


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Research Report No. 73

Robert Davies

SOUTH AFRICAN STRATEGY TOWARDS MOZAMBIQUE
IN THE POST-NKOMATI PERIOD
A critical analysis of effects
and implications



EX. 2

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INTRODUCTION

On 8th March 1985 a Summit Meeting of the Presidents of the Front Line States issued a statement declaring that the Pretoria regime had "refused to honour the Nkomati Accord" and continued to pursue "a policy of destabilisation against its neighbours" (1). This statement came in the context of a series of increasingly bitter complaints by Mozambican officials at the continuing acts of armed aggression by bandits operating from South African territory. On 6th February President Machel told a press conference, "South Africa is not complying with the Nkomati Accord...I do not know if it (South Africa) does not have the capacity or whether it is because of bad faith" (2). The President's remarks represented the first public statement by a senior member of the Mozambican government hinting at duplicity on the part of Pretoria.

The reality reflected in such statements contrasted sharply with the image which the Botha regime had tried to project of its intentions in the region less than a year earlier. On 16th March 1984 at the signing ceremony of the the Nkomati Accord of "Non-Aggression and Good Neighbourliness", P.W. Botha declared, "We have signalled to the world our belief that states with different socio-economic and social systems can live together in peace and harmony, and work together in the pursuit of common interests" (3).

Yet the year following Nkomati was significant not just because it saw the Botha regime manifestly failing to abide by its obligations under the Accord. It was also a year of intense action by the apartheid regime with implications at at least the following levels of struggle:

1. Bilateral South African - Mozambican relations;
2. South Africa's relations with the independent states of the region as a whole;
3. South Africa's position in the wider international community;
4. The struggle within South Africa itself.

There is no doubt that Pretoria's strategists saw the Nkomati Accord as creating new possibilities for the apartheid state to advance its position at all of these levels of struggle. In this sense the Nkomati Accord and South African - Mozambican relations in general became a laboratory for the South African ruling class to test and apply a range of tactics which had not been as prominent in earlier

phases when destabilisation tactics dominated Pretoria's actions in the region. In the original formulations of the Botha regime's regional policy however such measures were always seen as an essential complement to destabilisation tactics within a "Total Strategy" aiming at asserting South Africa's position as a "regional power" and establishing a "constellation of states" under its tutelage.

The experience of the first year after Nkomati has thus revealed much about the objectives and tactics of South African regional policy , as well as about its strengths and weaknesses, limits and possibilities, and contradictions. This paper seeks to analyse South African strategy in post-Nkomati period concentrating on its policy towards Mozambique and dealing more schematically with the other levels of struggle. However, since this can only be understood in the context of past South African actions against Mozambique and in the region generally, the paper begins with a brief sketch of the historical background.

1. MOZAMBIQUE IN SOUTH AFRICAN REGIONAL STRATEGY MID 1970s - THE NKOMATI ACCORD

a. The impact of the collapse of Portuguese Colonialism

The mid 1970s witnessed an important and dramatic shift in the balance of forces in Southern Africa. The collapse of the Portuguese African empire and the subsequent independence of Mozambique and Angola under governments formed by the liberation movements Frelimo and the MPLA respectively represented a severe setback for the apartheid regime in Southern Africa. Up to this point South Africa's entire regional strategy had been predicated upon the existence of a number of so-called buffer states which surrounded it - the Portuguese colony of Angola and South Africa's own colony of Namibia to the west, the settler-ruled British colony of Rhodesia in the centre, and the Portuguese colony of Mozambique in the east. The main thrust of Pretoria's regional policy had involved forging alliances with the colonial regimes of these territories and supplying them with various forms of assistance, including considerable military support (5). Through this policy of reinforcing the "buffer states" Pretoria's strategists had sought to achieve the two interrelated objectives of isolating the liberation struggle to regions far distant from its own borders and ensuring that regional territories continued to serve South African capitalism as labour reserves, markets and suppliers of specific services such as transport.

The fall of the Portuguese African empire thus fundamentally undermined the main pillar of Pretoria's entire regional strategy up to this point. Immediately it meant the "loss" of two key buffers - Angola and Mozambique. It also created more favourable conditions for an escalation of the liberation struggle in two others - Zimbabwe (resulting eventually in independence in 1980) and Namibia - as well as having an important impact on popular struggles inside South Africa itself.

The collapse of Portuguese colonialism gave rise to a hasty reformulation of regional strategy by the Vorster regime in 1974. This initially proceeded in a somewhat ad hoc fashion. South Africa's military capacity began to be expanded. The military budget for 1974/5 was one-and-a-half times that of the previous year, and by 1977/8 it had risen to a level three-and-a-half times that of

1973/4. In October 1974, Vorster launched a new diplomatic/political initiative known as "detente". Its objective was somewhat vaguely defined as drawing the states of Southern Africa into a "constellation of completely independent states" which would form a "strong bloc" and "present a united front against common enemies" (6). Orchestrated and conceived by the Bureau for State Security (the notorious BOSS), this involved a desperate search for influential allies within the OAU, and particularly in the Southern African region. Bribery, secret diplomatic contacts and eventually a visit by Vorster to a number of countries in West Africa as well as a meeting with President Kaunda of Zambia were all means used in the attempt to achieve this end. At the same time some minor internal changes were made, such as the scrapping of some forms of "petty apartheid". This had the clear objective of giving credence to the notion that "negotiation" could be a viable alternative to "confrontation".

As a key factor in the new regional balance of forces, Mozambique featured prominently in the Vorster regime's attempts to respond to the changed situation. In the period between the April 1974 overthrow of the Portuguese fascist regime and Mozambican independence in June 1975, it appears that a fierce debate took place within the security apparatuses of the apartheid state over how to respond to the imminent prospect of the formation of a Frelimo government. According to the former Director General of the disbanded Information Department, Eschel Rhoodie, top military commanders and the then Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, were strongly in favour of intervening militarily in support of the abortive settler uprising in September 1974 after the signing of the Lusaka Accords. Apparently Botha secretly ordered the Directorate of Military Intelligence to supply extensive support to the settler insurgents attempting to prevent Frelimo coming to power. This was however thwarted when BOSS agents acting on the orders of Vorster and van den Berg immobilised the equipment at Komatipoort (7). The calculation of Vorster and van den Berg appears to have been that, unlike in the case of Angola, there was no credible alternative force to Frelimo which could have formed a viable regime. To have become militarily involved under such circumstances, they argued, would have been too costly for Pretoria which should instead follow a policy aiming at "taming" the Frelimo government.

Shortly before independence Vorster offered to sign a "Non-aggression Pact" with the incoming Frelimo government. When this was rejected, the newly independent state was subjected to a number of ad hoc

actions. The number of Mozambican migrant workers recruited for the South African mines after rising to 118.000 in 1975 was cut to 79.000 in 1976 and to around 40.000 thereafter (8). Although there are a number of factors underlying the Chamber of Mines' decision to reduce recruitment of "foreign migrants" during these years, the fact that Mozambique was the most affected of the supplier states appears to have been, in part at least, an attempt by the Vorster regime to show that reducing ties with South Africa could be costly. On the other hand, however, other links, such as those in the transport field, were maintained, while some limited efforts were made to draw Mozambique into the "detente" initiative. For example, a Mozambican delegation attended the December 1975 Victoria Falls discussions on the Zimbabwean question.

By mid-1976 it became clear that the "detente" initiative had collapsed partly as a result of the debacle of the South African invasion of Angola 1975/6 and partly as an effect of the regime's brutal suppression of the June 1976 student uprising. This was followed by two years of stagnation in which no substantial regional policy initiatives were taken.

Meanwhile, a new alliance between the major monopoly capitalist forces and top military commanders was being formed within the apartheid state (9). This alliance was highly critical of the Vorster regime's inability to respond effectively to both the internal and external crisis confronting the South African ruling class, and called for a new approach to the defence of the apartheid state which it described as a "Total National Strategy". At the level of regional policy, the top military strategists who first formulated the "Total Strategy", saw a need to fundamentally reorganise both the apartheid state's capacity to make military interventions in the region and the approach towards winning allies which relied upon influencing individual decision makers rather than the objective environment in which decisions were made. They also argued that the mobilisation of all available resources - economic, political and psycho-social as well as military - was essential to defend and advance the interests of the apartheid state both at the internal and regional levels.

b. The Objectives and Instruments of the Total Strategy in the Southern African Region

Following P.W. Botha's assumption of office as Premier in September

1978 the Total Strategy was adopted as official state policy. This led to a restructuring of regional policy in a number of important respects.

Firstly, the objectives of this policy were somewhat reformulated. The vague notion of a constellation of states first put forward by Vorster in 1974 was substantially developed and was now defined as the ultimate objective of regional strategy (10). There were a number of aspects to this. The need to bring about such a constellation was seen as being partly derived from the worsening situation for the apartheid regime in Southern Africa, and partly from South Africa's then deteriorating relations with the major Western powers. In this new regional situation, the "moderate states of Southern Africa" were seen as facing a common "Marxist onslaught" but could not depend on support from the Western powers. This led to a need to construct a "regional alliance" in which South Africa would play the pivotal role. However it was recognised that aspects of apartheid policies were a barrier to formalised alliances with surrounding states. Therefore it was seen to be necessary to generate a "counter ideology" to "Marxism" in the region. This could be partly consolidated by the promotion of a number of joint economic projects between South Africa and other regional states. These were to demonstrate the superiority of South African capitalism over "socialist" alternatives, and would thus depend on a high level of involvement by the "private sector".

The other crucial element in the consolidation of such a "counter ideology" was seen from the outset as the luring of regional states into "Non Aggression Pacts" with Pretoria as a first step towards promoting "the concept of mutual defence against a common enemy" (11). Such action on both the economic and security fronts would significantly deepen the ties between South Africa and its neighbours and slowly bring into being the objective basis for what Foreign Minister Pik Botha described as "a common approach in the security field, the economic field and even the political field" (12).

From the outset of its adoption by the Botha regime, the promotion of the constellation was seen as an attempt to seek "regional solutions to regional problems". This would lead to South Africa becoming internationally recognised as the de facto "regional power" with whom the major powers would have to deal, and Southern Africa would now effectively acknowledged to be a sphere of South African influence.

Finally, the constellation was to be linked to domestic apartheid policies. Its component states would include the so-called "independent" bantustans. This would perform two functions for Pretoria. Firstly it would finally create the institutional mechanism to regulate relations between the now fragmented parts of South Africa and the central apartheid state - for which the regime had long been searching. Secondly by drawing the bantustans into an association with independent black states, it was seen to be the means of finally providing them with a measure of international recognition.

In addition to the ultimate objective of the bringing into being of a "constellation of states", the Total Strategy also defined a number of more immediate limited regional objectives. These included:

1. That regional states both refuse to permit liberation movements to operate from their territories and take steps to prevent these movements from operating clandestinely;
2. That regional states do not develop strong economic or more particularly military ties with socialist countries;
3. That regional states maintain and even deepen their economic links with South Africa, and refrain from supporting calls for sanctions against South Africa;
4. That regional states "moderate" their criticisms of apartheid (13).

New instruments were also developed to achieve these reformulated regional policy objectives. Military expenditure more than doubled between 1977/8 and 1984/5 to reach almost R 3.755 million and new capabilities were developed to mount aggressive assaults against regional states (14). At the same time considerable attention was given to ways in which economic links could be used to further the apartheid state's regional objectives. The Botha regime's strategic planners began to consider ways in which "economic action" (mobilised through the network of structures controlled by the State Security Council) could be applied either in the form of "incentive levers" to those states showing willingness to collaborate, or as "disincentive levers" against those viewed as hostile (15).

c. The Application of the Total Strategy Prior to Nkomati

Three phases in the application of the Total Strategy prior to Nkomati can usefully be identified (16).

The first running from the end of 1978 until mid 1980 saw the launching and promotion of the constellation of states initiative. This however suffered a severe setback when Zimbabwe, then seen by the Botha regime's strategists as the key to the early establishment of a constellation, achieved independence under a Zanu (PF) government rather than Pretoria's ally, Muzorewa. The formation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980 on the initiative of the Front Line States was another blow. SADCC's declared objective of "reducing external dependence and in particular dependence on the Republic of South Africa", as well as the fact that it embraced all independent regional states, represented a direct challenge to the apartheid regime's vision of a constellation of states.

This setback to Pretoria's efforts to re-mould the pattern of regional relations precipitated a second phase of South African action in the region lasting roughly from mid-1980 until the end of 1981. This period involved the application of destabilisation tactics in a fairly generalised and indiscriminate manner. Direct military action or the threat of such action was applied against a number of regional states. There was also a substantial increase in activity by South African sponsored dissident groups - Unita in Angola, the LLA in Lesotho and MNR in Mozambique - and the first major attempts were made to apply economic "techniques of coercion".

This phase of generalised and indiscriminate destabilisation gave way to a third phase lasting from the early part of 1982 until the Nkomati Accord. This can be described as a phase of intensified and more selective destabilisation. During it some attempt appears to have been made by Pretoria to categorise regional states and direct different tactics towards them. On the one hand, there were the more conservative states, such as Swaziland and Malawi, seen as potential collaborators. These were offered a range of economic and other "incentives" to encourage them to "cooperate" with South Africa. On the other hand, there were those states seen either as the most vulnerable or as Pretoria's principal adversaries in the region. States in this category included Lesotho, Angola and Mozambique, who

were subjected to destabilisation tactics on a much greater scale than previously. In addition to greater selectivity in identifying states, Pretoria's strategists appeared to have concentrated on trying to achieve two immediate objectives - the withdrawal of support given by regional states to the ANC and Swapo, and a thwarting of attempts to reduce economic dependence on South Africa.

Mozambique found itself a victim of hostile actions from South Africa during each of these phases. It provided political support to the ANC; allowed ANC members to reside in the country; and, although bases were never established, made available transit facilities to ANC cadres en route to South Africa. The country was an influential member of the Front Line States alliance, and one of the prime movers of SADCC. Its ports and railways offered the only realistic alternative to continued dependence on South African transport facilities for many of the SADCC states. It maintained friendly relations with the socialist countries, and was itself ruled by a Marxist-Leninist party committed to bringing about a process of socialist transformation. It thus represented a barrier to a number of Pretoria's immediate regional policy objectives, as well as posing a direct ideological challenge and potential alternative to apartheid capitalism.

Even during the phase of the launching and promotion of the constellation initiative Mozambique was singled out as a victim for aggression. According to press reports of the time (17), apartheid strategists had drawn up a schedule for incorporating regional states into the proposed constellation. Mozambique, along with Angola and Tanzania, was not considered as a potential member under its existing government. Instead, in the vision of the apartheid strategists of the time, it was to be progressively isolated and weakened as other states were drawn into the constellation.

With the turn to destabilisation tactics, Mozambique was a particular victim in both phases. It was subjected to a number of direct attacks by units of the South African Defence Force (SADF) - the first being the raid against ANC residences in Matola in January 1981. Members of the SADF were also implicated in clandestine acts of sabotage against strategic transport installations - in one such attack a SADF lieutenant, Alan Gingles, was killed by his own bomb. At the same time a number of "economic disincentives" were applied against the country. For example, a partial economic boycott was imposed against the port of Maputo and South African traffic in 1983 fell to half that

of 1982 and only 16 per cent of the level of 1973 (18).

The principal vehicle of South African destabilisation was, however, its sponsorship of the so-called Mozambican National Resistance Movement (the MNR or, as it now styles itself, ReNaMo). Composed initially of a number of former PIDE agents, Portuguese colonialists who had lost property in Mozambique, and members of right wing political movements which had sprung up in the period after the April 1974 Portuguese coup, the MNR had originally been sponsored by the intelligence service of the Rhodesian settler regime. With the latter's downfall this role was taken over by South African military intelligence who provided the MNR with the means to considerably increase its capacity to carry out disruptive military actions in Mozambique (19).

There is some evidence that initially South African strategic planners had no clear idea about precisely what they intended to achieve by destabilising Mozambique. Indeed, there appears to have been some internal debate over this within the SADF. "Hardliners" appeared to believe that it would be possible to overthrow the Frelimo government in the near future and install an MNR regime. Others believed this would be difficult and would in any case have disruptive effects on South Africa itself. Destabilisation, according to this latter school of thought, should be directed at weakening the economy and disrupting SADCC projects (20). This lack of clarity over objectives seems to have been resolved in favour of the second position by the second half of 1982. A prominent academic with close connections to the regime's foreign policy makers characterised Pretoria's objectives as follows:

"Assuming that South Africa is either engaged in destabilising Mozambique or contemplating it, several objectives are readily discernable. First and foremost, South Africa would want FRELIMO to abandon its active support for the ANC, which means denying it sanctuary. A more ambitious objective would be to influence Mozambique to loosen, if not cut, its close ties - particularly in the military field - with communist powers. South Africa would also welcome Mozambique toning down its revolutionary fervour and moderating its condemnation of the republic. What Pretoria essentially desires is a friendly cooperative neighbour instead of a Marxist state threatening its security. To achieve these objectives, support for the MNR and severe manipulation of economic ties are the two obvious means to apply. To talk of the MNR overthrowing FRELIMO,

or even forcing it into a compromise, seems highly premature and indeed highly unrealistic. South Africa would therefore have to confine its objectives to changing political behaviour, not political structures" (21).

This debate had important repercussions within the MNR itself. It seems that important figures within its leadership and in particular its then General Secretary, Orlando Christina, were unhappy about the comparatively modest objectives for their organisation being defined by the SADF. In early 1982, Christina visited several countries in Europe and America in what proved to be an unsuccessful bid to recruit various prominent anti-Frelimo figures who had not hitherto been associated with the MNR. This is interpreted by some observers as an attempt by Christina to rally new forces to wage a struggle to have the MNR supported in a bid to seize power. Shortly after this visit Christina was found murdered on a farm outside Pretoria in circumstances which have never been explained. Until the Nkomati Accord at least no further suggestions of conflict between the MNR and its South African sponsors emerged.

During 1982 and 1983 there was a considerable escalation of MNR attacks causing great damage to the Mozambican economy. Official sources estimate that 140 villages were destroyed, together with 840 schools, 900 rural shops and over 200 public health installations. The total cost of MNR destruction was put at US \$ 3,8 billion (22).

d. Factors leading to the signing of the Nkomati Accord

The Nkomati Accord was the result of a number of factors leading each of the two signatories, up to this point bitter adversaries, to seek some degree of rapprochement (23).

Very briefly, by the middle of 1982 it was becoming apparent that some of Pretoria's strategists were becoming concerned about the apparent absence of formative action by South Africa in the region. Destabilisation was seen as having successfully "softened up" a number of neighbouring states, but some initiative to make possible the application of economic "incentive levers" as envisaged in the original constellation formulation was seen as essential if Pretoria was to succeed in "ruling" as opposed to simply "throwing its weight around" the region. Moreover, the costs of the destabilisation policy were steadily rising at a time when the South African economy was

plunging into its worst recession since the 1930s. At the same time the major western powers, and particularly the USA, who had through the "constructive engagement" policy created the conditions for Pretoria to embark on its destabilisation policies in the first place, began to display doubts. Particularly worrying to the major western powers was the possibility that victims of destabilisation might seek further support from the socialist countries. They therefore began to urge Pretoria to seek some "settlement" within the framework of the Reagan administration's "regional security" doctrine.

On the side of Mozambique, by the end of 1983 it was clear that the economy was in tatters - ravaged by drought and then a flood, on top of the effects of sustained destabilisation. At the beginning of 1984 the government was forced to petition its creditors for a renegotiation of the country's US \$ 4,5 billion debt to the western countries alone. At the same time MNR bandits were causing enormous social and political as well as economic damage. All of these factors congealed to separately dispose the South African and Mozambican governments to negotiate an accommodation with each other. The result was the Nkomati Accord between Pretoria and Maputo signed on 16 March 1984.

2. SOUTH AFRICAN STRATEGY POST-NKOMATI

a. Pretoria's view of the significance of the Accord

We saw earlier that the two pillars on which the Pretoria regime sought to build its constellation of states were Non- Aggression Pacts and the deepening of economic ties with regional states. The Nkomati Accord of itself dealt only with security issues. It bound each of the "high contracting parties" to refrain from the use of force against each other and to prevent the use of their respective territories by any other "state, government, foreign military forces, organisations or individuals which plan or prepare to commit acts of violence..." directed against the other party (24). However, the Nkomati Accord was also part of an understood wider package which would include the renegotiation of various aspects of economic relations between the two countries.

Mozambique's objectives in signing the Nkomati Accord and entering into renegotiations on economic questions were clearly to end the bandit war and bring about some measure of economic recovery. It was anticipated that if Pretoria fulfilled its obligations under the Accord and ceased giving logistical and other support to the MNR the level of bandit activity would rapidly decline. At the same time the lifting of the undeclared South African boycott and the prospects of an increased volume of foreign investment would permit Frelimo to initiate a Mozambican version of the "New Economic Policy" - taking one step back in order to later take two steps forward towards socialism. The official Mozambican position was that the Accord represented a victory for Frelimo's "socialist policy of peace" over Pretoria's "militarism" (25).

At the same time Pretoria clearly regarded Nkomati as a breakthrough for its regional policies. In an "authorised" biography of P.W.Botha published a few months after Nkomati, the Accord is described both as a "miracle" and as one of the two pinnacles of Botha's career (the other being the large Yes vote in the November 1983 referendum among white voters on the new constitutional proposals) (26). It is also seen as a vindication of the application in previous periods both of the Total Strategy in general and, implicitly, of destabilisation tactics in particular. Botha himself is quoted as follows:

"Just as with the result of the referendum on 2 November 1983, the Nkomati Accord was the result of a process which began years ago in accordance with our philosophy of Total Strategy. It was a process in which the image of South Africa and all it had to offer economically and technologically, was firmly made known. The belief was built up in our capacity to maintain internal peace and safeguard our borders i.e. in our military strength. We could then undertake our diplomacy with self- confidence born of strength - economic and military strength - and make standing room for ourselves in Southern Africa " (27).

But perhaps even more importantly it is clear that apartheid strategists saw Nkomati as having created favourable conditions for the resurrection of the stalled constellation of states initiative. Indeed in his address at the signing ceremony, Botha pointedly referred to his "vision" of a "veritable constellation of states in Southern Africa" (28). More precisely, at the level of bilateral South Africa - Mozambique relations, Nkomati was seen as the green light for the apartheid regime and ruling capitalist class to initiate a series of actions aimed at generating a "common approach" on both the security and economic fronts in accordance with the original formulations of the constellation approach. At the regional level, it was followed by the application of intensified pressure aimed at forcing other states into signing security agreements. One objective here was clearly to try to isolate the liberation movements - ANC and Swapo - from the Front Line States. Another was to weaken the cohesion of regional alliances and institutions - the Front Line States and SADCC in particular. At the same time the apartheid regime attempted to capitalise on the prestige generated by Nkomati in the western world, to advance its claim for de facto recognition as the "regional power" in Southern Africa and thereby begin to break out of its international isolation.

How then has the apartheid regime and South African ruling class acted towards Mozambique on the security and economic fronts in the period since the signing of the Accord ? What objectives has it attempted to achieve, and how far has it been able to advance these to date?

b. South African Strategy in bilateral relations with Mozambique

i. Action on the security front

On the security front the principal feature of the entire post-Nkomati period to date has been the glaring disparity in the degree to which the two parties implemented their obligations under the Accord. The Mozambican government immediately took a number of steps against ANC members in the country. Residences were searched a few days after the signing ceremony and within a few weeks large numbers of ANC members were required to leave the country. The movement has since been permitted to maintain only a diplomatic representation in Mozambique with a maximum staff of ten.

The Pretoria regime by contrast manifestly failed to take anything approaching corresponding measures against the MNR. MNR armed bands continued to be supplied with arms and equipment from within South Africa as well as other neighbouring countries such as Malawi, the Comoro islands and a lesser extent Swaziland. Indeed MNR activities escalated in the immediate post-Nkomati period. By September all ten provinces were affected by bandit activity, including Maputo province, which until Nkomati had been relatively unscathed (29).

Whatever internal dynamic the MNR may or may not have acquired, its continued access to external logistical support has clearly been decisive in enabling it to maintain this level of activity. One of the key questions is thus the extent to which this continued external support has been the result of deliberate South African policy.

To begin to approach this question it is necessary to analyse some of the complexities both of the MNR as an organisation and of the modus operandi of South African support for its activities during the period prior to Nkomati. In particular, it is important at the outset to break from the type of simplistic view which presents the MNR as an unproblematic instrument of South African policy. In fact, far from creating from scratch a vehicle for its destabilisation intervention in Mozambique, Pretoria took over from Rhodesian Intelligence the sponsorship of an organisation with a base among sections of the former colonial ruling class and drawing support from elements dissatisfied with various aspects of the Frelimo government's policies. The movement's roots in certain contradictions of Mozambican society made it more effective as a destabilising force,

and sponsorship of it corresponded with Pretoria's emerging policy of attempting to base its interventions in neighbouring states on domestic contradictions in the societies concerned. However, it also meant that both the structure of the MNR itself and its relations with Pretoria were complex and replete with potential contradictions.

As indicated earlier the original founder members of the MNR had been a number of individuals who had held prominent positions within the Portuguese colonialist ruling class and/or served as agents of the fascist state - colonial capitalists who had lost property, PIDE agents etc.. In addition the movement now includes up to 20.000 Mozambicans who form the major component of the armed bands responsible for acts of sabotage, terror and disruption.

South African support for the MNR took a number of forms. It is generally known that MNR bases were established in the Transvaal and that members of the South African Defence Force (SADF) together with some Israelis and other foreigners provided a rudimentary training in the use of arms and explosives. Details also emerged over the years of cases in which SADF personnel took direct charge of certain field operations (30). There were incidents in which SADF officers flew into Mozambique to MNR camps, and the communications system was operated by Military Intelligence from a base in Phalaborwa. However, it now seems that all this was only part of the story. In addition to these forms of direct support it is believed that Military Intelligence (which was responsible for supporting the MNR) also set up a number of front companies through which to supply the movement. Most of the arms supplies, and in particular those passing through third countries such as Malawi, are now thought to have been channelled through these companies. One, an "export-import firm" Frama is known to have organised air drops using a Dakota aircraft supplied to it by the SADF (31).

The effectiveness of the MNR operations during these years depended to a considerable extent on maintaining a relative degree of autonomy between the different levels of the organisation. The fighters on the ground and potential recruits needed to be persuaded that they were part of a Mozambican organisation representing a political alternative to Frelimo, not the tools of former Portuguese colonialists or South Africa. Hence a formal "leadership" consisting of black Mozambicans, including a number of former members of Frelimo, was created around the movement's president, Alfonso Dlakama. However, it has long been

clear to a number of observers that Dlakhamu has never been the dominant figure in the movement.

Behind Dlakhamu were the network of former Portuguese colonialists, whose public spokesmen are people like Evo Fernandes, the Secretary General, and Jorge Correia, Information Officer. Some evidence has now emerged that these had links with prominent former settler capitalists such as Antonio Champalimaud, Manuel Bulhosa and, before his death in 1982, Jorge Jardim (32). The power of this "Portuguese component" was partly enhanced by the fact that it was they who through their South African subsidiaries and associates operated the front companies through which the MNR received most of its supplies.

This relative indirectness of links between the SADF and the MNR membership well suited Pretoria's strategists. It enabled them to conceal, if not the fact of South African support as such, at least details of the degree of dependence of the MNR on South Africa both from the outside world and from the MNR members themselves. However, while it should be stressed that ultimate control rested with the SADF, the clandestine support network also had the effect of giving the "Portuguese component" a substantial degree of influence within the organisation which was to become of importance later.

The signing of the Nkomati Accord clearly raised a key strategic question for the apartheid regime - to what extent should it cease supporting the MNR and/or act to restrict the activities of the MNR's external network. In examining the Botha regime's position on these issues it is important to distinguish between two phases - the period between Nkomati and the October Pretoria Declaration, and the period since October. This is necessary, in my view, even though there is one fundamental common characteristic of both phases - the fact that the Pretoria regime did not act to fulfill the obligations it accepted at Nkomati.

In the event shortly after Nkomati Pretoria ceased providing certain of the forms direct support for the MNR it had rendered previously. As far as is known SADF personnel ceased entering Mozambique to directly assist MNR bands as they had on numerous occasions previously (33). The MNR's radio station, the "Voice of Free Africa", went off the air (although for a while it transmitted from the "independent" bantustan of Bophuthatswana). However, no steps were taken to de-mobilise MNR members in camps in South Africa nor to

dismantle the indirect network of support through front companies etc.. The latter continued to supply MNR bands both from South Africa and third countries, Malawi in particular. Even communications traffic from the Phalaborwa base continued for several months after Nkomati at least (34).

Continued support for MNR operations from South African territory were discussed during the first of the above indicated phases at a number of meetings of the Joint Security Commission set up after the Nkomati Accord as well as at several higher level meetings between Mozambican and South African state officials. Although the details of these discussions were not made public, from the reports which emerged it appears that South African officials made strenuous efforts to persuade the Mozambican government that these clear violations of the Nkomati Accord had not been authorised, and were indeed expressly forbidden, by top decision makers in the South African state. It appears that South African officials argued that elements within the clandestine support network were acting autonomously and illegally. This led to much speculation about shadowy "new forces" based in the large Portuguese business community resident in South Africa which had allegedly taken over control of the MNR from South Africa. Some versions also referred to these continuing to receive a measure of unauthorised support from within the South African Military Intelligence, which was said to be reluctant to see the "deactivation" of the MNR. Sometimes it was even suggested that the position of the Bothas (P.W. and R.F), or more generally those forces within the South African ruling class favouring "peace", was so precarious in a highly militarised society that their capacity to act decisively against such clandestine and illegal "new forces" was severely constrained (35).

Little hard information is available. Yet it is eminently possible to think of a number of reasons why the most senior officials within the highest decision making body of the apartheid state (the State Security Council) might themselves have favoured the continuation of a certain level of MNR activity against the Frelimo government during this initial phase at least. Firstly, it is unlikely that Pretoria fully "trusted" Frelimo or regarded the measures taken during the period to "improve the climate" for South African economic involvement as a sufficient retreat from either domestic socialist policies or alignment with socialist countries. There are even indications that Pretoria did not regard the measures taken by Mozambique to restrict the ANC as sufficient. Thus, R.F.Botha told parliament in May, "We

are persuading Mozambique, that was initially unwilling to do so, to accept that we should have the right of access to Mozambique so as to combine with them in clamping down further on the ANC" (36).

Secondly, as indicated earlier, MNR activity was one of Pretoria's key levers and bargaining counters against Mozambique. There is no doubt that Pretoria's strategists consider the MNR as the principal factor leading Mozambique to seek rapprochement. It is thus unlikely that they would have wanted to completely abandon one of their trump cards in favour of an approach which relied exclusively on economic action at least until they felt sure about Frelimo's intentions, more particularly since the Total Strategy doctrine which they espouse envisages the coordinated mobilisation of all resources available to the South African ruling class - military as well as economic, political, socio-psychological. For these reasons it would be logical from the standpoint of Pretoria to have wanted during these months to be able to deploy a mixture of both "incentives" and "disincentives" against Mozambique. In this respect it can be appreciated why a certain level of continued MNR activity might have been considered a "useful" complement to economic action in the initial months of the emerging "new relationship".

However, if for these reasons the senior policy makers of the South African state were supporting, at least tacitly, a level of MNR activity, they would obviously have wanted to conceal this - particularly after having signed a formal "non-aggression" treaty. In this case having some clandestine "new forces" at hand to whom such supportive action could be attributed, would have been useful. One thing which is clear is that it would be almost impossible for the MNR to have received new arms supplies without some support from within the SADF. According to some sources the SADF always maintained the very strictest control over the issuing of arms to MNR bandits (37).

Of course it is possible, even likely, that differences existed within the security apparatuses of the state and the ruling class generally over the precise mix of "incentives" and "disincentives" to deploy. It appears that on the one side Military Intelligence favoured continuing to support a relatively high level of MNR activity on the grounds that if the MNR were fully "deactivated" it would take 3 to 4 years before effective destabilisation could again be applied against Mozambique (38). On the other side, various forces within the capitalist class and Department of Foreign Affairs appeared to be pushing for a reduction, though not necessarily cessation, of MNR

activity on the grounds that the security situation in Mozambique prevented the effective deployment of "economic levers". Complicating the picture were the various Portuguese business interests involved in the MNR's clandestine support network. A number of these were clearly seeking a "solution" in which not only would favourable conditions be created for capitalism in general in Mozambique, but in which they would also receive compensation for property lost during the country's transition to independence. However, it is inconceivable that an alliance of elements within Military Intelligence and the "Portuguese component" of the MNR could have continued to supply MNR bands without receiving at least the tacit authorisation of the Botha regime, and even less in flagrant defiance of its express instructions. The "illegal new forces" acting contrary to government thesis rests, in my view, on a serious misunderstanding of the decision making process on security questions in the current South African state.

Since P.W.Botha's accession to the Premiership in 1978, the decision making processes in the Apartheid state have been re-organised and centralised (39). A three-phase "rationalisation" programme was begun in March 1979. In the first phase, a cabinet secretariat was set up in the Office of the Prime Minister. The twenty cabinet committees which had existed on an ad hoc basis under the Vorster regime gave way first to six, then five and finally four permanent Cabinet Committees - for National Security, Constitutional, Economic and Social Affairs. These revamped cabinet committees were not the advisory bodies to the cabinet they had been under Vorster but became integral components of the highest level of the decision making machinery. They were given the right to make decisions, and Ministers could now refer matters directly to a cabinet committee without first going through the cabinet.

By far the most important of the cabinet committees, and the one which deals with foreign policy issues, is the Committee for National Security, known as the State Security Council (SSC). Set up by an Act of Parliament in 1972, it functioned under Vorster as a purely advisory body and met only sporadically. However, according to General Magnus Malan, the debacle of the first South African invasion of Angola in 1975-6 "focussed attention on the urgent necessity for the State Security Council to play a much fuller role in the national security of the republic than hitherto". An interdepartmental committee on which the SADF was strongly represented met to devise the organisational structure for "the formulation of strategy at a

national level". Out of this emerged the components of what is now termed the "national security management system" at whose pinnacle stands the revamped SSC (40).

In effect the SSC is now the primary decision making body in the South African state. It is presided over by the Executive President (the Prime Minister prior to the coming into effect of the "new constitutional dispensation" in September 1984). Its other statutory members include four ministers - Defence, Foreign Affairs, Law and Order, and the Senior Cabinet Minister, if not already included in the above portfolios - and the following senior state officials - the head of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), the Chief of the SADF, the Director-General of Foreign Affairs and of Law and Order, and the Commissioner of Police. The SSC has its own secretariat, headed by Lt. Gen. A.J. van Deventer - the man who commanded the first South African invasion force into Angola in August 1975. This secretariat is directly responsible to the the President and its staff is drawn from various government departments, with a high military component including, without doubt, a number of important officials from Military Intelligence.

According to one major study the SSC operates on the basis of consensus forming among proponents of different tactical positions.

"By its very composition the SSC is representative of different constituencies. Most prominent in the foreign policy field are the foreign ministry and the military, with the (civilian) intelligence service featuring less strongly. It is quite conceivable that the first two, in particular, want to promote their positions and get these adopted as official government positions. Whether there is coalition forming ... is doubtful. For one thing, the Prime Minister's intimate involvement in the Council's proceedings would make it difficult for members to 'caucus' in his absence. By the same token it is even more difficult to imagine members 'ganging up' against the Prime Minister in order to get a particular decision adopted. If there is any kind of manipulation involved, it is more likely to be managed by the Prime Minister himself, for P.W.Botha has a reputation as a political tactician. More plausible than coalition forming would be tendencies towards difference maximisation, the main protagonists being the foreign ministry and the military. Provision is however made for ironing out differences between SSC members through the Council's working committee, composed of officials. Here

a common position could be worked out and submitted to the Council for final decision" (41).

There is no evidence which convincingly shows that the above described highly centralised and "rationalised" decision making process has radically changed or broken down since Nkomati. It is true that the crisis of the apartheid state has deepened over the period and that this has sharpened contradictions, including those within the ruling class and its allies and within state apparatuses. However, the apartheid state still remains, in my view, a contradictory unity and not an inchoate grouping of competing power centres.

It is inconceivable, given its central role in the decision making process, to imagine that the whole question of support for the MNR in the post-Nkomati period would not have been discussed by the SSC. The most probable scenario is that as with other major decisions of this sort, for example the air attack on Matola in June 1983, the different options were debated within the SSC after which an agreed position was arrived at (42). Military Intelligence, which is well represented on the SSC, would have had ample opportunity to present its pre-occupations. Moreover, given that one of the key power bases of the Botha regime is the military, it is more than likely that they were duly taken into account by government ministers. However, it is also quite possible that a tacit understanding might have been reached that certain issues would not be raised for explicit discussion on the Council. If this were the case it would have to be regarded as nothing more or less than the deliberate creation of a convenient loophole to enable ministers to disclaim knowledge or responsibility for any actions it may be expedient for them not to admit to.

If the MNR continued after Nkomati to receive support from within South Africa via the clandestine network (a fact which is now established), this can only be because the SSC accepted that it should. The clandestine and indirect route of this support - through apparently independent "agencies" - has all the hallmarks of previous operations in which South African government involvement was later established - e.g. the abortive Seychelles invasion in 1982. At the very least the SSC must have taken a decision not to demobilise armed MNR members in camps on South African territory fully conscious of the fact that the effect of such a decision would be a continuation of MNR activities against Mozambique. Such a "turning of a blind eye" to clandestine operations its members must have been well aware were

continuing, would of course represent a violation of the Nkomati Accord on the part of the Pretoria regime through act of omission. More probably, the regime secretly authorised such actions, which would represent a violation of the Accord by act of commission.

But however that may be, it is clear that the persistence of MNR activity during this initial phase was of considerable value to Pretoria in its attempt to assert itself as the "regional power" in Southern Africa. It created conditions for the apartheid regime to attempt to set itself up as a "peacemaker" between two "contending factions" in Mozambique.

The details of this process are not available, and are indeed shrouded in a veil of secrecy. Nevertheless, it appears that the crucial first steps were taken during a top level security meeting held in Cape Town in mid May when a delegation led by Mozambican Minister of Economic Affairs in the Presidency, Jacinto Veloso, met senior South African officials including P.W.Botha. The Mozambican delegation, it seems, went to the meeting with a dossier documenting incidents of MNR bands being supplied from within South Africa since Nkomati (43). This was met by an acknowledgement of the veracity of the facts presented, but a denial of involvement or approval by senior South African state officials. It was at this point that the "new forces" thesis began to emerge. The Botha regime argued that it was unable to crush the "new forces" controlling the MNR, but offered instead to use its influence to assist in seeking a negotiated solution to Mozambique's security problems. Shortly after this meeting P.W.Botha issued a public statement in which he reaffirmed "the commitment of the Republic of South Africa to the spirit and letter of the Nkomati Accord and its rejection of acts of violence and subversion against the Peoples Republic of Mozambique and the Republic of South Africa". This statement was reproduced in full in the Mozambican press together with a statement by President Machel stating that Botha's reaffirmation was "very positive" and announcing that the Permanent Commission of the Peoples Assembly would introduce a law providing for an amnesty and the "reintegration" into Mozambican society of armed bandits who surrendered voluntarily (44). The precise terms of this proposed amnesty were however not published.

The next indications emerged in early June at the time of P.W.Botha's visit to Portugal. Press reports suggested that Portugal had been approached to assist in "arranging talks between the Mozambican

government and MNR" (45). This was followed by persistent rumours of low level, and probably indirect, contacts between Frelimo and the MNR in which it appears that the proposed amnesty was presented to the MNR as the basis for a settlement. According to some sources (46) there are between 16.000 and 20.000 MNR members both in Mozambique and in camps in South Africa. The apartheid regime is said to have agreed to find employment for 8.000 of these on the South African mines while another few hundred would move to third countries. The bulk of the remainder would be absorbed into various rural projects in Mozambique, and there have been suggestions that various western countries have been approached to finance these. The details of these projects for "reintegrating" MNR members into Mozambican society are said to have formed the basis of the Mozambican government's amnesty offer. At the end of June a further high level meeting was held in Maputo when a South African delegation led by Foreign Minister Pik Botha and the Head of Military Intelligence, Lt General Pieter van der Westhuizen, met senior Mozambican officials including President Machel. Once again no details were released, but it appears that a strenuous effort was made to convince the Mozambicans about the Botha regime's "sincerity" about Nkomati (47).

The next major development came in mid August when a Mozambican delegation led by Economic Affairs Minister Veloso and Security Minister Sergio Vieira travelled to Pretoria for a further round of high level discussions. Present in Pretoria at the time of this meeting was a delegation from the MNR. According to reports in the South African press, clearly based on briefings from senior state officials, South African officials acted as "interlocutors" in "proximity talks" between the Mozambican government and MNR delegations (48). Shortly thereafter the MNR issued a statement indicating its terms for a settlement. This demanded that the Frelimo government resign, that the Peoples Assembly be dissolved and that "a democratic government based on free enterprise" be formed. After the resignation of the Frelimo government a coalition between Frelimo and the MNR could be worked out. In return for agreeing to "accept" that Samora Machel continue to hold the office of President the MNR wanted for itself the portfolios of Prime Minister, and Ministers of Defence, Finance and Transport (49). Changes in the constitution to "eliminate marxism" and abolish the one party state were also demanded (50). An MNR spokesman claimed that these demands had been conveyed to the government delegation during the August meeting, and threatened that if there was no settlement by the end of September MNR forces would

"storm Maputo"(51).

The next dramatic development began at the end of September. Shortly after the celebrations of the 20th Anniversary of the launching of the armed struggle by Frelimo on 25th September 1964, a senior Mozambican delegation left for Pretoria for yet another round of negotiations. It was acknowledged that an MNR delegation would be in Pretoria at the same time and that South African officials would act as a go-between in discussions about the process of "reintegrating" MNR members into Mozambican society. Mozambican officials described these discussions as "decisive" (52).

Nearly five full days of discussions followed, and at one point the Mozambican government delegation threatened to withdraw. However, on October 3 P.W.Botha, flanked by members of both the Mozambican government and MNR delegations, announced that "a cessation of armed activity and conflict in Mozambique had been assented to" by both parties (53). A four point Declaration comprising the following was released:

"1. Samora Moises Machel is acknowledged as the President of the Peoples'Republic of Mozambique.

2. Armed activity and conflict within Mozambique from whatever quarter or source must stop.

3. The South African government is requested to consider playing a role in the implementation of this declaration.

4. A commission will be established immediately to work towards an early implementation of this declaration." (54)

The October Declaration perhaps marked the high point of Pretoria's influence, opening up expectations of a potential new role and level of involvement for the Pretoria regime on the security front. It was announced shortly after the Declaration was made public that the Pretoria regime's Deputy Foreign Minister, Louis Nel, would chair a commission on which both the Mozambican government and MNR would be represented. Foreign Minister R.F.Botha told a press conference that the commission would be discussing, inter alia, a possible role for the SADF, which "apart from monitoring the ceasefire...might include civil action programmes to help with agriculture, medical

care, schooling and technical training"(55).

It immediately became clear, however, that the Frelimo government and MNR had vastly different interpretations both of the meaning of the Declaration and the role of the commission on which they would for the first time engage in face to face discussions. Frelimo spokesmen interpreted the acknowledgement of President Machel as an implicit recognition of the "legitimate authority of our state and government" (56). The MNR for its part argued that this was merely "a recognition of a current fact" and that they had "not surrendered (their) political demands" which they would be putting to the commission (57). The Frelimo government, however, said that these would not be discussed as the commission was only empowered to discuss technical questions relating to the mechanics of a ceasefire (58). The sole point of agreement was that both sides said that the Declaration itself did not constitute a ceasefire and that the fighting would continue (59).

The first round of negotiations in the tripartite commission took place between October 8 and 11. No details were released but it appeared that the discussions were extremely tough. Two days of discussion had originally been planned, but in the end they lasted four full days with numerous breaks for bilateral discussions between Pretoria and the MNR on the one hand, or Pretoria and the Mozambican government on the other (60). "Informed speculation" in the South African press suggested that the first item on the agenda was the question of ceasefire and reintegration of MNR members, with an implicit understanding that certain political issues would be dealt with later. It was further suggested that this discussion of political questions would probably concentrate on the question of the elections for the Peoples' Assemblies due to be held in 1985, rather than the demand for ministerial posts against which the Frelimo government had firmly set its face (61). The MNR however appeared to have tried to alter the agenda to place the discussion of political questions first.

This first round of discussions was followed by a second round during the week 14-18 October. Again the talks appear to have been tough. Around this period, President Machel made a strong statement saying that "Mozambique will not negotiate with kidnappers, bandits and criminals. Instead Mozambique will wipe them out, and that day is not far off"(62). Ostensibly in response to this and other similar

statements by Frelimo leaders, the MNR delegation withdrew from the negotiations on the 16th. Evo Fernandes left for Portugal and stated that he would not return until Frelimo had clarified the meaning of recent statements (63).

However, it has subsequently emerged that there was much more behind the breakdown of the talks. An article published in Lisbon by the former editor of the Maputo newspaper Noticias, claimed that the negotiations had in fact broken down at the point where the two sides were about to sign a ceasefire agreement (64). The article quoted from what it claimed was the intended ceasefire document. This provided for a 45 day ceasefire renewable by mutual consent. A "monitoring commission" would be set up consisting of four members each nominated by the Frelimo government, MNR and South Africa as well as an "arbitration commission" in which South Africa would play the role of "chairman/convenor". The MNR would be recognised as an "interested party" and Frelimo would refrain from all hostile comment against it. Finally, after 45 days the monitoring commission would initiate discussions aimed at achieving "mutual political, social, economic and military accommodation". The article claimed that the reason for the breakdown of the talks was that the MNR wanted to begin discussions on "mutual accommodation" in the various spheres immediately and not wait until 45 days after the initiation of a ceasefire.

Sources in Maputo have refuted a number of key claims made in the article. They argue that the only possible source on which it could have been based was a leak from the MNR and that the document cited was an MNR position paper not an agreed document. It is flatly denied that any agreement on any process of "political accommodation" whatsoever had been reached (65). The explanation given for the breakdown in the Mozambican press emphasised the role of the "Portuguese component" of the MNR - former settler capitalists and their allies. These were said to be wanting to reopen the question declared closed by the late Portuguese Prime Minister Sá Carneiro in 1979 of "compensation" for property lost by Portuguese settlers during Mozambique's transition to independence and establish neo-colonial relations between Portugal and Mozambique (66).

The breakdown of the negotiations was followed by intense activity on the part of officials of the Pretoria regime. Louis Nel flew to Maputo, and R.F.Botha is said to have been about to fly to Portugal.

After Nel's visit to Maputo a two day visit of the Council of Ministers and other top Frelimo officials was held. This was followed by a statement on 19 October saying that the Pretoria Declaration was a "step forward" and that recent military victories had created favourable conditions for "action on the diplomatic level to reconstruct peace" (67). At about the same time MNR negotiators returned to Pretoria.

The next round of meetings began on October 26 with a one day bilateral meeting between a Mozambican government delegation and a team from Pretoria led by R.F.Botha and Lt Gen van der Westhuizen of Military Intelligence. This was followed by an attempt to reconvene the tripartite commission on the 29th. However, on the 30th the Mozambican delegation returned to Maputo. According to Jacinto Veloso the head of the MNR delegation had returned from Lisbon with instructions to boycott the commission. Veloso accused "the Portuguese component of armed banditism of trying to sabotage the Nkomati Accord and Pretoria Declaration"(68). A communique from the Pretoria regime said that it would continue to "play a constructive role"(69). However, up to the time of writing (March 1985), the tripartite commission had not been reconvened.

The breakdown of the tripartite negotiations ushered in a new phase, in which it has become apparant that Pretoria has lost much of its earlier initiative and influence over the evolving situation. This has manifested itself, on the one hand, in an increasingly evident strain in relations with the Frelimo government and, on the other, in the opening up of contradictions with its protege, the MNR.

With the breakdown of the negotiations, both the MNR and Frelimo government committed themselves to seeking a relative advantage if not a "solution" on the battlefield. Each side launched a number of new military offensives. It has now been established beyond doubt that the MNR has continued to receive support from within South Africa during this phase. Cases of MNR members being recruited, trained in South Africa and sent on missions in Mozambique even after the October Declaration have now come to light (70). There have also been a number of incidents of sabotage launched by what appear to be specialist "hit and run" teams which return to South Africa after operating in Mozambique (71). At the same time there have been indications that Military Intelligence has been actively involved in creating alternative supply routes for the MNR involving a network of

agents and allies in certain countries in the Middle East as well as Somalia, the Comores and Malawi (72). The objective of these continued violations appears to be twofold - firstly, to signal to any forces in Mozambique resistant to resuming negotiations with the bandits that seeking a military solution will be costly. Secondly, it has been suggested that the State Security Council had at the time of the October Declaration opted for a compromise position which would imply it acting differently in different areas of the country. In terms of this the MNR would have been "deactivated" in the area south of the Save River thus allowing the initiation of some form of "ceasefire" as well as creating conditions for a number of projects of interest to South african capital to go ahead. At the same time, however, the MNR would have been kept operating in the North from bases in other neighbouring countries, thus meeting Military Intelligence's concern that the bandits be kept in reserve for a future eventuality (73).

It is these continuing violations of the obligations accepted by the Botha regime at Nkomati, which have largely been responsible for the increasingly evident strain in Maputo-Pretoria relations manifesting itself in the various critical public statements quoted at the beginning of the paper.

At the same time it is clear that serious contradictions have emerged between the MNR leadership and its Portuguese backers on the one hand, and the Botha regime on the other. With the exception of the period immediately around Nkomati, little hostility had previously been expressed by the MNR to Pretoria's policies towards Maputo - thus apparently confirming the view that it was to a large extent "business as usual" in the months immediately after Nkomati. After October, however, MNR spokesmen have adopted an almost hysterical tone, accusing the Botha regime of "betrayal" and of "being in league with the Marxists of Maputo"(74). At the root of such conflicts is not fundamentally any major withdrawal of material and logistical support (which on the contrary they have continued to receive), but rather the failure of Pretoria fully to support the MNR's political demands. Pretoria has made it clear that it favours a "compromise" solution in which the MNR would be "integrated" into a coalition government, but in a subordinate position. This evidently derives from concerns, openly expressed by important forces within the South African capitalist ruling class, both about the administrative capacity of the MNR leadership and about the costs to South Africa of becoming

embroiled in trying to sustain an unpopular MNR regime in power. An un-named "top South African industrialist" was quoted as follows: " It is in no one's interest that the MNR takes over the government. They have very weak leadership, no clear ideological direction and absolutely no administration. With them in power and Frelimo in opposition, Mozambique will be in greater chaos than ever before. And we will be the first to feel it" (75).

In this context, the Botha regime has shown signs of vacillation and indecision, clearly reflecting a debate both within the regime and the ruling class generally on how to proceed. On the one hand, serious concern has been expressed in various quarters that a continuation of bandit activity at its present levels at least, is potentially threatening to South African interests. There are a two main aspects to this. First there is a general concern that the Nkomati Accord, and all it represents in terms of Pretoria's credibility in the region and at the wider international level, might be jeopardised. Secondly, there is the concern that the "security situation" in Mozambique has both placed severe constraints on the effective application of "economic levers", and stalled projects in the country in which South African capitalist interests want to become involved. Both aspects were well summarised by the un-named industrialist cited above, who said "(I)f the security situation does not improve within the next six months, Nkomati will be out of the window and all these opportunities...in the way of exports and imports...will be lost. And Africa will never trust us again" (76).

Forces emphasising such concerns tend to be advocates of "dovish" positions. They favour an approach concentrating on pressurising the MNR to return to the negotiating table with more conciliatory positions. There are however also powerful forces favouring a more "hawkish" line. According to the Financial Mail these consist of certain elements within the SADF who believe that the Mozambican government should be "pushed for further concessions" by stepping up support to the bandits (77). However, these differences exist within clear limits. There is not, and has never been in my view, any force within the South African ruling class which would willingly demobilise the armed MNR members in camps in South Africa without further concessions from the Mozambican government; in other words rigidly abide by the letter and spirit of the obligations accepted by the Botha regime at Nkomati. The most "dovish" position would insist on political concessions by the Mozambican government as the price for

any demobilisation of bandit camps.

Meanwhile in December and January, the regime's foreign minister R.F.Botha launched a new diplomatic initiative. This involved visits to Somalia and the Comores and discussions with Manuel Bulhosa and Frans Josef Strauss as well as contacts with the Portuguese government(78). In addition the Sunday Times reported in February that "a clampdown on MNR supporters in South Africa itself" was "imminent" (79). Despite this, however, it was reported that "the MNR had not abandoned its hard line" (80), while there was absolutely no indication that the "imminent clampdown" would include disbanding MNR camps on South African territory. All that is certain at the time of writing is that, in the words of Frelimo's best known slogan, "a luta continua".

ii. Action on the economic front

On the economic front, the signing of the Nkomati Accord was followed by the launching of a new offensive by the apartheid regime and South African ruling capitalist class. The immediate objective of this appeared to be to demonstrate that "economic cooperation" with Pretoria holds out greater advantages for Mozambique than socialism, whilst at the same time laying the basis for a deepening of economic links with South African capitalism envisaged in the original constellation conception. Action by state departments and corporations has featured prominently in this offensive.

There are a number of dimensions to this. Firstly, at the level of direct action there have been a number of state to state agreements on important economic questions. In May a tri-partite agreement between South Africa, Mozambique and Portugal was reached on the supply of power from the Cahora Bassa hydro-electric scheme. This agreement can be seen, in part, as a concession to Mozambique in that the tariffs have been considerably increased and are now calculated on the basis of the amount of power leaving the turbines, rather than that received in South Africa. It also provides that South Africa and Mozambique will be jointly responsible for the security of the power lines(81). This was followed in August by the signing of an agreement between the Transport Ministers of the two countries under which South African Transport Services undertook to provide various forms of assistance to implement a "ten point plan to develop Maputo harbour". Although this agreement did not in itself involve additional finance, mention was

made at the signing of a R10 million South African loan to Mozambique's transport authorities which had already been approved (82). In early November the apartheid regime's Minister of Manpower Utilisation visited Maputo and signed a partial agreement to "legalise" the position of the estimated 150.000 Mozambicans working as farm labourers in the Transvaal Lowveld. It was also agreed to that the Chamber of Mines would spend R 750.000 to refurbish its recruitment centres in Mozambique and that two working committees - one for mining and one for agriculture - would be set up to work out proposals for future ministerial level talks (83). This was followed at the end of the month by a visit by the regime's Minister of Environmental Affairs and Fisheries during which a fisheries agreement was signed. This provides for South African firms to be given fishing rights in Mozambican waters in return for the payment of licence fees, cooperation in fisheries research, and the granting of a R 2 million credit line for the purchase by Mozambique of fishing equipment (84).

As well as direct action, the regime has also, in accordance with one of the basic premises of the constellation approach, acted in various ways to persuade the "private sector" to involve itself in Mozambique. Action of this type has included a large number of appeals from senior state officials. Various (newly established or existing) state structures have also been deployed to support or encourage involvement by South African capital. Notable among these is the South African Tourist Board, whose current chairman is the former Administrator-General of Namibia, Danie Hough. The Tourist Board has been involved in numerous negotiations aimed at simplifying procedures for South African tourists to enter Mozambique. It has also arranged visits to Mozambique by potential tour operators. It is inconceivable that this level of activity by a seemingly minor state structure which is nevertheless chaired by a relatively experienced state official, would take place without any consideration of the strategic implications involved. In particular the vulnerability of the tourist industry to any worsening of relations between the host state and the state from which the tourists come must figure prominently as a factor prompting the apartheid regime to put so much effort into encouraging the re-opening of a South African tourist trade to Mozambique. In addition to the Tourist Board, a special government "economics committee" has been set up to deal with both state and "private sector" economic relations with Mozambique, and there have been suggestions that the South African trade commission in Mozambique will be strengthened to "deal with the increased volume of

business in the period since Nkomati" (85).

Two phases of involvement by "private" capital can be identified. The first, in the immediate aftermath of Nkomati saw a good deal of exploratory activity by a relatively large number of capitalist enterprises and organisations. Many leading South African capitalists were invited to the Nkomati ceremony, and a number of these expressed both support for the political objectives of the Botha regime in Southern Africa and an interest in exploring the possibilities of themselves becoming involved in "making the new relationship work" (86). This was followed by a number of visits to Mozambique by representatives of most of the major capitalist interest groups and a smaller number of individual enterprises.

Prominent among the capitalist organisations eager to investigate the prospects for South African capitalism in Mozambique was the Associated Chambers of Commerce (Assocom). In early April its Chief Executive declared:

"Most businessmen today - in the aftermath of the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique, new arrangements with Swaziland, conciliatory remarks by President Kaunda of Zambia, peace moves in South West Africa (Namibia) - stand closer to the Prime Minister's goal (of a constellation of states) than ever before. Businessmen have an enormous stake in the success or otherwise of recent developments in Southern Africa, especially in Mozambique" (87).

A few days later Assocom announced that it had given 'top priority' to the preparation of a "radical new master plan aimed at boosting two way trade with black Africa". This aimed at producing a blueprint intended to prove to neighbouring states "as far as the equator" that "free trade flows hold the key to mutual economic growth". The organisation also announced that it hoped to organise a wave of "business safaris" to explore new trade routes. The Assocom strategists working on this new trade plan are concentrating initially on an economic pact with Mozambique. According to the Johannesburg Star:

"Talks are likely to be sought with both the SA Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Commerce on the necessity of recruiting the private sector to the economics committee being set up in the wake of the Nkomati Accord. The aim will be to persuade Mozambique and

other black neighbours - already showing disillusionment with loan packages from both East and West - that 'Trade not Aid' should be the new slogan behind economic planning" (88).

Other capitalist organisations eager to promote South African capitalist economic involvement in Mozambique included the South African Foreign Trade Organisation (SAFTO). SAFTO organised a visit to Maputo by various businessmen in May and has subsequently offered advice and encouragement to capitalists expressing interest in becoming involved in Mozambique (89). The May visit was led by SAFTO's Chief Executive, Wim Holtes, who had previously published an article in the journal of the Institute of Strategic Studies of the University of Pretoria on ways in which South African trade could undermine SADCC (90). In addition officials of the Federated Chambers of Industry, the South African Agricultural Union and the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut visited Mozambique in June in a joint delegation with Assocom (91). This initial mood of euphoria and expectation among South African capital even affected organisations of black capitalists. At the annual congress of the National African Federated Chambers of Commerce, the organisation's president Sam Motseunyane urged his members to "join the stampede to establish relations with Mozambique". "The signing of the (Nkomati) accord and other Southern African diplomatic successes", he continued, "were historic and momentous developments...for which the PM deserves every praise"(92).

This initial phase of expectation and euphoria now however appears to have given way to a new phase in which as the results of investigations are evaluated capitalist enterprises have begun to make known the form, level and conditions upon which they are prepared to become involved in Mozambique. Although all the details are not available the broad outlines of the probable pattern of South African capitalist involvement in Mozambique can already be discerned. The main features appear to be the following:

Firstly, although there is a high level of agreement with the regional policy objectives of the Botha regime and a certain expressed willingness to back these up in practice, the level of purely politically motivated economic involvement by South African capitalists is likely to be decidedly limited. The bulk of whatever investment is forthcoming will depend on profitability prospects. In fact only one firm, Rennies, has indicated a willingness to 'invest in peace' without the prospects of an immediate return. In April its

Chief Operating Officer, Buddy Hawton, was quoted as follows:

"We can provide assistance and support to countries like Mozambique even if it is not in our short term interests to do so. For example, from a shipping point of view, it may be more advantageous for a South African shipper to move all his cargo through Durban or Richard's Bay rather than Maputo. But by opting for Maputo the local shipper will be helping Mozambique and at the same time contributing to the price that private enterprise must pay to ensure Southern African stability...What is more, we are prepared to put some money up front in the interests of getting the place back to normal and although there is a degree of philanthropic bias in what Rennies is prepared to do, we would - in the longer term - see ourselves as being able to capitalise on our initial investments"(93).

However, it is clear even from this quote that Rennies expects a financial return in the longer term. Moreover, as indicated below, Rennies is the dominant force in freight handling in Southern Africa. By investing in Maputo harbour it is acting in part to ensure that its monopoly position is not undermined.

Even what appeared to be the most palpably politically motivated "aid" gesture - the donation of 2.500.000 apples to Mozambican schoolchildren a few weeks after the Nkomati Accord - was not without commercial considerations. As the General Manager of the Deciduous Fruit Board explained, South Africa had a surplus of deciduous fruit in 1984. "It is also a fact that Mozambique has traditionally been a good outlet for Cape fruit and the Board regards the Frontline states as obvious markets for its fruit in the future"(94).

In short the ultimate determinant of South African "private sector" involvement in Mozambique, will be the traditional capitalist criterion of profit.

Secondly, it is clear that any South African investment is likely to be confined to determinate sectors of the economy and particular areas of the country. South African capital will not be entering Mozambique because it wishes to alleviate the plight of a war ravaged country and its hungry people. It will therefore head for those sectors and areas where the prospects for making profits appear to be best regardless of whether or not these are priority sectors in terms of the social needs of the people. From the indications which have emerged, it appears that potential South African investors will

largely confine their involvement to the following sectors:

1. The Maputo port complex;
2. Tourism;
3. A small number of agricultural and fisheries projects;
4. Trade;
5. A limited interest in mineral exploitation.

Maputo port was historically built to serve the needs of South African capitalism and indeed a proportion of traffic to and from the Transvaal has passed through Maputo throughout. However, one of the key projects of the SADCC has been to transform the Mozambican ports into facilities to serve principally the independent states of Southern Africa enabling these to reduce their dependence on South African ports and railways. There is no doubt that South African state and private capital have mounted a major struggle to have the role of Maputo harbour redefined as "a natural harbour" for the Transvaal. For certain types of cargo to or from the Eastern Transvaal and Witwatersrand areas Maputo harbour is without doubt a convenient and cheap facility.

Moreover, transport services have historically been Mozambique's largest foreign exchange earner. Apart from the immediate prospects for port users and handling firms, an increased volume of South African traffic is seen as the only short term basis on which to generate the additional foreign exchange revenue which would permit Mozambique to increase its imports from South Africa.

Tourism has likewise historically been an important source of foreign exchange for Mozambique. Apart from the probable strategic considerations prompting a high level of action by state structures referred to above, there appears to be a significant demand to visit Mozambican resorts among potential (white) South African tourists. South African tour operators are also said to be searching for additional resort outlets so as to be able to offer multi-destination packages to tourists from Europe and North America. Tourism in Mozambique therefore offers some prospects for profitable involvement by South African investors.

Agriculture has however not been an historic area of involvement by South African capital. In colonial times the limited capitalist

agricultural production which took place in the south of Mozambique was the exclusive preserve of Portuguese colonialists, while the region as a whole served predominantly as a labour reserve for the South African mines. Nevertheless, it appears that some South African concerns do regard a limited involvement in areas with an already existing relatively developed infrastructure as potentially profitable. There is thus some interest in taking over certain state farms in the south. It appears that a number of potential South African buyers are interested in producing crops for export to South Africa. Mozambique, like the Eastern Transvaal lowveld, has sufficiently warm winters to permit the cultivation of vegetables for the Witwatersrand market, while some proposals apparently envisage producing animal feed to supply South African cattle ranchers. Other potential investors appear to be interested in producing chickens, eggs and dairy products for the luxury market in the Mozambican cities, provided sufficient guarantees are received on the repatriation of profits.

Mozambique's rich fishing grounds likewise offer the prospects for profitable exploitation by South African fisheries concerns, as the numerous incidents in which South African trawlers were caught fishing illegally in Mozambican waters testify.

Apart from these areas the country has been flooded with offers to supply a host of consumer goods and equipment, in return of course for payment in convertible currency. There has also been some interest in tendering for construction contracts. Many trade proposals have taken little account of Mozambique's capacity to pay, although some goods have been supplied on a barter basis in exchange for the present or future supply of commodities such as prawns (95). A more limited interest has been displayed in becoming involved in mineral ventures if and when sufficient mineral resources are discovered.

A third notable feature of the emerging pattern of South African capitalist involvement in Mozambique is the relatively modest interest currently being displayed by the major South African monopolies.

The only subsidiary or affiliate of one of the major monopolies which made anything like a significant investment in Mozambique since Nkomati has been Rennies. Rennies is currently controlled by the giant South African Mutual Life Assurance Company. Its previous parent company was the Hong Kong based Scottish company Jardine Mathieson,

which sold its controlling interest in Rennies to S.A. Mutual in June 1983 for R 200 million (96). Rennies operates bulk terminals throughout Southern Africa and has been one of two corporations which control the major part of the region's clearing and forwarding and travel business (the other being Manica Freight, jointly owned by Safmarine and the Anglo American Corporation). Rennies also jointly owns, together with Sol Kerzner and associates, the Sun International hotel chain , which operates all the casinos in both the so-called independent bantustans of South Africa and neighbouring states. Rennies was ranked fortieth in the Financial Mail's "Top 100" companies in 1983 with assets valued at R 243,9 million and net profits of R 24,3 million (97). In August 1984 it merged with Safmarine, which runs South Africa's official shipping line, to form a new company - Safren - with assets of R 940 million (98). SA Mutual retains the controlling interest in Safren. Among other effects the formation of Safren has led to the merger of Rennies and Manica Freight operations in Mozambique. Since the beginning of 1985, the two groups have operated as one concern - known as Renfreight. Safren is without doubt the dominant force in regional ports and shipping as a whole, while Renfreight will control all but a minor part of the traffic passing through Mozambique's ports.

Two weeks after the signing of the Nkomati Accord, Rennies Chairman C.W.Fiddian Green (who is now Vice Chairman of Safren) visited Maputo (99). During the visit he announced that within a year Rennies would be moving an additional 1 million tons of South African cargo through Maputo (which happens to coincide exactly with the amount by which the volume of South African cargo passing through Maputo declined during 1983). Fiddian Green also indicated that his company would become involved in resolving some of "the enormous infrastructural problems" in the port and expressed the view that within three years Maputo harbour could be operating at maximum profitability(100). In addition Rennies proposed the building of two hotels (one a casino) to be operated by Sun International, and also that it act as agent for the Mozambican National Tourist Company through its Thomas Cook travel agency franchise(101). In June the company announced that it had successfully negotiated a change of policy at Maputo port which would allow "more flexibility in the maintenance of equipment by clients and agents". In view of this Rennies had agreed to invest the equivalent of \$ US 1 million towards the improvement of facilities(102).

Clearly this involvement by Rennies in Maputo harbour cannot be divorced from the company's monopoly position in regional freight handling and shipping. By expanding its already substantial stake in Maputo harbour, it is ensuring that its position will not be undermined by the entry of potential new competitors. Moreover, the current acute recession has dramatically reduced the volume of traffic passing through the ports of Southern Africa as a whole. It has been estimated that in 1983 South Africa's merchandise exports had fallen to half their 1980 level in real terms (103). Were a substantial volume of the overall reduced quantity of cargo to be diverted to other handlers, Safren's position could be substantially weakened. Given the particular market conditions within which the company operates, it therefore makes "good business sense" for it to want to become more involved in Mozambique at this conjuncture even if its investments do not prove to be immediately very profitable.

Apart from Safren/Sun International, the following subsidiaries or affiliates of South African monopolies are known to have submitted serious proposals during the period:

- African Explosives and Chemical Industries (controlled by the Anglo American Corporation) has indicated that it is investigating the possibility of setting up an ammonia plant in the Pande natural gas field (104).
 - Premier Milling (now controlled by Anglo American after its previous British parent company, Associated British Foods sold out in 1983) has submitted a proposal to supply animal feed, and perhaps at a later stage produce it in Mozambique (105).
 - Murray and Roberts, an important construction firm, is performing some work in Maputo harbour under contract to Rennies (106).
 - Sterling Fisheries, a subsidiary of Irvin and Johnson - now controlled by Anglovaal, has been granted a fisheries licence in association with Quintas Seafood (107).
- Two South African subsidiaries of European multinationals are also known to have also taken serious steps to become involved. These are:
- The South African subsidiary of the British Hill Samuel merchant bank which made available a R 30 million credit line in May (108).

- The Concor construction firm, controlled by the German Hochtief group. Concor is involved in a consortium led by Krupps of West Germany which has secured a R 20 million contract to improve the water supply and drainage system of Maputo city. This project is to be financed by a loan raised in the United States (109).

A notable feature of the period to date has been the relatively high, and perhaps even greater level, of serious interest in Mozambique displayed to date by small or medium size non-monopoly South African capital, and particularly from concerns based in regions immediately adjacent to Mozambique. It is representatives of capital of this type who have constituted the majority of members of delegations organised by such capitalist organisations as Assocom, SAFTO, the Federated Chambers of Commerce, the South African Agricultural Union and the Afrikaner Handelsinstituut. It was also largely on the initiative of non-monopoly capital that two organisations were established with the specific objective of promoting South African trade and investment in Mozambique. The first and currently less important of these is a "steering committee" to prepare for the formation of a formal South Africa - Mozambique Trade Association. This was set up at a meeting in Johannesburg in July attended "by businessmen with varying degrees of trade links between Mozambique and other Southern African countries" (110). Its chairman is a minor business figure, Anthony van Wyk. The second and more important organisation is the Eastern Transvaal Lowveld Liaison Committee also formed in July. This embraces over 100 Lowveld farmers, traders and petty industrialists. Its chairman is the Mayor of Komatipoort, Johnny Henn, who is also a wealthy farmer and owner of a number of shops in Komatipoort (111). In August members of the Lowveld Liaison Committee visited Mozambique and also organised a return visit by Mozambican officials (112). Later in the month the Committee signed a letter of intent to set up a joint SA - Mozambique company, Repmosa, which will promote small scale tourism to Mozambique concentrating on island resorts to be supplied from South Africa by members of the Liaison committee who will also open up marine sports shops. In addition the agreement provides for South African farmers to be involved in a 1.000 ha agricultural project (113). Later in the same month Henn announced that a further agreement would be signed involving "the development of 8.000 ha of irrigated farmland" in which there would be "lots of SA participation"(114). Eventually in November the first Mozambican-South African joint company was formed when Henn signed an agreement to form a joint tourism company, to be known as MOZATUR (115). MOZATUR now

runs tours to the island of Inhaca and is considering further projects. Henn is also notable as one of the few South African capitalists who have expressed any interest whatsoever in moving out of the Southern region. Also in November he said he would buy into a cashew processing factory in Zambesia province, and supply consumer goods to trade with peasant producers of cashew. The nuts would eventually be exported to South Africa (116).

Although there are no doubt a number of factors underlying this eagerness by non-monopoly South African capital to involve itself in Mozambique, the impact of the recession in South Africa must be prominent among them. South Africa's capitalist economy is currently in the midst of its worst recession since the 1930s. Negative real growth rates were recorded in 1982 and 1983, while the much anticipated upturn in 1984 did not materialise (117). Particularly hard hit has been capitalist agriculture, where the combined effects of recession and drought led to a 42% fall in "net farm income" in 1983 compared to 1982 (118). Moreover, the low gold price continues to have a dampening effect on the entire economy. It has led the monetary authorities of the apartheid state to follow a policy of maintaining a low exchange rate against the dollar in order to boost the Rand earnings (and hence profitability) of the mining companies. This policy combined with the balance of payments deficit had resulted in the Rand losing more than a third of its value on the foreign exchanges over the year (119).

As is generally the case in times of capitalist crisis, a process of rapid concentration and centralisation of capital has been underway in South Africa in which a number of small and medium sized concerns have been threatened with extinction. In response to the falling value of the Rand and the continuing high rate of inflation, interest rates have risen dramatically. By September 1984 the base rate reached 25% which meant that individuals and businesses had to pay up to 32% for overdrafts (120). Clearly very few small capitals have profit rates which would permit repayment at those rates. Moreover, in an attempt to reduce government expenditure there has been a substantial cutback in the number of government contracts put out to tender (121). Historically government contracts have "featherbedded" a number of smaller, particularly Afrikaner, capitals. The net result of all these factors is that there is currently very little scope for expansion by small capital within South Africa, whilst the number of bankruptcies has rocketed. One liquidator of bankrupt companies commented in

August, "Many small businesses are going bust and things can only get worse. Manufacturers, particularly small engineering shops, are being hammered and we can expect retailers to start coming through soon"(122). As a spokesman for the Small Business Development Corporation put it, "You have to be either very foolish or very brave to start a small business (in South Africa) today" (123).

In these circumstances it can easily be appreciated why such capitals would be only too eager to rush into any potential new market which became available. The "opening up" of Mozambique to South African capital has been seen as a golden opportunity for a number of struggling small capitalist concerns, especially since the current run down state of the Mozambican economy is expected to throw up the prospects of a number of takeovers at bargain prices. Moreover, unlike the monopolies such capitals have to seize whatever opportunities present themselves and cannot afford the luxury of waiting to see how things develop before seriously committing themselves. Nor are they in as strong a position to make demands and set conditions for their involvement. Such factors deriving from the current state of recession in the South African economy partly explain the greater eagerness displayed to date by non-monopoly South African capital to become involved in Mozambique as well as its greater willingness to accept existing conditions. On the other hand, however, the impact of the recession will also greatly affect the capacity of capital of this type to mobilise the resources necessary to sustain large new investments. The high interest rates in South Africa which have already been referred to will put a severe limit on the funds which small capitalists, even in consortia, will be able to raise. One would therefore expect them to be mainly interested in taking over the management of existing assets rather than opening up new projects. The limited experience of the Lowveld Liaison Committee, which has thus far negotiated a management contract for the hotel on Inhaca island and indicated an interest in taking over existing irrigated farmland, appears to confirm this hypothesis.

The monopolies, on the other hand, are not affected by the recession to the same degree or in the same way. While profit rates have clearly fallen, the recession, as a time of rapid centralisation of capital, has seen the real value of assets controlled by the small number of major monopolies which dominate South African capitalism rocketing (124). For the monopolies the "opening up" of Mozambique could never have the same significance as for smaller capitals. The Mozambican market will never be more than a minor part of their

operations. They too can afford to wait and see how things develop before committing themselves and are also in a better position to put demands and set conditions for their involvement. Thus while the monopolies have greater capacity to make new investments and generate new projects, their involvement if and when it occurs is likely to come at a higher price. Meanwhile, one of the common refrains among spokesmen for monopoly capital is that Mozambique "has potential" but that "much remains to be done" before they themselves would consider investing in the country (125).

Linked to the previous point, the final noteworthy feature of the post-Nkomati pattern of South African capitalist involvement in Mozambique is the way in which the prospect of future investment is being used as a lever to attempt to put demands on the Frelimo government in the sphere of domestic economic policy. The amount of actual investment made, or even firmly promised, to date has been extremely modest. In part this is related to the security situation. However, it is also being suggested that current proposals could be the first installment in a much larger potential investment package if certain steps were taken to "create a more favourable investment climate" in Mozambique (126). For reasons discussed above, this position is more firmly associated with the monopolies than some of the smaller concerns which have shown a greater willingness to become involved under existing conditions. However non-monopoly concerns are clearly also pushing for policy changes, as are a number of western multi-nationals (127).

Among the demands put and concessions sought have been the following:

- A guarantee not only against nationalisation, but also that the "private sector" and "individual initiative" will continue to have a central role in the Mozambican economy in the future;
- An "improvement in the infrastructure", meaning in particular communications to and from South Africa, as well as such things as ensuring higher quality hotel accommodation for visiting businessmen and easing procedures for obtaining visas;
- A guarantee that "existing supply agreements with communist countries" will not be an impediment to developing trade with South Africa;

-The relaxation of currency controls and the introduction of measures to bring the management of the country's external economic relations into line with the norms established by international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund. This is sometimes linked to the "suggestion" that the Metical should be pegged in some way to the Rand and/or that Mozambique should seek some form of association with the Rand Monetary Area (128).

As indicated earlier, the Frelimo government is currently attempting to implement a Mozambican version of the "New Economic Policy". The immediate objective is to bring about some measure of recovery in the battered and war torn economy, and in particular to increase food production to feed the hungry population. Frelimo has long argued, with considerable justice, that there are a series of economic links with South Africa inherited from colonialism which it would be pure voluntarism to imagine could be broken at a stroke. In the present circumstances it argues that it is engaged in an attempt to identify those links with South Africa which are unavoidable and obtain better terms for Mozambique within these without becoming further enmeshed in new ties of dependence on South African capitalism. In order to achieve some of these goals the Frelimo government has indicated its willingness to make certain concessions to both domestic and external capital in order to attract investment funds which it seeks to control through its planning procedures and by encouraging joint ventures with state participation. In an attempt to attract foreign capital, a new law on foreign investment was published in August 1984. This provided, inter alia, for:

- guarantees against nationalisation except in "exceptional circumstances", in which case compensation will be paid in freely convertible currency;
- the export of an agreed level of profits within three months of submitting an application, plus the guaranteed right to re-export capital invested;
- the duty free import of all raw and auxilliary materials used to produce goods for export;
- tax free salaries for foreign technicians;
- a "tax holiday" for new investors of between two and ten years;

- the declaration by the Council of Ministers of "free zones" (zonas francas) which will be exempt from normal controls;
- the resolution of any disputes through a process of arbitration with the right of appeal to the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, which will be the final adjudicator (129).

In addition, in September Mozambique joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. The country's quota payable to the IMF was set at \$ US 600 million. This is based on a country's Gross Domestic Product and IMF rules specify that one quarter (in this case \$ US 150 million) has to be paid in freely convertible currency, whilst the remainder was paid by opening up an account for the IMF in Meticaís. Mozambique immediately requested a loan of \$ US 260 million (130). This is in excess of its so-called gold tranche (an amount equal to the contribution in foreign exchange) which is completely without strings, but is within its so-called first credit tranche (an amount equal to its total contribution) where conditions are relatively lax. However, it is believed that the country is planning to borrow more later - possibly in six tranches. In this case extremely stringent conditions would apply.

However, while welcoming such measures, South African and indeed other foreign capital would clearly prefer that they were part of a permanent fundamental break from socialist policies rather than a temporary tactical retreat. There is no doubt that an intense effort is being made to push the Frelimo government in this direction.

The major intervention of South African capital to date appears to be on the apparently technical question of payments. The question of how Mozambique can pay for an increased volume of South African imports has featured prominently in discussions between representatives of South African capital and the Mozambican state. These have led to a number of ad hoc measures being proposed. For example, SAFTO has proposed an "innovative financing" arrangement under which South African firms doing business in Mozambique would form consortia in which payments due to one firm for supplying goods or services can be offset against fees payable by another for use of the port of Maputo (131). There have also been discussions about the possibility of barter deals in which Mozambique would receive goods immediately while the South African supplier is guaranteed an agreed quantity of export commodities such as prawns over the following few years. In some

cases participation in joint ventures to produce such exports has been offered in proposed barter deals (132). However, it is clear that measures of this sort are regarded as mere temporary expedients, while the introduction of a more regularised external payments system is one of the priorities of South African capital (133). On occasions it has been suggested that the "most logical" solution to the payments problem would be for Mozambique to affiliate to the Rand Monetary Area. In April, the influential Financial Mail advocated the formation of an enlarged nine nation Rand monetary union including Mozambique, and argued that this would wield "considerable bargaining clout" on international financial markets (134). While this editorial may perhaps be regarded as kite flying by one of the most rabidly pro-"free enterprize" publications in South Africa, it is known that Mozambique has come under considerable pressure "in private" to link its currency to the Rand. This has come not only from South African capital, but also from such figures as David Rockefeller, the prominent U.S. banker who visited Mozambique in April. In an interview with a South African journal, Rockefeller not only repeated this "suggestion" but also indicated that he had discussed it with South African officials (135). An investment conference organised by SAFTO and the University of South Africa business school, which was attended by the Governor of the Bank of Mozambique, included a presentation by Dr Chris Stals of the South African Reserve Bank on the workings and alleged advantages of membership of the Rand Monetary Area (136).

The implications of such demands are profound. The current members of the loose association known as the Rand Monetary Area are South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland. These are territories in which either currently or in the recent past, the South African Rand has circulated as legal tender. Lesotho and Swaziland now each have their own currencies, but given their degree of economic integration with South Africa are obliged to peg their currencies to the Rand as well "harmonise" their monetary policies with those of Pretoria. In Swaziland and Lesotho a one to one exchange rate is maintained between the Liligeni and Maluti on the one hand and the Rand on the other.

To achieve a degree of convertibility of the Metical into the Rand corresponding with that of the currencies of other members of the Rand Monetary Area, would necessarily imply a drastic change in both the domestic and external orientation of the Mozambican economy. At the very least a massive devaluation would be essential, accompanied by measures to give priority to the potential Rand earning sectors of the

economy. Moreover, once having affiliated Mozambique would be obliged, as are the other members, to "harmonise" its monetary policies with those of South Africa. In this respect it should be noted that the monetary authorities of the apartheid state do not normally consult other members of the Rand Monetary Zone before taking major decisions which affect them as well as South Africa (137). Affiliating to the Rand Monetary Area would therefore imply a major loss of sovereignty in a key policy area.

One year after Nkomati any illusions which may have existed about South African capital "rescuing" the Mozambican economy have been thoroughly discredited. The volume of investment has been decidedly limited, confined to sectors which would tend to deepen the overall dependence of Mozambique on the South African market and make the country more vulnerable to the "strategic application of economic levers", and tinged with conditions and demands which would imply Mozambique abandoning socialist policies. At the same time, however, it is clear that the links which have been created have not functioned as the invincible economic incentive levers imagined by the apartheid regime's strategists. Both South African capitalists and the Mozambican government have to a considerable extent followed their own agenda, which has not always been identical with that of the strategic planners of the Botha regime. We shall return to discuss some of the implications of this last point in the conclusion.

c. The impact of Nkomati on South African Policy towards other Southern African states

South Africa's relations with and policy towards other independent states in the region continue, of course, to depend on a number of factors including , the historical pattern of integration of the particular country into the South African dominated regional sub system; the class character of the state concerned; the internal contradictions and struggles in the society; and the impact of South African policy in previous periods. In this section, however, we consider only the direct impact of the Nkomati Accord on South African policy towards other regional states.

Shortly after the signing of the Nkomati Accord, it was publicly announced that a secret "Non-Aggression Pact" had been signed in February 1982 with the Kingdom of Swaziland (138). There were in fact a number of significant differences in the Pact signed with Swaziland

and the Nkomati Accord. The agreement with Swaziland committed both states to "combat terrorism, insurgency and subversion individually and collectively" and to "call upon each other wherever possible for such assistance and steps as may be deemed necessary". Each state was also obliged to inform the other about any foreign military personnel in their territory (139). No such clauses were included in the Nkomati Accord.

Nevertheless, the fact that two regional states had entered into security agreements with Pretoria was seen by the apartheid regime as creating a precedent for other states in the region to follow. The post-Nkomati period saw a concerted attempt to cajole other states in the region into concluding similar "Non-Aggression Pacts". Lesotho and Botswana were particularly singled out, while Zimbabwe came under some pressure as well.

On a number of occasions in mid 1984 Lesotho was threatened with "economic havoc" - and more precisely with the repatriation of its migrant workers in South Africa and Pretoria's withdrawal from the Highlands Hydro-electric scheme - unless it entered into an agreement obliging it to "notify SA of every refugee escaping to Lesotho and provide for deportations or repatriation if Pretoria insists" (140). In July it was announced an arms shipment from socialist countries was held up in Maputo port, while another had been unable to leave Britain, because Pretoria refused to allow transshipment over its territory (141). Meanwhile the opposition Lesotho Democratic Alliance (LDA) formed at Pretoria's suggestion openly boasted that its election campaign would be financed by South Africa (142).

Botswana was likewise threatened with the disruption of the flow of goods and people across the common border unless it entered into a formal security agreement with Pretoria (143). There were also allegations of secret contacts between South African agents and the leadership of the Botswana National Front (BNF). In the Botswana general election held in September 1984 the BNF advocated the signing of an "Nkomati type" agreement with Pretoria (144).

During the same months Zimbabwe Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, spoke of pressure being put on his government to enter into a security agreement (145). This came mainly in the form of continued South African support for the so-called "super Zapu" dissidents operating in the Matabeleland province.

One of the notable features of this period was the resistance put up by these states to South African pressures. All staunchly refused to sign formal agreements, although they each reiterated that they would not permit liberation movements to operate from their territories (146).

This perhaps unexpected resistance, plus possibly the pressure which Botha came under on this question during his June Western European tour (147), led to a change in tactics on the part of the Pretoria regime. Press reports in September suggested that Pretoria was seeking "low profile 'working agreements'" with these countries rather than formal "high profile 'Nkomati-type' accords" (148). However, despite the altered form, Pretoria's essential demands remained unchanged - namely, that the regional states concerned not only refrained from providing facilities to liberation movements, but also implemented more effective measures to prevent clandestine use of their territories by freedom fighters. It was also implicitly understood that the signing of such agreements would be followed by further "economic cooperation" between the country concerned and South Africa (149).

During September separate bilateral discussions were held between both governments and Pretoria on security questions. Although the full details are not available, it appears at the time of writing that both Lesotho and Botswana have succeeded for the moment in 'persuading' Pretoria to refrain from insisting on security accords. Apparently Lesotho threatened to take the question of the hold-up of arms shipments to the United Nations Security Council, thereby raising the spectre of a tightening up of the arms embargo against South Africa or other sanctions (150). Nevertheless, reports in the South African press referred to the "friendly spirit" in which discussions took place as well as to the fact that various proposals were tabled for transmission back to the respective governments (151). The Basotho Information Minister subsequently announced that Lesotho wished to improve its relations with South Africa. He said "there were no ANC members in the country" and that his government would continue to ensure that this remained the case (152). At about the same time the blocked arms shipments were permitted to pass through South Africa (153). In October further talks aiming at "the normalisation of relations" between the two states were held and after these it was announced that the feasibility study for the Highlands water project would go ahead (154). In the same months it was reported in the South

African press that "sensitive" negotiations with Botswana had taken place. Although once again no formal agreement emerged it was reported that the Botha regime was hopeful that certain measures would be taken "aimed at helping Botswana enforce its own policy of preventing insurgents from using its territory to launch attacks on South Africa" (155).

d. Pretoria's post-Nkomati strategy at the wider international level

At the wider international level the dominant feature of the first six months following Nkomati was Pretoria's attempt to use the Accord as a springboard to break out of its international isolation. The dominant feature of the second six month period was way in which the deepening domestic crisis undermined the regime's earlier gains.

The attempt to use the Accord as a means of breaking out of Pretoria's isolation had two main aspects. First, in the politico-diplomatic sphere the regime launched a new offensive seeking de facto recognition for itself as the "regional power" in Southern Africa - i.e. as the force with whom all other "interested parties" in the region would have to come to terms whether they liked it or not. This was clearly one of the principal objectives of P.W.Botha's visit to Western Europe in June 1984 - an event which would have been inconceivable before Nkomati. Moreover, it is clear that the visit had some success at this level. It did not generate any greater support for the regime's apartheid policies among the peoples of the countries visited - the massive demonstrations are testimony to this, but at the level of state officials and leading figures of Western European capitalism (the 'constituency' at whom the visit was directed) there is no doubt that a significant breakthrough was achieved. The Sunday Express claimed that "European leaders have now acknowledged that South Africa is the regional power in the (Southern) African subcontinent" (156). The Sunday Times commented as follows:

"Mr Botha has cast himself in the only role open to him - not as the defender of apartheid nor as hesitant reformer, but as an African statesman, an earnest advocate of the nations which share the subcontinent with South Africa. This role would have been scarcely credible a bare six months ago. In these post-Nkomati days, however, not even the most hesitant European leader could fail to recognise Mr Botha's claim to the title, or the seriousness of his intentions." (157).

By the end of August the Pretoria regime also appeared to have directed its bid for de facto recognition as the Southern African "regional power" at the "superpowers", including by implication the Soviet Union. In an important speech, headlined in the press "PW's new stand on working with the USSR", Botha attempted to define the forms of "superpower" involvement in the region acceptable to South Africa as the "regional power". South Africa would not oppose the "justifiable global interests" of the superpowers - including those in Southern Africa - in return for the superpowers not endangering South Africa's "essential regional interests", Botha was reported as saying.

If the objectives of the superpowers in Southern Africa were "peace and prosperity" South Africa would not oppose their involvement and would even be prepared to cooperate with them. This was interpreted by the Rand Daily Mail as an attempt by Pretoria to define the parameters of "acceptable" links between regional states and the Soviet Union. "...Improved relations with Mozambique and the prospect of improved relations with Angola - both of which have close links with the Soviets - might have led the government to believe that the chances of including Soviet assistance in the economic redevelopment of Southern Africa are now strong", the paper commented (158).

The second aspect, linked to the bid for recognition as the "regional power", was a sustained effort to persuade potential external investors to regard South Africa as the "natural route" for channeling investments to countries in the region. This too was a major objective of Botha's European tour, which included a number of closed door seminars with leading Western European capitalists (159). The same theme was also pushed on numerous occasions since. The objectives here appear to be threefold - to attract foreign investment to South Africa's own crisis ridden economy, to ensure that South African firms have a stake in profitable ventures elsewhere in the region, and to undermine SADCC's attempts to reduce the dependence of regional states on South African capitalism. Again some measure of success appeared to have been achieved during the initial post-Nkomati period.

Thus, it was reported that there was great interest in Portugal in participating in tripartite ventures in Southern Africa, and in particular in Mozambique. These would involve the use of Portuguese technicians in projects financed by Western European or North American concerns, and organised in association with South African firms or the South African subsidiaries of multinationals (160). It also appears that some interest was expressed by certain West German and American

potential investors in Mozambique in routing their activities through South Africa. On his return from a visit to the United States the President of the Mozambican Chamber of Commerce remarked:

"They (North American businessmen) want to invest but they also want to see how commercial relations develop between the Peoples' Republic of Mozambique and the Republic of South Africa. I am convinced that they will try everything to ensure that their initial investments go through South Africa and Portugal" (161).

This campaign by Pretoria was also extended to the level of international organisations. At the meeting of the World Bank and IMF held at the end of September, a programme "to ease the plight of sub-Saharan Africa" was approved. During this meeting South African officials made strenuous efforts to persuade other delegates that South Africa was the key to the effective implementation of any such programme in Southern Africa. Although nothing was stated formally South African officials reported that they were pleased at the way discussions had gone (162).

By the end of the year, however, it had become apparant that many of these earlier gains were being undermined. This was partly a consequence of the growing international perception of South Africa's duplicity over Nkomati. More fundamentally, it was a consequence of the international impact of the deepening domestic crisis confronting the Apartheid system and state - manifested in a worsening of the economic recession and mass popular uprisings in black residential areas. In November the Rand Daily Mail reported that,

"South Africa's ability to borrow overseas is beginning to be adversely affected by a combination of a deteriorating economy and recurring reports of unrest in black townships. London based bankers say South African borrowing costs have now increased..."(163).

Since then an important new element - the snowballing of the international disinvestment campaign - has entered the equation, creating perhaps one of the most difficult periods ever for the apartheid regime on the international stage.

e. Impact on the struggle inside South Africa

The most important immediate objective which the apartheid regime

clearly sought to achieve through the Nkomati Accord was to "spike the guns" of the ANC and thereby dampen down the mass struggle within the country at all levels. The regime's propaganda had long presented the escalating armed struggle as an externally generated assault, whereas the ANC argued that its essential dynamic derived from the movement's organic links with the struggling oppressed people of South Africa. The Pretoria regime hoped that by depriving the ANC of what it described as its bases in Mozambique, the level of armed ANC action would rapidly decline. For its part the ANC acknowledged that the loss of transit facilities in Mozambique would be a setback, but declared that new methods which emphasised above all the strengthening of underground organisation within South Africa would be found (164).

In the event, during the first six month period after the Accord, the impact even directly on the armed struggle seems to have been limited. A study undertaken by the University of Pretoria's Institute of Strategic Studies (a body with close links to the SADF) concluded:

"The Nkomati Accord and the crackdown on the African National Congress by the Swaziland authorities appear to have only minimally reduced sabotage attacks in South Africa"(165).

According to statistics compiled by the Institute the number of attacks between March 16 and early September was only a fraction below the figure for the corresponding period in 1983 - 27 against 29 (166).

Moreover, despite intense repression, other forms of militant mass struggle continued unabated, and indeed escalated. It has been estimated that there were more strikes during the first nine months of 1984 than during the previous record high year of 1982 (167). The year also saw the United Democratic Front leading a militant boycott campaign against the elections for the so-called coloured and Indian chambers of the Botha regime's new tri-cameral parliament. This campaign, plus the inept response of the regime in detaining UDF leaders and the subsequent British consulate affair, largely succeeded in demonstrating to the world at large the total unacceptability of the new constitution to the majority of the people of South Africa. Moreover, September saw an explosion of popular resistance in the black residential areas of the Vaal triangle on a scale which even surpassed the 1976 Soweto uprising. The immediate cause of this was the imposition of rent increases. However, since these rent increases were imposed in part to finance puppet local administrative

authorities, this uprising should also be seen as an indication of popular rejection of the Botha regime's constitutional plans. The regime's response was to send in police and troops in an attempt to quell the uprising by force. According to the South African Institute of Race Relations, 134 people had been killed by the army and police by the end of October (168). However even this did not succeed in dampening down the struggle. In early November, a two day "stay away" strike was called to protest against state brutality and in support of the people's demands. Backed by a number of major unions as well as the UDF, this was described by one academic as, "the most successful stay away since the tactic was first adopted 35 years ago"(169). By the end of the year a number of commentators were arguing that the mass struggles of this period had deepened the crisis in South Africa to the point where it was now becoming clear to all that the Botha regime had failed to impose its restructuring plan on society (170). Moreover, as indicated earlier, the international repercussions were such that the gains made at this level earlier in the year were being visibly eroded.

The fact that Nkomati did not produce the expected dampening down of popular struggles inside South Africa, has led a number of influential figures in and around the Botha regime to tentatively suggest the initiation of a "dialogue" with the ANC. This was openly advocated in March by the columnist "Dawie" in Die Burger (of all South African newspapers that closest to P.W.Botha politically) (171). Foreign Minister Pik Botha also hinted that he did not reject the possibility out of hand.

However, a closer examination of the regime's "dialogue" proposals shows that they are laden with conditions that would imply the ANC fundamentally changing its character. In the first place, the stated precondition is that the ANC should abandon the armed struggle. It would then be permitted to engage in discussions not about the implementation of a political system in which there would be equal political rights for all - this has been repeatedly ruled out of court by even the most "reformist" elements within Botha's Nationalist Party (172) - rather a gelded ANC would be permitted to "negotiate" over the more effective integration of local administration of black urban areas into the regime's existing "constitutional dispensation". Not surprisingly, ANC leaders have rejected all such overtures (173).

3. CONCLUSIONS

The experience of the post-Nkomati period has clearly demonstrated that the apartheid regime is not prepared to live in "peaceful coexistence" with its neighbours in Southern Africa, if this is taken to mean leaving these states to determine for themselves their internal social systems and the regional and external relations they wish to develop. The Botha regime has a project to re-mould the pattern of regional relations in Southern Africa. Described ideologically as the establishment of a "constellation of Southern African states", this aims at nothing less than the assertion of Pretoria's undisputed hegemony as the acknowledged "regional power" over a tightly controlled alliance of vassal states. Every measure introduced since 1979 at least - every act of destabilisation, every offer of aid and "economic cooperation", and every treaty signed - has been applied (whether effectively or not is another question) with the clear objective of furthering this plan. Moreover, the experience of Nkomati suggests that the regime will not hesitate to act deviously even to the point of violating, whether by act of omission or commission, undertakings given in formal treaties.

There is no doubt that this strategy enabled the apartheid state to achieve an important breakthrough in the Southern African region in the early part of 1984. Through its "Non-Aggression Pacts" with two regional states, the regime achieved a degree of international recognition unprecedented in the past 25 years in which Pretoria's foreign policy makers acquired something of the aura of "statesmen".

However, the experience of the post-Nkomati period also shows that the apartheid leviathan is not invincible. While it has tremendous military and economic resources at its disposal compared to those available to its neighbours, its regional policy efforts have been characterised by contradictions and real limits on its field for manoeuvre. It has been obliged to pull back from some of the more blatant destabilisation tactics - even if in many cases simply to substitute these with more subtle, concealed "techniques of coercion".

Moreover, the limited experience of the post-Nkomati period suggests that "economic incentive levers" may prove more difficult to apply effectively than apartheid strategists may have imagined. There are a number of aspects to this (174)

Firstly, there is a clear contradiction at the level of South Africa's

current policy objectives. On the one hand Pretoria evidently desires to maintain regional states in a position of weakness as the basis on which to exercise its domination over them. It certainly does not wish to see economically strong independent states arising in the region, and much of its activities over the past six years have been explicitly designed to undermine the economic viability of other Southern African states. On the other hand, in the wake of Nkomati, the apartheid regime is now obliged to demonstrate that "cooperation with South Africa" works.

Secondly, it is clear that the recession and Balance of Payments deficit have placed severe limits on South Africa's capacity to fund projects. In this respect it is noteworthy that one of the reasons given for the cancellation of Botha's proposed tour of a number of countries in West and Central Africa was that South Africa did not have sufficient funds at its disposal to offer anything worthwhile to these states (175).

Thirdly, the key role assigned to the "private sector" in the establishment of economic links means that factors other than the political schemes of the Botha regime enter into the equation. The limited experience of post-Nkomati Mozambique suggests that the earlier experience of the bantustans, where the state has for years placed great political pressure and offered extra-ordinarily attractive incentives to businessmen to invest in Pretoria's political projects, is likely to be repeated. No matter how much they may agree with them, hard-headed South African capitalists are not likely to furnish large amounts of capital to support Pretoria's political schemes unless it is profitable for them to do so. While some prospects are seen for profitable investment in Mozambique, the overall involvement is likely to be limited.

Mozambican analysts have argued that if Pretoria could be restrained from at least some of its destabilising activities in the region, the prospects for the realisation of the SADCC project would be brighter (176). Certainly, some of the delegates at the July SADCC summit showed a shrewd appreciation of South African strategy and expressed a determination to combat it (177). This is encouraging. However, it is extremely unlikely that Pretoria will actually leave its neighbours in peace to implement a programme which seeks to reduce the dependence of regional states on South African capitalism. To a large extent the entire history of Pretoria's acts of destabilisation in the region

have been an attempt to export the domestic crisis arising from the irreconcilable contradictions of apartheid capitalism. With Nkomati having failed to bring about the hoped for dampening down of the mass struggle inside South Africa, the pressure will be on the apartheid regime to embark on further adventures in the region. What is urgently needed is the development of a strategy for combatting Pretoria's hegemonic ambitions which is firmly based on a recognition of the point underlined at the Front Line States meeting at the end of April - real peace in Southern Africa is impossible while the apartheid system continues to exist.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Noticias (Maputo) 9/3/1985.

2. Noticias 7/2/1985. December 1984 saw the first of a number of public statements by Mozambican officials complaining about continued bandit activity from South African territory. Initially, however, these refrained from directly accusing the Botha regime of violating the Accord. Thus in mid month Minister for Economic Affairs in the Presidency, Jacinto Veloso announced that Mozambique would shortly publicly present proof of violations of the Nkomati Accord. However, he added, "We are convinced that the South African government is complying with the Nkomati Accord and is making efforts to ensure that it is complied with. But it is possible that they are having some difficulties" (Noticias 15/12/1984). In a major speech at a public meeting in Manhica on the 25th, President Machelwent further saying, "South Africa has principal responsibility for armed banditism in Mozambique. It is South Africa that created, equipped and infiltrated here through the armed bandits" (Noticias 26/12/1984). The latter speech led P.W.Botha to send a special envoy to obtain the full text of the President's speech, which the Mozambican media said should be interpreted as referring to South Africa's historical responsibility. On January 17th, however, an article in Noticias under the by-line of its editor, Mario Ferro, referred to clauses obliging the signatories to the Nkomati Accord to prevent armed actions against the other party and spoke of a recent sabotage and murder incident near the South African border as a violation of the Accord.

3. "Remarks by the Honourable P W Botha DMS MP, Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, on the Occassion of the Signing of the Accord of Nkomati: Friday, 16 March, 1984" p 1.

4. This section is largely based on the analysis developed in R.Davies and D.O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Strategy since 1978", Journal of Southern African Studies, 11, 2, April 1985. 5. For an interesting account of P.W.Botha's role in and attitude towards the supply of military equipment to Portugal see Dirk and Johanna de Villiers, PW, Cape Town, Tafelberg-Uitgewers, 1984.

6. Quoted in D.Geldenhuys and D.Venter, "Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: A Constellation of States?", South African Institute of International Affairs Bulletin, December 1979, p 49.

7. For a published version of this story see K.W.Grundy, The Rise of the South African Security Establishment: An Essay on the Changing Locus of State Power, Bradlow Paper no. 1, Johannesburg, South African Institute of International Affairs, August 1983, p 29. Grundy however has confused support for the abortive settler uprising before

independence (which is the generally accepted version of the incident) with support for anti-Frelimo guerrillas operating after independence. After this incident, Vorster assured the then Portuguese authorities that South Africa would make no military intervention in Mozambique. (Personal communication from Professor Aquino de Bragança).

8. R.First and R.Davies, Migrant Labour to South Africa: A Sanctions Programme?, Geneva, International Universities Exchange Fund, 1980, Table 1.

9. For the fullest and most satisfactory account to date see D.O'Meara, "From 'Muldergate' to Total Strategy: The Politics of Afrikaner Nationalism and the Crisis of the Capitalist State in South Africa", mimeo, 1984.

10. The following two paragraphs draw on the history of the constellation idea in Geldenhuys and Venter, op cit.

11. Ibid p 52.

12. Ibid p 54.

13. See D. Geldenhuys, "Some Strategic Implications of Regional Economic Relationships for the Republic of South Africa", ISSUP Strategic Review, University of Pretoria, January 1981.

14. See Davies and O'Meara, op cit.

15. See Geldenhuys, op cit.

16. For more details see Davies and O'Meara, op cit.

17. See The Star 20/11/1979.

18. Peoples Republic of Mozambique, Economic Report, Maputo, National Planning Commission, January 1984, p 30.

19. See "Briefings" article by P.Fauvet, Review of African Political Economy, no 29, 1984.

20. See Financial Mail 16/7/1982.

21. D.Geldenhuys, "The Destabilisation Controversy: An Analysis of a High Risk Foreign Policy Option for South Africa", Politikon, 9, 2, December 1982.

22. Economic Report, op cit, p 41.

23. See Davies and O'Meara, op cit, for a development of these points.

24. "Accord of Nkomati signed by the Honourable Pieter Willem Botha and His Excellency Samora Moises Machel at the Common Border on the Banks of the Nkomati River 16 March 1984 on behalf of the Republic of South Africa and the Peoples' Republic of Mozambique".

25. See, for example, Noticias 6/4/1984 for the official Mozambican position.

26. See Dirk and Johanna de Villiers, op cit, Part 1 Chapter 1 and Part 6 Chapter 7.

27. Ibid p 363, my translation. Foreign Minister R.F.Botha expressed similar sentiments in a parliamentary speech during his Department's Budget Vote. He said "The hon members can take it from me that in the period during which we determined the strategy which was ultimately crowned with success at Nkomati, I was in absolute agreement with the decisions taken....I believe we did that by way of the military action that we took, as well as by way of diplomatic action. It was also the result of the relative economic strength of this country...and the fact that we made it clear to both friend and foe that we consider ourselves a regional power...A combination of all these factors ultimately made it possible for realism to crystallize in our relations with some of our neighbours" House of Assembly Debates, 9/5/1984 columns 6099, 61101-2.

28. "Remarks by the Honourable P.W.Botha...", op cit p 4.

29. See, for example, Rand Daily Mail 22/5/1984.

30. See J.Hanlon, Mozambique: The Revolution under Fire, London, Zed Books, 1984, Chapter 21.

31. Interview with Mozambican researcher.

32. See Fauvet, op cit; Diario de Lisboa (Lisbon) 26/10/1984; Domingo 21/10/1984.

33. However, in January local people reported seeing armed white men fleeing in the direction of the South African border shortly after the commission of various acts of sabotage and murder. See Noticias 18/1/1985.

34. See interview with Mozambican Information Minister Cabaço in Sunday Mail (Harare) 17/10/1984. See also interview with captured former MNR member, Constantino Reis, in Domingo 16/12/1984 and the Sunday Star of the same date. Reis who worked as a radio operator for the MNR said that communications were maintained with Phalaborwa

up until the time of his desertion in June 1984 at least.

35. See, for example, Noticias 17/7/1984.

36. House of Assembly Debates 9/5/1984 column 6112.

37. Personal communication to a colleague from a member of a West German delegation visiting Maputo, who claimed to have had several meetings with members of the MNR leadership.

38. Africa Jornal (Lisbon) 17/10/1984.

39. The following account of the role of the SSC draws largely on D.Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making, Johannesburg, Macmillan, 1984, Chapter 4.

40. General Magnus Malan, "Die Aanslag Teen Suid Afrika", ISSUP Strategic Review, November 1980, pp14-15.

41. Geldenhuys, op cit p 236.

42. See e.g the discussion of the timing of the South African Air Force attack on Matola in June 1983 in J.Seiler, "The South African State Security System: Rationalisation to What Ends", mimeo, Yale University, 1983.

43. See report in The Guardian 18/5/1984.

44. Noticias 28/5/1984.

45. Sunday Times 3/6/1984.

46. See, for example, The Citizen 7/6/1984.

47. For press reports on this meeting see Sunday Times 1/7/1984, Noticias 2/7/1984.

48. Sunday Times 19/8/1984, Sunday Express 19/8/1984.

49. Sunday Express 26/8/1984.

50. SABC "Radio Today" programme 29/8/1984.

51. Sunday Express 26/8/1984.

52. See Noticias 28/9/1984.

53. "Remarks by Mr P W Botha, DMS, State President of the Republic of South Africa, on the Occasion of a Declaration of a Cessation of Armed

Activity and Conflict in Mozambique'.

54. "Declaration of 3 October 1984".

55. Rand Daily Mail 4/10/1984.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. See Noticias 4/10/1984.

59. Rand Daily Mail 4/10/1984.

60. Rand Daily Mail 12/10/1984.

61. Sunday Times 7/10/1984.

62. Quoted in The Herald (Harare) 17/10/1984.

63. Rand Daily Mail 18/10/1984.

64. Africa Jornal 12/12/1984, article by Migueles Lopes Junior. The Sunday Express of 21/10/1984 also said that the talks broke down at the point where an agreement was about to be signed.

65. Personal communication.

66. See Domingo 21/10/1984, article by Carlos Cardoso, and Noticias 31/10/1984 for a statement by Minister Veloso on the "Portuguese component". On the so-called "contention" (contencioso) between Portugal and Mozambique see O Jornal (Lisbon) 18/5/1984

67. Noticias 19/10/1984.

68. Noticias 31/10/1984.

69. Ibid.

70. During an important meeting addressed by President Machel in December, a captured armed bandit was presented to the audience who said he had crossed into SA in search of work in October. He had been given a few week's training and then sent back to Mozambique to carry out acts of sabotage and banditry. See Noticias 26/12/1984.

71. See note 33 above.

72. See Domingo 30/12/1984 and Noticias 31/12/1984.

73. See Africa Jornal (Lisbon) 17/10/1984.
74. See Noticias 5/11/1984.
75. Financial Mail 30/11/1984.
76. Ibid.
77. 25/1/1985.
78. See ibid, Sunday Times 27/1/1985.
79. Ibid.
80. Financial Mail 25/1/1985.
81. See The Citizen 3/5/1984.
82. See Rand Daily Mail 14/8/1984.
83. See Rand Daily Mail 6/11/1984.
84. See Noticias 27/11/1984.
85. See The Star 25/4/1984, The Citizen 9/6/1984.
86. See The Citizen 19/3/1984.
87. The Star 25/4/1984.
88. Ibid.
89. See Noticias 16/5/1984.
90. W.B.Holtes, "The Future of Trade between the Republic of South Africa and Black Africa", ISSUP Strategic Review, August 1983.
91. The Citizen 9/6/1984.
92. Sunday Tribune 12/8/1984.
93. Rand Daily Mail 19/4/1984.
94. The Citizen 14/4/1984.
95. Rand Daily Mail 6/6/1984.
96. See Sunday Times Business Times 19/6/1983.

97. Financial Mail Special Supplement: Top Companies 6/5/1983.
98. See Sunday Times Business Times 5/8/1984.
99. Noticias 30/3/1984.
100. Ibid
101. Ibid
102. B.B.C. Monitoring Report 5/6/1984.
103. Sunday Times 8/4/1984.
104. Sunday Times 17/7/1984.
105. Personal communication.
106. See Noticias 17/7/1984.
107. Noticias 27/11/1984.
108. Noticias 19/5/1984.
109. Personal communication.
110. Rand Daily Mail 1/8/1984.
111. See Rand Daily Mail Business Day 10/8/1984.
112. Rand Daily Mail 2/8/1984.
113. Sunday Times 19/8/1984.
114. The Star 21/8/1984.
115. Noticias 3/11/1984.
116. Noticias 17/11/1984.
117. See, for example, Sunday Times Business Times 5/8/1984.
118. Sunday Times 17/6/1984.
119. On the continuing saga of the fall in the value of the Rand see, for example, Rand Daily Mail Business Day 31/7/1984.
120. Sunday Times Business Times 6/8/1984.

121. Sunday Times Business Times 12/8/1984.

122. Sunday Times Business Times 6/8/1984.

123. Ibid.

124. On monopolisation see R.Davies, D.O'Meara and S.Dlamini, The struggle for South Africa: A Guide to Movements, Organisations and Institutions, London, Zed Press, 1984.

125. See, for example, The Citizen 19/3/1984.

126. See, for example, interviews in Finance Week 22-28 March 1984.

127. The best known statement of such a position was by David Rockefeller who visited Maputo in April. See Noticias 18/4/1984.

128. These demands are synthesized from a number of articles in the South African press on "problems" that remain to be solved in order to increase economic links with Mozambique. See, for example, Rand Daily Mail 6/6/1984, The Star 18/7/1984, Rand Daily Mail 16/8/1984.

129. The code is reproduced in Noticias 23/8/1984.

130. See Noticias 27/9/1984.

131. Rand Daily Mail 6/6/1984.

132. Ibid

133. See articles in Rand Daily Mail 16/8/1984 and The Star 18/7/1984.

134. Financial Mail 27/4/1984.

135. See interview in Leadership SA 3,2, 2nd Quarter 1984.

136. See Rand Daily Mail Business Day 2/11/1984.

137. On the working of the Rand Monetary Area see S.Ettinger, The Economics of the Customs Union between Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1974.

138. See The Citizen 2/4/1984. The full text of the Pact with Swaziland was reprinted in the South African Defence Force Official Periodical, Paratus, 35, 5, May 1984.

139. Ibid.

140. Africa Times (UK) 3/5/1984 and The Guardian 26/5/1984.
141. Rand Daily Mail 31/7/1984 and 3/8/1984.
142. See Rand Daily Mail 27/9/1984. In April two members of the LDA revealed that the alliance had been formed at the suggestion of Pretoria's Foreign Minister. See The Observer (London) 8/4/1984.
143. See, for example, Rand Daily Mail 14/6/1984.
144. See Rand Daily Mail 7/9/1984 and Dikang Tsa Gompiano/Daily News (Gaborone) 23/8/1984 (for the position of the BNF) and 4/9/1984 (for the official government view).
145. Rand Daily Mail 19/7/1984.
146. See, for example, Rand Daily Mail, 31/7/1984, 19/7/1984, 3/8/1984 and 7/9/1984.
147. See response by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information, Louis Nel, in Rand Daily Mail 14/6/1984.
148. See Rand Daily Mail 11/9/1984.
149. Ibid.
150. See Rand Daily Mail 21/9/1984.
151. Rand Daily Mail 22/9/1984 and New African October 1984.
152. Quoted SABC "Radio Today" programme 9/10/1984.
153. Ibid.
154. Rand Daily Mail 3/10/1984 and 9/10/1984.
155. Rand Daily Mail 11/9/1984.
156. Sunday Express 10/6/1984.
157. Sunday Times 10/6/1984.
158. Rand Daily Mail 1/9/1984.
159. The London Sunday Times of 6/6/1984 described one such seminar held in Rome as the "high point" of the Botha European visit.
160. See Sunday Times 3/6/1984.

161. Noticias 10/7/1984. In the case of West German investment there is the example of the Krupp/Hochtief/Concor project mentioned on p 19 above. This point was also made in a personal communication to a colleague by a member of a visiting West German delegation.

162. SABC "Editorial Comment" 29/9/1984.

163. 19/11/1984.

164. See "Press conference with African National Congress President Oliver Tambo held under the auspices of the Greater London Council in County Hall, March 21st 1984", reproduced as supplement to ANC Weekly News Briefings 1/4/1984.

165. Rand Daily Mail 5/9/1984.

166. Ibid.

167. See Editorial Work in Progress, 33, 1984.

168. The Star 28/10/1984.

169. Rand Daily Mail 8/11/1984.

170. See Work in Progress, 34, 1984.

171. Die Burger 24/3/1984.

172. See, for example, Willem de Klerk, The Second (R)evolution: Afrikanerdom and the Crisis of Identity, Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1984. de Klerk is generally regarded as one of the most "verligte" Nationalists. It was he in fact who first coined the terms "verligte" and "verkrampste". His rather unremarkable book was seen in some quarters as a minor publishing sensation. In Chapter 2 he explicitly rejects equal political rights within a unitary state.

173. For the ANC's position see The Indian Ocean Newsletter: Special Report (Paris) 26/1/1985 - interview with ANC President Oliver Tambo.

174. The argument in the following three paragraphs was developed in Davies and O'Meara, op cit.

175. Rand Daily Mail 21/9/1984.

176. See C.Cardoso, "The Nkomati Accord and SADCC" AIM feature reprinted in Review of African Political Economy, 29, 1984.

177. See speech by President Nyerere reported in The Times (UK) 7/7/1984.

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