ANGOLA: PROSPECTS FOR SOCIALIST INDUSTRIALISATION

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Introduction

The People's Republic of Angola (PRA) was proclaimed by MPLA in November 1975. By April 1976, with the help of Cuban troops, FAPLA (the military arm of MPLA) had driven out the invading South African and Zairean troops. Their defeat had immediate repercussions on their Angolan proteges, FNLA and UNITA. Any presence FNLA had in the country was wiped out. Although UNITA couldn't be similarly completely routed, its armed attacks were greatly reduced and it was pinned down to certain pockets in the southern provinces.

Once the immediate threat posed by the imperialist countries and their Angolan allies had been countered, and a certain measure of calm and stability restored within the country, MPLA could turn to the task of reconstructing the economy which had suffered severely as a result of the mass exodus by the Portuguese in 1974 and 1975, the economic sabotage carried out by fleeing Portuguese capitalists and Portuguese skilled workers, and the physical destruction and plunder indulged in by the retreating South African, Zairean, FNLA and UNITA troops.

The goals of national reconstruction and the forms it should take were announced by the Central Committee of MPLA in October 1976. These were presented to and ratified by the first Congress of MPLA held in Luanda in December 1977. At this congress, MPLA was proclaimed a Workers' Party with an explicit Marxist-Leninist ideology and a democratic-centralist structure, the supremacy of the Party over the government was reafirmed, and the choice of socialism was reconfirmed.

The resolution on the Economic Policy[1] passed by the Central Committee of the Party in October 1976, and ratified by the first Congress in December 1977, is quite comprehensive, and deals with a number of sectors and issues. Since our interest is in industrialisation, we look at some selected parts of the resolution which concern the industrial sector, directly or indirectly:[2]

"From a strategic point of view

1. To build a State of People's Democracy and construct the material and technical bases for socialism
2. To favour planned development of the economy, with agriculture as its basis, and industry as the decisive factor, developing in a harmonious way the country's various economic sectors and all its regions
3. To consider the satisfaction of the needs of the mass of the people as the objective of production

From a tactical point of view

1. To define the present phase as one of National Reconstructions, aiming to reach, in the shortest possible time, 1973 production levels in the most decisive and important sectors for the life of the people
2. To continue on the road of confiscation and nationalisation
3. To institute a vigorous system of control over the national economy, through the Plan, Finance and the Bank.
4. To lay down a wages policy without delay, to reduce high salaries, to freeze other wages, allowing for readjustments in cases of flagrant injustice and to reward in accordance with the quantity and quality of work produced.
5. In addition to oil, to define as key sectors of the economy, in the short term, the building industry and those connected with it, and the fisheries, and in the medium term, the mining industry".

On considering these aims, it seems to us that the industrial sector is expected, among other things, to develop in such a way as to fulfil the following expectations in parallel: to contribute to the material and technical bases for socialism, and the satisfaction of the needs of the masses, to be the decisive factor in the economy, and to reach the 1973 production levels in the most decisive and important sectors for the life of the people. To what degree and at what pace these expectations will be realized depends on three things: First, the industrial structure left behind by the Portuguese when they left in 1975; second, the strategy adopted to break out of the old international division of labour that the imperialist countries had imposed on Angola during the colonial period, and the capacity to manage to ones own advantage the possibilities that may be available under the new international division of labour, while avoiding its pitfalls"[3]; third, the outcome of the ongoing class struggle within Angola between those who truly represent the interests of the workers and the peasants and those who represent the petty bourgeoisie. Of course, these three are not separate issues but are strongly linked together.

In this paper, we will examine the first issue in depth and detail, the second issue only in broad terms, and the third issue (the most important of the three) not at all, as that is outside our present competence.

Growth, structure and class character of manufacturing industry

The economic policy resolution has singled out the oil (petroleum) and other mining industries, the building industry, and fisheries as key sectors for some years to come. In 1973, the chief sources of export earnings in hard currency were oil, coffee, diamonds and iron ore, accounting respectively for 30, 26.5, 10.4 and 6.2 per cent of the total export income[4]. It is easy to see that oil and diamonds already have the potential of making Angola independent of foreign "aid" and loans, as far as financial investment in reconstruction work is concerned. By 1978, oil production had reached 9.6 million tons, thus surpassing the previous high of 8.9 million tons in 1974. It brought a revenue of 500 to 600 million US dollars to the state, and oil revenue for 1979 is estimated to be about 800 million dollars[5]. Angola is now in the advantageous situation of paying for all its imports out of its export income, and can therefore pick and choose its trading partners. As for other minerals, Angola has proven deposits of 34 minerals, 14 of which are in the strategic category. To give some examples: iron ore, coal, phosphates, uranium, titanium, copper, gold, manganese, bauxite, mica, nickel, cobalt, chrome, vanadium, beryllium , wolfram, tin, lead, limestone, asphalt rock, rare earths and radioactive elements. The mining industry will therefore be of immense significance for Angola's economic independence, and the emphasis placed on it is perfectly understandable. But it is precisely this fabulous mineral wealth that makes Angola such a prime candidate for imperialist control. Immense pressure will be exerted by international capital to make Angola conform to the old international division of labour of exporting minerals in their raw form and delay as long as possible the conversion of minerals into full manufactures. Simultaneously, Angola will be invited to step into the pitfalls of the new international division of labour, in the name of rapid industrial growth.

In Angola, the sectors of mining and agriculture have the potential to provide not only the major raw materials necessary for a rapid development of the economy but also adequate export income that if properly managed could be used as a source of productive investment. But these two sectors of the economy cannot by themselves translate into reality the socialist economic goals of the PRA. To achieve that, manufacturing industry of a particular kind of structure is absolutely essential. In fact, one could provide theoretical arguments that under certain historical and political conjunctures some countries which are poor in agricultural and mineral resources could still become thriving socialist economies on the basis of properly planned industrialization.

Therefore, in this paper, we concentrate exclusively on the manufacturing sector.

The period of substantial growth of the manufacturing sector did not begin until 1960. From then onwards till 1973[6] it was quite rapid, the growth being about 20 per cent per annum at current prices (see Table 3). But this is not a true indicator, for current prices include the effects of inflation. The real growth rate is estimated to be about 11 per cent per annum[7]. Even though this figure must be interpreted with caution, because the growth occured on a small initial base, still it is a remarkable rate, probably not surpassed by any African country south of the Sahara except South Africa. Manufacturing output, which was only 6.5 per cent of the total GDP in 1960, had grown to about 16 per cent by 1971 (see Table 1).

We will now look at the social and political factors that led to this growth. Between 1940 and 1960, the immigrant white population (almost entirely Portuguese) rose from 44 000 to 172 000, and formed 3.5 per cent of a total population of 4.8 million in 1960[8]. Within those twenty years Angola had been transformed into a settler colony. Originally, most of the white immigrants were single men, but by 1950 the immigration became more balanced and more firmly family-based, with proportionate number of women and children, and with increasing proportions of permanent residents. One of the major reasons for this influx was the promise of high profits that could be made in coffee cultivation and export. An additional powerful reason was the lack of social mobility in Portugal, where capitalism remained underdeveloped and stagnant under fascist rule. There weren't many opportunities for material advancement. There is a view prevalent among the top echelons of the Portuguese petty bourgeoise today, that during the 1950s and 1960s many of the most energetic, gifted and ambitious emigrated to Angola in search of wealth and power, while the mediocre stayed behind to join the Portuguese bureaucracy[9].

The MPLA launched its armed struggle against the colonial regime in 1961. As the First War of Liberation intensified and spread to several parts of the country, the regime had to fly in more and more troops from Portugal. This swelled the ranks of the white population. By 1970 (the year of the latest census), it had risen to 290 000, i.e. 5.1 per cent of a total population of 5.6 million[10]. Both because of its size and its high income, this white population formed a sizeable domestic market. It acted as one of the incentives to capitalists in Portugal and to owners of coffee plantations in Angola to invest in the manufacture of consumer goods within Angola. Domestic production was greatly helped by the demands made by the settler population for consumer goods which were cheaper than those imported perforce from Portugal.

In 1955, the colonial government began a programme of developing the transport and communication infrastructure. In the so-called "First Development Plan"[11] of 1953-58, the investments intended by the metropolitan government in Lisbon for the colonies were earmarked as follows: 45 per cent for railways, 16 per cent for hydroelectricity, and 11 per cent for ports. Similarly, in the so-called "Second Development Plan"[12] of 1959-64, the distribution of investment was 49 per cent for infrastructure and 19 per cent for hydroelectricity. The intention was to provide better and greater facilities in railways, roads, ports, cement output and electrical energy for expanding the production and export of coffee and minerals. But as it happened, and perhaps quite unintentionally, this extension and improvement of the infrastructure also spurred on investment in manufacturing enterprises.

The structure of manufacturing production clearly reflects the dominant position of the white settlers in the domestic market. To analyse how the domestic market affected the situation, we classify consumer goods into two categories: mass and luxury consumption goods. We define the former as those goods which are within the buying power of the majority of the population, on a regular basis, and the latter as those goods which only a minority can afford to buy regularly. In 1970, 63 per cent of the population were semi-subsistence peasants and petty commodity producers, 16 per cent were wage labourers in farms, plantations and mines, and about 15 per cent were urban proletariat, who worked in manufacturing, construction and service industries and as domestic servants[13]. The average daily wages of the mining and agricultural proletariat were respectively 16 and 20 escudos (see Tables 7 and 9). The cash income of the semi-subsitence peasantry was definitely lower than that of the agricultural proletariat. So, on an average, the buying power of 95 per cent of the population would be about 20 escudos per day. (In 1965 an escudo was approximately equal to US$ 0.03, i.e. 3 US cents).

Almost all the skilled workers and all those above them in the income hierarchy were whites. Their buying power, which ranged from 400 escudos per day (skilled workers) to 1600 escudos per day (top managers), would be representative of the buying power of the white settler population which made up the rest 5 per cent of the population in 1970. If we compare these buying powers of the majority and the minority with the prices of consumer goods on sale in Angola in the 1960s and early 1970s, we can distinguish the mass consumption goods from the luxury consumption goods in the colonial Angolan context. These goods are listed in Appendix 1. If we turn to the prices of the foodstuffs given in Table 10, we can deduce that 95 per cent of the population could afford to buy, for regular consumption, only maize flour, rice, fish, vegetable oil and sugar, but not dairy products, eggs, poultry, meat and European type beer.

If we compare the increases in the consumer price index for Luanda with the wages of the unskilled workers, we see that their real buying power has been decreasing in the early 1970s (see Tables 7 and 11). Even the very limited list of mass consumer goods given in Apendix 1 may be somewhat idealistic, because it may well be that many members of the major social classes did not have the wherewithal to buy such things as footwear, modern medicines, etc.

We see that from 1960 to 1966, the consumer goods sector absolutely dominated the scene, accounting for more than 70 per cent of manufacturing production (see Table 2). The pattern changes somewhat in 1967, when the capital goods sector goes up from a pathetic 3 per cent to a slightly better 8 per cent, with a corresponding decrease of 5 per cent in consumer goods. This "jump" is not due to any onset of a structural change in the industrial sector, but because of the introduction of the assembly of motor vehicles. From 1967 to 1973, the consumer goods sector still retains the dominant position at about 65 to 70 per cent, while the capital goods sector moves up to 10 per cent, with the intermediate goods sector staying at about 20 per cent.

What does this pattern signify in class terms? To make this analysis, we have chosen to look at the years 1965 and 1973, the former because by then the growth of the manufacturing sector had settled down to an even pace, after the big push it got in the early 1960s, and the latter because that is the reference year for national reconstruction. We see from Table 4 that in 1965, 20 per cent of the production was geared exclusively to the luxury consumption of 5 per cent of the population, leaving only 43 per cent of production to be consumed by the whole population. This distortion gets worse as we move to 1973, where 37 per cent is for luxury consumption and 33 per cent for mass consumption. So it is obvious that during the colonial period manufacturing industry was organized principally to cater to the luxury consumption of the petty bourgeois and bourgeois sections of Angolan society. Of course, this comes as no surprise, because it is precisely these sections which constituted the local ruling groups, and acted as agents of the metropolitan ruling classes, and exercised political power. This kind of class bias in production can be seen all over Africa, both before and after formed political independence[14].

Besides the domestic market, several other factors helped stimulate the growth of manufacturing industry in Angola. One was that Portuguese capitalists found that some of the consumer goods produced in Angola were competitive in the export markets of neighbouring African countries. For instance, processed meat, textiles, beer, and sugar were exported to Congo-Brazaville, Zaire, Zambia, Rhodesia, Gabon, etc. This competitiveness would be lost if they were manufactured for export from Portugal because of higher wages, transport costs and customs duties. So they were willing to invest in export-oriented manufacture in Angola.

To prevent the flight of capital from Angola that began with the start of the First War of Liberation in 1961, the Portuguese authorities introduced strict exchange control in 1962[15]. On the other hand, the restrictions placed by the Salazar regime on industrial development within Portugal led to the emigration of many Portuguese "entrepreneurs" to Angola. These two factors reinforced each other, leading to an increase in production within Angola. Another contributing factor was the foreign exchange regulations according to which Angola had to pay for its imports in hard currency (and not in escudos) out of its own balances. This tended to discourage imports and encourage domestic production. This tendency was strengthened by the fact that the export of consumer goods from Portugal to Angola began to slacken from mid 1960s onwards, because Portuguese exporters began to find more lucrative markets in Western Europe.

There were conflicts between the Portuguese settlers and the metropolitan government in Lisbon. The latter tried to retain as much control as possible on Angola, while the former wanted a share in political and economic power. One way in which the settlers could accumulate power in their own hands was to build an economy that would aspire to become independent of Lisbon. Another desirable side effect for them that industrial growth would bring was more social infrastructure like schools and hospitals[16].

Integration into the world market

Like all other underdeveloped colonial economies, Angola too was linked to metropolitan capitalist markets as a supplier of raw materials. In 1960, 96 per cent of exports (in monetary value) consisted of simply processed primary produce[17]: Coffee (35 per cent), uncut diamonds (14), and sisal (11) were the three major exports, with the rear being brought up by maize (5 per cent), iron ore (4), cotton (4), sugar (4), fish products (5) and timber (3). These products were destined primarily for half a dozen countries in Western Europe and North America: Portugal (24 per cent), North America (19), U.K. (15), Holland (10), West Germany (10), France (3), Italy (3), other Portuguese colonies (4). The role assigned to manufacturing industry in exports was one of simple-processing of agricultural products, like the ginning of cotton, decortication of sisal, curing of tobacco, preserving of fish and the refining of sugar. Thirteen years later, in 1973, the character of foreign trade remained the same except that oil had replaced coffee as the leading primary produce to be exported, and the U.S.A. had replaced Portugal as the biggest export market. There was only a minor change in the contribution made by manufacturing activity: small quantities of manufactures like cigarettes, beer, textiles and preserved meat were exported to neighbouring African countries.

As far as the manufacturing sector goes, the nature of its integration with the world capitalist system is revealed by the kind of inputs it had to import and the countries from which they were imported. Looking at the structure of imports from 1960 to 1973 (see Tables 13,14 and 15), we find that the change in its pattern is closely related to the change in the pattern of manufacturing: share of import of consumer goods grew at 8 per cent per annum at current prices, while intermediate and capital goods grew at about 14 per cent each. If we deflate these by 40 per cent to get at the real growth rates (as we have agreed in footnote 7), we see that consumer goods imports have grown at a much slower rate than intermediate and capital goods imports. The interrelation between imports and domestic production becomes even clearer if we look at the kinds of goods that were being imported: The interesting fact is that while in 1960 luxury foodstuffs and luxury textiles headed the list of imports, by 1973 they'd given way to machinery (23 per cent), transport equipment (13), basic metal products (11) and chemical products (11).

The intermediate goods sector, which acts as backward linkage to the consumer goods sector, was relatively well diversified by 1973, if one compares with other African countries around that time. Certainly it was as diversified as in Kenya, and much more so than in Tanzania, Zambia, Ivory Coast, etc.[18]. But this diversification did not yet mean any significant internal or domestic integration, because the inputs into the manufacture of these intermediate goods were largely imported intermediate goods themselves, e.g. heavy and light chemicals, plastics, paper.

The share of capital goods manufacture does not seem so trivial at 11 per cent of the total in 1973. But if one looks at what is being produced, one sees that the dominant activity is in the assembly of motor vehicles and agricultural machinery using fully-finished imported components (so-called completely knocked down and semi-knocked down components). These assembled vehicles and agricultural machinery were largely meant for the mining industry and export agriculture. Making of metal articles, and simple ones at that, was a very minor activity. On juxtaposing this with the fact that the import list is headed by machinery, it becomes clear that there were almost no backward linkages from consumer and intermediate goods manufacture to capital goods manufacture.

Portugal was (and still is) an industrially backward economy. It didn't have the capacity to manufacture and export much of the machinery and equipment required. So Angola had to import most of its industrial means of production from the advanced capitalist countries. For instance, textile machinery came from West Germany, Britain and France, cement machinery from Britain, beer making equipment from Belgium, etc. West Germany, U.S.A., U.K. and France were the principal suppliers of equipment. Thus we find that the colonial Angolan economy was integrated into the world market not only in the sector of agriculture and mining, but also in that of manufacturing.

A country cannot be said to have embarked on the path of self-sustaining, self-reliant industrialization until it has initiated the process of the manufacturing of the means of production. Angola in 1973 was nowhere near fulfilling this condition.

Ownership and control

As the First War of Liberation, which was launched by MPLA in 1961, began to score successes and spread into different parts of the country, the Portuguese found that their own resources were not adequate to counter MPLA advances. They turned to their NATO allies, who provided military and financial aid, and in return they had to open up Angola for a massive penetration by non-Portugues monopoly capital. Using this opening, the multinational corporations (MNCs) moved primarily into mining of oil, diamonds and iron ore. The resulting increase in the exploitation of these three minerals was dramatic: oil production went up from a mere 58 000 tons in 1958 to 7.4 million tons in 1973, iron ore from 106 000 tons in 1957 to 7 million tons in 1973, diamonds from about 1 million carats in 1960 to 2.1 million carats in 1973. The MNCs that moved into mining were largely American, West German, South African, British and Belgian.

The picture was quite different for manufacturing. Profits in manufacturing were much smaller than in mining, because production was primarily for the small domestic market, and the boosting of exports was not considered visable. Some idea of the enormous difference in profits between mining and manufacturing can be got from the fact that in 1961 the net profit of the diamond mining monopoly Diamang was about 300 million escudos, whereas ten years later (i.e. 1971) one of the biggest money spinners in manufacturing, the cement producing Companhia Cimento Secil do Ultramar, was making a profit of "only" 63 million escudos. Our guess in that by 1971, Diamang would be making many tens of times 300 million escudos as net profit, given the increased production, and increased real sale value at 1961 prices.No wonder then that the MNCs did not move into manufacturing in any big way. The non-Portuguese capital that did enter manufacturing was very modest by MNC standards: West Germans went into industries like sisal fibres, wood products, pulp and paper, the British into textiles, the South Africans into meat processing, the Belgians into rubber tyres, etc. Examples of such foreign companies are: Reckitt and Colman, Crown Cork, Firestone, General Tire, British American Tobacco, British Oxygen, ICI, Leyland and Plessey[19]. One among the many incentives offered by the Portuguese authorities was tax holidays. However, by law, at least 55 per cent of the shares in each manufacturing firm had to be in Portugues hands. It was only big capital, and not middle and small capital, from Portugal that moved into such joint-ventures. Portuguese big capital also collaborated with white settler capital in starting manufacturing firms. The biggest of the settler capitalists made their money through coffee exports, during the boom in prices after the Second World War. Within twenty years (1945-1965), competition and government policy had reduced the number of coffee exports traders from 300 to 30, thereby allowing for concentration of domestic capital in a few hands. For instance, to survive in coffee trading, each company had to mobilize a capital of about 500 million escudos.

The number of manufacturing enterprises rose from 2490 in 1961 to 5561 in 1972, and athe total nominal investment in this sector rose from 2561 to 7336 million escudos during the same period (see Table 5). The vast majority (85 per cent) of these firms were small establishments owned by white settlers.

The ownership and control of large manufacturing firms were shared between non-Portuguese foreign capital and about half a dozen Portuguese monopoly establishments, each of the latter combining manufacturing activity with banking, insurance, trade, transport and plantation agriculture. In descending order of the magnitude of their total holdings, they are: 1. Companhia Uniao

Fabril controlled by the Mello Brothers, 2. The Champalimand Group controlled by the Champalimand family, 3. The Espirito Santo group, 4. Banco Portugues de Atlantico, 5. Banco Fomento Nacional, and 6. Grupo do Banco de Angola. In Appendix 2, we list the major manufacturing branches owned by these groups. The profits they made were pretty high, ranging from 10 to 35 per cent of the nominal investment for the year 1971. (See Table 12).

The total employment in manufacturing industry rose from 15 650 in 1961 to 125 370 in 1973, i.e. by a factor of 8 (see Table 6). Out of these, 80 per cent were unskilled workers, 12 per cent skilled workers, 6 per cent non-managerial administration personnel and 2 per cent managerial personnel. Africans got only the unskilled jobs. All jobs requiring some skill (whether technical, clerical, managerial) were almost entirely taken up by the white settlers, with a very small share falling to the mestiço population.

The African proletariat within manufacturing industry was thus weak in two respects: it had no skills that could be used as positions of strength in a confrontation with the colonial regime and the bourgeoise; and it was numerically weak being only 5.4 per cent of a total labour force of 1.8 million in 1970[20]. Therefore, industrial growth, although more rapid and more diversified up to 1974 then in most African countries, had done very little in transforming African labour both in quality and quantity.

Prospects for socialist industrialization

At present (i.e. 1980) Angola has no option but to commit a lot of its political and economic resources, and a large number of its cadres, to the task of countering the constant military threat posed by South Africa[21]. Further, due to the massive dislocation of labour and the destruction of its transport and storage facilities during the second war of liberation, Angola is as yet unable to produce and distribute adequate quantities of foodstuffs and other consumer goods to its population. Going by the tendency of 1977 (see Table 17), Angola would have allocated in 1979 about 42 and 16 per cent of its total import expenditure of $680 millions on foodstuffs and other consumer goods, respectively. In addition to these great difficulties, there is the huge void created by the mass exodus of skilled Portuguese workers, adminstrators and managers, which has led to severe falls in industrial production and in the maintenance of essential services. Given these formidable constraints, it is perhaps too early, not to say too presumptous, to start analysing the prospects for socialist industrialization in Angola. Nevertheless, it may be useful to see if the present tendencies can say anything about an emerging pattern.

Self-sustaining industrialisation, whether socialist or otherwise, cannot begin unless a country has built up a certain capacity in the manufacture of equipment goods, especially machine tools and machinery. This process has not yet been initiated in Angola. The massive foreign exchange earnings from the export of oil,[22] coffee and diamonds (see Table 18) can provide the big investments required for the manufacture of equipment goods, assuming that the present expenditure on importing foodstuffs and consumer goods can be progressively reduced. This implies that the process of self-sustaining industrialisation cannot be seperated from the drive to acquire self-sufficiency in essential foods and mass consumption goods. They hang together.

Nationalisation

The Law of State Intervention was enacated by Angola in February 1976, which allows for nationalisation and confiscation of private property. In May 1979, the Angolan government passed a new mining law which states that all the minerals in Angola belong to the Angolan people. The prospecting for, and the mining of, minerals can be undertaken only by state-owned companies, or by joint-ventures between the State and foreign firms. The Law of State Intervention has been applied to achieve two objectives: First to vest the overall guidance and general control of the economy in the hands of the State, and second to get production back to the 1973 levels. This has resulted in the nationalization of banks, insurance companies, internal transportation and distribution network, and foreign trade, as well as of all those enterprises (agricultural, industrial, mining and trading) which were abandoned by their former Portuguese owners who fled the country en masse after 1975. By mid 1977, more than 85 per cent of the enterprises were under state control[23]. It is important to note that non-Portuguese foreign capital was not touched by these nationalization measures, but was allowed to continue its existence as before. Although quite a few of the nationalized production enterprises were large ones, most were medium and smallscale. A significant change of policy with respect to the small enterprises was announced in Dec. 1978 by President Neto, who declared that private ownership of small enterprises would be allowed, and said that this decision "did not necessarily clash with the revolutionary principles of MPLA"[24]. In Appendix 3, we give examples of large firms that were nationalized.

By the end of 1978, the share of state-ownership in different branches of industry were as follows:[25]

Branch	Percentage share of state-ownership
Mining	
Oil	51
Diamonds	61
Consumer goods manufacture	
Sugar	100
Edible oil	37
Margarine	76
Textiles	100
Matches	67
Soap	55
Leather shoes	52
Beer	85
Cycles and motorcycles	100
Intermediate goods manufacture	
Cement	58
Paper and pulp	100
Plywood	100
Iron articles for the construction industry	100
Metal sheets for wrapping	98
Capital goods manufacture	
Assembly of motor vehicles	100
Repair and maintenance of ships	100

We conclude from this distribution that the State has in principle acquired a dominant share of the capacity to produce not only certain mass consumption goods (sugar, textiles, edible oil, margarine, matches and soap), but also certain intermediate goods which could act as inputs into mass consumption (cement and structural iron for mass dwellings, plywood for mass furniture, paper for educational material, etc.).

As we saw in section 2, 37 per cent of the industrial capacity went into the production of luxury consumption goods towards the end of the colonial period. In the transition to socialism, this capacity would have to be quickly diverted to produce mass consumption goods. Since even those enterprises which earlier were producing luxury consumption goods are now in the hands of the State, such a diversion should be possible. Because of lack of information, it is not possible for us to say whether this switch-over has begun. All that can be said right now is that the total production in manufacturing industry in 1978 was in all probability only half of that in 1971, and therefore lower than half the production in 1973. (These estimates have been arrived at on the basis of the GDP figures published by the Angolan authorities in 1979. See Tables 2, 19, 20 and 21).

Foreign capital

Prior to liberation, small and middle enterprises in the manufacuring sector were owned by white settler capitalists, most of whom were Portuguese. These establishments, which accounted for about 85 per cent of the total number of manufacturing firms, have now all been brought under state control, the former owners having fled Angola. As for the large enterprises which made up the rest 55 per cent, a majority of their shares were held by about half a dozen big Portuguese capitalist groups - by law, at least 5 per cent of the shares in any enterprise had to be in Portuguese hands. The rest of the shares (45 per cent minus) were owned mainly by West German, British, South African and Belgian capital. As we mentioned earlier, the Portuguese share of the capital has been nationalised. So one can say that formally the entire manufacturing sector is under state control. Equally, it is correct to say that certain West German, British, South African and Belgian capitalist groups still own and control a part of the manufacturing industry, although this part is quite small, especially when compared to the huge amounts invested by MNCs in the mining of oil, diamonds and iron ore.

At the present stage, the Angolan state clearly feels that it not only cannot afford to nationalize the capital that still remains in the hands of foreign firms, but also must encourage the inflow of more foreign investment. The reasons given by the Angolan authorities for wanting to attract new forign capital into industry are firstly the acceleration of the pace of industrialization, secondly the quick promotion of exports of manufactured goods and thirdly the acquisition of the kind of modern technology which the advanced capitalist countries have. In July 1979, the Angolan State promulgated a "Law on Foreign Investment in Angola", which sets out the general terms and conditions or such investment. We reproduce some of its main articles in Appendix 4. As can be seen from it, very attractive terms are being offered to foreign investors: 1. In general no nationalisation for the next 10 to 15 years, but if and when nationalisation is undertaken, handsome compensation will be paid, including the interest accruing, in the currency in which the original investment was made. 2. Transfer abroad of profits up to 25 per cent of the capital invested. 3. Access to internal (i.e. Angolan) credit. 4. Exemption from, or reduction in, taxes during the the first few years of production. 5. Exemption from, or reduction in, customs duties on imports of capital goods, accessories and spares, raw materials and intermediate goods. 6. Exemption from, or reduction in, custom duties on the export of manufactured goods. 7. Transfer abroad of amounts necessary for the servicing of loans contracted overseas by the Angolan firm in which foreign capital has been invested.

It is too early (in 1980) to say how far foreign capital will react to these inducements. On presently available information it seems that French capital has begun to show active interest. For instance, the French MNC Creusot-Loire has invested in a big joint-venture textile mill in Benguela, which started production in April 1979 (supposedly the most modern in Sub-Saharan Africa), the total investiment being about 100 million French frances (US$ 23.5 million), 55 per cent of which is held by the Angolan state.[26] In the context of foreign investment, it is interesting to note that the EEC commissioner for development aid, Mr. Claude Cheysson, has expraessed his satisfaction at the way the Angola government has set about treating foreign firms. He is reported to have said in October 1978 that the mutually satisfactory agreement signed by the Angolan authorities with Petrofine (Belgian) and Gulf oil (USA) could provide a model for future relationships with other foreign companies.[27]

It therefore seems on the cards that at least for the next several years foreign capital will be allowed to extract surplus value from the Angolan working class and transfer that surplus abroad. To that extent one can say that a part of industry in Angola will not be moving in the socialist direction for a considerable time to come.

Obviously, it would be absurd to discuss socialist industrialisation in isolation from the rest of the economy. For a proper assessment, one has to analyse the situation in agriculture, transport and communications, foreign trade, etc., etc. However, two facts are noteworthy in this respect: Firstly, the pattern of foreign trade in 1978 was the same as it was just before liberation. As Table 22 shows, 64 per cent of the exports were to the U.S.A., with Western Europe coming next at 19 per cent. As for imports into Angola, Western Europe led the field with 61 per cent, while U.S.A. took the third place with 14 per cent. Almost all the exports are of primary products, and the imports consist of manufactured goods and raw materials (Tables 17 and 18). One conclusion is that the integration into the world capitalist markets imposed during the colonial period still remains intact. The process of deliking from those markets has not yet started in earnest. 2. The number of Western countries, as well as those of Eastern Europe, which are involved in giving technical and financial aid in the reconstruction of the economic and social infrastructure is increasing (see Appendix 5 for some examples). This can be interpreted either as a wise move to diversify which avoids critical dependence on any one country, or as a disturing tendency which will further deepen Angola's integration into the world market. Which of these interpretations is correct only time will tell - there is too little evidence at this stage to favour either of them.

Control by the working class

Nationalisation is only one of several necessary conditions for transition to socialist industry. But it is far from being a sufficient one. It can become an instrument for achieving the transmition only in a situation where the working class has already acquired real, and not just formal, control over production and distribution.

Immediately after liberation, a situation arose where a part of the workforce in some production enterprises tried to take control of the day to day running of the factories. As a result, several contradictions came to the fore. On the one hand, there were contradictions between the workers and the technicians, and on the other, between workers and workers' commissions. Further, the trade union commissions disputed the right of the "commissions of intervention" to manage the enterprises. The Party and the State felt that these contradictions had led to grave indiscipline and absenteeism among the workers, and seriously reduced production. Some of the authorities felt that nationalisation had been misinterpreted by the workers as meaning that the factories belonged to them rather than to the entire people of Angola. They felt that the workers had not acquired the consciousness of working for the welfare of the entire nation.

To come to grips with this situation, the plenary of the Central Committee of the Party held in October 1976 abolished collective management in enterprises, replacing it by management through a small group of individuals, where the members of the group took individual responsibility. It was decreed that the new directors of the enterprises should come from the ranks of the miltants, and be acceptable to the politbureau. This managemant group consists of a few workers, civil servants and administrative employees. They are appointed as directors to enterprises other than the ones in which they are already involved through the "commissions of intervention". In each enterprise, every department has its "person-in-charge" (responsable).

The trade union (UNTA) commissions at the enterprise levels were abolished, pending the restructuring of UNTA, and were replaced by trade union nominees. UNTA is a mass organization that is kept separate from the Party. It was restructured in 1978. It now has three tiers, which interact with one another: the top national level, the industrial branch level manned by workers' representatives and the enterprise (factory) level manned by worker' groups. Meetings of UNTA personnel are held both at provincial and industrial branch level to discuss the problems affecting specific branches. For instance, such a meeting was held recently to discuss the sugar industry.

In October 1977, Angola enacted a law concerning the organisation and management of state-controlled enterprises, which explicitly mentions the ways in which the workers can participate in the running of the enterprises. It says that "the workers, through the mediation of the Party and trade union organs, ought to discuss the projects planned for their enterprise, comment on whether it is well-founded and suggest changes. Workers should control their working conditions and direct the use of "social funds" jointly with the management. They ought to suggest projects for raising the cultural, educational and political level of the workers, and express an opinion on the reclassification of workers and the application of disciplinary measures.[28]"

The situation in 1980 seems roughly as follows: Decisions that affect industrial production at the aggregate level are taken by various commissions within the Ministry of Industry, each industrial branch having its own commission. Annual consultations which are held between ministry officials, workers representatives and UNTA representatives seem to have some influence on the decisions made about industrial activity and industrial managment. In the same spirit, national seminars on industrial development have been held involving people at different levels.

On balance, it seems as though right now the ministry officials and the managers of enterprises have a greater say on, and control over, industrial activities than the direct producers. But there are a few instances where workers have taken over small and medium scale establishments, and have been by themselves managing the day to day running of these firms. An example is the plastic products factory in Luanda. The influence wielded by the workers and the representatives of UNTA varies from factory to factory depending on the degree to which the party has mobilized the workers.

In relation to its present very small population (between 6 and 7 million), the natural resources of Angola are very impressive. In addition to oil, which is bound to bring in vast sums of hard currency over a substantial period of time, it has a wealth of strategic minerals, vast areas of fertile land and forests, and untapped big potential for hydroelectricity. Given this marvellous resource base and the very firmly expressed committment by MPLA to Marxism-Leninism and scientific socialism, one would expect the chances for socialist industrialization to be bright. But that's a purely mechanistic and rather nondialectical way of thinking. The really deciding factors will be: First, the ability to counter the forces of imperialism which are constantly trying to disrupt the economy and polity of Angola. Second: the outcome of the internal class struggle that is being waged between the aspiring petty-bourgeoisie and the direct producers (workers and peasants in alliance). As president Neto said in his 1978 New Year message "It will be impossible to strictly follow the political orientation of our nation, if the implementation of decisions is entrusted to those, who while holding top (key) positions, systematically oppose our politics". The importance of the class struggle for the task of building socialism has also been recognised by the politbureau of MPLA which in the ongoing rectification campaign has stressed the need to "struggle against petty-bourgeois ideology, its vices and its manifestations"[29].

APPENDIX 1

Our classification of goods manufactured in Angola in 1973

Mass consumption goods

Flour of staple grains
Dried and salted fish
Oils and fats from vegetables and animals
Sugar
Textiles and clothing (excluding synthetic fibre and linen)
Matches
Soap
Rubber and plastic footwear
Domestic articles made of plastic (buckets, bins, etc)
Medical, dental and orthopaedic goods

Luxury consumption goods

Processed meat
Dairy products
Processed fish (excluding dried and salted fish)
Bakery and confectionery
Beverages (alcoholic and non-alcoholic)
Tobacco products
Linen and synthetic fibre textiles
Leather goods, including leather footwear
Furniture
Toilet paper
Cosmetics (excluding soap)
Bicycles and their spare parts
Assembly of morotcycles, and assembly of passenger motor cars
Assembly of radios, record players, domestic electric equipment

Intermediate goods

Wood and wood products
Pulp, paper and paper products
Industrial gases
Industrial alcohol
Fertilisers and pesticides
Paints, varnishes and lacs
Petroleum refinery products
Derivatives of petroleum and coal
Rubber tyres and simple articles made of rubber
Plastic products
Glass and ceramic products
Cement and other non-metallic products

Capital goods

Steel plates and tubes, and products thereof
Simple articles made of iron, steel and aluminium, e.g. bars, pipes, vessels
Assembly of tractors and other agricultural machines and implements
Electrical meters
Electrical cables and batteries
Assembly of commercial vehicles (e.g. lorries) and heavy passenger vehicles (e.g. buses)
Professional, scientific and optical instruments

APPENDIX 2

Examples of large Angolan firms owned by Portuguese monpoly capital prior to liberation

1. The Companhia União Fabril Group (CUF) controlled by the Mello Brothers:

Branch	Firm
Fishmeal	UNIPESCA (jointly with Anglo-American of South Africa, belonging to the Oppenheimer Group)
Vegetable oils	INDUVE
Tobaco	Sociedade Ultramarina de Tabacos (SUT). This had a quasi-monopoly in tobaco and also operated through its subsidiaries SITAL, FTV, Filtrangola

2. The Champalimand Group

Branch	Firm
Beer	Nocal-Empressa de Cervejas de Angola (jointly with Dutch capital)
Cement	Companhia de Cimento de Angola
Iron and steel products	Siderurgía Nacional de Angola

3. Espírito Santo Group

Branch	Firm
Sugar	Companhia Açúcar de Angola
Sugar, palm oil, alcohol, meat processing	Sociedade Agrícola de Cassequel
Insecticides	Agroquímica de Angola (AGRAN)

4. The Banco Portugues do Atlantico Group (BPA)

Branch	Firm
Cotton and textiles	Algodocina de Fomento Colonial
Aluminium, cement, etc.	SONEFE

Through its subsidiary Banco Commercial de Angola (BCA),BPA owned shares and controlled the following:

Branch	Firm
Meat processing	Sociedade de carnes de Angola (SOCAR)
Fisheries	Sociedade dos Armadores de Pesca de Angola (ARAN)
"	Companhia Industrial de Pesca de Angola (CIPESCA)
Pulp and paper	Companhia de celulosa do ultramar Portugues

5. Banco de Fomento Nacional

Branch	Firm
Pulp and paper	Companhia de Celulosa do Ultramar Portugues (with BPA and BCA)
Forest industry	Madeira do Belito Lida (MABEL)

6. Grupo do Banco de Angola

This group worked jointly with Banco de Fomento Nacional, and had shares in a number of industries.

Sources: Backlund, L., Biureborgh, L. and Hellström, P. The Angolan economy and industrial development Euro-Action-Accord, London and IUEF, Geneva 1977.

Guerra, H., Angola: Estructura Económica e Classes Sociais, Livrangol 1975, Luanda

APPENDIX 3

Examples of Largescale firms which have been nationalized

Name of the firm	Branch/Sector	Date of nationalization
Companhia do Açúcar de Angola	Sugar	May 1976
Sociedade Agrícola de Cassequel	Sugar	May 1976
Sociedade Açucarera do Bom Jesus	Sugar	May 1976
Sociedade Textil de Angola (TEXTANG)	Textiles	May 1976
Sociedade Angolana de Teçidos (SATEC)	Textiles	May 1976
Companhia Cimentos de Angola (belonged to the Champalimand group)	Cement	May 1976
Siderurgía Nacional (belonged to the Champalimand group)	Iron and steel products	May 1976
Companhia Angolana de Agricultura (CADA)	Agricultural products	June 1976
Companhia Uniao de Cervejas Angola (CUCA)	Beer	June 1976
Banco de Angola (now called Banco Nacional de Angola)	Banking	Nov. 1976
Banco Comercial de Angola (now called Banco Popular de Angola)	Banking	Nov. 1976

The above two banks together accounted for 87 per cent of the financial operations within Angola at the time of nationalization.

Angol Oil Company (Subsidiary of SACOR Group)	Oil	Feb. 1977
Companhia Mineira do Lobito	Iron Mining	June 1977
Companhia do Manganes de Angola	Manganese mining	June 1977

Diamang (61 per cent of the shares have been nationalised. The rest belong in the main to the De Beers-Oppenheimer Group, Morgan Trust and a few Swiss banks)	Diamond/mining	August 1977
Empresa Estatal de Pesca Vivilar	Fish trading	1977
Consórcio Técnico de Aeronáutica (CTA)	Air transport	1977
Empresa de Transportes Aéreo de Angola (ETAA)	Air transport	1977
Companhia do Caminho de Ferro do Amboim	Railway	1977
COTONANG	Cotton	1978
Companhia Geral dos Algodoes	Cotton	1978
Cristaleira Maquinas Fermentes	Glass	1978
Cristaleira Commercial	Glass	1978
MATERVI	Glass	1978
Companhia Congo-Agrícola	Agricultural products	1978
MABOR	Tyres	May 1979
Companhia de Cervejas do Sul de Angola	Beer	May 1979
Gulf Oil of Cabinda (51 per cent of the shares have been nationalized. The rest belong to Gulf Oil U.S.A.)	Oil	1979

APPENDIX 4

Excerpts from the Law on Foreign Investment in Angola, promulgated on 10 July 1979.

(Translated from the Portuguese into English by the Danish Embassy in Luanda, Angola)

Chapter I
General Dispositions

Article 1. The Peoples Republic of Angola (PRA) permits the realisation of foreign investments in Angola by entities of recognised competence and technical and financial capacity on the basis of the principles of respect of the independence and national sovereignty and of reciprocity of advantages and as long as they correspond to the interests of the economic and social development of the country.

Article 3.1. For the purpose of the present Law there are considered as foreign investments:

(a) the introduction into the PRA of capital, of equipment or foreign technology destined to the creation of new enterprises, of branches of enterprises already in existence, as well as the constitution of shared association

(b) investments made in national currency arising from funds with rights of transfer outside under legislation in force.

Article 3.2. Foreign investments, in whatever form they may take, always will be valued in a currency to be agreed.

Article 4. Foreign investors can be individual or collective foreign persons, private or state as well as international entities, as long as they comply with the legally demanded requirements.

Article 5. The areas excluded from foreign investment are defence, banking, insurance, telecommunications, electricity and water supply.

Chapter II
Forms of foreign investment

Article 7. Foreign investments in the PRA can be for the constitution of (a) mixed enterprises (joint-ventures), (b) shared associations, (c) private enterprises.

Article 8. Mixed Enterprises.

Article 8.1. There is a mixed form of enterprise (joint venture) when the foreign investor associates himself with an Angolan State Economic unit, constituting a common fund given a legal form, in the form of a limited liability company, or a company with shares.

Article 9.1. The Angolan share in the capital of mixed enterprises will be a minimum of 51 per cent and will include particularly land, installations, machinery and tools existent in the national territory, as well as expenses effected in national currency.

Article 9.2. In exceptional cases of recognised interest for the development of the country, the Council of Ministers will be able to authorise the constitution of mixed enterprises in which the participation of the Angolan state could be less than 50 per cent.

Article 10. Shared Associations

Article 10.1. The foreign entities can be authorised to import capital, equipment and technology, with the aim that jointly with Angolan State Economic Units they will form associations not having a legal personality.

Article 10.2. The products of the activity realised will be divided between the parties on the terms agreed in the contract.

Article 11. Private Enterprises

Article 11.1. There can be authorized the import of capital, equipment and tecnology, for the constitution of private enterprises, providing they contribute to the economic development of the PRA.

Article 11.2. Recourse to foreign investment for the constitution of private companies will only be authorised (a) when they produce goods destined exclusively for export (b) when the volume of investment and/or the complex technology justifies it.

Article 11.3. The Council of Ministers will be able nevertheless to authorize the import of capital, for the constitution of private enterprises in case of recognised national interest, particularly when from it there will result a significant decrease in imports.

Chapter III
Guarantees

There are guaranteed to foreign entities who invest in the PRA under the present laws:

(a) A period of activity of 10 to 15 years

(b) In case of nationalisation due to national economic exigencies the foreign partner will have the right to indemnification--------, the payment of which will be made in the currency invested or conventioned, in a period of eleven months counting from the date of nationalisation. This indemnity will never be less than the difference between the amount invested, increased by interest in accordance with the inernational market, and the amount of the value already repaid. Interest will be calculated from the beginning of the realisation upto the date of payment of the agreed indemnity.

(c) Transference to overseas of annual profits, duly authorized by the Ministry of Finance, after payment of taxes and deductions for obligatory funds, up to 25 per cent of the capital invested, in accordance to that stipulated in the contracts, in specific cases.

(d) Recourse to internal credit for financing of current operations.

Article 13.1. In special cases there could be conceded to foreign investors:

(a) Exemption from or reduction in taxes on income during the first years of activity, taking into account its importance on national economic development.

(b) Exemption from, or reduction in, custom duties, for one or more times, on the import of capital equipment, accessories or spares, as well as on prime materials (raw materials) or other materials which do not exist in the country.

(c) Exemption from, or reduction in, the customs export duties, for one or more times, reflecting the value of duties not paid to the benefit of the producer.

Article 14.2. There will be authorized the transfer of amounts necessary for the servicing of loans contracted overseas in terms of the previous paragraphs.

Article 15. The remuneration of the capital invested by the foreign partner can be made through the delivery of products, resulting from the activity in which the investments were made.

Chapter IV
Obligations

Article 16. Foreign entities which invest in the PRA under the terms of the present Law are obliged to respect the laws and regulations in force as well as their contractual promises, and to submit themselves to the control of the Angolan authorities, being required to provide all the information necessary.

Article 17.1. Undertakings covered by the present law are subject to the payment of a unique (sic) tax on income, the rate for which will be fixed by Fiscal Law.

Article 17.2. To give effect to what is laid down in the previous paragraphs, the (tax) rate will be fixed in the Contract, taking into account (a) the importance of the investment for national economic development, (b) the volume of production destined for export, (c) the volume of investment necessary, (d) the level of technology demanded, (e) the time foreseen for the recuperation of capital invested and (f) the plan for the formation (training?) of an Angolan workfore.

Article 18.1.

(a) Companies created under the present Law exercise their activity in a form not to disturb other activities, or the population in general, and to adopt specific security measures against pollution of the environment and the protection of nature

(b) Organize their activities in a form to guarantee the hygiene, protection and security of workers against professional sicknesses and working accidents.

Chapter V
Losses

Article 19.1. In case losses are verified in activities in which there exist foreign investments, these will be covered by the parties in proportion to their respective participation.

Article 19.2. In case the foreign investor does not cover the losses with the corresponding entry of means, the covering will be made athrough a deduction in their percentage of capital invested.

Chapter VII
Workers

Article 27.1. Enterprises formed under the present Law must employ Angolan workers, guaranteeing the necessary technical and professional training.

Article 27.2. In case qualified Angolan workers are not available in sufficient numbers, the enterprises can admit foreign workers, under the authorisation of the Ministry applicable to the enterprise.

Article 28. Foreign workers contracted under paragraph 2 of the previous Article submit themselves to the legislation applicable to foreign workers in the PRA, not being subject to the salary scales fixed for Angolan workers.

Article 30. Working conflicts which arise in enterprises constituted under this Law will be resolved in terms of the legislation in force in the PRA.

APPENDIX 5

Some examples of various countries involved in infrastructural and other projects in Angola

Cuba Fisheries, construction of bridges, dams, waterworks, cold storage plants, residential accomodation, and road building in urban areas.

U.S.S.R. Fisheries.

East Germany Workshops for repair and maintenance of transport vehicles, suppling technicians for installing dockside cranes in the ports of Luanda, Lobito and Mocamedes.

Czechoslovakia Supply of transport equipment.

Bulgaria Supplying technicians for working in large state-owned farms.

Hungary Building a pharmaceutical industry

Yugoslavia Supplying engineers for working in the construction and expansion of ports and for training dock workers.

Sweden Fisheries, education and health, supply of transport vehicles, and training of Angolans in the repair and maintenance of these vehicles.

France Telecommunications, water treatment plants, electricity generators, oil terminals, dockside cranes, vehicle assembly plant.

Italy Airport construction, training of Angolans in oil prospecting, drilling and extraction technology, general civil construction, fuel distribution, fisheries, supplying technicians for working in a plywood factory, drafting a plan for renewing the agricultural infrastructure in the Mocamedes region.

Portugal Aircraft maintenance, supply of engineers to work in electricity generator plants and for training Angolans in electrical engineering, professional banking assistance and the training of banking personnel, supply of prefabricated houses.

Belgium Supplying technicians for working in the communications network, and for training Angolans to run the Benguela railway.

Brazil Setting up and administering a chain of retail shops

Consortium of West German, U.S. and Belgian companies to extend the port of Lobito.

Consortium of the Arab Development Bank, EEC countries, Canada and Sweden for modernizing the Benguela railway and increasing it's carrying capacity.

EEC countries Fisheries.

Table 1. Share of manufacturing output in total GDP

1	2	3	
Year	Total GDP at current prices (in million escudos)	Manufacturing Gross output at current prices (million escudos)	3 as percentage of 2
1960	20633	1335	6.5
1963	24527	1987	8.1
1966	33005	3814	11.5
1969	43630	6188	14.2
1970	53823	7962	14.8
1971	59703	9489	15.9

Sources: For total GDP, EURODELTA: Etude économique: Angola, Brussels 1974.
For manufacturing, as in Table 2

Table 2. Structure of gross output in the manufacturing sector[a,b,c]
(Absolute values are at current prices in million escudos)

Year		Consumer goods	Intermediate goods	Capital goods	Total
1960	As percentage of total	74.8	24.1	1.1	100
	(Absolute value)	(999)	(322)	(14)	(1335)
1961[d]		76.1	23.3	0.6	100
		(1131)	(347)	(9)	(1487)
1962		71.3	27.2	1.5	100
		(1384)	(527)	(30)	(1941)
1963		69.5	28.7	1.8	100
		(1381)	(571)	(35)	(1987)
1964		72.0	26.3	1.7	100
		(1810)	(662)	(43)	(2525)
1965		73.2	23.9	2.9	100
		(2194)	(716)	(88)	(2998)
1966		73.0	24.0	3.0	100
		(2782)	(917)	(115)	(3814)
1967[e]		68.0	23.7	8.3	100
		(2921)	(1018)	(358)	(4297)
1968		66.7	25.8	7.5	100
		(3475)	(1346)	(389)	(5210)
1969		67.4	23.6	9.0	100
		(4175)	(1459)	(554)	(6188)

Table 2. (cont.)

Year	Consumer goods	Intermediate goods	Capital goods	Total
1970	68.6	22.0	9.4	100
	(5460)	(1753)	(749)	(7962)
1971	67.7	22.7	9.6	100
	(6428)	(2153)	(908)	(9489)
1972	67.3	22.5	10.2	100
	(7379)	(2470)	(1116)	(10965)
1973	70.3	18.5	11.2	100
	(9638)	(2543)	(1543)	(13724)

Sources: Anuário Estatístico 1960 to 1972
Boletim Mensal de Estatística 1973
(Instituto Nacional de Estatística, Delegação de Angola)

Notes: a) For the years prior to 1960, production statistics are given only in terms of physical measures and not monetary value. It's not possible to compare the production of different kind of goods using these physical measures, because the units of measurement differ from product to product, e.g. metres of cloth, litres of beverages, tons of flour. We have therefore no choice but to restrict ourselves to statistics from 1960 onwards.

b) The reader will discover that there are discrepancies in the figures quoted for certain branches, and hence in the values of the total output, in two major sources of data: 1) Anuário Estatístico and Boletim Mensal de Estatística, published by the Instituto Nacional de Estatística, and 2) Situação Económica e Financeira de Angola, published by Banco de Angola. A number of authors have used the second source, but we have chosen to use the first one because we believe it to be the primary source.

c) For a few commodities, explicit data stops or starts being available from certain years. For instance, explicit data on the monetary value of slaughterd animals (Gado abatido) stops being available from 1963 onwards, whereas similar data on processed fish (Conservas de peixe) starts from 1962 onwards. The reader is referred to the sources for details. In our tables, we include whatever data is available for any given year.

d) The value for rubber products (artigos de borracha) is taken to be the same as in 1960, because no data was available for 1961, but starts being available again in 1962.

e) This abrupt change in the pattern, with a noticeable rise in the proportion of capital goods and a corresponding dip in that of consumer goods, is primarily due to the assembly of motor vehicles, in particular heavy commercial vehicles (lorries or trucks). For instance, the assembly of heavy commercial vehicles accounts for 48% of capital goods production in 1967. (The compartively small rise in the absolute value of consumer goods is due to the fact that the 1967 production of vegetable and animal oils and fats was only ¼ that of 1966).

Table 3. Annual growth in manufacturing output by sectors, expressed in percentages (based on current prices)

Year	Consumer goods	Intermediate goods	Capital goods	Total manufacturing
1960	-	-	-	-
1961	13.2	7.7	- 35.7	11.4
1962	22.3	51.8	233.0[a]	30.5
1963	- 0.2	8.3	16.6	2.3
1964	31.0	15.9	22.8	26.5
1965	21.2	8.1	104.6[a]	19.2
1966	26.8	28.1	30.7	27.2
1967	5.0	11.0	211.3[a]	12.6
1968	18.9	32.2	8.6	21.2
1969	20.1	8.4	42.4	18.8
1970	30.8	20.1	35.2	28.6
1971	17.7	22.8	21.2	19.2
1972	14.8	14.7	22.9	15.5
1973	30.6	2.9	37.4	25.1
Average for the period				
1960–73	19.4	17.8	57.7	19.8

Sources: As in Table 2.

Notes: a) These big jumps in the growth of capital goods should be interpreted with a great deal of caution. They do not represent any big absolute growth, but a doubling or quadrupling of really small initial ouput. The figures become regular after 1967, because now growth is taking place on a non-trivial base.

Table 4. Structure of manufacturing production in 1965 and 1973

Types of goods[a]	As percentage of total manufacturing production 1965	1973
Mass consumption goods		
Food processing (including oils and fats from vegetables and animals)	28.5	19.5
Textiles and their products	12.3	11.7
Miscellaneous products[b]	2.6	2.1
Luxury consumption goods		
Food processing	7.7	15.0
Textiles and their products	0.2	0.9
Beverages (alcoholic and non-alcoholic)	14.0	11.5
Tobacco products	7.6	5.7
Miscellaneous products[b]	0.3	3.9

Table 4. (cont.)

Types of goods[a]	As percentage of total manufacturing production 1965	1973
Intermediate goods		
Wood and wood products	0.3	0.6
Pulp, paper and paper products	3.6	3.0
Chemical products	2.5	4.2
Petroleum refinery products (including derivatives of petroleum and coal)	9.7	4.0
Rubber and plastic products	0.3	1.1
Ceramic and glass products	0.5	0.8
Non-metallic mineral products (cement, etc)	7.0	4.8
Capital goods		
Iron and steel products	} 2.4	2.5
Metal products		3.9
Non-electrical machinery	non	0.8
Electrical machinery and gadgets (excluding consumer durables)	0.5	1.9
Transport equipment (excluding passenger motor vehicles and motorcyles and bicyles)	none	2.1
Professional equipment	none	negligible

Source: Same as for Table 2.

Notes: a) For a detailed list of the goods in this classification system being produced in Angola, see Appendix 1.
b) "Miscellaneus" covers everything after food processing, textiles, beverages and tobacco products have been taken out of the list of goods given in Appendix 1 under mass and luxury consumption.

Table 5. Number of manufacturing enterprises and investment in them

Year	Total Number of manufact. enterprises	Total investment (nominal, in million esc)
1961	2496	2561
1962	2679	2675
1963	2954	2772
1964	3257	2981
1965	3479	3100
1966	3853	3325
1967	4175	3685
1968	4468	4123
1969	4706	4387
1970	4996	4858
1971	5316	5392
1972	5561	6060
1973	not available	7336

Sources: Same as for Table 2.

Table 6. Distribution of employees by category in manufacturing industry

Year		Administrative, technical and clerical jobs Managerial	Non-Mangerial	Skilled workers	Unskilled workers	Total
1961	Abolute number	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	15654
	Percentage of total no.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	
1965	Absolute number	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	63293
	Percentage of total no.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	
1968	Absolute number	841		8313	57469	66623
	Percentage of total	1.2%		12.5%	86.3%	
1969	Absolute number	1648	4006	9045	59302	74001
	Percentage of total	2.2	5.4	12.2	80.2	
1970		1686	4355	9278	59622	74941
		2.2	5.8	12.4	79.6	
1971		1737	5057	10010	70412	87216
		2.0	5.8	11.5	80.7	
1972		n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	99730
		n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	
1973		n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	125373
		n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	

Sources: Anuário Estatístico, Vol. II., Provincias Ultramarinas, 1965 to 1972, Published by Instituto Nacional de Estatistica (INE).
Boletim Mensal de Estatística, Ano XXIX, No. 12, Dec. 1973, Published by INE.

Note: n.a. means "not available"

Table 7. Average daily wages paid in manufacturaing sector (in escudos)

Year	Skilled workers	Unskilled workers	Annual increase in wages (percentage Skilled workers	Unskilled workers
1969	124.1	25.6	-	-
1970	138.0	27.6	11.2	7.8
1971	154.9	27.7	12.2	0.3

In the mining sector, average daily wage of an unskilled worker was 16 escudos, if we go by the figures of the biggest mining employer Diamang, the diamond mining company.

Sources: Anuário Estatístico Vol. II, Provincias Ultramar. Published by the Instituto Nacional de Estatística. For mining wages, M. de Andrade and M. Olliver "War in Angola"

Table 8.

1 Year	2 New investment in manufacturng sector (mn.esc)	3 Approximate total wages[a] paid to direct producers[b] in manufacturing (mn.esc)	4 Ratio of column 2 in year x+1 to column 3 in year x
1969	-	818.4	35.4 per cent
1970	290	905.2	35.3 "
1971	320	1085.0	22.5 "
1972	245		

Sources: Based on Tables 5,6, and 7.

Notes: a) Assuming that a year has 310 working days for the direct producers, the total yearly wages are computed as follows:
It is equal to (the number of skilled workers x their average per capita daily wage + the no. of unskilled workers x their average per capita daily wage) x 310.
b) The category "direct producers" in manufacturing consists of only skilled and unskilled workers, and excludes all other types of employees.

Table 9. Average monthly salaries and daily wages paid in Luanda in 1960-70 (in escudos)

	Monthly salaries/wages	
Portuguese Top managers	50000	(excluding all fringe benefits)[a]
Portuguese Middle managers	25000 to 30000	(......ditto........)
Portuguese Skilled worker	12000	
African Unskilled worker	-	
African Domestic servant	600	(excluding board and shelter)

Average Daily wages 1960-70

African Casual worker:	20 esc.
African Agricultural worker:	20 esc.[b]

Sources: Author's interviews with people resident in Angola during 1960s and early 1970s.

Notes: a) one of the interviewees, a highly placed official, estimated that fringe benefits amounted to 60000 escudos per month.
b) Also see G. Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality, Heinemann, London 1978, p. 226.

Table 10. Price of foodstuffs in Luanda in the early 1970s

Commodity	Measure	Price in escudos 1971	1972	1973
Mize flour	1 kg	7.79*	7.58*	n.a.
Rice (2nd grade)	"	8.00	7.80	9.00
Fresh fish	"	10.30	14.40	15.00
Sesame seed oil	"	n.a.	n.a.	22.50
Palm oil	"	n.a.	n.a.	10.00
White sugar	"	4.70	4.80	4.77
Lard (edible animal fat)	"	15.40	12.40	22.37
Milk (fresh)	1 litre	6.00	6.40	6.00
Butter	1 kg	55.20	56.40	54.00
Cheese	"	52.50	53.90	54.60
Eggs	1 dozen	18.20	17.80	18.33
Chicken	1 kg	27.40	25.00	30.00
Mutton	"	33.00	36.00	36.00
Pork	"	33.10	40.00	40.00
Beef	"	36.00	36.00	36.00
Beer	0.75 litre	9.10	9.70	9.00

Source: As in Table 7, and Boletim Mensual de Estatística, Dec. 1973.

Notes: * Our estimates based on the assumption that the price of maize flour will have risen by at least the same degree as that of rice over the period 1964-72; the price in 1964 is available, and it is 5.34 escudos for one kilogram of maize flour.

Table 11. Consumer price index in Luanda (Base 100 in year 1965)

1965	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
100	125	134	141	152	172	205
Annual percentage increase		7.2	5.2	7.8	13.1	19.2

Source: Banco de Angola Boletim Trimestral.

Table 12. Profits of selected major banks and manufacturing enterprises in 1971

Bank or Enterprise	Capital (nominal value in mln.esc.)	Profits (in million escudos)	Ratio profit/capital (in percentage)
1. Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor	500	91.3	18.2
2. Banco de Angola	300	105.8	35.2
3. Banco Comercial de Angola	267	39.6	14.8
4. Bco.de Crédito Comercial e Industrial	200	21.7	10.8
5. Bco. Totta-Standard de Angola	150	16.5	11.0
6. Instituto de Crédito de Angola	n.a.	36.6	-
7. Cª. Cellulosa de Ultramar Portugues	250	44.6	17.8
8. CUCA - Cª. União de Cerveja de Angola	300	38.7	12.9
9. Hidro-Eléctrica do Alto Catumbela	160	14.1	8.8
10. SECIL - Cª. Cimento Secil do Ultramar	400	62.8	15.7
11. CASSEQUEL - Soc. Agrícola do Cassaquel	175	20.6	11.7
12. Cª. do Açúcar de Angola	337.5	15.0	4.4
13. Cª. do Cimentos de Angola	150	9.4	6.2

Source: "A Capital" A Portuguese weekly, 14 December 1972.

Table 13. Structure of Imports (excluding armaments)

Year		Consumer goods	Intermediate goods	Capital goods	Total
1960	Percentage of total	42.4	18.8	38.8	100
	(Absolute value) (1000 esc)	(1526)	(677)	(1394)	(3596)
1961		39.4	20.7	39.9	100
		(1269)	(666)	(1284)	(3219)
1962		38.9	19.6	41.5	100
		(1513)	(759)	(1614)	(3886)
1963		42.3	19.8	37.9	100
		(1777)	(833)	(1593)	(4203)
1964		42.8	19.5	37.7	100
		(2014)	(917)	(1775)	(4706)
1965		40.6	18.7	40.7	100
		(2271)	(1047)	(2275)	(5593)
1966		35.7	18.9	45.4	100
		(2120)	(1125)	(2695)	(5940)
1967		29.2	17.4	53.4	100
		(2309)	(1367)	(4212)	(7897)
1968		31.1	19.5	49.4	100
		(2708)	(1693)	(4294)	(8695)
1969		31.0	21.4	47.6	100
		(2860)	(1985)	(4400)	(9245)
1970		30.5	21.5	47.9	100
		(3231)	(2275)	(5072)	(20578)
1971		28.7	20.1	51.2	100
		(3471)	(2433)	(6205)	(12109)
1972		20.9	23.2	55.9	100
		(2243)	(2481)	(5992)	(10716)
1973		25.6	24.7	49.7	100
		(3395)	(3278)	(6581)	(13254)

Sources: Comércio Externo, Vol. I, 1960 to 1972 Boletim Mensal de Estatística, Dec. 1973

Table 14. Annual growth of imports (excluding armaments) expressed in percentage

Year	Consumer goods	Intermediate goods	Capital goods	Total
1960	-	-	-	-
1961	-16.8	- 1.5	- 7.9	-10.5
1962	19.2	13.9	25.7	20.7
1963	17.4	9.7	- 1.3	8.1
1964	13.3	10.1	11.4	11.9
1965	12.7	14.2	28.1	18.8
1966	- 6.6	7.4	18.4	6.2
1967	8.9	22.3	56.3	32.9
1968	17.3	23.0	1.9	10.1
1969	5.6	17.2	2.4	6.9
1970	13.0	14.6	15.2	6.3
1971	7.4	6.9	22.3	14.4
1972	-35.4	1.9	- 3.4	-11.5
1973	51.3	32.1	9.8	23.7
Average of annual growth over 1960-73	8.2	13.2	13.7	10.6

Sources: As for Table 13.

Table 15. Structure of imports in 1965 and 1973 (excluding armaments)

Types of goods	As percentage of total imports 1965	1973
Consumer goods		
Food processing (including vegetable and animal oils and fats), bevarages, tobacco products	19.3	13.3
Textiles and their products	17.5	10.5
Articles of clothing, various garments (including footwear), costume jewellery, etc.	2.1	0.9
Leather and fur goods	0.5	0.2
Miscellaneous	0.5	0.7
Intermediate goods		
Mineral products	2.4	5.4
Chemical products	8.2	11.1
Plastics, rubber, resins and their products	3.5	4.1
Wood and its products	0.4	0.2
Paper and its products	2.4	2.2
Ceramic and glass products	1.9	1.6
Capital goods		
Basic metals and their products	10.0	11.6
Machinery and gadgets(including consumer durables)	14.8	22.9
Transport equipment	14.3	13.6
Professional equipment	1.5	1.6

Sources: As for Table 13.

Table 16. Share of imports by principal countries of origin for 1965 and 1973 (as percentages of total imports)

Country	1965	1973
Portugal	47.5	26.3
West Germany	8.2	13.0
U.S.A.	7.9	9.5
U.K.	11.2	7.6
France	4.4	6.7
South Africa	1.8	5.8
Japan	1.4	5.5
Italy	1.7	3.8
Belgium and Luxemburg	2.9	3.4
Netherlands	1.6	2.5
Sweden	2.4	1.6

Sources: Comércio Externo 1966. Boletim Mensal de Estatística 1973.

Table 17. Imports in 1977 (From January to June)

Commodities	Value (in million kwanzas)*	As percentage of total imports
Foodstuffs	8661	42.4
Other consumer goods	3350	16.4
Equipment goods and accessories	3289	16.1
Transport equipment	2656	13.0
Raw materials	2473	12.1
Total	20429	

* 1 US$ = 30 kwanzas (approximately)

Source: Quarterly Economic Review of Angola (QER), 3rd Quarter 1979, The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), London.

Imports in 1978

Commodities	Value (in million US dollars)
Consumer goods and other products	276
Equipment	310
Raw materials	301

Source: QER, 1st Quarter 1980, EIU, London.

Table 18. Exports

Total export earnings for 1979 are estimated to be $ 1300 million and for 1980 they are expected to reach at least $ 1700 million.

Source: QER, 1st quarter 1980, EIU, London

Exports during 1977 and 1979

	1977		1978	
Commodity	Value (mn. kwanzas)*	As percentage of total	Value (mn.kz.)*	As percentage of total
Oil and oil derivatives	22465	72.3	18845	63.0
Coffee	7528	24.2	6732	22.4
Diamonds	655	2.2	2996	10.0
Others	402	1.3	1386	4.6
Total	31050		29959	

*1 US$ = 30 kwanzas (approximately)

Source: SIDA, Stockholm, Country Overview - Angola (Landöversyn-Angola), February 1980 (unpublished)

Table 19. Industrial production in 1977 and 1978

Branch	Value of output in current prices (in million Kwanzas) 1977	1978
Foodstuffs	2648	3148
Heavy industry	1195	1598
Light industry	662	947
Mining industry	1607	3981
Crude Petroleum	23675	20330
Refined petroleum products	1029	1262
Electrical energy	252	267

Source: Boletim Informativo 1978, Ministério do Plano. RPA, Luanda. Table 6, pp 34

Table 20. Gross Domestic Product (in million Kwanzas)

Sectors	1971	1977 (current prices)	1977 (constant 1971 prices)
Agriculture and Fishing	6071	5022	2310
Mining and oil	4055	19500	3120
Manufacturing	4864	5880	2380
Construction and public works	1344	1090	670
Electricity, gas and water	379	480	460
Transport and communications	2428	14540	6650
Wholesale and retail trade	13037		
Banking and insurance	1476	-	-
Real estate ownership	2833	-	-
Public administration and Defence	4673	10800	5400
Services	6746	16000	8000
Total	47906	73312	28990

Source: QER, 3rd Quarter 1979, EIU London.

Table 21. Total GDP (in million dollars)

	1971	1977	1978
At current prices	1600	2200	2600
At 1971 prices	1600	800	1000

For the years 1977 and 1978, as compared to 1971, the situation of the total GDP looks better than that of the industrial GDP. But this is because the increase in total GDP is mostly due to the increase in the price of oil.

Source: QER, 1st quarter 1980, EIU, London.

Table 22. Destinations of exports and origins of imports in 1978 (January to June)

Region	Percentage share of exports to	Percentage share of imports from
U.S.A.	64	14
Western Europe	19	61
Eastern Europe	11	21
Africa and others	6	4

Source: SIDA, Stockholm, Country Overview - Angola (Landöversyn-Angola), February 1980 (unpublished)

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Declaration of the Political Bureau, Documents of the Plenary meeting of the MPLA Central Committee, 23-29 October 1976, Luanda. (English translation by the Mozambique, Angola and Guine Information Centre, London).

2. Ibid

3. During the colonial period, the countries of the third world were obliged to produce agricultural and mineral raw materials for export to the capitalist countries , from whom they were also obliged to import the manufactured goods that they could pay for. This "old international division of labour (OIDL)" still persists very strongly in many underdeveloped countries (UDCs). In recent years, however, new strands have been added to this pattern by international capital, in particular the multinational corporations. They have invested, and are continuing to invest, in the manufacture of consumer goods, in a relatively small number of UDCs, both for the domestic and export markets. This addition of industrial manufacturing to the OIDL is called the "New international division of labour (NIDL)".

   It is the latest stage in the ongoing integration of the UDCs into the world market. A common pitfall for the NIDL enterprises is that they are not allowed to make products in their <u>entirety</u>, but only <u>parts</u> of products, the remaining parts being farmed out to other subsidiaries of the same international parent company located in various parts of the globe. In short, international capital is trying more and more to use the whole globe as one huge integrated factory, where different sections (i.e. countries) make different parts, the final assembly of parts into an entire product being made in one section (country). Another very dangerous pitfall is the export free zone (or the so-called free trade zone).

4. Boletim Mensal de Estatística, 1973 (Instituto Nacional de Estatística, Delgação de Angola).

5. Quarterly Economic Review of Angola (QER), 2nd quarter of 1978, 1st, 2nd and 3rd quarters of 1979, The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), London.

6. Reliable and detailed statistics are available upto 1973, but not beyond. However, in 1979, the Angolan authorities published some data on the macro economic indicators, but not at the levels of disaggregation required in our analysis. That is one technical constraint which prevents us from taking one part of our analysis beyond 1973. But that is not a handicap, because the reference year for the immediate goals of national reconstruction is 1973, the aim being to reach the production levels of that year. Severe disruptions in the economy set in from 1974 onwards.

7. According to a study carried out in 1974 (see Etude Economique: Angola, Eurodelta, Brussels, 1974), the total GDP increased, between 1960 and 1971, by 12.5 per cent per annum at <u>current</u> prices, and by 7.8 per cent at <u>constant 1963</u>

prices. This real growth rate of 7.8 per cent tallies well with the 8 to 9 per cent estimated by the IMF study on Angola carried out in 1975. The difference between the current and constant price growth rates of the GDP is about 40 per cent of the former. Assuming that the same difference applies to the manufacturing sector, the real growth rates can be estimated to be 11.6, 10.7, 34.6 and 11.9 per cent per annum respectively for the production of consumer, intermediate, capital and all manufactured goods.

8. de Andrade, M. and Ollivier, M., The War in Angola: A socio-economic study, Tanzania Publishing House, 1975, Dar es Salaam.

   Bender, G., Angola Under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality, Heinemann, London 1978.

9. Interviews conducted by the author in 1978 and 1979.

10. de Andrade and Ollivier, op. cit.

11. I Plano de Fomento (1953-1958), Lisbon.

12. II Plano de Fomento (1959-1964), Lisbon

13. Guerra, H., Angola: Estrutura económica e classes socias, Edição Livrangol 1975, Luanda.

14. For other examples in Africa see:
    Bhagavan, M.R., Industrialization and Transfer of Technology in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia, Proceedings of the Seventh General Conference of IPRA, Helsinki, 1979.

15. Legislação dos mercados monetairos, Cambial e Financeiro, Liv. Almedina 1972, Lisbon.

16. The above conclusions are based on the analysis of the material collected by the author during his interviews in 1978 and 1979.

17. de Andrade, M. and Ollivier, M., op. cit.

18. Bhagavan, M.R. op. cit.

19. Quarterly Economic Review of Angola (QER), Annual Supplement 1977, Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), London.

20. Guerra, H. op. cit.

21. The Angolan ambassador to the EEC, Mr. Luis de Almeida, said in November 1979 in London that "All the targets (of the latest attacks by South Africa) have been economic, not military ..... They have not hit SWAPO bases, for instance, but have chosen factories and boatyards. We know why: the South Africans are worried because hostility in the West towards Angola is diminishing. Investors are coming in on a 49-51 per cent basis with the government in agriculture, oil production and minerals. ..... Angola believes that the (South African) bombing is designed to force expenditure away from reconstruction and towards defence". QER, 1st Quarter 1980, EIU, London.

22. Total export earnings in 1979 are estimated to be about $ 1300 million, out of which oil revenue accounts for $ 840 million. QER, 1st Quarter 1980, EIU, London.

23. Communication by Basil Davidson at a seminar in Uppsala, Sweden, 1977.

24. QER, 1st Quarter 1979, EIU, London.

25. Boletim Informativo 1978, Ministério do Plano, Republica Popular de Angola, Luanda, pp. 32, (unpublished).

    Country overview of Angola (Landöversyn-Angola), SIDA, Stockholm, Sweden, February 1980 (unpublished).

26. QER, 3rd Quarter 1979, EIU, London.

27. QER, 1st Quarter 1979, EIU, London.

28. Afrique Asie No. 164 (Special issue on Angola), 26 June-9 July 1978. pp xxxi.

29. Ibid. pp xxxiii.