology of capitalism and free enterprise among the black majority.

The proclamation of the state of emergency in 1985 made it evidently clear that the Botha regime was unable to regain control through these policy changes. Partly because this policy was difficult to implement; conflicts with the white community and state apparatuses made detailed formulation and implementation slow and difficult, and frequently the regime experienced that the policy changes did not have the intended effects. And partly—and primarily—because the blacks were not available for manipulation; they actively resisted the attempts to modernise apartheid and made it increasingly difficult for the regime to find candidates willing to collaborate with the state a *sine qua non* for a successful implementation of the new strategy.

The story since the introduction of the first state of emergency in 1985 is now familiar. A stream of new emergency regulations, mass detention and state terrorism have been introduced in an attempt to crush the resistance and regain the political initiative. The progressive militarization of the South African society has accelerated even further. The State Security Council, its secretariat and work committees, which is dominated by the military and their security concerns, has gradually emerged as the key decision-making agency for the formulation and implementation of national policy.¹² Over the past few years—especially since 1984–85—this system, generally known as the National Security Management System (NSMS), has also been established and operationalized at local and regional level through a network of Joint Management Centers. The NSMS is supposed to be all-pervasive and constitutes a parallel administrative structure under the direction of the military, a structure of increasing importance in the administration and running of the black townships and touching virtually all aspects of public life.

The massive repression and terror coming out of this NSMS has failed to quell the liberation forces and the mass resistance. The liberation struggle has, however, no doubt experienced setbacks; movements have

been disorganized in certain areas, community organizations find themselves unable to mobilise at the same level as before and the efforts to create alternative power structures based on street committees and grassroots organizations ("people's power") have largely been blocked.

It is difficult to distinguish a clear political strategy behind the escalating use of state violence and repression. The basic tactic appears to be the use of repressive measures and terror to counter what the regime perceive as the "revolutionary onslaught". But the task of the NSMS seems also to be to identify and address grievances and potential areas of dissatisfaction before they explode in violence and open protest.

At the simplest level the purpose of the NSMS and the apartheid policy appears to be centered on the co-optation of some and the coercion of most with the basic aim of securing political and economic power in a situation characterized by erosion of state power from below and a disintegrating apartheid ideology. On the one hand we are witnessing a number of initiatives and legislative proposals which seek to enable the state to control the resistance. Emergency regulations, bans and restrictions on a number of nationwide movements together with the Labour Relations Amendment Bill are all intended to bring an end to mass political protests and resistance outside legalised channels, while the Group Areas Amendment Act, the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Bill, the Slums Bill and the Rent Bill are seen as key policy means to enable the state to bring the chaotic cities and urban areas under control. Tighter controls along these lines should then—according to government planners—isolate the radicals, clear the way and enable the "moderate" blacks to come forward and take part in government structures.

Socio-economic uplift of the townships, greater powers of control to black collaborators (ensured by the emergency regulations, more stringent squatter regulations and the Rent Bill), and extended political privileges (lifting of Groups Areas restrictions, creation of non-racial local governments and—above all—the Promotion of Constitutional Development Act and the Extension of Political Participation Bill) are all intended to make collaboration more attractive to the "minority".¹³

It is, however, difficult to imagine how these measures could be able to secure the survival and consolidation of white political power. Partly because the policy is difficult to implement due to financial constraints (it is hard to find money for expensive reforms in a period of economic recession and crisis!) and conflicts within white politics leading to obstruction and delays. Partly because it is not obvious that this strategy of "winning hearts and minds" through co-optation would attract the necessary "moderate" support; even important "moderates" like Mangosuthu Buthelezi would lay down preconditions (like the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC) which the Botha regime are unable to meet. And, above all, it seems not very likely that the masses will retreat from the center-stage of the struggle for political power—despite setbacks over the past couple of years; 10 years of a deepening

crisis have made it evidently clear that peace, stability and conflict resolution based on suppression of the ANC and the liberation forces are not viable.

In the short-to-medium term (1–5 years) the conflict dynamic would thus most likely remain essentially unchanged with increasing black militancy, escalating state repression and more severe international sanctions and external intervention.

REGIONAL STRATEGIES AND DESTABILIZATION

What would be the regional implications of such a scenario? The effects of the rapid militarization of the apartheid state have probably been even more manifest in South Africa's regional policy. The last decade has seen a war of destabilisation—heavy use of disruptive economic pressure, armed attacks and cultivation of proxy groups—against the neighbouring countries and frontline states which has grown ever more brutal, especially in Angola and Mozambique. In Mozambique random terrorist attacks have escalated into regular large-scale massacres of civilians, employing a particularly savage level of cruelty. The human casualties and economic costs for the SADCC-countries have been enormous; 750 000 deaths in Angola and Mozambique between 1980 and 1986, millions of people displaced as refugees, and a staggering economic damage of more than 25 billion US dollars!¹⁴

The objectives of Pretoria's war of destabilization are not always stated, but basically it is centered on the defence of the traditional structural dependency and control mechanisms that are beginning to erode with the SADCC-initiative. The specific demands are generally calls for the expulsion of ANC and SWAPO and a recognition—through agreements of security and cooperation and other means—of South Africa's regional **hegemony**.¹⁵ Essentially, Pretoria's political-military strategy *vis-à-vis* the region seems to be based on the classical doctrine of low-intensity warfare as developed through decades of counter-insurgency by Western powers in other third world regions. The lessons culled from France's colonial wars, American experience in Vietnam, Israeli national security policy, and insurgent theory itself, are apparently very important. Crucial elements of this sort of strategy are the utilization, development and coordination of the full array of resources available to the government as well as national mobilization to the extent of a **wartime/crisis** level of mobilization.

All means of implementation are deemed acceptable, including pre-emptive cross-border strikes, assassinations and sabotage. Victory is not judged as coterminous with the military defeat of the opponent, but rather with the erosion of his social order and moral which is supposed to be achieved through the promotion of a continuous low-level instability in the target countries. This will—according to the strategy—serve to

erode the external support of the liberation movements (their weakest link), thwart attempts by the SADCC members to lessen their economic independence on South Africa, and reinforce Pretoria's racial worldview by showing that majority rule invariably will lead to instability.¹⁶

Counter-insurgency forces and tactics were developed rapidly from the late 1970s. In the beginning a greater emphasis was laid upon "positive inducements" including economic rewards (e.g. the CONSAS plan), but increasingly South Africa has relied on the coercive use of force as the main instrument.¹⁷ A variety of explanations have been put forward in an attempt to analyse the apparent change of tactics (and the shifting intensity in the use of military force).¹⁸

A popular interpretation analyses the changing emphasis in regional policy implementation as an indication of a general vacillation in foreign (and domestic) policy-making emerging from a split between "hawks" and "doves" within the state.¹⁹ This has led to an ongoing struggle for policy predominance in Pretoria, especially between the "doves" centered in the Foreign Ministry and the "hawks" in the security establishment. Confusion and indecision, combined with a substantial amount of "free-lancing" from the "hawks" in the defence and security apparatuses, have—according to this view—then led to contradictory and changing—but increasingly violent, policy outcomes.

It is very difficult to evaluate assertions of a vacillating regional policy based on a split between "doves" and "hawks". Decision-making in the top echelons of the state is virtually closed for outside observations and no one really knows what goes on in the State Security Council, where the main decisions regarding the strategy and tactics of regional foreign policy are taken.²⁰

There is, however, probably some truth in the confusion/competition thesis, especially in the argument which says that the struggle/competition is a product of different elements of the power structure in charge of different facets of policy. Compromises (or "bargained decisions" in decision-making theory) are probably in most cases worked out within the State Security Council, but frequently it has also led to contradictory policy outcomes, distrust and sometimes conflict.²¹

It is, however, important to emphasise two points which often get lost in the hawks/doves debate. *First* there is a general agreement within the apartheid state of the need for a war of destabilisation in the region—the disagreement is essentially one of the tactics—not on the main principles and overall strategy.²² *Second*, it is important to realise that the policy of aggression and warfare against the neighbouring states, the struggle to maintain the regional hegemony, is basically pursued because of the need to dominate South Africa's own domestic policy. And since the apartheid order it seeks to impose and maintain is inherently illegitimate and unstable, the bottom line will invariably become coercive. Increased reliance on force almost automatically leads to growing force levels and increased military budgets. And when the leaders of a state in a condition

of internal deterioration and disorder acquire the capacity for repression and aggression, it is easy to rationalize the use of force and an escalated use of police and military forces follows almost axiomatically.

Furthermore, the way the military doctrine of low-intensity warfare is applied, will in itself contribute to an accelerated use of military force and armed aggression. This is so because there does not appear to be any reasonably precise and clearly defined political objectives behind the destabilization strategy. The aims for which the destabilization is carried out become so general and open-ended as to be unattainable without major escalation and increasing military commitments; ends and means become hopelessly confused and military considerations will increasingly dominate decision-making.

Closely linked to the **argument** about domestic deterioration and regional militarism is also the suggestion that South Africa's regional policy is essentially a product of the cleavages in white politics; aggression and militaristic actions will tend to unify and mobilise the white regime and its constituents.

Based on this argumentation it is difficult to escape the depressing conclusion that Southern Africa will experience more, rather than less, military aggression, terror and war before the final demise of apartheid. However, it is important also to bear in mind that the flawed premises, sharp contradictions and dilemmas which have been a characteristic feature of South African policy also have placed some real limits on Pretoria's capability to pursue war of destabilization.²³

First, it must be noted that Pretoria's regional (and domestic) strategy is contingent upon the preservation of white morale in the face of increased resistance and demands for the elimination of apartheid from the black majority. As pointed out above we are already witnessing rapid changes in white politics with an irrevocable split in Afrikaaner nationalism, a growing recognition that the days of old-style white supremacy are numbered, and the ideology of apartheid unable to act as a unifying force between classes and social groups.

Although only a small minority are prepared to join the liberation movement, a substantial number are beginning to lose faith in the traditional apartheid policy. With the resistance from the suppressed majority, in all likelihood, continuing indeterminately and becoming increasingly militant and violent, the ability of the apartheid state to preserve white support and morale is likely to diminish.

Secondly, the military capability of the South African Defence Forces is rapidly becoming thwarted by a number of other factors. Partly because of the shortage of white manpower which has become even more serious with the escalating reluctance and opposition among white youth to do military service. Partly because the arms embargo makes purchase and manufacturing of modern and efficient arms an increasingly costly and difficult task (especially when they get lost in warfare!). And partly

because the economic cost itself is very high, making expanded expenditures on the military difficult.²⁴

Thirdly, escalation of South Africa's regional aggression would, most likely, provoke outside intervention and increased pressure from the Western countries upon the regime in Pretoria. Despite the claims of the regime, without the tacit support of the main Western countries, the war of destabilization as we can see it today can not be maintained.

Fourthly, South Africa may quickly be—and probably already is—experiencing diminishing returns from its use of destabilization and warfare. As noted above, the aim of South Africa's aggression is to force the SADCC countries—by threatening their regimes and strengthening their opposition—to accept South Africa's regional hegemony. However, rather than to erode regime legitimacy, increased low-intensity warfare may actually enhance regime security! The tolerance for violence in the SADCC countries has increased and public preparedness for South Africa's warfare is more developed (especially compared with South Africa's own preparedness!), the Frontline states are all ideologically motivated by the struggle against apartheid, and they may be able to use South African aggression—not as a sign of weakness—but to strengthen their own legitimacy.

Finally, the economic realities in Southern Africa will also put some restraints on Pretoria's capability to escalate their destabilization. South Africa is very dependent upon the maintenance and expansion of the existing economic links with the SADCC economies, especially the trading and transport arrangements. A deepening of the economic crisis in South Africa and the prospect of extended sanctions and economic isolation will make these links even more crucial for the South African economy.

It will be of vital importance to keep the SADCC economies as a market for South African exports (particularly for manufacturing products) and to use SADCC countries in sanction-busting efforts. A general escalation of the South African destabilisation may quickly destroy these opportunities and contribute to a further weakening of the South African economy and the power of the apartheid state.²⁵

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The liberation of South Africa and the transition to majority-rule would open up vast possibilities for social and economic development of the entire region. Southern Africa, with a population (at the time of the arrival of post-apartheid) of 100 million or more, comprises an area about as large as the United States. It possesses rich mineral resources, as well as soils and climates capable of growing almost every kind of crop, and regional cooperation holds fruitful possibilities for much improved living standards for all the region's inhabitants. A post-apartheid Southern Africa would indeed be pregnant with possibilities.

It must be added that however much the SADCC members and a liberated South Africa may wish to avoid it, it will turn out to be difficult to escape from the dominance and dependency relations inherited from the past. The capability to create and establish the conditions for a transition to a new regional development is not only affected by the route to post-apartheid and the long-term goals of the new regime, but also by the socio-economic context and the nature of the inherited economic and political structures.

The main challenges facing the region after the liberation of South Africa—and the basis for the formulation of a possible research agenda—might be grouped under three headings.²⁶

– Immediate and main problems:

This is centered on the all-embracing issues of extreme poverty; massive unemployment and rehabilitation after the damage caused by war and destabilization; challenges which can only find a solution through regional coordination and cooperation.

– Constraints:

The traditional dependency relations and economic structures in the region may be changed in the process towards liberation, but probably not altered in any fundamental way. These structural constraints will impose powerful impediments and obstacles on any attempts to lay the foundation for an alternative development in the region, especially for a new post-apartheid regime with consolidation of state power and domestic issues—not economic concessions to neighbouring countries—as the main priorities. A continued strengthening of SADCC—and the lessons, awareness and knowledge developed through this effort—will probably be a crucial factor in the struggle to overcome these structural constraints.

– Class forces:

The strength and position of the various class forces in a liberated South Africa will be of critical importance. It is vital that the growth and consolidation of class forces determined to oppose radical change in national and regional economic structures is prevented. Ultimately, the future of the region depends on the strength and cooperation between the democratic forces and organizations in the region, not only inside SADCC, but also with liberated South Africa.

NOTES

1. See especially the article by W Cobbett *et al.*: "A Critical Analysis of the South African State's Reform Strategies in the 1880s", pp 19–51. In P Frankel *et al.* (eds): *State, Resistance and Change in South Africa*. London, Croom Helm 1988. (The article was originally published in 1986. This version contains a post-script with an update.)
2. A good introduction to the main issues and positions can be gained from John Saul: *South Africa: "The Question of Strategy"*. *New Left Review*, No 60 1986, pp 3–22; Maria Van Diepen (ed): *The National Question in South Africa*. London, Zed Press 1988; and the special *After Apartheid* issue of *Third World Quarterly* (vol 9 1987, No 2). The

- South African based journals *Work in Progress* (Johannesburg) and *Transformation* (Durban) are an excellent introduction to the radical intellectual debate taking place inside the country.
3. Many of the papers—together with an editorial introduction and summary of the conference—are reprinted in John Suckling & Landeg White (eds): *After Apartheid—Renewal of the South African Economy*. London, James Currey 1988. Several of the papers have also been published in a variety of (mainly South African) journals.
 4. The contributions from this tradition will not be discussed further in this paper. For an illustrative (and influential!) example of this type of arguments see, e.g. J A Lombard & J A du Pisani: *Removal of discrimination against blacks in the political economy of the Republic of South Africa—A Memorandum for Assocom*. Pretoria, Bureau for Economic Policy and Analysis, University of Pretoria 1985.
 5. Charles Simkins is a prolific exponent for these types of arguments. Based on John Rawls' theory of social justice, he formulates guidelines for redistribution, arguing that traditional socialist means and state intervention (changes in relations of production) will not have the intended effects and may even reinforce poverty and inequalities. Hence, a more welfare oriented/social-democratic route towards a just post-apartheid society is preferable. See, e.g., his *Reconstructing South African Liberalism*. Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations, 1986.
 6. The growth and strength of an independent trade union movement have also put these issues in the forefront in the political struggle. Cfr the debates in the *South African Labour Bulletin*.
 7. One of the best attempts to confront the issue of constraints on socialist efforts after apartheid, is Roger Southall's article: "Tost-Apartheid South Africa: Constraints on Socialism". *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol 25 1987, 2: 345–74.
 8. The following contributions are illustrative here: Joseph Hanlon: "Post-Apartheid South Africa and its neighbours". *Third World Quarterly*, vol 9 1987, 2 pp 437–50; E N Tjønneland: "The Regional Role of South Africa After Apartheid—Some Notes on Problems, Potentialities and Research Priorities". Paper prepared for the Africa Days, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies 1987; and P Goodison: "The SADCC and Post-Apartheid South Africa: A Consideration of Research Priorities". Paper prepared for Research Priorities for soao-economic planning in Post-Apartheid South Africa—A Policy Workshop. South Africa Economic Research and Training Project, 1986.
 9. The realization that South Africa would remain the economic center of gravity for some time, even after apartheid, was clearly recognized in early SADCC-documents. Cfr, e.g., the following extract from a 1980 document: "A liberated Republic of South Africa might well, in a spirit of cooperation, accept (...) a policy of balanced regional development, but the economic center-periphery problems would still be facts of life and would have to be tackled whatever the changing regimes and political dispensations in the area". From p 47 in A J Nsekela: *Southern Africa—Toward Economic Liberation*. London, Rex Collings, 1981.
 10. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Carol B Thompson: "Zimbabwe in SADCC: A Question of Dominance?", pp 238–256 in C Stoneman (ed): *Zimbabwe's Prospects—Issues of Race, Class, State, and Capital in Southern Africa*. London, MacMillan, 1988.
 11. I have discussed this process more systematically elsewhere. See, e.g., my: "Class, Ethnicity and the Racially Exclusive State-Apartheid South Africa and the Politics of Continuity and Change". *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, vol 18 1987, 4: 575–84.
 12. Cfr K W Grundy: *The Militarization of South African Politics*, 2nd edition, Oxford. Oxford U P 1988 (this new edition contains a valuable update) and press reports (especially in *The Weekly Mail*). For a general introduction to the main issues, see also my: "The Dynamics of Reform and Repression in the South African Conflict and the Emerging Role of the South African Defence Forces", pp 529–43. In C Alger & M

- Stohl (eds): *A Just Peace Through Transformation—Cultural, Economic and Political Foundations for Change*. Boulder, Col, Westview Press 1988.
13. Cfr Mark Swilling: "The 9 Bills which may change South Africa". *The Weekly Mail*, July 22–28 1988.
 14. Cfr Dan O'Meara: "Destabilization of the Frontline States of Southern Africa, 1980–1987". Background Paper, No 20, July 1988 (Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security) for an excellent summary of the main trends and research findings.
 15. See K W Grundy *op. cit.* ch 6, for a general discussion of the ideology and policy behind the destabilisation. Deon Geledenhuis has been an influential and prolific writer behind the devise of theory of destabilization. See, e.g. his: "Some strategic implications of Regional Economic Relationships for the Republic of South Africa". *ISSUP Strategic Review*, January 1981, pp 14–30; and "The Destabilization Controversy: An Analysis of a High-Risk Foreign Policy Option for South Africa". *Politikon*, vol 9, 1982: 2: 16–31.
 16. Steven Metz—a US army strategist at Fort Leavenworth—provides an interesting comparative analysis of South Africa's strategy in: "Pretoria's "Total Strategy" and Low-Intensity Warfare in Southern Africa". *Comparative Strategy*, vol 6 1987: 4: 437–69.
 17. See Robert H Davies & Dan O'Meara: "Total Strategy in Southern Africa—An Analysis of South African Regional Policy since 1978". *Journal of Southern African studies*, vol 11 1985: 2: 183–211.
 18. K W Grundy *op. cit.* pp 122 summarises the main available explanatory models.
 19. Peter Vale—at the time Research director at the South African Institute of International Affairs—gave one of the first major interpretations along these lines in the article: "Hawks, Doves and Regional Strategy". *The Star*, September 3 1982.
 20. Research on the South African armed forces and repressive apparatuses has made much progress over the past few years, but still the knowledge of the "inner working" of the Defence Forces and hard data on their role in national (and local!) decision making is fairly limited. As a result of the rapid militarization it is also becoming increasingly difficult to get access to data needed to analyse these issues. (In fact, we have a situation where more and more researchers chase after less and less data!). Cfr the "state of art" review by Annette Seegers: "Apartheid's Military: Its Origins and Development", pp 143–172 in W G James: *The State of Apartheid*. Boulder, Col, Lynne Rienner Publishers 1987.
 21. More details of decision-making structures and foreign policy-making can be found in D Geldenhuys: *The Diplomacy of Isolation, South African Foreign Policy Making*. New York, St Martin's Press 1984.
 22. Cfr the analysis developed in R H Davies & D O'Meara *op. cit.* They identify a competition between "minimalist" and "maximalist" positions within the regime. The discussions taking place within the State Security Council and the Defence Headquarter are shrouded in a veil of secrecy, but recent press reports have revealed some details of these tactical differences and internal cleavages. (*Africa Confidential*, vol 29, No 12, June 17 1988).
 23. Some of these constraints are also pointed out by Christopher Coker in his: *South Africa's Security Dilemmas*. New York, Praeger 1987 (The Washington Papers No 126). (This author does not agree with all his interpretations and assessments.)
 24. Although it should be added that the white society's ability to sustain higher levels of military expenditures (and extended conscription) probably can be higher than today. Cfr J Herbst comparisons with Israel and the Middle East in "Political and Economic Implications of South Africa's Militarization". *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, 8 1986: 1: 42–75.
 25. See especially S R Lewis Jr: *Economic Realities in Southern Africa (or, One Hundred Million Futures)*. Brighton, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex

1987 (Discussion Paper No 232). A major monograph by Ronald T Libby: *The Politics of Economic Power in Southern Africa* (Princeton, N J, Princeton U P 1987) also discusses South Africa's dependence on the region, but takes the argument many steps too far in his analysis of the neighbouring states independence and ability to influence South Africa.

26. The headings are inspired by two recently published collections of papers examining the development in Zimbabwe after independence: C Stoneman (ed): *op. cit.*; and Ibbo Mandaza (ed): *Zimbabwe—The Political Economy of Transition 1980–1986*. Dakar, Codesria 1986. These two books are highly relevant for any discussion of post-apartheid developments.

Labour and Migrant Labour in Destabilized and Future Southern Africa

Gabriele Winai Ström

Apartheid in the Republic of South Africa is a combination of a specific socioeconomic structure sanctioned by state violence and governed by a minority, which defines itself and its opponents in racist terms. The government of this minority considers itself to be a party in a conflict, in which the aim is the prolongation of apartheid requiring a 'Total strategy, mobilizing its capacity to withstand challenges to South Africa's territory as well as the present political and socio-economic *order*' (Maganya 1987).

Whereas white employers are mobilized on the side of the regime, the black workers are seen as the enemy. The employers are however becoming more and more dependent on their labour. Since 1980 the total strategy has expanded to warfare in the neighbouring states and emergency regulations internally, with forced refugees adding to the earlier established pattern of forced labour migration. The violence used by the South African government can be explained by problems for the regime to mobilize support for itself. It is thus not necessarily a sign of strength as is often referred to in the media.

The objective of this paper is to give a background for an analysis of conflict resolutions in Southern Africa. The focus here is not on territorial or political aspects, but on the socio-economic order referred to in the above mentioned "total strategy" of the South African minority regime in its attempts to postpone the fall of its power basis. This paper is restricted to the situation of the well documented mining sector, and on how this political and socio-economic order is illustrated in the mining sector, a crucial sector for South Africa's socio-economic order. I discuss the demand for labour and how this might affect power relations between employers and employees in the South African mines.

The institutions which enforce this apartheid order are:

- a. A legal system strictly applying laws on
 - migration according to racist criteria
 - unequal legal rights according to ethnic (including race) relations.
- b. Linkage bodies co-ordinating relations between the government and private enterprise (including Western capital-owners).

The way these institutions are organized affect in the short term the distribution of power and wealth, not only in South Africa, but also in relation to SADCC states and Namibia. The institutions regulating conflicting interests in the mining sector have the double aims of *a)* low wages and *b)* no influence for the majority of the people in South Africa, resulting in sufferings for large parts of the population. These institutions produce *direct violence* as well as *structural violence*.

The victims of violence can be seen in both cases. I define direct violence as a situation when physical force is used and the individual criminal can be found and punished. Structural violence, I define as a situation when the political and socio-economic system and its institutions are responsible for the crimes. The individuals are not as easily found. Thus the whole socio-economic order is criminalized because of the violence enforced in South Africa, without the individual actors being pointed out.

The entire UN has many times confirmed that the laws of South Africa violate the unanimously agreed Convention on Human Rights by taking away the political rights of the majority of people in South Africa, and by enforcing racist laws. But exactly what institutions and what patterns are criminalized? The workers and their families in the present migration system often refer to the institutions regulating the pattern of migration as the essence of the system of apartheid, because it is a system enforcing low wages and racist relation.

In this process, however, the individual foreign workers risk being criminalized as a result of **criminalizing** the migrant labour system. They are as much the victims of apartheid as the domestic workers. From other similar situations in history, we have seen that the divide and rule method used by the ex-colonizers tends to hit the weakest workers.

Unless conscious government action, in majority ruled South Africa, is taken in favour of those who immigrated last or came as seasonal workers, the result might be scape-goating of the migrant workers. A continuation of possibilities to migrate is however not a continuation of apartheid; it does not follow racist and inequality lines.

What economic rules will prevail in a majority-ruled South Africa? What power relations between employers and employees and between different groups of workers? I will not attempt to predict this, but discuss what general correlations ought to be studied further from the perspective of the workers in their power relation with employers, with examples taken from the mining sector.

MIGRATION PATTERNS

Regions kept together by migration are not unusual in the world. Such regions can be found in Europe, North America, West Africa, and the Middle East, with the economic centres being the destination of immigrants and guest workers, whereas the periphery is the destination for

tourists from the centre. Japan is the exception to the rule that industrial centres are also centres in a migration pattern (Seers 1982). Migration patterns certainly characterize socialist as well as capitalist countries. Although state planned migration is stressed in the former, large-scale non-voluntary movement takes place also in capitalist and pre-capitalist economies.

Thus, migration as such is universal and not peculiar to apartheid South Africa. There is a difference concerning the scale of violence and the institutions enforcing inhuman work and living conditions, short-term contracts and lack of family life along racist principles. This type of political and industrial relations enable the present state of cruelty in South Africa. Any majority regime will face the need to change these conditions towards greater freedom to bring the family and to move permanently. This change will affect the SADCC states since some of its citizens may emigrate whereas others will demand a permanent job at home. Still, others will demand continued freedom to move seasonally or during certain periods of their lives.

In South Africa an explicitly planned system developed from the 19th century onwards, of state-initiated and controlled recruitment of migrants on time-limited individual contracts to the private owned and run mines, via the so-called Chamber of Mines. The National Party government in 1948 took over the system established by the British colonial administration and mining firms. The migration system has historic roots from the beginning of this century.

But the roots cannot explain the continued existence of the system, allowing the capital side in the capital-labour relation to exercise more power than in any of the other regions mentioned. The persistence of the apartheid system can only be explained by events later on in history and by the forceful international backing it has had on the employers side in the conflict.

We can find similar types of conflict-creating state-controlled immigration laws, negatively affecting migrant and domestic workers, elsewhere. But the difference in scale and repression is enormous. This difference certainly gives no excuse to the government and employers either in racist South Africa, or in Europe and the Middle East.

Table 1. *Number of mine workers ('000) in South African mines 1905-86*

Year	From South Africa	Botswana	Lesotho	Swaziland	Malawi	Zambia Zimbabwe Malawi	Mozambique	Total	% from outside RSA
1905	12	0,6	1,6	0,6	-	3	59	81	85
1909	61	1,0	3,9	1,4	-	4	85	157	61
1915	93	3	12	5	-	1,1	83	198	53
1920	59	1,4	13	2,8	-	0,6	96	173	64
1927	84	1,5	17	4	-	0,4	108	215	61
1931	113	3	31	5	-	0,3	74	226	50
1936	166	7	46	7	-	3	88	318	48
1942	214	-	-	-	-	22	75	310	31
1946	126	7	38	6	-	32	96	305	59
1951	108	9	36	6	-	41	107	306	65
1956	116	10	40	5	-	60	183	335	65
1961	151	13	54	7	-	89	100	414	64
1966	131	19	64	4	-	56	109	383	66
1971	87	16	69	5	-	108	102	386	78
1975	122	17	86	7	-	16	118	365	67
1976	142	19	85	8	-	30	44	331	57
1982	258	18	99	9	15	(16)	47	448	42
1983	269	19	101	11	17	-	45	463	42
1984	304	18	105	12	18	-	49	506	40
1985	315	20	109	14	20	-	48	536	41
1986	350	21	115	16	21	-	61	583	40

Source: Bertil Odén, 1988

The regular uprooting of people which characterizes this old migration pattern is accentuated by the refugee pattern in present Southern Africa, which is an effect of the direct violence of military and economic destabilization policies and wars in the 1980s (Baregu *et al.* 1988). Indirect effects of South African employers actions against migrant workers from Mozambique have contributed to the economic crisis in this country. The 6 million displaced persons and refugees in Southern Africa are not the migrant workers of mines and industries in South Africa (UNHCR June 1988). But they are also human beings developing new relations and friendship over borders, which might be very important for the future. Research studies on migration patterns in Europe after the second World War, show for example that a person who has moved once is more ready to move a second, and third time. Thus, refugees have a greater tendency to become migrants later.

Table 2. *Displaced persons and refugees in Southern Africa*
(from Southern Africa)

Receiving country	Number of: Displaced	Refugees	Returnees
Angola	1 533 000	79 000	
Botswana		5 225	
Lesotho		4000	
Malawi		425 000	
Mozambique	3 310 200		50000
South Africa	unknown	unknown	
Swaziland		26 700	
Tanzania		72 000	
Zambia		136 000	
Zimbabwe		166 250	

Source: UNHCR figures from 31st March 1988, for OAU-UN-UNHCR Conference on Southern Africa in Oslo 22-24 August 1988.

TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE DEMAND FOR LABOUR

Economic development analysts of Southern Africa often refer to a negative correlation between technical improvements and demand for labour. This correlation has not, however, been possible to prove in other parts of the world. In Sweden it is often referred to as an employers perspective, strengthening employers through decreasing the importance of labour in relation to capital investments in production. The South African employers have also used this perspective. And they have been rather successful in demystifying the increasing demand for and reliance on workers.

The demand for labour, both from South Africa and the neighbouring countries has increased continuously, and particularly during the last decade. It has increased after investments in more modern technology in the mining industry. The total number of workers increased tremendously including migrant labour.

The proportion of South African workers to migrant workers has certainly increased. The amount of migrant workers has also increased during the last decade! Thus, the total amount of labour employed in mines increased during the last decade more than ever before in the history of South African mining.

It is true that there was a sudden drop in recruitment from Malawi in 1975, and from Mozambique in 1976. But these changes were initiated from the labour exporting governments, not from the employers in South Africa. The decision from Malawi to stop workers from going to South Africa in 1975 was taken by President Banda as a reaction to an aeroplane accident, when all passengers—workers—were killed. A demand for increased safety had long been expressed by the workers representatives. A renegotiation in the earlier inter-governmental agreement between South Africa and Malawi probably took place around this time. Such agreements exist not only with Malawi, but also between SADCC states that are independent today and the Republic of South Africa, although their contents are not known in detail.

As soon as such safety requirements were implemented for the workers from Malawi, the export of workers was continued at the same level as before 1975, i.e. from 1976. (Workers from Malawi are, however, not distinguished from those from North Rhodesia and Zambia, table 1, which makes it difficult to refer to exact figures.)

After the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, there was a boom in economic growth, allowing more and better employment of black workers within Zimbabwe. The decision by the Mozambican government to stop migration after independence in 1976 was political. For economic reasons, since there was little alternative employment in Mozambique at the time, the migration was cut only by half. As a result of destabilization and war this situation has worsened further. The number of workers going to the mines of South Africa from Mozambique has increased anew after the drop in 1976. Thus the demand for labour seems to be there, when there is supply.

If we look at historic statistics we find that in 1905 labour from Mozambique constituted the majority of total mine labour at the time. 59,000 of a total 85,000 mine workers at the time came from this country. As much as 85% of all mining labour came from outside the borders of South Africa. This proportion decreased to 53% in 1915 (Diagram A). The total amount of labour in the mines had increased to nearly 200,000.

The relation between foreign and domestic labour in the mining sector varied quite much over time also thereafter. The proportions between workers from within the Republic of South Africa (including the so-called

bantustan areas) and workers from the areas of the present SADCC states thus have never been stable.

In 1931, when the total amount of labour had increased to 226,000, the proportion was 50 %. In 1942, when the total increased to 310,000, the share was 31% foreign labour. **I**f there is any relation at **all**, we can maybe argue that the number of foreign labour is increasing at a slower rate during times of interstate wars. But we cannot talk about a general decrease in labour employment in the mines. There is no visible relation between the implementation of technological advancements and a decrease in labour demand in the mines of South Africa. The share of foreign workers dropped from 57% out of the total 331,000 mine workers in 1976 to a share of 42% out of the total of 583,000 mine workers in 1986. Thus, absolute number of foreign migrant workers in the mines increased from 189,000 in 1976 to 233,000 ten years later.

Looking at the number of workers in the mines after 1961, we see *the only drop in the total amount of labour during this century, between 1961 and 1976*. Was this due to investments in better technology? A careful study should be made relating investments before 1961 to the decrease in labour demand thereafter. The economic history of South Africa talks about a decrease in capital investment during this period. There were less improvements in technology and safety regulations during this time than during the early 1970s.

What characterized this time was hard organizational work to build up trade unions in South Africa and a tough attitude among domestic workers, not accepting the terrible conditions in the mines at that time. Strikes and boycotts were common. The decrease in the total amount of labour employed in the mines affected mainly South African **recruitments** during 1961 to 1975.

It affected Mozambican workers after 1976, but not migrant labour from Botswana, Lesotho, **Swaziland** or Malawi. The impression we get is a highly political behaviour by the employers, but not a negative correlation between investments in technology and labour. We also have to study conditions affecting both labour demand and investments like the world market prices of minerals and coal and the production of competing producers.

The correlation between technology investments and demand for labour could thus just as well be that *the decrease in the amount of workers was caused by decreasing labour supply and lack of investments in better technology, the contrary to what should be expected by the stated correlation of decreased labour demand*.

Digram A. The changing proportions of foreign to domestic workers in South African mines (percent of total workers)

This information about a positive correlation between technological improvements and labour demand, which should not be **unknown** to the **employers** and mine owners, **has** not been spread by the employers side in the chronic labour conflict of the mines in South Africa. Instead a myth of a continued negative correlation is repeated in statements by representatives of South African mines and by South African news agencies.

After 1976, when wages increased and safety regulations were better applied, the total amount of workers in the mines almost doubled from 331,000 in 1976 to 583,000 in 1986! This enormous increase in the number of workers occurred after and during the greatest investments in technological improvements in the mines in South Africa throughout 20th century history! Why did the better technology increase the number of workers? *Better technology resulting in better work conditions increased the supply of labour*, although still much remains to be done. This improvement made it possible for South Africa to keep its position as the largest producer of **gold** in the world, and a **large producer** of other mining products as well.

The number of workers from within the Republic of South Africa increased tremendously from 87,000 in 1971 to 350,000 in 1986, at the same time as the **recruitments** from Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi continued to increase.

Not only the establishment in apartheid South Africa are deceived by the myth of "decreasing demand for labour as a result of technological improvements". A good example is a recent otherwise very interesting paper on the prospects for growth and structural change in Southern Africa by Chandra Hardy. Without referring to absolute figures she states incorrectly, that "the demand for migrant labour has fallen drastically over the past decade", whereafter reference is made to the correct fact: "The proportion of foreign to domestic workers in mining has declined by 50% ..." (Hardy, 1988). As we can see (in table 1) the opposite is the fact. The demand for migrant labour increased.

Hardy is not unaware of the policy of the South African employers. She refers to the "long-established policy of South Africa to employ migrant workers instead of the black population. The migrants did not have to be housed permanently and they could be expected to be politically less defiant since they worked under a constant threat of expulsion". She forgets, however, to write that important changes in the consciousness among migrants workers has taken place, thus unintentionally adding to the traditional divide and rule principle of South African employers. She even argues incorrectly as we have seen, that "since the demand for labour decreased: "employers now have to show good cause for retaining any foreign workers".

By quoting correct proportions and leaving out absolute figures, a false impression is given that labour demand fell as a result of technological improvement, exactly the trend and pattern the employers in South Africa would like us to believe. Their own figures, however, give a different

trend as we have seen. Not only did the demand for migrant labour increase continuously, the demand for South African labour increased even more, at the same time as the workers became more and more conscious of their rights. We have no reason to believe that economic realities are against the workers demand for both more employment and wage increases. Hardy is clearly against apartheid, but tends to see strikes and work stoppages as "difficulties" that "plague" the mining sector, rather than an efficient instrument for workers in high demand who have been successful in their work for better conditions and higher wages, thus increasing the supply of much needed and demanded labour.

Several trends counterdict the proposed long term decrease in demand for labour, and work for changing patterns, counter to the employers "well-established policy" and "apartheid rules":

1. The number of workers in mining, including migrant workers, has increased particularly during the last decade when technological improvements were made.
2. The number of skilled black workers increased in mining. In spite of declarations from the Chamber of Mines in South Africa about its intentions to decrease **recruitments**, the employment in fact increased.
3. Not only South African workers, but also foreign workers are politically active, work through trade unions, although at present illegal, and they have a need for bringing their families and a demand for better housing conditions which will make them just as expensive under more humanitarian laws.

Let us now take a closer look at the established pattern of labour migration in Southern Africa and the power distribution behind it. The mining sector in South Africa is a major employer of workers and dominant in demanding migrant labour. Similar patterns of labour recruitment exist in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors. The focus in this paper is on the mining sector only. Mining is the foundation of South Africa's wealth and its apartheid policies. The mining industry in South Africa has since the end of the 19th century depended on mass recruitment of people, via labour recruitment firms, ACRO, ARC, NCOLA, MLO etc. This kind of firms operate both within South Africa's own labour reserves (**bantustans**) and in the neighbouring countries in Southern Africa, the present SADCC countries.

Analysts of the migrant labour system often argue that employers "control labour" in South Africa by manipulating recruitment and increasing competition among these countries. What is not so often mentioned among these analysts of migration in Southern Africa is that even such an established structure is possible to change by conscious action and cooperation between trade unions over national borders. This is in fact what has taken place recently. In the mid 1970s before SADCC, government representatives from the labour-exporting neighbouring countries to the

Republic of South Africa formed an association to coordinate their policies in relation to the employers in South African mining sector, SALC (Southern African Labour Commission). The aim of the SALC was to increase the power of the labour-providing side in the conflict on wages and safety, but also to increase the **possibilities** to create alternative **employment**. This was not an easy **task**. **Contradictions** between these two aims have been exploited by the employers, and **SADCC** itself has not given priority to workers' conditions so far.

In the last decade, the employers in the mining sector of South Africa have experienced difficulties, including strikes and work stoppages. A direct effect has been a weakening of the employer party in the power relation between workers and employers, between labour and capital. The non-racial independent union movement, despite repression, expanded from 70,000 in 1979 to 520,000 in 1985. By 1987 COSATU claimed to have over a million members. The trade union movement in South Africa has shown that there are possibilities to put pressure on the employers **cum** white minority establishment to not only increase wages and living conditions, but to change power relations and migration patterns.

Comparing with Zimbabwe, which is another country in Southern Africa with a well-organized trade union movement, we can see that expectations of wage increases after independence resulted in strikes and repression from the new leaders of government after independence (Mandaza 1986, Wood 1988). Will similar expectations on wage increases create conflicts in South Africa? And how would such wage increases affect the mining sector?

FUTURE PATTERNS AND INSTITUTIONS

The violence necessary to force black people to act in the economic interest of the ruling white groups in South Africa is presently increasing. The violence has its roots in the apartheid system. In addition to the "direct violence", caused by the militarization of the conflict, producing refugees, prisoners and killing people, there is the "structural violence" exercised by the present political system in the form of transfers of the cost of reproduction of labour, borne by the families in remote areas, or squatting illegally in slum areas near the mine areas. The cost of bringing up children and treating the old is borne, if at all, almost entirely by the families of the mine workers and the workers themselves through a costly insurance system.

The prevention of immigration from the labour reserves within the Republic and in the neighbouring states will hardly be defensible in human rights terms in a majority-ruled South Africa. The strict laws preventing people from settling near their work is for many of the affected workers the essence of apartheid. There are many alternatives for a future government in South Africa, if it wants to continue the large mining

production, but it will in any case be forced to react to the demand from workers to bring their families. Such a reaction could be an increase in family housing, allowing for permanent immigration or a restriction of foreign workers to immigrate. Any decision will have consequences for the regional migration pattern. An important major decision concerns the wage levels.

South Africa is, as we know, the world's largest producer of gold. But what is not so often mentioned is that the effort and energy put into the production of every ton of gold in South Africa is very high and probably higher than in most other gold-producing countries. For every ton of gold produced, about 100,000 tons of ore have to be moved from depths of about three thousand meters below the surface of the earth in some cases. If black miners were paid half the wages of white miners in South Africa these mines might immediately become uneconomical (Hardy, 1988).

Does this mean that a majority-ruled South Africa would have to close down its mining sector? Or that if the mining sector with its migration system is kept, apartheid will by definition continue? The present wages are, not half, but only one tenth of a white mine worker's. This means that quite considerable wage increases are possible for the black mine workers without risking a cost inflation and a decrease in demand for South African gold on the world market.

When the wars are over, we can expect a decrease in supply of labour because of growth in demand for labour in other parts of the economies of South Africa and the neighbouring states. Another trend might, however, contradict a trend of less migration to the mining. In a peaceful Southern Africa, we can also expect people to migrate more easily and under safer conditions, allowing an equalisation in wages, if trade unions are allowed to continue their organizational work. Wages together with other costs of production in the mining sector should, however, be compared with mining costs on the world market. Since present wages are one tenth of the white workers' wages, there is much room still for considerable increase in worker salaries, both migrants and South African.

COMMENTS

A crucial question to be taken up by the labour movement in Southern African states is the inequality between foreign and domestic workers in South Africa. Comparing with Nordic conditions we find that the trade unions have a self-interest to organize foreign workers to control competition from low wage immigrants. The changes in the migration pattern after the racist minority has left its power position in the government of South Africa might therefore not be as great as declared by the present regime in South Africa?

The decision-makers of a future government in South Africa might have an interest to study different models for common labour markets

elsewhere. The common labour market for the independent Nordic states might be one such model. The notorious conflict between employers and employees on wages and living conditions has been institutionalized in these countries, in the form of regular bargaining rules and procedures. Migration laws allow the migrants to organize in the country where they work. The trade unions thus are secured a legal position preventing wildcat strikes. Immigration laws do not apply to the citizens of the Nordic area, thus allowing for free labour migration. By organizing migrant domestic workers assure that wage competition does not take place outside the control of the trade unions.

Social security and safety rules are taken up in negotiations between civil servants from the Nordic governments. These improvements in workers' power and welfare are the result of a long and hard struggle. Such a struggle has certainly taken place in Southern Africa during this century too, but there are differences in opinions and values which prevent an "import" of a Nordic system. The rules and methods of negotiation and conflict resolution differ according to experience. Comparative research could give new **insights** on the organization and influence of different types of institutional orders.

A basis for future cooperation between the states of Southern Africa might instead be a different "Chamber of Mines" with a new power base. The Southern Africa Labour Commission (SALC), the association formed in the mid-70s for cooperation by the governments of labour-exporting countries, might be another organization with a new role in the future. A cooperation between the trade unions of Southern Africa to safeguard workers conditions in relation to employers is also foreseeable. The prospects for the labour movements, however, not only depend on the future governments in the region, but also on the skill and knowledge of their own organizational power and the economic conditions under which they can act.

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Regional Cooperation
in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa:
The Need for a Uniform
Information System and Data Base
in the SADC Region

C. K. Brown

With (a) attainment of political independence by the majority of Southern African states *b_x* (a) 1970s, a stage was set for economic liberation *m d* regional cooperation. Through their own individual efforts at the national level, the countries of Southern Africa have attempted to disengage from the integrated regional economic complex dominated by South Africa. Indeed with the collapse of the Portuguese African empire in the mid-1970s and the liberation of Zimbabwe in 1980, a radically different set of national priorities was instituted, geared towards the long-term goals of equitable development? *not socialist transformation*. It also made possible the creation of favourable conditions for national efforts to *be* enhanced by joint struggles, aimed at reducing the collective independence of (a) Southern African states *on* South Africa, *and* at replacing this dependence of (a) Southern African forms of regional cooperation (Setälä 1985, *p d* 170). In recent times, the most important initiatives towards realizing *a-i-* regional cooperation have *been* (i) the formation of the Frontline States at the political level and (ii) the establishment, in April 1980, of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to accelerate the drive for economic liberation? *and* regional cooperation.¹

The establishment of SADCC was a logical outcome of the development of the liberation struggle from (a) political to the economic phase. Its overall objective is the reduction of economic *no asuapua* Republic of South Africa, through coordinated regional cooperation between its member states. This was stated in April 1980 in a declaration by the governments of the independent states of Southern Africa *as follows:*

In the interests of the peoples of the Republic of South Africa, it is necessary to liberate our economies from their dependence on the Republic of South Africa, to overcome the imposed economic fragmentation, and *due* to coordinate our efforts towards regional and national economic development. This will be as great for Namibia as it is for all the independent states of the region.²

Even though SADCC has made impressive strides in the development of regional cooperation since its establishment, there are still many fundamental and technical problems, due to:

1. differences in the level of economic development and resource endowment in the region;
2. the degree to which SADCC member states have been integrated into the world capitalist system;
3. the divergent paths of socio-political development being pursued by the different SADCC states;
4. South Africa's campaign of military and economic destabilization in the region which has raised the issue of sanctions and counter-sanctions to the top of the political agenda; and
5. the impact of recession, worsening terms of trade, the debt crisis as well as IMF and World Bank-imposed structural adjustment programmes.

In addition to the above mentioned factors that have tended to stunt the development of the SADCC countries, another factor that should be mentioned and which is of prime importance to this conference is the lack of a data base from which to coordinate the exchange and flow of information among the SADCC countries and sectoral ministries.

In recent years, however, the greater awareness among government officials, academics and information professionals of the importance of information as a vital resource for achieving socio-economic goals has sharply intensified the demand for research on Southern Africa in all branches of the humanities and social science. Indeed, the approval of the Southern African Documentation and Information System (SADIS) in Dar es Salaam in May 1983 as a priority sectoral project by the Council of Ministers of SADCC clearly underscores the importance which is attached to the need for the generation, storage and dissemination of information in the region.

THE STATUS OF RESEARCH IN MEMBER COUNTRIES

Various efforts have been made in recent years to gather information in member states. A study of the successive National Development Plans of the various countries of Southern Africa reveals that (with the exception of Namibia) the governments of these countries, since attaining independence, have not only incorporated some aspects of research in their respective national development strategies but some of the governments have established institutions to oversee national research programmes.

The demand for new research in the region has been generated within a variety of official and non-governmental institutions. These include: (i) the academic community both in the region and abroad, including ap-

plied and specialized research institutions and the universities; government departments, agencies and parastatals on national policies and development programmes; (ii) multilateral and Western development agencies contributing to regional and national development efforts; (iii) individual SADCC states on specific issues of contingency planning and national security as well as broader political questions such as destabilization; and (iv) the SADCC secretariat, sector coordinators and Western development agencies, ranging from broad regional policy reviews to project feasibility studies (ESARG, 1987).

There is no doubt that this demand, especially for policy-oriented research, has led to the expansion of research capacity in the region with the strengthening and reorientation of existing institutions and the founding of new ones. This expansion has not, however, escaped the wider problems associated with the shortage of high level man-power and the scarcity of domestic funding for research activities.

Furthermore, the execution of the research has faced the difficulty of obtaining the necessary resources and services. Information on existing resources and support services and on past and ongoing research activity is frequently difficult to obtain or even identify, both within the region and abroad due to the lack of adequate bibliographic information.

There are a number of constraints, albeit in varying degrees, common to all the SADCC member countries that hinder the development of local research capacities. These include:

- a. an acute shortage of post-graduate training facilities for research workers;
- b. lack of properly organized national information infrastructures such as archives, documentation and library services;
- c. the apparent inability of governments to control the operations of transnational corporations which often insist on and dictate priorities and the order in which a particular research project must be executed in the recipient country;
- d. research findings and documents are not only hard to obtain locally but, as if to prove their scholarly attainment, the authors prefer to publish in international journals of limited or restricted circulation;
- e. the tendency for civil servants and bureaucrats to dismiss outright university documents as lengthy, academic and/or as being out of step with a country's national development objectives; and
- f. the lack of a central machinery for the control of research activities in the country resulting in fragmented, uncoordinated and usually wasteful research in terms of a country's national development (Kukubo, 1988, p 311).

There is no doubt that if a viable local research capability is to be developed these constraints should be addressed and contained at the national level.

PREVIOUS INITIATIVES TO COORDINATE RESEARCH

In recent times, a number of initiatives have been made in the SADCC region to coordinate research activities and in several cases to provide information on those activities and other information services. Among these are:

1. the Europe-Southern African Research Group (ESARG) which links up mainly European-based researchers and has a strong SADCC focus;
2. the regional research programme on South African destabilization and the sanctions issue coordinated by the Institute of Southern African Studies (ISAS) in Lesotho;
3. the networking between European/North American human rights NGOs of their information resources, including cooperative relations with their Southern African counterparts;
4. joint arrangements with regard to documentary and data collection and research support services from CODESRIA;
5. moves towards the standardization of software packages on IBM-compatible hardware in SADCC sectoral units;
6. the recently formed Southern African Research and Documentation Centre in Harare which aims to build a training and research-oriented documentation centre; and
7. the formation in 1983 of the Southern African Development and Research Association (SADRA) to act as a regional body for the promotion of development-oriented research, information and documentation exchange in Southern Africa (ESARG, 1987).

In spite of all these efforts, there is still a lack of a solid base for scientific information analysis and dissemination. Expert reports continue to repeat themselves in circular motion and progress reports, if not retrospective in outlook, often lack up-to-date statistical evidence that can be used as starting points for further project development (Kotei, 1988, p 297).

THE NEED FOR A REGIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEM IN THE SADCC REGION

Very often, researchers in Southern Africa have focused their research on national issues, unrelated to the possibilities of attaining regional integration. As long as the individual countries of the region seek to resolve their development problems in isolation, their efforts will be hampered by

their small economic size and South African domination. If they could unite on a regional basis, they could contribute far more effectively to the struggle for greater regional autonomy and development. In this connection researchers could play a significant role in helping to realize this goal by working to gather essential information as to the possibilities of coordinated policies for planned regional development (Seidman, 1988, p 52).

The importance of the above is underscored by the fact that, as with other areas of encroachment, South Africa has succeeded in denying self-generated growth of information systems that are capable of supplying most demands in neighbouring countries. For example, the Republic has built up huge arsenals of Southern *Africana* in its research libraries and administrative units as well as public and private archives. Many of their holdings of source materials were printed and published in South Africa itself although the manuscripts were prepared outside (Kotei 1988, p 291). This is because the Republic serves as the major publishing house for the sub-region. Consequently, much of the decision as to what information should be made available is vetted, censored and controlled.

Furthermore, the present anomaly whereby Pretoria has maintained an interlibrary loan network receiving and distributing documents to 60 odd research centres and libraries in Central and Southern Africa, needs a substitute system. This is because, at the moment, the National library in Pretoria has been distributing vital data, on the basis of which officials take vital decisions in SADCC states. There is therefore the obvious need to break the stranglehold of information dependence since a control of a people's information system is a control of their minds and actions.

Apart from breaking away from the dependence on South Africa, an effective regional research control and coordination will enable researchers, documentalists and information specialists working in SADCC countries to discuss and exchange information on research priorities, resources, facilities and future needs, with a view to identifying common problems, resources and modes of cooperation within the region.

With particular reference to microbased information technology, the coordinated extension beyond the current small user base holds tremendous potential for enabling researchers and institutions: (i) to process research data; (ii) to publish and disseminate results to build data bases geared to research and policy making requirements; (iii) to provide a variety of in-house and external information services; (iv) to get access to distant database resources and information providers; (v) to coordinate data gathering and research activities; and (vi) to exchange and share resources and facilities of mutual benefit (ESARG, 1987).

THE NEED FOR INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF COORDINATED RESEARCH EFFORT AND DATA BASE

In spite of the many differences in their research approaches and the varying national political and economic contexts in which they work, researchers from the various institutions throughout the region can cooperate together on a research agenda of their own choosing. As they exchange information and data, and discuss their differing methodologies, they can learn useful lessons from each other.

In the first place, by working together, they will acquire a more cohesive understanding of the possibilities and problems of regional development. They will bring the results of their separate national researchers together for comparison and joint evaluation (Seidman, 1988, p 31). Thus, they will shape a more penetrating analysis of the regional development possibilities and problems. They will, in addition, build the foundation of information and analysis needed to contribute to the current struggle for regional liberation and development.

Furthermore, they will obtain new ideas and suggestions as to how to improve upon the research exercise itself.

At the institutional level, there are many advantages to be gained as well. A closer collaboration of institutions in Southern Africa will ensure the development of research projects which will facilitate the exchange of data between research centres in a mutually accessible format.

This will, of necessity, bring about a data storage and retrieval system for information, classified in a format that is easily accessible to researchers in different centres and which is complementary to the storage of their own data. In this connection, it will be possible for research centres in the region to adopt the use of common computer hardware and software packages to encourage complementary research and exchanges between workers at a number of institutions in the region. This will enable them to adopt standardized procedures for sharing and disseminating information on resources, services and research activities.

For the poorer countries in the region, research cooperation is extremely vital. It will enable scholars in these countries to learn to reduce the risks of making mistakes that other scholars elsewhere have made. More importantly, it will enable them to have easy access to facilities, resources and services which their fragile economies would not normally allow.

The advantages of collaborative research among researchers in the region transcend national and regional boundaries. Through cooperation, researchers will be able to share relevant information on the counterpart research support environment in other parts of the world. With the establishment of an efficient mode of cooperation and standardization between SADCC-based research and documentation centres, the way will be paved for counterpart institutions in various parts of the world to organise their resources and provide the needed research support ser-

vices. For example, cooperation would not only enable researchers in the region to visit other non-SADCC institutions for research training and to get greater access to materials but also enable these institutions to assist in local training programmes and provision of complementary research resources and facilities.

PAST PROBLEMS OF REGIONAL RESEARCH COOPERATION

Research coordination and cooperation at regional level implies that at the national level there are functional research institutions that are able to effectively coordinate the various research programmes and activities. While it might be said that some countries in the region have been able to institute control and coordination of their research activities and programmes this cannot be said of others to the same degree.

A number of factors that appear to have hindered the needed type of coordinated research effort have been identified as follows:

1. there is no regional, legal or administrative machinery in which research coordination can be accommodated;
2. not all countries in the region are at the same level of socio-economic, political, educational, informational and even cultural development;
3. the countries' respective national economic priorities differ;
4. different countries espouse different political and national ideologies and dogmas and subscribe to different international political ideologies; and
5. the countries' historical backgrounds are totally different (Kukubo 1988, p 314).

In addition to the above factors it has been pointed out that the available research infrastructure—information, research and teaching **services**—cannot conveniently sustain multidisciplinary research covering the whole region, vast areas of which many are not only inaccessible but sparsely populated.

Furthermore, most research institutions have, to date, focused primarily on gathering data and information relating to national development issues, each focusing on the particular problems of the individual country in which they are located. As a result, many cyclostyled papers and a number of articles focus on individual country experiences.

What is more, researchers in each Southern African state have understandably been conducting their research in isolation, providing separate fragments of data, despite the fact that all the nations are confronted with similar problems. They have indeed made few efforts to conduct comparative analyses on a regional basis, or to gather essential information in a way which would facilitate the formulation and implementation of policies directed to the attainment of regional integration.

TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR REGIONAL RESEARCH COOPERATION

Institutionalization of Coordinated Research at the National Level

As indicated earlier, there is the need to establish functional research institutions and protocols at the national level in order to coordinate research programmes at the regional level, effectively. The absence of research controls has often resulted in unpleasant and sometimes embarrassing consequences. Government planners, policy and decision makers, research scholars and future generations will not only find it difficult to operate but also be forced to duplicate efforts, waste time and money, delay the execution of vital development projects simply because previous research findings, studies and documents are irretrievable when needed. It is no secret that the continued contradictions or inconsistencies in many government policies and national development programmes are largely attributed to and stem from the lack of communication between those in possession of either the required information or knowledge about the materials, and those in need of the records.

It is the conviction of the present writer that there is the need to establish, in each SADCC country, a National Research Council (or a body of a similar nature), in order to improve research coordination at the national level as well as integrate regional research activities properly. Experience from other countries, especially in Africa, has shown that no satisfactory long term policy for national research programmes can be planned and developed without the enactment of appropriate legislation. It is therefore essential that the functions of such a body be clearly defined by law.

Research Coordination at the Regional Level

SADCC has already laid down a viable framework for regional economic cooperation with clearly defined areas of sectoral responsibility. It may therefore be safe to surmise that the SADCC countries are united for a common purpose which should result in the evolution of a regional research policy whose seeds should disperse and germinate into viable national research policies in each member country of the SADCC group. In this connection, there is the need for the establishment of a regional non-partisan mechanism which would service the research needs of SADCC member states. Such a mechanism, which might be called Southern Africa Regional Research Coordination Council (SARRCC), should have the following functions:

- a. formulation of regional policies and delineation of sectoral research programmes;
- b. mobilization of available regional research capacities;
- c. encouraging the sharing of limited available regional resources among member states;
- d. collection and dissemination of information on research capacities of each member country in the region;
- e. assisting governments in the region to prepare inventories of national institutions with research or potential research capabilities;
- f. acting as a regional clearing house for requests for funds for regional and national research projects;
- g. development of regional research facilities;
- h. sponsoring and training of scientific personnel and supporting staff;
- i. making summaries of all important materials on the region and facilitating their usage by scholars;
- j. developing and maintaining uniformity and consistency in research standards in the region;
- k. acting as a liaison between international organizations and individual member countries unable to participate in any international arrangement for collaborative research programmes;
- l. organizing and hosting seminars, conferences, workshops and meetings; and
- m. generally, acting as advisor to SADCC member countries on all matters of research.

There is also the need to strengthen the existing schemes and procedures of cooperation between SADCC-based institutions in data exchange, information provision and other research support services, including computer-based facilities. In this connection, special mention should be made of the SADIS subsystem which should identify, collect and disseminate relevant documentation for planners, policy formulators and officials as well as independent research workers who might be involved in decision making. Because of the varying conditions in the region it will be important for descriptors in data bases to adopt uniform terminologies, using common standards in citation and referencing.

In order to ensure rapid information transfer from country to country, there is the need to provide on-line information hardware so that computer terminals, located in each sub-regional and member states' national focal point would feed into, and draw from, the data bank provided by PADIS in Addis Ababa.

Specifically the SADIS system should be able to provide the following services: indexing and abstracting services; current awareness profiles, and retrospective bibliographic searches, on demand; selective dissemination of information; referral services; document delivery; and, provision of information-bearing magnetic tapes to interested member states (Kotei 1988, p 297).

Closely related to the above is the need for the establishment of a common classification system of data with a view to ensuring closer collaboration and exchange of data. At this early stage of research coordination in the region, it is crucial that researchers become aware not only of people's research foci but also of the classification system colleagues are using to establish their individual and common data bases.

For example, it will be useful if the Institute of Southern African Studies (ISAS) in Maseru will make available to other researchers its classification system used for the compilation of the incidents of destabilization and analysis of the changing dynamics in South Africa. This will, without doubt, help others in understanding the different forms of dislocation in the region.

Training

An important component of any programme of research collaboration in the region is that of training. In this connection, a central training agency should be established to produce on a regular basis various categories of information specialists and researchers in model and system use. It goes without saying that the effectiveness of an information system will depend on the skill with which it is designed and operated, as well as the facility with which users can manipulate the system to advantage.

In addition to the central training agency in the region, there should be established *ad hoc* national training centres for updating skills and orienting them to peculiar local problems of data collection. Use could therefore be made of the research and documentation centres for this exercise.

Regular Meetings

In order to facilitate increased, mutually beneficial exchanges relating to the methodologies and the research results they use, researchers (if possible with relevant policy makers) should hold regular meetings to compare and evaluate the results of their research that relate to priority areas in the region. These might, for example, take place at the time of the annual Southern African Universities Social Science Conference (SAUSSC), at the Biennial Workshop and Congress of the Southern African Development and Research Association (SADRA) or, at the Standing Conference of Eastern Central and Southern African Librarians (SCECSAL).

Resource Allocation

It will not be enough for governments in the region to merely promote and facilitate an awareness of previous and current research in member states and in the region. This gesture should be effectively backed by the

provision of adequate resources for research and information gathering. Each member country should therefore allocate a substantial amount earmarked for its **sectoral** responsibility for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information pertaining to the sector.

An Effective Retrieval System

Much research data on the region is currently more easily obtainable from international sources than locally. If this anomaly is to be corrected and the required information is to be obtained without strain, then the retrieval mechanisms in the region should not only have international compatibility as far as possible, in terms of both hardware and software, but should use common, mutually comprehensible terminologies in the form of thesauri, compiled for each project sector as well as standardized citation indices. Research results must be transmitted in meaningful practicable terms to those who need them. For example, the limited agricultural research and extension resources which the region is able to deploy should be directed towards the efforts of the many food producers to enable them to apply appropriate production methods in their operations.

Furthermore, it is important that university students and students of other tertiary institutions be involved in this regional research retrieval exercise. This will help to ensure that as future policy makers they are not only aware of national issues but also have knowledge of happenings in the region. It will also provide them with the necessary information as to alternative approaches so that they can contribute to shaping the necessary regional perspectives and institutions designed to spread increasingly productive employment opportunities and higher living standards throughout the region.

Institutional Changes

The implementation of the proposed type of long-term regional research coordination would require regional cooperation involving major changes in the inherited political and economic institutions which currently enable South Africa and allied transnational corporations to shape the economic development perspectives of most of the member states.

As the participating countries introduce the necessary institutional changes to begin to implement self-reliant regional development plans, they contribute to weakening the South African subcentre and liberating the people of that country. On the one hand, as they build up their own economies, they can strike better bargains with transnational corporations to acquire needed capital, manpower training and technology. On the other hand, as they begin to cut off South Africa's source of low-cost labour and raw materials, limit the market for South African-based manufacturing industries, and end the drain of investible surpluses to

South Africa, they undermine the features which attracted transnational corporations to invest in that economy (Seidman, 1988, p 51).

ANTICIPATED DIFFICULTIES

There is no doubt that keeping the nine SADCC countries together in an anti-South African alliance will be a continuing struggle, requiring their collective capacity to provide real material alternatives to increasing links with South Africa. It is in this context that the SADCC strategy has to be analysed and the role of research assessed.

Basically, the SADCC alternative strategy calls for restructuring at **three** levels, namely:

1. restructuring the economies of the nine countries;
2. restructuring relations between the nine states; and
3. restructuring relations between the SADCC states and the world economy (Centrode Estudos Africanos, 1988, p 59).

Given the heterogeneous nature of the SADCC grouping, there will clearly be differences between them both on the extent and implications of each of these recommended forms of restructuring, as well as on the relationship between them.

Furthermore, research priorities in each SADCC country will be dictated by domestic priorities, and the interpretation given to the question of the extent and implications of each of the three forms of restructuring. This means that it will not be easy to establish a centralized, coordinated research programme involving all countries in parallel research on identical issues. However, this should in no way rule out cooperation and collaboration between researchers in the various SADCC countries. On the contrary, research should begin with an investigation of the meaning of each of these forms of restructuring in each SADCC country, and then the identification of the common priorities which arise out of such restructuring.

Thirdly, within each of the SADCC countries, there exist social groupings whose interests are served by existing links with South Africa. To a varying degree within the nine countries, these groupings possess the capacity, social position and the will to obstruct the restructuring of internal, regional and international linkages envisaged by SADCC. We would therefore suggest that a SADCC research strategy should begin with a detailed investigation of precisely these interests which maintain existing links with South Africa, and locate them within the political and resource allocation processes within each country.

Finally, the regional information system and data base that is being envisaged raises some financial implications. It certainly costs a considerable sum of money to install an effective regional information service

and data base. Initially, this may be fully or partly financed by a number of international bodies and organizations. However, there is no guarantee that the system will continue to receive adequate support after termination of initial multilateral funding. Subsequently, SADCC countries will therefore have to bear the cost of, at least, maintaining the system on a permanent basis.

CONCLUSION

The need for the proper planning and coordination of research activities and the establishment of a common data base in the Southern Africa region has become more pressing as a result of SADCC's commitment to liberate her member countries from the economic stranglehold of the Pretoria regime as well as from other undesirable foreign domination. This commitment first and foremost calls for a redefinition of research strategies which should be articulated in harmony with the developmental objectives of SADCC member countries.

At the national level, research should form an integral part of the national plan for economic and social development. Each country should endeavour to formulate a national research policy and involve its relevant institutions in the evolution of national research policy and culture. This should be supplemented by the establishment or rehabilitation, in each country, of a National Research Council whose functions must be clearly defined by law.

The synchronization of SADCC's developmental objectives calls for the coordination of research activities at the regional level. This would be ensured through the founding of a non-partisan regional body to which all SADCC member countries must be committed. If this body is sustained through the provision of the necessary input, it would contribute to changing substantially the economic, political and research scene of the Southern Africa Region in which the development of indigenous research capacities and culture have for a long time been clogged by imported ideas and technologies.

Without doubt, the development of research capacities in the Southern Africa region cannot be realized overnight. This is indeed a long time objective which requires careful planning and steady implementation. Most important, there are a number of constraints which must be identified and contained if a viable regional research capability is to be developed.

NOTES

1. SADCC comprises the nine Southern African States of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
2. Now commonly known as the Lusaka Declaration, the document was entitled *Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation*. A Declaration by the Governments of the Independent States of Southern Africa.

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Strategies for Regional Cooperation in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa —the Role of Non-Governmental Organizations

Ansu Datta

Since the 1960s regional cooperation in Africa has assumed a new meaning. It is no longer imposed from outside, but seeks to respond to the felt needs of the countries and the interests of the dominant groups in these countries. Regional cooperation in the present context is also tied to the process of development, with the economic dimension occupying the central position in most cases.

Also, increasingly more careful preparation is being expended on some of the more recent experiments. Gone are the days when early exuberance born of the similarity of historical experiences produced certain instant blueprints, such as the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union which hardly ever functioned. By contrast, the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), among several other organizations, bear unmistakable evidence of industry and a relatively good spade-work.

An attempt has been made in the present paper to discuss how regional cooperation at the grassroots level can be promoted in Southern Africa after the apartheid system has been dismantled. This is done on the assumption that regional cooperation in post-apartheid Southern Africa will be development oriented and generated from within the region and that, in fostering it, its architects will not sacrifice careful preparation on the altar of youthful enthusiasm. The holding of the present conference is an indication that the last assumption is not altogether baseless.

We start off by examining alternative forms of grassroots cooperation. This is followed by a discussion of different models of regional collaboration. The next section compares and contrasts governmental and non-governmental cooperation. Finally the paper is rounded off by a scrutiny of possible strategies of fostering grassroots cooperation among non-governmental organizations leading to greater regional collaboration.

FORMS OF GRASSROOTS COOPERATION

Cooperation at the non-governmental level can take a variety of forms. There is of course person to person interaction across state boundaries among friends, kinsmen and tourists. But contact among them is casual and diffuse. More regular and intensive cooperation may occur among professionals and businessmen either on a person-to-person basis or through their associations. These and other non-governmental organizations are marked by a certain regularity of operation with specific objectives. At least some of them are committed to the development of regional cooperation and have already established links with their counterparts in the region. Grassroots cooperation at the regional level can thus be best promoted by non-governmental organizations or NGOs.

Non-governmental organizations can be classified in terms of different criteria. First, with regard to the fields of operation, the main types of NGOs are:

1. NGOs active in the field of education (e.g. the Botswana Educational Research Association – BERA, the Swaziland Educational Research Association – SERA);
2. NGOs active in the field of health (e.g. societies to campaign against smoking, Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies);
3. NGOs active in the field of religion (e.g. various societies based on religion);
4. NGOs active in the field of social services (e.g. Rotary club, Lions club, Jaycees, YMCA/YWCA); and
5. NGOs to promote sectional interests (e.g. trade unions, gender related societies and child protection societies).

NGOs can also be categorized with reference to the scope of their geographical operation. Thus there are:

- a. NGOs which are affiliated to various international societies, (e.g. YMCA/YWCA);
- b. NGOs which are local branches of regional organizations (e.g. BERA as a branch of the Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland Educational Research Association or BOLESWERA, the Foundation of Education with Production-FEP— withits different branches); and
- c. NGOs which are purely local organizations (e.g. the Botswana Federation of Trade Unions or BFTU);

Many of the NGOs mentioned above already work within a regional framework. It is the purpose of the present paper to indicate how best to strengthen these frameworks and to extend the idea of regional co-operation to other NGOs.

Modern non-governmental organizations in Central and Southern Africa have their roots in the colonial times. Christian missionary societies started functioning early—at first with European missionaries and later including African catechists and committed lay converts. The emergence of various welfare societies among educated Africans—sometimes on a narrow ethnic basis—during the interwar period illustrates the success of indigenous initiative in the field. Other examples of non-governmental organizations are trade unions, various occupational associations and political parties. African traditional societies set considerable store by mutual assistance and cooperation. Thus, relief and rehabilitation during disaster and distress was conceived in societal terms and ensured by means of kinship obligations and through the practical implementation of the principle of *noblesse oblige* on the part of the rulers and leaders of a society. In such societies there was thus no concept of "service organizations", such as the Rotary and Lions clubs and the YMCA and the YWCA. These were created and nurtured mainly by expatriates; it is largely since the post-independence period that indigenous Africans have been taking an increasingly active share of the administration of these organizations.

MODELS OF REGIONAL COOPERATION

The term "post-apartheid Southern Africa" makes sense only if it denotes that the apartheid structure has been replaced by a non-racial united South Africa which is wedded to a democratic system based on the principle of "One Man, One Vote" and that such a country is keen on maintaining friendly relations with its neighbours. In terms of territory, population, natural resources, infrastructural development and manpower, South Africa will remain by far the strongest country in the region. And no real regional cooperation will be possible without her.

It is difficult to foresee the type of relationship that may develop among countries of the region. Southern African states have themselves created the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) as a collaborative effort to lessen their dependence on the Republic of South Africa. Although the headquarters of the organization have been set up in Gaborone, much of its work is decentralized with the job of coordinating activities of individual countries relating to a particular field entrusted to one of the member states. More specifically the job division among members is along the following lines:

Angola	Energy
Botswana	Crop Research and Animal Disease Control
Lesotho	Soil Conservation and Land Utilization
Malawi	Fisheries, Wildlife and Forestry
Mozambique	Transport and Communications

Tanzania	Industrial Development
Swaziland	Manpower Development and Training
Zambia	Mining and a Southern African Development Fund
Zimbabwe	Food Security

SADCC's own efforts at regional cooperation will of course provide valuable experience for regional collaboration in the future; but ironically, the demolition of apartheid will also remove the *raison d'être* of SADCC. It may be premature to speculate on what may happen in the changed circumstances. Certainly because cooperation with a free, democratic, non-racial and friendly South Africa is likely to be a priority objective, attempts will perhaps be made to change the basic direction of what will remain of SADCC and transform it into an instrument of collaboration among all countries of the region including the Republic of South Africa. Assuming that this is going to take place, the strategy of bypassing and reducing the dependence on South Africa will in all probability be replaced by one of making the maximum use of the resources of South Africa. In short, in its present form, SADCC can hardly be a relevant model for post-apartheid regional cooperation in Southern Africa.

There are of course several other models of regional cooperation: (i) the Organization of American States or OAS, which is the successor of the Pan-American Union; (ii) the Economic Commission of West African States or ECOWAS; (iii) the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation or SAARC; and (iv) the European Economic Community or EEC. But none of these models may be entirely suitable to Southern Africa.

The USA has a dominant role in the OAS, but has to take cognizance of "little giants" such as Argentina, Brazil, Canada and Mexico. Yet with smaller countries the USA enjoys an asymmetrical and hegemonistic relationship which is heavily tilted in her favour. In West Africa, Nigeria is the biggest regional power; however, Ghana enjoys near equality with her in manpower development. Ghana also has the advantage of having played a leading role in African affairs to a greater extent than Nigeria.

The internal balance of forces within ECOWAS is not thus comparable to what is likely to obtain in Southern Africa after the dismantling of apartheid. Furthermore, the record of ECOWAS is not sufficiently impressive so that its experiment can hardly merit being emulated elsewhere in the Continent. In South Asia, India's leadership role is not undisputed, which that of post-apartheid South Africa's is likely to be. Also, the relationships among South Asian countries are not free from tension or even hostility. South Asian affairs are additionally influenced by "bigger brother" breathing on the necks of the countries from across the Himalayan mountain range. Finally, SAARC does not at present have any ambitious programme of regional cooperation; it modestly holds regular consultations among its member countries for sorting out certain multilateral problems.

Probably the richest source of experience in building regional cooperation (and integration) in the contemporary world is the evolution of the European Economic Community (EEC). But the pertinence of even this experiment to Africa can be questioned. First, we should not forget that European regional collaboration has a long history going back to the Greek heritage, Christianity and the Holy Roman Empire and evolving into an institutional order through the so-called "Congress System" in the nineteenth century. In the modern period what has later blossomed into the European Economic Community had but a modest beginning in the signing of the Brussels Treaty in 1947 and the formation of the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948. The first step towards integration was taken in 1957 with the signing of the Treaty of Rome by Belgium, France, Germany (West), Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

Countries of Southern Africa do not have traditions of collaboration going back to such a long period. Nor can they boast of such intensive spade-work for collaboration. Furthermore, the West European scene during the two decades after World War II presented a balance of forces which was quite different from that of what will probably emerge in the wake of the end of the apartheid system. The European Economic Community did not, and still does not, have a "big brother". The Federal Republic of Germany, France and the United Kingdom are roughly equivalent in power and influence—a phenomenon which merits consideration in planning for further regional cooperation in Europe (and also in Africa).

Since none of the existing models is applicable to Southern Africa, the region will have to evolve its own model of cooperation in the post-apartheid era. As said before, no meaningful cooperation is conceivable without the participation of South Africa. The implications of this have to be carefully considered. On the other hand, future cooperation can ill afford to ignore what SADCC has been trying to achieve during the present decade.

GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION

Regional cooperation among non-governmental organizations is marked by certain characteristic features. Non-governmental cooperation can be organized on a small scale with a modest beginning, but gradually growing into a more ambitious framework. Its development can be facilitated by a process of continuous evaluation of its success and failure, of its strong and weak points.

Another advantage of promoting regional cooperation through mobilizing non-governmental agencies is that such a process can largely be free from the formalities connected with protocol and related matters. It can thus foster local initiative and harness the vast source of experience

and energy available at the grassroots level. Because it is not constrained by protocol, cooperation through NGOs can also be selective, emphasizing the role of certain organizations while leaving out other organizations which do not conform to the goals set before the specific process of cooperation.

If regional cooperation through NGOs has certain advantages, it suffers at the same time from certain weak points. NGO sponsored cooperation is likely to be fragmentary, its resources are limited; it may not be in a position to commit a country or its **government** to a particular course of action; it can be multi-directional and operate at cross purposes.

Certainly, regional cooperation through NGOs can never be a substitute for governmental cooperation at a formal level, although it can both complement and supplement the efforts made by governments. It can also function as a pressure group for lobbying for the adoption and implementation of a particular course of action.

The table below compares and contrasts governmental and **non-governmental** cooperation at the regional level.

<i>Governmental Cooperation</i>	<i>Non-Governmental Cooperation</i>
1. Aim = Development of the region: all-rounded development through participation of all countries and promotion of non-racialism	1. Aim = Development of the region: all-rounded development through participation of all countries and promotion of non-racialism
2. More expensive	2. Cheaper
3. Formal	3. More informal
4. Centralized	4. Decentralized and diffuse
5. Protocol bound	5. Not bound by protocol
6. Initiative from the top	6. Bottom-up grass-roots initiative
7. Ideologically neutral	7. Can be ideologically oriented
8. When participating, governments are treated on an equal footing	8. Participation of countries may not be on an equal footing
9. Popular participation is difficult	9. Institutional cooperation may be extended to popular participation without much effort

STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPING REGIONAL COOPERATION

To me, the most fruitful strategy for developing regional cooperation at the grassroots level should be based on the experiences derived from contemporary attempts and from those made in the recent past.

Post-apartheid Southern Africa may differ in certain, perhaps important, respects from those which characterize the region currently, but several of the problems which beset us now are likely to be with us for some time to come. Indeed an effective strategy for building regional cooperation has to take cognizance of the basic constraints within which it will have to operate. Two of these are: an acute shortage of suitable personnel and near absence of indigenous financial support. The shortage of personnel is related to the small size of the potential catchment area and the high turnover of potential leaders—a phenomenon discussed below in greater detail. The near absence of financial support is largely a consequence of the economic backwardness of the region, especially as it has adversely affected the birth of an indigenous affluent class with surplus funds and the right attitudes.

The net result of all this is to make NGOs depend heavily on foreign funding. It does not need a lengthy discussion to realize that this state of affairs has far-reaching implications for the functioning of the non-governmental organizations. In the first place, the heavy dependence on foreign sources makes a mockery of one of the basic objectives of regional cooperation, that is, self-reliance. Foreign funding may also seriously jeopardize our own priorities, some of which may suffer because of the absence of support. External donor agencies may more easily become victims of what can be called a "halo effect". This may happen in aid disbursement when a major part of aid goes to those organizations which have "effective" public relations or are otherwise conspicuous rather than to those which are endowed with the right programme and successful performance. The problem may be accentuated when an NGO operates in a remote area or with reference to an obscure field, in which cases foreign aid agencies, despite the best of intentions, may not be able to reach it.

Over and above the general constraints, there are problems for which we should be prepared to bear responsibility. At least a part of the difficulty in building regional cooperation stems from the fact that our practice has so far been blind, enlightened by neither a theoretical direction nor any logical conclusions drawn from our experiences. Admittedly our experiences are limited, but they can nevertheless yield some interesting guidelines, especially when cross-fertilized with the lessons derived from experiments carried out elsewhere.

Many non-governmental regional associations in Southern Africa have functioned only sporadically. Accelerated spurts of activities mark the periods on the eve of, during, and immediately after a conference. At other times associations lie dormant. Formal leaders are either too busy with their "normal" duties or fail to attach adequate importance to regional work which thus suffers in comparison with the leadership function within the country. Examples are numerous and can be reported from many countries and organizations so that there is, I hope, general agreement about what I have chosen to call, the inertia syndrome in regional institution building.

The inertia syndrome comprises a set of symptoms which generate an identifiable pattern, characteristic of a particular deficiency. The condition referred to here is the failure to engage in meaningful actions, probably due to the need and obligation to carry a heavy work load that is realistically impossible to achieve within the time available. Consequently it may result in a tendency to accord low priority to the regional jobs undertaken or to leave the jobs to a subordinate officer, sometimes without clear instructions. The syndrome may also manifest itself in the failure to monitor the progress made by the subordinate to do the jobs delegated to him.

There is no suggestion here that all this is done deliberately or that individual officers are to blame. It is more a matter of institutional priorities. Most of the organizations we work for lend support to ambitious programmes, while their manpower resources are limited. Also senior level personnel are not always sustained by an adequate supporting staff. Add to this the fact that, unlike in the political field, regional collaboration in NGOs is not generally recognized as part of the normal job description of an officeholder.

Consequently, when an over-worked official has to choose between regional work (for which there is no direct accountability) and jobs relevant to nation-building (for which he is immediately responsible to superior officers and political leadership, and ultimately to the people) it is clearly the latter which is given priority.

The inertia syndrome may also develop when it is realized that there is a great difference between rhetoric and reality, that regional cooperation cannot be achieved by enthusiasm alone and that long, hard, and patient spade-work is necessary before the complex problems surrounding regional cooperation, not to speak of regional integration, can be resolved. The awareness of the immensity of the task may then simply paralyse the will to do the work. If it is tempting to relate this desideratum of determination discipline and industry to the "Protestant ethic", the Strodbeck-Kluckhohn framework, or McClelland's concept of *nach*, it is simplistic, naive or even dangerous to indulge in psychologistic explanations for the deficiency.

Indeed the inertia syndrome in regional cooperation is partly grounded in historical circumstances; it is also sustained by structural factors. We have already spoken of the commonality of historical experiences generating great popular enthusiasm for unity, integration or at least cooperation at the regional and continental level. What should be added now is that the present leaders and decision makers in Southern Africa, apart from being overstretched, were hardly ever exposed to the need to launch a deep and thorough analysis of the process of regional cooperation. Nor were they trained to embark upon such an undertaking.

The very complex issues surrounding the formulation of a common policy and course of action for regional cooperation did not come to the fore in the early years of decolonization simply because African states

were still new, and vested interests in individual countries were yet to be entrenched. These have now come into existence.

Apparently, experienced statesmen and hardened bureaucrats acknowledge this development and realize the inevitability of tough and lengthy bargaining by competing interest groups. Probably they also understand that hard, patient and painstaking work is necessary for ironing out the rival claims and counter-claims. It seems, unfortunately, that this realization has not percolated down to others — not even to many an academic.

Inertia is not the only problem that is afflicting the leadership of NGOs. There is additionally the problem of high turnover among academics, administrators and other people with the right qualifications and aptitudes. This group has been increasingly mobile as job opportunities have been opening up at upper levels. Since the late 1970s highly educated people in East, Central and Southern Africa have been discovering UN and African agencies as well as other "greener pastures".

Indeed several countries in the region are now facing a minor brain drain with the result that there is discontinuity in the leadership function affecting both the public and private sectors as well as voluntary societies. On top of this, some NGOs, especially a number of service organizations, are often led by expatriates or their wives. This situation also leads to a breakdown in the continuity of leadership because of the limited duration of expatriates' stay in the country.

The high turnover would not have hampered the operation of NGOs had the catchment of their leadership been sufficiently large. The establishment and management of non-governmental organizations, often on a voluntary basis, need certain skills and attitudes which are generally found among the educated, bourgeois and petty bourgeois, and especially among the professionals. For historical reasons the size of this category of people, although growing, is still too small to supply the requisite number of leaders to run such organizations.

If ineffective leadership has made the regional societies limp, the way they function has turned them into white elephants. In the first place, there is often an avoidable duplication of efforts which makes the totality of operations more costly than what they need to be. One or two examples will suffice. Southern Africa's energy crisis is presently being studied by several organizations — without a common framework or linkages of any sort. Southern African Development Research Association (SADRA) and the Southern African Universities Social Science Council (SAUSSC) are both active in regional meetings devoted to social science research independently of each other. That SAUSSC is manned by University lecturers, while SADRA is supposed to be an organization of researchers is not a sufficient ground for the duplication because research and teaching, especially in developing countries, have to be closely integrated. There are additional cases related to other fields.

Duplication contributes to costliness and is wasteful; it also creates vested interests which take the role of defenders of the established institutions and practices—a kind of self-justifying, hence self-perpetuating, mechanism. Our resources are so limited, our manpower so small that we can ill afford to have parallel structures all purportedly running in the same direction.

The costliness of the attempts at regional cooperation is also linked to the way in which regional societies function. Is there any reason why participants of a conference cannot be accommodated in a University hostel instead of in a five-star extravaganza? Cannot we make a serious attempt to use road transport instead of airtravel where the difference in time between the **two** modes is not significant?

The high cost of running regional organizations has made our dependence on outside help heavy. To be realistic, we cannot expect to be totally free of foreign aid at this stage of our development. But for a proper regional organization to flourish, external help should be used only marginally—maybe to fill in certain gaps in the available resources, to provide "the seed money" for certain operations to take off the ground, and to meet unexpected contingencies. Anything beyond these should cast doubt on our approach to regional development.

For some years to come the institution which locates the focal point of a particular regional effort will have to provide certain facilities (e.g. secretarial help) to the organization free of charge, if we wish to reduce our dependence on donor agencies. The alternative is to ask for subvention from the governments of the region. But judging by the state of the region's economy, the request is likely to be rejected.

The primary strategy for developing regional cooperation in post-apartheid Africa can thus be summarized into a commonplace slogan: "**Learn** from the current strategy (or from its absence!)."

There is of course room for planning ahead in terms of other appropriate strategies. In doing this one has to take cognizance of the implications of the possible emergence of South Africa as a strong, non-racial, democratic and friendly neighbour. However, a transformation of this sort cannot guarantee the overnight change of heart of all and sundry. Thus it is in grassroots cooperation, that ideological orientation can and has to play a part. So far as grassroots movements are supposed to enact the role of pressure groups, it will in fact be convenient to reach some kind of ideological consensus before embarking upon any regional cooperation.

In the context of Southern Africa united action on a broad-based programme of this nature may include certain general principles, e.g. non-racialism; harmonious and all-rounded development of the countries in the region in terms of equity and social justice; and cooperation among the countries of the region leading to closer integration. It is not being presumed that an ideological consensus of this sort will be automatic and all-embracing. What is being suggested, prescriptively, is that NGOs

operating in a particular field try to reach a consensus as a charter of action.

A second important aspect of our strategy is to combine governmental and non-governmental cooperation—in fact to fashion the latter in such a way that it aims at forging institutional ties with government agencies, the media, and the relevant practitioners and professionals in the field. Once non-governmental organizations have been able to establish such links, they can, with the practitioners in the field, form themselves into a national lobbying and pressure group. The group then launches a bulletin as a forum for the exchange of ideas, views, experiences and suggestions culminating ultimately in a network. This will also help avoid duplication of efforts, which has been mentioned before.

It will be for the NGOs in the region operating in a given field to select a focal point to be located in a country, at an important institution. It is here that the secretariat of the like-minded NGOs operating as a regional pressure group may be located. It is from here that coordination of the activities of NGOs will be effected.

CONCLUSION

The thrust of the present paper is the argument that a future strategy for developing regional cooperation can evolve at least partly out of the present practice. There will certainly be later strategies which will go beyond what has been happening now; understandably these will have to take cognizance of the emergence of a non-racial and resourceful South Africa.

Cooperation among NGOs may be effective when based on certain broad ideological tenets. Identification of possible partnership can then be followed by the establishment of a focal point for a particular initiative at a lead institution in the region. On the other hand, NGOs with similar interests in a country can join hands to form a pressure group in collaboration with the practitioners in the field and liaise with the government of the country.

The biggest problems that may afflict any attempt at regional cooperation through grassroots organizations concern finance and leadership. Neither of them is capable of simple solution. It is unrealistic to hope for complete financial self-reliance in the near future, but there seems to be scope for greater economy. One way of achieving this is to ensure that the lead institution at the focal point will provide certain free services to the regional organization. As regards leadership, with the recognition of regional development as part of their regular work load, leaders will be expected to pay greater attention to regional cooperation.

Furthermore, with outside job opportunities reaching the saturation point, leadership in regional organizations will be less affected by the turnover of their office-bearers. Short courses of leadership training may

additionally be of some help to those who wish to play a prominent part in non-governmental cooperation leading to regional development.

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Transport Structures and Dependency Relations in Southern Africa: The Need for a Reorientation of Nordic Aid

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The aim of this rather sketchy and tentative paper is to provoke a discussion among decision makers in the SADCC, as well as the Nordic, countries on future cooperation in development of the region's transport capacity. The aim is furthermore to contribute to the discussion on which areas, related to Nordic-SATCC1 activities, that could be of importance for a future inter-regional research cooperation. The paper focuses primarily on regional cargo which can potentially pass through the Mozambican ports of Beira and Maputo.

This paper raises three main issues:

- In addition to the well-known and documented continuous economic and military destabilization carried out in the region by South Africa, a number of *commercial factors* of equal, or perhaps even greater, importance explain the difficulties in rerouting the region's cargo flow from Durban (or Port Elizabeth/East London) to Beira (or Maputo).
- Given the all-encompassing scope of the aggression, a reinforcement of political actions and coordination on a *regional level* is not enough. Of even greater importance is a comprehensive support to different commercial actors on a *national level*. This requires a reorientation of actual Nordic Aid consisting mainly of investments in hardware to more software management support.
- This need for support constitutes a challenge to renovate existing immobile structures in the Nordic Aid bureaucracies (sometimes justified by the very nature of traditional hardware projects). In order to cope with a dynamic transport sector, where the results of activities can seldom be fully foreseen or planned, decision-making must be immediate, independent and allow for a considerable degree of uncertainty.

If such provisions are not taken, gloomy prospects will come nearer. Heavy investments in the infrastructure of the transport sector of SADCC **will** then result only in an increased dependency upon both South Africa

and the Western countries, indeed with limited prospects for increased collective self-reliance in the future.

THE POLITICS OF TRADE AND TRANSPORT

It is generally recognized that the stability and future growth of the SADCC economies is critically dependent on their ability to trade. The dependence upon trade as a source of GNP ranges from more than 40 per cent in Zimbabwe to close to 100 per cent in Botswana.

At the same time, intra-SADCC trade accounts for only 4 per cent of the SADCC countries' total foreign trade. South Africa receives 10 per cent of the SADCC countries' exports, while it accounts for a significant share of their imports (30–40 per cent). However, variations among member states regarding this pattern must be noted, ranging from 20 per cent for Mozambique to around 90 per cent in the cases of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. This high portion of trade with South Africa, in spite of the political objective of delinking, must be viewed against the background of the country's regional hegemony. In fact, its industrial base accounts for 40 per cent of industrial production in Africa. This naturally creates a situation of interdependency. Approximately half of South Africa's total export of machinery and equipment goes mainly to Southern Africa (Mandaza *et al.*, 1987).

In the case of Mozambique, trade with South Africa could also be a tool to counteract destabilization, in an attempt to increase internal contradictions in the latter country between commercial interests and the military. One of the aims of the N'komati agreement was, as far as I understand, to attract such interests for investments in the country which would have (it was believed) mutual benefits. The South African trade mission in Maputo can be viewed as an illustration of this fact.

In any case, the structure of the SADCC countries' trade must above all be viewed in light of the low level of complementarity between SADCC members. Their economies are heavily reliant upon the export of agricultural products and raw materials, for which there is little demand in the region. Their imports consist of fuel, agricultural implements and capital and consumer goods.

The SADCC Strategy

SADCC's strategy to change this outward structure of trade to a more inward one, in order to increase independence, is an effort which is well-known in the Third World. With the help of Western capital, technical projects and foreign experts, as well as access to export markets, the intention is to be able to develop industries and infrastructure. The short term aim of the industrialization process is to decrease dependency on

South Africa. The long range struggle to decrease dependency on Western Europe still remains. Today, Western Europe is by far the most important trading partner of the SADCC countries, accounting for more than 50 per cent of the region's foreign trade.

In fact, this situation also illustrates some roots of existing interdependency between SADCC countries and South Africa. Ongoing trade with the latter, despite its contradiction to the manifested political will, reflects the political reality of the region in a two-fold sense. In the same way that increased cooperation with Western Europe will decrease dependency on South Africa, cooperation between SADCC and South Africa is important for achieving partial independence from Western Europe and for maintaining some links of great significance in post-apartheid Southern Africa.

However, the point to be made here is that the vital importance of transport routes which link SADCC exporters with customers in Western Europe is inherent to SADCC's strategy, which aims to reduce dependence upon South Africa. These transport routes will continue to be of great importance until the prosperous day when the structure of production and trade has been modified and another economic base, allowing for increased collective self-reliance, has been created. This is the case especially for the six land-locked countries in the region. No one is going to buy tobacco in Zimbabwe or tea in Malawi if they fear that the products will be delayed or damaged during the transport process.

Transport Routing

During colonial times, quite a substantial transport infrastructure was created in Mozambique in order to link the so-called hinterland, with its mines and plantations, to the Indian Ocean. Three important international ports (Maputo, Beira and Nacala) were built with accompanying railways running West-East. Few investments, if any, were allocated to create a national or regional transport system to promote local trade by linking areas with a surplus of food to those with a deficit. Yet, the transport sector became very important for the economy of the former Portuguese colony. Approximately one third of total export earnings came from transit traffic which was routed through the country. It is estimated that as much as two thirds of Rhodesia's trade passed through Mozambique during the 1950s and 1960s.

The importance of this infrastructure has remained even after the independence of Mozambique in 1975. For Rhodesia, Zambia and Malawi, the natural transport route was via Beira or Nacala. However, Mozambique decided to follow UN recommendations after being attacked by the troops of the Smith regime and closed its border with Rhodesia in 1976. The flow of cargo through the port of Beira was thus substantially reduced, as Rhodesia began to route its trade via South

Africa. This not only led to the **uprise** of one of the largest sanctions busting in the history of mankind; it also initiated a structural transformation of the region's entire transport system.

After Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, South Africa took several measures which made the transport of goods through the country problematic for the new nation. During the last part of 1980 and the first six months of 1981, imports were delayed in South Africa for several weeks, while exports were prevented from being shipped. According to official sources in Zimbabwe, the transport crisis provoked unilaterally by South Africa cost the country during that time around 5 million Zimbabwean dollars for every week of delay. By the end of the year, goods worth more than Z\$100 million were still awaiting export (Hanlon, 1986).

Effects on Zimbabwe's balance of payments were by this time considerable, and the new government was soon forced to turn to the IMF for assistance, with obvious implications for the country's sovereignty. The only exception to the manifestation of South Africa's power was the containerized cargo, with the country inducing Zimbabwean shippers to containerize their goods. The importance of this process will be discussed below.

Forces Behind Dependency

With the creation of SADCC in 1980, the member states took several political actions which showed their interest in decreasing dependency on South African ports. However, in spite of political will, economic dependence has only increased during the 1980s. At the time of Mozambique's independence in 1975, the volume of cargo handled through her ports amounted to 15 million tons (Maputo 11 million, Beira 3, Nacala 1), the major part of which was transit traffic. During 1986, approximately 4 million tons were handled in the ports of Mozambique (Maputo 2.5 million, Beira 1.3, Nacala 0.2). The decrease in cargo handled was extraordinarily large, from 15 to 4 million tons, while political will continued and strong efforts were made to upgrade the existing infrastructure in order to increase transit traffic through Mozambiquan ports.

The actual state of affairs can accordingly be summarized as follows. The importance of the transport routes which link Southern Africa to the Western countries has its base in SADCC's strategy to attain a decreased level of trade dependency *vis-à-vis* South Africa. At the same time, the actual transport routes used, passing to a large extent South African ports, has instead increased transport dependency on South Africa during the 1980s.

It is argued that the consequences of transport dependency are more crucial than those of trade dependency, since they are related first and foremost not to South Africa, but to SADCC trade with other regions.

While the latter can be viewed as a result of the political realities of the region and is both risky and costly to alter, the former is of a more artificial, and thus expensive, nature and could (as will be outlined in the following sections) be more easily decreased through different technical and commercial actions.

The main reason behind this reinforced dependency is no doubt to be found in South Africa's deliberate strategy of economic and military destabilization. Beginning with making it difficult for Zimbabwe to use South African ports in the early 1980s, the apartheid regime has through a variety of actions made it impossible to use Mozambican ports, in an attempt to have the cargo flow return to South Africa.

The objective of this destabilization process is two-fold. On the one hand, it aims to disrupt any sustained development in the majority-ruled neighboring countries. On the other hand, by increasing dependency on South African ports, it aims at making the neighboring countries victims of any future sanction policy, which in turn reduces international pressure for sanctions.

The methods used in this economic and military destabilization process are well-known and documented (Hanlon, 1986). Suffice it here to remember the combined impact of rate-cutting and direct military attacks on the railways. The consequences of destabilization are severe, not only for Mozambique (which has lost one of its principal sources of foreign currency earnings), but even more so for the land-locked neighbors.

In 1982, the newly liberated Zimbabwe succeeded in increasing the part of its overseas trade shipped through Mozambique from one third in 1981 to one half. However, four years later, only around 20 per cent of its exports passed through the ports of Mozambique. The costs of this dependency have been estimated to be around 50 Z\$/ton, which is the average difference in rates between Beira and Durban. During the year, this means a loss of around Z\$250 million just for higher direct transport costs in Zimbabwe's trade.

However (and as will be elaborated in the next section), the economic and military destabilization carried out by South Africa is only one factor which serves to explain the considerable decrease in cargo flow through Maputo, Beira and Nacala. This is clearly illustrated by the fact that the port of Beira has a greater capacity than is actually used, as does the railway which links the port with Harare. This point will also be illustrated when the Limpopo railway is reopened and, to a certain (although lesser) extent, when the Nacala railway is reopened.

Another factor of equal, or even greater, importance than various forms of destabilization is found in the *commercial conditions* which prevail in the region as a result of the structural transformation of Southern Africa's entire transport sector carried out during the late 1970s and early 80s.

As will be highlighted in the next section, this structural transformation implies a concentration of the cargo flow to a few principal ports, which results in a much more efficient use of the means of transport and also

decreases transport costs. The decrease in freight costs applies especially to the so-called indirect transport costs. Increased transport frequency with decreased total transport time resulted in a faster cash flow and reduced interest costs for immobilized capital, while sellers were awaiting payment from the purchasers. As will be shown, the achieved reduction in indirect transport costs actually often does fully compensate the exporter for any extra direct transport costs which result from the choice of transport route (e.g. Durban instead of Beira).

THE PROCESS OF CONTAINERIZATION

Strange as it may sound, it can be argued that South Africa no longer needs the instruments of economic or military destabilization in order to maintain her absolute hegemony over the region's transport system. The tendency towards a perpetuation of the structures of transport dependency is clear and, even worse, is reinforced by various aid projects which emphasize only hardware support.

In spite of heavy investments in infrastructure of the transport sector which aim to rehabilitate transport routes via Mozambique, Zimbabwean and Malawian dependency on the South African transport system is increasing. This is due not only to the obvious fact that the infrastructure is not yet prepared to take over (the reopening of the Limpopo and Nacala railways is still pending)—the main problem is that all investments so far have been directed towards so-called hardware needs (even though these investments in hardware nowadays normally include a component of software support for the operation of same). Irrespective of how necessary these investments may be, they will never divert any cargo flow from South Africa if they are not complemented by 'software' investments such as management support to *national transport entities acting on an executive level* which are willing and able to put these investments to use. Thus, not only political and technical constraints have to be overcome, but commercial ones as well.

The importance of this must be seen in light of the structural transformation of the transport sector that was initiated in the industrialized countries during the 1960s. Up to that time, general cargo was shipped as individual packages between consignor and consignee, with various means of transport and transshipments along the route. In the 1960s, general cargo began to be loaded into containers by the producer and then transported the entire way to the importer, without any handling or transshipments whatsoever. Total transport costs were considerably reduced, particularly in the areas of packing, handling and freight. The latter could be diminished by a more efficient use of transport means (shorter loading times at ports and/or warehouses).

Integrated Door-to-Door Transports

The introduction of so-called integrated door-to-door transports required substantial investments in means of transport, harbours, warehouses and handling equipment. In addition, an efficient communications system which permitted the planning of loading and customs clearance to be carried out in advance had to be developed.

Containerization implied an intensive struggle among the different actors along the transport chain, as all parties wished to be in control of the cargo which flowed directly from the exporter to the importer. The forwarding agents, who had been up to that time acting mainly with customs clearance and the processing of required documentation in the ports, constructed terminals and succeeded in gaining control over inland transport, while the ship owners concentrated on renovating their tonnage. The required infrastructure of harbours, highways and railways was supplied by the governments and paid by tax money, making it publically owned but at the disposal of the actors. A number of these actors, who had traditionally operated along the chain, could not mobilize the required financing and had to leave the scene (Abrahamsson, 1980).

The result of this transformation process was more efficient and less costly transport, but also a substantial monopolization of the execution of transport. The management and control of the cargo flow was concentrated in the hands of the successful forwarding agent and/or shipowner. Normally, the forwarding agent chose the transport route and the shipowner supplied required tonnage. Different harbours came into severe competition and many suffered a reduction in activities, as they could not attract cargo flow.

Containerization reached Southern Africa during the second half of the 1970s. South Africa had been struggling hard to persuade international shipowners that the country was prepared to containerize and thus enter the club of industrialized countries. Containerization was a must for South African industry, since it reduced the costs for international cooperation and trade, and thereby partly counteracted competition on the world market, especially from the East Asian countries. In fact, South Africa had to build up its own sea-transport fleet in order to force the European shipping lines which operated in South Africa to also containerize. At the same time, Mozambique followed the recommendation of the U.N. and closed its border to Rhodesia. Consequently, the traditional transport route via Beira ceased to be an alternative for the Smith regime.

Two different but concurrent factors accordingly contributed to the extremely rapid containerization of the cargo flow to/from Rhodesia. One was the exporters' need to rationalize their transport in order to compensate for the higher direct transport costs that routing via Durban instead of Beira implied. The other was the South African shipowners'

need to gain access to volumes from Rhodesia in order to attain the base required for containerization (Mackintosh, 1986). A considerable imbalance in the flow of cargo to South Africa existed; far more goods which were suitable for containers were imported from Europe than vice versa. A lot of containers did not have to be returned empty to Europe, due to i.a. the availability of tobacco from Zimbabwe and tea from Malawi, which were possible to containerize.

Implications for Southern Africa

What, then, does this process of containerization imply for the current transport situation in Southern Africa?

Firstly, a number of important investments in modern container terminals and handling equipment were made in South Africa during the late 1970s. A reasonable volume of cargo had allowed for these investments. The process has been supported by the relatively marginal but important quantities diverted to Durban, East London and Port Elizabeth from Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. (These quantities today constitute around 5 per cent of the total cargo flow which passes South African ports. Thus, 95 per cent of the cargo, or 85 million tons, is generated by South Africa's own trade). While the port of Maputo could compete with and even surpass the productivity of Durban during the 70s the situation became totally reversed after the termination of the containerization process (Mackintosh, 1986).

Secondly, the shipping lines operating in Southern Africa within the *Europe-Southern Africa Conference* (ESA Conference) manage eight container ships, five of them so-called *lo/lo* and three of them *ro/ro* vessels (permitting the cargo to be rolled on and off instead of handled by expensive container cranes). The ships belong to the consortium of *Southern Africa-Europe Container Service* (SAECS). The South African carrier *Safmarine* has a dominant position in the consortium, in which eight European shipping lines participate; estimates show that *Safmarine* carries around 40 per cent of the cargo to and from South Africa. This portion is equivalent to what is stipulated by the so-called UNCTAD code (which will be further elaborated in the next section). Due to technical reasons in Maputo and Beira, only the three *ro/ro* vessels call at these ports. This, together with the dimensions of the cargo flow, explains the reduced shipping frequencies via Beira in relation to, for example, Durban, as referred to below.

The objective of a liner conference could be compared with the regular air flight controlled by International Air Transport Association (IATA). The shipping lines have an obligation to clients to offer scheduled service at agreed price and frequency. The price will obviously be higher than what could be obtained from 'outsiders' (charter flights), but so will the frequency. Due to the general recession of international shipping, a

consequence of reduced world trade, the ESA Conference has suffered substantial competition from outsiders. During the 1980s, the latter have managed to gain control over around 30 per cent of the cargo flow to and from Southern Africa, leaving 70 per cent with the ESA conference.

The ESA Conference controls liner shipping between Europe and Southern Africa up to the port of Chinde (South of the Mozambican port Quelimane). Northwards from there, the so-called East Africa Conference controls liner shipping from Europe up to Sudan. Thus, trade in Mozambique must occur through two different conferences. Trade via Maputo and Beira is handled by the ESA Conference, while trade through the Northern port of Nacala is controlled by the East Africa conference.

This situation with two conferences is a heritage of colonial times. The East Africa Conference was concerned mainly with transporting coffee to Europe as quickly as possible. It did not consider the possibility of extending its traffic further South. In the same way, the ESA Conference was preoccupied with transporting tobacco from Southern Africa to Europe as quickly as possible. Extending its traffic further North than Beira was not of interest. In fact, the very same shipping lines which belong today to the ESA Conference constitute the backbone of the East Africa Conference. This split between two different conferences places a constraint on Mozambique, but also opens up new opportunities. These aspects will be elaborated in the next section.

Thirdly, as noted above, containerization has increased the control of the cargo flow of the forwarding agent, through the availability of integrated door-to-door traffic systems. At the same time, needed investments have drastically reduced the number of actors. This process of concentration is especially strong in Southern Africa, where the South African forwarding agents (Rennies and Manica) are acting free of competition from regional forwarders. Through the creation of efficient communications systems, and in combination with comprehensive investments, Rennies and Manica have been able to offer the exporters /importers integrated transport systems which guarantee the agreed time and costs of transport services. The clients may continuously obtain information regarding the whereabouts of their cargo and when it is due to arrive at points along the transport chain.

Fourthly, the frequency of shipping is so important that it often compensates for extra transport costs which arise from choosing Durban instead of Beira. The extra inland transport costs may be around \$US 400 for a twenty foot container loaded with tobacco, but via Durban a ship sails to Europe every week, while goods are shipped from Beira only every three weeks. Consequently, the average transport time to Europe via Durban, calculated on a yearly basis, could be two weeks shorter per shipment. For tobacco with a cargo value of \$US 100,000 per container, this would imply interest costs for immobilized capital amounting to around \$US 800 per shipment (at an interest rate of 20 per cent).

Finally, I would like to conclude this section by emphasizing that containerization has resulted in a much more effective and less costly transport service, as well as greater influence and control by South Africa's transport actors. The decreased transport costs achieved through containerization partly compensate the Zimbabwean exporter for the increase in costs which occurs when cargo is routed via South Africa instead of Mozambique. He is also partly compensated from time to time through South African subsidies (i.e. rate-cutting) (Stephens, 1986). This rate-cutting reflects what is for South Africa both a dilemma and a weapon, depending on specific political aims. Higher inland transport costs will, if not subsidized, cause the exporters to lose their competitive strength on the West European market. This fact has to be taken into consideration if South Africa wants to retain the business of transporting goods. This fact also constitutes a weapon when South Africa wants to put Zimbabwean exporters out of business.

In the process of containerization, we can accordingly find the very roots of the frontline states' increased dependency on South Africa regarding transport in the 1980s. This also explains the bizarre fact that most of the aid donors and multilateral organizations still prefer to route their cargo destined for Zimbabwe via Durban instead of Beira. However, we should also be aware of the fact that the exporters, despite various forms of compensation, still have to carry a major portion of the increased freight rates which result from routing the goods via Durban. Thus, they would have an objective interest in rerouting the cargo via Beira/Maputo if the means of transport were available.

THE SCOPE OF POLICY OPTIONS

The question which must now be raised is, of course, whether the SADCC countries can ever switch the cargo flow back from the South African ports and, if so, under which circumstances.

The various assessments carried out indicate that the potential cargo flow from the region is of a great enough dimension to justify future direct calls at Maputo, Beira and Nacala. The international role that these ports play seems unquestionable, despite the degree of concentration which follows containerization.

It was argued in the previous section that it is not only the destabilization process carried out by South Africa which prevents such a transfer. Of equal, or perhaps even greater, importance are a number of commercial factors. Besides investments in infrastructure, a political environment which enables various national actors to act with the dynamism required must be created. In addition, such actors must receive extensive support in organization building, administrative capacity and professional know-how. In many cases, it is necessary to create such

actors in order to be able to offer exporters in the region competitive, alternative transport systems.

State intervention is required in order to break the vicious circle that Maputo, Beira and Nacala are in danger of entering; without goods, no ships and transport systems—without ships and transport systems, no goods.

This section will consider two of the actors which need to be created. It will also touch upon one important instrument which is both required by and immediately available to the state if it is to intervene and commence this process.

The UNCTAD Code

The aim of the so-called UNCTAD code is to regulate transport of goods which are traded between two countries. The code applies to general cargo shipped on liner terms, and is thus limited to sea transport excluding bulk shipments on a charter basis, as well as freight carried by "outsiders". The code stipulates that each party's share of the transport work should be equal, but that at least 20 per cent should be available to competitive third parties. In the case of trade with countries in the Third World, this means that at least 40 per cent should be reserved for their fleets, which would enable them to create national carriers (thereby explaining the denomination of the code as "the 40/40/20 rule").

The UNCTAD code has been ratified by all OECD countries and a number of Third World countries as well, but few governments have altered their national legislation in order to allow the code to come into force. At the UNCTAD conference in Manila in 1979, the Third World countries raised demands for corresponding regulation of sea transport of bulk and tanker shipments. The conference did not manage to reach any decision in this matter. The question will, however, be raised again at this year's UNCTAD conference in Geneva.

Accordingly, the frontline states can in fact, by ratifying the UNCTAD code and adapting their national legislation, reroute considerable quantities of their international transport to Maputo/ Beira/Nacala.

National Carriers

Nonetheless, state intervention based on the UNCTAD code, aimed at rerouting cargo through the ports of Mozambique, would be pointless if no actors were available to handle the cargo in an efficient and competitive way.

Accordingly, in order to be able to ratify and implement the UNCTAD code, a *national carrier* must be created to supply a *sufficient transport capacity on a regularly scheduled basis*. Ratification of the UNCTAD code

would result in not only a right to transport 40 per cent of the cargo, but also an *obligation* to do so in a permanent and continuous way. As we all can understand, these rights and obligations are a prerequisite for satisfying not only the interests of the Third World countries regarding participation in shipping, but also those of exporters and importers in the industrialized countries forced to transport a considerable share of their goods with the carrier in question. This obligation to guarantee permanent and regular shipments according to a fixed time schedule implies, of course, severe constraints on anyone who wishes to enter the shipping industry anew. We shall explore some of these constraints below.

Forwarding Agents

In order to attract *commercially* the exporters/importers of the region to use the ports of Maputo, Beira and Nacala, a traffic system must be created which offers secure, punctual and regular integrated door-to-door transports at a competitive price in relation to what can be obtained through Durban and Port Elizabeth. The client would only have to turn to one party and receive one transport document from a transporter who (in return for agreed expenses) assumes full responsibility for the entire process from consignor to consignee. The transport could entail full door-to-door movements or so-called **groupage** cargo, i.e. quantities which are less than one container load (LCC).

In order to achieve this, national forwarding agents have to be supported in order for them to be able to leave their traditional port location and to invest in the inland transport, terminals and handling equipment required. Through the establishment of an international network with a comprehensive communications system, agents should, together with their representatives, be able to provide information to clients regarding the exact location and estimated time of arrival of cargo whenever required. Thus, forwarding is rapidly evolving away from the old idea of an operation which simply involved the stamping of papers and assistance with customs clearance. The forwarding agent has to act as an architect of transport who negotiates rates with the different owners of transport means (whether shipping lines or railways) on behalf of his client but in his own name, following agreed liability and on his own Through Bill of Lading (Abrahamsson, 1980).

Paralyzing Constraints

The establishment of national carriers and forwarding agents are two prerequisites for the rerouting of cargo to the ports of Maputo, Beira and Nacala and, accordingly, for the proper utilization of the actual investments in infrastructure made within the framework of SADCC. This

is, naturally, not a new insight. The importance of creating these actors has been highlighted at various SADCC meetings. The issue at stake is why so little has happened, bearing in mind, of course, the heavy costs to be carried by the region when relying on South African ports. No doubt, a lot could be learned about various forms of dependency in Southern Africa—and the proper potential of the SADCC cooperation—by carefully analysing the reasons behind this stalemate. Allow me an attempt at contributing to this with a few viewpoints.

As a starting point, we can consider the fact that SADCC should be considered as a planning organization on a regional level, without executive functions on a national level. If no actors on an executive level are available, willing and able to implement various SADCC recommendations, all their various reports will remain inoperative. A number of factors explain the difficulties involved in creating such actors on a national level.

The first *factor* is related to the need for coordination. In fact, this need for coordination of shipping activities carried out by individual nations within the region is a perfect illustration of the basic argument for regional cooperation in general. Shipping is one of the many activities in the present case of Southern Africa that can be profitable only if carried out on a regional level, due to the economy of scale which is attainable through cooperation and coordination (i.e. a necessary flow of cargo). Thus, in order to benefit from the UNCTAD code, *all* member states should:

- Ratify the code and adapt their national legislation accordingly.
- Create national carriers.
- Transfer the rights (and obligations of transports) to one appointed regional carrier, for example the Mozambican shipping company Navinter.

This need for coordination illustrates a dilemma for the SADCC countries. It is relatively easy to reach a general consensus regarding recommendations. It is far more difficult to arrive at this consensus on an executive level, especially if this implies different commercial considerations within various social groupings, and not only mutual political interests.

Secondly, the possibilities of acting and implementing political directives depend on the access to foreign exchange. With regard to the SADCC region, the present economic situation requires member states to rely on various international donors. The latter have not been easy to mobilize for the creation of independent national carriers with or without regional cooperation. Negotiations with the Nordic countries have been carried out for quite some time without any concrete results so far. Most of the donors are extremely sceptical towards the creation of national carriers in light of present junctures regarding the shipping industry in the world economy.

Experiences from West Africa clearly show the difficulties that the Third World's national shipping companies (and others as well) are facing in operating with economic viability. To carry out sea transport is indeed complicated and takes time to learn. An infrastructure for maintenance must be created and a choice of technology (type of tonnage) adapted to handling methods, existing infrastructures in ports, the supply of competent, skilled crews and administrative/commercial personnel. However, ratifying the UNCTAD code does not mean that the established national carriers must necessarily own their ships. A number of far better alternatives exist, especially in the short and medium term.

The third factor which complicates the creation of national carriers is related to quite complex policy options. One issue is whether the carrier should operate under the existing liner conference or not. This question is of crucial importance for the SADCC countries, bearing in mind the dominance of South African interests over the ESA Conference.

The UNCTAD code presently applies only to liner cargo. In order to implement the code, a country must not only create a national carrier but also apply for membership in the Conference. This fact prejudices the interests of the Third World, as a number of existing liner conferences in practice are so-called closed conferences, i.e. do not permit new members to enter. The reason for such restrictions in applying the code seems to me to be found not only in the need to maintain regular and timely scheduled access to transports, but also in the wish to defend the interests of the industrialized countries' shipping lines in a world economy suffering from a recession and with a gloomy outlook for shipping.

If the conference in question does not allow new members to enter, there still exists the possibility of carrying out shipping in competition with the conference line as an outsider. The rates of outsiders are often less expensive but the regularity and security offered inferior. However, if a national carrier opts for operating as an outsider, it could not at present refer to the UNCTAD code and thus oblige the exporters /importers to ship 40 per cent of the goods with its ships.

In regard to Southern Africa, there are a number of factors which favor entrance of the national carriers into the ESA Conference. In order to obtain the cargo flow needed for an acceptable regularity and frequency, access to South African ports is mandatory. It will take time to reroute required quantities from Durban/Port Elisabeth to Beira/ Maputo, especially if operating as an outsider. In reality, it would probably also be necessary to gain access to South African cargo in order to carry out activities with economic viability and required frequency. In addition, there exists the key issue as to access to infrastructure for repair and maintenance in South Africa.

Another advantage of membership in the Conference is that freight rates, at least initially, will be stable and cut-throat price competition avoided by the newcomer entering the market. By participating in the Conference, a national carrier also gains access to all information from the

group related to cargo flows, freight agreements in force, etc., and will thereby benefit from an important transfer of knowledge.

For all of those opposed to the apartheid system and who are working in various ways to decrease the SADCC members' dependence upon South Africa, this position may seem absurd. The Conference is dominated by South African interests and membership implies a cooperation that certainly will not eliminate dependency. However, we must distinguish between different time perspectives. In the short run, it is argued here that belonging to the ESA Conference will not end dependency but will diminish it. Instead of relying on South African railways and ports, cargo would be routed via **Beira/Maputo**, though cooperation with South African shipping lines would be necessary. In the long run, such a development may imply that a national carrier will have gained knowledge of the trade. Through controlling the cargo flow, it could find ways of reducing dependency even further. However, it is obvious that the effects of participation in the ESA Conference and the possibilities of using it in order to decrease dependency must be analyzed more in depth.

In the meantime, let us take the opportunity to continue the exercise of these complex issues a bit further. What is the alternative to joining the ESA Conference? If the SADCC countries cooperate, couldn't they create national carriers which would operate in competition with the conference? The answer is yes, under one condition: that various international donors back up this option by guaranteeing sufficient support to compensate for all negative consequences. Such consequences may range from subsidies to the national carriers if sufficient cargo cannot be obtained to the question of military defense if South African military destabilization is used, in order to counteract competition, by sabotaging railway links in the "corridors". As regards the required subsidies for such operations, and keeping the severe economic constraints that the SADCC countries are facing in mind, I very much doubt that either the SADCC countries or the international donors consider it a priority to initiate a costly economic struggle in the Indian Ocean at the present time.

Another issue is, of course, why the ESA Conference will allow the national carriers of the region to enter the Conference. The reason is purely commercial. The Conference has already lost around 20-30 per cent of its traffic to e.g. Mediterranean outsiders, and is therefore more interested in reacquiring the cargo than in stopping traffic which passes **Beira/Maputo**. A question beyond the scope of this paper is whether the South African military will allow such a cooperation. How far the SADCC countries may exploit the contradiction between commercial interests and the military is an open question, which also depends upon the relation between apartheid and destabilization over time. Although the military obviously links the two, currently there seems to be growing pressure from various capital interests, including the Boers, to separate the issues since the gains from using carrots can be far more advantageous than those from using sticks.

Thus, it could be anticipated that membership in the Conference would increase the pressure on the military to avoid a direct intervention in the "corridors". At the very least, the contradictions will become much clearer. Every agreement on economic cooperation between Mozambican and South African commercial interests will increase tension inside South Africa, if military actions try to stop the implementation of such agreements. This, in my view, was one of the reasons why Mozambique signed the N'komati agreement.

The third question of interest is how SADCC participation in the liner conference would be affected by eventual sanctions vis-à-vis South Africa. The European shipping lines could not continue their traffic to South Africa if faced with sanctions, thereby ceasing the ESA Conference's functions. The European shipping lines, however, are simultaneously members of the East Africa Conference. In order to partly compensate for lost South African cargo, and still be able to operate in Beira/Maputo, the latter will most probably be integrated into an expanded East Africa conference.

Another possibility, in case of sanctions, is that Mozambique and Tanzania create their own conference encompassing Maputo, Beira, Nacala and Dar Es Salaam. In the case of sanctions, the users will obviously prefer the first alternative, since the European lines still represent higher credibility. If this extension of the East Africa Conference line can not be achieved, they will not have any other option than to accept the latter

The fourth question to be analyzed is, of course, how the creation of the proposed national transport entities would fit into the Southern Africa transport system *post apartheid*. The fall of the apartheid regime is a historical must that implies the necessity of putting the issue of transport after apartheid on the agenda even now in order to avoid the creation of contradictory transport systems and the unnecessary waste of money due to impractical investments in the future (Mandaza *et al.*, 1987).

Peaceful development in the region would release the potentiality of trade and increase the flow of cargo. The use of Beira and Maputo for a part of this flow is strongly advocated in this paper. This routing would be in accordance with traditional transport routes which were at that time motivated by geographical and commercial factors. As the proposed rerouting accordingly is not imposed solely by political reasons, requiring the creation of artificial transport solutions, the use of Maputo and Beira will continue to be the natural and rational transport route to follow in post-apartheid Southern Africa.

The same can be said for organization building and the transfer of know-how needed for the creation of the national transport entities. Pending the outcome of the post-apartheid process, it could be advocated that South Africa will have sufficient administrative capacity to encompass the whole region. However, it is obvious that South African hegemony and dominance in the region will be maintained even with a black,

majority-ruled South Africa. This economic strength will naturally be commercially utilized. Thus, for the sake of maintaining national sovereignty, these new forms of dependency have to be counteracted. It could be argued that membership in the conference already today, together with the immediate creation of national carriers and forwarding agents, would facilitate this process.

The creation of forwarding capacity in the region also raises other kinds of complications for policy- and decision-making. Historically, the forwarder has been an agent of the shipper and/or the importer. In his own name, but on their behalf, capital and risks, he assisted with customs clearance formalities, storage, etc. Hence, the need for investments was limited. The forwarder is thus a good illustration of an entrepreneur of old times.

For a number of the SADCC members, the state has been perceived as if not actually blocking the development of such entrepreneurial skills, so at least making life extremely difficult for them. No doubt, a number of political decision-makers in the region have not considered it a task of priority to create and maintain black businessmen and thereby an increased social differentiation. The struggle to satisfy basic needs of the majority has been more important. The constraint was viewed more as a distribution problem than as a commercial one.

However, the various stabilization and structural adjustment programmes outlined by the IMF and the IBRD in most SADCC countries strongly emphasize the role of the markets for dynamization of commerce, the need for private business and accordingly for state withdrawal from commercial activities. The reason behind this wave of liberalization is well-known and a direct consequence of the lack of administrative capacity, in order to replace the function of the market with distribution planning. The transport sector, and the forwarding business in particular, have until now often been quoted as good illustrations of state bureaucracies in conflict with the need for entrepreneurial skills required to get the goods and business moving quickly enough.

These kinds of illustrations are spurious, although the IMF and the IBRD have made them more opportune than ever. I would argue that it is not the intervention of the state that has prevented existing entrepreneurs from becoming modern forwarders. The time since independence has been too short, irrespective of regime, to allow for the accumulation of the capital required for a comprehensive participation in the process of containerization. Hence, it is the financial requirements and the accompanying process of concentration of capital which has blocked potential entrepreneurs. There is now a risk that the state is withdrawing too rapidly from transports without anyone capable of creating the required capacity for a forwarding business to replace it. Entrepreneurial skill is still a must for a forwarding agent (Hallenborg *et al.*, 1987). However, as a result of containerization, this need has been complemented by another, more important one, i.e. financial resources for investments in adequate

handling equipment, inland transport means and warehouses. This has also increased the demand for strategic planning and management objectives.

The role of the state in creating skilled forwarders is accordingly obvious. Having said this, it should however also be noted that the need for state intervention does not mean that the forwarders, or any other transport entity which will be created, automatically must be state-owned. There are, in fact, a number of different types of ownership, ranging from mixed share-holding to joint ventures with foreign capital. The important point here is that the required capital can be mobilized. The company must also, irrespective of ownership, be allowed to operate as independently as possible under commercial competition and with complete responsibility for its activities (Abrahamsson, 1987).

THE NORDIC-SATCC DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

The preceding section argued in favour of the need to create different actors in the transport sector, mainly in shipping and forwarding, as a prerequisite for decreased dependency vis-à-vis South Africa in the long run. However, the need for membership in the liner conference was also advocated, implying increased cooperation with the South African shipping company Safmarine. It was argued that the reason for such a membership is dependent on the limited flow of cargo from the region, which does not permit a national carrier to operate as an outsider as it cannot offer the required frequency of vessels with economic profitability.

These recommendations would have been different had the Nordic countries considered the consequences of their political will of isolating the apartheid regime, and assumed the economic burden of required subsidies to a national carrier acting as an outsider. Such financing is, however, as far as I understand, not on the agenda where the Nordic countries are concerned.

Still, the present situation not only constitutes a dilemma, but also a possibility. In this section I will argue that the proposed membership in the ESA Conference in fact could decrease dependency vis-a-vis South Africa, provided support from the Nordic Countries could be obtained regarding software in management assistance. This would facilitate the transfer of knowledge required in order to strengthen the bargaining power of the national carrier.

The Nordic Commitment

Nordic commercial links with the majority-ruled Southern Africa have throughout history been insignificant. However, during the 1970s and

1980s, the region has become a major focus for Nordic Development Cooperation.

The Nordic countries contribute approximately one third of the total OECD aid flow to the SADCC region (i.e. approximately 2.3 billion USD 1980–1986). This is a little less than the corresponding sum from the European Economic Community but far more than the support provided by the United States (Haarlov, 1988).

While I believe it fair to explain the background for European support as a tentative attempt to reconstruct earlier economic and commercial relations with former colonies, I think that the roots of Nordic aid to the Southern African region can be found in the early Nordic concern for decolonialization and support for liberation movements on the one hand and in increased Nordic concern for the South Africa apartheid system on the other. However, the Nordic long-range perspective of economic benefits from this aid should of course not be underestimated.

Regional programmes carried out within the context of the SADCC cooperation should be viewed as complementary activities to the bilateral (country-to-country) assistance provided to the region by individual Nordic countries. The aims of the regional cooperation are linked to decreasing dependency on South Africa, and the projects should generally benefit more than one SADCC member state.

The different regional projects are, however, administrated by the concerned ministry in each country. The coordination is effectuated through a decentralized division of labour where each member state has the responsibility for particular fields. The exception to this is constituted by a special commission created for Transports and Communications called the Southern African Transport and Communication Commission, SATCC. The permanent secretariat of the commission is located in Maputo.

The importance of the Nordic contribution regarding transport and communications is illustrated by the fact that the Nordic countries, under the administration of SIDA, are responsible for the recruitment and financing of all the foreign expatriates needed at the secretariat of SATCC. The main objective of the group of expatriates has so far been to mobilize international financial resources for the rehabilitation and upgrading of the transport infrastructure in the region, which has been badly damaged by insurgency and limited maintenance facilities/ capacities (Danielsson et al., 1987). Swedish aid to specific SADCC projects on a regional level is estimated to reach 71 million USD during the three budget years 86/87, 87/88, and 88/89. The major part is allocated to different hardware investments in transport, mainly in the so-called Beira Corridor (Hook, 1987).

The Need and Scope for Reorientation

As highlighted, the major part of the Nordic contribution is linked to so-called hardware investments, as is the majority of the SATCC financial resource mobilization (although most of the investments begin to include a software component for their operation).

Already at the time of the creation of SATCC, the importance of software management support to the shipping and forwarding was emphasised. Still, with the exception of a number of studies, nothing has happened. The reason behind this is not to be found entirely in the member states' difficulties in defining their roles and finding ways of stimulating national entrepreneurship. It is also to be found in the very structures of the aid bureaucracies created by the needs of traditional hardware projects.

The latter need planning, appraisals and evaluations. The results of various projects must be possible to foresee and their economic viability calculated. It is obvious that aid bureaucracies are facing severe difficulties in coping with a dynamic transport sector on an executive level where decision-making has to be immediate, allowing for a certain degree of risk-taking. This structure, of course, heavily influences the recruitments of civil servants to the bureaucracy. Within the Nordic aid organizations, one will accordingly find very few personalities with the spirit of having entrepreneurial skills. This obviously constitutes another dilemma which is reflected by the expatriates working for SATCC. They are all high officials from different civil services departments in the Nordic countries (Danielsson et al., 1987) and linked in one way or another with investments in transport infrastructure. And, as outlined in previous sections, this is precisely the traditional role of the state and its civil servants in the Nordic countries: investments in transport infrastructure. The use of this infrastructure, the control of the cargo flow and decision-making regarding routing has always been in the hands of the private commercial transport industry. Indeed, very few representatives of these actors are to be found within the Nordic aid organisations. Obviously, it is very difficult to assess the political impact of aid assistance as long as the use of the investments is not controlled. Frequently this comes into conflict with the original aim of the support, especially at the present juncture of Southern Africa.

The Nordic Initiative

Obviously, the decision-makers in the SADCC countries, as well as in the Nordic, have become aware of the limited possibilities of Nordic aid to create such actors. For the recipient countries, this was in the beginning a bit difficult to understand, given the fact that the resource base in the

Nordic countries for activities such as shipping was indeed very good, with long Nordic traditions prevailing.

However, in order to facilitate and broaden commercial cooperation between the Nordic countries and the SADCC members, the Finnish Prime Minister in late 1982 proposed the so-called Nordic Initiative. The aim of the initiative was to provide small amounts of funding in order to stimulate Nordic commercial actors to increase trade and investments in Southern Africa. This, it was believed, would not only raise possibilities for improved utilization and coordination of Nordic aid to the region but also mobilize additional financial resources.

In addition to reinforced intra-regional cooperation between SADCC members, the Nordic Initiative aimed at increasing the inter-regional cooperation between the SADCC and the Nordic countries. The basis for such a cooperation between a group of like-minded countries in the North and certain developing countries in the South, is objectives presented by the Third World in its demands for a New International Economic Order—hence the so-called concept of mini-NIEO (Haarløv, 1988).

The gloomy fact is that the initiative has so far attracted very little, if any, attention from commercial business life in the Nordic countries. Accordingly, very little has been achieved as regards inter-regional cooperation in trade and production (Haarlov, 1988). One reason for this is the prevailing security situation in Southern Africa. Another reason is lack of motivation. Markets in the United States and Europe are much more prosperous. If any resources are left, they will most likely be used for entering into exciting, although difficult, East Asia. Southern Africa is not on the agenda.

Thus, it could be argued that in maintaining the use of aid for investments in hard-ware, the SATCC secretariat has overestimated the possibility of attracting commercial capital through the Nordic Initiative and taking over the use of these investments by providing software on commercial terms.

The Future Role of Aid

In order to reroute the flow of cargo from Port Elisabeth, East London or Durban to Maputo, Beira and Nacala, and in order for the SADCC countries to participate in and benefit from the utilization of the transport investments carried out, a national/regional carrier as well as a national/regional forwarder have to be created. This implies a great need for financial resources, organization building and the transfer of knowledge. The activities are accordingly very suitable for development assistance, especially from the Nordic countries, where a comprehensive experience of these kinds of activities exists.

How, then, can these resources be mobilized, since experiences from the Nordic Initiative clearly show the limited interest of commercial

enterprises to invest risk capital? This question is crucial since, on the other hand, the use of aid for providing management assistance is not always capable of exploring existing resources.

It may sound strange, but the fact is that in spite of the very high remunerations for consultancies, a number of the most competitive companies are not very interested in selling their know-how, not even on a market far away from competition. The reason is that a remuneration ranging from US\$ 3,000–4,000 per week and expatriate in many cases does not compensate the companies for income foregone by not posting the same employee on the Western market. And, if the company in question should enter on a consultancy basis, it seldom takes any executive responsibility for the achievement of different objectives and therefore lacks incentives to provide the most competent resources to the projects paid by aid money.

All this leads me to one conclusion. If actors on an executive level cannot be created on a purely commercial basis, thereby filling the gap of lacked entrepreneurs, and since the aid bureaucracies themselves have not yet adapted to this task, Nordic aid must be allowed to pay the entrance tickets for the commercial interests and enable them to enter the markets in Southern Africa on a joint-venture basis without having to assure the entire burden of the risk capital needed. This would be in exchange for an incentive to assume the executive responsibility for the activities.

No doubt, this is indeed a very crucial issue. Should the tax payers in the Nordic countries, mobilized for development cooperation with the Third World, be used for the profit-making of Nordic enterprises?

This issue is perhaps especially relevant in the Nordic countries. As earlier stated, the justification of Nordic aid is to be found primarily in the preoccupation with decolonization. The reason for this preoccupation is the predominant analysis in the Nordic aid bureaucracies that it is mainly the effects of colonialism which explain the process of underdevelopment. After independence, neo-colonialism continued to support the unequal exchange and transfer of surplus from the South to the North. Thus, here we also find the roots to the necessity of supporting nation-state building and enabling the new nations to control economic activities and minimize the negative effects of participation in the international economic world. Accordingly, in *the* proper roots of the Nordic aid one can find the objective of counter-balancing the constant transfer of surplus from the South to the North.

The question is then, under which circumstances the very same Transnational enterprises which are partly responsible for continued underdevelopment in a Southern African context (where the state is weakened not only by South Africa's aggression but also by the structural adjustment programmes imposed by the IMF and IBRD), can contribute to any sustained development in the region. The other question is whether the Nordic countries are capable of supporting the nation-states

in reinforcing their structures, which would cause them to operate more efficiently.

The answers can indeed be debated. However, this paper argues that at the present juncture, there does not exist any alternative to motivating commercial actors to take increasingly united actions together with that bilateral development cooperation which reinforces the structures of the states. In fact, the whole strategy of SADCC is at stake. A continued reluctance from not only commercial interests in the Nordic countries, but also from the Western economies in general, to more fully participate in the economic struggle in Southern Africa will reduce the strength of the SADCC cooperation. Thus, the scope for South Africa to continue to divide and rule in the region with maintained apartheid will be increased. Peace and Development in its proper sense (Hansen, ed. 1987)—an obvious prerequisite for any level of increased self-reliance in the future—will be further delayed.

CONCLUSIONS

From a technical or commercial point of view, the conclusions to be drawn from this exercise are quite obvious. The need to complete the actual Nordic development cooperation, emphasizing investments in infrastructure, with a comprehensive soft ware support for the creation of national transport entities in shipping and forwarding has been strongly advocated throughout the paper.

In spite of the urgent need to investigate and analyse various commercial aspects (e.g. dimensions of cargo flow and the scope for outsider operations), the need for research in the proper meaning of the word is limited, and so in fact are the very possibilities for carrying out such activities in this particular field. The researcher will most probably face even more difficulties in coping with the dynamics of trade and transport than the actual structures within the aid bureaucracies.

From a political point of view however, this paper, instead of conclusions, raises a number of issues requiring future research. Areas of particular interest to be mentioned are, among others, the scope for co-ordination of and cooperation between different regional interests within the SADCC (as well as the Nordic countries), the role of the state and of development cooperation in shipping and forwarding, and last, but not least, the need for and implications of united actions between development cooperation and transnational enterprises.

In fact, research based upon such concrete activities as transport can contribute many highly valuable components towards a better understanding of the constraints which explain prevailing divergencies—in the SADCC as well as in the Nordic countries—between the manifested political will and the political reality.

NOTE

1. Southern African Transport and Communications Commission, with its secretariat based in Maputo.

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Aiming Beyond Conventional Development Assistance: An Analysis of Nordic Aid to the SADCC Region

Tom Østergaard

Now in its 8th year of existence, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) is still vibrant. SADCC's primary objective is to gradually create regional integration, thereby reducing economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on South Africa. As a part of a larger research project, "The Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa (SADCC) and Nordic Support to SADCC with Special Emphasis on Industrial Development," this paper will not dwell on a discussion of SADCC as an organization for regional cooperation. That discussion has been taken up by others.¹ The present paper deals with SADCC's continuing ability to attract the attention of foreign donors. It focuses on the aid involvement of the Nordic countries.

The paper is divided into seven sections: (1) A brief outline of the background of SADCC; (2) examination of the dimensions of the Nordic support to southern Africa; (3) discussion of the objectives and underlying motives behind the Nordic aid; (4) based on SADCC's, and Nordic objectives, an analysis of the character of the Nordic aid to SADCC projects; (5) discussion of objectives, activities and problems connected with the "Nordic/SADCC Initiative"; (6) evaluation of the results of the Nordic SADCC aid; and (7) discussion of the donor influence on SADCC.

Before we proceed, a few remarks are in order.

Emphasis must be placed on the fact that SADCC is a relatively new organization. Time is required for SADCC to develop new institutions, and for the donors to adapt their aid administrations to the task of dealing with a new regional body. Furthermore, the bulk of SADCC's projects are in infrastructure. The size and complexity of such projects require considerable time for preparation, and they may need 3, 5 or 10 years before they become fully operational. It follows from this that conclusive observations cannot be made on several issues.

Although SADCC is a recent venture, the Nordic countries have a long tradition of supporting the independent countries in southern Africa. This is so despite the geographic distance and the Nordic countries' non-

involvement in the colonial race. It was the political support and humanitarian assistance to the liberation movements in southern Africa which, from the late 1960s, formed the basis for the present Nordic commitment to SADCC. Today, the Nordic countries' support to SADCC is still firmly rooted in their anti-apartheid policies.

The long-standing involvement means that the Nordic countries provide support to southern Africa through a number of channels. These include bilateral aid programmes, via multilateral institutions to projects in the region,² humanitarian assistance, projects through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and support to SADCC projects.

Finally, the Nordic support to southern Africa is particularly interesting because it represents a new concept in development assistance: region-to-region *cooperation*. The Nordic/SADCC Initiative is an expressed desire to move beyond conventional aid. Besides efforts to make conventional development assistance more effective and coordinate it better, the goal is to promote cooperation in new areas such as trade, joint ventures, transfer of technology and financing.

BACKGROUND OF SADCC

Any examination of the origin of SADCC inevitably introduces the question of foreign aid. There are two major lines of thought regarding SADCC's origin. The first, which is commonly accepted, maintains that SADCC is a direct continuation of the cooperation between the Frontline States during Zimbabwe's liberation war. This line of thought sees the experiences of the political cooperation among the Frontline States as forming the basis for SADCC's present economic coordination.

The second line of thought regarding SADCC's origin is more controversial. It traces a number of diplomatic initiatives of African and Western states for a massive programme of reconstruction in southern Africa after years of war (Leys and Tostensen, 1982). According to this view, some sort of a "Marshall Plan" was to be drawn up for the region. In the mid-1970s, Western states became alarmed by the inroads being made into Southern Africa by the socialist bloc. In promising aid via SADCC, their objective was to entice Angola and Mozambique back from their attempts to link up with the socialist bloc organization, COMECON. At the same time, the Western states hoped to strengthen their economic and political influence in Southern Africa (Mbeki, 1987).

Several factors lend support to the latter explanation of SADCC's origin. It is highly plausible that the EEC, or at least certain of its officials, served in a capacity as midwife in discretely promoting the birth of SADCC. More specifically, David Anderson, then the EEC delegate in Maseru (Lesotho), is said to have been the first to propose the idea of SADCC in 1977. This line of thought argues that when the concept of "economic liberation" came to the attention of Sir Seretse Khama, he

seized the initiative and enlisted the support of his fellow Frontline States presidents, thereby pre-empting any possible undue influence of the EEC through the London Steering Committee (Anglin, 1983).

One year before the launching of SADCC, the foreign ministers of the Frontline States created the London Steering Committee as a think tank and interim secretariat. The Steering Committee was composed of diplomatic representatives of the SADCC states in London and nearby, and the influential African and expatriate officials that had conceived and lobbied for the creation of SADCC. David Anderson, mentioned above, was one of the four members of the Steering Committee.³ Their primary role was to facilitate contacts with Western aid agencies, and notably the EEC. Still in existence, the main function of the London Steering Committee is now to follow-up on requests for assistance (Anglin, 1983).

It is hard to dispute that the EEC has had an influence on SADCC. As indicated above, the London Steering Committee has probably had a favourable bias towards the EEC. Furthermore, it was probably no coincidence that SADCC chose Arthur Blumeris as its first executive secretary. Prior to his SADCC appointment, Arthur Blumeris served as Zimbabwe's ambassador to the EEC (Edlin, 1983). At a more tangible level, the EEC certainly has been a major donor to SADCC's projects.

There are a few additional pointers which indicate the Western donors' strong influence on SADCC. First, as will be discussed below, the USSR and the Eastern Block have made virtually no commitments to SADCC. As far as the donors are concerned, SADCC is almost exclusively a Western affair. Second, the anticipated role of donors is underlined by the fact that the SADCC acronym originally was SAACC; it had an "A" which stood for "aid" instead of the present "D" for "development" (Tostensen, 1982). SADCC was seen as a vehicle for soliciting financial and technical donor support. In short, there is no doubt that the donors were to play a central role from the start.

DIMENSIONS

Nordic Aid in Perspective

To set the stage for the discussion that follows, this section places the Nordic assistance in perspective. It begins with a discussion of the overall aid flows to southern Africa. Subsequently, the dimensions of the Nordic aid are examined. A discussion follows of southern Africa's dependence on foreign aid and the Nordic countries' political and economic interests in southern Africa.

Aid from OECD to Southern Africa

The SADCC states (hereafter southern Africa) receive virtually all of their development assistance from the OECD (DAC) countries.⁴ From 1981 to 1986 the DAC countries disbursed nearly USD 8 billion in bilateral ODA to southern Africa.⁵ Over 1/3 of this assistance went to Tanzania; Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique also receive large amounts (see Table 1).

Table 1. Net Disbursement of ODA by DAC Countries, *current* USD, millions

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	Country-by country Total 1981- 1986	Country share% 1981- 1986
Angola	39.4	40.0	46.4	59.6	59.6	93.8	338.8	4.3
Botswana	75.9	83.2	74.6	64.9	59.1	82.0	439.7	5.6
Lesotho	62.3	57.2	64.7	66.0	51.5	56.0	357.7	4.5
Malawi	82.1	65.0	56.2	51.7	52.9	89.5	397.4	5.0
Mozambique	110.0	160.6	160.4	190.1	216.9	319.2	1,157.2	14.6
Swaziland	23.8	18.8	20.6	17.6	18.2	24.8	123.8	1.6
Tanzania	485.6	485.2	429.4	409.8	372.6	514.2	2,696.8	34.0
Zambia	179.2	189.8	180.2	181.8	215.4	349.0	1,295.4	16.3
Zimbabwe	137.0	142.2	185.6	243.6	214.2	191.3	1,113.9	14.1
SADCC								
Total	1,195.3	1,242.0	1,218.1	1,285.1	1,260.4	1,719.8	7,920.7	100.0

Source: OECD "Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries", 1988 and earlier editions.

Owing to the great fluctuations of the US dollar in the 1980s, Table 1 does not adequately portray the increase in ODA from the DAC countries. It is necessary, therefore, to make corrections for exchange rate changes. From 1981 to 1986 the ODA (in constant dollars⁶) to southern Africa increased by 54%. However, it is risky to draw conclusions from a comparison of just two years. Table 2 illustrates that disbursements did not rise steadily over the period.

Table 2. Net Disbursements to *Southern* Africa, constant USD millions

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
	946	1,078	1,116	1,251	1,260	1,453

(See Table 1)

Since most of the aid disbursements are used for purchases in the donor countries,⁷ the purchasing power of ODA granted to Southern Africa is affected by price changes in the OECD countries. If corrections are made

for exchange rate and price changes, we can assess the value of ODA in real terms. Between 1981 and 1986 ODA to southern Africa increased only 22% in real terms, i.e. half as much as the rise in constant dollars. Again, it is more appropriate to examine the changes over the period.

Table 3 *Net Disbursements to Southern Africa, USD millions, real terms*

1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986

1,151 1,225 1,206 1,299 1,260 1,403

(See Table 1)

We see that in real terms ODA to southern Africa actually declined between 1982 and 1983, and again between 1984 and 1985. If one examines the period from 1981 to 1985, there is virtually no increase at all.

It is also instructive to evaluate the growth in ODA to southern Africa in relation to the rise in the DAC countries' overall ODA disbursements. Measured in constant dollars, the latter grew steadily from 13,773 million in 1981 to 21,126 million in 1986, i.e. 53% over the period. We have already noted that the disbursements to southern Africa increased at the same rate. In other words, the OECD countries have not increased the proportion to southern Africa of their total ODA disbursements.

Southern Africa's share of ODA from the OECD countries remained relatively stable between 1981 and 1986:

Table 4 Southern Africa's share of total OECD disbursements

1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986

6.9% 7.1% 6.9% 6.9% 6.0% 6.9%

There is no apparent increasing trend; southern Africa actually received a smaller share of the total in the latter half of the period. Given the escalating crisis in southern Africa, one may argue that the average share of the total is inappropriately small.

It is interesting, too, to evaluate the ODA to southern Africa vis-à-vis the ODA to Africa south of the Sahara. In constant dollars, the bilateral disbursements from the DAC countries to **sub-Saharan** Africa grew steadily from 4,043 million in 1981 to 6,319 million in 1986. But, as with OECD's overall disbursements, the proportion accruing to southern Africa decreased during the latter half of the period.

Table 5 Southern Africa's share of disbursement to Sub-Saharan Africa

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
ODA in constant USD	4,043	4,431	4579	5,079	5,949	6,319
Southern Africa share	23.4%	24.3%	24.4%	24.6%	21.2% ⁸	23.0%

It seems plausible that the OECD donors are shifting their aid commitments away from southern Africa to other parts of the continent. By comparison, southern Africa's share was 25.4% in 1980. Indeed, the Sahel in particular is facing a grave crisis which calls for increased assistance. But the trends in ODA disbursements to southern Africa should be viewed against the deepening crisis engulfing that region as well as the international condemnation of apartheid South Africa.

At the end of 1985 southern Africa's total outstanding debt was USD 14.64 billion, equivalent to about 50% of the region's GDP.⁹ Several of the nine SADC members are burdened with heavy debt service ratios; Mozambique in 1988 must pay USD 125 million, or 20% more than its expected export earnings (AED, 22/1/88). SADC expects that the 1988 average real GDP growth for the region will not exceed 2.4%. Meanwhile, the average population growth rate is 3.2%. The average per capita growth rate is therefore negative. This economic predicament results in part from the deteriorating terms of trade facing the region. Measured against the price of manufactures, commodity prices exported from southern Africa in 1986 were at their lowest level since the 1930s.¹⁰ Many countries have also been plagued with prolonged droughts. South African military aggression and destabilization activities, however, impose the greatest cost. For the period 1980–86 SADC has assessed the costs of this in destroyed assets, lost production, economic growth foregone, higher transport costs and increased defense spending to USD 30 billion. That amount is more than southern Africa's combined GDP in 1985. The human costs are severe, but incalculable.

Seen against the crisis in southern Africa, the response of the donor community taken as a whole is insufficient. It is certainly not at par with the OECD countries' rhetorical opposition to the apartheid regime in South Africa.

Aid from the Nordic countries to Southern Africa

The Nordic countries provide almost one third of the Western aid disbursements to southern Africa.¹¹ Compared with the growth in DAC disbursements to southern Africa, the Nordic countries have upgraded their support substantially. From 1981 to 1986 the combined Nordic bilateral net disbursements in constant dollars to southern Africa increased by 136%. This rise is nearly three times as large as the rate of increase from the DAC countries. But, as Table 6 illustrates, the Nordic disbursements to southern Africa did not rise evenly between 1981–86. There was considerable growth between 1981–83, almost no growth between 1983–85, and marked growth between 1985–86. All the four Nordic countries more than doubled their disbursements; Norway and Finland's disbursements rose by more than 150%.

Table 6 *Nordic ODA to the SADCC states, 1981–86*

	Constant, mill USD						Change
	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1981–86
Denmark	40.7	52.3	55.7	59.1	65.2	81.7	101%
Finland	18.5	23.9	31.7	37.7	36.8	46.8	153%
Norway	51.9	74.2	90.8	94.6	104.5	138.8	167%
Sweden	100.6	138.2	159.2	151.1	162.9	232.5	131%
Total	211.7	288.6	337.4	342.5	369.4	499.8	136%
Totals in current USD	335.9	385.5	385.5	356.1	369.4	606.5	81%

*Division factors used to correct for exchange rate changes**

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Denmark	188.0	148.8	127.2	115.9	102.3	100.0	131.0
Finland	166.2	143.6	128.6	111.3	103.1	100.0	122.3
Norway	174.1	149.8	133.2	117.8	105.3	100.0	116.3
Sweden	203.4	170.0	137.0	112.2	104.0	100.0	120.8

* Owing to the limited weight of the Nordic currencies within the OECD, the OECD division factors do not yield a correct picture – in constant dollars – of the growth in Nordic aid disbursements. Instead, I have used the IMF's "rf" rates (period averages of market exchange rates) and calculated the yearly division factors for each country. The division factors were calculated by setting (indexing) the **1985** rates at **100**, and then dividing these by the exchange rates for the years **1981** to **1986** for each country.

As in the case of disbursements from OECD, the purchasing power (or value) of the Nordic assistance is subject to price changes in the Nordic countries. But, even in real terms¹² (corrected for exchange rate and price changes), the Nordic aid disbursements to southern Africa increased significantly. The combined Nordic bilateral net disbursements in 1986 were 95% higher than in 1981; they nearly doubled in real terms in five years. The disbursements in real terms varied, of course, as they do in Table 6.

This impressive rise in Nordic aid disbursements to southern Africa should be evaluated against the rise in overall Nordic ODA disbursements. Measured in constant dollars, total bilateral aid disbursements by the Nordic countries more than doubled between 1981 and 1986. Disbursements grew steadily from USD **722** million in 1981 to USD 1,485 million in 1986, an increase of 106%.

Table 7 *Nordic Disbursements to Southern Africa, USD mill, real terms*

1981	1982	19883	1984	1985	1986
247	322	349	356	369	483

This means that Nordic disbursements increased twice as fast as the overall disbursements from the OECD. Furthermore, if we look exclusively at the years 1981 and 1986, we find that Nordic disbursements to southern Africa grew faster (136%) than overall Nordic aid disbursements (106%).

However, an examination of southern Africa's share of the Nordic aid disbursements over the period reveals no discernible increase. Its share fluctuates relatively evenly around an average of 31%.

Table 8 *Southern Africa's Share of Nordic Disbursements*

1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
29.2%	31.8%	32.5%	30.7%	29.2%	33.6%

The fact that we do not find a clearly increasing trend in the bilateral Nordic disbursements to southern Africa is rather surprising. Although the amounts are indeed large, and growing, one would have expected that the heightened political importance of southern Africa would have been expressed in increased proportions to southern Africa of the total Nordic disbursements.

The above exercise in numbers and figures provides the basis for one additional observation. It seems as if the DAC donors divide their clients (aid recipients) so that no one is favoured at the expense of others. As an illustration, let us look at the Nordic share of the total disbursements to southern Africa. It was 28.1% in 1981 and there were only minor fluctuations in the share until 1986, when it jumped to 35.3%. As shown in Table 4, southern Africa's share of disbursements from OECD was the same in 1981 and 1986, namely 6.9%. Consequently, as the Nordic countries accounted for a larger share of the total in 1986, other donors must have shifted their disbursements elsewhere.

If this is how it works, then increased disbursements from the Nordic countries will not necessarily augment the aggregate flow (or share) of assistance to southern Africa. Other donors are likely to reduce their disbursements. The net effect for southern Africa would amount to a change in donors, not a larger slice of the global aid pie.

Other dimensions of the Nordic assistance to southern Africa deserve mention. As per 1 January 1987, 182 Danish experts were stationed in southern Africa.¹³ To put this in perspective, in 1986 a total of 332 Danish bilateral experts served in developing countries. Southern Africa, therefore, received more than half of the Danish experts. Furthermore, compared with other developing countries, a considerably larger proportion of the assistance to southern Africa is in the form of experts. In 1986

Denmark spent DKK 189.5 million on bilateral experts, i.e. 6% of the total bilateral aid. Using the average cost per expert (DKK 570,800), SADCC in 1986 received DKK 104 million in bilateral expert assistance. This is equivalent to 12.6% of the bilateral aid (including SADCC projects) to southern Africa. In other words, the expert component in the southern Africa assistance was more than two times the overall average.

The above suggests that the assistance to southern Africa is more "staff intensive"¹⁴ (in the sense of having a large component of experts associated with projects) than Nordic aid to other regions of the Third World. This is a reflection of the need to raise the technical capacity and upgrade the skills of people in Southern Africa. Because of the demands they place on qualified manpower, staff intensive development projects are difficult for the donor agencies to handle. This difficulty, however, may be offset by the fact that staff intensive projects ensure large "return flows" to the donors. Around 60% of expert wages are usually returned to the donor country in one form or another.

A substantial amount of assistance is given via the so-called "multi-bi" projects.¹⁵ Owing to the nature of these projects, detailed statistics are not easy to come by. The Danish example, however, may be indicative. In 1986 Denmark had commitments to 8 multi-bi projects in southern Africa totalling DKK 403 million. The larger commitments include a UNICEF medicine supply project in Tanzania (DKK 255 million), an IDA/World Bank project supporting Tanzania's education sector (DKK 45 million) and an ILO project to strengthen cooperatives in Botswana (DKK 21 million). Although the total is a sizable amount, it must be noted that the duration of these projects run from 2 to 8 years. Furthermore, 21 of the 106 multilateral experts funded by Denmark were attached to projects in southern Africa.

Furthermore, interesting trends in disbursements and differences among donors can be seen in the individual countries' shares of Nordic bilateral assistance to the region. Table 9 provides an overview.

Table 9 *SADCC Countries' Shares (%) of Nordic Assistance*

	Denmark		Finland		Norway		Sweden		Total weighted shares	
	1980	1985	1980	1985	1980	1985	1980	1985	1980	1985
Angola	4	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	5
Botswana	6	3	0	0	15	11	8	5	9	6
Lesotho	2	3	0	1	0	0	2	4	1	3
Malawi	10	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1
Mozambique	18	9	11	9	13	20	20	21	17	17
Swaziland	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Tanzania	52	57	61	45	53	45	45	30	49	40
Zambia	6	10	26	33	13	16	18	14	15	16
Zimbabwe	1	9	1	12	5	8	7	14	5	12

Table 9 reveals that Tanzania, Mozambique and Zambia continue to receive the largest aggregate shares of Nordic assistance to southern Africa. Although it still receives by far the largest chunk—from all countries—Tanzania's share fell from 49% in 1980 to 40% in 1985. There are noticeable differences, however, among the Nordic countries. Over the period, Sweden, Norway and Finland all reduced substantially their aid to Tanzania while Denmark, surprisingly, increased its share from 52% to 57%. The aggregate drop in Tanzania's share appears to result from the increase in aid to Zimbabwe after its independence.¹⁶ Owing to Sweden's (and less so Finland's) upgrading of assistance to Angola, that country's share of the regional receipts went from 1% in 1980 to 5% in 1985. Denmark again stands out as the only country decreasing its share of assistance to Angola. Differences among the Nordic countries are also marked with respect to Mozambique; Norway's share to Mozambique increased roughly 50% while Denmark's declined by the same measure.

Donors to Southern Africa

This section examines from which donors the countries of southern Africa obtain their development assistance. By way of introduction, Table 10 shows bilateral aid disbursements in 1985 from the most important donors to each SADCC country. Several interesting observations can be made from Table 10:

First, in 1985 the three largest donors to southern Africa were the United States, Sweden and West Germany. While their bilateral disbursements are high, the United States and West Germany do not, as we will see below, support the endeavors of SADCC to any great extent.

Table 10 *Important Donors to SADCC Countries in 1985, Mill USD*

	US	Italy	West Germ	UK	Nether- lands	Canada	Japan	Finland	Nor- way
Angola	7	16	3	—	8	2	—	—	—
Botswana	11	—	13	6	2	5	—	—	11
Lesotho	19	1	8	3	1	5	1	1	1
Malawi	6	—	12	14	3	4	5	—	—
Mozambique	47	28	5	9	25	5	4	3	21
Swaziland	8	—	2	1	—	4	1	—	—
Tanzania	20	35	33	23	37	30	29	16	45
Zambia	36	1	19	23	16	11	41	12	17
Zimbabwe	56	7	27	25	18	17	9	5	8
	210	88	122	104	110	83	90	37	103

Table 10, continued:

	Sweden	Denmark	EEC	Totals without Nordics	Distr(%) without Nordics	Nordics Total	Distr (%) Nordics only
Angola	19	1	7	36	4	20	5
Botswana	7	2	3	37	5	20	5
Lesotho	7	2	8	38	5	11	3
Malawi	—	5	11	44	6	5	1
Mozambique	34	6	25	123	15	64	17
Swaziland	1	—	2	16	2	1	—
Tanzania	49	37	30	207	26	147	40
Zambia	23	6	30	147	18	58	16
Zimbabwe	24	6	4	159	20	43	12
	164	65	120	807	101	369	99

Notes: The donor countries listed, except Finland, ranked among the 5 largest to at least one SADCC country. The total, USD 1,296, is equivalent to more than 90% of all ODA from DAC countries to SADCC.

Second, if the contributions from the Nordic countries are viewed collectively, they amount to USD 369 million. That makes the Nordic group by far the most important donor to southern Africa. Its contribution is larger than the combined disbursements from the United States and West Germany.

Third, the variation in the most important donors is striking. A ranking of the three most important donors to each country is shown below:

	1	2	3
Angola	Sweden	Italy	Netherlands
Botswana	W Germany	Norway	USA
Lesotho	USA	W Germany	Sweden
Malawi	UK	W Germany	USA
Mozambique	USA	Sweden	Italy
Swaziland	USA	Canada	W Germany
Tanzania	Sweden	Norway	Denmark
Zambia	Japan	USA	Sweden
Zimbabwe	USA	W Germany	UK

Although hardly surprising, it is significant to note from Table 10 that Sweden, Norway and Denmark were the three largest donors to Tanzania. More surprising, perhaps, is the fact that in 1985 the United States was the largest donor to Mozambique. However, the US aid to Mozambique in 1985 was three times the annual levels of 1983 and 1984. The high disbursement in 1985 resulted from a near tripling of food deliveries under the "Food for Peace" (PL480) programme; food deliveries in 1985 accounted for 65% of the US assistance to Mozambique (US State Department, 1986, p. 230). It is equally unusual that Japan ranked as the most important donor to Zambia. Its disbursement to

Zambia in 1985 almost equalled the combined disbursements of the previous three years.

Fourth, it is interesting to note the differences in the distribution of the aid from the Nordic countries compared with that from the other major donors. Most notably, the latter gave larger shares than the Nordic countries to Swaziland, Malawi and Zimbabwe. The Nordic countries accord Swaziland a lower priority because of its relatively cosy relations with South Africa. Malawi obtains Nordic assistance only from Denmark; the other Nordic countries express their disapproval of Malawi's domestic policies (which are inadequate to reverse the skewed income distribution) by withholding aid disbursements to Malawi. Nordic disbursements to Zimbabwe are moderate because of Zimbabwe's favourable economic position vis-a-vis its southern African neighbours. While Tanzania also was the most important country to the other major donors, its share of their aid to southern Africa was far smaller than the share from the Nordic group; Tanzania received only 26% against 40% of the Nordic disbursements.

Donors to SADCC projects

Also in the category of SADCC projects, the Nordic group is the unrivalled donor. Otherwise, the composition of major donors is remarkably different from what was discussed above regarding conventional bilateral assistance. According to SADCC's latest (1986-87) annual progress report, SADCC has secured USD 2,166 million for its 493 projects costing at USD 6,401 million.¹⁷ The list below shows¹⁸ the most important donors to SADCC projects:

	Mill USD	Percent of Total
Nordic countries:	514	24
EEC	124	6
Canada	111	5
France	94	4
Italy	88	4
USA	52	2
World Bank/IDA	43	2
Portugal	40	2
OPEC	23	1
Netherlands	19	1
Japan	19	1
China	18	1
West Germany	3	
Total	1,148	53

Notes: USD 88 mill of the commitment from France comes from participation in one project: the Nacala-Cuamba Railway. The same is the case for the entire commitment from Portugal. The OPEC commitment goes to projects in Mozambique only.

The significant differences between the ranking of donors in Table 10 and above give rise to speculation.

I suggested above that the United States and West Germany give only limited support to SADCC. As the list above reveals, whereas the United States was the number one bilateral donor to the SADCC region in 1985, it ranked only number six among the donors to SADCC projects. West Germany, the third most important bilateral donor, barely contributed to SADCC projects.

It is hardly an exaggeration to argue that the US policy toward SADCC is two-faced and contradictory. On the one hand, a USAID official at the 1985 SADCC conference in Mbabane told the delegates that SADCC's success was of "incalculable importance to Africa as a whole" (ARB, 28/2/85). This recognition is not reflected in the actual US policy toward SADCC. According to SADCC's 1986-87 annual report, the commitment to date from the United States is only USD 52 million, or 2 percent of the total commitment from donors. On the day when SADCC opened its 1986 annual conference in Harare, President Reagan received Jonas Savimbi of UNITA at the White House (Africa Confidential, Feb 1986). At the same conference, the United States reportedly offered SADCC "unlimited funds" for its transportation projects—on the condition that SADCC open up dialogue with South Africa to bring about a new political dispensation peacefully in that country (Africa Business, April 1986). Recently, however, the United States is reported to be considering a USD 60 million contribution towards the creation of a regional export pre-financing revolving fund with a seed capital of USD 160-190 million (AED, 5/2/88). Previously, the US assistance tended to be divisive. The United States has offered to co-finance an agricultural research institute in Zimbabwe, on condition that the results not be shared with Angola, Mozambique or Tanzania (Africa Business, April 1986). SADCC has always rejected pre-conditions such as these. Overall, there is little doubt that the actions of the United States run counter to its professed support of SADCC.

While the US assistance to SADCC has been unimpressive, the same could be said regarding the Eastern Block. One observer has even stated that it appears as if Moscow has "developed a special aversion to SADCC" (Anglin, 1983, p 698). Certainly, no East Block country appears on the list of important donors to SADCC projects. In fact, delegates from the USSR and East Germany participated in 1986 for the first time in a SADCC meeting (ARB, 31/5/86). There are recent signs, nevertheless, that SADCC wishes to enhance its cooperation with members of the East Block (Amin, 1987).

The above has discussed the dimensions of Nordic assistance in various perspectives. But the discussion has been limited to only half

the story: the donors . The next section examines the SADCC countries' dependence on aid, differences among them, and the Nordic influence.

Southern Africa's Dependence on Aid¹⁹

The individual SADCC countries' dependence on aid may be assessed in a number of ways. Table 11 provides an overview.

Table 11 SADCC Regions' Dependence on Aid, 1985

	Total ODA Mill USD	GNP/ capita	ODA per capita	ODA in % GNP	ODA in % of Gross Domestic Investment	ODA in % of Imports
Angola	60	5051	11	2	—	6
Botswana	60	840	91	11	35	10
Lesotho	52	470	61	13	—	15 ³
Malawi	53	170	16	9	34	19
Mozambique	217	160	22	14	96	40
Swaziland	18	6502	452	7	—	7
Tanzania	373	290	22	8	40	37
Zambia	215	390	49	13	77	33
Zimbabwe	214	680	28	4	21	25

1 ODI Briefing Paper, May 1987

2 EIU Country Reports, 1987

3 World Bank 1987. "Country econ. Memo: Lesotho", No.: 6671-LSO.

General Source: World Development Report 1987 - World Bank.

Interesting observations can be made from Table 11 on at least four measures. First, it is striking to note that in terms of GNP/capita the wealthiest country in SADCC (Botswana) received the highest level of ODA/-capita. On this measure, Botswana has been the largest aid recipient within southern Africa throughout the 1980s. In 1985, Botswana received the second highest amount of ODA/capita in Africa; only Mauritania received more. Some of the poorest (GNP/ capita) countries in SADCC: Mozambique, Malawi and Tanzania, received the lowest levels of ODA/capita. Thanks to its income from oil exports, Angola's GNP per capita was slightly higher than SADCC's average. The most likely reason why Angola received only USD 10.5 in ODA/capita—the second lowest in Africa—is, however, a political one.

Second, the level of ODA in relation to GNP is a better indicator of aid dependence. On this measure, the SADCC members receiving the most were Mozambique, Zambia and Lesotho. While the ratios in these countries were high, other African countries receive more. The highest

levels of ODA/capita in percent of GNP/capita are found in the following: Mauritania (29%), Somalia (24%), Niger (19%), Sudan (17%) and Burkina Faso (17%) (World Development Report 1987). On this indicator, too, Angola scores the second lowest in Africa; only Nigeria, with a GNP/capita income of USD 800, gets less.

Third, while far from all aid is used on capital investments, aid dependence may be indicated by viewing ODA in relation to gross domestic investment. Table 11 reveals that the value of ODA disbursed to Mozambique almost equalled its outlays for fixed assets and net changes in the value of inventories. On this measure, Zambia almost followed suit. Although Mozambique's and Zambia's levels of gross domestic investment were among the lowest in Africa, it is almost certain that the ability of these countries to launch capital investment projects are highly dependent on aid.

Finally, it is interesting to observe ODA in percent of imports. Table 11 suggests that the capacity to import of Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia are dependent on aid. In some of Africa's "basket cases," however, the dependence is much more apparent. In those countries, ODA amounted to the following percentages of imports: Sudan 143%, Somalia 93%, Mauritania 88%, Niger 86% and Burkina Faso 75% (World Development Report 1987).

In short, on the four measures examined above, Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania stand out as the most aid dependent SADCC members. However, a handful of Sahelian countries appear to be more severely dependent on aid.

What does the above discussion imply for southern Africa's dependence on Nordic aid?²⁰ According to the data in Tables 9 and 10, the SADCC countries in 1985 received the following percentage of their total development assistance from the Nordic countries:

Angola	33%
Botswana	33%
Lesotho	21%
Malawi	9%
Mozambique	30%
Swaziland	6%
Tanzania	40%
Zambia	27%
Zimbabwe	20%

Overall, in 5 of the 9 SADCC states the Nordic countries provide at least one-quarter of the total development assistance. The Nordic influence, however, is likely to be most significant in the SADCC countries that are most dependent on aid: Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania.

In regard to SADCC projects, the situation is somewhat different. Without going into greater detail here, it can be asserted that no less than 86% of the estimated USD 6,401 million cost for SADCC's 493 projects is sought from foreign donors (SADCC Annual Report, 1986-87). It was

demonstrated in Table 9 that the Nordic countries account for the largest share of the funds so far committed to SADCC projects. The Nordic influence, therefore, is likely to be substantial.

While this section has dealt with southern Africa's dependence on aid in sheer numerical terms, donor influence—via bilateral aid and SADCC projects—can also be assessed by examination of specific projects and policies. A separate section will later discuss the donor and Nordic influence in that context.

The above has reviewed Nordic aid in perspective and the SADCC countries' dependence on aid. To complete the discussion of the dimensions of the Nordic assistance to southern Africa, the next section examines the Nordic interests lying behind the commitment to the SADCC region.

Nordic Interests in Southern Africa

Foreign aid is only one part of a country's foreign policy. Foreign policy, in turn, is based upon national interests. The Nordic interests in southern Africa are primarily political and economic. While the subjects of interests and objectives are very closely related, this section deals mostly with the Nordic interests in southern Africa. The discussion of the Nordic aid objectives will be the topic of the next main section of this report.

Political interests

The Nordic political interests in southern Africa are connected predominantly with the struggle against the racial policies of apartheid in South Africa. The disapproval of the apartheid system is also the central reason for the Nordic commitment to SADCC. DANIDA has stated that for the Nordic countries the aid commitment to SADCC follows logically from the South Africa sanctions policy (November, 1987, p 4). At the SADCC conference in Maseru in 1983, the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, who spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries, stressed this point:

Our support for the endeavours of the SADCC should...be seen in the context of our strong wish for contributing to bringing about an early end to the apartheid in South Africa and to that country's illegal occupation of Namibia. It is our belief that the solidarity and strength achieved through an efficient economic cooperation within SADCC can become the adequate means of making a turn in the right direction—the creation of stability, peace and true economic independence to the benefit of all countries in Southern Africa.²¹

What sort of political benefits do the Nordic countries derive from their anti-apartheid stance? Acting in conformance with the near universal condemnation of the apartheid regime naturally gives a favourable boost to the Nordic countries' reputation in the international community. The support against apartheid, dating back long before the launching of

SADCC, has given the Nordic countries considerable prestige, especially among the independent nations of Africa. This has great importance for countries like Denmark since, in this way, small countries without physical sources of influence can attain high status and profile on the international scene (Gregersen, 1986).

In a similar vein, there is no doubt that the Nordic countries view SADCC as a welcome opportunity to enhance the manifestation of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden as a Nordic unit. A strengthened perception of Nordic unity could yield political benefits in various international fora.

Some scholars point out that when the rationale is substantiated for supporting Mozambique and the liberation movements in southern Africa, Nordic politicians sometimes argue that cooperation with Western countries would strengthen the possibility for development in a democratic direction and lessen the likelihood that they are "driven into the arms of the USSR" (Eriksen, 1987, p 36). An argument could also be made that via SADCC, the Nordic countries can augment their support of Mozambique and Angola without upsetting relations with their less progressive allies. Finally, using SADCC projects as a medium for channelling aid to Mozambique and Angola may also be a more subtle means to soften possible criticism from political hard-liners **domestically**.²²

In sum, the Nordic countries' overriding political interest in southern Africa is tied to their anti-apartheid position. Though it yields fruits in the form of improved reputation, the political interest in southern Africa is rooted in the moral and humanitarian condemnation of apartheid. Though not to be disregarded altogether, the other political interests sketched above are less important. Economic interests, at least in principle, should be easier to ascertain.

Economic interests

The Nordic countries' economic interests in southern Africa involve primarily trade and investment. While expectations regarding the potential for trade and investment are subject to interpretations, the present importance of this can be readily evaluated.

Even a cursory examination of trade statistics reveals that the SADCC market is not important to any of the Nordic countries. Table 12a and Table 12b show Nordic exports to and imports from SADCC relative to the trade with South Africa and developing countries as a whole.

According to Table 12a the Nordic countries in 1986 imported for USD 136 million from the nine SADCC countries. This was equivalent to the value in 1986 of Danish imports from Hong Kong (USD 132 million). Imports from the SADCC region amounted to only 0.15% of the total Nordic imports. On the export side, Table 12b presents a similar picture. The Nordic countries exported for USD 258 million to the SADCC region.

This was comparable to the value of Danish exports to Saudi Arabia (193 million), or about half of the Nordic aid disbursements to southern Africa. The exports to the SADCC region accounted for only 0.28% of total Nordic exports.

Table 12a Nordic Imports from SADCC Region, 1986, Mill USD

	SADCC Market		South Africa		Developing countries		Total
	USD	%	USD	%	USD	%	USD
Denmark	28	0.12	102	0.45	2,751	12.0	22,865
Finland	32	0.21	1	—	1,457	9.5	15,339
Norway	7	0.03	26	0.13	1,621	8.0	20,300
Sweden	69	0.21	19	0.06	3,537	10.8	32,648
	136	0.15	148	0.16	9,366	10.3	91,152

Table 12b Nordic Exports to SADCC Region, 1986, Mill USD

	SADCC Market		South Africa		Developing countries		Total
	USD	%	USD	%	USD	%	USD
Denmark	63	0.30	52	0.24	3,009	14.2	21,243
Finland	44	0.27	2	0.01	1,576	9.6	16,356
Norway	29	0.16	45	0.25	2,500	13.7	18,229
Sweden	122	0.33	107	0.29	4,873	13.1	37,263
	258	0.28	206	0.22	11,958	12.8	93,091

Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1987.

Nordic trade with the developing countries as a whole is relatively small; in 1986 it amounted to 10.3% of imports and 12.8% of exports. Nonetheless, in this context, too, trade with the SADCC region is small. Nordic imports from the SADCC market amounted to only 1.45% of Nordic imports from all the developing countries. SADCC's corresponding share of exports was only 2.16%.

A comparison can also be made with the Nordic trade with South Africa. Despite their emphatic anti-apartheid stance, the Nordic countries in 1986 imported more from South Africa than from the SADCC region.²³

It is interesting to note that one commodity (coal) accounted for 90% of Denmark's imports from South Africa; overall, the Danish imports amount to over two-thirds of the Nordic imports from South Africa. Although Nordic exports to the SADCC region get a substantial boost from the bilateral aid disbursements – most of it is probably related to aid deliveries — Table 12b reveals that the Nordic countries exported almost as much to South Africa as to the SADCC region.

It is also interesting to take a glance at the types of goods traded between the SADCC region and the Nordic countries. The situation resembles a classical colonial trade relationship. For example, in 1986 Denmark's export to the SADCC countries (DKK 506 million) consisted of machines, metal goods, transport equipment and chemicals. All are goods with a high manufacturing value added to Denmark. The Danish imports from the SADCC countries (DKK 220 million) were limited, however, to a few raw materials, some of which had been through first-stage processing locally.

As a final remark on the Nordic trade with the SADCC countries, it may be pointed out that the Nordic countries in 1986 had a trade surplus of USD 122 million with the SADCC group; they exported for nearly 90% more than they imported from SADCC. The trade surplus probably results from the deliveries connected with Nordic tied-aid disbursements.

In short, the above leaves little doubt that from a trade perspective, the SADCC market at present is unimportant to the Nordic countries. Having made that argument, it is relevant to briefly examine whether trade relations are important in the other direction. Are the Nordic countries important trading partners to the SADCC members?

Angola	(DKK 9 . h) ;coffee, 97%
Botswana	(DKK 0.2m); live animals, 70%
Lesotho	(DKK 0.6m); mohair, textiles, 91%
Malawi	(DKK 23.0m); tobacco, 98%
Mozambique	(DKK 7 . h) ; sugar, 94%
Swaziland	(DKK 18.0m); coal 55%, sugar 23%
Tanzania	(DKK 77.0m); coffee and tea, 70%
Zambia	(DKK 0.3m); coffee and tea, 91%
Zimbabwe	(DKK 85.0m); tobacco, 81%

(Source: "Udenrigshandel" 1987:2, Danmarks Statistik).

Table 13a and Table 13b provide an overview of 6 of the 9 SADCC members' external trade.²⁴

Tables 13a and 13b suggest that to the SADCC countries as a group, the Nordic market is not an important trading partner. In 1986 only 2.7% of the SADCC countries' exports went to the Nordic market; just 6% of their imports came from there. As far as imports from the Nordic countries are concerned, the differences within SADCC correspond with the relative amounts of aid received from the Nordic countries (see Table 10). Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique, which all imported more from the Nordic countries than the SADCC average, in 1985 received 77% of the Nordic bilateral aid to the SADCC region. In short, the bulk of southern Africa's imports from the Nordic countries seems to constitute aid deliveries.

Table 13a *SADCC Imports from Nordic Countries, 1986, Mill USD*

	Nordic USD	Market %	EEC USD	%	Total Import USD
Angola	44	4.1	603	55.8	1,080
Malawi	8	3.1	97	37.3	260
Mozambique	35	7.2	177	36.5	485
Tanzania	102	10.2	354	35.3	1,003
Zambia	40	8.1	226	45.9	492
Zimbabwe	30	3.0	338	33.5	1,008
Total	259	6.0	1,795	41.5	4,328

Table 13b *SADCC Exports to Nordic Countries, 1986, Mill USD*

	Nordic USD	Market %	EEC USD	%	Total Import USD
Angola	37	2.1	555	31.1	1,787
Malawi	8	3.3	156	63.4	246
Mozambique	1	0.6	21	12.7	166
Tanzania	29	7.7	242	63.9	379
Zambia	15	2.2	258	37.5	688
Zimbabwe	24	2.4	416	41.6	1,001
Total	114	2.7	1,648	38.6	4,267

Source: IMF. *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1987.*

While obviously a larger entity, the EEC as a group is a far more important trading partner to southern Africa than the Nordic countries. The SADCC countries sold 38.6% of their exports on the EEC market, and obtained 41.5% of their imports there. Trade relations with the United States are very limited. Of all the SADCC countries, the United States is an important trading partner only to Angola (Østergaard, 1987). This suggests that via trade, the EEC has a considerable interest in SADCC.

We have now seen that in terms of Nordic imports and exports, the SADCC market is relatively unimportant. This appears to hold the other way around as well. If trade is not important at present, what can be said about the economic interest through direct Nordic investments in the SADCC region?

The case of Denmark may be illustrative. Between 1980 and 1987 the differences between payments on new Danish investments and withdrawals of previous investments amount to a net outflow of DKK 20.4 millions from the SADCC region.²⁵ The amounts are so small that it is difficult to conclude anything except that southern Africa is of minor importance as an area for Danish investments. The positive trend

discernible in the net balance of **inflows/outflows**, however, may indicate that a change is taking place.

Table 14 *Balance of Danish investment flows to Southern Africa*

1980	11.2 DKK million
1981	-2.9
1982	-5.1
1983	-4.0
1984	-4.4
1985	-
1986	4.5
1987	2.7
<hr/>	
Total	-20.4

If these investment flows are compared with those for all of Africa,²⁶ it becomes clear that SADCC is an unimportant area for Danish investments. Between 1980-87 there was a *net inflow* of DKK 167 million of Danish direct investments in Africa; inflow DKK 259m, outflow DKK 92m.

While the above has indicated the flows, figures are not available on the volume of Danish investments in the SADCC region. However, if the flows are seen in relation to the volume of Denmark's total foreign direct investment (DKK 16,067 million in 1983), SADCC's share is undoubtedly insignificant. As another indicator, we may look at Danish subsidiaries abroad. In 1984 only 26, or 4 percent, of the 621 subsidiaries were located in lower middle and low income countries (Schultz and Vestergaard, 1987, p. 5). In 1986 the Danish Industrialization Fund for Developing Countries had only three projects in the SADCC region. The combined investment in these projects was DKK 83 million. The Fund had investments for DKK 2,528 in 33 projects in Africa. By value, SADCC's share of these projects was only 3 percent (IFU Annual Report, 1986). In short, Denmark does not have much at stake insofar as direct investments in the SADCC region are concerned.

Objectives

This main section on the objectives of the Nordic assistance to SADCC has four sub-sections: (A) general aid objectives, (B) particular objectives of the SADCC aid, (C) other motives, and (D) contradictions.

General Aid Objectives

The Nordic countries have similar goals with their development aid. The general aid objectives are premised on the basic needs strategy and the

"trickle down" theory. This is revealed in the bills on international development cooperation. The principal objectives read:

Denmark

To further the social, humanitarian and political ideals behind Danish foreign policy towards the Third World; to create a lasting improvement of the economic and social conditions for the world's poorest populations; to strive towards economically and ecologically sustainable development; to integrate women's aspects into the aid cooperation and to enhance the respect for human rights (Danida's 5-year Plan, 1988-92, p. 2; own translation).

Norway

"To promote economic, social and cultural development in the recipient countries" (1962 Act, quoted in Eriksen, 1987).

Sweden

"To raise the standard of living of the people in the poor countries." A complementary goal is the promotion of economic growth (1962 Act, quotation from Jellinek, 1984, pp. 367-8).

Finland

The objectives are contained in the 1974 "Programme of Principles for International Development Cooperation". The main ones are: To correct structural imbalances between developed and developing countries and to support greater political and economic independence; To equalize distribution of income between and within developing countries.

In connection with Finnish aid, a word may be added about Finland in the context of the other Nordic countries. Finland's relations with the Third World have traditionally been few and limited. In recent years, however, its aid budget has grown rapidly. The Finnish scholar, Kimmo Kiljunen, has made the interesting observation that initially Finland's "development aid became an instrument with which to support the Finnish policy of widening cooperation with the other Nordic countries" (Kiljunen, 1984, p.151).

Although not stated directly in all the quotations above, each Nordic country has a declared aim to raise the standard of living of the poorest population groups in the Third World.

It should be stressed that all of the above are declared objectives. For example, it is stipulated that Norway's aid has to benefit the poorest population in countries where governments conduct policies that are socially just and geared toward equalization of incomes. But, as Eriksen writes, "probably no [Norwegian] government, regardless of the colour of the party, has taken this seriously" (1987, p. 42). The Norwegian case is not unique. A partial explanation is that the general aid objectives are

broadly defined. Such objectives are necessary, but specific criteria are needed in order to evaluate whether the objectives are reached. Moreover, if the political will was there, better results could undoubtedly be achieved.

The next section examines how the aid to SADCC relates to the general aid objectives outlined above.

Particular Objectives of SADCC Aid

The objective behind the aid to SADCC is basically premised on the general Nordic aid objectives. However, certain elements of the general objectives get priority. The rationale for supporting SADCC derives from the Lusaka Declaration, SADCC's founding document, which gives particular importance to the reduction of dependence on South Africa. Accordingly, representatives of the Nordic aid administrations all stress that emphasis is placed on the objective of reducing dependence on South Africa; conventional aid objectives are regarded as less important.²⁷

One Nordic aid official pointed out that in addition to the general objectives, the aid to SADCC has a pure "purpose of survival." That is, the SADCC countries need aid merely to survive the South African destabilization. In short, the support to SADCC should be regarded as complementary to the bilateral aid to the region.

It is not surprising that the Nordic assistance is rooted in SADCC's endeavours to reduce dependence on South Africa. I have shown above that at present, the Nordic countries have virtually no economic interests (trade and investment) in the SADCC region. The political nature of the commitment to SADCC is thus the carrying element. However, as political considerations are not supposed to play a role in the aid policies of any of the Nordic countries, it is precisely this which makes the assistance to SADCC exceptional. The aid to SADCC is a rare example of foreign policy influencing the aid programmes of the Nordic countries.

Other Motives

There are other objectives, however, than those connected with the struggle against apartheid. Such objectives, or motives, are mostly economic. Foreign aid is given not purely for altruistic reasons. A country's aid policy is usually formed on a principle of balance between recipient and donor interests (Holm, 1982). Due to their relatively high ratios of foreign trade to GNP, the Nordic countries are sensitive, and to a certain extent vulnerable, to changes in the Western economies. As with other developing countries, the SADCC region may thus play a role as reserve (or substitute) market, reserve area for investments, and reserve supplier.

Although not previously a focus area in the Nordic assistance, SADCC's emphasis on transport and communication infrastructure may suit the donors. In their eyes, infrastructure projects are ideal for a

number of reasons: they are easy to administrate, they are clearly limited in time and space, investment calculations are easy and, they leave a concrete proof of the donor's contribution after project completion (Leyns and Tostensen, 1981). Moreover, infrastructural development projects cannot readily be launched within the ordinary Nordic bilateral aid programmes. Furthermore, SADCC's transport and telecommunication projects require large deliveries of technically advanced equipment with concomitant consultant services. SADCC projects thus have the capacity to absorb funds from the aid budgets—to many donors, disbursement is actually perceived as a problem—and, by design, the SADCC projects provide an opportunity to secure deliveries from the Nordic countries' own industries.

Lastly, the importance of the potential long-term benefits should not be underestimated. It has been said that in terms of natural resources, the SADCC region is one of the world's most valuable pieces of real estate. Once the shackles of apartheid have been removed, the region's great economic potential could be unleashed. Through the support to SADCC, the Nordic countries may strive to secure a foothold on the future market of southern Africa.

Whatever the case may be, the Nordic countries are performing a difficult balancing act between the needs of SADCC and their own economic interests.

Contradictions

The dual aid objective of catering for own economic interests and fostering development and an improved reputation in the Third World is a fundamental contradiction (Boel, 1986). In the case of SADCC projects, which so far have been mostly infrastructural, other objectives and interests overshadow the common Nordic aid objective of poverty alleviation. Some of the Nordic aid officials interviewed by the author stated outright that the poverty orientation does not count for SADCC projects. An argument could be made, however, that it is within the transport and communication sectors that SADCC is most vulnerable and dependent on South Africa. At the same time, these sectors constitute a severely limiting factor in the development of new trade relations and other economic interaction. Consequently, these SADCC projects may have an indirect poverty alleviation effect. In this context, some Nordic aid officials readily admit that the "trickle-down" theory is again gaining ground.

To the extent that SADCC projects, premised upon the trickle-down principle, assume a larger ratio of the total Nordic aid to the region, it will alter the profile of the overall Nordic aid commitment. The Norwegian government has already recognized and stated that this eventuality is not desirable (DUH, 1985, p. 63).

The next main section will expand on the above by reviewing the character of the Nordic support to SADCC.

CHARACTER OF THE NORDIC AID

The review of the character of Nordic aid to SADCC is divided into four sub-sections: (A) SADCC's goals, (B) Nordic aid and SADCC goals, (C) bilateral versus SADCC-project aid, and (D) joint-Nordic projects.

SADCC's Goals

The experience of the Nordic aid to SADCC must be appraised in the context of SADCC's own objectives. These were laid down on 1 April 1980 in the Lusaka Declaration:

1. Reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the Republic of South Africa;
2. Forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration;
3. Mobilization of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies;
4. Concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of our strategy for economic liberation (SADCC, 1980, p 3)

As they are defined above, it is difficult to assess how the Nordic support tallies with SADCC's own objectives. A more tangible measure of SADCC's objectives is reflected in its *Programme of Action*. The latest annual progress report shows the following sectoral distribution of projects and project costs.

While it is clear from Table 15 that SADCC's priority is transportation and communication, SADCC also attaches importance—nearly 20% of estimated project costs—to the industry and trade sector. The next section explores how the donors, in particular the Nordic countries, have responded to SADCC's priorities.

Table 15 SADCC Programme of Action, by sector

Sector	No. of projects	%	Cost USD Mill	%
Energy	63	13	246	4
Food, Agriculture+				
Natural resources	97	20	628	10
Industry + Trade	63	13	1216	19
Manpower Development	38	8	60	1
Mining	25	5	54	1
Transport + Communications	207	42	4 197	66
Total	493		6 401	

Source: SADCC Annual Progress Report, July 1986–Aug. 1987, p. 13.
Gaborone: SADCC Secretariat.

Nordic Aid and SADCC Goals

By the end of 1987, SADCC had secured (obtained commitments for) USD 2,166 million from all sources. This significant amount represented 34% of the cost of the SADCC programme of action. Table 16 shows the sectoral distribution of funds secured by SADCC, funds secured in relation to funds needed, and the Nordic commitments.

It appears from Table 16 that for each sector SADCC has secured a fairly even proportion of the funds needed. In this regard, mining and energy received most; about half of the requirements. In SADCC's mining sector, most of the funds secured are for a fluorspar mining project in Zambia. In the energy sector, the larger projects include the interconnection of the Botswana and Zimbabwe electrical grids, and the Corumane hydropower project in Mozambique. But the manpower and industry sectors secured only 15% and 21% of the funds needed. In terms of dollars, however, the unrivalled favourite with the donors is the transport and communication sector. The donors have committed over 1.5 billion dollars to SADCC's transportation and communication projects, the largest of which are connected with the Dar es Salaam and Beira transport systems. This is equivalent to 72% of all funds committed to SADCC projects. As the transportation and communication sector amounts to only 66% of the cost of the SADCC programme of action, it seems as if the donors accord this sector higher priority than SADCC itself.

Table 16 *Sectoral Distribution of Funds Secured by SADCC, 1987*

	Total Funds Committed		Nordic Funds Committed	Nordic Commitment in % of Funds Secured
	USD Mill.	Funds secured in % of funds needed	USD Mill.	
Energy	116	47%	40	35
Food, Agriculture & Nat. Resources	192	31%	22	12
Industry and Trade	253	21%	191	76
Manpower Development	9	15%	—	—
Mining	31	57%	—	—
Transport and Communications	1 565	37%	261	17
Total	2 166	34%	514	24

Source: SADCC Progress Report, 1986-87.

At first glance, the distribution of Nordic commitments appear to differ from the pattern for the donors as a whole. According to the figures in Table 16, over one-third of the Nordic SADCC commitments went to projects in the industry sector. This is three times the average (12%) for all donors combined. A closer look at the project portfolio reveals, however, that USD 187 million has been committed to *one project* which hardly belongs in the category of SADCC projects: The SIDA-supported Mufindi pulp and paper mill in Tanzania. The Tanzanian government decided to implement the project already in 1977, and the investment agreement with SIDA was signed on 6 April 1979, i.e. before SADCC was launched. Moreover, SIDA's own documents state that the "main objective of the project is to make Tanzania self-sufficient to 80% with paper products around 1990" (SIDA, 1984, p. 342). The scope of the project is thus national, not regional. It is rather puzzling that the Mufindi project is categorized as a SADCC project.²⁸

If it is accepted that the Mufindi project should not be regarded as a SADCC project,²⁹ the distribution of donor funds, in particular the Nordic, looks quite different. If SIDA's USD 187 million commitment to the Mufindi project is subtracted from the total, USD 253 million, then only USD 66 million has been secured for SADCC's industrial projects from all sources. That would reduce this sector's share from 12% to 3% of the total (adjusted) donor commitment. In a similar manner, the Nordic commitment to industry would fall from USD 191 million to just USD 4 million, or 1% of the (adjusted) Nordic commitment to SADCC projects. The exclusion of the Mufindi project would also raise the overall share of

transportation and communication projects to 79%. For the Nordic commitments, that share would come to the tune of 80%. Finally, Sweden's share of the support to SADCC projects would also be reduced.

With the exclusion of the Mufindi project, only 5% of the cost of SADCC's industrial projects has been secured. This is significantly lower than the ratios of funds secured to funds needed (see Table 16) for SADCC's other programme sectors. In terms of project costs, industry is SADCC's second priority. Nevertheless, donors appear to have shunned this sector. The question is why.

There are two main reasons for the donors' lack of support to SADCC's industry projects. First, probably because of fear for competition with their industries at home and affiliates abroad, Western donors traditionally have not given much support to the development of the productive branches of industries in the Third world (Baskin, 1985; Friedland, 1985).³⁰

Second, the quality of SADCC's industry programme has hitherto been unacceptable to the donor community. When it was presented at the 1983 Maseru Conference, the donor response was mixed. One delegate stated that SADCC's industry programme was "like an eccentric's shopping list. It was totally unworkable" (Edlin, 1983, p. 46). During my interviews in December 1987, SIDA officials characterized SADCC's industrial plan of action as disjointed. The projects were seen as poor and expensive, and the programme, as it was, went little beyond a collection of national projects. The donors call for regional projects.

The lack of progress and donor dissatisfaction with the industry programme have led SADCC to review the sector. The 1988 Arusha SADCC Conference papers read as follows: "In view of the priority given to the Industry and Trade Sector in the context of the Organization's new emphasis on investment in production, and the similar focus of the Nordic/SADCC Initiative, it has been decided to undertake a thorough review of the objectives and strategy of the sector" (SADCC, 1988a, p. 10). As a result of the review, no details of project descriptions and costings were included in the 1988 SADCC conference papers. It is interesting to note in this context that the Nordic countries are planning to support the SADCC Industry and Trade Coordination Unit with two experts. This should enable SADCC to address better the regional concerns in the critical areas of industry and trade.

The discussion of support to industry notwithstanding, the Nordic support to SADCC projects have contributed to the achievement of SADCC's objectives. The main projects are listed in Table 17.

Several observations can be made from Table 17. The amounts committed vary considerably between the Nordic countries. Of the total in Table 17 (representing 94% of the cost of projects listed in the source), Sweden has committed USD 133 million, Norway 110 mill., Finland 65

mill., and Denmark 63 mill. Although the countries use slightly differing planning periods, it is noteworthy that Finland's commitment exceeds Denmark's.³¹

More interesting, perhaps, is the **sectoral** concentration among the Nordic countries. For all countries, the transport and communication sector gets priority. But the emphasis varies; **Finland** committed 100% to this sector, Sweden 83%, Denmark 62% and Norway only 55%. Denmark and Norway thus have considerable commitments to other sectors. 32% of the Danish commitment goes to SADCC's food and agriculture sector. **Denmark's** commitment of USD 20 million accounted for 87% of the total Nordic commitment to this sector. 45% of the Norwegian commitment goes to SADCC's energy sector. Norway's commitment of USD 50 million accounted for 71% of the total Nordic commitment to this sector. These emphases are hardly surprising; they correspond to **Denmark's** and Norway's expertise in respectively agriculture and energy. Finland's emphasis exclusively on transport and communication projects may be a result of its limited experience with foreign aid. Moreover, Finland's aid projects generally seem to follow the lead of Scandinavia's "big brother," Sweden.

Based on Table 17, three-quarters of the Nordic support to SADCC projects goes to the transport and communications sector. But, even within this sector, the commitments are concentrated on a few large, capital intensive, projects. The rehabilitation and development of the port transport systems of Dar es Salaam, Beira and Nacala claim USD 168 million of the total Nordic commitment to SADCC projects, USD 371 million. No less than USD 64 million is committed to microwave links (telecommunication) projects. In other words, over 60% of the Nordic aid to SADCC projects goes to the rehabilitation and development of the main transport corridors and to advanced telecommunication projects.

As the above projects are SADCC priorities, the Nordic support is in accord with SADCC's objectives. An argument could be made, however, that SADCC's rehabilitation of the main transport corridors may reinforce the unbalanced production systems emanating from colonial times. Nevertheless, those projects are necessary for at least three reasons: (1) they reduce dependence on South Africa, (2) they facilitate the expansion of production and overseas trade, thus earning sorely needed foreign exchange, and (3) they provide a series of main transportation routes between which connections can be made to link the internal markets.

This section has discussed the Nordic support to SADCC projects. The next will examine how this relates to the Nordic bilateral programmes in the SADCC region.

Table 17 Nordic *Commitments*^a to SADCC, by Projects, 1981–90, *Mill USD*^b

	Transport + Communication		Food + Agriculture	
Denmark	Tech. ass. SATCC	3	Early warning system	7
	4 major roads, Zambia	5	Reg. meat inspector training school,	
	Railway depot, Botswana	8	Botswana	9
	buoy vessel, Mozambique	8	Animal disease lab., Zimbabwe	4
	Port of Dares Salaam	15		20
		39		
Finland	Electrification, Airport, Lesotho	5	–	
	Container terminal, Nacala	20		
	Tech ass., SATCC	3		
	Container handling equipment,			
	Dares Salaam	25		
	Crane, Tazara	7		
	Meteorological networks	5		
		65		
Norway	Microwave link, telecomm	40	–	
	Oil terminal, Tanzania	5		
	Port training institute, Mozambique	6		
	Road, Botswana	9		
		60		
Sweden	Tech ass, SATCC	2	Soil + water secretariat, Lesotho	3
	Roads, Mozambique	12		
	Railway telecomm, Botswana	7		
	Navigational aids, Mozambique	8		
	Port of Dares Salaam	19		
	Aircraft, Lesotho	6		
	Microwave links	17		
	Int. telephone switchboard	5		
	Tazara, rail repairs	16		
	Tazara, wagons	12		
	Container handling, Mozambique	6		
		110		
Totals		274		23
	Energy		Other Sectors	
Denmark	Electrical grid, Botswana	4		–
Finland	–	–		
Norway	Energy secretariat, Angola	13	–	
	Petroleum training centre, Angola	6		
	Hydropower, Lesotho	9		
	Electrification, Lesotho	9		
	Hydropower, Mozambique	8		
	Fuelwood, Malawi	8		
		50		
Sweden	Power Transmission	2	Reg. employment promotion	4
	Hydropower, Mozambique	7		
	Electricity to Beira	7		
		16		
Totals		70		4

Source: SADCC. 1987. "Report on Nordic/SADCC Initiative"

^a Commitments refer to funds pledged to particular projects.^b Exchange rates 24/2 1988: DKK: 646, FIM: 409, NOK: 640, SEK: 601.

Bilateral versus SADCC-Project Aid

It should be stressed from the outset that, apart from projects involving more than one recipient state, SADCC projects function like bilateral projects. When SADCC has established contact between donor and recipient, the member state involved assumes full responsibility for the financial commitments, implementation and operation of the project.

The strong emphasis on transportation and communication in the Nordic commitment to SADCC projects differs sharply from the bilateral commitments. Before the launching of SADCC, the Nordic aid programmes largely neglected infrastructure. SADCC provided the opportunity to address this important area. A rough assessment³² of the sectoral distribution of Denmark's bilateral assistance to the SADCC region provides an example. The break-down of projects on which disbursements were made in 1986 is as follows:

Agriculture	26%
Industry	22%
Education	20%
Health	18%
Transportation	8%
Communication	6%

This example supports the assertion that the focus of the SADCC assistance differs from the bilateral programmes. About 14% only of Denmark's bilateral aid goes to transport and communication projects, but 62% of Denmark's commitments to SADCC projects goes to this sector. Because of SADCC's emphasis on transport and communication, Norway, too, has practically ceased its support to national infrastructure projects (NORAD, 1987, p. 5).

The fundamental difference in type between bilateral and SADCC projects may not be cause for alarm.³³ On the contrary, the coexistence of bilateral and SADCC projects introduces new possibilities; the two types of projects may fruitfully complement one another. DANIDA actually envisages that its future assistance to SADCC will be directed to activities that support the functioning and utilization of the Dar es Salaam and Beira transport corridors. Such activities may include: establishment of "dry ports" (customs and goods handling facilities), support to SADCC-forwarding/shipping agencies, or projects within the communication sector that facilitate increased usage of the corridors by local import/export companies. A range of such activities could probably best be supported via bilateral aid channels (DANIDA, Arbejdspapir, Nov'87). Furthermore, bilateral projects could be used to support national production enterprises, while the SADCC assistance supplements by developing the necessary regional infrastructure, and—via the Nordic/SADCC

Initiative—seeks to enhance the engagement of Nordic enterprises. Via the transport corridor projects, the interplay between bilateral and SADCC support may provide increased bilateral assistance to countries that did not receive much before.

The interplay between the bilateral and SADCC support could have a range of positive spin-offs. Some of these may "trickle down" to the broad masses. This would give the transport corridor projects a measure of indirect poverty alleviation.

As already discussed, the normal concern for poverty alleviation in the Nordic development assistance is overshadowed by other factors. This is indicated by the criteria on which SADCC projects qualify for Nordic support. SADCC projects should have a clear regional orientation and contribute to planned regional objectives. They should make a contribution to the reduction of dependence on South Africa, and they should be economically sound. In practice, it is difficult to satisfy these criteria evenly. For example, projects reducing the dependence on South Africa have been accepted although they have been principally national and with relatively minor regional implication. Conversely, as one Nordic aid official has stated frankly to the author, no assistance is given to projects that are not economically viable, even though such projects may reduce dependence on South Africa.³⁴ It is probably at the qualitative level that SADCC projects differ most from the conventional bilateral projects. SADCC projects often represent highly integrated webs of interconnected projects. This is the case, for example, with the Dar es Salaam port transport system. That project encompasses over 50 sub-projects within the areas of port, water transport and railways. Frequent meetings of SADCC officials, implementing agencies and donors make such complex projects a viable possibility. Furthermore, SADCC's decentralized mode of operation ensures that projects have effective backing at all levels of government. At the donors' end, SADCC's political appeal enables the donors to make large, and long-term commitments.

The SADCC projects also provide a means by which the Nordic countries can coordinate their assistance to the SADCC region. This is examined in the next section.

Joint-Nordic Projects

There are at least 13 SADCC projects which receive coordinated support from two or more of the Nordic countries (SADCC, 1987b). The most important, on which all the Nordic countries participate, include the following:

- SATCC, technical/consultation assistance, USD 7.7million.
- Dar es Salaam port transport system, including TAZARA projects, USD 112.6 million.
- Beira port transport system, USD 37.4million.³⁵

The above projects alone, which each comprise a number of inter-connected sub-projects, account for about 60% of the Nordic aid to SADCC. In other words, the Nordic countries' assistance to SADCC represent, to a very large extent, a coordinated Nordic commitment. It is therefore highly appropriate to speak of the Nordic/SADCC relationship as a region-to-region cooperation.

Each Nordic country works with SADCC projects at three different levels: (1) one Nordic country-SADCC, (2) joint-Nordic-one SADCC country, and (3) joint-Nordic-SADCC. Joint-Nordic projects are "joint-projects" in the sense that they are financed collectively and administered by one Nordic country. Although one country usually acts as the main administrator, a large measure of coordination takes place. The main administrator for a joint-Nordic project has hitherto been selected by a process akin to a Russian roulette. The example of the Nordic-supported Beira project is illustrative. Each Nordic country submitted bids for the contracts in Mozambique. The country that won the largest contract (Denmark) became the Nordic administrator. The practical advantages inherent in this process are obvious. In all likelihood this model will be used to select the main administrator of future joint-Nordic projects, at least until the projects can be divided evenly.

SADCC's regional projects lend themselves to joint-Nordic support. Projects like the rehabilitation and development of the port systems of Beira and Dar es Salaam are simply too large to undertake for any one Nordic country. Furthermore, Denmark, for example, usually does not support transportation projects in Mozambique. The existence of SADCC and the possibility to participate in a joint Nordic endeavour have induced Denmark to make a large commitment to the Beira corridor project.

The coordination of Nordic aid to SADCC paved the way for the Nordic/SADCC Initiative, the subject of the next section.

THE NORDIC/SADCC INITIATIVE

Background and Content of the Initiative

At the Harare SADCC conference in January 1986, an important development occurred in the cooperation between SADCC and the Nordic countries. The two groups of countries approved a "joint declaration on expanded economic and cultural cooperation" and a "framework for a

programme of cooperation 1986/90." This is commonly referred to as the Nordic/SADCC Initiative (hereafter the Initiative).

The history behind the Initiative dates back to the early 1980s. In 1982 the then prime minister of Finland, Sorsa, presented a proposal to the Nordic Council of Ministers to design a Nordic parallel to the Lomé Convention. The ASEAN countries, Central America and the SADCC countries were all considered as a regional partner. SADCC was selected because of the Nordic aid involvement, because its member states already had a cooperation established, and because of the South African aspect. In 1984 Nordic officials concluded an evaluation of new cooperation possibilities. The report was presented in 1985 and it received a positive welcome by SADCC. By September 1985, after the SADCC countries' reaction and wishes had been incorporated, the details for the cooperation were ready. While Denmark preferred to delay until a more concrete programme of action could be launched, the decision was made to follow the SADCC general secretary's desire to have a declaration ready for signing at the Harare conference in January 1986; a programme of action could follow later.

The Joint Declaration contains a description of the general areas of cooperation, purpose and conditions. The Framework for a Programme of Cooperation contains a framework for the activities to be implemented. An actual programme-document will not be developed; the objectives of the Declaration will be effected in a continuing process.

Although there is no controversy about the background of the Initiative, it is noteworthy that the initiative was taken and developed by the donors (Nordic countries) and subsequently presented to SADCC. One may speculate why the Nordic countries wanted to have their own Lomé type of arrangement with a selected group of Third World countries. One clue may be that during the early 1980s, the EEC was accorded increasing importance internationally while the Scandinavian countries as a group were regarded as less and less important. Whatever their motivation, the Initiative has indeed enhanced the perception, especially in the SADCC region, of Nordic unity.

In the view of SADCC, the Initiative should be seen as being complementary to the ongoing regional and bilateral programmes of cooperation between the two regions. The Initiative focuses especially on the development and implementation of measures to strengthen the productive sector in the SADCC region. It seeks to stimulate joint ventures and other forms of Nordic enterprise investment; to increase intra and inter-regional trade; and to increase social and cultural contacts between the two regions. Furthermore, the Initiative aims to improve the effectiveness of Nordic aid by enhancing the coordination of the Nordic development efforts. The overall objective of the Initiative is to promote a long-term, mutually advantageous cooperation. The development assistance should thus be seen in a broad economic perspective. This type of region-to-region

Aiming beyond Conventional Development Assistance

cooperation is an innovation in the area of development assistance; it is a step beyond conventional aid.

Activities under the Nordic/SADCC Initiative

As the Initiative represents an innovation, every proposed activity requires careful consideration before implementation. By necessity, therefore, the activities so far initiated under the Initiative are still largely at the stage of feasibility studies. The Nordic countries are already involved³⁶ in a range of activities:³⁷

Intra and inter-regional trade

- The Nordic Import Promotion Offices have conducted a programme of seminars covering all the SADCC states.
- A study is being prepared on the tariff and non-tariff trade regimes applying to SADCC exports to the Nordic countries. An effort will be made to improve the utilization of the GSP system.
- A computerized "Market News Service" on export products from the SADCC countries is due to be launched.
- A study has been carried out on clearing, forwarding and shipping agents in the region.
- Studies are completed on counter trade in the region.

Financial Mechanisms

- A Joint Expert Working Group on Financial Mechanisms has provided valuable input in the preparations for an export pre-financing revolving fund and an export credit fund. USAID may finance these funds.
- A study will be carried out on double taxation and incentives.
- A principal agreement was reached at the Arusha conference in January 1988 to launch the NORSAD Fund. NORSAD will provide foreign exchange for the import of raw materials, spare parts, etc., to be utilized by Nordic joint ventures in SADCC countries.
- The major Nordic commercial banks are considering the establishment of a joint representation in the region.

Relations with the business community

- The Nordic countries have agreed to support the creation of a SADCC Business Council.
- A financing agreement is nearly complete for the launching of a "SADCC Economic Bulletin."

Cultural cooperation

- The Nordic Council of Ministers has submitted to **SADCC** a draft memorandum on cultural cooperation.
- The Nordic countries have financed a fund with about DKK 8 million to support cultural activities.
- Various cultural groups have already been in the Nordic countries, and groups of Nordic students have visited the **SADCC** region.

Cooperation at the **sectoral** level

- A project proposal for a regional (seed) **genebank** is under consideration.
- Consultations have taken place between **SADCC** energy ministers and **NORDEL** regarding cooperation in the electricity sub-sector.
- The Nordic countries will soon provide technical assistance and programme support to **SADCC's** Industry and Trade Coordination Division.
- Iceland has been appointed Nordic coordinator for the fisheries sector.
- **SADCC** has requested that the Nordic countries provide technical assistance to **SADCC's** mining sector.
- Possibilities for cooperation in **SADCC's** tourism marketing and promotional needs are being assessed.

In view of the fact that only two years have lapsed since the signing of the Joint Declaration, this range of activities is quite impressive. They are also in accord with the objectives laid down in the Framework for Cooperation. The activities under the Initiative are financed from different sources in the individual Nordic countries. Denmark and Finland draw on their **SADCC** allocations, but Sweden has paved the way with a separate allocation exclusively for the **Nordic/SADCC** Initiative. In Sweden's 1987/88 budget, this amounted to SEK 30 million. While not quite as formal as the Swedish solution, Norway has for 1988 "earmarked NOK 20 million especially for the Initiative. Separate allocations provide flexibility and facilitate long-term planning.

NIEO Objectives in the Nordic/SADCC Initiative

In preparatory papers to the Joint Declaration and in its foreword are mentioned the desire to realize certain of the elements of the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The text of the agreement, however, does not contain specific pledges about this. Nevertheless, in public debate the Initiative is seen very much in the context of the NIEO. A comment on the NIEO is therefore in order.

The developing countries' demands for a NIEO were first formalized at the 6th and 7th Special Sessions of the United Nations in 1974/75. They called for a restructuring of the international system of economic relations to fulfil the long-term goals for development in the Third World and to create a more equitable distribution of the world's wealth. The specific areas to be restructured include the following: trade with raw materials, transfer of technology, the international system of payments, and relations among the developing countries themselves. In calling for a NIEO, the developing countries appealed to the developed countries to recognize the global interdependence and mutual interests in the development of the Third World.

The lack of progress may be better appreciated if we recall the special circumstances which provided the basis for the developing countries' demands for a NIEO. In the early 1970s: (1) The ability of the United States to dominate the world economy was limited because of its war in Vietnam and the Watergate affair; (2) OPEC's efficiency and power provided a stimulating example to other developing countries; (3) The more radical explanations of underdevelopment were gaining ground; and (4) The leading governments in Europe were social democratic and the Carter administration occupied the White House in Washington (Hveem, ch in Eriksen, 1987).

In the meantime circumstances have changed. The developed countries have long been in the grips of recession. Nevertheless, *vis-à-vis* the Third World, the developed countries are still powerful. Although the roots of the recession went farther back than the "oil crisis," the latter caused an almost hysterical resistance against giving concessions to the developing countries. Free-traders have held sway in the United States, West Germany, Britain and Japan. Finally, disagreements have reemerged about the meaning of "development" and how a development strategy ought to be devised (Eriksen, 1987).

In addition to the above, a lack of realism also hampers the emergence of a New International Economic Order. The capitalist economies of the West do not allow for free and easy government intervention in the market operations in the large private sectors. "Thus one finds that the demands of the South in the North-South dialogue are, in most cases, outside the decision-making powers of the western governments" (Onwuka, 1986). Another main obstacle to a NIEO is economic disorder at the national level in the Third World. According to the Nigerian scholar, Onwuka, "the developed countries have reasons to insist that their resources, if so transferred, should not be recklessly managed or exploited by a small group of urban petit bourgeoisie" (1986, p. 13).

It is against this background that the relevance of the NIEO objectives associated with the **Nordic/SADCC** Initiative should be assessed.

Among the Nordic aid administrators involved, the perceptions are mixed regarding the feasibility of a "mini-NIEO," i.e. NIEO relations between the **SADCC** region and the Nordic countries. The prevailing

view seems to be that the talk about a mini-NIEO in connection with the Initiative is rather unrealistic. While a great deal of skepticism was expressed during the author's interviews, there is also a belief that we could go much farther with the ideals of the NIEO. There may be particular scope for this within the area of trade. SADCC and the Nordic countries could work, via the General System of Preferences, for customs and tariff removals on imports (e.g. textiles) from the SADCC region.

The Joint Declaration gave rise to great expectations among the Nordic non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The Nordic NGOs have concentrated on the mutual and fair trade aspect of the Joint Declaration. In this respect, the Finnish NGOs have been particularly active.

The information on the Finnish NGOs is derived from Timo Voipio's unpublished paper (Nov 1987) "SADCC and Finland: A Critical Evaluation."³⁸ As a result of joint efforts by student unions in Helsinki, a pilot project called "Gaudeamus-Import Ltd" has been established. This import agency will focus its operations on supplying processed goods from the SADCC region to Finnish retail shops. The Finnish NGOs have organized several seminars in Finland on the mini-NIEO aspect of the cooperation with SADCC. Furthermore, as a part of the European Council sponsored "North/South Campaign," a joint Nordic mini-NIEO conference was held in Stockholm on 19-20 March 1988.

The Finnish NGOs have made a series of formal proposals to the Finnish government; most of these have been turned down. In Norway, the "NIEO-Network" group has lobbied the government to implement some of the mini-NIEO goals associated with the Nordic/SADCC Initiative. NGO actions such as these have stressed the need for constructive and innovative cooperation and coordination among the many actors involved in the cooperation with SADCC. At present, there is almost no coordination among the involved parties: ministries, aid administrations, government and educational institutions, private companies, interest groups and the media. An overall coordination, national or Nordic, of the relevant activities of these actors would obviously be tremendously useful.

One of the central proposals made by the Finnish NGOs was that all goods from the SADCC countries be granted full exemption from customs, import quotas and other restrictions. The Finnish government rejected this proposal as it does not comply with the letter of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle of the GATT rules. Article I of GATT states that any member of GATT is not allowed to give preference to any group of countries without extending this treatment to all other countries. But, in practice, GATT has allowed exceptions to the MFN principle when needed by the developing countries for their economic development. The de facto flexibility of the MFN principle should, therefore, permit a much more open Nordic import regime for SADCC goods.

Let us examine the hypothetical case of exempting all SADCC imports from customs, tariffs and trade restrictions in the Nordic countries. It has

already been noted that the Nordic countries at present import next to nothing from the SADCC region. In 1986 the Nordic countries imported for USD 136 million from the nine SADCC countries, equivalent to only 0.15% of total Nordic imports. SADCC's share of the Nordic countries' imports from all developing countries was equally insignificant (1.45%). The trade in the other direction was no more impressive; only 2.7% of the SADCC countries' exports went to the Nordic market. While these amounts were traded under the present trade regime, they are indicative of the volume of trade that can be expected, even without restrictions.

Moreover, the removal of trade barriers cannot alter the underdeveloped structures of the SADCC economies. Mozambique is a service economy, earning its foreign exchange from port and rail fees. Lesotho's major export is still its manpower to the South African mines. The other countries' export earnings are derived from an extremely narrow range of commodities; for example: Angola earned 95% from oil, Botswana 78% from diamonds, Zambia 90% from copper, and Malawi 77% from three cash crops, most of which is tobacco (World Bank Development Report, 1987 and EIU reports). How much more could the Nordic countries absorb of such commodities?

Even under the best scenario imaginable—no import restrictions whatsoever—the Nordic countries would be in a position to purchase only slightly more than they already do from the SADCC countries. A fundamental change in the international division of labour is most likely to be attained by changing the structures of the SADCC economies. By focusing on the productive sectors, this is precisely what the Nordic/SADCC Initiative aims to do. The lifting of trade restrictions would greatly facilitate this process.

In short, the basis for a mini-NIEO is relatively limited. A NIEO can be feasible only if all, or most, of the developed countries are willing to transfer the ideals into practice. A statement by Tanzania's minister of foreign affairs, B. Mkapa, may indicate the weight that should be ascribed to the relevance of the NIEO objectives in the Nordic/SADCC Initiative: "[We] hope that the Nordic/SADCC Initiative might prove to be a *shot-in-the-arm* for the quest for a New International Economic Order" (Meeting of senior Nordic/SADCC officials, Dar es Salaam, 17–18 June, 1987). The proper way to speak about the Nordic/SADCC Initiative is not in connection with a NIEO, but as a novel attempt to move beyond conventional development assistance.

Problems and Coordination

We have seen in the previous sections that the Nordic assistance to SADCC projects is based on political motivation. The political motivation behind the Nordic/SADCC Initiative is equally, if not more, apparent. This causes a number of problems in addition to those already discussed.

The Nordic aid administrations are under heavy political pressure to fulfil the objectives of the Initiative. Aid officials in Finland mention that politicians are unaware of the "budget competition" that they have to deal with. ("Budget competition" means that projects under the Initiative must compete with bilateral and other SADCC projects for funds from the Nordic aid budgets). However, if the Nordic donors experience "budget competition" along with "disbursement problems," then there is obviously a need to alter the budgetary routines. In Norway the aid minister has held three "propaganda" meetings with Norwegian business leaders. These meetings have created great expectations that are hard to fulfil. The private business sector in the Nordic countries is reluctant to invest in the SADCC region. The main reasons are the perceived political instability in some SADCC countries, problems with earnings in soft and non-convertible currencies, and the large financial commitments often required to enter the SADCC market. It is quite possible that the political pressure to realize things in a hurry influences the donors to invest in projects that are incapable of attracting private risk capital.

While politicians and the public put pressure on the Nordic aid administrations, cooperation takes place at a high level to achieve the objectives of the Initiative. The working-group of Nordic officials that in 1984 concluded the evaluation of possibilities for inter-regional cooperation has never been formally dissolved. The present "Nordic SADCC-Coordination Group" (hereafter "Group") represents the continuation of that working-group. The Group does not comprise formally appointed members but includes those from each Nordic country who are responsible, at any given time, for the area on which the Group is working. One of the Nordic countries is appointed as coordinator and given the authority to act on behalf of the other Nordic countries in the contact with SADCC's principal organs and the Secretariat. The role as Nordic coordinator rotates every two years. The Group usually meets prior to all joint meetings with SADCC representatives, and whenever there is a need. So far it has met at least on a bimonthly basis. The tasks of the Group are to serve as a forum for discussion of objectives and as an organ for practical coordination and follow-up. Its primary responsibility is the implementation of the Joint Declaration and the Framework for Cooperation.

The Nordic coordination is thus institutionalized in order to seek the attainment of the objectives of the Initiative. In general, the Group has functioned well. But not without certain problems.

The coordination work of the Group is inevitably going to be difficult and time consuming. After every meeting of the Group, each member has to "box" with various interest groups in his or her home country, i.e. the Group members have to win the support of those involved, before the Group can meet again for a new "round." And, although they appear to be homogeneous, certain differences do exist among the Nordic countries on how to implement the cooperation with SADCC. For example,

Norway would prefer to include the overall purpose of the Nordic/SADCC Initiative in the Group's discussions. Sweden, however, prefers that the cooperation develops in an "organic" manner around specific projects. Said in a crude manner: Denmark and Sweden sometimes have different opinions, Norway is somewhere in between these two, and Finland usually does not disagree with Sweden.

The Nordic negotiations over the past two years on the NORSAD fund may illustrate some of the difficulties that the Group has to deal with. There have been four areas of contention. First, what type of production (domestic or export) should NORSAD promote? Nordic NGOs, and some of the Nordic aid administrations, have argued that NORSAD should support production for the domestic markets. NORSAD is designed as a revolving fund, so domestic production would lead to an accumulation of local currency funds. As most of the SADCC currencies are overvalued, some of the Nordic countries therefore took the position that NORSAD should support primarily export-oriented production. This position seems to have prevailed. Second, the widespread South African ownership and dominance of enterprises in the SADCC region has been a bone of contention. NORSAD must not end up serving the interests of South African capital. Third, how is NORSAD going to be managed? The Nordic industrial support funds (IFU, SWEDFUND, FINNFUND), which took the initiative to establish NORSAD, wanted to partake in the management. But the Nordic aid administrations were against leaving the management to these. Should SADCC also participate in the management of NORSAD? Fourth, which foreign exchange costs should be eligible for support from NORSAD? Should dividends, and management, know-how and licence fees be eligible? Answers to some of these questions are still to be ironed out.

The author has also noted that differences exist within the Group about the central purpose of the NORSAD fund. One of the members of the Group saw the main purpose of NORSAD as increasing *trade* between the Nordic and SADCC regions. However, NORSAD is predominantly viewed as a catalyst for an increasing flow of technology and *investments* to SADCC countries from Nordic industries.³⁹

One of the Nordic aid officials working on SADCC has told the author that the members of the Group also have different opinions about the purpose of the Nordic/SADCC Initiative. What is worse, the same official felt that some of the members of the Group have an unrealistic appreciation of SADCC's ability to act. According to this source, some of the members of the Group view SADCC as a regional integration entity with more power than SADCC, as a coordination body, actually has.

The differences discussed above illustrate that there are difficulties involved in the coordination of the development efforts of the five, seemingly homogeneous, Nordic countries. It also underscores that in the cooperation on the Nordic/ SADCC Initiative, the Nordic countries are little more a monolith than is SADCC. Thus, considering that the Initiative

involves no less than 14 countries, at this early stage much more in terms of concrete achievements could hardly be expected from the Initiative. According to SADCC's 1987 "Report on the Nordic /SADCC Initiative," both the Nordic and the SADCC countries were satisfied with the progress which had been achieved in the implementation of the Initiative during the first 12 months of its existence. Ultimately the Initiative will be judged by its success in stimulating new, viable economic activities within the productive sectors of the SADCC economy.

RESULTS OF THE NORDIC SADCC AID

Effectiveness of the Support to SADCC

Although it is too early to say anything definitively about the effectiveness of the support to SADCC projects *vis-à-vis* bilateral projects, a few observations can be made. As SADCC projects function like bilateral projects once they are established, it is fair to ask why SADCC projects should be more effective. Among the Nordic aid officials working with SADCC, the author noticed a consequent consensus that, besides ordinary aid problems, there has been no major problems with the aid to SADCC projects. But, as already discussed, it is generally easy for donors to support and cooperate on infrastructural projects.⁴⁰ This may explain why the Nordic aid to SADCC projects has been relatively free from trouble.

Certain problems have surfaced, however. Maintenance is one of these.⁴¹ The regional infrastructure projects have not always been maintained to the satisfaction of the Nordic donors. This may have something to do with the fact that SADCC is not an executive body. For example, unless specific provisions are made, Mozambique alone will be responsible for the maintenance of the Beira transport system. Meanwhile, Zimbabwe, and to a lesser extent Zambia and Malawi, are the main users and beneficiaries of the Beira corridor.⁴² The responsibility for maintaining regional projects must somehow be divided between the beneficiaries. Another problem is that SADCC projects are not sufficiently integrated with national activities. Nordic aid officials point out that this is the case especially with SADCC's road projects.

The Nordic donors make a particular effort to address the maintenance problems with infrastructure projects. In the Beira project, for example, training and management is especially emphasized (interview, Danida).

Nevertheless, representatives of all the Nordic aid administrations express satisfaction with the Nordic cooperation on joint-projects. The joint-Nordic support to SATCC is usually singled out and emphasized as having been more successful than ordinary projects. According to DANIDA, the main reasons for this are probably that the transport and communication committee (SATCC) was set up, and is, operated with

Nordic assistance. SATCC projects are also described better than usual and there are obvious regional implications (Interview, Nov 87).

Fulfilment of Goals for the SADCC Aid

This section should ideally be concluded with an evaluation of the fulfilment of the goals for the SADCC assistance. It is difficult, however, to evaluate a long-term project which has just begun to materialize.

The strong political motivation behind the assistance to SADCC has, ironically, created difficulties for the Nordic aid administrations. SADCC gets considerable public support and Nordic politicians of all persuasions have shown a particular interest in SADCC. This puts great pressure on the Nordic aid establishment to deliver fast results. The dilemma is that the regional infrastructural projects, high in the list of SADCC's own priorities, require thorough and time-consuming preparations before implementation; typically two years from idea to project start (SIDA, 27/11, 87, p.13). This is true as well for the complex set of measures that needs to be devised to stimulate the Nordic industrial engagement in the SADCC region.

The time required for preparation is indicated by the wide gaps between Nordic allocations and Nordic disbursements to SADCC projects:⁴³ As per December 1987, 22 SADCC projects were under implementation involving Danish commitments amounting to a total of DKK 581 million. The implementation of these projects spans the period from 1981 to 1990. Up to 1987, only DKK 341 million, or 59%, has been disbursed (Danida documents). Of Sweden's total allocation to SADCC projects as per 1986/187 (SEK 734 million), only 289 million, or 39%, has been disbursed. The undisbursed (previously allocated) funds in the 1987/188 budget amount to SEK 286 million. This exceeds by SEK 116 million the new allocation of SEK 170 million for 1987/188 (SIDA documents). Norway's allocations to SADCC projects between 1981–86 amounted to NOK 600 million. Of this amount, only NOK 130 million has been disbursed on completed projects, i.e. 22% of the allocation (NORAD documents).

Apart from the fact that SADCC projects to date have been mainly large infrastructure projects, there are other factors explaining the low ratio of disbursements to allocations. First, SIDA, for example, readily recognizes that its administrative capacity has been insufficient to handle the increasing demands from SADCC projects. As a result, SIDA has upgraded the capacity of its regional secretariat for southern Africa. Furthermore, SIDA has found it necessary to strengthen its infrastructure office with external consultants. Second, in joint-financed SADCC projects, delays have occurred due to heavy bureaucratic administration with the Nordic partners: the African Development Bank, EEC and the World Bank. Finally, the security (war) situation in Mozambique has slowed implementation of projects. In short, the low disbursement ratio is not

simply a question of aid absorption capacity but also a function of donor disbursement capacity.

In recognition of these constraints, Nordic experts have been stationed, at the request of SADCC, with several of SADCC's **sectoral** offices. There are **3-4** Nordic experts at SATCC in Maputo, 2-3 Norwegians at SADCC's energy secretariat in Luanda, 2 Swedes at the soil and water conservation secretariat in Maseru, and Iceland has recently sent one expert to the new fisheries secretariat in Lilongwe. Furthermore, **2** Nordic experts will soon be delegated to the industry and trade secretariat in Dar es Salaam, Finland will send one expert to the mining secretariat in Lusaka, and Denmark will send an expert to the food security secretariat in **Harare**.

In spite of the above, some observers feel that the fulfilment of the goals for the SADCC aid is proceeding too slowly. However, seen in its proper perspective – SADCC's own objectives and the practical difficulties in attaining these – the Nordic assistance is on track in meeting the aid objectives.

Although the share of the region's overseas trade going through South African ports is still higher than it was in 1981 —because of South African-sponsored sabotage—certain results have been achieved particularly within the transport and communication sector (SADCC, 1988c). According to SADCC, the utilization of the Beira and Dar es Salaam systems has *increased significantly* over the past two years (SADCC, 1988b).⁴⁴ The SADCC states' traffic through Beira is reported to have increased 50% between 1986 and 1987 (Facts and Reports, 15/1/88). All of Zambia's copper exports have now been re-routed away from South African ports; 80% goes through Dar es Salaam and 20% through Beira (Facts and Reports, 3/3/88). To a very large degree, this has been made possible by the Nordic assistance. At the end of 1987, the Nordic commitment to the Beira system amounted to USD 37.4 million, or 19% of the funds secured. The Nordic commitment was equivalent to that of all other bilateral donors combined.⁴⁵ The Nordic commitment to the Dar es Salaam system amounted to USD 112.6 million, or 38% of the funds secured. In this case, the Nordic share exceeded the total of all other foreign commitments, bilateral and multilateral (SADCC, 1987, pp. 100–112).

SADCC also emphasizes that noticeable progress has been achieved in telecommunications. The microwave links have made possible the direct routing of telephone calls between most member states. This is a major achievement considering that less than five years ago, most of these calls had to go through Cape Town, London or Lisbon. With a commitment of USD 67 million to the telecommunication sector, or 27% of funds secured, the Nordic countries are by far the largest foreign contributor to this sector.

Other results of the Nordic assistance include the following: An early warning system for regional food security is operational; airport lighting has been modernized to regional standards in Maputo, Beira and Nampula; the Nacala harbour will soon be functional and; a master plan

for the Lobito harbour has been completed. Under the Nordic/SADCC Initiative, several background and feasibility studies have been completed, and a range of activities are in the pipeline for implementation.

In conclusion, the Nordic aid commitment to SADCC—and the results achieved to date—correspond relatively well with SADCC's own objectives. Moreover, the Nordic aid has made an important contribution to preparing the ground for the realization of future initiatives. However, the significant donor input in SADCC's development process raises a range of questions.

DONOR INFLUENCE ON SADCC PROJECTS AND POLICIES

It is commonly accepted that the business of giving aid is not pure altruism. And it is a sad fact that aid often creates increased dependence in the form of spare parts, maintenance, etc. (Skarstein and Wangwe, 1986). To a varying extent, the development assistance entering the SADCC region does so in the interest of the donors. As no less than 86% of the cost of SADCC's project portfolio requires foreign funding (SADCC, 1987, p. 13), the donors are bound to have a considerable influence on SADCC's project and policy formulation. Perhaps it is symptomatic of SADCC's reluctant awareness of the pervasive donor influence that recent SADCC documents call the annual conferences for "consultative conferences" and not "donor conferences," as they used to be known.

The question about donor influence on SADCC's selection and formulation of projects is a bit like that about the chicken and the egg. However, as one director in Sweden's Ministry for Foreign Affairs stated to the author, "SADCC know they are popular; they adjust their projects accordingly." The implication is clear: SADCC, to a large extent, select and formulate their projects on the basis of what the donors are willing to support. Furthermore, the pervasive use of consultants and experts inevitably gives the donors a certain influence. As shown in Table 17, the donors choose to support SADCC projects that suit their own industries and expertise. Consequently, while SADCC is "free" to determine its own priorities, the donors have—through their control of the purse—the power to veto.

In a different way, SADCC's dependence on donor funds may push SADCC to make quick decisions. Although this is not a new situation—southern Africa has been short of funds for many years—it may have unwanted effects. To take a speculative example, this could become the case with the NORSAD fund. After one or two years of careful deliberations in the Nordic SADCC-Coordination Group, the Nordic countries presented the NORSAD fund at the January 1988 SADCC conference in Arusha.⁴⁶ Comprising twice as many member countries as the Nordic, it would not be entirely unreasonable if it took SADCC twice as long to accept the Nordic proposal for the NORSAD fund. However, the lure of

the DKK 200 million (approx. USD 31 mill) Nordic commitment may influence SADCC to accept prematurely, i.e. without thorough feasibility and impact evaluations on their side. Given their desperate need for development funds, SADCC has little choice but to make quick decisions on this and other donor initiatives.

Nonetheless, SADCC has had some past success in reminding the donors that it is the member states, not the donors, that control the direction of the SADCC programme of action. But disagreements between SADCC and the donors have emerged on a number of issues.

At the 1984 SADCC conference, the Nordic countries presented a document on the experience of bilateral cooperation with SADCC countries in the agricultural sector. The document was critical towards several aspects of the agricultural policies carried out in various SADCC countries. It also laid down a set of preconditions for continued assistance to this sector. The Nordic move seems to have had a certain effect and, at least Norway intends to follow up on this through the Nordic support to SADCC's agricultural programme (DUH, St.meld. nr.36, p. 62).

At the 1988 Arusha conference, SADCC's plans for the agricultural and food sector ran into unexpected problems when donors—led by Canada and Australia—showed some unwillingness to cede control over food aid. Apparently, SADCC had requested the right to dispose of the donor-supplied food as a means to support their proposed USD 208 million food reserve project; this aims to establish a regional maize reserve of 356,000 tonnes (AED, 5/2/88). The donors wish to retain control over food aid because of skepticism toward SADCC's food reserve project. This skepticism emanates from unresolved questions such as the following: Who shall distribute the food? What prices are to be paid for the expensive surplus maize from Zimbabwe? How can e.g. Mozambique make payments to Zimbabwe?

In the area of energy, donors believe that SADCC should take a wider regional approach, integrating national interests with those of SADCC as a whole. At the Arusha conference, the donors expressed concern over Zimbabwe's proposed extension of the Kariba South hydroelectric station, despite availability of inexpensive surplus electricity from the Zambian side of the scheme, and possibly from the Cabora Bassa (AED, 5/2/88; Facts and Reports, 15/1/88).

In the area of transportation, SADCC's recent USD 575 million development plan for Angola's Lobito corridor may illustrate differences of opinion between SADCC and the Nordic countries. While Belgium, which has great interests in the Lobito line through Société Générale, and the EEC have shown great interest in the development plan, the Nordic countries are unlikely to give anything but symbolic aid to the Lobito corridor. In addition to the security situation, the Nordic countries see it as a problem that the corridor goes through Zaire which is not a member of SADCC; they also disapprove of Mobuto's policies in Zaire. Furthermore, since Zambia gets its copper out through Tazara and Beira, the Nordic

countries question the need for the Lobito corridor. Finally, the Nordic countries will rather not spread their commitments too thin.

As earlier discussed, SADCC is undertaking a complete review of its strategy for industrial development. Perhaps this is a result of donor disapproval of the previous approach. At a November 1987 conference on Danish aid, where the author was present, SADCC officials announced that the SADCC countries' own industry ministers had called for a regional industrial strategy. However, one of the Norwegian delegates told the author that he thought the announcement was tactical. The Norwegian delegate thereby implied that it was the donors that had taken the initiative. In a later discussion of SADCC's intentions to have a new industrial strategy ready in a year's time, a Swedish aid official said to the author that "this depends on what the donors say about their plan."

From all of the above, it is clear that the donors do have an influence on the formulation not only of projects but also on overall SADCC policies.⁴⁷ The overt donor influence has led Dr. Ibbo Mandaza, secretary general of the African Association of Political Science, to state that SADCC has, perhaps, become more of an obsession of external forces than that of the Africans (*Herald, Zimbabwe*, 17/2/84). His viewpoint is shared by many of the academics that I have interviewed in Southern Africa.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper has examined the dimensions of support to southern Africa, the objectives behind the Nordic aid, the experience with the support to SADCC, the Nordic/SADCC Initiative and donor influence.

The crisis engulfing southern Africa must be the basis for any assessment of the development assistance to the SADCC states. As a group, these nine countries face negative per capita growth rates, deteriorating terms of trade, mounting debts and massive South African destabilization. Against this background, the overall donor response has not been impressive. Measured in real terms, OECD's support to southern Africa since 1981 has hardly increased at all. Southern Africa's share of total OECD disbursements may actually be declining.

The Nordic countries' response to the crisis has been more substantial. Real term Nordic bilateral disbursements in 1986 were nearly twice as high as in 1981. Over this period, Nordic disbursements grew three times as fast as OECD disbursements to southern Africa. It is surprising, however, that no steadily increasing trend can be determined in southern Africa's share of the overall Nordic disbursements.

In terms of SADCC projects, the Nordic countries as a group is the unrivalled donor; their commitments account for one-quarter of the funds secured for SADCC's projects. It is equivalent to that of the other major

SADCC donors combined: EEC, Canada, France, Italy, United States and the World Bank.

As the Nordic countries' commercial relations with southern Africa are extremely limited, their strong commitment to SADCC appears to be founded upon their anti-apartheid policies. The support to SADCC should be viewed as a complement to the Nordic countries' bilateral programmes in southern Africa.

The Nordic, and other, donors have so far concentrated their commitments on SADCC's transport and communication projects. This is in line with SADCC's own objectives. The rehabilitation of infrastructure is required for the desired reduction of dependence on South Africa. It is also essential for future economic growth. SADCC is now attempting to shift the emphasis from infrastructure to production.

It is too early to offer a conclusive assessment of the Nordic/SADCC Initiative. However, an impressive range of activities have been set in motion to realize the aims of this innovative region-to-region cooperation. Both SADCC and Nordic aid officials consider the prospects for a mini-NIEO rather unrealistic. The main obstacle is the underdeveloped structure of most of the SADCC economies. The Nordic/ SADCC Initiative by focusing on the productive sectors—addresses precisely this problem.

Altogether, SADCC paves the way for substantially improved cooperation between donors and aid recipients. Some of SADCC's regional projects consist of a multitude of interconnected sub-projects. This enables various donors to coordinate their assistance and participate jointly. Furthermore, the periodic contacts between SADCC officials promote an enhanced sense of regional unity. A range of positive spill-over effects follows from this: The SADCC states are the only states in Africa to have managed to have mandated one single organization to be the exclusive coordinator of EEC regional development funds (Africa Recovery, March 1988); because its stipulations ran counter to SADCC's objectives, SADCC has demonstrated the power to reject support from USAID; and SADCC has the potential to develop a capacity to negotiate as a unit in other situations, e.g. with foreign suppliers of technology. In short, SADCC is making a valuable contribution towards economic development in southern Africa.

It is clear, however, that SADCC was established on the basis of political decisions, and with a certain external influence. The experience has also shown that SADCC is sustained more on political ideals than economic realities. This has important implications for the future of SADCC. Will the donors support SADCC in their next phase—development of the productive sectors—merely on the basis of the political anti-apartheid motivation? Can SADCC progress without broad popular support and the active involvement of the private enterprise sector? Without a solid local foundation, SADCC may run the risk of becoming a political balloon.

NOTES

1. See for example: Anglin (1983), Haarløv (1988), Meyns (1984), Thompson (1986), and Østergaard (1987).
2. Denmark has on many occasions—often together with the other Nordic countries—emphasized the need for increased assistance from the multilateral institutions to the SADCC countries. At the same time, the Nordic countries seek to secure purchases for multilateral projects in their own countries.
3. When launched, the other members of the London Steering Committee were: Reginald Green (IDS), Iddi Simba (African Development Bank, London), and Tim Sheehy (Catholic Institute for International Relations, London and Harare).
4. The aid to Southern Africa from the East Bloc and OPEC had been minimal. Furthermore, as the data for aid flows from other donors are not nearly so accurate and vary often quite considerable from year to year, this paper uses primarily OECD statistics from the DAC countries.
5. Unless otherwise stated, the data below is taken from OECD's "Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries," 1988 and earlier editions.
6. The division factors provided by OECD have been used in the conversions to constant dollars; and to correct for price changes—see text below (OECD 1988 and earlier versions).
7. For example, between 1984–85 the following percentages of all bilateral assistance from the Nordic countries were formally tied: Finland and Sweden 28%, Norway 29%, and Denmark 42% (OECD, 1986). In general, however, the actual "return flows" to donor countries are much larger. They may be on the order of twice the levels of formally tied aid (Eriksen, 1987).
8. The rise in ODA to Africa south of the Sahara in 1985 and southern Africa's reduced share the same year is a result of marked increases in ODA to Sudan, Ethiopia and Niger.
9. The information regarding the crisis in Southern Africa is drawn from SADCC's 1987 "Annual Progress Report," pp 2–9.
10. The United Nations has estimated that between 1979–81 and 1985–87 Sub-Saharan Africa lost USD 2.9 billion because of deteriorating terms of trade (UN 1988. Financing Africa's Recovery, p 14).
11. This sub-section reviews the dimensions of the bilateral assistance. Aid to SADCC projects will be examined separately.
12. The level of price changes in the Nordic countries have been approximated by calculating the differences between the OECD's division factors for exchange rate changes only. The division factors used for the Nordic currencies in Table 5 were then adjusted with these differences to obtain real term division factors.
13. The statistics below are from DANIDA's 1986 yearbook.
14. Although the above is based only on statistics on Denmark, the other Nordic countries' aid commitments to Southern Africa are likely to be equally "staff intensive". While it is a slightly broader measure, the 1985 levels of "technical cooperation" to total bilateral ODA support the argument: Denmark 20.6 % Finland 42.2 % ,Norway 13.1 5 and Sweden 20.9 % (OECD 1986, Table 28).
15. Multi-bi are projects by the multilateral institutions in specific countries. Multi-bi differs from general support to multilateral institutions in that the donor knows to which country/project the aid goes.
16. Reasons for the fall in Tanzania's share may also be sought in the previous "over-commitment" to Tanzania and the poor experience with several projects there.
17. SADCC's figures on funding secured includes both local and foreign resources (p 13).

18. Several SADCC projects get funding from groups of donors and multilateral institutions. In such cases, SADCC statistics often do not show a break-down of contributions from individual donors. As the following uses data only on commitments from individual donors, it must be treated as indicative.
19. In this context, "dependence" is defined as the weight of aid in relation to various parameters.
20. The high percentage of Nordic aid may actually increase "independence" in the sense that it contributes towards the diversification of trade dependence.
21. Quoted in: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies 1985. "Denmark: Review of Aid Objectives in Various Policy Documents." Paper prepared by DANIDA for seminar on **Dependence Relations and Development Assistance for Economic Independence in Southern Africa**, Uppsala, 10–12 April 1985.
22. During the early 1980s, certain members of the Danish parliament actually voiced opposition against giving aid to Mozambique.
23. Denmark in 1986 was the first country to impose trade sanctions against South Africa. The other Nordic countries have since followed suit. It may be pointed out that Finland's and Sweden's imports from South Africa in 1986 (see Table 13) were much lower than the 3 preceding years; Finland's averaged USD 17 mill and Sweden's USD 49 mill.
24. The IMF does not list separate trade figures for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. This, and differences in reporting, explains the differences between the totals in Table 13.
25. The figures on direct investments in the SADCC region have been provided by the Danish National Bank.
26. The information on direct investments for all of Africa is derived from Danmarks Nationalbanks *Årsberetning* 1987, Table 10.
27. The author conducted several interviews in Nov/Dec 1987 at the Nordic aid administrations in Copenhagen, Stockholm, Helsinki and Oslo. Much of the information that follows is based on these.
28. The classification of Mufindi as a SADCC project may be a mistake. One of the senior Swedish aid officials working with SADCC seemed surprised when I mentioned that it was listed as a SADCC project. On the other hand, SADCC may have opted to list it as a SADCC project in order to entice other donors to support SADCC industry projects.
29. It is interesting to note that SADCC's 1987 "Report on the Nordic/SADCC Initiative" does not include the Mufindi project. That report contains a listing of virtually all the Nordic supported SADCC projects contained in the SADCC 1986/87 Annual Progress Report.
30. There are of course exceptions to the general rule. Tanzania, for example, has received substantial support to its productive industries. The results of this support, however, are not impressive.
31. The figures do not reveal, however, that Finland's SADCC assistance to some extent is in the form of loans, while that of Denmark is in the form of grants.
32. Source: DANIDA's *Årsberetning* 1986, bilag 3. The total bilateral assistance for the SADCC countries amounts to approx. DKK 3,600 million. About 30% of this is loans with multiple uses. The break-down above is based only on cost-specified projects, i.e. roughly 70% of the total. The sectoral distribution is therefore indicative only.
33. The value of annual allocations to SADCC projects averages about 16% of the Nordic bilateral assistance to the SADCC region.
34. Economic viability is determined by conventional cost-benefit analysis. The Beira project, for example, has a fine internal pay-off (Interview, DANIDA).

35. Sources: SADCC Annual Progress Report 1986-87, and SADCC's 1987 "Report on the Nordic/SADCC Initiative."
36. As a result of the Initiative, SADCC has itself initiated a range of activities to stimulate investment in the productive sector.
37. Source: Various SIDA, DANIDA and SADCC documents.
38. The information on the Finnish NGOs is derived from Timo Voipio's unpublished paper (Nov 1987) "SADCC and Finland: A Critical Evaluation".
39. In this connection it may be pointed out that NORSAD is not intended as a means to boost intra-SADCC trade; the PTA Clearing House in Harare should serve that purpose.
40. Similarly, as infrastructure projects can often best be handled regionally, they provide a nucleus around which regional integration may be fostered. SADCC's early focus on infrastructural projects was probably the optimal way to consolidate the regional cooperation.
41. Maintenance of aid-supported activities is generally a problem in the Third world.
42. The Beira harbour in 1986 handled 1.2 million tons of goods of which approximately 700,000 tons was oil products for Zimbabwe (DANIDA, Arbejdspapir, Nov 87, p. 8).
43. Budget periods vary among the Nordic countries. And there is sometimes an overlap between allocations for SADCC pledges and bilateral cooperation. This is reflected in the lack of uniformity in these examples.
44. With the implementation of the development plan, Beira's capacity will increase from 1.2 million tons in 1986 to 3 million tons by 1988/89. Similarly, Dares Salaam's present capacity of 3 million tons is expected to increase to 7 million tons in the 1990s (DANIDA, Arbejdspapir, Nov 87).
45. Italy, Netherlands, OPEC and USAID together committed USD 38.8 million; EEC committed USD 40 million. Mozambique itself made the largest commitment, USD 66.6 million.
46. The Nordic SADCC-Coordination Group and NORSAD will be discussed in detail in the section on the character of the Nordic aid.
47. Donor influence is not necessarily a negative thing. To the extent that the donors have influenced SADCC to take a more regionally coherent approach to industrial development planning, it can hardly be interpreted as a negative influence.

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If not Global, then (Inter-)Regional: The Mini-NIEO Alternative

Helge Hveem

The break-down of negotiations on a New International Economic Order left international reformism in large parts of Europe with a challenge.

During the 1970s Third World activists, center-to-left politicians and concerned researchers formed a loose but effective coalition. They had reached a measure of consensus over certain international development issues, in particular the issue of underdevelopment or lack of development in the Third World. After years of heated debate, there was a basic agreement that the international financial and trade system contributed to the process of underdevelopment or did not sufficiently provide for inputs to the process of development in the Third World. Whether the thinking was formulated in terms of prebischian, structuralist or in terms of neo-marxist analysis, there was agreement that the system had to be reformed in order to create conditions for development.

Agreement may have been superficial at times and may also have covered over many serious weaknesses and contradictions that characterized the content of the NIEO programme. There is no question that the NIEO was and remains a package of elements that reflects its character as a compromise proposal the quality of which ought to have been better analysed.

What remains is a feeling that some reform of North-South relations is necessary. Notions of "trade not aid" or "aid is not enough" still persist. The combination of rapid international industrial restructuring, permanent debt crisis and financial instability that has paralleled the fall of the NIEO since it peaked in 1976-77, has not reduced the validity of that observation. Many would say that, on the contrary, it has been dramatically strengthened.

The challenge was three-fold. First, it was simply moral; should one accept that a reform programme which was seen as not only necessary but inevitable, was blocked due to the (predictable) resistance of great powers and (many of their) large transnational corporations?

Secondly, it was doubly *political*; would European reformism dare to challenge those powers on whom European countries themselves were highly dependent politically and economically, by being prepared to support an alternative to the global programme that those majors had been highly instrumental in preventing? And; would reformist coalitions be able to convince labour and industrialists in their own countries that

these groups were wrong in assuming that the NIEO approach was a zero sum game in which they were bound to loose jobs and markets (respectively)? In other words, would the thinking of the Brandt Commission be able to convince them that reformism was in their own best interest? (Independent Commission on International Development Issues, 1980; Hveem, 1980).

Third, the challenge was *entrepreneurial*; would it be possible to design and implement a NIEO in miniature—a mini-NIEO—to make up for some of the vacuum left by the defunct NIEO process? And if so, what were the conditions under which it could work?

These questions raised a number of further questions of a practical nature: Would such a miniature version of what was clearly by its whole logic a global programme, not be a *contradictio in absurdum*? Would it be politically accepted or rather challenged for being discriminatory? Should it by necessity include all the sectors and part-proposals promoted in the original NIEO programme or some negotiated version of it, or should and could it be more restricted in scope (sectors covered) or domain (countries covered), or in both? Would a mini-NIEO reduce or enhance the possibility for a global programme to be set up at a later stage?

When I first introduced the mini-NIEO concept in a research report commissioned by UNITAR and suggested it be taken up by Norwegian authorities in 1979, the reception was rather cool.¹

The proposal was later presented in several other fora in a rather general form.² It took close to three years and the Finnish Prime Minister at the time to initiate the process. In 1982, Mr Sorsa proposed a "broadened programme of cooperation" between the Nordic and a group of developing countries. A few months later, the Norwegian government suggested to the so-called Group of Likeminded Countries that a miniature of the NIEO be considered as a programme of cooperation between the Likeminded and the 9 members of the Southern African Development Cooperation Conference (SADCC). The Finns got their way as far as the North was concerned. Then the Nordic governments accepted the Norwegian proposal to choose SADCC as the Southern counterpart.

THE NORDIC INITIATIVE

The Nordic initiative has indeed got past the stage of mere talking. At the Donor Conference between SADCC and donor countries in January 1986, the Nordic countries and the SADCC countries agreed to expand their economic and cultural cooperation and to set up a framework for cooperation over the next five years. Extended cooperation would, according to the agreement, be founded on existing development aid programmes, but even cover trade, investments, finance and cultural exchanges. The text includes a reference to the NIEO and states that the

intention of the programme is to implement some elements of the NIEO programme as agreed in the UN General Assembly.

The declaration of intent was repeated and made somewhat more precise in the Communiqué issued from the Joint Meeting of Nordic/SADCC Ministers in January, 1988. Still, development assistance programmes remain the backbone providing for a total of 4 bn US dollars over the 1988-91 period. The Nordic countries thus account for about 1/3 of total OECD development assistance to the region.

Other sectors of exchange between the two regions remain, however, relatively undeveloped. The communiqué refers to:

- increased intra-regional and inter-regional trade;
- increased involvement of the business sector in Nordic countries; funds are to be set up to facilitate the creation of joint ventures;
- assistance to develop some branches of service industries and to solve problems that non-convertible currencies create and for increased trade.

Reference is also made to other areas of possible cooperation, noting that the "overall objective of the initiative is to establish deep and lasting roots, within both regions, so that mutually advantageous cooperation can be developed into, and beyond the next century." It is further stated that the "initiative represents a long term commitment to cooperation on an equitable and mutually beneficial basis and not simply a mechanism for promoting additional assistance."³

The initiative has indeed produced some concrete results. How these are to be assessed is a question not to be taken up in the present context, the more so because practical steps are fairly recent achievements or in the process of being implemented. Instead I propose to discuss in a general way, the following questions:

1. What is the rationale behind a mini-NIEO viewed in terms of the world economic situation in the 1980s?
2. What can we infer from past and present experience with similar efforts that may shed light on and be a model for the one that we consider in this particular case?

I propose, in other words, to put the Nordic-SADCC proposal into comparative perspective. The Nordic initiative and the SADCC programme should draw upon experiences reflected in theories of inter-regional and intra-regional integration. In proposing that, I am adopting what I referred to above as an entrepreneurial approach to the problem. I shall argue that the contents and direction of the effort is basically a matter of political bargaining and of the options and skills available for institutionalising it.

THE NORTH-SOUTH DIMENSION: MINI-NIEO, TRADE PREFERENCES OR "AID PLUS"?

Since the initiative was taken, there has been intra-Nordic bargaining over the scope of the programme. This bargaining has taken place as much within as between the individual Nordic countries. It has centered around three concepts:

- a. the mini-NIEO concept;
- b. an expanded trade programme that would come close to a preferential trade agreement; and
- c. a programme based on the existing bilateral development assistance schemes but with an expanded volume, some expansion of scope and common inter-Nordic schemes; this would be an "aid plus" type of arrangement.

What has been the substance of the bargaining? And what explains it? At least three hypotheses may be suggested:

1. Participants differ with respect to how far they have come to think in terms of comprehensive and all-sector approaches to development problems.

Some think in abstract and complex structures — and quite a few of them in fact support the NIEO. Others still think in instrumental and simplistic terms. The latter probably prefer measures which are concrete and yield identifiable outcomes. The hypothesis then is that the choice of an option is a function of position on the comprehensive (systemic) versus simplistic (*particularistic*) dimension.

Group or professional interests linked to public sector institutions and organizational processes within the private sector in the respective Nordic countries struggle to advance their particular sector or group views. Import competing industries (textiles) and export industries naturally advance their particular trade interests. They often link to their counterparts in public administration and parliament in what constitute strong segments of "democratic corporatism" (Katzenstein, 1984. Hveem, 1988). Development assistance administrations according to the same logic tend to favour the aid-plus option.⁴

2. The interest in a particular North-South scheme is a function of participants' perception of its feasibility. To many, SADCC is a region of little or no economic interest because it is relatively undeveloped in terms of production facilities, markets, infrastructure, labour skills and so on. Also and apart from the aid sector programmes, the Nordic-SADCC relationship is relatively modest in volume and in scope. There are, according to this view, few natural incentives to make comprehensive

and substantial efforts. A mini-NIEO scheme is thus perceived as too ambitious or less feasible.

The bargaining over the contents of the initiative may thus be seen as a struggle between pragmatists and voluntarists, between those who operate from the situation as it is and those who wish to change the situation. The motive of the latter must be of a political, moral or some other non-instrumental or non-pragmatic nature.

3. Support of the mini-NIEO or either of the other options is a function of political or ideological position. The Third world polity in a political system of the Nordic type consists of various groups with legitimate claims for a share in deciding outcomes of political bargains. The political and ideological stand of groups with such legitimate claims can be classified along two dimensions: altruism vs self-interest, and reformism vs status *quo*.⁵ Reformists are those who promote NIEO type policies in moderate or radical (anti-imperialist) versions. Altruists are found in Christian, humanitarian and other types of pro development, pro Third world groups.

When NIEO support peaked in Norway during the last part of the 1970s, a main factor was alliance-building between altruists, notably within the Church, and reformists in the Social Democratic, Socialist and centrist parties. A supporting factor was that many people perceived the Third world as a political front uniting to demand concessions from the North aided by a strong OPEC cartel. If there is less support for mini-NIEO politics in the 1980s, the reason may be that perceptions of Third world bargaining positions have changed.

On the other hand, political considerations must have formed an important part of the explanation why Nordic governments choose SADCC as their priority partner and why center-left action groups and intellectuals have suggested Central America. Those considerations have to do not primarily with the NIEO issue but with the problems of apartheid's regional dominance and of war.

The implications of South Africa's aggression against her neighbours have been discussed elsewhere (Hveem, 1986, Tostensen, 1986). In this context, I shall limit myself to one specific element of that relationship. Before doing so, there is one question that needs to be addressed:

If a mini-NIEO programme is wanted by some actors for political or other reasons, a precondition for it to gain wide support is that some NIEO principles have survived the breakdown of negotiations.

But what is really left of it for the 1980s and 1990s? Can we derive any universally applicable and lasting principles from the programmes and the proclamations of the 1970s?

North-South reformism rests on four principles that can be said to qualify for the criteria just referred to:

1. Third world countries should achieve *greater political autonomy and greater influence over international institutions and decision-making arenas* that shape their own possibilities for development;
2. there should be *redistribution of resources* vital to social and economic development among all countries;⁶
3. international measures that are taken to alleviate underdevelopment or promote development in the Third world should be *consistent and mutually supportive* of each other; and
4. in their exchange of goods and services with the North, Third world countries should *run a net balance* that gives them stable and real benefits.

The growing awareness of the ecological aspects of maldevelopment has added a dimension to international development that was present at the time when the NIEO demands were formally launched, but was not a major parameter for political action. With the Commission on the Environment and its report, this appears to be gradually changing. We may thus add to the list of principles;

5. international development measures must be compatible with the need for an *ecologically viable or sustainable development*.

If these five principles can be said to constitute the *basic NIEO principles*, one of the questions that were asked earlier can be reformulated: To what extent do actual developments in the North-South relationship, since the negotiation process started, deviate from these principles?

THE CASE FOR CHOOSING SADCC

In asking the question in this manner, we get the simplest explanation why the Nordic countries had a good case when they choose the SADCC region as a starter for a new North-South initiative. If we hold recent international developments up against the five principles, the following picture emerges:

Autonomy

The region is apparently subjected to a form of aggression by the RSA that is openly motivated to dominate the region and deprive her neighbours of their autonomy *or* set the conditions for its exercise such as in the Nkomati Agreement of 1984 (which is an indirect way of depriving the other country of autonomy).

Not only is there military aggression. The dependence of most of the SADCC members on RSA for economic resources and transport of essential goods make them vulnerable to the Republic's policy of domination by non-military means as well. One among several indicators of

this aspect of SADCC's vulnerability is the trade structure: the RSA takes only 7% of SADCC's exports whereas she accounted for 30% of their imports (CMI/SADCC, 1986). The purpose of the RSA policy is to maintain the apartheid system by holding the neighbouring countries hostages (Hanlon, 1986).

Now, all the 9 SADCC countries are not equally vulnerable in these respects. Swaziland and Lesotho find themselves in a position of absolute vulnerability, with practically no room for autonomous action. Others face relative vulnerability. Practically all face a situation of structural dependence on the RSA which offers the latter options of blackmailing and threats in the short run that can be corrected for only in the long run. This makes particular sense of some of the huge transportation projects that both EC and Nordic countries support in the region.⁷

Whereas the foreign debt position of the SADCC in purely economic terms is not as serious as that of many Latin American and other African countries, SADCC countries face a rather dramatic threat from this double vulnerability. Apartheid will fall, but the transition to freedom may take either an extremely violent direction or be solved by political means. And it may take several years or start tomorrow. In either event is it important, first, to extend the concept of national security to include the economic dimension, and secondly, to prepare for the after-apartheid situation. I shall return to the last point.

Resource transfer

A majority of the SADCC members are among the Least Developed or the Most Severely Affected among the Third world countries. Economic recession since the 1970s has hit them harder than most other countries, **which** means that their position has deteriorated. The exception is Zimbabwe.

The fact that the Nordic countries account for one third of all ODA⁸ to the Nine does not only reflect the priority that Nordic governments continue to put on the region. It also reflects the fact that other donor countries do not put a corresponding priority on it.

Consistent and mutually supportive measures

One of the greatest deficiencies in the North's policies towards the South is the lack of consistency between the various practical measures that are adopted. Trade policies counteract aid measures, or vice versa. This situation is to a considerable extent caused by the segmentation and fragmentation of the political process that was described above. One of the greatest challenges is therefore to attempt to correct this deficiency.

SADCC countries generally have not enjoyed an across-the-sectors relationship with non-SADCC countries (other than the colonial powers and the RSA). The majority has had an aid relationship, rather few investments (that were not of the colonial or neo-colonial type) and comparatively little trade (other than one or a few primary commodities). The cause of this situation is not only to be located externally. It can also be found in the economic structures of these countries.

A comprehensive approach to development problems appears thus as particularly appropriate in this case.

South Africa's strategy of all-out domination is another argument in favour of a comprehensive approach to SADCC. If one sector is aided, others may fall apart. Or the transfer of resources to that one sector may *leak to the RSA*. It is along the same argument that some groups in the Nordic countries have raised the question whether it is possible to assist SADCC without at the same time take some action against the military aggression of the **RSA**.⁹

Nordic countries do not seem in practice to have advanced far in combining the various elements of their *economic* policies toward the Third world policy into a comprehensive and consistent programme (Holm, 1979; Bergesen, Holm and McKinley, 1982). It is part of the political and entrepreneurial challenge to cope with this deficiency.

As far as Southern Africa is concerned, and leaving aside the military issue proper, the Nordics came out in 1978 and 1985 with what was referred to as an Action Programme. In March 1988, it was revised to encapsulate a trade boycott against the RSA. More specifically, it envisages a prohibition of *new* investments in the RSA and gradual reduction of trade with the Republic. The purpose of the programme is to continue to work for international sanctions by the UN, some unilateral sanctions by the Nordic countries and support of the SADCC as "a complement to sanctions, not an **alternative**".¹⁰

Net gains from exchange

Part of the development assistance channelled to the South is recirculated to the Nordic economies through payments for goods, services and personnel. Estimates of the percentage of total aid which is thus **re-**circulated, vary between 17 and 45% or **more**.¹¹ There is reason to believe that the percentage may be higher for Nordic aid to SADCC than for the average Nordic aid to the **South**.¹²

Trade and industrial investment relations are on the whole more important channels than aid for the exchange of economic value. In the Nordic-SADCC case, however, these relations appear rather undeveloped, even on a comparative basis. A comparison between EC-SADCC and Nordic-SADCC trade shows that: (i) the EC has a relatively far greater import from the SADCC countries than the Nordics, and the EC import is more evenly distributed among the SADCC countries; (ii) the EC import is

on the average on a higher processing level than that of the Nordic countries which mostly import raw materials. The differences may in large parts be explained by three factors:

1. More restrictive import policies by the Nordic countries in agricultural products;
2. differences in product structure (applies to ores and metals);
3. the colonial past of the EC-SADCC relationship which has created and maintains tight trade networks (a factor that is found to account for about 1/3 of total trade variance) (Olsen 1986).

Nordic-SADCC trade is thus small and rather characterized by those elements that have been associated with uneven exchange. Although the continuation of colonial ties between the EC and the SADCC represents a factor of potential imbalance in favour of the EC, the Nordic countries on the whole appear to contribute more than the EC (in relative terms) to the large trade deficit that SADCC countries have with the rest of the world.

As far as Nordic investments are concerned, they are linked to such "odd cases as Danish beer breweries and a few others. Swedish firms, which rank as comparatively big at the global level and which are found still operating in the RSA with the political acceptance of the Swedish Social Democrat government, have not found it interesting to move to the SADCC area.

The NIEO ideology was to a large extent built on the dependency interpretation of North-South relations. This interpretation that too often concluded too superficially that a trade surplus and net transfer of investment income from Third World to industrialized countries meant that the latter automatically or *by definition* exploited the former. Such simplistic analysis has clearly not advanced our understanding of North-South relations. Nor has it improved the scholarly quality of dependency, imperialism or other theories of a critical kind that are quite necessary for our discipline, but which today appear misused and misinterpreted at one and the same time. This being said, there can hardly be any question that parts of the South have been subject to what must properly be called exploitation, that is to a distribution of goods which is truly unjust (see below).

Ecologically viable development

There is very little information on the type and magnitude of ecological, environmental problems that SADCC countries face. There is information on aspects of their resource base, such as in minerals and arable land, and on the magnitude and the rate of increase of deserts in the region. The crisis following recent drought periods is visible enough to warrant action. So are the ecological consequences of South Africa's war against her neighbouring states. In the context discussed here, what is needed is a

better picture of whether present trade and aid channels contribute to ecological and environmental degradation in the region.

Except possibly for some of the mineral-exploiting areas in the region, present industrial infrastructures do not appear to pose a serious problem to ecological viability. The reason could be more the fact that there are few such infrastructures in operation than the fact that those which operate are particularly ecologically viable. Also, population/land ratios appear to be theoretically compatible with an ecologically sound policy of development. This being said, however, there may still be a case for applying *another development*¹³ including a more ecologically viable policy in the region. This applies both at project and programme levels and at the level of international exchange. A Nordic-SADCC programme may be made a testing ground for such a policy at the international level covering not only aid, but investment and trade relations as well.

Conclusion

With the possible exception of the third principle, all the other four appear to support our assumption that the SADCC region is a particularly good candidate for a mini-NIEO initiative. In addition, five out of the nine countries appear on the list of the so-called "Least Developed" of the Southern countries, authorized by the UN during the 1980s. Repeated resolutions have laid the basis for a *positive discrimination* of these countries in asking for special measures to be taken on their behalf.

In addition to these arguments of a moral and political nature, there is a more abstract—moral and philosophical—case for the initiative in *theories of justice*. It means quite a difference whether the *a priori* principle of Rawls or the *a posteriori* principle of Nozick is applied.¹⁴ But in reality the difference may turn out not to be great. If we are able to prove, as imperialism theory holds, that the present distribution of goods in the world economy is the result of a prior process of domination and exploitation and that the operation of the free trade principle has had a similar effect, then it is possible to apply Nozick's *a posteriori* or "conservative" approach. Then one may present a strong defence for the NIEO and in particular for the mini-NIEO proposals.

THE SOUTH-SOUTH DIMENSION: THE CRUCIAL ISSUE

The above has hopefully provided sufficient support for the positive discrimination case and the choice of SADCC. One counter-argument remains, however: if the Nordic initiative does not discriminate unjustly against other Third World countries, it may represent a method of negative discrimination against other OECD countries and thus break e.g. the international MFN regime on that score.

There are two possible replies to this type of critique. First, the principle of selective arrangements of the type envisaged is applied elsewhere, viz. Lome (EC-ACP), the US Caribbean Basin Initiative and others. One aim of the Nordic-SADCC Initiative thus could be to present an improvement on North-South relations compared to the EC-ACP system. The improvement would probably have to be qualitative rather than quantitative. A more limited comparative base, and one which would make even a quantitative comparison more feasible, would be to compare a Nordic-SADCC Initiative with the relationship between the EC and the Preferential Treatment Area (PTA) that includes more African countries but even five of the SADCC members.

A fairly recent and quasi-official report on the EC-ACP agreement concludes that "the performance of ACP countries in world trade in general and in EC trade in particular has been poor over the past fifteen years and this despite relatively generous preferences." Both trade policies of the EC and factors of international political and economic change made, according to the report, "the influence of privileged market access (...) small" (Kiel Study 1986, p 91).

As we pointed out above, the Nordic countries trade relationship with the SADCC appears to be even less contributing to net exchange benefits for the latter than the EC-SADCC relationship. There is therefore scope for the Nordic countries to correct present imbalances in trade with SADCC, not the least by changing trade policies.

Secondly, the critique makes it imperative to see to it that the Nordic-SADCC Initiative does result in a net transfer of resources to SADCC and offers no particular advantage to the Nordics. It should, in other words, be a concessionary system of transactions.

The real answer, however, may lie in a practical delimitation of the thrust of the initiative. It may be formulated thus: The purpose of the Nordic-SADCC Initiative is to promote intra-regional exchanges and cooperation. "Collective self-reliance" was part of the NIEO as the Third World presented it.

In the case of the Southern African region, no other part appears more important in the 1980s and 1990s as a means to merge multiple goals into one: create more autonomy *vis-à-vis* the RSA and neo-colonial tendencies; offer alternative market opportunities to producers in the region; offer economies of scale for production facilities which are too small to develop effectively on a national basis.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGIONAL COOPERATION

One of the backbones of SADCC's regional cooperation strategy is the programme of industrialization laid down in the Memorandum of Industrial Cooperation adopted by the Council of Ministers in Blantyre,

November 1981. In 1983, it was further concretized when the responsibility for developing a total of nine different industrial and infrastructural sectors was allocated among member states.

In a number of studies to follow these political steps, the nature and the scope of the common industrial policy of SADCC countries have been described and analysed (UNIDO, 1985; CMI/SADCC, 1986; OECD, 1984). They all highlight the characteristic feature of the SADCC scheme as being relatively peculiar, a point which is indirectly supported in a survey by Rossen (1984) and to which I return below. At the same time, they pay relatively more attention to economic aspects and less attention to political and institutional matters related to the scheme. There is therefore much scope for expanding analytical work on the latter. What follows is a very preliminary, brief and therefore admittedly rather superficial contribution in that direction.

Among theories of regional cooperation, we may distinguish between (i) theories of free trade areas or customs unions; (ii) theories of politically guided but selective (sector specific) economic integration; (iii) theories of political integration through federalism or political union; and (iv) theories of externally induced integration.

Free trade or customs union integration theory in the Viner tradition offers a strategy which is basically aimed at either trade creation or trade diversion. The method is reducing tariffs or relaxing non-tariff barriers to the movements of goods or services.¹⁵ The strategy contained in (ii) is apparently illustrated by SADCC's industrial cooperation programme, but is also illustrated by historical examples such as the Coal and Steel Union of the EEC. The (iii) strategy has been attempted on various occasions by some Arab countries, but has not been achieved in this or in other cases of regional cooperation in the Third World. It is high on the agenda of the EC. Option (iv) is not a strategy as much as it may act as an important incentive to regional integration. History is full of examples of countries coming together to act against a common enemy.

SADCC's relationship with South Africa obviously is part of the reason for the cooperation effort (type iv). Apartheid's destabilization policy acts as a negative incentive for the integration effort. The Nordic Initiative ideally is supposed to act as a positive incentive, in two respects: first, in terms of the resource transfer and net exchange effects; secondly, as an incentive for the SADCC countries to come together to develop a common bargaining position.

In addition, it would seem that SADCC is also motivated by factors that apply to type (ii). To the extent it is, *the SADCC case goes beyond the free trade/customs union approach* in at least two respects: it contains an element of non-market considerations of resource allocation or consideration of comparative advantage; and it plays down the role of the export sector as an engine of growth.¹⁶

In general, the experience with other regional cooperation efforts in the past is rather bleak. This appears to be particularly true for Africa (Green

and Krishna, 1976; Hazelwood, 1977). There is reason to believe that the form which the SADCC schemes has taken is motivated by this experience. It includes the experience with two local regional efforts that originated in colonial times, the East African Community and the Central African Union.

I propose for the rest of the paper to concentrate on three issues that appear to be of particular importance: the structural, political and institutional aspect of declared SADCC goals; the theoretical rationale or its industrial policy; and the after-apartheid question.

The present distribution of capabilities among the Nine is not different from the kind of unequal distribution that has troubled similar initiatives in the past. For an integration system to function, participants must have reasons to expect that it offers at least Pareto-optimal outcomes or at best net gains to everybody.

The politics of building such expectations among members is a very important process in any such scheme.

There are three dimensions that shape the structural, political and institutional conditions of any regional cooperation effort:

1. whether the *distribution of capabilities* at the outset of the effort is highly uneven or relatively even;
2. whether institutions are built according to the *centralizing or decentralizing* principle; and
3. if distribution of capabilities is uneven and institutions rather centralized, whether some state plays the role of an "*enlightened hegemon*".

The latter would according to one school of hegemony theory, take upon itself to lead the integration effort by assuming a disproportionate share of the burdens of implementing it. This would leave other members a chance to catch up with the *hegemon* by reaping a disproportionate share of the benefits of cooperation at least in the medium term. In the case of SADCC, the obvious candidate for such a role is Zimbabwe.

While it may be unclear whether Harare in fact assumes or is aspiring to assume such a role, *and* whether other members would be prepared to accept it doing so, it appears sufficiently clear that SADCC has opted for a *decentralizing* model. The decision taken in 1981 allocates to each member country the responsibility to coordinate one particular sector of cooperation. There is only a loose central institutional framework. The thrust of leadership and accountability lies with member governments. The integration process is thus less the affair of one common institution aspiring to play a supranational role of some degree, more vested in the day-to-day affairs of national government. This makes the SADCC a rather unique experiment in regional cooperation. It also offers both advantages over other comparable efforts and disadvantages.¹⁷

As far as *industrial policy* is concerned, one aspect of it—the institutional arrangement—has already been discussed. The other aspect

is what type of industrial policy is envisaged. This question does not seem to be clarified at this stage (1988). There are, however, some indications that SADCC leaders may think in terms of a model which is usually ascribed to Prebisch and ECLA: import substitution rather than export oriented industrialization.

Irrespective of whether this interpretation is correct or not, there appears to be good reasons to rethink the traditional view—that there is a straightforward choice between the two. The staff of the World Bank is a source of constant underpinning of the view that there is in fact such a choice. And that import substitution policies have turned out to be inefficient.

Recent studies of the experience of some Latin American countries cast doubt on the conventional wisdom (Singer, 1986). They show that rather than describing import substitution industrialization (ISI) as inefficient and therefore a policy not to be recommended to other countries, the ISI of the 1950s and 1960s served to develop technological capacity, experience and skills, economies of scale, linkages to domestic firms and infrastructure that later, during the 1970s led to a substantial increase in the volume of exports (Teitel and Thoumi, 1986). In an earlier study, Park was able to show how ISI and export oriented strategies can be interwoven as they in fact were in the case of South Korea, to form a sequential scheme (1977). The basic principle for the scheme was and is to identify and promote "industries which are both export industries and essential domestic producers so that the measures associated with import substituting industrialization and export-oriented industrialization can both be used in proper combination and proper sequence" (Singer, *op. cit.*, p 8).

One question which the SADCC process has not yet dealt with is its relationship to non-government transnational networks such as the Transnational Corporations (TNCs). For one thing, conglomerate Anglo-American Corporation (AAC) is accounting for an unknown, but no doubt large share of all production and distribution of goods within and among the SADCC countries. Previous experience shows that the type, resources and the determination of a regional integration effort such as SADCC is very important in deciding the role and effects of TNCs.

A common market or customs union arrangement with weak national and/or international institutions to steer the integration process has proven in several cases to offer TNCs particularly advantageous conditions and in some cases represented a drain of benefits away from the local governments and populations. Now, SADCC has so far not set as a goal to develop a common market. But the possible conflict of interest between TNC and local government goals is even stronger in the case of an integration model based on production *sharing*.

In terms of technological capacities, economic scale and the ability of the firm to play on internal transfers by setting up affiliates in different countries, TNCs normally enjoy a strong bargaining position in dealing with small and weak countries (Vaitsos, 1986).

An attempt to establish an international regime to regulate (moderately) the activities of the TNCs was part of the NIEO process until its very end. For this reason, but above all because TNCs are de facto important actors and thus effectively policy-makers in probably all the sectors that **SADCC** has embarked upon, the **SADCC** enterprise ought to take up this aspect of its environment.

Yet another reason why this has to be done is the probability that **AAC** and other similar networks will remain as apartheid goes. So will the strength of the South African economy, a strength that represents a formidable bargaining power even to a majority government in the Republic. This is not to say that such power will be misused to perpetuate economic domination over **SADCC** after the military and political domination is gone. It belongs, however, to the reality of politics that no government will voluntarily or for a long time retreat from a position of relative bargaining strength.

The Republic will probably become member of **SADCC** with majority government, as will Namibia. This probability makes it even more important for **SADCC** to start planning for the after-apartheid era. But for all that an outside observer knows, that planning may already be under way.

NOTES

1. See **Hveem**, 1980, a draft of which was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1979 with a recommendation that it considered the proposal seriously. Norway at the time chaired the North-South dialogue and may not have wanted such new concepts to interfere with the global process.
2. *Inter alia* in a colloquium in **Alger**, a seminar of the international coalition of Development Action in Elsinore, Denmark and a seminar of the Finnish UN Association in Lahtis, Finland in 1981.
3. Communique from Joint Meeting of **Nordic/SADCC** Ministers in Arusha, Tanzania, 28th February 1988.
4. In the case of Norway, during the 1984-85 period when the Initiative was discussed initially, the aid administrators (**NORAD**) apparently made objections to enter into a more comprehensive scheme as suggested by the special Committee of Nordic Civil Servants; representatives of the Ministry of Commerce and Foreign Affairs on the other hand were more positive to measures in addition to aid.
5. For a presentation and discussion of these dimensions as they apply to the Norwegian Third World polity, see **Hveem** 1988.
6. Many would add *within* countries as well, but the **NIEO** programme was primarily meant for international relations.
7. See **Hveem** 1986 for a more detailed presentation and discussion of the vulnerability concept in relation to the **RSA-SADCC** confrontation and with respect to how **SADCC** may find ways to exploit the relationship to their own advantage.
8. Official Development Assistance.
9. The question has been raised *inter alia* by the **Fellesrådet** for det **Sørlige Afrika** (Council on Southern Africa) in Norway. See also Reginald H Green 1986.
10. Revised Programme of Action against Apartheid agreed by the meeting of Nordic Foreign Ministers in **Tromsø**, Norway 23 to 24 March 1988.

11. The estimate depends on the definition of aid, modes of recirculation, on the reliability and validity of sources and on other factors. OECD definitions appear to be the most commonly used guide. According to the OECD Development Centre's 1983 Review, Sweden and Finland tied 17%, Denmark 34 and Norway some 36% of their total development assistance in 1982. Estimates by Strand, 1980, indicate that the figure for Norway may be somewhat higher.
12. According to the OECD Development Centre, 1984, total DAC aid to SADCC that was tied in 1982 was 42% (weighted figure) as against 38% for global weighted average. See Table 2, p 80.
13. Reference is made to the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation's report.
14. For Rawls, the guiding principle for distributing goods is that negotiations over how to distribute goods should be concluded before considerations of what is beneficial to which group, including oneself, may influence decisions. He expects negotiators to agree that goods should be distributed in a way that ensures a disproportionate flow of goods to those groups which are initially at a disadvantage. Rawls, in other words, is mainly interested in the outcome of the distributive issue. For Nozick, the process of distribution is more important as his point of departure the distribution of goods as it is and looks at how it came about of goods that is the result of legitimate purchase, transfer of goods by heritage or otherwise through voluntary exchange transactions in a free market is just according to Nozick.
15. Trade creation means a shift from the consumption of higher-cost domestic products to lower-cost products of other member states; trade diversion is shift from the consumption of lower-cost non-member countries' products to higher-cost products of member states. See Staubhaar, 1987.
16. This is the impression left by e.g. the statement by President Masire of Botswana at the 1988 SADCC Donor Conference, but the statement may be interpreted as a plea for reduced export dependence (from a very high level) more than a quest for wide-range self-sufficiency or import substitution policies.
17. For a detailed description, see SADCC memoranda and OECD, 1984.

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Industrial Development in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa: Some Issues for Further Research in a SADRA/Nordic Context

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For a research effort which aims at having an impact, it is important to select themes in the light of an assessment of future prospects and problems. Contrary to what some of our clients or target groups in administration and policy making seem to believe, research takes time. To be able to produce research results and research competence to match, or still better, create the demand at any given time, our topics have to be correctly chosen in advance. For applied research to be considered relevant and to have an impact it is important to identify the important themes, not of today but of tomorrow. This paper is therefore not an attempt to answer any questions but rather to stimulate a debate on what the relevant questions may be.

In broad terms this conference aims at coming up with themes which we think will be relevant to the policy makers in the Nordic countries and/or Southern Africa in the post-apartheid era. The particular focus of this paper was supposed to be the industrial sector but has, not surprisingly, come to focus much more on the broader economic context for industrial development. Developments in the economy are of course heavily influenced by factors that go far beyond economics and which largely fall beyond the scope of this paper. This is a limitation which I hope will be corrected by other papers and the debate during this conference.

The task of selecting tomorrow's themes in Southern Africa is enormous and can not be done justice to in a short paper; A bewildering number of alternatives exist for South Africa's post-apartheid future. If one attempts to consider the future of the whole Southern Africa, there is even more scope for bewilderment. As I see it we do however have some advantages on our side that we should make full use of. We know that a fundamental change will have to take place in South Africa, the major power in the region. I also believe that there is, between us, some broad degree of consensus as to the direction of these changes.

OUTLINE AND ASSUMPTIONS

Any attempt at precise economic prediction would be futile. I shall look at tendencies in the form of regional economic opportunities, tensions, constraints, and trends which are likely to emerge in the medium term (usually interpreted as about 5 years) after apartheid. I shall largely refrain from considering an overall outcome by weighing these tendencies against each other and against tendencies of political, social and external character. Particularly the external influences—politically and from the world market—will be crucial and unavoidably will have to be kept in mind. Forecasting the effect of those and the other factors on, for example, standards of living and the macro economy lies far beyond the scope of this paper.

My scheme of analysis is simple. It certainly does not cover all the complexities, but hopefully will reveal a few important features of the economic scene post-apartheid.

I start by making two fundamental assumptions about the effects of the removal of apartheid. Those are (i) the emergence of a greater popular influence on economic policy making and (ii) recognition of South Africa as a bona fide member of the international community.

The rest of the analysis is largely an attempt at tracing the economic tendencies and pressures arising from these changes, in the South African economy and in the region.

Further limitations lie in the following assumptions:

The first is that I assume, during the medium-term transitional period, an economy which will not be disrupted to the extent that production stops or declines dramatically. This in turn will have to rest upon two conditions: (i) that limited material damage will be inflicted during the final phases of the liberation struggle and (ii) that key economic institutions except those which are closely connected to the apartheid system will remain largely intact. The relative constancy of institutions implies that the exodus of whites, who control these institutions at present, will not exceed dramatically the ability of the new government to replace those in key positions.

The second is that the form and substance of the post-apartheid government will be democratic in the sense that the needs and aspirations of the majority of the population will become the cornerstone of government policies.

The third—which is probably safer to make—is that majority rule in South Africa will also bring peace to the region as a whole.

TENDENCIES IN THE POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY

The major effect emerging from greater democracy in economic policy-making in South Africa will be a greater equality in access to national resources and in the distribution of the national income. This would manifest itself through a greater strain on public sector resources and through a relative weakening of the power of capital in wage bargaining.

The public sector

The manipulation of the government budget is a main way in which government exercises its influence on the economy. To respond to popular pressures post-apartheid, *a dramatic increase of budgetary expenditure on a wide range of social services will be necessary*. This part of the budget is even at the present time substantial, although used in totally different way from what it would post-apartheid. EIU (1988) estimated the expenditure on social services at 35.2% of the total budget 1988/89.

The major category under social services is education. It has been estimated (Cobbe, 1986) for 1983/84 that if per pupil education expenses had been the same for other groups as for whites, total education expenditures would more than triple (from 4 to 14 billion Rand). In terms of recurrent expenditure at the wage levels at that time this is a maximum figure and does not take into account possible savings on white education expenditure or the fact that at first there will be a relatively low fraction of blacks at the higher and more expensive levels of education. On the other hand, the estimate does not take into account the likely post-apartheid increase in teachers' salaries (some 90% of recurrent costs according to Cobbe) and the very necessary investment in the expansion and improvement of facilities. These costs, as well as greatly increasing numbers of blacks at the higher education levels would however make themselves felt in the medium term. At the present time the education budget is likely to run at R5 billion.

If majority rule was achieved tomorrow, and an equitable *education system* introduced, it could at a conservative guess bring the budget up to the R15 billion level after a few years. According to the EIU (1988) the entire social services expenditure is at present (1988/89) R 19.8 billion. The total expenditure is at present R55.5 billion. To illustrate the overall budgetary effect of increased education expenditure, the R10 billion increase in education expenditure is nearly 20% of the entire budget. That such an expenditure increase is fully possible may be indicated by the experience of Zimbabwe: In the first five years after independence, the education vote in the Zimbabwean budget *quintupled* (at current prices).

In other social services sectors, mainly health and various forms of welfare measures, the situation is likely to be similar to that of education.

A restructuring of the budget to bring about equal treatment of all population groups can hardly take place within the present overall budgetary frame. The removal of the privileged status of the whites may go some way towards covering the necessary increased outlay. However, only the simple fact that the number of whites is small relative to the non-whites limits the balancing effect of this. Another limiting factor is that some of the white **privileges** cannot be taken away entirely in an abrupt way without precipitating a mass exodus.

According to Savage (1987) there are substantial budgetary costs attached to the upkeep of apartheid. The costs relate to both administration and the item "public order and security". In some of the literature it appears to be assumed that the elimination of such costs will cover a substantial part of the new necessary expenditure post-apartheid. On this point, I have some reservations.

Firstly, comparing Savage's estimate of the "direct annual cost of apartheid" of between R 2.8 billion and R 5.7 billion (1985-86 basis) only to the estimate above on additional expenses in the education sector and what one may expect in the other social sectors, the *budgetary* savings on the costs of apartheid appear limited. It is the economic costs of apartheid, those which lie in the limiting effect on production and consumption, which are the most important ones. The beneficial effect of those will only come into full play in the longer term.

Secondly, one factor referred to as a cost of apartheid is the "bantustan" policy. While abandoning the present "regional development policies" is likely to create considerable budgetary savings, budgetary costs, particularly for infrastructural development are likely to arise as the **present** policies are replaced.

Thirdly, even if one assumes a relatively smooth transition to majority rule, implying a reasonably low level of defence and police expenditure in the early post-apartheid periods, the new government will have to pay for a considerable military force which in all countries constitutes an **important** pillar of the state beside popular support and economic power.

The *revenue* side of the budget depends on taxation measures and policies but more fundamentally on the *tax base* which again is related to the growth of the economy. Although, as argued below, a certain "honeymoon" period in terms of foreign investment may occur, the problems with a likely and necessary process of achieving control over major multinationals may well erode taxable incomes. Also, a more equitable wage structure would mean a stronger popular opposition against an increase of **personal** income taxation and indirect taxes. In conclusion I believe the argument stands strong that the medium term fiscal situation post-apartheid will be one of a considerable budgetary squeeze.

The wage structure

The apartheid structure of wages and salaries cannot be continued under a majority regime for any length of time. If not changed towards a more equitable structure it would quickly erode the credibility of the new government. In general it is beyond doubt that movements from an inequitable to a more equitable structure will tend to increase the overall wage bill. This is likely to have several effects on the economy. It may contribute to a cost push inflationary spiral and erode the country's international competitiveness. It may also lead to a change towards labour saving technology.

An interesting case study has been presented by Bergsman (1982). Using different analytical approaches for predicting the effect of "crowding" caused by apartheid in the lower paid sections of the labour market he arrived at the conclusion that "apartheid-free" wages would be on average some 9% lower for whites and around 65% higher for blacks. The alternative methods used gave roughly consistent results. Applying these predicted changes to company operating data on production of ferrochrome in the US and South Africa he found that it would increase costs by some 14%. That estimate includes an arbitrary, but in Bergsman's opinion, upper bound assessment of the factor substitution effect, that is the extent to which costs could be cut by substituting capital for labour.

One may argue that there is scope for financing the higher wage bill by cutting the present excessive profits of the private sector. This might to some extent counterbalance cost push inflation and the erosion of competitiveness, but hardly, within an essentially market-based system, affect the bias towards labour saving technology. The question of whether, or how easily, profits could be expropriated and used to pay the expected increase of the wage bill is essentially the question of how to deal with the major multinationals. Again, with reference to Zimbabwe it appears that such a process is made difficult by the fact that the private sector can always threaten with the loss of competitive edge and that government may not dare to press the issue for the fear of the loss of jobs.

Employment

Under apartheid, the jobless have had virtually no voice. When the struggle is won, the pressure for government policies to create more jobs may to a certain extent work counter to a general lifting of the wage level of the lowest paid. Although some of today's unemployment may be absorbed in various ways, the employment problem will certainly be brought very high up on the agenda of a government which has to be responsive to popular demands.

Investment

Post-apartheid South Africa will quickly become a "persona grata" in the international community. Although one may discuss to what extent the apartheid regime has been standing in the way for normal relations in international trade and investment, its fall is likely to intensify international economic relations. The present tendencies to withdrawal of foreign capital is likely to be reversed. It appears likely that for some years after the new government takes over, the country will have a "honeymoon" period with regard to private capital inflows. The final effect of this tendency will certainly depend on the foreign investment policies adopted by the new government but it would not be unlikely that sizeable capital inflows resulted.

Trade

The dismantling of apartheid would be likely to increase South Africa's external trade flows. Mineral exports could be a bigger foreign exchange spinner for the country than what is the case at present since some costs attached to sanctions evasion would disappear. The success of manufactured exports would partly depend on how competitive South Africa would be on the major markets in the US, Europe and Japan. The signs are that South Africa still has a long way to go to be able to compete in such markets. Manufactured exports would probably fare much better in the Africa where South Africa has the advantage of proximity. Post-apartheid improvement in access to Asian markets could also open opportunities. On the import side, cif unit prices may go down after apartheid: Those who at present export goods to South Africa would not be able to charge the "apartheid premiums" that they now do.

Manpower

Both the assumed loss of significant numbers of key white personnel in the private and public sectors and any new demand for educated manpower in connection with new industrial investment would need to be filled. Even a cursory look at the numbers involved will make it clear that this gap could not easily be filled by the qualified South African blacks—either in South Africa or abroad—who are prevented from taking high level jobs because of the colour bar. The manpower gap is likely to be filled by a considerable amount of imports, by private companies or by government through donor agencies.

REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

It is not an easy task to draw any strong overall conclusions from the above examination of economic tendencies in post-apartheid South Africa. It appears however quite likely that even under a relatively problem free transition, various pressures in the economy would require so much resources and attention by policy makers that the scope for attention and support to the problem areas in the region would be rather limited. South Africa's regional economic policies would therefore tend to emerge as a reflection of domestic problems rather than arising from a particular interest for the regional and continental context.

This point will also be reinforced by keeping in mind some key economic magnitudes; Although South Africa is less than half the size of **SADCC (incl Namibia)** in terms of population, the total size of the **SADCC countries'** economy is about 1/3 of South Africa, as measured by the size of **GDP**, exports and imports. Although the majority of South Africa's trade and other external economic links are not directed towards the **SADCC** region it is clear that South Africa's economic behaviour will play a major role for development in the region as a whole.

What effect would these foreseen changes have on the industrialization process which, for most of the **countries** in the region is in a rather embryonic state? Only one point seems fairly clear: The industrialization policies of the countries in the region, which are largely built on the present form of their relations to South Africa, would under such circumstances come under pressure for change. This goes equally for the individual governments and for **SADCC** collectively.

To be more specific on the effects on industrialization in the region a more comprehensive scheme of analysis will have to be constructed. We would have to investigate the character and magnitude of economic-politico interregional relations, policy action and reaction.

I shall again not try to predict but will look at the question in the following way: The common list of obstacles to the growth of the manufacturing industries in **SADCC** includes the small size of their domestic markets, poorly developed infrastructure, lack of the appropriate kind of manpower (including entrepreneurs), lack of capital (particularly risk capital) and a low technological level. How will the likely post-apartheid developments in South Africa affect these obstacles?

Economic activity and trade

It seems quite clear that the peace brought to the region as a result of the end of apartheid would first of all bring about an increase in the regional demand for industrial goods. Economic activity, particularly in the three countries now ravaged by war, would pick up considerably, freed as they

would be for transport difficulties, the heavy drain on resources for military expenditure, and the disruption of productive activities by military action and various other forms of destabilization. The cost to the economies in the region of South African and South African-backed warfare has been estimated in various ways by various observers. The exact figure varies but is very considerable; a Commonwealth study estimates the combined effect of war and destabilization at some 15–20% of the combined GDP in the SADCC region. For comparison, the annual *growth* of GDP in the region is hardly above the about 3% it would take to prevent a decline in GDP per head, some of the countries showing negative growth rates. In addition to this would come the results of the destructive process in Namibia which at independence will have to recover from both apartheid and war. The potential effect of peace on production and demand in the region could be spectacular.

Interregional trade would benefit considerably from the potential improvement of interstate transport and communication. Absence of military and other obstruction of the transport network could realize the full potential of the infrastructure that the SADCC countries have built up or rehabilitated since 1980.

The perspective that South Africa under a democratic regime, in addition to the improved scope for trade, would open its markets to the countries in the region may appear very promising for the SADCC countries, indeed the whole of Sub Saharan Africa. However, South Africa would not be likely to do so without some form of *quid pro quo* in terms of trade concessions from the SADCC states.

The question of a realignment of SADCC countries' trade relations with South Africa raises some important questions in the field of industry; for example, how competitive is South Africa's industrial sector compared to the other countries of the region? Most of the countries except Zimbabwe would perhaps not have many industrial goods to export. In a free or nearly free regional market, would not South African exporters achieve a considerably greater penetration of the home markets within SADCC even though the supposedly greater wage bill in South Africa would present some incentives for manufacturers of consumption goods to turn to the domestic market?

This, in turn, brings up the difficult problem about the distribution of benefits from post-apartheid forms of regional economic cooperation, including the distribution between South Africa and SADCC as well as between the individual countries within SADCC. The acquired insight into the distribution question and its effect on the opinions and ideas held by the governments in the region will form a most important background for negotiations between the SADCC (or PTA) countries and South Africa to set the new rules of the game for regional trade and other economic relations. I believe that such negotiations will have to take place at the very beginning of the post-apartheid era.

At the present time, trade relations between SADCC countries and South Africa take several forms. Tanzania, at one extreme, has banned all trade and financial relations with South Africa, whereas, at the other end of the spectrum, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). The degree of change, or potential change, will therefore differ substantially from country to country. A stock-taking of the workings of present relations might be of considerable interest in the post-apartheid era. Although the SACU relationship at present is set in an apartheid context and comprises countries that always will belong to the South African hinterland, it contains general features which may illustrate the problems and potentials of a free market approach to economic cooperation. Academic debate on the nature and effect of the present SACU relationship has not brought much consensus. Although one should be aware of the sensitivity of this issue as seen from the three smaller countries, I feel that a renewed research effort could yield interesting results, not least in a post-apartheid perspective.

Looking beyond the region, it is clear that a Southern African trade area comprising South Africa would be much more interesting as an interregional trade partner than for example SADCC is at present. Various opportunities need to be explored. Present trade flows point to the importance of industrialized countries' markets, but both for economic and (not least) political reasons one should pay major attention to the prospects of stronger linkages with Asian and Latin-American economic groupings.

Infrastructure

Infrastructural weaknesses represent barriers to industrialization in all SADCC countries. Industrial infrastructure may be divided into "hardware" and "software". Apart from the expected improvement in access to transport links in post-apartheid Southern Africa, the hardware side is not likely to be dramatically affected by the transition to majority rule in South Africa. There is a possible difficulty however, for those countries who might be using the domestic South African transport network for transit. The transport subsidy that some of the SADCC countries at present draw from South Africa by using the subsidized South African railway network would be likely to come under pressure. The apartheid regime's reason for allowing this subsidy; to keep as much as possible of the SADCC countries' transport network under their control for strategic reasons would vanish after apartheid.

On the "software" side, where the *location* of infrastructure is less important, there would be scope, post-apartheid, for sharing facilities. South Africa, together with SADCC, is in a better position than the two parts separately to carry the cost of testing and research facilities, labora-

tories and organizations for standardization and quality control. Also the combined market could make more efficient use of specialist services usually bought by enterprises in the form of various industrial consultancy services.

Manpower

All countries of Southern Africa regard the lack of highly qualified manpower as a key constraint for the development of their manufacturing sector. As indicated above it is possible that certain kinds of specialist "overhead" manpower from South Africa could come within closer reach for industry in the SADCC countries. On the other hand, the possible tendency for an urgent manpower gap in post-apartheid South Africa may result in a considerable "pull" from South Africa on able managers from elsewhere in the region. If a fairly free regional labour market is established, this could well result in a flow of highly skilled manpower to South Africa from the region. This flow may take on considerable proportions; in spite of the present apartheid regime a brain "trickle" to the South is already seen as a problem in some SADCC countries. For ambitious industrial managers and entrepreneurs in several SADCC countries, both challenges and rewards in a post-apartheid South African industrial sector would appear greater than in their home countries.

For unskilled and semi-skilled manpower, the flow is highly likely to go in the opposite direction. The effective pressure to employ unskilled nationals instead of migrant labour from the countries in the region will be greater in post-apartheid South Africa than under the present government. There is at present (as pointed out by Hanlon 1987) resistance from the South African mining industry, a major migrant employer, to the use of repatriations of mine workers as a means of retaliation for sanctions. Whereas resistance against the repatriation of migrant workers would remain post-apartheid, it is likely to be weaker relative to the pressure for domestic job creation. A reduction of the number of migrants would perhaps be more acceptable for the industry if it was seen as a change to last in the longer term and not something that might be reversed if sanctioning countries started to "behave". It would not be unlikely that most of the migrant mine workers were phased out in the medium term, perhaps apart from those from Lesotho where the dependence on sale of labour is almost total.

The countries which now supply mine labour would confront both problems and opportunities. The balance between problems and opportunities would depend much on the skill type and level of the repatriated workers and economic opportunities in the receiving countries. I would tend to believe that for the medium term the problems in the SADCC countries' urban labour markets would be the most visible result of the repatriation. More knowledge about the possible numbers

involved, their skills and possible ways of absorbing them can be accumulated in advance. Systematic gathering of experience from countries which have been confronted with similar situations would be valuable.

Capital flows, international investment

For the SADCC countries, several opposing factors will affect the private (non-concessional) capital flows within the region and from outside. Peace, and the economic opportunities following it would attract international capital for the region as a whole. On the assumption of rapidly established stability in South Africa, the relative attractiveness of South Africa as an investment location for international industrial investors in the region will increase. There is little doubt that a large part of the possible capital flow would tend to be led there.

Capital flows between SADCC and South Africa are generally very small, although from time to time significant for some countries. There would be a tendency post-apartheid for South African and international capital at present establishing within SADCC, directly or via middlemen, to withdraw and establish itself within South Africa. On the other hand, the envisaged black wage increases in South Africa and the repatriation of migrant workers to the supplying countries may increase the cost of labour in South Africa relative to that in some of the SADCC countries to the extent that some South African capital in the more labour intensive industries (textiles, clothing) would be attracted to the idea of setting up in the SADCC countries.

Technological development and capability

More open borders between South Africa and SADCC would mean an enlargement of a market at roughly the same technological level. Within the greater area there would be more scope for a development and adaptation of technology suited to the existing technological level. A surge of international investment to the region would in many ways work the other way by introducing capital goods designed with quite different factor prices in mind.

The effect of the introduction of new technology "packaged" with international investment will depend on how well the quality of their manpower is attuned to such new technology. If the flows of more educated manpower in the post-apartheid period will tend to go towards South Africa, the other countries are likely to lose out in that respect.

SADCC VERSUS SOUTH AFRICA?

It is clear from the above that the dismantling of apartheid carries great opportunities for industrial development in the region as a whole. But the individual countries' share of these opportunities are not necessarily equal. The sharing of the advantages from a larger market would depend on the trade arrangements that are made in the region. A free market arrangement would probably give the result that the major benefits would go to the bigger and most industrialized countries and in the longer term worsen already severe regional imbalances. The natural response to this prospect for the smaller countries would be to argue that regional economic agreements and mechanisms must contain arrangements to ensure that benefits of the productive resources released by the collapse of apartheid will benefit also the smaller countries. The response to such claims from the South African government would probably be affected to a great extent by the constrained budgetary situation that they were likely to be in. An extension of sharing and compensation arrangements built on the same kind of financial compensation formulae as for SACU would hardly be on the agenda. There would probably be a need for constructing sharing arrangements which did not involve budgetary flows. A number of such mechanisms have been used for benefit sharing, most of them involve protection schemes.

In the absence of early post-apartheid regional agreements on such schemes, the smaller countries in the region may well find it necessary to build protective structures between their own economies and South Africa. Even for BLS which have had nearly completely open borders to South Africa, it may well be that the post-apartheid absence of what one could call "apartheid protection" towards South Africa, which has made it unthinkable that any of the countries moved towards a complete absorption by the apartheid state, may necessitate other forms of protection. The smaller nations on the fringe of South Africa may well find that they have to protect their nationhood by erecting economic borders, fearing that an open border policy in the early post-apartheid era would start them off on the way to complete absorption into South Africa.

If the individual SADCC countries would have to negotiate various trade and other economic arrangements with South Africa, would they not be likely to attempt to do so collectively rather than one by one? One central issue in providing the answer to this would be the strength of their cohesion under the above post-apartheid scenario. If it is right, as often assumed, that the major adhesive in SADCC is the front against apartheid, its demolition would make a major crack in the SADCC wall.

But does that assumption hold? Observers tend to stress different opinions about the origins of SADCC and for the cohesive power which has carried the organization since. Questions like the following are asked:

- Were its origins based on the erstwhile member countries' fears that Zimbabwe after its independence would preempt the lion's share of the aid allotted to the region?
- Was a major factor the need for cooperation in the struggle against apartheid?
- Does cohesion mainly stem from real common economic interest?
- Is **SADCC's** basis and *raison d'être* the coordination of donor funds and the coordination of aid projects?

It is important to acquire a better understanding of **SADCC** origins, more important to understand what its basis is at the present time but most important to assess its potential in a long term post-apartheid future. Only then can one meaningfully discuss possible options for **SADCC's** role in the post-apartheid era and compare it with other options for economic groupings.

Would the best option for **SADCC** after apartheid be to attempt co-option of South Africa into the organization? On one hand, this may create a common platform from which negotiations between countries may take place. On the other hand, would not South Africa as much the stronger party in such a grouping lead the whole group in the direction of its own best economic interest? For what reason might South Africa be interested in joining **SADCC**?

An important question would be what bargaining positions the other countries have, individually and collectively. Although South Africa is extremely well equipped in natural resources, it does not have everything. South Africa clearly has a need for complementing its own resources for example in the areas of water, petroleum, power, and a few industrial raw materials. Even with the best of relations between the **post-apartheid** government in South Africa and the **SADCC** governments, there will be some bargaining to do. It could be an extremely intricate balancing process, affected by all the relevant and irrelevant political factors at the time of negotiation and it could be a process lasting for years. The role of research may be limited, but I believe an effort in clarifying major options and their possible effects as well as advance thinking about the framework for negotiations could have an impact.

THE DONOR COMMUNITY

The early post-apartheid era will give rise to new problems and prospects for the region as a whole. This will have an influence on development cooperation in the region, both in terms of extent of ODA flows and the way in which it is deployed. It will be important that donors are responsive to new needs, but one also should expect that they will have

their own ideas about the ways in which they would like to see things develop and try to influence by using whatever leverage they have.

The *magnitudes* involved

According to OECD statistics, the combined gross ODA receipts for SADCC countries in 1986 were in the order of US\$ 2.5 billion or some 25 % of total aid to the entire Sub Saharan Africa. With a population of about 70 million this gives a per capita ODA flow of some US\$ 35, nearly twice the size of the world average per head inflows to low income countries (China and India excluded).

After apartheid it appears highly likely that the pressures in the South African economy would give rise to a need for external aid. Emergencies may arise and huge sums in immediate humanitarian aid may be needed for shorter periods. But even excluding such extraordinary flows there would be arguments for a significant level of ODA from the early post-apartheid years. If one argued that the per capita flow to South Africa post-apartheid should equate the average for the region it would mean an annual flow of US\$ 1.1 billion. On the other hand, South Africa is classified as an "upper middle income" country (World Bank 1988) with GNP per capita at a level three times that of Zimbabwe and about twice that of Botswana, the two "middle-income" economies within SADCC. Using the average per capita flow to "upper middle income countries" would give a total annual flow of less than US\$ 1/4 billion, still as high as 10% of the total ODA into the SADCC region in 1986.

Assuming that additional "world" ODA, which over the last half decade has been largely stagnant (in terms of constant US\$) will not drastically increase just at the time of South African independence, the entry of South Africa on the development cooperation scene will have to lead to considerable rearrangement of ODA flows. This appears quite clear at the regional level, but also—if the flows to South Africa are to approach the higher bound mentioned above—even on a world scale. US\$ 1.1 billion is nearly 4% of the total world flow of ODA to developing countries in 1988.

In addition to filling the "development assistance vacuum" in South Africa, the international donor community in the region would also face other challenges after apartheid. The countries presently at war, in particular Mozambique, Angola and Namibia, would probably be in that state until near the fall of apartheid. Under post-apartheid and supposedly peaceful conditions, these countries would be able to absorb much more assistance and very easily be able to demonstrate their needs. Under a static ceiling for world ODA and for the region as a whole the readjustment that would have to take place could be very painful for some of the SADCC countries and require intricate balancing acts in the diplomacy of negotiating foreign assistance.

But donors do not always look at needs in terms of low or high GDP per capita. There are a lot of other factors that will play a role on the supply side, one of the major ones being the opportunity of using development aid as a spearhead for commercial relations and private capital. Also, a lot of less relevant factors seem to be important for donors in selecting their recipients; language, the development of service institutions and infrastructure, climate, holiday and adventure opportunities for so-called experts and other aid workers. If one looks at South Africa as a potential aid recipient in this way it would appear to be almost the ideal choice for any donor. It has a very attractive raw materials base which it is easy for resource-hungry industrial countries to exploit beyond what they do at present because of the infrastructure already in place. Given only moderate damage to infrastructure, housing and service institutions from the liberation struggle, the central towns would certainly be "nice places" in which scores of new foreign embassies and experts could set up. There is certainly a considerable chance that South Africa would be more attractive to the donors than most of the SADCC countries. The scenario of donors "falling over themselves" just to get in at an early stage seems to me quite realistic.

It would be desirable to avoid a situation where the aid flows to several SADCC countries would have to be scaled down to absorb South African and other needs. One obvious way out would be to mobilize additional resources. This would depend on the economic situation in the "traditional" main donor countries around the time of the change in South Africa and the needs of countries in the other third world continents.

One may infer certain contours of a scenario over the next 5-10 years by looking at today's situation. Among the OECD donors the Nordic countries and the Netherlands have surpassed the UN ODA target of 0.7% of GNP. France is virtually on the target. All the other countries are below 0.5%. Among these, countries at the lower end where even a small increase in their ODA/GNP would make a big difference to total flows would be the US and Japan. Clearly the amount of additional aid these would mobilize would depend on the political colour of the post-apartheid South African government. Looking at the economic factors as seen from the donor side, Japan with its massive external surpluses and its need for raw materials to feed its industrial machine would seem to be both immediately able to increase its ODA contribution and particularly well placed to benefit from close economic relations with South Africa. The Nordic countries are heavily engaged in the SADCC countries and they are likely to be so for a long time to come. If therefore the change in South Africa comes in the nearer future, a most likely new major donor on the scene would be Japan, whereas there would be strong limitation on Nordic engagement. Outside the OECD, a major potential could lie in the COMECON countries.

The composition of aid sources would effect the form of aid through the various donor countries' aid conventions and sectoral preferences.

The prevalence of Japan and US would perhaps mean that support for the productive sectors and economic infrastructure would be relatively easy to get. The relative absence of the Nordic countries would possibly mean a lack of assistance offers for the social sectors.

RESEARCH TOPICS

The analysis above has been undertaken within a number of quite restrictive assumptions, and is also limited in the sense that it has used mainly rather blunt economic tools, leaving out the question of class forces and political development. I still think however that some possible research topics or themes have emerged, none of which have not been mentioned or indeed pursued before. All of them however could take much more empirical and theoretical work without danger of being over-researched.

There will be urgent problems in the immediate aftermath of the final defeat of apartheid. A high degree of preparedness is needed here and I feel that research may play a role. I find, however that it will be important at least for economic research to take a medium term look. This is the time span within which development plans are made, coinciding with policy-makers maximum time horizon. Although a fundamental and long term view is certainly needed, results should be cast in a more practical medium term perspective.

Right through the above bits of analysis it is clear that even if one focuses on the problems of the **region**, one would have to pay major attention to the domestic affairs and developments in South Africa. Research focus may therefore have to be South Africa itself just as much as the SADCC countries. For most countries in the region, developments in South Africa are far more important than what happens in the other neighbouring countries.

South Africa

While I believe that economic forecasting for post-apartheid South Africa would be a near pointless exercise, there are some areas of the economy where almost any post-apartheid solution would lead to changes in a direction which is predictable and wherever research may reveal effects, problems and even some elements of alternative solutions.

I do not mean to say that some of these problems and solutions can be studied in a political vacuum. Indeed, a serious dilemma for present research on post-apartheid South Africa, including the present paper, is that any assumption made about the future has political implications. As expressed by Green (1988) "Political decisions neither are, can be, nor should be taken by researchers on purely technical (economic or other)

considerations. Researchers and intellectual supporters—no matter how committed—have no business seeking to achieve a role as Platonic guardians with the liberation movement cast as warriors. To do that is just as much a treason of the intellectuals as it would be to remain silent rather than calling attention to, and provide information on, political economic issues on which choices need to be made and acted upon."

With this in mind, I see the following issues both as important points of focus in a post-apartheid South Africa and as important building blocks for research at the regional level:

- The labour market, comprising post-apartheid wage structures, mechanisms for wage determination and unemployment. It would be necessary to see this in connection with profits and private sector surpluses in the economy (particularly the transnationals) and the effect on international competitiveness.

- A strongly related issue would be the human resource problems, education and training. What are the basic consumption type education needs and what are the needs of the economy?

- In the external sector, several issues require attention. Above, I have quite lightly assumed that investment and aid flows will present more opportunities than problems in the medium term. Firstly, that is clearly not the only conclusion one may come to after a more detailed look at the various scenarios. Secondly, if a greatly increased flow materializes the opportunities need to be grasped through appropriate decision making. This involves the existence of suitable institutions and raises the question of decision-making power, both vis-a-vis the major multinationals and the aid community. In international trade the demise of apartheid will rid the economy of certain costs of sanctions-busting. The size of such costs are important, and may be assessed. Also, new and different trade alignments would be on the post-apartheid agenda. What would seem the best options for the South African economy under various scenarios? Needless to say, the roles and powers of multinationals would be a major consideration in research on the external sector.

- Above I have paid considerable attention to the budget. This is because I believe that many of the medium-term tasks of a post-apartheid government have to be solved through the public sector and that this will require resources of a large scale, particularly in the social and infrastructural sectors. This has macro economic consequences, which would clearly influence the basis for South Africa's regional policies in the medium term. The two sub-topics which to me seem the most important ones for focus are first the education sector and second the budgetary costs of apartheid, both the present expenditure for the upkeep of apartheid structures and the expenditure of replacing them with something better.

Considerable research on post-apartheid South Africa has already been done or is under way. Examples are the papers for the York Conference on "The Southern African Economy after Apartheid (SAERT 1988) from

the South Africa Economic Research and Training Project based in Amsterdam. We should take care to coordinate **our** own research on the region with such and similar efforts by other groups.

The region

The end of apartheid will present not only the Southern African region but the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa with a great many economic opportunities. The major ones as I see it are the promise of peace in the region, and the opportunity for establishing a powerful regional market, which can be a basis for future economic growth and prosperity. Our task should be to foresee these opportunities in order to realize them while avoiding the pitfalls.

First, however, I would urge that one takes up a topic that does not strictly belong to the post-apartheid era; the ongoing war and **destabilization** in the region which is rooted in the apartheid state. True, quite a number of studies have been made of the effects and the costs of the war. I believe however that it is now time to go further than that and lay in front of the international community much more clearly the gains from an end to war and destabilization. Can we not, for example, find out more about the reasons why the international community complains that their aid efforts in Mozambique are obstructed by the war and at the same time so obviously are not willing to take effective steps to stop it? What options should be investigated for stopping unnecessary bloodshed? What would be the military and political implications of, for example, establishing an appropriate international peace keeping force in Mozambique? This is an area where I believe research efforts across international borders and full use of whatever political connections and clout that we have within our group may have a tiny chance to support an initiation of a peace effort.

The second regional theme comprises the whole complex of **post-apartheid** regional economic relations:

- What would in theory be the best options for ordering regional co-operation in trade and payment matters, capital flows and the labour market in such a heterogeneous region as South Africa.
- The re-ordering of regional relations under post-apartheid will probably necessitate extensive regional negotiations. What are the options for the *framework* in which these negotiations will take place? Should all forms of relations (trade, payments, capital flows, labour) be negotiated under the same framework. Does the **SADCC** group of countries constitute an appropriate forum? Should one think in terms of a wider group of countries like PTA? I do not believe that research could solve these political and very sensitive questions, but a certain clarification of options could perhaps be achieved by for example looking at experiences elsewhere.

- Regional economic cooperation is influenced, and will always be influenced by the industrial powers outside the region, through the aid flows and through international capital. The commonality of interests between a regional organization like SADCC and other third world regional organization-tend to be overshadowed by such influence. One needs to explore practical ways of linking up with the rest of the third world to support, in the words of Mandaza (1987) the drawing up of "a political agenda that unites such regional organizations as the SADCC within a wider Third Worldist framework".

Development cooperation

From the aid side (Nordic and other) it would be important to build a solid basis for the decisions which aid administrators would have to take in the future. One particular problem would be how to fashion and distribute aid so that it would accentuate the new opportunities created by the dismantling of apartheid and not lead to conflict over aid allocations within the region.

- What are, for example, the merits and demerits of a regional aid consortium with SADCC and South Africa. The problems in getting the donors together for such a consortium would probably be greater than coordination on the recipient side.

- I would also like to bring out a perhaps more fundamental side of the aid relationship which I feel will be a very appropriate point of focus in our context. Through research related to various aspects of aid, researchers, aid officials and politicians from the North gain a lot of insight into the societies they are supposed to assist. The aid flows into Southern Africa are so substantial that donors do have a lot of influence based not only on clout through their resource transfers but on insight. The same amount of insight into the Northern countries has not been systematically gathered and accumulated on the other side. I feel that we should attempt to use considerable resources to tilt the bias the other way. Research on Nordic and other aid administrations, in their proper political context, should heavily involve researchers from Southern Africa. The Nordic research institutions should place some of their research infrastructure at the disposal of researchers from the South for such projects. I have, a (hopefully) justified belief that the fact that they may thus be indirectly funded by the aid donors will not bias the result of their research.

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Dissonance and Class Conflict in Post-Apartheid South Africa

Gwen M. Malahleha

My race needs no special defence, for the past history of them in this country proves them to be the equal of any people anywhere. All they need is an equal chance in the battle of life. (Robert Smalls, black US Congressman 1874–1886)

The theme of this meeting is a futuristic one in nature. This paper attempts to analyse what is likely to happen in post-apartheid South Africa in terms of complementarity between realities and expectations. It is argued here that realities of post-apartheid South Africa will not necessarily complement the expectation of the young Africans who have been in the struggle for an improvement of their peoples' lot. This conflict in turn will lead to dissonance likely to cause a great deal of discomfort. Since 1976 Soweto uprising the young Africans have pursued a goal of social justice to the neglect of acquiring the skills which enable them to maximally use that opportunity when it is eventually achieved. While they argued that their protestations were directed at demanding an end to discriminatory education and specifically to be allowed to be taught in a language of their choice to be able to compete or contribute equally in building South Africa, twelve years have gone by in which this change to receive this education has passed many Soweto children by. In the post-apartheid era they will be the adult African population, still expecting that equal opportunity but unable, for lack of skill, to utilise this opportunity.

The struggle for national social justice in South Africa developed dialectically from the contradictions inherent in the nature of settler colonialism and capital exploitation. Thus the African resistance which first started in defense of the sovereignty of their Chiefdoms and Kingdoms passed into other realms. This struggle lasted two hundred years. During the last part of the nineteenth century their men and women folk were incorporated into the settlers economy, then began the struggle against national oppression and exploitation. All along most people involved in the struggle were the adult members of the society, hardly touching the youth under twenty years, each old group came and went, **but** in the past twelve years the struggle drew its most prominent activists from children, some of whom were as young as six years.

This was a group which was still consolidating its internal world with its external world. It is going through the learning process, as the struggle continues the process of being transformed continues to exist and to

change as an external form of activity to being an inward activity. This process of transfer inward is linked with changes of the laws governing the activity resulting in the development of a new system of laws and expectation.

Now the liberation struggle in South Africa is a national struggle' and rightly so as it is the national liberation of the oppressed nations. However as change becomes eminent in that country other social relationships and interactions will demand attention. Among these are the consideration of class. Often class interactions and relationship centre around the desire of each group to attain better conditions for its members. This is what the eminent sociologists describe as class conflict. The social, political and economic factors play a great part in shaping these groupings and in shaping each individual's hopes. Each group's hope is for upward mobility.

For most of the developing countries this upward mobility becomes more assured with adequate and appropriate education. It is because of this interplay of education and class formation that I have chosen to centre my discussion around education, class and complementarity or dissonance between these two.

In placing class as central to my discussion, I am not necessarily subscribing to that school which believes that the South African situation can be analysed and understood in terms of class only and that race and ethnicity are epiphenomena. On the contrary, while I believe that class and class struggle are crucial and central in analysing the South African situation and in creating a harmonised South Africa I also believe with the same degree of **fervor** that ethnicity and race are important in the strategies for African liberation. Be that as it may, I will not pursue this particular discussion.

There is a dialectical relationship between acquisition of skills through education and expectations enshrined in the liberation struggle and what the future holds.

An individual is at one and the same time part of the class structure, the religious, racial, ethnic and national structures. There is interconnection and interaction between and among these. It is because you are an African that you live in a less prestigious sprawling residential area, "**Soweto**" with its "**locations**", and not the suburbs. It is because you are a Mosotho that you are assigned to Sotho Section of Rockville and so on.

We therefore note that the clusters in South Africa are **plural**.² On writing about plural societies in British West Indies, Smith pointed out that the various segments of a plural³ society are held together by the political dominance of one of them, with the consequence that the very existence of society is threatened when this domination ends (Smith, 1965). The hope for everyone is that when the existing order has been overthrown there is a possibility of new relationships arising. This sets a basis for expectancy, yet pointers in certain areas are that dominance may

continue even though the inhabitants of the political structures may have changed. Hopes may not by necessity be fulfilled.

CLASS ISSUES IN SOUTH AFRICA

Class issues in Africa have engendered a plethora of studies, the South African situation more so than most countries to the extent that the market is surfeited. This section only **serves** as an introduction for consensus understanding of **class**.⁴

While, in post-apartheid South Africa, most attention of scholars, policy makers and the populace will be directed towards more tangible issues of economies, law, politics and the like, the nebulous issues of class expectation and conflict will be relegated to the inconsequential, meantime the feeling of non-fulfilment of expectation will simmer among these clusters. It may not be until the storm breaks that we will backtracked, probably puzzled why things are not working as had been expected. Get rid of apartheid and everything will fall into place. Of course nobody is making such a simplistic assumption, but our paramount concern currently mention this in passing makes this the elixir.

There is no gainsaying the fact that class concern forms one of the basic elements of social evolution and development. It is inherent in the social process of conflict, accommodation, competition and assimilation. We cannot be complacent about the structural and functional situations which are likely to arise in this process of development in South Africa.

Evolution of class and class dominance in South Africa is no different from that given by Franklin Giddings. Of immediate relevance is Giddings' assertion that when the ruling group becomes strong enough it becomes aggressive, it adds to its opportunities and increases its privileges by deliberately wresting goods and other things from other groups. The ruling group shapes the situation to which others have to adapt themselves (Giddings). There can be no more succinct way of describing the South African situation than this one.

All this results in inequality of opportunity and unevenness of representation, the consequence of which is conflict among people. The problem of class conflict involve evolution, survival, **culture** and achievements of people. But most importantly, it represents ameliorative problems of social relationships within particular societies. Hence the need to address and articulate these issues. We need to be concerned with the kind of structural changes people expect the revolutions and liberations to bring in terms of cultural, political, economic and social dispensation. If these cannot be realised there is need for articulation of these possibilities.

The South Africans' expectations of over-night changes are not peculiar to its people. Other communities have held the same hopes when the possibility of shedding the colonial yoke became a reality, however, when these were not realised the world was never the same.

EDUCATION AS A MEANS TO AN END

While South Africa has its own uniqueness, it shares many similar characteristics with the rest of the world and among these is the relationship between education and upward mobility. Thus next to the possibilities of staying alive and remaining healthy the most crucial life chance is the opportunity to obtain a good education. The prevailing inequalities in educational opportunities in South Africa are a direct result of the 1976 disruptions even if this is not necessarily the only and whole explanation. This confirms the assertion that there is a dialectical relationship between acquisition of skills through education and expectation enshrined in the liberation struggle and what the future will be. Therefore education is not an end in itself but a means to an end. The South African youth wants to ensure the realization of this dueness.

Therefore the disruptions in the **Black**³ school in 1976 were not a series of haphazard accidental events, merely underlying a dissatisfaction with Bantu education (Brooks and Brickhill, 1980). On the contrary it was an angry and consistent expression of the desire for a radically different system of education. It was a quest for an education that will enable the oppressed to take control of their own destinies and to have a fair share of the resources of the country.

When the students destroyed the schools and the educational and training facilities this act was very symbolical—it was a demonstration of destroying a system which had hitherto aimed at ensuring perpetual domination and subordination.

The call for a fundamentally different and qualitatively improved form of education demonstrated deep-rooted desire for an outright struggle, with disappointing results to their desires for a functional education. In 1976 children involved in this struggle for a better education were between the ages of 6 and 21 years, twelve years later they are now between the ages of 18 and 33. Some are too old to acquire the kind of education they so fervently fought for. Those who were 6 years then, are probably technically illiterate, as the disruption started as they were commencing formal schooling. Those who were at pre-school have not fared any better. This calls for remedial measures. An issue which is no less important and of immediate concern is to reduce possible sources of tension.

Speculation of what ratios of the population these form is too frightening to contemplate. These are the adult population of the post-apartheid South Africa who will expect compensation for the sacrifices they have made. The post-apartheid era is a stage of expectations of positive reinforcement.

Education as a means to an end enhances emancipation, combats alienation and creates and reproduces skills which will ensure the well-being of a society. The “**Black**” children realized that they continue to be distant ob-

servers of the "miracles and wonders" of science and technology. This was a constraining factor, under the present system of education, for their aspirations. Further education that teaches children to use their minds creatively and flexibly therefore is what life is all about. What matters is the ability to learn; not the sum total of knowledge.

They have lost their opportunities, but they have not lost their quest for personal or group betterment. Thus, for them there has been no positive relationship between action and reward. It is at this point that dissonance will become manifest and cause conflict. Class conflict? Yes, they will be a cluster of persons occupying a certain stratum within the community. Those who have remained in South Africa and continued the struggle are the ones who will be most disadvantaged. While those who fled the country acquired that enabling instrument and will occupy a different stratum, for their erstwhile colleagues this might only remain a dream.

TRANSFORMATION AND SOCIAL CLASS AWARENESS

As the young Black South Africans become more and more immersed in the struggle, their behaviour outlook takes on a different view of what to expect at the end of the road. The unusual factor about the South Africa struggle is that political and intellectual activities are not carried on exclusively by a socially rigidly determined group, it is by a social stratum which to a large degree is unattached to any social class and is recruited from an increasingly inclusive area of social life. These political activities have engendered **social** class awareness by articulating the need for improved conditions for the Blacks.

The conflict was expressed in status group terms by the students. Wallerstein argues that as the social conflicts became more status group approaching the level of class consciousness (Wallerstein, 1977). This same process was quite manifest among the student songs. During the height of the riots the Azania Manifesto and the Freedom Charter became popular and might probably continue to be so. These documents are powerful political symbols which have encapsulated the political aspiration of the people. At their meeting the young people were made to be politically aware of this situation, new values were articulated and a qualitatively new society expanded. All this was closely linked to an education which will enable the young to acquire critical attitudes towards themselves and towards the socio-political order of the day.

Weber aptly points out that every technological repercussion, economic transformation and *political upheaval* (my emphasis) threaten stratification by status and pushes the class situation to the foreground. Epochs are regularly periods of technical political and economic transformation (Weber, 1969). Weber's explanation makes class consciousness the correlate of progress and social change, stratification by status the expression of retrograde forces.

At this point one could surmise that the young Black South African is going through an attitude learning process. That attitude is determined in the educational aspiration, political articulations and actions, which in turn inculcate certain attitudes. By the end of this period they will have learned certain attitudes, most of them pertaining to occupation of a different class. In most cases they will be expecting a better class position, whatever better class positioning means. However, they will still have to learn the requisite behaviour responses.

INTERNALIZATION ATTITUDE AND DISSONANCE

The internalization of cultural forms of behaviour and expectation involves the reconstruction of psychological activity on the basis of sign expectation. Similarly the transformation of an interpersonal process into an intrapersonal one is the result of a long series of developmental events. Thus, as the struggle continues, the process being transformed continues to exist and to change as an external form of activities to being an inward activity. In this process of internalization, new attitudes and values are incorporated in a person's repertoire.

A person's attitude toward any object can be seen as a function of his or her belief. As of now the young people of Soweto believe that they have a potential to assist their communities to better their lot provided they are given that chance. One is not saying anything new here, it is well known that as we grow we learn new things which to a lesser or a greater degree influence our attitude and eventually we come to believe in these things. Doob aptly points out that an attitude is a learned predisposition to respond. In other words, it is a learned mediating response (Doob, 1947). More importantly for the youth in the struggle, this function of his or her belief creates a cognitive consistency. 'We are fighting for the rights of the oppressed for equal opportunity, when this has been achieved, we expect to be the benefactors'. However, if the belief and expectation do not correlate, conflict is likely to follow both in the internal self and the external world.

End of apartheid does not on its own ensure equal access to the goods. These are to a large measure governed by qualifying. Even though colour may no longer be a qualification, knowledge and skills will still be a requisite. It is these last two that I am concerned that they may not be present as most of the young people have directed their energies to the struggle and as they have put it in no uncertain terms that they will not participate in an education system which is intended to make them perpetual subordinates.

Exactly what is this dissonance? Dissonance is a type of relationship that obtains between two cognitions when they appear mutually contradictory to the person who holds or entertains them (Festinger, 1957).

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CONCLUSION

The problem is: where does South Africa go from here to minimize, if not eliminate, the psycho-social problems raised above? While there are a number of options, the heart of the matter is to take a hard look at the stark facts and explore a different philosophy if not a complimentary one. That is an education for liberation.

The fact that the apartheid system of the past and present denies blacks access to the kind of education which would empower them with the necessary skills so as to be participants in the control and transformation of their country, cannot be over-emphasized. For the oppressed knowledge remains power which must be acquired alongside political power to ensure this upward mobility.

There is no denying that political consciousness is necessary, the destruction of apartheid system is a prerequisite to creating a just system. But these have to be accompanied by an education system which enhances emancipation, combats alienation, creates skills that will ensure consistency of expectation. This will not only reduce internal conflict but also reduce extraneous conflicts.

NOTES

1. The notion that the class and national struggles are necessarily antagonistic stems from the attempt to apply an abstract definition to the concept class displaying unified homogenous entities. There are a number of class contents in this national struggle, which will become manifest in the next phase of South African developments.
2. Here we are accepting that in a plural society the state is a structure in dominance in an Althusserian sense and that this dominance may continue in the post-colonial period, even though the inhabitants of the political structure have changed.
3. The concept "**Black**" to denote those communities in South Africa who are African, Asian or "Coloured" is used here for lack of a more fitting all embracing term. It is used as a convenience term and for one I would gladly celebrate its demise.
4. One of the tasks that we face in undertaking analysis of the social conceptions that are characteristic of a particular social environment is to penetrate to the essential meaning of metaphors. In considering the general problems of social structure and the types and transformations of social systems we generally make considerable use of terms with a spatial connotation. Class is one of those terms which refer to spatial relations. Here the term is used to denote the large groups in South Africa which differ from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social production. V I Lenin: A Great Beginning. The Essentials of Lenin, London, Lawrence and Wishart vol. 11, 1947 p 492.

Report from the Concluding Session

During the conference there emerged a large number of suggestions for possible research areas, themes and topics. A listing of these suggestions is enclosed as Annex II of this report. Three working groups, one for each of three major themes of research, were appointed to consider the suggestions;

- Group I: Southern Africa, the Nordic Countries and the International System
- Group II: Destabilization, Conflict, Dependency
- Group III: Economic Development and Socio-Political Forces

During a final session, the conference

- A considered the overall content of suggestions from the working groups;
- B considered, item by item, research areas and topics suggested by working groups, indicating ongoing activities and scope for further action;
- C considered the overall framework and further steps in stimulating research cooperation between Southern African and Nordic researchers.

This process resulted in the "Guidelines" for Southern African/Nordic research cooperation which are enclosed as Annex I.

OVERALL CONTENT OF SUGGESTIONS FROM THE WORKING GROUPS

It was argued during the session that some important topics and perspectives were not sufficiently emphasized in the lists of suggestions put forward by the working groups:

- The gender dimension had not received appropriate attention.
- There was a lack of projects in the field of environment and ecology.
- The need for analyzing a great number of issues with implications far beyond the social sciences was stressed. Examples mentioned were health care and food security.

It was agreed that the attention to the gender dimension be improved by stressing, under the description of selected individual topics, the importance of bringing in a gender perspective.

The general and all embracing character of the working group's suggestions were pointed out. There was agreement on the need for attempting to set priorities **and/or** regrouping the list. Also, it was pointed out that there was a need for indicating which topics were best suited for collaboration. It was realised, however, that time would not permit a thorough consideration of priorities. It was therefore agreed that priorities suggested in the report from one of the groups would not be reflected in the final document. Also, it was agreed that the initial list of areas and topics considered by the working groups would be attached to the report (See Annex II). In this way, the full range of discussed projects could be indicated for those institutions and researchers not present at the conference.

It was agreed that the chairman, Haroub **Othman**, the **rapporteur**, Jan Isaksen, and **Bertil Odén** should edit the list of areas and topics in the light of the above and in the light of comments and suggestions brought up during the examination (below) of the individual items. On the incorporation of the gender dimension they would be guided by the executive secretary of **SADRA**, Gwen Malahleha, **G Winai** Strom and **KO Jirira**.

RESEARCH AREAS AND TOPICS SUGGESTED BY WORKING GROUPS.

Group I. Southern Africa, the Nordic countries and the International system

1 Factors behind Nordic involvement in Southern Africa

Several Nordic-based research projects exist in this area. Recent work in Norway by **Linné Eriksen** of Oslo was pointed out. A planned project on the influence on aid policies of ideas behind Nordic social insurance policy by **J L Kanywany** of the Faculty of Law, University of Dar Es Salaam, was also brought to the attention of the conference. An interest in drawing up a project focussing on aid conditionality was indicated from The Christian Michelsen Institute, Bergen. An important research potential seemed to exist under the above heading.

2 IMF/World Bank structural adjustment policies in Southern Africa

A great deal of work has been done in Southern Africa. Most institutions have done or are doing projects. On the Nordic side, most of the work has been on the debt side. **WIDER** has produced a series of analyses of adjustment policies. The need to be aware of research on the topic elsewhere in the Third World as well as in Europe, UK, and

the USA was stressed. The area was seen as a most important one for further collaborative effort.

3 SADCC's relationship to other South-South and North-South institutions
Not much work seemed to have been done in this area.

4 Effects of sanctions against South Africa

The work done in monitoring and information by non-academic groups and the need for mutual support between them and the research community was mentioned. The Institute for Development Studies, Helsinki and the Finnish "Isolate South Africa Campaign" were preparing a major sanctions conference in Finland.

5 Problems and models of regional integration

The Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies reported that they were developing a programme within this area. On the Nordic side, some aspects had been taken up by the Centre for Development Research. A conference on the theme: "Central America/Southern Africa" will be arranged this year by the University of Oslo.

6 Information famine in Southern Africa and Nordic action

There was a lengthy discussion on this point.

a The substantial needs, in particular the "book famine" was stressed.

b Several examples of possible support were referred to: -

- Initiatives of a number of British institutions including the British Library, ODA, ODI, WUS.

- The experience in Botswana with Devindex, IDRC and SRCSA.

- Modest and practical schemes like the twinning of institutions from Southern Africa and Nordic countries, assistance in book and journal purchases and copying of journal articles by Nordic institutions for their Southern African counterparts.

- A joint project between the United Nations Institute for Namibia, Lusaka and the Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen on a database for Namibia.

c The potential role of data-communication in solving data and information problems was pointed out. Concern was however raised that a leap into a computer network and database system would fail on the present lack of hardware and computer expertise. On the other hand it was pointed out that considerable training capacity in fact already existed in some countries of the region.

d The idea was put forward that SADRA institutes could jointly apply to the Nordic donors for funds to solve their pressing problems.

e It was felt that Southern African research institutions should also keep up the pressure on their own governments for sufficient resources to do research in vital areas. In Southern Africa it had

proved nearly impossible for research to be considered important enough to deserve support through development cooperation agreements.

Group II: Destabilization, Conflict, Dependency

Although the group had come up with seven broad themes, only two appear in the list below. The other five also appeared under group I and III. It was felt that they were more appropriately taken care of under the other groups.

1 South African destabilization

Activities going on in several institutes, e.g. Centre for African Studies, Maputo, Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies, Harare, and Institute for Peace and Development, Gothenburg.

2 Militarization of the region

Two activities in Southern Africa were mentioned: The Annual Conference on Peace and Security in Southern Africa and the work done in Zimbabwe (Martin and Johnson) on data collection and information.

Three planned projects were pointed out:

- The Conference in Arusha, December 11-17 1989 on "The State in Conflict. Resolution between Internal and International Pressures";
- a two year project planned by the Institute for African Alternatives, London on "Front Line States, Geopolitics and Strategy" comprising plans for a conference and a book; and
- a two year project planned by H Othman and others on "Militarism and Demilitarization in Southern Africa".

Group III: Economic Development and Socio-Political Forces

1 Post-colonial experiences in Africa and its *relevance for* Southern Africa

A massive amount of literature exists on African experience. It was agreed that one should strongly encourage efforts to analyse and sift such experience with regard to its relevance for post-apartheid South Africa and Southern Africa.

2 The role of monopoly capital in Southern Africa

There was great interest for this topic, particularly among the SADRA researchers.

3 End of the war economy

Some work has been undertaken at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala and the Peace Research Institute, Oslo. The field was characterized as grossly under-researched and the great need for results was stressed.

4 *Relationship between employment and skills*

It was reported that **SAREC** is involved in funding a project under this heading. The project is taking place in the UK.

5 *SADCC's role in reducing dependence on the Republic of South Africa*

The Beijer Institute has done considerable work in the energy sector.

6 *The effect of male and female worker demands*

The majority of work in this area has been done by South African scholars as reflected e.g. in the South African Labour Bulletin. Also at the Institute of Labour Studies (ILS), Maseru, considerable work has been done.

7 *National gender and class interest*

A project on women cooperatives is conducted by Swedish researchers. At least three researchers from Oslo are engaged in women related projects in the region. At the Chr Michelsen Institute, Bergen a small group focusing on gender relations is presently being established.

8 *Industrialization on a regional basis*

Several researchers from both Southern Africa and Northern countries were involved in research related to **industrialization** in SADCC; Mlawa (Dares Salaam), Samuel Wangwe (Dar es Salaam), Oliver Saasa (Lusaka), M R Bhagavan (Stockholm), Tom Østergaard (Copenhagen) and Jan Isaksen (Bergen).

9 *Scenarios for economic development in post-apartheid South Africa and the effects on the region*

Part of this complex of issues would be given attention in the work planned at the Chr Michelsen Institute, Bergen.

10 *Importance of migrant labour to South African mining industries*

Work was reported from several of the SADRA institutions. Several studies have been done in Lesotho, including work by ILO/JASPA. The National Institute for Research, Gaborone and the Centre for African Studies, Maputo have both done work on the migrant situation in their respective countries. Also Swaziland reported work done here. The earlier major "Migration Study" in Botswana had also included sections on mine labour.

11 *The role of SADCC states and of development aid in shipping and forwarding*

In this area work has been done and is under way in Maputo.

12 *The viability of selective de-linking of the Southern African region*

Work needs to be done in this area.

FURTHER STEPS IN STIMULATING RESEARCH COOPERATION

It was agreed that the framework for **Nordic/SADRA** research cooperation should be considered open and non-exclusive. The conference should be considered an initial step towards creating cooperation among scholars

worldwide, and encourage a focus on Southern African issues. The following concrete steps in preparing collaborative research were agreed:

- 1 SADRA will expedite the completion of its inventory of social science research being undertaken in the Southern African region.
- 2 SADRA and SIAS will distribute copies of the completed inventories to Nordic and Southern African research institutions.
- 3 SADRA and SIAS will publish the conference papers and distribute the lists of research topics which emerged at the conference to research institutions.
- 4 Institutions which find common interests within the range of topics indicated in the Guidelines (Annex I) and attempt to develop research cooperation should inform SIAS and SADRA by sending copies of their correspondence related to such matters.
- 5 Having developed joint proposals they may apply for funding to the existing funding institutions.
- 6 It is recommended that researchers participating in projects for which funds are sought be members of, or affiliated to, the institutions concerned.

It should be noted that neither SADRA nor SIAS are funding institutions.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS FROM THE CHAIR

The chairman of the session, Haroub Othman, in concluding, felt that the conference had been a highly useful intellectual exercise. He expressed his gratitude to the two institutions, SIAS and SADRA, and particularly to Gwen Malahleha, Bertil Odén and Peter Magnusson who had worked hard on both the practical arrangements and the content of the conference.

He furthermore stated that SADRA particularly welcomed a collaboration with Nordic researchers. He perceived such cooperation as a counterbalance to the heavy influence of North American research institutions in the region. He also felt it was easier to collaborate with nations without a colonial past. He wished the participating institutions the best of luck with the formulation of joint project proposals.

He encouraged all institutes whose members were travelling in the two regions to inform the regional institutions so as to increase the personal and institutional contacts between Southern African and Nordic researchers.

Annex I

Research Themes and Topics Proposed for Southern Africa/-Nordic Social Science Research Collaboration

GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION BETWEEN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND NORDIC RESEARCHERS

At the "SIAS/SADRA Conference on Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa with a Post-Apartheid Perspective" in **Harare** from 21st to 23rd September 1988, there was agreement that a set of guidelines be issued for the content and practical framework of research cooperation. It was agreed that the framework should be considered open and nonexclusive, not preventing other themes and topics from being taken up and not excluding other forms of cooperation than those sketched out below. The conference should be considered an initial step towards creating cooperation among scholars worldwide, and encourage a focus on Southern African issues.

CONTENT OF RESEARCH

Theme 1: Southern Africa, the Nordic Countries and the International System

- 1 *Factors behind Nordic involvement in the Southern African Region*
Historical roots, **diverging/competing** interests and their implications for policy formation.
- 2 *IMF/World Bank structural adjustment policies in the Southern African Region*
 - a Implications of the policies and scope of the problem.
 - b The debt problem and its link to structural adjustment.
 - c Alternative strategies to structural **adjustment/debt**.
 - d Potential and actors for support of alternative strategies, in particular the potential role of NGO's.
 - e The influence of structural adjustment policies on the life and work situation for women.
- 3 *SADCCS relationship to other South-South and to North-South institutions*
 - a Compatibilities and incompatibilities with other regional organisations.
 - b The scope for inter-regional cooperation (from SADCC's point of view).
 - c Relationship to and bargaining position **vis-à-vis** the Nordics, EC, CMEA, China etc.

- d The implications of the policies and practice of these organisations in the Southern African Region, in particular aid.
- 4 *Sanctions against South Africa*
 - a Effects on South Africa and neighbouring countries.
 - b Strategies and scope for sanctions busting.
 - c Comparative analysis of cases where sanctions have been imposed: Cuba, Nicaragua, Rhodesia, Poland etc.
 - d Monitoring of Nordic sanctions.
- 5 *Problems and models of regional integration*
 Research efforts could aim at a comparative analysis to bring out lessons from regional cooperation from Southern Africa as well as other regional groupings. It would be important to investigate untraditional models of cooperation as well as conventional approaches like monetary unions (CMA), customs unions (SACU), and common markets.
- 6 *Information famine in the Southern African Region and Nordic action*
 - a Documentation.
 - b Information systems.
 - c Collaboration in linking SADRA institutions to international data banks.

Theme II: Destabilisation, Conflict, Dependency

- 1 *Destabilisation by South Africa*
 - a A systematic account of the issues involved (see II.1, Annex II).
 - b Limits to RSA destabilising power (see II.3, Annex II).
 - c Lessons from the defeat of RSA in Angola (see II.4, Annex II).
- 2 *Militarization of the region*
 Impact on the economies of Southern African Countries.

Theme III: Economic Development and Socio-Political Forces

- 1 *Post-colonial experiences in Africa and its relevance for Southern Africa*
- 2 *The role of monopoly capital in post-apartheid South Africa*
- 3 *End of the war economy*
 - Its effects on SADCC economies.
 - Demilitarization and disinvestment policies.
- 4 *Relationships between employment and skills and the role of training and education*
 - Both at present and in post-apartheid Southern Africa.
- 5 *An analysis of SADCC's role in reducing dependence on South Africa*
 –Focus on infrastructure.
- 6 *The effect of male and female worker demands for improvements in wages and employment conditions on industry in post-apartheid Southern Africa*

7 *National, gender and class interests in the regional context*

8 *Industrialization on a regional basis in Southern Africa*

- Prospects

- Policies

- Strategies

As far as possible, research should aim at gender specific analysis and results.

9 *Scenarios for economic development in post-apartheid Southern Africa*

Effects on the region: biases in flows of capital, labour, technology and trade.

10 *Importance of migrant labour*

- to South African mining industries.

- to the SADCC region.

Special attention should be paid to recent decreases in migrant labour employment by SA mines.

11 *The role of SADCC states and of development cooperation in shipping and forwarding*

12 *The viability of selective de-linking of the Southern African region from the international capitalist system*

Annex II

Complete Listing of all Research Areas, Topics and Projects Brought up during the Conference.

This annex lists all the research areas and research topics which were used as an input to working groups for the preparation of recommendations for the Guideline topics listed in Annex I. They are reproduced here in their original, partly overlapping and unedited form for the benefit of researchers and institutions not present at the conference.

Group I: Southern Africa, the Nordic Countries and the International System

Historical factors and political reasons behind Nordic aid.

Cross fertilisation of political perceptions between Nordic and Southern African political figures and decision-makers, during the latters' stay in the Nordic region.

Changing attitudes to white South Africa in Nordic countries.

Social forces within Nordic countries that generate progressive policies and ensure their continuity vis-a-vis the Southern African countries.

Importance of the role of the Christian missions in promoting Nordic support to Southern African countries.

Foreign policy implications of Nordic aid.

Aid and political forces in Nordic countries.

SADCC as a power block; in relation to Nordic countries, in North-South relations and in relation to present and future South Africa. Models for ideology and practice.

- 9 Foreign policy implications of SADCC/Nordic cooperation.
- 10 'Nordic Country' images in Southern Africa.
- 11 Evaluation of the 1986 and 1988 Nordic/SADCC policy declarations and effects of the implementation of these declarations on monetary, industrial and trade cooperation.
- 12 Scope of inter-regional cooperation.
- 13 Costs of sanctions busting.
- 14 Nordic relationships with the Southern African liberation movements.
- 15 Impact of sanctions on the neighbouring independent states.
- 16 Effects of sanctions on the South African economy.
- 17 Sanctions and unemployment.
- 18 Sanctions and TNCs; new tricks.
- 19 Comparative study of sanctions on Nicaragua and Libya.
- 20 Rhodesian sanctions.

- 21 Survey: types of NGO's facilitating regional cooperation.
- 22 Role of NGO's in foreign aid allocation.
- 23 Practical investigation: How aid resources could be used in improving the SADCC academic information system.
The role of the state and of development aid in shipping and forwarding.
Needs and implications of united actions between development cooperation and TNC's.
Implications of delinking/linking theories.
Role of small scale, grassroot NGO's in opposition to the IMF/World Bank Adjustment programmes.
Impact of aid from different countries: Comparing Soviet, Chinese, Nordic, US/British aid.
Evaluation of IMF/World Bank Adjustment Policies.
Lessons for regional cooperation: a) Monetary unions b) Customs unions c) Common labour markets.
Studies of institutions and rules influencing regional cooperation negatively and positively.
Positive and negative effects of delinking vs. increased dependence, comparing short term effects with long term effects.
Anti-imperialist demands on post-apartheid South Africa from SADCC and Nordic countries.

Group II: Destabilisation, Conflicts and Dependency

- 1 Itemised and systematic discussion of the various issues involved in the destabilisation and militarisation of the Southern African region by South Africa.
- 2 Impact of militarisation on the economics of the Southern African countries.
- 3 Limits to the power of South Africa in destabilising the Southern African region, and an analysis of the balance of forces holding South Africa in check.
- 4 Analysis of, and lessons to be drawn from, the defeat of South Africa in Angola.
- 5 Importance of the analysis of the post-colonial experiences of Africa as a whole, and of comparative African research, in theorising about post-apartheid South Africa.
- 6 Possibilities of conflicts of interests between post-apartheid South Africa and the Southern African countries due to past economic structures and constraints.
- 7 A factual and critical analysis of whether or not the SADCC region's dependency on South Africa has actually increased over the last eight years.

- 8 A critical examination of whether or not the SADCC countries have been able to effect any redirection at all of the regional infrastructure away from South Africa.
Can the South African mining industry survive without migrant labour?
- 10 Theorisation of the post-apartheid South Africa: comparative studies with other states.
- 11 Labour relations in South Africa.
- 12 Positive and negative effects of delinking vs. increased dependence, comparing short term effects with long term effects.
- 13 End of "war economy" and effects on SADCC economies.

Group III: Economic Development and Socio-Political Forces

- 1 Social forces within Nordic countries that generate progressive policies and ensure their continuity vis-a-vis the Southern African countries.
A factual and critical analysis of whether or not the SADCC region's dependency on South Africa has actually increased over the last eight years.
A critical examination of whether or not the SADCC countries have been able to effect any redirection at all of the regional infrastructure away from South Africa.
- 4 Can the South African mining industry survive without migrant labour?
- 5 Is the decrease in migrant labour in the South African mines due to the initiative of the South African mine-owners and/or government or due to the withholding of migrant labour by South Africa's neighbours?
Improvement in wages and working and living conditions of migrant labour in post-apartheid South Africa, and the role of the trade unions in promoting these. How will this effect the mining industry's future in South Africa?
- 7 NGO's in the socio-political context of Southern Africa.
- 8 Survey: type of NGO's facilitating regional cooperation.
- 9 Role of NGO's in foreign aid allocation.
- 10 Practical investigation: How could aid resources be used in improving the SADCC academic information system.
- 11 The scope for coordination between different regional interests within the SADCC.
- 12 The role of the state and of development aid in shipping and forwarding.
- 13 Needs and implications of united actions between development cooperation and TNC's.

- Role of small-scale, grassroots NGOs in opposition to the IMF/World Bank Adjustment programmes.
- 15 Labour relations in South Africa.
 - 16 SADCC as a power bloc, in relation to Nordic countries, in North-South relations, in relation to present and future South Africa: Models for ideology and practice.
 - 17 Economic and political interests and benefits for increased SADCC cooperation.
 - 18 Evaluation of 1986 and 1988 SADCC/Nordic policy declarations and the effects of the implementation of these declarations on monetary, industrial and trade cooperation.
 - 19 Comparative studies of alternative industrial policies, trade vs. investment export-led or inward mobilisation.
 - 20 Studies of institutions and rules influencing regional cooperation negatively or positively.
 - 21 Institutions for solving conflicts between different group interests, labour relations, ethnic-language relations, class relations.
 - 22 Role of the Anglo-American Corporation in post-apartheid South Africa.
 - 23 Repatriation of labour vs. common labour market.
 - 24 Labour movement influence on long term policy making vs. restriction to wage bargaining.
 - 25 End of "war economy" and effects on SADCC economies, demilitarisation, disarmament policies and their effects.
 - 26 Redistributive demands within South Africa and its implications for external relations towards SADCC states.
 - 27 A study of the plight of the uneducated in post-apartheid South Africa.
 - 28 The relationship of unemployment and education.
 - 29 Comparative analysis of specific issues concerning the post-independence era.

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from the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies

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contributed with other scholars **from** the Southern African region and the Nordic countries to a conference in **Harare**, Zimbabwe, in September 21–23, 1988, arranged at the initiative of the **Southern African Research Association (SADRA)** and the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies (**SIAS**).

The conference theme was “**Regional** Cooperation in Southern Africa with a Post-Apartheid Perspective”. The main objective was to initiate research cooperation between Nordic and Southern African researchers,

The papers form the main part of these proceedings and cover a wide area of topics, from regional cooperation in the field of information and the role of Non-Governmental Organisations, to shipping structures, industrial development, and analyses of Nordic aid to the **SADCC** region, as well as the regional policy of South **Africa**. The proceedings also include conclusions from the discussions on future research cooperation and lists of topics identified by the conference as relevant for common research.

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