CHANGING PARADIGMS IN DEVELOPMENT – SOUTH, EAST AND WEST

**A meeting of minds
in Africa.**

MARGARETA VON TROIL, ED.

CHANGING PARADIGMS IN DEVELOPMENT— SOUTH, EAST AND WEST

A Meeting of Minds in Africa

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Margaretha von Troil

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Abbreviations

CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
EC	European Community
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
ERP	Economic Reform Programme
ESAMI	Eastern and Southern African Management Institute
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LDC	Least Developed Countries
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIC	Newly Industrialised Countries
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ODA	Official Development Assistance
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SME	Small- and Medium-Scale Enterprise
SOE	State-Owned Enterprise
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
TNC	Transnational Corporation
UDT	Underdevelopment Theory
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation

Preface

Margaretha von Troil

Events over the past few years have challenged and revised long prevailing conceptions of world politics and ideological divisions in the global context. East and West have, at long last, entered into a supportive relationship. Communism has been more or less declared a failure, the Soviet Union has dissolved into sovereign states, and the heart of what had been for over seven decades the USSR is again under Russian rule.

The end of the Cold War has brought forth cordial, though still economically unequal terms between East and West. The new era has been welcomed by the North, but has caused anxiety in the South.

Since the 1960s, which marked the dawn of independence for African states, the international community has responded, both through the United Nations and bilaterally, with an aim to support African development. More than three decades of development thinking, accompanied by the implementation of various development strategies, form a vast resource of knowledge in which the African experience and that of the donor community, including international financial institutions, form the cornerstones. In this process of development thinking and aid practice there have been manifestations of continuity but also of change.

The workshop entitled *Paradigms in Development Thinking and Strategies: African, Nordic and Soviet experience*, held in Uppsala /Enköping on May 21–24, 1991, brought together researchers from Africa, the Nordic countries and the Soviet Union, in order to discuss development thinking and strategies. Whereas Africa was in focus for the workshop, the presentations reflected the different geopolitical domiciles of the participants.

The programme of the workshop was scheduled to highlight specific themes as well as different approaches and priorities in development research. The main themes were:

- Different Perspectives on Development Thinking and Strategies 1960-90;
- The Roles of External Assistance in Implementing Development;
- Present and Future Paradigms of Development.

The workshop was organised jointly by the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies (SIAS), Uppsala, and the Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University (PFU), Moscow. The initiative had been put forward in an earlier encounter between Associate Professor Anders Hjort af Ornäs, Director of SIAS, and Professor Alexander A. Ivanov, Vice-Chancellor of PFU. The timing of the workshop was, in many respects, fortunate. The discussions were fruitful, and added both insights and dimensions to the earlier experiences of development thinking. In retrospect, it may be that had the workshop taken place at an earlier date, time might not yet have been ready for the informative and straightforward exchange of views and experiences, particularly on the part of the

Soviet workshop delegates. On the other hand, had the meeting occurred only a few months later, after the August revolution, or after the official demise of the USSR, the new historical setting would have called for a different workshop agenda.

The workshop discussions in May 1991 were lively and engaged. The presence and active participation of Russian (Soviet) scholars brought a new and fresh element into "conventional" development dialogues, calling for a revision of earlier ideological dogmas or prejudiced preconceptions. The presentations and following discussions reflected a certain tension among the participants between grassroots thinking, on the one hand, and macro-analytical thinking, on the other. The bridging of these levels of focus, when planning and implementing development strategies, may be regarded as one of the challenges resulting from the workshop. The responsibility of the elite and the need for them to join with the grassroots in common development efforts was emphasised, in particular, by the African participants. Differences in outlook among the participants may be explained partly by their respective orientation in different disciplines, partly by their respective ideological positions.

In May 1992, we learnt with deep regret about the death of Alexander A. Ivanov, Doctor of Science (Philosophy), Professor, Head of the Political Science Department, and Vice-Chancellor of the Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University. Born in 1947 in Moscow, he graduated from Moscow State University in 1971 (philosophical faculty). At the same University he received his PhD. and his DS degrees. Both were devoted to political and ideological problems of African states. He wrote more than one hundred publications about political problems of the USSR and Africa. Among these were: *Socialist Choice in African and Ideological Struggle* (Moscow, 1984 in Russian; Moscow, 1987 in Portuguese); *Problems of Democracy in Contemporary World* (Moscow, 1990). He participated in national and international congresses and conferences on African problems. His specialities were political institutions, systems and processes, especially in African states.

The proceedings of the Workshop are presented in a sequence which partly differs from the agenda of the workshop itself. The submitted contributions have undergone some editing. We feel, however, it is important that the contributors should express their ideas in the way that they were originally presented.

THEORETICAL PARADIGMS

Development theory and Africa's lost decade

Critical reflections on Africa's crisis and current trends in development thinking and practice

Tade Akin Aina

A highly visible element of the contemporary discussions of Africa's current condition is that observers, rather than talk of Africa's development, tend to refer more to Africa's crisis. This, it seems, is an indication of the extent to which there is a consensus that Africa's development process is in crisis. And indeed, what has come to be known as Africa's crisis has generated an extensive and evergrowing literature, produced both inside and outside Africa.¹ Offering a wide variety of diagnoses and prescriptions, many analysts have focused, often with great pessimism, on what they consider as the chronic, or in some cases, acute pathological state of the development process in Africa.

The pessimistic and despairing tone has taken on a more insistent and strident dimension in the light of what happened in the global economy in the 1970s and 1980s. Over this period, particularly in the 1980s, the African condition has been seen as taking on more desperate and frightening forms as economies deteriorate, social and physical infrastructures decay, ecological problems and disasters heighten, while political and social order and legitimacy, gradually crumble. All of these processes represent not only the expression of the deepening crisis, but also the responses of the governments, international financial agencies and institutions, and other countries, to the crisis. Important as the internal dynamics in Africa are, they are reinforced, strengthened and often complicated by external forces and overall global dynamics.

Perhaps an interesting and far-reaching response, externally packaged, internally administered, and offered as a solution is the series of economic reform packages, inspired and supported by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), known as the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) or the Economic Reform Programme (ERP). These were introduced by many African governments with the explicit objective of reversing the decline in their economies through the expansion of market-based principles and practices in several sectors and areas of national life. While the SAP has obviously sorted out some areas of inefficiencies (particularly in the public sector) in the macro-economic structures of most of these countries, its immediate and perhaps unintended results have been to complicate an already desperate situation and to worsen the standards and conditions of living of the majority of the peoples in the continent.

Maybe an important lesson from SAP which needs to be applied to the overall development process and strategy in Africa is that it is not a neutral nor innocent package, but rather a series of policy and political instruments that

derive from a specific set of world-views and a development paradigm containing its own values, methodology, and network of vested interests. Although clinical imagery and analogies are most often utilized in discussing SAP and the African crisis, SAP should not be seen as a treatment prescribed by a disinterested physician whose primary commitment is to the Hippocratic ideal of saving life. In the case of SAP, the doctors will want their fees paid, their debts settled, and continuous use of and dependence on their services, drugs and instruments.

It is this realisation of the lack of innocence and neutrality in economic programmes and strategies, such as SAP, that informs this paper's position: what has come to be known as Africa's Crisis is not only a crisis of development practice and process, but also a crisis of paradigms, that is a crisis of a framework (world-view and vision of the development process, experience and practice.) It is believed here that what has failed in Africa, and failed Africa, has been the initial conceptualization and design of the nature, direction and objectives of the development process. Of course, implementation and management have been faulty but these could not have had much success in any event, since the initial framing of the whole phenomenon was faulty.

This paper argues that a critical factor in the design and production of development theory and practice is the absence of indigenous and endogenous popular definitions of priorities, objectives, paths and problems. Development theory and the development process in Africa have therefore been alien, lopsided, and non-people-oriented in their definition, formulation and implementation.

It is this argument that we pursue in the rest of this paper as we examine: (a) the nature of dominant paradigms in Africa's development, their main highlights, problems and constraints; (b) the emergent alternative paradigms to those that were dominant in Africa's development strategies, their main highlights, problems and the lessons to be learnt from them; and (c) the options for Africa in terms of "reclaiming development". However, before we do this, two further tasks are necessary. The first, which is the simpler one, is the need to remind ourselves that Africa is an extensive and highly diversified continent, and that for the purpose of our discussion here, we need to limit ourselves mainly to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) excluding South Africa. The second is a brief clarification of the notion of crisis and an examination of the broad outlines of Africa's crisis. This last is necessary because the characteristics of this crisis are also those of Africa's development process. We turn to this.

The nature of Africa's crisis ²

First and foremost, how do we understand the notion of crisis? By this, we refer to a situation in which a system or structure begins to experience serious breakdown in the process of reproducing itself in a form hitherto considered normal. The notion also refers to "... a moment or specific time period in the history of a system at which various developments of a negative character combine to generate a serious threat to its survival" (Lawrence, 1986, 2). This phenomenon often occurs within the context of a defined period in the lives of most systems and structures but the African case is characterized by the long

term nature of the threatened breakdown and a lack of resolution in either one direction or the other.

Although what is generally termed as Africa's crisis is often considered mainly in terms of Africa's economic decline, it needs to be recognized that the crisis is multi-dimensional and that the economic problems, though central, are only an aspect. Africa's crisis is, in fact, primarily a combination of economic, ecological, political and socio-cultural upheavals which, although they have become quite intense in the past, are really the product of Africa's economic and political history and her ongoing subordinate and disadvantaged location and interaction within the global system. Explaining the cause or the current dynamics of the crisis is not easy, as it is a very complex phenomenon tied to Africa's history, her external relations, and her internal structure. Monocausal or unidimensional frameworks and explanations will not do. According to one observer:

If we attempt to reduce the explanation of these phenomena to economics, or to the inescapable consequences of imperialism then we will miss important aspects of their origins and also fail to understand their specific nature... (Sutcliffe, 1986, 20).

The crisis, therefore, is as multi-dimensional in origin as it is in the way it is expressed. Five features of its mode of expression are most prominent.

The first is the extent to which Africa is conflict-ridden. More than any other continent, Africa happens to experience extensive divisions, and ongoing civil wars and conflicts. The African continent experiences strong divisive tendencies and actual divisions as a result of her colonial past which created artificial boundaries, languages and consciousness. It is in Africa that divisions exist not only as a result of indigenous languages but on the basis of being Arab- or Spanish-speaking, anglophone, francophone and lusophone. All of these create not only direct cultural problems but have contributed to making armed conflicts and wars the main medium of political interaction and negotiation. At the moment there are ongoing armed conflicts/civil wars in Morocco/Saharawi, Sudan, Chad, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, and South Africa. There are of course endless skirmishes and struggles in various parts of Somalia, Cameroon, Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire and on the Liberia-Sierra Leone border. Of course, the various anti-colonial liberation struggles and wars to prevent secessionist groups are quite recent experiences. Undoubtedly, the consequences of these conflicts on the general well-being in the affected areas, and for economic production, political order, health, etc., have been negative.

This is because these wars have, not only aggravated natural and environmental problems, but they have also occasioned the massive displacement of millions of ordinary poor peoples. Today in Africa, the total number of uprooted people has been estimated at ten million. More significantly, useful energies and scarce resources, which should have been used for improving general well-being, are poured into military spending and irrational destruction.

Africa's domestic politics are a second feature of this crisis, closely related to the first element discussed above. Africa's politics are currently characterized by fragile but authoritarian and over-extended state formations with weak roots in civil society. These are controlled by an insecure, non-hegemonic political elite who are dependent on the state for accumulation and who utilize both

corruption and patronage as media of bargaining, negotiation and legitimation. Furthermore, a central element in their search for security and stability is dependence on external, often Western, support to counter the many oppositional forces ranged against them on the domestic front. As part of their search for security, rulers utilize repression and non- and anti-democratic means to retain power without showing any concern for the human and democratic rights of their citizens, which they flagrantly breach. These rulers often adopt a political style that divides their citizens along ethnic, economic, religious and even racial lines, fuelling the costly diversions which keep their nations off the track of development. This situation Claude Ake (1989, 54-65) has aptly captured under the title: "How Politics Underdevelops Africa". All of this makes participation in African politics a highly precarious, yet significantly profitable venture for a dominant few, while at the same time it imposes limitations on effective democratization and popular participation. It further reinforces the tendency towards the concentration and centralization of power and personal rule, and the depoliticization and departicipation of the majority (Sandbrook, 1986; Ake, 1989, 51-52). This kind of political situation leaves open only the option of violence in the form of coups, urban riots, insurrectionary struggles, etc. as effective means of participation and expression for a marginalized majority or political aspirants. Recent examples from Liberia, Benin Republic, Togo, Cameroon and Zaire amply demonstrate these dynamics.

Another feature of the crisis is the combination of rapid population growth and increasing environmental degradation that characterizes contemporary African development. Africa has the fastest growing population in the world and population growth rates are generally above three per cent. Sub-Saharan Africa, SSA, is said now to possess "twice the population it had in 1965 and more than five times the population it had at the beginning of the century" (World Bank, 1989, 25). This population pressure combines with the fragile tropical ecology of the continent to accelerate the process of ecological degradation. Desertification, erosion, deforestation, pollution of all sources and the dumping of toxic waste characterize the environmental condition of the continent. Also of significance, is the extent to which economic development activities seemingly contribute to the acceleration of the loss of the continent's much-valued biodiversity and to increasing environmental degradation.

A fourth feature is the socio-cultural malaise of the continent, particularly in terms of the crisis of culture as expressed in the reproduction of meaning and authentic and indigenous social values (Aina 1988). The integrative mechanism, that culture represents at the personal and collective level, is today experiencing rapid erosion not only as a result of the colonial heritage but also from the onslaught of modernization, the influence of the Western mass media, the fact of mass displacement and political upheavals. This crisis, reflected in the loss of language, the loss of collective and personal integrity, and the pervasiveness of anomic conditions, has fuelled a tremendous number of personal and collective responses. At the personal level, neuroses and psychoses of all sorts, for which the extended family and traditional healing once provided therapeutic defences, emerge in large numbers. At the collective level, there is a tendency to cultural irredentism and chauvinism, religious fundamentalism and adherence to syncretic religious movements and other prophylactic social organizations. If these remain pacifist and insulated, they can often be ignored. Yet, when they become militant, hostile and aggressive, as has occurred in Northern parts of

Nigeria, the modern state, whose legitimacy and authority they often violently challenge, cannot ignore them.

Finally, perhaps at the very core of the crisis, feeding on it, reproducing and complicating all other dimensions, are the factors of Africa's poverty and her economic predicament. Whatever happens to the economies of the nations of Sub-Saharan Africa must be seen in relation to their position in the global economy, particularly the predominance of primary production, yet the role of domestic politics and management in contributing to the continent's real economic decline cannot be denied. This is more so in the area of declining production.

According to Sutcliffe (1986, 22); "During the whole period from 1965 to 1983, 13 countries in the world had negative rates of growth of GNP per head, eight of these were in Africa." Also, as the World Bank showed for the end of the 1980s:

Sub-Saharan Africa has now witnessed almost a decade of falling per capita incomes and accelerating ecological degradation. Per capita food production first fell, then rose, but remains lower than in 1980. Africa has lost a substantial part of its share in the world market for its exports. Some African countries have surrendered some of the gains they made earlier in human resources development... Open urban unemployment is a growing problem in many countries.

In the past decade six countries, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, and Zambia—have slipped from the middle-income to the low-income group (as classified in the World Development Report). (World Bank, 1989, 17).

Leaving this catalogue of events and processes aside, what is more devastating in Sub-Saharan Africa than anywhere else, is the impact of the global economic recession of the 1970s and the 1980s. While some other countries, particularly the newly industrialized countries (NICs), are entering a phase of recovery and growth, the situation in SSA is that of worsening or stagnating conditions with high inflation, increasing unemployment, declining incomes, and deteriorating productive capacity. Also Africa's own experience of the debt crisis, a situation common to other Third World countries has complicated this economic situation. According to the World Bank:

For African countries, the 'debt crisis' had a different meaning. Though the overall indebtedness of low-income Africa is relatively low... the fall in net disbursement of external finance from a peak of USD 3.9 billion in 1980 to USD 1.7 billion in 1982 has posed problems. The ability of many countries to service their debt is weak, and this is reflected in large numbers of debt reschedulings in low-income Africa. Nearly half of all reschedulings between 1975 and 1983 were by African countries... (World Bank, 1984, 31).

At present, most African countries have not come out of the trap of the debt-crisis and are battling with various aspects of the economic reform policies imposed on them by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. For these countries, and most of SSA, this encapsulates the major elements of the three "development decades" since most of them attained constitutional decolonization in the early 1960s. Apart from a short period of respite and growth in the early 1960s, development has meant incessant battles with one crisis or the

other. As of 1990 in most of SSA; the story of development is that of living standards having "fallen to levels last seen in the 1960s" (World Bank, 1990, 7).

But can the experiences of the past three decades of post-colonial SSA be real development? Some Africans do not think so (Claude Ake, 1989, 49; Ali Mazrui, 1990, 5-6).

Responding to the question, "Why is Africa Not Developing?", Claude Ake wrote:

To begin with we have pursued development with a confusion of purposes and interests and with policies full of ambiguities and contradictions. It is not that we could not find suitable notions of development or ways to apply them to our experience. The problem lies with the major agents of development; our governments, the multinationals, the IMF, the World Bank, and the Imperial powers. *Each of them propagates an idea of development corresponding to its interests and images of the world.* (emphasis, ours) All the talk of development and partnership in development does not really reflect a consensus on what development is or how it might be realized. Below the surface appearance of common concerns is a cacophony of voices talking different languages... In the meantime the common man who is the *raison d'être* of development remains silent, so that in the end nobody really speaks for development and it never comes alive in practice (Ake, 1989, 49).

What this quotation from Claude Ake points at is at the core of the argument of this paper. That is, the crisis of Africa's development process is a crisis of "purposes", "ideas", "images" of, and "interests" in development. In other words, we are back to the conception and design, and consequently the paradigms of development. These are the foundations and the basis of what constitutes Africa's development experience and process, as partially described above. Let us turn to them.

Dominant paradigms in Africa's development

It is perhaps necessary to point out, as we begin to examine paradigms that long before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, scholars involved in development studies and the sociology of development had started to express great dissatisfaction with the state of theory in the field, pointing out that the discipline had reached an impasse (Booth, 1985). This statement by David Booth, which focused on Marxism and development sociology and the kind of emerging theoretical and empirical closures, stimulated an interesting and exciting debate to which contributions pointed at new openings and directions emerging from a wide range of theories, which include modern classics such as Marx and Weber, the theoretical and practical knowledge gained from the women's movement and other such social movements, and what has been called the contributions of Post Marxism (Sklair, 1988, Vandergeest and Buttel, 1988, and Corbridge, 1990). These discussions on the impasse in development studies showed that there was intense dissatisfaction with the interpretation of reality that development studies, particularly the Marxist and Neo-Marxist variants, provided, and that no viable theoretical responses were emerging in relation to the seeming success of the dominant practices and doctrines of free market economics and capitalist development theories. These at least triumphed in the North where they were put in place as response to the global economic crisis.

Where they did not triumph as the policy instruments of those who attained power through electoral politics, they were imposed on governments via the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). The triumph of the once-discredited neo-classical economics and the failure of a vibrant and alternative left critique and options (not to mention the crisis and collapse of Eastern European socialism), demonstrated beyond doubt the problems with the paradigms of development.

Africa's development experience and process can be located within two broad development paradigms, namely the Conventional Development Paradigm and another broad group of theories which can be termed the Radical Alternative. Let us examine each of these:

The Conventional Development Paradigm

It has been given all sorts of labels, some of which refer to specific currents within the broad paradigm, such as the neo-classical approach, the modernization approach or, in some cases, the developmental perspective.

The most popular nomenclature, however, is the modernization approach. This paradigm whose origins can be traced as far back as the end of the Second World War involved attempts in the various disciplines of sociology, political science, economics and psychology by Western, predominantly American scholars to interpret and predict the transformations then occurring in the non-Western world.

Proceeding from a position, which utilized Western societies that had undergone such transformations as a basis, these social science theories attempted to discuss the development process from the perspective of modernization theory, which relied essentially on abstracting from the structural and dynamic experiences of Western societies. Authors like Rostow, Talcott Parsons, Hoselitz, Almond & Verba, and McLelland imposed categories, directions and goals that were mainly Western on the experiences and strivings of non-Western societies.³ The dominant theoretical strategies imposed across all disciplines included those of classical political economy, Neo-Classical economics, structural functionalism in political science and sociology, and the achievement motive and entrepreneurial spirit in psychology and systems theory.

Methodologically, these contributions could be faulted on many grounds, some of which include ethnocentricity, teleology, reification, ahistoricity, and the failure to take real actors into consideration. And they were faulted by contributions that attacked their original methodology within mainstream Western social science, such as the critiques of Dahrendorf, Barrington-Moore, Lockwood, and others. Apart from these radical neo-Weberian and pluralist critiques, there were responses from Third World scholarship and development studies. Again, the range of scholars and critiques was wide—it included Raul Prebisch, Paul Baran, André Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, Hamza Alavi, Magubane, Claude Ake, Roxborough, John Taylor, Laclau and a wide array of contributions that came to constitute the radical alternative.⁴

Conventional development theory was heavily attacked from the late 1960s and the 1970s and in its place the radical problematic of dependency, multi-national corporations, imperialism, the World System, class relations, and the structuralist concern with modes of production and social formation became

entrenched. Nevertheless, some of the concerns of the conventional paradigm central to an understanding of the development process, but formulated in reactionary and ethnocentric terms, such as the role of culture, politics, value-system, non-economic forms of domination and exploitation, rationality, motivation and incentives, did not receive the critical and deep attention they deserved.

In the meantime, at the level of practice, the writing of development plans, technical assistance and development aid, and the actual process of development of investments and projects, the conventional approach still held sway, at least for most of the 1960s and 1970s. This was more so because the International Development Agencies and the institutions of the United Nations family were dominated by Western practitioners, funds and ideals, while the Soviet Union and the then Eastern bloc, which constituted the basis of another development path, were neither as active nor as committed to Third World development aid.

Yet even in terms of practice, it needs to be pointed out that by the late 1970s, international agencies had started experimenting with alternative development activities, which, though they did not threaten the conventional orthodoxy, were beginning to question the efficacy and effectiveness of its component strategies. As part of that movement "redistribution with growth", "the basic needs approach", "the basic services approach", a focus on "the informal sector" and the outlines of the eco-development and "ultimate values" approaches began to emerge. The idea of participatory development started to emerge as a development practice (Harrison, 1986, 25-42). Most of these currents, while not fundamentally questioning the organization of the development process in an explicit way, offered alternative perspectives and dimensions which held some promise for current attempts. We shall return to these approaches later on in the paper.

The Radical Alternative

Two main currents are discernible within this paradigm, namely the Neo-Marxist/World System/Dependency approaches and the Marxist approach. Both can safely be lodged within this paradigm, because they are critical of the conventional orthodox explanations, they introduced the factors of exploitation and domination between countries and social groups, and saw radical transformation as the solution to the problem.

The Neo-Marxists/World System/Dependency Approaches

Some care needs to be taken in lumping all of these together, particularly in the currents of the World System/Dependency approaches, within which are lodged left- and right-wing tendencies. Again certain important similarities exist in this work. These are the following elements:

- a) the facts of international relations and international exploitation and domination;
- b) the necessity and importance of history;
- c) the need for a radical transformation of the societies.

The last point contained right and left variants particularly amongst the broad range of scholars who utilized the Dependency framework in Latin America. Some wanted a transformation from capitalist to socialist societies while others were more concerned with the emergence of national capitalism and a strong national bourgeoisie (Taylor, 1979). The more radical wing of the Dependency School, the current that spawned writers like André Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, Walter Rodney and a host of others, and which has been called the Underdevelopment Theory (UDT), can be termed genuinely Neo-Marxist. Works from this current contained substantial elements of Marxist language, mode of analysis, and ideological and theoretical projects. Unfortunately some took a great deal of liberty with orthodox Marxist concepts and strategies which led to their being accused of lacking theoretical and conceptual rigour and a disciplined adherence to, and understanding of, the theory and practice of Marxism.

The Orthodox Marxist Approach

The criticisms of Neo-Marxism pointed out above created the basis for the emergence and, to some extent, dominance of the Marxist set of problems in Development studies. Realising that the Neo-Marxists were dealing with the same problems of exploitation, domination, underdevelopment and investment at both the national and global levels, Marxism vigorously re-introduced its own concepts of modes of production, social formations, classes, imperialism, accumulation and social transformation. Under the leadership of the French School of Structural Marxism, they introduced a whole set of concepts and a linguistic structure that were fascinating not only because of their ideological and analytical prowess but also for their bombastic appeal and concomitant capacity to intimidate non-initiates. A vast array of works developed in this current, ranging from the contributions of the French anthropologists to the revisions of erst-while Neo-Marxists (Taylor, 1979). More interesting, the works of this school contained the greatest fascination and intellectual appeal to young scholars who worked in Development Studies in Africa in the 1970s and early 1980s. What were its strengths?

Marxist metatheory offers a critique of capitalism and explains colonization and modern imperialism in a way that is most convincing to critical students from ex-colonial societies. It is most useful as it points at the core of the problem in terms of socio-economic inequalities, polarities and contradictions that exist in class relations. It was a success in dealing with the origins of underdevelopment and it provided a theory of transition from one type of society to the other. It also successfully linked politics through class analysis and the theory of the state with the economy. In the language of structural Marxism this was neatly and elegantly done through structures constructed with impeccable logic and convincing inter-linkages.

But, apart from a few variants, it failed to cope effectively with cultural issues and extra-class domination and exploitation such as those based on gender, race and religion. The problems that were foremost in the construction of development included the national question, ethnicity, corruption, fascination with, and dominance of, the bourgeois consumption and accumulation patterns and tastes, bureaucratization, and the nature of individual and collective in-

centives and motivation for productive work, and, until recently, the issues of patriarchy and gender domination. All of these Gramsci, Lukacs, Weber, and Cabral have taught us are central elements of the reproduction and dominance of capitalism and modern society. They embody the multiple and varied complexity and often contradictory structure of the modern human condition and existence.

The radical alternative paradigm and its currents were strong as critical tools, not as programmes for action and structuring new social and power relations at the national and global levels. While imperialism, colonialism and dependency have been plausibly explained, they did not provide a concrete agenda for overcoming the steely grip of the World Capitalist System on the struggles of an individual, transitional African nation trying to build real socialism or overcome economic dependency.

More significantly, the radical alternative paradigm could not cope with popular participation and democracy. Coming from an assumption of the dominance of the working class, the regimes that modelled their development on these paradigms could not deal with the variety of other social groupings in society, particularly groups like peasants, the middle class and the vast majority of marginals that were called lumpens. They are either wished away or subsumed under the dictatorship of the party. The organization of society is also conceptually based on the dictatorship of the party, often operating on a formal definition of democracy which, while not logically different from the ritual electoral participation of Western Liberal democracies, denies the pluralism that the latter permits.

However, as a theory of liberation, providing a justification for the removal of oppression and explaining its processes, the radical alternative paradigms constitute a vibrant and genuine approach whose innermost concerns and questions must not be lost to a future theory of development. The radical alternative paradigm has not been successful as a theory and practice of institutionalizing a development process based on popular participation and empowerment and on genuine democratic principles, concerned not only with productivity but also with equitable distribution within a pluralist context, that integrates certain other basic human psychological needs and wants into a structure of motivation, rewards and mobilization.

The market-economy system has not either succeeded on all the complex scores listed above. Nor has it, as a system, resolved the problem of popular participation, genuine democracy and distributive equity, although it has made substantial progress in the areas of productivity, and incentives and rewards for productive work. The question is how can a balance be sustained between these different elements in the pursuit of development? This is what we turn to as we examine emergent alternative development paradigms.

Recent development alternatives: development as empowerment and participation

As pointed out, disenchantment during the Second Decade of development in Africa with the orthodox development paths led to a wide array of innovations and experiments with paradigms and practices such as the basic needs approach, concern with the informal sector and the redistribution with growth

strategy. Each of these strategies was an expression of concern over the limited impact that the development process was having on the lives of the majority of the citizens of the developing countries. They represented a recognition of the need for the majority of the people to be involved in the process and to be *enabled* to be involved in a meaningful way in terms of activities and contributions. These approaches recognized that deprivation, disease and inhibiting environments were making it difficult for ordinary people to contribute their quota as citizens and producers at optimum capacity thereby limiting the capacity to mobilize national resources. If development is seen as the qualitative and quantitative, positive and beneficial transformation of the lives of the majority of the peoples, not only in terms of production, but also in relation to the existence of various institutions that ensure that their dignity as human beings and their material and non-material needs are guaranteed, then the involvement of the people in the productive life of the nation is a minimal requirement for any tangible progress.

Recent writings on the African experience such as Hydén (1984) and the World Bank Report (1989) recognize the importance of these factors in the development of productive forces and the mobilization of resources. Hydén on his part sees the forces of capitalism as essential to the dissolution of the "economy of affection" which predominates in these societies, resulting in the "capturing of the peasantry" and the redirection and utilization of hitherto under-utilized productive energies and resources. While agreeing with the centrality of effective participation in the generation of a successful mobilization for development, one does not necessarily accept participation because it is guaranteed to build capitalist development. In fact, traditional capitalist development was built through a dialectical interaction of the simultaneous participation, alienation and marginalization of workers. People's participation is necessary because it can build authentic development which contains some of the values that the development paradigms so far used in Africa have not encompassed.

It is in this light that the principles of development as empowerment and participation arise. Although both notions do not mean the same thing, they go very well together in the context being discussed. The notion of empowerment refers to the possession of the capacity to influence and direct one's life through the gaining of greater access to and control over resources that are central to one's reproduction. This notion implies some elements of power relations within the economic, political or/and cultural structures. Embodying both individual and collective autonomy issues, this notion, which is becoming one frequently used all over, contains tremendous economic and political features. Particularly from the angle of mobilization, they include changing erstwhile structures of dependence, gaining power either through access to new skills such as literacy or control of local and municipal councils through elections, or by becoming involved in direct productive activities that transform one's individual or collective position in relation to others. An example of the latter is women becoming involved in income-generating activities which provide them with incomes that guarantee not only economic independence from men but also resources for them and their children. These various elements of empowerment have formed aspects of social mobilization work in Latin America known as conscientization and have come through a process of consciousness-raising to constitute a basis for grass-roots social movements.

Participation, on the other hand, is a well-known principle that is at the base of all activities in which equity and equality are held as important. It is seen as an important element of politics and defines the core of the so-called representative democracy. As an approach in development work, the participatory strategy can be traced back to the late 1960s and early 1970s in rural development work. Its successes in Asia and other parts of the world have started to create a paradigm shift in development. It has been more related to projects, operating more on a micro-scale and taking its strength from the bonds of the face to face micro-community within which it is established. In terms of procedure, development work and strategies in this context are not imposed on the recipients, but rather reflect their needs and demands as they see and express them. Participatory development operates an ideology that values empowerment without being explicitly political. Although, it can be said that, in its demands for consultation and involvement from the very beginning, it is an expression of what real and authentic democracy is. It is a democracy of direct involvement and concrete choices rather than a formal democracy of indirect representation and programmed choices. In contemporary development literature, the outlines of the participatory approach have been well worked out and tried across a wide range of societies and experiences. Its exponents and theorists such as Chambers, Ghai and Korten are quite well known.

As paradigms guiding development strategies, development as empowerment and participation contains several potentials and opportunities. First and foremost, it opens up the issue of incentives and motivation for production and productivity. The rewards are both individual and collective, and the factor of involvement becomes a central element of resource-mobilization. Choice of focus is derived from the people and the feeling of commitment and integration can be a further source of motivation towards productivity. This has been a major human element inhibiting development in Africa. Effective motivation and perception of rewards can be incentives to higher productivity, to innovation, to even greater commitment to the maintenance and care of technology and resources.

Secondly, it contains extensive democratic and democratization potential. Particularly if the notion of participation is that deriving from empowerment—that is autonomy and control over strategic resources by the direct users and their sources. With this approach power and authority can be decentralized and deconcentrated. Development efforts and objectives will also be in consonance with the various real needs of the participatory communities, groups and sectors. Differences will, of course, arise but can be resolved on the basis of participation and a harmonization of needs and priorities based on mutually-agreed principles.

Thirdly, deriving from the above, the incessant problems of the breach of human rights will be reduced. Abuse of human rights in Africa has its roots in the abuse of democratic rights and a hostility to distributive equity. Once these are resolved, several other related problems in the political and economic arena will be resolved.

The option for Africa—reclaiming development

So far we have discussed the relationship between development paradigms and the actual development process. We have also pointed out that Africa's development so far has been no more than Africa's crisis. We have examined the emergent alternatives to the dominant paradigms that have engendered and reproduced this crisis. What we have identified as a viable option is embodied in the paradigm of development as empowerment and participation. This contains the economic, political, cultural, and ecological imperatives to Africa's transformation and survival.

Our position is that Africa must move beyond crisis to reclaiming development—a path which it lost in the decades of the 1970s and 1980s. This is best done and attained through the path of development known as empowerment and popular participation. This cannot, however, be done without struggles. There are too many vested interests both internal and external to Africa. But the fact is that the majority of the peoples and social forces in Africa know what they want. Just as the Soviet Union's withdrawal from intervention in Eastern Europe allowed the popular forces and movements in those countries to begin to participate in resolving their problems in their own ways, so it will happen in Africa, if the Western powers will refrain from intervening. Of course, the initial struggles will be bitter and painful, but can be resolved. The seeds of the new path have already been sown, as witnessed in the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation declared in Arusha in 1990.

Reclaiming Africa's development is the only viable path as the continent enters the 21st century, but it is a task that must be done by Africans and left to them to do. It is a task which, in spite of the limitations imposed by history, must not have its ends foreclosed through definitions imposed either by aliens or the African elites.

Notes

1. These include Sandbrook, R., *The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation*. Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Ihonvbere, J. (ed.), *The Political Economy of Crisis and Underdevelopment in Africa: Selected Works of Claude Ake*. JAD Publishers Limited, Lagos, 1989.
2. A substantial part of this discussion comes from the author's previous work. See Akin Aina, Tade, "Africa's Current Crisis and the Urban Condition", (1989) in *African Urban Quarterly*, forthcoming.
3. See Claude Ake's criticism of the Modernization School in Political Development in Ake, Claude, *Social Science As Imperialism*. University Press, Ibadan, 1978.
4. For a review of the broad pattern of these currents and paradigms, see Taylor, John G., *From Modernization to Modes of Production*. The Macmillan Press, New York, 1979.

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Strategies and structures of development

The new dogma and the limits to its promises

Georg Sørensen

Dominant conceptions about the ways in which economic development can be brought about in Third World countries in the fastest, most efficient and least costly manner are closely related to the dominant theories or paradigms of development. In the fifties and early sixties, the heyday of the modernisation paradigm, focus was on industrialisation in the vein of the West, eradicating traditional structures and promoting a modern, industrial sector through investment, entrepreneurship, and the transfer of technology from the West. When the great expectations of fast economic development proved unfounded, the reaction came with the dependency paradigm of the sixties and early seventies, where focus was put on the negative effects of Third World integration in the world market. Consequently, the strategic recommendations had to do with delinking from the world market, emphasising self reliance, often in the context of a non-capitalist strategy of development. But the attempts at self reliance and socialist development in a number of Third World countries were hardly startling successes. At the same time, a group of South-East Asian countries experienced rapid economic development basing themselves on what seemed to be old capitalist virtues of private entrepreneurship and world market integration. The Asian Dragons were embraced by those who formulated what became the development dogma of the eighties: less state activity and more private enterprise; create a free market environment together with macro-economic stability, and economic development will follow.

I am well aware that this brief outline is overly simplistic. Theories alone do not fully explain why some development strategies are adopted while others are not and even if they did, there is a much greater diversity of theoretical contributions than indicated in the paradigmatic categories named above. Even so, the central point remains: there has been a dominant development dogma in the eighties, the successor of different dogma of earlier phases, based on the traditional capitalist virtues of free markets, minimal state intervention and private entrepreneurship. Starting from there, the present article contains two messages; one is that a new development dogma has taken shape over the last few years. There is an attempt to specify the content of the new dogma and explain why it is appropriate to call it Social Democratic. The other message is that the new dogma, sophisticated and attractive as it may be, will not give birth to a string of successful economic development experiences in the Third World. The reason for this, as will also be explained, is that successful economic development is not only predicated on finding the "correct" strategy, but also on other, more structural factors which determine the development potential of a specific state.

The new development dogma

I am concerned here with development strategies, in the sense of sets of recommendations formulated with the intention of promoting economic development. Economic development is growth in a process of structural transformation, in the sense of increasing the productive capabilities that could lead to improvement in welfare and overall standards of living. "Development dogmas" are the recommendations which dominate theorising and the strategic recommendations on development at a given time. Such dominance is never total, of course. The neo-classical economists, predecessors of the new dogma described here, never converted the entire development research community into their way of thinking. But they did succeed in setting up a new agenda for the discussion of development problems, and those working with development issues were, more or less, forced to address the issues which were raised. The neo-classical economists could not do this alone; they interacted with the media, with politicians and with the international organisations engaged in development problems (cf. Toye, 1987). The events which finally led to the supersession of the neo-classical thinking involved not only scholarly debates, but also political changes in the world and the accumulation of new development experiences. Perhaps the issue of what was decisive in paving the way for a new kind of thinking is better left alone by the scholars. We might discover that scholarly arguments had less of an influence than we like to think.

There are four main elements in the new development dogma. I will treat each element separately under the following headings:

1. Markets and states are both necessary;
2. Create "good" relations with the world market, i.e. a sensible mix between autonomy and integration;
3. Foreign direct investment is good—and bad;
4. Growth and welfare must go hand in hand; growth per se does not solve the poverty problem.

Markets and states are both necessary

A renewed belief in the virtues of the market characterised the foregoing, neo-classical phase. It was asserted that even imperfect markets functioned better than imperfect state regulation—government failure was considered a much more serious problem than market failure. Two major reasons were given to support this view. One was that even in the face of imperfections, the price mechanism of the market would function:

Although demand and supply always depend to a greater or lesser extent on expectations of an uncertain future, nevertheless most markets usually tend to achieve an equilibrium without wild price fluctuations. In short the price mechanism can be expected to work rather well (Little, 1982, 25).

The other reason had to do with the accusation that state interventions in the economy had done much more harm than good. On the one hand, the claim is that "developing country governments have damaged national economic performance by taking on functions which are beyond the proper, appropriate or

normal functions of government, especially in the sphere of production" (Toye, 1987, 48n.). On the other hand, government economic controls are criticised for being ineffective, counter-productive, involving excessive costs as well as having undesirable side-effects, and also for being in internal conflict (cf. Toye, 1987, 76n.).

In addition to the theoretical debate, the neo-classical favourable valuation of the market forces has been based on empirical examples of countries which have had economic development success by supposedly basing themselves on market forces, notably Taiwan and South Korea, while countries with a high degree of state intervention, for example India, had not experienced similar economic progress (e.g. Lal, 1983; Little, 1979). The response by non-neo-classicals has addressed both the theoretical and the empirical bases for the above arguments. First, it has been demonstrated that there is no firm support in economic theory for suggesting that there are automatically negative effects of state intervention. The fact that some interventions have been counterproductive does not constitute a case against intervention per se (cf. Toye, 1987, Ch. 4). Second, it has been shown that there may be serious flaws in the forces of the market. Weiss (1988, 177) stresses that the short-term economic efficiency dictated by market signals may differ substantially from a nation's long-term development priorities. From a broader perspective, Bienefeld (1989, 9-43) has provided an up-to-date application of the thesis developed by Polanyi in "The Great Transformation", that "the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia" (quoted from Bienefeld, 1989, 12).

At the empirical level, there has been a two-pronged counter-attack on the neo-classical view. First, it has been demonstrated in lucid detail that the accomplishments in economic development of neither South Korea nor Taiwan have been based on a role of states minimised to support market forces. On the contrary, these states have been instrumental in working towards building a desired structure of production (Wade, 1985; Luedde-Neurath, 1985). Second, there is the lack of economic success in countries applying the neo-classical recommendations. This debate has focused on the Latin American countries of Argentina, Uruguay and, most importantly, Chile (cf. Foxley, 1983; Stewart, 1985; Waagstein, 1986). In Africa, market-oriented measures have mostly been undertaken through the IMF and World Bank adjustment/restructuring programmes. In 1988, the World Bank chief economist for Africa found that "We did not think that the human costs of these programmes could be so great, and economic gains so slow in coming" (*Globe and Mail*, June 22, 1988, quoted from Bienefeld, 1989, 41).

These reactions have lessened confidence in neo-classical views about the supposed efficiency of market forces and the supposed inefficiency of state intervention. At the same time, it is recognised that excessive state intervention can involve "bureaucratic failures" (White, 1984, 101) and very few (Mandel, 1986, 1988 is one exception) have argued in favour of an economic model with no significant role for market forces.

The new consensus—an important part of what was termed the new development dogma above—is that of striking a sensible mix between market forces and state intervention, cf. the summary by Gordon White (1984, 101).

First, there are developmental dangers on the side of the minimally parametric (market failures) and the maximally pervasive state (bureaucratic failures)—some

balance needs to be struck. Second, the nature of this developmentally advisable balance varies across societies and within the same society over time—in general, pervasive methods have been more characteristic of earlier phases of the industrialisation process. Third,... the basic problem of modes and degree of state involvement is common to widely varying social systems, although the issues may be discussed in different vocabularies (government intervention versus free enterprise in capitalist contexts, state versus market or civil society in socialist contexts).

Thus, the discussion in the context of the new consensus is about the optimum way of combining state and market; this debate is situated in the territory between the neo-classical position on one side, where states should only intervene in order to create the proper framework for the functioning of the market, and the more orthodox socialist position on the other, where the market is substituted for the plan. It is agreed that state intervention along neo-classical lines is not enough and that state intervention along orthodox socialist lines is too much. In the space between these positions, there are two broad areas for the state to deal with: the creation of a sound structure of production in the context of furthering economic growth, and issues which have to do with redistribution and welfare. If the sensible starting point suggested by White—that the proper state/market mix varies across societies and within societies over time—this debate is going to have to deal with complex issues, as has already been indicated by such diverse contributors as Prebish (1984), Nove (1987) and Elson (1988).

Let me indicate one area where serious problems have already turned up. It has to do with the extent of state intervention in different phases of economic development. Basing himself on the experience of the socialist countries, Senghaas (1985, 179-203) convincingly argues that a high degree of state involvement is necessary in early phases of economic development, in order to secure a rapid transformation of backward societies (cf. also the above statement by White). At the same time, in very early phases of development, the state may not be well equipped to conduct massive interventions, and that "comes down to a justification for greater caution in resorting to the use of controls until such time as the quality of public administration can be improved in the developing countries" (Toye, 1987, 78). It seems that the phase where intervention is most needed coincides with the phase where the capacity for intervention is at its lowest.

I shall return to these problems in a moment. Here, it may be noted that the new dogma definitely constitutes a step forward in the sense that previous grumbling about the mere relevance of states and markets respectively has been replaced by a debate where the starting point is that an important role for both entities is accepted. It is a point of view which has also made headway in IMF and the World Bank, organisations which were only yesterday staunch supporters of the free market. In its recent report on Sub-Saharan Africa, the World Bank (1989) points to the Scandinavian model of substantial state involvement combined with an essentially market based economy as a desirable goal for African countries, as a basis for sustainable development. In this sense at least, the Social Democratic model has arrived as the new starting point for achieving economic development.

Create "good" relations with the world market

One of the most important issues in research on economic development has concerned the effects of Third World countries' relations with the world market. The point to be argued here is that the old conflict between keen supporters of maximum world market integration and radical autarkists is being replaced by a new consensus which argues in favour of the pragmatic creation of "good" economic relations with the world market, "good" meaning a sensible mix between autonomy and integration.

In the modernisation theories, foreign trade was held to make important contributions towards the economic development of the Third World. The theoretical underpinning for this view was the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage with its subsequent refinements (see the presentation of trade theories in Kiljunen, 1989; and Todaro, 1985, Ch. 12, on which the following remarks are based). Trade, according to this view, is held to have several positive effects: it stimulates economic growth and promotes greater international and domestic equality; moreover,

Trade helps countries to achieve development by promoting and rewarding those sectors of the economy where individual countries possess a comparative advantage whether in terms of labor efficiency or factor endowments.

In a world of free trade, international prices and costs of production determine how much a country should trade in order to maximise its national welfare. Countries should follow the dictates of the principle of comparative advantage and not try to interfere with the free workings of the market (Todaro, 1985, 383, emphasis in original).

These assertions of the positive effects of comparative advantage and free trade were questioned very early. Already in 1841 the German Friedrich List pointed out that the principle of comparative advantage might not hold true from the viewpoint of a specific country seeking to maximise *national* economic development. It might be cheaper for Germany of the 1840s to import manufactures from industrially more advanced England, but resorting to this procedure would jeopardise the development of the productive forces in Germany in the longer run. Thus, protectionism with the aim of developing the national economy was—from the German viewpoint—the better strategy. In the 1950s, structuralist economists such as Myrdal (1957) and Prebisch (1950) elaborated the criticism against comparative advantage and free trade. Prebisch demonstrated the inequality of the existing international division of labour, where Third World countries in the periphery of the system exported raw materials and primary products to the industrialised countries in the centre, which in turn provided the peripheral countries with manufactures. The economic benefits which should accrue to the periphery according to comparative advantage were not forthcoming, basically because of a secular decline in the terms of trade for the periphery's traditional exports. For this and other reasons, argue the structuralist economists, it is necessary to actively promote industrialisation in the periphery, even if such industry may be comparatively high-cost in the initial phase.

Scepticism of comparative advantages and free trade was developed even further by dependency theorists such as Gunder Frank (1967, 1970) and Samir Amin (1976). Their argument was that the real reason for the underdevelop-

ment of the periphery was the exploitation to which these countries were subjected by the industrialised centre countries. Modernisation theory and free trade arguments were thus turned upside down. Economic integration in the world market, dominated by the leading industrialised countries, was the problem, not the solution. The only feasible path towards achieving real economic development lay in severing ties to the capitalist world market and pursuing some kind of socialist model of development.

However, it was also quickly recognised by the dependency theorists that pure autarky would not be a feasible or even desirable path for most peripheral countries (cf. Amin, 1980). Thus, the debate in the dependency school focused on how to achieve a radical break with traditional international ties without having to face autarky. This debate about "self-reliance" (Galtung, et al. 1980) and "delinking" (Amin, 1986) still contains positions close to that of autarky, but the general trend of the debate is to recognise that what is called for is a more pragmatic assertion of how individual Third World countries can cope with the constraints of the world market, given the actual combination of "different national situations and a continuously changing international context" (Hettne, 1989, 72).

I shall return to this debate in a moment. Here, the question may be asked how the traditional view of comparative advantage and free trade has reacted to the challenges from structuralists and *dependistas*. First, there has been an attempt to demonstrate the potentially counterproductive effects of the protectionist measures suggested by the structuralists in order to further industrialisation. Protection of industry is blamed for being harmful to other parts of the economy, in particular agriculture and exports in general; for encouraging high-cost domestic production with no stimulus to reduce costs; and for creating unanticipated and even undesired effects because it is difficult to design policy instruments which guarantee the desired effective rate of protection of priority industries (cf. Weiss, 1988, 181-198).

At the same time, it is recognised that remaining at the level of raw material and primary goods exporting is not a sound economic goal for the Third World. The recommendation is that of a strategy of *export-substitution* which is dynamically combined with other phases in the following sequence:

- primary import-substitution
- primary export-substitution
- secondary import-substitution
- secondary export-substitution

Weiss explains:

The adjectives primary and secondary refer to the technological complexity and capital intensity of commodities; commodities that are primary are therefore relatively unsophisticated labour-intensive goods, the most obvious examples for manufacturers being textiles, clothing and toys. (Secondary commodities) are technologically more advanced, skill- and capital-intensive; both consumer-durables ... and intermediate and capital goods ... are covered here (Weiss, 1988, 199n.).

New industries will normally be oriented towards the home market in the initial phase, where they may receive protection and subsidies by the government.

But according to the neo-classical view, permanent, substantial protection should be avoided. It is better to introduce a shift in strategy, with exports of simple, labour-intensive goods. When demand for labour rises, as do real-wages, as a result of this strategy, it will become feasible to establish a more sophisticated industrial structure. Protection and subsidies may again be necessary for the new, secondary industries in a build-up phase. "However, any anti-export bias at this stage should be short-lived and it is recommended that adequate incentive be given to encourage producers of secondary commodities to break into export markets. At this point secondary export-substitution will be reached" (Weiss, 1988, 201).

Thus, some transitional protectionism and especially subsidies may be called for in the process of establishing a sound economic structure. Even so, the basic thrust of the neo-classical approach is that of a "much less active industrial policy. Trade is to be liberalised, and markets are to be decontrolled so that firms and households can largely take their own decision on what to produce and consume" (Weiss, 1988, 264).

The empirical evidence put forward in support of this view is the South-East Asian success-stories of Taiwan and South Korea, but, again, it can be demonstrated that these countries did not follow a strict neo-classical policy of trade liberalisation. In the case of South Korea, there has been heavy protection of key sectors of the economy on the one hand (Fransman, 1984; Evans and Alisadeh, 1984); on the other hand, there is a significant bias in favour of export industries, created by export subsidies (Toye, 1987, 88). At the same time, the one outstanding case of across-the-board trade liberalisation, namely Chile under Pinochet, has not exactly been a startling success, even when judged by neo-classical standards (Nielsen, 1989; Waagstein, 1989; O'Brien, 1985).

Furthermore, the empirical cases of structuralist protectionism in favour of import substitution and also of more radical *dependista* delinking have not been brilliant successes. Brazil is an important example in the first category. Ranis (1985) argues that Brazil moved directly from an over-long phase of primary import-substitution to an even higher stage of protectionism in secondary import-substitution, losing efficiency as well as industrial employment opportunities of labour-intensive exports and, it may be added, building up a serious debt-problem in the wake of import-substitution.

Turning to the cases of radical delinking from the world market, it was noted above that the dependency theorists have retreated from favouring a strategy close to autarky. Hettne (1989, 64-69) goes through four cases of "experiments with delinking" during the 1970s, namely Tanzania, Ghana, Jamaica and Nicaragua, and finds lack of success to be due to a combination of external destabilisation (most visible in the case of Nicaragua) and internal resistance combined with economic policies which were unrealistic (i.e. overly optimistic about what could be achieved in a short time span).

I submit that strategies of radical delinking, aiming at a situation close to autarky, are no longer in vogue. Neither are orthodox liberalist policies of across-the-board integration in the world market. Somewhere between these views is the new development dogma.

According to Dieter Senghaas, who has made a detailed study of the experience of the European countries which were successful in terms of economic development (Senghaas, 1985), what can be learned from these countries as regards navigation between autonomy and integration, is that "The art of devel-

opment policy seems to consist in finding the *blend of openness to the world outside and delinking from it* which is right for the society in question" (Senghaas 1989, 59, emphasis in original). This can be seen as the basic starting point for the new dogma: pragmatic policies on a case-by-case basis which are ready to exploit economic opportunities in the world market, but are also aware that, for example, measures which protect at least parts of the national economy from world market competition may be necessary. Björn Hettne uses the following formulation: "To succeed in development is to make use of the available room to manoeuvre in order to accumulate, rationalise the national production system, and steer the country into the appropriate niche in the world division of labour." (Hettne, 1989, 78).

While this is definitely a step forward compared with both unfettered liberalism and utopian autarkism, it is also a position which is not very precise. In other words, there is need for defining a coherent path in the territory between the two extremes with due respect for individual variation, a path which will most likely contain a dynamic combination of different strategies, not least because opportunities on the world market are subject to rapid change.

Direct foreign investment is good—and bad

The activities of transnational corporations (TNCs) are at the centre of the debate concerning the effects on economic development of direct foreign investment in the Third World. Although there is a large number of different approaches (combined with different normative attitudes) to the study of TNC activities in the Third World, the important distinction in the present context is between those who believe that there are many more benefits than costs for the host countries from foreign investment, and those who stress the negative consequences of TNC activities (cf. Lall, 1974; Biersteker, 1978). Most neo-classical economists are clearly in the first group, but we also find neo-marxist contributors here, such as Bill Warren (1973, 1980). Prominent in the second group are the "orthodox" dependency theorists (André Gunder Frank, Paul Baran), cf. the elaborated classification of approaches in Jenkins (1987, Ch. 2). Examples of sharply defined pro- or con-TNC approaches can still be found, but for some years now there has been a tendency towards a more pragmatic stance, willing to accept that there can be positive as well as negative effects of TNC activities. Thus, already in 1981 Sayre P. Schatz found the "Acceptance" as well as the "Rejection" approach on retreat in the analyses of transnationals, with "Assertive Pragmatism" coming to the fore (Schatz, 1981). A few years earlier, Paul Streeten (1979) found that "There is no longer the sharp separation between those who think that what is good for General Motors is good for humanity and those who see in the multinational corporations the devil incorporated".

The claim here is that this pragmatic approach, ready to acknowledge positive as well as negative effects of TNC activities in the Third World, constitutes a part of the new development dogma. However, as is often the case, the settling of one dispute immediately starts another. In this case, the "new" problem is of course the identification of those factors which determine whether the positive or the negative effects of foreign investment will prevail. In this area there is less agreement, and empirical investigations of the relationship be-

tween the level of foreign investment and economic performance of Third World countries have not come up with very clear results (cf. Weiss, 1988, Ch. 2). It is necessary to build on a more elaborated theoretical foundation. Efforts in this direction have most often focused on the bargaining power of host governments, cf. the questions posed by Paul Streeten:

1. Even if the will and political power exist, do LDC governments have the technical ability to bargain with/control TNCs to the extent that they consider desirable?
2. Even if they have the political power, do they have the will?
3. Even if they have the will and ability, do LDC governments have the political power? (Quoted from Nixon, 1988, 381).

The decisive question, as Nixon rightly points out, is the identification of the "underlying forces", determining the political will, political power and technical capabilities, i.e. the bargaining power of LDC governments. My own investigation of TNC activities in Brazil (Sørensen, 1983) contains an attempt to answer this question, insofar as it contends that developments leading to either "positive" or "negative" effects of TNC activities stem from two main sources: on the one hand, changes in the characteristics and behaviour of transnationals, related to the process of accumulation in the industrialised countries; on the other, changes in the conditions (in a broad sense) under which the transnationals are operating in the host economies. The decisive element in the latter conditions is the position of power (economically and politically) of local (private and state) capital, relative to that of foreign capital. The stronger position held by local capital in an industry, the better the possibilities of extracting positive benefits from TNC activities and avoiding negative effects. The strength of local capital is determined by the interplay of the latter's position in the economy on the one hand and state measures regulating the operations of TNCs on the other (cf. Sørensen, 1983, 98-103).

The need to focus on the role of the state and the underlying class forces is also brought clearly forward in the analysis by Frederick Nixon (1988), which contains a typology of Third World states that contributes to explaining the variation in bargaining position of different states.

Further analysis in this area is necessary. One conclusion can, however, be drawn right away: the poorest Third World countries which most desperately need economic development are those least capable of extracting the positive effects of TNC activities. Local capital is weak or non-existent and the state is not well equipped to regulate the transnationals. At the same time, the TNCs are more attracted to Third World countries where some industrialisation has already taken place; such countries have dynamic local markets and/or the best conditions for export activities.

Moreover, the tendency in recent years has been for transnationals to invest more in the industrialised countries and less in the Third World (UN 1988, 30); so even if one can also point to developments which ought to make it easier for Third World countries to benefit from foreign investment, there is little reason for optimism in most Third World countries as regards the potential benefits from TNC activities.

To sum up: the pragmatic approach, ready to acknowledge positive as well as negative effects of TNC activities in the Third World, forms part of the new

development dogma. Current research efforts are directed towards identifying those factors which decide whether the positive or the negative effects will prevail. Although further analysis is needed in this area, it is clear that the poor majority of Third World countries can expect only small or no contributions from transnationals in their economic development efforts.

Growth and welfare must go hand in hand; growth per se does not solve the poverty problem

Modernisation theory basically expected economic growth aiming at industrialisation to take care of the welfare problems in the Third World. Even if Simon Kuznets had shown that the benefits of economic growth would be rather unequally distributed in the early phases of the process, when a certain level was reached there would be benefits for everybody, including the poorest parts of the population. Dependency theory vehemently attacked the developmental optimism of modernisation theory, with its basis in a harmonious, non-antagonistic relationship between centre and periphery; but at the same time, the *dependistas* shared the conception of the goal of development set out by modernisation theorists: economic growth based on industrialisation, albeit of a self-reliant, autonomous variant, was the necessary and sufficient condition for eradicating mass poverty (cf. for example Sutcliffe, 1971, 345n.).

The 1970s became the decade which increasingly questioned the assumption that growth and industrialisation would automatically solve the problems of welfare and poverty. During this decade, focus was put on the basic needs of the population in general, and the needs of the poorest 40 per cent in particular. In his presidential speech to the Board of Governors in September 1972, Robert McNamara said that:

The task, then, for the governments of the developing countries is to reorient their development policies in order to attack directly the personal poverty of the most deprived 40% of their populations. This the governments can do without abandoning their goals of vigorous overall economic growth. But they must be prepared to give greater priority to establishing growth targets in terms of essential human needs: in terms of nutrition, housing, health, literacy, and employment ... (quoted from Ul Haq, 1976, 9).

It was the analyses and reports by the ILO which gave particular emphasis to the welfare dimension of development. It was most clearly expressed in its 1976 report on "Employment, Growth and Basic Needs: A One-World Problem", but was already present in the country case-studies it had published in the early seventies (see the overview in Kitching 1982, 70-84). Another important study was "Redistribution With Growth" conducted under the auspices of the World Bank (Chenery, et al. 1974).

Against the background of these studies, Mahbub Ul Haq claimed as early as 1976 that there were several areas of agreement in the debate on development strategies. He summarised the agreement as follows:

First, it is generally accepted by now that market mechanisms are neither efficient nor reliable instruments for allocating resources when the income distribution is very distorted. ... A related area of agreement is the realisation that institutional

reforms are often more decisive for a developing country than marginal changes in the price system. There is no longer a blind faith in price corrections achieving a multiplicity of objectives. ...

Second, there is an increasing realisation that economic growth does not filter down automatically to the masses except in the modern sector and at very high rates of GNP growth. ...

Third, most developing societies realise by now that they cannot emulate the consumption styles of the rich nations. ... Thus, there is greater interest now in the concept of basic human needs and in fashioning development strategies which are need-oriented, rather than market-demand-oriented. ...

Fourth, there is also an agreement that the economic condition of the poorest sections cannot be improved simply by distributing some purchasing power to them through short-lived welfare schemes. Any long-term improvement requires ... fundamental institutional reform ...

Fifth, there is also a widespread realisation that development strategies should be shaped by domestic needs and not by either export or foreign assistance requirements (Ul Haq, 1976, 60-63).

To the extent that the "new agreement" had any practical effects at all before a different kind of thinking came to dominate, it served as guidelines for aid projects which had varied performance results; some were successful, some less so. In the latter group were the ambitious integrated rural development projects (cf. Mellor, 1986, 73).

At the same time, many Third World countries objected to outsiders' intrusion into internal distributional issues (cf. Lewis, 1986, 8). When they finally had to accept such intrusion, it was against a whole new background of debt-crisis plus economic set-backs. The conditions for financial assistance for "adjustment" that they had to accept were not at all in line with Ul Haq's "new agreement"; they were the neo-classical economic instructions regarding macro-economic stability, external economic balance with export promotion, cut-back in state expenditure and services, and promotion of private enterprise.

I have already argued that neo-classical thinking has been modified or altered in several important respects. The argument here is that in addition to the changes already described, there is also a revival of important elements in the "new", now "old", agreement outlined by Ul Haq. One contribution which has had a significant impact in this respect is the UNICEF study, "Adjustment With a Human Face", (Cornia, et al. 1987), which recommends changes in the adjustment policies so as to incorporate the needs of the poor, not only through specific relief programmes, but also through changes in the overall policy of adjustment.

Another pointer towards renewed emphasis on welfare and the needs of the poor is in the Overseas Development Council volume on "Development Strategies Reconsidered", which provides a "state-of-the-art review of mainstream development strategy" (quoted from the editor's introduction, Lewis, 1986, 12). Several contributors to this volume stress the need for "A Poverty-Focused Approach to Development Policy" (the title of Irma Adelman's contribution). She identifies two basic strategies towards poverty alleviation; one is agricultural-development-led industrialisation; the other is export-oriented growth in labour-intensive manufactures. "During the coming decade—likely to be one of low growth in world demand for labour-intensive manufactured exports—the agriculture-led approach is likely to deliver more in terms of less inequality and poverty, a higher growth rate, and a better balance of pay-

ments." (Adelman 1986, 65). At the same time, Adelman reiterates two of Ul Haq's main points. One is that "Strategies for poverty alleviation are not compatible with just any kind of economic growth. They entail particular kinds of economic growth." (p. 64); the other is that institutional reform, in particular land reform and investment in education for the poor, is an important element in a poverty-reducing development strategy.

In sum, my argument is that a renewed emphasis on the need for growth and welfare to go hand in hand and the insight that not just any kind of growth contributes to solving the poverty problem is an element in the new development dogma. This does not mean a recourse to exactly the same view as expressed by Ul Haq in the seventies; for example, there is much less scepticism towards the market mechanism and export-oriented policies than there was then. What is clear is that "actually existing industrialisation" (Sutcliffe, 1984, 123) has performed less well than expected, and that the pursuit of economic growth per se cannot be expected to contribute enough to solving the poverty problem.

This concludes the presentation of what I have called the new development dogma, meaning those recommendations which dominate theorising and strategic considerations on development at present. As described here, the new dogma is not a fully fledged strategy of development; such strategy cannot be designed at a general level, relevant for all or even most Third World countries; a high degree of differentiation is needed to match the differences between countries. It should rather be seen as a starting point in terms of an attitude towards some of the most important issues in the current debate on economic development.

What does it mean that the new dogma "dominates"? Certainly not that it is being adopted to the letter by a majority of Third World countries; in the present context, "dominant" pertains to the positions taken by the research community, the development theorists and strategists. Not all researchers have adopted the new dogma, of course; there are both neo-classical and radical die-hards which hold on to their own orthodoxies. At the same time, it has become more difficult than before to identify a clearly defined block of mainstream development strategists (cf. Lewis, 1986, 9); however, my argument is of course that the thinking described above is widely enough diffused to deserve the label "new dogma".

Moreover, there is a relationship between the research community, the international organisations active in the area of economic development, and policymakers in individual countries. Thus, the new dogma is, as was documented above, also beginning to appear in the publications of international organisations; in some countries, it has been part of the development policy framework for a long time; in others, it is finding its way in.

What justifies labelling the new dogma "Social Democratic"? Basically, it features the blend of "pure" liberalism and "pure" socialism typical of Social Democratic thought. There is the combination of free markets and private enterprise with both direct (state ownership in some areas) and indirect (state regulation of private activity) state intervention. There is also the acceptance of liberal ideas regarding the benefits of trade and integration in the world market together with a recognition of the need for some protectionism in order to promote national economic development. There is the realisation that TNCs can make positive contributions to a process of economic development in the Third

World if and when local conditions, including regulations, are up to extracting such contributions. And finally, there is the combination of economic growth with popular welfare objectives, with the underlying insight that not all kinds of growth promote welfare.

At the same time, there is room for variation in the new dogma, just as there are many different varieties of Social Democracy. In terms of extremes, one might think of a liberal variant emphasising the values of free market and *laissez faire*, and a socialist variant, emphasising state intervention and need-orientation instead of market-orientation. In both cases, of course, the combination would still be there and the typical version of the new dogma would give due emphasis to both aspects.

It is, in many ways, an attractive starting point for development efforts, compared with yesterday's harsh neo-classical orthodoxy; however, this need not secure its actual implementation or, if implemented, its success in practical development efforts. The main reasons for this state of affairs are discussed in the next section.

The structural constraints on development strategies

It was indicated in the above that the new dogma constitutes a sound basis for designing a strategy of development; but development success is not only predicated on devising the "correct" strategy; even the best of strategies is subject to constraints. It is the purpose of this section to identify some of the most important of these internal and external constraints.

Let me start with the external, the international context for a national strategy of development. Countless structuralist and radical analyses (cf. Weiss, 1988, Chs. 3 and 4) have made it abundantly clear that the structure of the international economic and political system has a decisive influence on the economic development possibilities of Third World countries, including their room for manoeuvre in formulating development strategies. It is relevant to analyse both the general development trends of the international economic and political system and the situation as seen from specific countries. Nothing of this can be done here; a few further remarks will have to do.

The world economy has gone from a phase of rapid expansion from the end of the second world war until the late sixties, to a phase of economic crisis which during the eighties has turned into a phase of stabilisation. There are new technologies which are suitable candidates as the basis for another phase of world economic expansion (micro-processors, genetic engineering, new sources of energy). What will the rôle of Third World countries, or groups of countries, be in such a possible phase of expansion? It is clear that most Third World countries are no longer doomed to occupy the traditional economic role of exporters of raw materials and primary products, and importers of manufactures. According to Wallerstein a new upswing will involve a further relocation of "old" industrial sectors to parts of the Third World, the semi-periphery.

This is related to developments at the political level. The East-West confrontation is being superseded by a new structure of which we have no clear view. Wallerstein's vision is that of a dominant U.S.-Japan alliance, "U.S.-Japan Inc.", which leads the new phase of economic expansion in association

with "East Asia (including China), the Americas (not forgetting Canada), and probably Australasia as well." (Wallerstein, 1989, 284). The other main block is centered around Europe (an expanded European community in cooperation with the Soviet Union), associated with "the Middle East, Africa, and India." (Wallerstein, 1989, 285). It should be noted that in Wallerstein's opinion the future for most Third World countries is not bright. He foresees a seriously expanded exploitation of the periphery. The last redoubts of partial non-involvement in the world-economy might well disappear. And with it the last zones that have not yet been ecologically ravaged might also disappear. If one combines this ecological deterioration with the greatly increased needs of the North for waste disposal... 30 "glorious" years of renewed expansion of the world-economy might well be more than the Third World states would be politically able to bear. (Wallerstein, 1989, 286).

Be this as it may, the international context will also have to be studied from the viewpoint of the individual country. There are two main dimensions in this. One is the situation of the country in relation to the political divisions in the international system. For example, military, economic and institutional support from the U.S. have played a vital role in Taiwan's economic development success (cf. Jacoby, 1966). If one compares this to the external odds for present-day Nicaragua, it is abundantly clear that not even the most brilliantly designed strategy for development can make up for the different situation in the two countries in terms of external conditions. The other dimension has to do with the scope and depth of integration in the world economy sought by a country in relation to its external possibilities. We saw, for example, the pessimistic valuations above by both Kaplinsky (1984) and Adelman (1986) regarding the possibilities for strategies based on the export of manufactures from the Third World. If Wallerstein's projections hold true, the position of a Third World country in this new global economic and political pattern will, of course, be of vital significance for its possibilities for development.

Let me turn to the internal, the national context for development strategies. There are two important dimensions here. The first concerns what the state *can* do, its capabilities; the second what the state *will* do, its willingness to promote economic development. The following remarks on these two aspects are based on the work by Gordon White (1984). White's discussion concerns the basis for industrialisation, but it is equally relevant to the issue of economic development in general.

As regards capabilities, the state's politico-administrative capacity, White identifies three dimensions:

- a) Its [i.e. the state's, GS] *political* capacity to define and disseminate a new ideology of "industrialism" ..., provide stable and dynamic leadership and mobilize widespread support for industrialization programmes. ... Although a specific industrialization programme may reflect the interest of a particular class or class coalition, effective state action often depends on its ability to transcend those interests at any given time (e.g. a socialist government keeping industrial wages low in a "workers state", or a state capitalist regime putting heavy pressure on sectors of the bourgeoisie, as in South Korea's industrial restructuring in the 1970s;

- b) the existence of reasonably efficient administrative institutions responsive to political cues, resistant to penetration by special interests and relatively free from the perennial problem of complex bureaucratic organizations;
- c) *atechnical* capacity to analyse problems, formulate feasible solutions and implement them in technically competent ways. This would include planning expertise, reliable statistical procedures, etc. (White, 1984, 99n.)

It is the lack of these capacities which constitute "soft" states (Myrdal, 1970, cf. also White, 1984, 100), and it is clear that many Third World states are soft (especially in Africa, cf. Hydén, 1983, but also elsewhere). The Third World state with a high political-administrative capacity is the exception rather than the rule. At the same time it is obvious that successful employment of a development strategy based on the new dogma requires a rather high political-administrative capacity as a basis for its demands for sophisticated state intervention and regulation of the economy. Such requirements are often put forward when discussing development strategies; John Mellor lists "highly trained people" and an "institutional structure within which they can work effectively" as the necessary basis for an agriculture- and employment-based strategy of economic growth (1986, 77); Thomas Weiss argues the case for a government industrial policy and notes that "the degree of competence and honesty of a bureaucracy will limit the scope for detailed and complex forms of direct intervention and sophisticated macro-economic management." (1988, 306).

Let me turn to the other important internal factor, concerning the state's willingness to promote economic development. This has to do with the state's social base, or, in White's formulation:

... its *social nature*: the social character and political interests of the groups which direct and compose the state and the nature of the links with domestic and international forces. ... To the extent that the state rests on, or embodies, social forces favourable to industrialization, it gains in credibility and effect. Clarity on this question helps to explain particular patterns of state action and dispel some of the confusion arising from the frequent mismatch between proclaimed goals and actual impact. If we know on whose behalf a given state is acting, we have a more substantive idea of its 'effectiveness' (White, 1984, 98).

There is, as White also notes, "immense variation in the social interests served by state action" (p. 98). I shall limit myself here to mentioning a few examples of social bases which prohibit a development strategy based on the new dogma. The first is states controlled by an elite which takes no particular interest in economic development; rather the state is put in the service of those few who control it. Thus, despite official claims to the contrary, the ruling elite takes no real interest in economic development, be it in terms of growth or welfare. The main aim is self-enrichment. This requires an act of balancing against potential opponents and a measure of distribution of spoils which may have side-effects in terms of promoting either welfare or growth, but this is not the main aim. Zaire under Mobutu may be the clearest example of this type of regime. Mobutu came to power after a coup in 1965. Zaire was transformed into a one-party-state but in reality rule took place per decree from Mobutu himself. The inner circle of the Mobutu Clan consists of a few hundred people, his

"Fraternity". The lucrative positions in "state, diplomatic corps, party, army, secret police and the Présidence" (Nour, 1982, 512) are reserved for members of this Clan. They directly claim some twenty per cent of the national budget. Their income is complemented through smuggling (diamonds and gold) and "private" sales of copper. Mobutu himself has a personal share in all foreign undertakings operating in Zaire, and his family controls sixty per cent of the domestic trade net. He has accumulated enormous wealth abroad and is recognised as being among the three richest men in the world (Nour, 1982, 496).

The Mobutu regime may be a particularly nasty case, but the lack of willingness to promote economic development on the part of the social forces that control the state which it exemplifies can be found elsewhere, if in less blatant versions. To make things worse, social bases of the state of this kind more often than not coexist with soft states with a very low degree of politico-administrative capacity.

To the extent that the social forces which control the state actually are interested in promoting economic development, this need not imply that the new dogma will be put to good use. It may be outside the scope of the interest and ideological conviction of the rulers, who may wish to stay with more orthodox versions of development thinking, be it of the ultra-liberalist (Pinochet in Chile) or ultra-orthodox socialist (North Korea) variety. Such regimes, however, seem to be strictly a minority, even though there are not many cases where the new dogma has been consistently employed. Two examples of development strategies based on the new dogma, albeit on different varieties, are found in Taiwan and Costa Rica.

Conclusions

I have argued that a new development dogma has taken shape over the last few years and that it is reasonable to call it Social Democratic. It looks promising and should not be discarded as a mere whim in the debate on development. The new dogma is the result of a critical theoretical assessment of the neo-classical thinking which dominated earlier, combined with a stock-taking of the recent concrete development experiences of a number of Third World countries. The new thinking is going to be of practical importance as a basis for the design of development strategies in coming years, and it is going to be of theoretical importance as a frame of reference in coming debates.

At the same time, the importance of the new dogma should not be exaggerated. As is the case with any strategic consideration on development, its possibilities for implementation and practical success is subject to a number of constraints, of which I have attempted to identify the most important internal and external ones. Thus, the new dogma should be placed in the context of old truths regarding the structural constraints on any development effort. The main weakness of the new dogma may be that it does not emphasise the need for a development effort to attack these constraints directly, be it the internal constraints regarding the state's capabilities and willingness to promote economic development or the external constraints in the structure of the international political and economic system. Development theorists have had their eyes on these constraints for many years, but very little has been done about them, primarily because strong social forces in both the First and the Third World resist

deep-going changes in most of these areas. It is important that a new departure for the design of development strategies has been formulated, but the internal and external constraints will remain decisive for its possibilities for practical success.

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Evolution of the Soviet conception of development in African countries

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The increasing role of developing countries in world politics is one of the most remarkable features in the present-day world. At the same time the social and political problem in these countries, the scale and degree of their acuteness may be compared to nuclear or ecological danger. The concentration of vast areas of hunger, poverty, mass diseases, backwardness, illiteracy, and military conflicts in Africa cannot but exert influence in all parts of this contradictory but unique world.

The disastrous economic and social situation in Africa, which is lagging more and more behind industrial countries as the wave of scientific and technical/technological revolutions is slipping past them, is one of the most important global problems. To solve it we need extraordinary approaches and understanding of the whole range of contradictory matters in the light of the new political thinking, as the only one which is adequate to face the realities of the contemporary world. Now the principal question is: Will the African countries be able to overcome the barriers of economic, scientific and technological backwardness and embark on the road of accelerated development in the foreseeable future, or will backwardness and underdevelopment, fraught with explosion, become permanent?

In other words, are these countries doomed not to use in full the scientific and technological achievements and in this way gain strength in the struggle for their survival or will they remain as such in the periphery of the world development, which may lead to unpredictable consequences? Some attempts to find answers to these questions undertaken by a number of Soviet researchers in the light of new thinking are quite fruitful and demand further discussions.

We stress the importance of the new thinking in the policy of granting help to developing African countries because the ideologisation of public life in the Soviet Union could not, of course, but influence the whole system of international relations, including the African states. In a broad sense, Africa had been considered a reserve area for spreading "world revolution", even before World War II. The "cold war" which followed WWII sharpened the rivalry between the two world systems and witnessed the geo-strategic conceptions of N. Krushchev and L. Brezhnev. Brezhnev's doctrine regarded Africa as the "battlefield" between capitalism and socialism. It directly influenced the choice and character of the USSR's aid to African states.

By the mid-eighties the Soviet conception of Africa's "socialist orientation" resulted in 90 per cent of the economic ties of the USSR being concentrated in ten countries: Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Guinea, Angola, Mozambique, and Madagascar. Documents on cooperation were signed with 37 countries and trade agreements with four countries. 348 projects in different spheres of economy had been realised, 300 more were under con-

struction. In the course of construction half a million specialists and skilled workers had been trained. 40,000 specialists had been taught in schools and colleges in the USSR. Now 27,000 Africans study in them.

It should, however, be stressed that the nature of the aid was determined by geo-strategic ideas. The proportion of military and economic aid was 10:1. At this, two thirds of the economic aid were given to the industrial development of African countries. Sometimes those industrial projects corresponded poorly to the local conditions.

Unfortunately, the attempts to solve problems of social progress due to the rapid development of the working class in African cities have brought no result.

The orientation which emphasised manufacturing of means of production has given the recipient countries neither prosperity nor independence. Since independence the social welfare of the population has decreased considerably. In the city about 20 per cent of the urban working people were unemployed. In the early 1980s, the number of unemployed people amounted to 13.3 million (33 per cent more than in 1975) and the number tends to increase: according to some forecasts it will reach 45 million in the first decade of the 21st century.¹

The political situation and the aggravation of military conflicts seriously influenced the general level of income and consumption. In the beginning of the 1980s five million refugees from 16 African states lived in 22 other countries of that continent, at the end of the same decade their number exceeded ten million people. In the same period there were over 13 million refugees in the whole world.²

The situation is aggravated by the internal instability of many African states. It is particularly grave in Ethiopia, Angola, Somalia, Uganda, Liberia and some other countries. Thus, the defence budget of Ethiopia has grown by 13 times since 1974. It devours about 50 per cent of the country's expenditure.

According to the United Nations' calculations, by the year 2000 the population of Africa will number 583 million people, among them 215 million (36.9 per cent) will lack houses, medical aid, food, education, and 147 million people (25.2 per cent) will be on the verge of starvation.³ Economic difficulties are accompanied by property differentiation: 20 per cent of the richest population surpass by four times 40 per cent of the poorest population in total income.⁴

The political orientation of many of the African countries (Guinea, Mali, Congo, Benin, Ethiopia, etc.) towards the dogmatic, essentially stalinist, model of socialism, blind copying of the experience of the USSR and other socialist countries, without considering local peculiarities, produced huge but flaccid structures in the social and economic life of African countries. The American economist J. Galbraith remarked on this effect:

Socialism failed, especially in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Mozambique. And it shouldn't surprise a true socialist. The main point that Marx defended was that socialism may come only after preliminary 'socializing' influence of capitalism. But we've also suffered because we thought that what was a reasonable economic policy for the USA, could suit India, Africa and Latin America.⁵

American political experts notice that:

... under Gorbachev the Soviet attitude to the Third World and the role of regional conflicts has greatly changed. On the whole, Soviet experts have begun to view the 'Third World' as something more complicated and unstable, than it was before today. They are paying more attention now to such non-class factors as religion, inter-tribal differences and ethnic nationalism, which contributed to unleashing conflicts in the Third World.⁶

One should say firmly that, by the mid-eighties, the crisis of the concept of socialist orientation was predetermined by the stagnation of socialism itself. The military-communist interpretation of socialism by Soviet scientists did not allow socialism to realise its own socialist essence. As a result of its deformed development, socialism brought to life phenomena contradictory to its aims. Thus, the planned character of economic development spontaneously reproduced disproportions in the structure of the productive forces, while the bureaucratisation of social property led to alienating the workers themselves from their own living conditions. In fact, socialism failed to oppose its humanism against militarist tendencies. At present a hard, bitter and sometimes tragic struggle of social development alternatives is going on in the liberated countries.

One cannot fail to notice that social cataclysms brought about by convulsive attempts to settle the problems of backwardness and dependence through establishing personal dictatorship, create dangerous hotbeds of tension, internationalising most of them.

We can also see a critical situation in those countries of socialist orientation where super-centralisation of economic and social-political structure prove more and more its inefficiency. Here special decisions are required to find a way out of the deadlock, on the basis of the new political thinking, and restructuring of society as a whole.

First of all, it is necessary to revise the old-fashioned ideas that dominated in the works of Soviet scientists. Application of such principles to practice led to wrong classification of several countries as socialist. These ideas were based on considering the dimensions of the state-owned sector of the national economy, speed of cooperation, industrial planning, etc., without serious analyses of the essence of relations hidden behind the figures (whether the regime was socialist or not was judged according to dimensions). The transition from a highly centralised structure to flexible forms of economic management is an obligatory element of restructuring the social relations in developing countries. At the same time it is necessary to give up the idea that the larger the production, the more it is socialised, and the more efficient it is. It is not always true that the larger the sector of state property in the general property structure, the better. Co-existence and interaction of various types of property is a long-time perspective for developing countries of socialist orientation. There is no place for voluntarism here. It may be proved by the example of the state-owned sector of national economy in Congo. In fact, the state-owned sector consumes as wages everything it produces. The reasons for such a situation are typical for all countries of socialist orientation: poor working discipline, mismanagement, embezzlement of material values and financial means, growth of managerial apparatus.

To our mind, the most urgent task for the explorers of Africa today is to find and eliminate social and psychological barriers on the way to forming new production forces and a new type of workers. Without an independent effort in this direction Africa will never get out of the crisis, will not be able to pay its debts.

It must be admitted that the existing and reciprocal types of productive forces in the centre and beyond it differ by their social elements which were formed during the period of long historical evolution, and by various types of workers. While in the West the subjective element in the structure of productive forces developed through universal and flexible forms of labour organisation, in the East, including Africa, narrow specialisation and adjustment to the given economic conditions led to the formation of a different social type of worker who was oriented not to intensified but to long-time labour and cooperation, and whose organising basis was state power and extra-economic forms of coercion.

The break of the existing dependence on external factors of development and on foreign help makes it necessary, in the first place to solve the problems of development of man himself and to create new forms of his labour organisation. Help is needed, not to prepare manpower reserves as it is usually expressed in bureaucratic language, but to prepare the man himself in the broader sense of the word. The investment must be made in the human factor, keeping in mind social-cultural peculiarities of Africa.

Very few examples of successful economic and social development in developing countries are known. Almost none in Africa testify that this development was carried out through an organic fusion of general human achievements (market, interaction of different forms of property, democratic principles of building political systems, vast systems of education and social security) and the original cultural-historical inheritance. The experience of the 20th century demonstrates that successful development fully depends on finding the most effective means of involving the main contingents of the population in the process of modernisation without seriously damaging or destroying their socio-cultural consciousness. We do not mean here total crushing of tradition, but its evolution, which enables cultural consciousness to remain in process.

In this connection special attention is paid to African students at the Peoples' Friendship University (Moscow), where there are at present 1,306 students from 43 African countries, including 163 postgraduates. Admittance of students from Africa has been going on since the foundation of the University. 3,044 specialists have been trained during 30 years at six faculties of the University (Engineering, Medicine, Physics and Mathematics, Agriculture, History and Philology, Economics and Law). This number includes 200 Ph.Ds, 97 of whom wrote their theses in the humanities, 51 in technical science, 40 in agricultural science, and twelve in medical science. The topic of each thesis is as close as possible to the problems of Africa—tropical medicine, tropical agriculture, exploring mineral resources, economics and legislation. The human potential here is big and it should be properly used. We consider further promotion of the University as the most important element of humanitarian aid to the peoples of Africa, including transmission of knowledge, information, intellectual know-how—in fact, everything that will become the main capital of mankind in the 21st century.

The most important theoretical aspect of perestroika going on in the University is the regeneration of the creative spirit of the humanitarian sciences, their decisive penetration beyond the limits of the Stalin-Brezhnev dogmas. This means both overcoming a simplified conception of social development, the perspectives of mankind, and further development of social theory based on a common experience of the world community, the achievements of progressive public thought of the latest decades. Profound changes in the field of social sciences gave impetus to free creative activity of scientists, competition of ideas, to studies of the most important theoretical and practical problems of the contemporary world, especially those of developing countries, decisive penetration into the spheres which have been monopolised by a small group of people, who took decisions concerning home and foreign policy. Everything mentioned above deals not only with problems of war and peace, where the achievements of new political thinking are most impressive, but also with the problems of the social renewal of the planet in the conditions of a non-nuclear and non-aggressive world.

Public opinion often connects the conception of "new thinking" with the Soviet doctrine of international relations developed by Gorbachev in the second part of his book "Perestroika, New Thinking for our Country and the World".⁷ We think that the title of the book suggests the formation, within the framework of science and politics, of totally new philosophical concepts illustrating the realities of social development during the second part of the 20th century. Keeping it in mind the new thinking, abiding by the laws of logic and common sense should primarily entail giving up old approaches to defining the principles of the world community functioning and the laws of its development. Abandoning old dogmas and trite outlooks can be observed in all the spheres of progressive social thinking, which are united in their search for ways in which to save mankind.

The present-day scientific works of University professors do not use the concept of "the general crisis of capitalism", but that of "the crisis of human civilisation", meaning the ailment of the entire social system (that is of the whole world). Mankind could overcome it only by doing its utmost to survive.

In the most general of terms, the essence of this crisis lies in the fact that human activity, with its innate contradictions stemming from the established forms of social being, has entered into a contradiction with nature and its laws; this has posed a threat to life on Earth.⁸

Unadjusted progress along the traditional path will plunge into an abyss. We have discovered a limit to industrialisation. It is estimated that if developing countries follow in the footsteps of the developed nations and reach their energy consumption level, it will lead to a "greenhouse effect" and the rapid extinction of the human race. But it is also clear that it is still unrealistic to expect people to give up their struggle for a better life or higher consumption level. Rational solutions are impossible at the national level.

It is also true that the crisis of civilisation manifests itself on many levels. It is a crisis of international relations in all their spheres—East-West, North-South, etc. A special part involves sharp contradictions between the main centres of capitalism and developing African countries, and enormous foreign debt in the developing world. Yet we can say that the origin of the crisis of civilisation is

linked with the contradictions and essential features of the antagonistic society—both pure capitalism and deformed socialism. Socialism as it exists today in the USSR, has not yet fully become a negation of capitalism but largely followed the development path of the latter, accompanied by the same negative phenomena—industrialism, destruction of the environment, man's alienation, social inequality and the like—although in specific forms. Deformed socialism has also given rise to distinctive problems connected with the cult of the state, the use of its mechanisms and means of management and the complex structure of leaders who are little concerned about the efficiency of their work. We suppose that in the Third World, Africa as a whole has also failed to create a development formula of its own, instead reproducing, often in inferior version, forms of economic structures and social relations that are already available.

Thus, the crisis of civilisation is the common problem. But reliable international mechanisms which would join the efforts of different nations in tackling mankind's common problems have yet to be designed. The same is true for the efficient ways to prevent global catastrophe, whether military, environmental, Third World, or other. Moreover the threat of such catastrophes is constantly reproduced by the operation of historically shaped mechanisms and structures.

The University's scholars state that the emergence of the industrial forms of social organisation (above all, the industrial type of productive forces) is linked to a particular phase in the development of capitalism. The Third World was attached to industrial civilisation through a network of colonial and neocolonial relations of dependence. The crisis of industrialism reflects the crisis of existing forms used to link the Third World to global processes and the crisis of the "grow-in-order-to-catch-up" model.

Resolving the problem of human survival means overcoming the crisis of civilisation. This is possible if the three major components of the contemporary world all reach a fundamentally higher level of development. This implies the replacement of an industrial civilisation with a postindustrial or scientific and technological one. Each of the systems should, acting within its distinctive structural framework, realise a version of historical progression which offers an alternative to the present (industrial) logic of development.

In order to overcome the crisis of civilisation, different social systems should undergo transformations not in isolation but in tandem, as it were. Such transformations are rooted in the changing formula of world development, that is, in the changing principles of the global system's organisation and operation. "At others' expense" sums up the old formula. The degree to which socialism advanced was seen as the degree to which capitalism was set back, and vice versa. The accumulation of wealth by the capitalist North was proportional to the poverty of the South (the Third World), etc.

This formula was generated by the overall mechanics of industrial civilisation: the latter could develop only at the expense of nature, which was treated in a utilitarian way; man who was reduced to a narrow specialist; and of whole classes and nations subjected to plunder and violence. Such is actual manifestation of the formula of antagonistic progress which Marx recorded. It is a salient feature of this formula that amid a crisis of industrial civilisation, further progress along the old path is feasible only at the expense of humanity as a whole. In other words, it is essentially impossible. This confronts the world with a dilemma—either destruction, or development along a different path. The new formula for the world process is based on a different imperative—not

"at the expense" of man, nature or other nations. It advances the principle of co-development and non-violence.⁹

Thus, the new thinking sees the way out of the crisis lies in giving up the old conception of development that is causing damage to the partner, whether it is capitalism, socialism, the Third World, or nature. World development should be transferred to a new road, leading to mutual progress and non-violence—that is, to the way of social renewal of the world, corresponding to the idea of human survival, and giving it a real chance in conditions where new thinking can spread and penetrate into world politics. The wish to survive urges mankind to turn to the instruments of morality: the values of humanism and democracy formed and improved by thousands of years. And here Marxism, in spite of the widespread ideas, has a solid philosophical tradition. Incidentally, Lenin stressed that "from the point of view of Marxist ideas, the interests of social development stand above the interests of the proletariat".¹⁰ Again, the problem of Marxist study of humanism, the removal of all forms of alienation from human liberty and the consequent development of the principles of democracy to make a better man, the problem not distorted by political practice comes forward.

As is well known, up to now social progress on the Soviet political science has been understood primitively as just a transition to a higher step in the development of the society. But the growing interdependence, the process of integration that sees human values as the top priority, leads us to conclude that social progress is possible and necessary today in the framework of the long existence of various social systems.

As it turns out, socialism did not escape the crisis of human civilisation. It showed practically the restrictions of understanding of the world, society and man that are typical of rationalism of the new time and that made the social life look like a mechanism, a machine. The crisis of real socialism means the crisis of the logics of thinking itself, of the model of social life. Today the pattern already does not work. The civilised world is transferring from existence within the logics of a mechanism to the logics of the organism.

One must speak of the growing dynamism of all social systems in the framework of their informatic determination and their transferring from the industrial stage to the post industrial and scientific-technical stage.

The above mentioned does not mean that there is a dominating tendency for the convergence of systems. In the knot of contradictions and opposite directed forces one can clearly see a divergent tendency. Thus, the process of mutual influence will rather lead to a clearer divergence of social systems. Strange as it might seem, it is the deformed socialism that had much more in common with capitalism.

Disclosing the potential of human democratic socialism in its truly scientific meaning, including mastering humanitarian culture, will promote the definition of specific features of socialist forms of social life. In this connection it is possible to suppose that the socialist criterion of social progress, connected with creative conditions for a vast developing of personality, replacing the worker as a common bearer of a partial social function, which is true for the essence of capitalism, by "a fully developed individual, for whom various social functions are only altering means of life activity"¹¹ will lay the basis for the criterion of progress of all post-industrial civilisation.

On the other hand, the development of capitalism, which could not help changing in the 19th century, will be still subject to further influence from renewed socialism, and that cannot remain the same either. The course of its development objectively leads to increasing the importance of transitional forms not adequate to its nature. These transitional forms do not have any specific capitalist characteristics according to their genesis, but they are the result of socialisation of production. Being interspersed with the complicated structure of the capitalist economy, the transitional forms favour the appearance of elements which can "remove" the negative aspects of market regulation and "soften" class contradictions by means of intensifying the efficiency of the social policy of a state.

The overcoming of the crisis in the countries which became free, and the emerging of the Third World at a new stage of social progress, will also demand new political thinking and mode of action, the overcoming of stereotypes and dogmas inherited from the past ages.

The manifestations of crisis in the countries of socialist orientation do not remove the problem of the existence of an alternative to capitalism in developing countries. They only convince us of the harmfulness of any clichés in attempts to suppress the progress, capitalist in essence, or to overcome conservatism of the traditional forms. They again draw the attention of the researchers to the ideas of multilateral approaches to the social organisation of society. The way out of the present-day critical situation of the developing countries implies the mobilisation of the integrated potential of different social and economic structures and political forces often pursuing different aims but objectively concerned with humanising the whole system of "North-South" relations, settling accumulated differences.

Reformist and revolutionary alternatives are possible on the way. The realisation of each of them will be determined by the correlation of the fighting forces, by their configuration at the global, regional and national levels.

The renewed programme of national-democratic revolution, enriched by the experience of the new political thinking, at present forms the social block of such a revolutionary alternative which would mean the suppression of transitional crisis by means of the liquidation of non-democratic political structures, inequality and discrimination, by means of assertion of the dignity of personality and cultural values, the original way of development.

A democratic spirit is maintained in the world today. It deals with interstate links where there is consciousness that one can solve the key problems of our time only by multilateral effort. It also deals with the internal life of the states where all the people everywhere stand for their rights and main liberties. Democracy requires the primacy of rights, respect for the rights of personality and the rights of the minority, ethnic, religious and others among them. It requires particular attention to secure the main needs of man. The growth of national and religious extremism, the manifestation of hatred, violence and other forms of terrorism threaten democracy.

Non-violence, patience towards different forms of social development and the just economic and political place within the country are inseparable elements of a stable and civilised international peace.

In perspective, the logic of the struggle for the elimination of global crisis, for reconstruction of human civilisation, is to lead to the formation of such a block of forces of social progress in which proponents of democratic changes will

unite in the widest sense of the world and the block itself, by undergoing proper changes, will serve as the main force of deep social changes. In addition they will include proponents of perestroika in socialist countries, those movements and coalitions in the Third World which have become aware of their interests in the context of profound problems, and the forces in the West, struggling for the survival of humanity as well.

All this makes it necessary to reconsider the Soviet political science thesis about "the main moving forces behind the world social progress" such as "the world socialist system", "the working and communist movement" and "the national-liberation movement", as directly opposing imperialism, its military-political structures and political power. Life has outsmarted the rigid formulae again.

Ideological, political and social division is observed within the existing movements rather than among monopolists of social struggle, which leads to the formation of new coalitions and formations.

Today the crisis of civilisation demands correlation of the goal and the means, the practice of current social struggle and the prospects for this struggle. In the new thinking, social progress cannot, as mentioned before, develop at the expense of man. In other words, one cannot pave the way to the kingdom of social progress with dead bodies, no matter whether it is called: socialism, communism or post-industrial civilisation. In the logic of new thinking it is not the goal that justifies the means, but the goal is justified by the means.

It is impossible to build up a just society, while ignoring the very principles of democracy, human rights, freedom of thought and convictions. In this, the history of Soviet society is very illustrative. Thus, the main problem of politics itself in new thinking today should be considered not as a problem of power, but as the problem of non-violence. To save the process of social change from violence, terror, suppression of democratic freedom and dissidence is considered to be the main aim for the searching new forces of movements, alternatives to conservatives of any kind.

It should be mentioned that the process of the social renewal of the world in the current epoch demonstrates the unbreakable connection of humanism and democracy. Passing over class interests, human concern over the threat posed by the anti-social activity of conservative forces lies at the base of current social and political movements.

The growth of social democratic movements brings the problem of the "self-generating" of man's civil activity before the theory and practice of social process. New social movements more and more boldly join the complicated picture of the contemporary world, where only traditionally confronting groups used to be represented through their "political elites". Manifesting a wide spectrum of social protests, they not infrequently are unified by anti-etatism, the tendency to a free independent organisational shaping. This sort of situation needs a profound analysis of possible new forms of joint action, that exclude the imposing of one's own interests and goals with the claim to be absolutely significant. By now the real situation of that joint action would not raise before the partners of a single democratic movement the question of their abandoning their political and ideological values. At the same time the search for new forms of union of different socio-political forces, striving to solve tasks of a one-sided character, will make it possible to put an end to global destructive tendencies pushing the world towards a catastrophe, to isolate and defeat those, who used

to regard man not as the goal of social development, but as the means to achieve their selfish interests.

Thus, in today's world one can see a strong integrative tendency which universalised the striving for democratic change, anti-etatism, forming self-governing structures in all spheres of public life. The integrative tendency in the modern world makes it possible to start a constructive dialogue between non-governmental social structures of a one-sided character, which provides a principal basis for new politics of aid, and strategies of development.

Notes

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Development strategy in the context of changing theoretical paradigms

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The course for a renewal of socialism in the USSR, proclaimed in the middle of the 1980s, found its reflection in the change of priorities in the internal and foreign policy. Seemingly unshakeable ideological propositions, which determined not only political rhetoric but notably influenced the formation of public consciousness and civil institutions of Soviet society, have been subjected to critical review.

The elaboration of a new development strategy is connected with a re-evaluation of recent experience and is a subject of heated discussions.

The objective of the present paper is, within the framework of a brief review, to present some of the most characteristic points of view of the contradictions and tendencies in the restructuring of relations between the USSR and developing countries, voiced in the course of these discussions, and to show change in the conceptual schemes, within which these relations are perceived in public consciousness.

Ideologisation of interstate relations: social and political costs

The change of strategic propositions is linked with alterations in the perception of the USSR's past experience of cooperation with developing countries. This experience is of interest since it enables a better comprehension of the social value of progress in conditions of global confrontation.

The substantiation of the development strategy was based on the ideas of class solidarity and the concept of fundamental opposition between the two types of economy: capitalist and socialist. Corrections, made in the course of time, did not change the essence of the basic principles. Thus, at the beginning of the 1960s it was considered that the newly liberated countries had no other choice except socialism, and that the preservation of state sovereignty and independence was possible only along the path of integration into the world socialist economy. In the middle of the 1970s there appeared a concept of socialist orientation, which involved certain alterations to the theory of a non-capitalist road of development. Developing countries were divided into two groups: the countries of capitalist orientation and those of socialist orientation. It has been stressed that integration into the world capitalist system does not exclude the possibility of economic progress and growth, despite dependence, but involves significant social costs, caused by the polarisation of society into antagonistic classes. In the case of a socialist choice such a polarisation, if not fully avoidable, can be noticeably reduced, as a result of both the extensive formation of a state sector and the disinterested aid of the socialist countries.¹

The priority of social interests, such as class interests, dictated the choice of the priorities in relations with the developing countries, especially those which have chosen a path of socialist orientation. In the declarations of the Party forums and in statements by state officials it has been pointed out that cooperation and assistance from the socialist states should more actively mobilise all internal resources to meet the requirements of economic development. It has been stressed that the assistance rendered is an important addition to the efforts of the newly liberated countries to solve their urgent and coming tasks in the interest of wide sections of society.

The main tendency of this economic and technical cooperation was an all-round support of the attempts of the developing countries to build up a modern national industry, as well as fuel, raw material and power potentials. At the beginning of the 1980s, about 80 per cent of all resources allowed by the CMEA member-states for economic aid to the developing countries, was used for the development of the metallurgic industry, machine-building and power engineering. By the mid-eighties the number of projects and enterprises (already completed or under construction) built in developing countries with the help of the socialist countries, exceeded 6,400.²

The emergence of a state economy sector promoted the solution of a two-fold problem: the formation of a national working class and the consolidation of the position of the national state sector, within the country as well as on the world arena, which helped to defend the economic and political interests of the immature proletariat against national and foreign capital.

While rendering economic assistance, the socialist countries were guided by the principles of a disinterested approach, which implied the absence of a commercial interest in the further operation of projects built with their aid.

The disinterested character of this help found its reflection in the following:

- A complex approach to the development of branches of the national economy, set up with the aid from the socialist countries. The projects of cooperation formed a continuous cycle of technological processes—from the extraction of raw materials and fuel to the output of ready-made products;
- A mechanism of transfer of a new technology. All "know-how" documents have been presented by the CMEA member-states free of charge;
- Creation of organisational and production infrastructure. The specialists from the socialist countries usually did not perform any administrative functions. Alongside the organisation of production, their duties included free participation in the training of local personnel, assistance in setting up national design and consultative offices, promotion of general technical and vocational skills for national cadres.

As a result of economic, scientific and technical assistance from the USSR and other socialist countries, a number of major economic projects have been implemented in the developing countries (aluminium plant in Egypt, metallurgical plant in Algeria, oil processing factory in Ethiopia etc). Over two million specialists and skilled workers have been trained for the developing countries. In the USSR alone, over 100,000 students, postgraduates and trainees from Asia, Africa and Latin America, were annually enrolled in studies, the scholarship paid, as a rule, by the Soviet side.³

However, in spite of noteworthy achievements in such cooperation, it is necessary to emphasise that the proclaimed strategic proposition—the stimulation of the internal dynamism of economic structures of the developing countries—has not been fully realised. The cause lies both in the mechanism of rendering assistance and in the priorities chosen.

Excessive ideologisation of such cooperation, when the principle of class solidarity dominated over economic requirements, and class interests over commercial interests, as well as the failure to recognise market and legal mechanisms of regulation of economic relations, created favourable conditions for administrative arbitration both in the countries which gave assistance and in the countries which received it. The mechanism of the realisation of interstate relations was determined by the following peculiarities of the Soviet political system:

1. the monopoly of the Communist Party to define domestic and foreign policy, approved by the Constitution,
2. state monopoly on foreign trade and all forms of foreign economic activity.

The experts mark excessive adherence to gross indices at the expense of economic feasibility. The construction of some major projects (numbering up to 300) has not been the result of a profound study of the objective needs and efficiency of new technologies, but has been dictated by considerations of conjuncture aimed mainly at the "showing off" effect.⁴ As a result of superfluous red tape in the adoption of foreign policy decisions, failure to operatively and quickly mobilise resources and control their distribution and realisation, and the absence of flexibility and sometimes of competence, the attractive characteristics of Soviet aid have been reduced.

The consequence of ideologisation and bureaucracy of interstate relations entailed not only economic but also social costs—repudiation of internationalist mottoes and slogans by public consciousness. The anatomy of "racism of everyday life" in Soviet society is to be investigated. The scale of its spreading and the typical character for the traditions of multinational culture are disputable. In 1989 a selective social inquiry was conducted in the USSR concerning the relation of the Soviet public to the programmes of Soviet cultural, political and economic aid. 92 per cent, 77 per cent, and 32 per cent respectively were in favour of the above programmes, three per cent, 13 per cent and five per cent against the programmes.⁵ Some aspects, however, in the mechanism of its formation can be revealed through the comparison of certain facts. Suffice it to mention a peculiar atmosphere of "silencing" and an absence of discussion during the adoption of expenditures for economic cooperation in the commissions and the parliament, unconditional parliamentary support of the decision to allocate 10.5 million roubles for economic assistance to the developing countries, and long debates concerning an additional 2.4 million roubles required to cover the growing expenses for social development, which failed to be successful.⁶ These facts should be analysed and should be given good coverage by the massmedia, because during a long period they gave a one-sided view of USSR policy in the Third World, as a policy of a triumphant march of socialism on the planet.⁷

Return to the sources or the search of a new theoretical paradigm

The majority of the researchers come to the conclusion that the costs of Soviet domestic and foreign policy can be found in the administrative-bureaucratic model of socialism, which took shape in the 1930s and has not been superseded in later periods despite the reforms attempted. There is a point of view, that a prototype of this model is the policy of the "War communism", pursued in Russia immediately after the October revolution.⁸

The specific feature of this model is the opposition of social interests, interpreted as class interests, to individual ones. This was reflected in the demand to abolish private property and unite various forms of public ownership into one, namely state property.

The sources of such distorted understanding of socialism some authors see in the uncritical approach to Marx' idea concerning the possibility of a "curtailed path of development" for formerly backward countries. The term "backward" was applied to countries where capitalist relations either have not formed, or have not been properly developed to become a factor of system-formation. The historical process was viewed as a consequent replacement of socio-economic formations.

The idea of "a curtailed path", or the possibility of by-passing capitalism, was advanced by K. Marx in discussion with populists, after his study of Russian peasant socialism. Taking into consideration the existence of producer cooperation within the framework of the peasant community, Marx admitted the possibility of "by-passing" such an important moment in the historical development of capitalism as the separation of the producers from the means of production—land, handicraft tools etc. But he put forward a mandatory provision—to find the formula of synthesis between undistracted communal collectivism and the material and spiritual achievement of the West (applied science, industry, civil rights). Marx warned of the danger of a simplified perception of overcoming private property, stressing that it is fraught with grave consequences. He noted: "The fact that such abolishing of private property is far from really mastering it, is obvious from abstract negation of the entire world of culture and civilisation, from retreat to unnatural simplicity of the poor, who have no demands and far from raising above the level of private property, have not even grown up to it".⁹ The state can come to this "only in the way it comes to the annihilation of life, to the guillotine". The policy of war communism has become a vivid realisation of this prediction. The degree of loyalty to socialism in the young Soviet state has become the degree of state coercion over private interests. Working out the principles of the New Economic Policy, V. I. Lenin demanded "to bring about a radical change in our point of view on socialism", to transfer the centre of gravity to peaceful organisational and cultural work.¹⁰ However, this has not been implemented.

The concepts of "socialist orientation" and "non-capitalist" road of development were elaborated in the 1950s and 1960s when the confrontation between the USSR and the USA became the major axis of the international relations, and the ideas of class struggle were transformed into a thesis about the struggle of opposing socio-economic systems, which determined world development. In this context, the attempts of some authors to provide parallels between the present socialist orientation in the Third World and our "War communism" of the past does not look so unjustified.

In the opinion of most experts studying the problems of the developing countries, philosophic methodological problems of the developing countries, and philosophic methodological problems of development, the exclusive formation approach, even "purified" from further distortions, does not provide an adequate conception of the character of world development and the position of the developing countries in the world.

There exists a tendency to transfer the problems of the typological features of capitalism and socialism and the formation reference of the developing countries to a different aspect. There are attempts to broaden the conceptual set through introducing a notion of "civilisation" into existing theoretical patterns with the aim of supplementing the temporal dimension of social processes with spatial.

The term civilisation implies a stable socio-cultural complex, or cultural-historical complex, or cultural-historical genotype, determining the forms of human activity and the interaction of different ethno-cultural units. The major characteristics of civilisation comprise a specific type of personality and the forms of its socialisation, type of social activity, character of public values, standards or social regulation and communication. If, in the formation analysis of the historical process, the emphasis was on dynamics, the civilisation approach emphasises relative stability. The question of the applicability of the formation scheme to world development in general, and to the development countries outside Western civilisation in particular, is the most disputable. In the wide spectrum of answers given to this question there are two extreme points of view.

The advocates of the first, (L. Alayev, V. Lie, N. Simonia) proceed from a postulate on the unity of mankind and the sequential development of the historical process.¹¹ L. Alayev points out: "If mankind is developing sequentially as a whole, it should pass definite stages in its development: these stages are formations. The question of their differentiation—according to the stages of development of productive forces, or the type of economic organisation, or the major cultural shifts—is of secondary importance since the formations differ, in conformity with the theory, not only by the dominant mode of production but by the entire structure of society, i.e. culture, relation to an individual, political system, world outlook".¹² However, the theory of socio-economic formation makes it possible to follow the action of law, establishing a correlation between the productive forces and the character of the development of productive relations on a global scale. At the local level there are possibilities of interruption in the historical process, regressive movement or motion towards a blind alley. While revealing general tendencies of development, it fails to predict the development of specific societies, because the laws of the general and the part are not identical.

The advocates of the civilisation approach (L. Vasiliev, A. Salmin, E. Pozdnyakov) doubt the applicability of the formation schemes to societies outside Western civilisation and show preference for phenomenological understanding of the historical process as compared to a socio-positivist perception.¹³

Firstly, the very possibility of referring formation theory exclusively to science is subject to doubt. In his study of the genesis of stage scheme, A. Salmin suggests that in this case the researcher has to deal not with the laws of the immanent development of social science, but with the problem of correla-

tion between scientific and metascientific consciousness, not alien to scientific, but not identical with it.

Secondly, the question of the unity of the historical process is also subject to doubt. The European and non-European worlds are interpreted as two different ways of development. The historical origin of their differentiation dates as far back as the seventh and eighth century B.C., when mutation in the Mediterranean region resulted in the appearance of the unique civilisation of ancient Greece, and the world was divided into at least two incompatible models of development—East and West. Therefore, it is necessary to delineate the question of the applicability of the formation scheme to the experience of Western Christian civilisation and to the experience of global development. For Western Christian civilisation this scheme is the expression of a natural and eternally incomplete striving to reproduce the antique archetype of political-historical thinking. And the application of the stage scheme to the development of mankind as a whole, or to its specific civilisations, is caused not so much by the universal character of the proposed scheme, but by the success of the economic expansion of the West in the 19th century; the end of the expansion brings about the loss of the up-to-date character of the scheme.

Despite the versatile points of views and positions of authors voiced in the course of discussions, there prevails a humanist approach to the problems of present-day development, manifesting new tendencies in the Soviet social sciences.

This is revealed in the gradual overcoming of a uniform approach to the problems of development, based on dogmatically dissected Marxist ideas, when general sociological law, interpreted in the spirit of economic determinism, was viewed as a specific providential script, legitimating political voluntarism.

The expansion of time limits of historical outlook, intrinsic to the civilisation approach, helps to reproduce an integral image or images of non-European societies and to restore integrity to the subject, which has long been divided between the two branches—oriental studies and studies of the Third World; it also opens prospects for the experience of historical self-reflection. The successful renewal of the foreign policy course of such a complicated complex as the USSR is hardly possible without due consideration of the geopolitical and cultural, historical realities. The search for optimal forms of combining moral, psychological, regulatory and legal aspects of policy is one of the basic requirements for the realisation of principles of the new political thinking.

Outlines of a new development strategy

The recognition of the fact that the world is a united, integrated and interrelated whole and the proclamation of general human values as the basic for a foreign policy course reduced the level of confrontation between the USA and the USSR and opened up vistas for the solution of a number of regional conflicts, including the south of Africa. The new political thinking proceeds from the unity of mankind as an imperative in world development. The concept of the role of revolutionary violence has been revised. The process of achievement of the world human community cannot become the apotheosis of violence, and general human interests cannot be opposed to class interests.

The Programme Statement of the 28th Congress of the CPSU comprises the following priority trends in the foreign policy of the USSR:

- to achieve the demilitarisation of international relations aimed at the reduction of armaments and armed forces within the limits of reasonable deterrence level and, in this perspective, the end of military confrontation;
- to set up security structures at global and regional levels on the basis of the balance of interests of all parties concerned, with the view to preventing conflicts and international instability;
- to create a legal basis in interstate relations, which guarantees the freedom of socio-political choice, sovereignty, independence and development of cooperation and partnership with all countries of the world.¹⁴

However, without a radical renewal of the organisational structures, the proclaimed principles of the new political thinking are liable to remain a mere declaration of intentions. E. A. Shevarnadze, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, remarked that recently the quality of political relations between the USSR and the developing countries have greatly improved, but the potential of promoting relations in economic, cultural, scientific, technical and other spheres are limited by the state of affairs of the Soviet economy and the structure of its foreign economic contacts.¹⁵

One of the most significant and complicated problems of the restructuring period is to put an end to the monopolism of the administrative apparatus in the solution of certain strategic questions concerning domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet state. The first stage in the realisation of this task, attempted in 1986, to use foreign economies as a testing ground for a new model of management, failed to bring the expected results. Consequently, there was a growth of destructive tendencies, a deepening of the conflict between the state enterprises which acquired free access to the foreign market and the foreign trade organisations. The relations with the developing countries were illustrious in this respect. Free from overhead control, the enterprises have been guided by the interests of spontaneous profit, not by the long-term strategy of forming a large-scale demand for the goods produced. Some of them hastened to shift the focus of their attention from the developing countries to the developed states. The joint Soviet-Tanzanian venture "Mosoblavtotrans" is a promising, but not typical example of establishing new forms of cooperation. In 1990 the Soviet side signed some 1,200 agreements on the creation of joint ventures, developing countries constituting only a small fraction of this number. Statements in the press voice a deep concern over the decline of interest on the part of Soviet enterprises to participate in the UN Development Programme. Nevertheless, such participation provides prerequisites for the expansion of bilateral commercial and economic relations with the developing countries and opens up possibilities for sharing the advanced technological experience of other countries, through cooperation with partners from the developed countries.

Such a situation was caused by reforms in the foreign economic sphere outstripping the transformations in the domestic economic relations, as well as by the absence of the institutional basis required for this process.¹⁶

The year 1990 has become a turning point in the development of restructuring in the USSR. The session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted "Basic

Trends on the Stabilisation of the National Economy and Transition to the Market Economy". It adopted number of fundamental acts: on property, on land, on lease relations etc., ensure a legal basis for the functioning of the market economy. Some major political reforms are in the making: the new Union Treaty, aimed to change the distribution of functions between the Centre and the Union Republics; the military reform, the draft of which, on an alternative basis, has been submitted for discussion to the Supreme Soviet.

The estimation of the impact of the above measures on society is diverse. For one section of society they manifest the beginning of a new stage in the proclaimed course to restructuring. The other section emphasises the incomplete character of the proposed acts and the inconsistency of the government in their realisation. This part of society views the renewed course as a retreat from the democratic ideals proclaimed earlier, a return to authoritative methods of administration and the consolidation of positions of the conservative and even reactionary forces. However, despite the swinging of a political pendulum and the depth of implementation of the coming political and economic reforms, it can be assumed, that some propositions, concerning relations with the developing countries, will be realised in the near future and favourably influence the development of these relations. These propositions deal with the following problems: specification of aid and cooperation on grace terms and cooperation on commercial terms; elaboration of scientifically substantiated criteria of granting loans and credits; rendering assistance within the framework of special programmes, adopted at a parliamentary level, etc. As for the moral commitments made by our country to developing countries under different socio-cultural, military, political and economic conditions, even the most favourable variant of the possible political script, will hardly facilitate their realisation.

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AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT REALITY

African languages, the key to African development

A critique of ideas in development thinking

Kwesi K. Prah

The post-second world war period has seen in the Third World, first the unwinding of the colonial order in its classical form, and then the arrival of new states on to the arena of international politics. The economic heritage of the new states of Africa, Asia and Latin America, bore the marks of the old order. As primary producers of raw materials and semi-processed commodities, the new states remained linked to the metropolitan powers of the world in much the same fashion as they had done in the pre-independence period. Thus while the imperial idea as a colonial phenomenon was in an overt political sense buried during the mid-20th century, structurally the political economy of the post-colonial world changed only in a limited way, ensuring the emergence of what has since then been described by analysts and observers as neo-colonialism, or the new imperialism.

It was Harry Magdoff who, two decades ago, drew attention to the fact that the structural difference, which demonstrates the contrast between the old and the new imperialism, is the replacement of an economic system in which a variety of firms compete, by an emergent system in which a more restricted number of giant corporations in each industry effectively compete; that is the era of the multinationals. Also remarkable in this new era has been the advancements in communications and transport technology by some of the new states, especially in Asia, that heightened the competitive urge globally between the multinationals, and has tended to diminish the individual economic influence of some of the older metropolitan powers.¹

Africa in the post-independence era has seen a situation of steady decline in its economic production. The crisis of African development has been variously addressed by aid agencies, natural and social scientists and national governments. Three decades beyond the beginning of the era of African independence, it is abundantly clear that the various approaches and models of development in Africa have largely failed to transform for the better, the material and social realities of African life. The optimism of the early post-independence period has given way to a mood of foreboding and desperation in Africa. Western scholarship on the African development paradigm has been as fertile as it has been ineffectual. Approaches like Rostow's stages of economic growth, Arthur Lewis' idea of "the will to economize", Merle Lipton's or Reginald Green's work in Africa, the dependency school, and the theory of structural adjustment, to mention a few, have both at the theoretical and practical levels yielded little tangible benefit. There is sense in Hassan Zaoual's contention that "economy is as the West thinks and as the West does" and "the discovery of

the Third World by the social sciences of development was frequently nothing more than a case of the West encountering itself".²

Nordic paradigms as exemplified by the concept of "Another Development" of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation represent more a sensitive and sympathetic conscience of the West in the Third World, rather than a sociologically and economically effective tool for development.

East European scholarship on the development problematique in Africa, has been equally impotent in both the theoretical and practical senses. Ulyanovsky's writing in 1977 argued that:

... when the 1960 Moscow meeting of Communist and Workers Parties declared that transition to non-capitalist development and the establishment of national democratic states was an immediate revolutionary prospect for many Third World countries, the idea met with some scepticism. The past few years, however, have left no room for doubt: non-capitalist development has proved to be a highroad for social and economic progress...³

Today with hindsight, such reading borders on the absurd. According to the same author, The 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties again came up with new and well-substantiated reading of the non-capitalist development concept". The report of this meeting suggested that:

Under the impact of the revolutionary conditions of our time, distinctive forms of progressive social development of the newly free countries have appeared, and the role of revolutionary and democratic forces has been enhanced. Some young states have taken the non-capitalist path, a path which opens up the possibility of overcoming backwardness inherited from the colonial past and creates conditions for transition to socialist development.⁴

In Africa, observers, political scientists, and activists who have tended to lean on Soviet views have replicated such approaches. Some twenty years ago, the South African Joe Slovo for example was of a similar view.⁵ The collapse of Soviet-sponsored socialism in the final decade of the 20th century, and the bureaucratic and economic bankruptcy of the Soviet state itself and the near shambles of Soviet society today leaves a bitter taste for those who were intellectually taken in by the concept of non-capitalist development. As I argued in 1987, the general theory of the non-capitalist road to socialism, which in practice envisaged a development short-cut for pro-Soviet states, such as Nasserite Egypt, Toure's Guinea, Keita's Mali, and Nkrumah's Ghana, to socialism has historically proven to be wrong.⁶

African paradigmatic responses to the development problem have tended to reflect a reproduction, often with little revision or adaptation of the Eastern and Western approaches to the problem. Little originality or creativity has been displayed by African scholarship in this respect. The economic hardships of scholarly existence in contemporary Africa have drawn many such minds into occupational frames and positions which provide little scope for independent thought. Aid agencies prefer like minds to contentious or disputative types. Among African intellectuals, it is possible to argue that the general retreat from the euphoric Zeitgeist of the early independence period was not effected through the sheer command of the intellectual force of theory or pure reason. On the contrary, arguably, the change in view has been painfully won through

the existential crisis of contemporary African history. This history is dogged by repetitive famine, falling commodity prices, unequal exchange, unfavourable and punishing terms of trade, vast debt-burdens, political, social, and cultural repression by tin-pot dictatorships which have scant respect for individual or collective rights. Civil wars, steadily crumbling infrastructure, large-scale corruption and graft, and a general collapse in the morale of the masses have dominated the African scene.

Philosophical pitfalls

Whether understood in the context of historical realities; or the philosophical promptings which define our world-view with respect to the development idea; or development as an ideal, a millenarian or utopian construct, inspired by the objective sociological realities in which we are located; the development concept is not a category *sui generis*. It is reducible to more derivative facts of sociological, philosophical, and historical character; in short it is ideological. For some, it refers to Gross Domestic Product, Gross National Product and related indices; others see in development more the expansion of infrastructure; some visionarily refer to improvements in the "quality of life"; while others link the development notion to emancipatory processes affecting society at the level of the masses in both the economic and sociological spheres of social life.

For those social scientists for whom the case of value-free science is a discredited cause, there is fairly little difficulty in accepting or notionally accommodating the relativity of conceptual formulae. There is always for such minds a grey area in which subjective factors colour probings of objective reality. With respect to Nordic scholarship, this argument was admitted by Gunnar Myrdal, over half a century ago, in his *Das Politischen Element in der Nationalökonomischen Doktrininbildung* (1932), that:

...we cannot pretend to understand completely, or even to define logically, the economic-political speculation of recent times except in perspective of historical evolution. We must look upon the majority of modern economic doctrines as modified reminiscences of very old political thinking, conceived in days when teleological meaning and a normative purpose were more openly part of the subject-matter of economics.

Myrdal was using this argument as part of his debatable strictures against Marxism, although the general thrust of the argument is not a point which marxists would refute. What they would postulate however would be the need to transcend the phenomenology of ideas as historically and sociologically bound considerations. It is not just epochs and societies which produce a specific blend of ideas, more crucially it is social classes, and their derivative material and differential relations as reflected in production, distribution, and exchange, which particularize ideas. This approach structurizes the roots of ideas at a level of logical refinement which facilitates the analysis of socio-historical reality. Non-Marxian German sociology, from Max Scheler to Karl Mannheim, as *Wissensoziologie* has contributed considerably to our understanding of ideas as products of changing society and the group basis of this. To treat the Marxian approach literally as gospel, with scriptural finality, is to expunge it of its

methodological vitality, fossilize its dialectical edge. It is this latter weakness which has characterized much of Soviet scholarship in the social sciences. Indeed it is precisely the need to treat the Marxian approach as a creative and dialectical analytical framework that the economist Schumpeter regarded as most significant in the contribution of Marx to economic theory.

Marx's theory is evolutionary in a sense in which no other economic theory was; it tries to uncover the mechanism that, by its mere working and without the aid of external factors, turns any given state of society into another.⁷

The modalities of evolutionary transformation can be best understood dialectically. Not in a mechanistic or formalistic fashion, but as a critical method, juxtaposing oppositional tendencies embedded in the realities of change in phenomena and social facts. Noteworthy is also the notion that dialectical approaches are not essentially formal cerebral procedures. Rather, at best, they represent logical forms in which social change can be understood in the material and objective world. We would argue that scientific enterprise is primarily the dialectical interplay between rationalistic conjecture and the practicalities of social life. Ultimately, science is not a body of facts, timeless and repetitive. While it presents facts as constituents of reality, it is more fundamentally a way of analysis, explaining and understanding the processes of nature.

The decline of occidento-centric theorizing on the African development concept arises out of the failures to either fully offer explanations of the crisis of African development, and the means for changing this for the better, along lines conceived to be "developmental"; and the failures of a quarter century of "aid". The heart of the matter, as Blomström and Hettne have candidly admitted, is that:

... the traditional and still far from abandoned thinking on development is based on experiences which are specific to the Western world and that the claim to universal validity must therefore be repudiated. A truly universal theory of development must reflect the development experiences of different societies. Since the global domination of Western development theory is based on intellectual penetration (from the centre to the periphery), it is important to consider "the voices from the periphery" in this context.⁸

This sentiment, sound and sympathetic as it sounds, oversimplifies the issue. "Voices from the Periphery" are neither ideologically homogeneous nor scholastically undifferentiated. Many are ideological extensions of the Western or Eastern approaches criticized above. With the difference, I would insist that, too often they are jaded versions devoid of original impulses. In a conversation with the Ghanaian political scientist Yaw Twumasi, he advanced a plea against facile assumptions and crude fashionability which deserves recall. He suggested that we should be made to re-examine our unspoken assumptions, that we must leave the level of slogan-mongering, and account for our views in theoretically coherent terms in the wider context of African society and politics. Intellectual mimicry has little creativity relevant to the developmental challenges of contemporary Africa. The dilemma is also discussed in great depth by Mudimbe in his *The Invention of Africa*. The epistemological basis of science for the world remains still largely a fund created and intellectually dispensed by the West.

The observations made by Paul Baran regarding the underdeveloped and developed societies of the world deserve citation for the sobering and candid view he expresses:

There is a maze of pretence, hypocrisy, and make-believe to confuse the discussion, and a major effort is required to penetrate the smoke-screen obscuring the main issue. What is decisive is that economic development in underdeveloped countries is profoundly inimical to the dominant interests in the advanced capitalist countries.⁹

Culture, language and African development

If the pursuit of development paradigms based rigidly and essentially on the computation of indices on GNPs and GDPs has failed in three decades of African independence, and structural adjustment has proven to enhance the misery of the masses of the African people, then solutions should be found elsewhere. New concepts, or old concepts with new applications should be sought. Fresh departure points need to be explored in the effort to define new strategies for the transformation of the human condition in Africa. Development social scientists need to move away from the excessively numerative and quantitative obsessions of the past. Qualitative criteria of a multi-dimensional character are important.

Development has analytically a wider frame of reference if it is understood within the design of the culture concept. The culture concept unites more and provides a fuller multi-dimensionality to the notion of development because it encapsulates history, economic and social life. Culture sums up human creation, as a generationally transferred and altered phenomenon. An evolutionary or revolutionary process of change, influenced by both internal and external influences. It captures conceptually both material and non-material spheres of social production, and summarizes the totality of the material representations of human creativity, while vesting permanence and continuity to the institutional forms of social life defined by language, religion, mores and customary practices. Thus culture provides humans with their intellectual bearings in the production and reproduction of social life. Few concepts have the universe of the culture concept. In the vastness of its catchment area, it affords a good measure of the idea of development. It ultimately defines this as the enrichment of the material base of culture. The evolution of culture and societal transformation, is exteriorized developmentally and validated by the extent to which development options offer greater and more effective control and means of control over the material or natural environment.

Even if the culture concept is conceived in a narrower and often more colloquial sense, it is difficult to rationalize development on the economic and infrastructural dimensions without such development being evidenced in areas of collective social life and usage, such as music, literature, art and dance. Crucial to the flowering of the above areas of social life is the need of such manifestations to draw on the interests of wider society.

African underdevelopment is in finality cultural stagnation, a paralysis in the dynamic of social production. It is not solely the declining GDPs and GNPs which reveal Africa's bald development. This condition is also manifested in

the heathenization of African belief systems, and the atrophy of African languages; their usurpation in the order of the contemporary African's perception, by mainly European languages. These latter languages define the world of the African elite, who assume the trust of providing the route to development. As reference groups for the aspirant but less materially and socially endowed sections of society, their undervaluation of African languages directly undermines the maintenance of these languages, by challenging the need for their persistence and development in the eyes of mass society. Language is a package of culture. It structurizes the way we perceive and relate to reality. It carries values and standards of taste. It mediates in our interventions in nature and culture; and set limits in the structure of our perception of the external world.

African languages, I have argued, have a peculiar historical significance for the continuity and development of African society, which invests them with a cruciality specific to the nature of African history in the era of neocolonialism.¹⁰ They have for the most part been literate systems only within the last 150 years. A good deal of its corpus is evangelical in vintage. For such late pre-literate societies, these languages as living forms provide the epistemological and historical continuity with the past. They are the real repositories of the African as a total phenomenon. They relate directly to mass society, and offer the real access to social perception for the overwhelming majority of Africans. It is in these languages and idioms that the knowledge base of the majorities are grounded.

Language is a function of culture. It is possible to argue that it is, indeed, the most central aspect of culture. But, its importance varies from one case to the next. In societies with a literate culture spanning centuries, the written form almost matches the spoken version in significance. In the African case, because African societies have until relatively recent times been pre-literate, the spoken language remains the only real linguistic foundation of culture. It is possible to recall the life of classical Greece and Rome, in spite of the fact that the languages of these societies are "dead". They can be learnt and accessed by interested parties. The opposite is the case in Africa. Written literature is spare and scanty. The spoken language holds the identity of Africans, and provides the only route to developmental creativity.

If development is viewed as a process of innovative transformation, and the institutionalization of novel social structures which enhance social production and its consumption, then humans stand at the centre of this process; and they are reached ultimately within their existent cultural frames. People are best reached in their understanding within the matrix of cultural reference points to which they are cognitively native. Knowledge is best absorbed and integrated when this is done within the framework of existing parameters. Furthermore, knowledge or innovative practices find fertile ground for growth if and when they integrate without disruption into a similar or structurally responsive mould. For Africa, the transfer or adaptation of developmental practices requires linguistic vehicles which relate to the masses rather than the elites. Such approaches require that new developmental inputs are shaped and conceived in language and forms which are in harmony with the indigenous knowledge base and its internal logic. This ensures that introduced knowledge or technology is adopted in harmony with existing understandings. Dialectically, it means also that developmental inputs within the domain of science and technology introduced into the African situation should be free of the specific

Western cultural packaging, if they are to find fertile and receptive grounds in African society. For all of these considerations, African languages stand at the centre of developmental effectiveness and success.

Although the creative spirit is in itself a universal phenomenon, for it to respond to challenge, it needs to be rooted in a familiar and native cultural system. Its inventiveness cannot operate meaningfully through the agency of a borrowed language. Fanon's imagery of "Black Skins, White Masks" is all that the elite modelled with Western inspiration can achieve. Creativity is largely lost to this group in the African historico-cultural context. Cultural mimicry devoid of the creative impetus is more characteristic of this group than their leadership role in African society demands.

Concluding remarks

Language as mother tongue in Africa has been an underestimated tool in most conceptualizations of development. Without its conscious use in the development effort, work may be doomed to the failure that has checked scientific and technological progress in Africa since the late 1950s. The use of the mother language implies that people are reached in communicative forms which evoke the most intelligent reactions to the issues under plan and discussion. Differentiation and integument in the texture of language as a vehicle of communication is more easily appreciated by such users. People respond better to spoken language in their own native languages. It relates communicants to their history and other areas of culture. Mother language provides a direct linkage to reality.

Development activity in Africa needs to be coupled with language planning. The establishment of degrees of structural linguistic proximity between various clusters of African languages, and the facilitation of common or shared written forms which permit dialectal differences. Standardization is necessary in order to facilitate communication, to make possible the establishment of an agreed orthography, and to provide a uniform form for literature accessible to wider sections of the African population across in most instances, existing borders. Studies and lexicographical compilations starting with clearly identifiable clusters, and the production of literature for such clusters would appear to be crucial to provide a practical handle on the development ideal. The Nama and Damara in Namibia have an easy basis for standardization. So do the Samburu and Maasai in Kenya, or the Luo cluster including groups in five countries (Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania). The Boran and the Oromo cluster straddle Ethiopia and Kenya, while various variations of Hausa in West Africa feature prominently in large areas in three countries in the Sahelian-border area. Fula features in at least five West African countries. Varieties of Nguni are used in six Eastern and Southern African countries, while the Sotho-Tswana cluster also penetrates six countries.

African development cannot mean the destruction of the African as an identifiable historical and cultural category; the relegation of African languages to disuse, stagnation and death. The real and only basis for sustained and realizable socially emancipatory development for Africans, hinges on the usage of African languages, as the instrumental premise of African scientific and technological development.

Notes

1. See: Magdoff, Harry, *The Age of Imperialism*, p.15. New York 1969.
2. Zaoual, Hassan, "La Crise du paradigme du developpement. Critique des discours critique par un economiste du Tiers Monde", *Tiers Monde*, No. 100, October–December 1984.
3. Ulyanovsky, R., Foreword to I. Andreyev, *The Noncapitalist Way*. Moscow 1977.
4. *Report of the International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties*, Moscow, 1969, p. 280, Prague 1969.
5. Slovo, Joe, "On the Non-Capitalist Road to Socialism", *Marxism Today*, 1969.
6. See: Prah, K. K., "Class, Ideology and the Practice of Development" in *Africa. Conference Proceedings, International Conference on Development and Underdevelopment in Africa*. Centro de Estudos Africanos, Lisbon 1987.
7. Schumpeter, J., *History of Economic Analysis*. 1961 edition, p. 391, London.
8. See: Blomström, Magnus and Björn Hettne, *Development Theory in Transition*. London 1984.
9. Baran, Paul, *The Political Economy of Growth*, pp. 11–12. New York 1957.
10. See: Prah, K. K., "Can Swahili Become African Lingua Franca?", *SAPES Journal*, Vol. 4, No. 6, 1991.

Environment reconsidered

Developmental perceptions of pastoralism in dryland Africa

Anders Hjort af Ornäs

The African drylands have intrigued development planners since early colonial times. The lands have, from a planners' perspective, been on the verge of collapse at least since the end of the 19th century. Colonial administration reports excel in diagnosing dramatic environmental degradation, starvation and death. They might have been right to some extent but not to the level anticipated. The Maasai in Kenya, for instance, were to become extinct before the turn of the century, now almost a hundred years ago. But the people are still around.

There are many illustrations of discrepancies between what development planners and dryland populations perceive. I have raised some of the implications before. Hjort (1981) is a critique of the planners' perspective which, based on ecological argumentation, presents a simplistic equilibrium model for sustainable development. One "Catch 22" of this approach is that recommendations for striking a balance between herd and people populations, along with land management, are based on micro findings but given for macro contexts. The focus on production, economy, and only biological aspects of livestock management leads to a disregard of cultural systems as, among other dimensions, providing "sensible" sets of rules for behaviour and management (Hjort af Ornäs, 1990a). Herd management is sustainable on several levels of livestock aggregates (Dahl and Hjort, 1979). The kinds of combinations may be culturally determined. The cultural dimension of dryland resources is highly significant and often overlooked (Hjort af Ornäs, 1985).

This paper claims that the tragic gap is narrowing today, at least to the extent that major aspects of such argumentation have gained ground within planners' traditions. We may, it is true, speak about a planners' culture or behavioural system, which is conservative in countering not least paradigmatic shifts (Dahl and Hjort, 1984). What we see occurring now is in this terminology a cultural revolution, fuelled by a number of significant factors:

1. The trend of blaming difficulties solely on a colonial heritage has to decline as time goes by.
2. The drive for democratic governments and empowerment locally brings the issues of development thinking closer to an empirical universe formulated in greater harmony with local perceptions than before.
3. The world community's concern over the global environment is real and calls the cards of both of conservationists' and rationalists' positions. The search is for more pragmatic step by step approaches to dryland development rather than seeking "final solutions"; more of supportive inputs than of systemic

changes. Issues are formulated differently, not least in connection with environmental security.

4. Knowledge and competence is growing. This goes for academia in Africa and for civil servants, but also for governmental development aid organisations and NGOs.

I will in this paper elaborate these points and argue that we witness a process of paradigmatic shift in the development planners' views on the role of African drylands. The conventional approach, for instance of a generally underpopulated Africa, where land management has to become more effective through irrigation projects or else, is replaced by patterns of production systems which interact in a constructive or destructive manner. The view has altered from one of hierarchical systems with the state structure being the motor of all development. The alternative picture, which is emerging in a number of African countries, is one where the role of the state is concentrated on coordinating the interactions of existing or modified production systems, in drylands based on livestock rearing normally seasonally combined with farming. The implication is more of decentralisation. Decision-making gravitates towards the scene of action, where not least pastoralists and small-scale farmers live. Not that we could speak of local authority over local issues, but at least a drastic shift in this direction. And this occurs in spite of depressing arguments that pastoral political systems are weak and will not offer a means towards local control.

Colonial heritage, the state and pastoralism

There is, no doubt, a colonial heritage for dryland inhabitants to carry. The case was well made in 1980 under the title "seeds of famine" (Franke and Chasin, 1980). The economic history point taken is that colonial planners basically ignored the needs of the local population. Developmental perceptions, including drylands, were almost entirely concerned with market oriented agricultural production: cocoa as the title of the above-mentioned book implies, or more generally livestock production. The problems became intrinsic since emerging infrastructures were geared towards colonial priorities.

Colonial administrations were operating on tight budgets, pressurised in their system from two sides; tax payers and settlers. The British policy in the drylands of Eastern Africa, for instance, aimed at maintaining Pax Britannica at minimum cost. A certain amount of resettling had to be organised, for instance the negotiations with Lenana bringing all the Maasai into one territory, the current southern Kenya. The policy then was to divide and rule, through local governments with indirect authority. Included in these ambitions was predominantly the aim to keep better producing (settlers') regions protected against livestock disease. The period, therefore, saw development inputs in the form of livestock disease projects; rinderpest and CBPP vaccination campaigns, etc. Essentially, no attention was paid to the needs of local populations. It was today's conservationists' dream: the ecological man/land system was left untampered.

People were recruited to farms when farm hands were needed: drylands turned partly into a reserve-labour reservoir, seen in a development perspective. The drylands also became major suppliers of high quality livestock for

cross-breeding with European stock or intensive production ranches and farms. The situation in northern Kenya, the Northern Frontier District, NFD, is a good example. In the 1920s the local pastoralists were forced to sell their best quality Boran breed cattle as a result of quarantine measures, hampering proper management through nomadic movements. This was a dramatic negative development which can be recalled both in District Commissioners' Annual Reports and in life histories of herdsman in the area (Hjort 1979). The point often made by the dryland inhabitants is that a major proportion of breeding animals was lost; that a key reproduction asset changed hand, from pastoralists to settlers.

This effect of a colonial development policy was followed up in Kenya by settlers' involvement in pastoral households as cheap labour for the care of calves and immatures. Such animals were left under nomadic circumstances until they were taken to the better-resourced settler lands for a fattening period before being slaughtered and marketed. Had it not been for other factors such as World War II, Mau Mau and Independence, the system in northern Kenya was turning into a drastic exploitation of the region, almost of a Latin American hacienda type of system. Dependent pastoralists delivered animals to holding grounds in Isiolo area, the settlers operated as brokers between local and national systems, and the railway from nearby Nanyuki provided efficient delivery of meat to urban markets.

Now, was this situation perceived as development? It would probably have been, for good or for bad, today. But the conservationist perspective prevailed at that time. In the triangular drama between settlers, colonial administration and the dryland inhabitants, it was the colonial records that wrote history. And it said: there are practically no development projects since these are not the aims of the (British) government. Settlers pressurised for protective inputs and were in fact exploiting both the British tax-payers and the local Kenyan population.

An interesting fact is that, in spite of the exploitation quality of the situation, it is the settler approach which comes closest to a development policy as we see it today. The settler community built up a massive stock of knowledge about soil and conservation about dryland management, etc. That competence is there even today, albeit put not at the service of national planning but primarily for ranch development on the dryland fringes. I would even dare to claim that no dryland expert has the same competence to combine theoretical and practical issues as do the settlers' descendants who are today ranch managers.

How come? We have to return to how development is perceived. The settlers and the pastoralists had in common a practical concern for land and livestock. Settlers (and, indeed, some colonial officers) would spend weeks in the field, walking from one part of the country to another. This is an approach which not only assumes an interest in the complexities of dryland management but also one which creates respect and mutual values. This link is probably one important reason why the British were relatively popular in the northern part of Kenya.

Uhuru, independence, brought a profound shift in power structures in that country. With independence followed throughout Africa a first generation of a leadership which was national, but urban and possibly farming, based. Dryland populations were poorly represented. Their ways of perceiving development problems were generally not respected. Instead, the modern state was to be built. A heavy Western impact, not through colonisation but through

"colonized minds" (to paraphrase Fanon) was felt in development models inspired by the Rostowian modernisation school. A variety, the dependency school, had similar, if not identical, ideas about dryland development. The production systems had to be more market-oriented, faster producing and more cost-effective. They should contribute better to national development. But the persons defining the content of national development and what costs were actually involved, were all inexperienced in drylands. Most rural development thinking of the post-colonial era in the 1960s and the 1970s was heavily biased towards farming and towards high-technical and large-scale development projects. This is how development was perceived at the new national centres: successful technical projects. Success was there if the irrigation pumps functioned and the production of watermelons followed the plan. The then radical cost/benefit approach became disturbing since it introduced the uncomfortable element of economic considerations and, hence, a suggestion that there might be a sustainability conditionality in the immediate future.

No mention was at the time made of environmental, social or cultural factors at the level of implementation. It can hardly be surprising if local populations did not feel involved in the independence process. The role of the state was not for pastoralists. In some countries this situation changed, in others it prevailed. Somalia is an illustration of the latter category. The current civil war can to a significant extent be brought back to the fact that pastoral populations have not felt involved in the central government's process of nation-building (Bongartz 1990). Ecological considerations, for example; even though they are part and parcel of everyday life in drylands (whether based on settler or pastoral activities), were incorporated in development projects designs in a mechanical way, more or less out of touch with local reality. The group ranches in Southern Kenya, to mention the most significant example, were demarcated by the government, considering two factors; to identify viable units in carrying capacity terms, and, if possible, to identify some (sub-clan Maasai) social groups with the territory. The result seems to have been a kind of mental Berlin Conference: boundaries were drawn not on political but on ecological maps before populations were ascribed to the territories. Development promotion by extension workers was then preoccupied with the consequences of this thinking: how to make the units viable through technical inputs (vaccines, dips, other infrastructure), how to improve the economy of the experiment (advice, loans, etc with all sorts of difficulties), and how to introduce a minimum of social welfare (schools, health care, etc). A range of complications emerged, projects failed, donors complained that development of drylands is so extremely complex (in their terminology another word for "impossible"). The local population saw a system fit for exploitation. Dependency relations, brokers, patron/clients and other expressions of the stratified systems emerged. This was not perceived as sustainable development by local populations. The prime contacts with extension workers, the agents of development, was with veterinary vaccination teams. Again, a professional category which takes the trouble to actually gain and maintain a field experience. They were in their turn alienated from the development debate of the time; seeking African socialism and quick harvests of the fruits of independence.

What has happened thereafter is a gradual shift away from the urban elite perceptions of development. The search is now more for the role of the state than for the means to immediately impinge the insignia of a nation-state.

Subregional conflicts, often over resources suitable for both farming and pastoral communities, have been dangerously activated in the colonial and post-colonial period. Indeed, the important historical boundary is not the one dividing before and after independence for the drylands. The significance of a pragmatic shift away from a big-brother centralised perspective is much greater.

Mobilising pastoralists for dryland development

The depressing message of the last section is that the pastoralists were not really involved in the development process that followed upon independence. This process had instead to do with an urban-based perception of development, including of course the glory of industrialisation and a market economy. But the task was also a difficult one, with, for one thing, an acute shortage of good civil servants as a result of a short-sighted colonial policy cutting costs at any expense. Aggravating for most drylands was the fact that most pastoral communities are built, more or less out of necessity, on decentralised and accordingly weak authority structures. They form minorities in their respective countries, and they generally have small means of making their voices heard in the political centre for development events.

Making their situation even worse was the international competition over much of the African drylands, leading in several cases to war or war-like situations (cf. Cervenka, 1989 and El-Gammal, 1989). To conclude the gloomy picture; donors and research communities had absolutely no interest in drylands. Their interest was in areas where a development input was thought to have the greatest effect; densely populated high production areas. I can contribute two impressions from my own research career which both disturbed me at the time. One is from 1973 when I presented my research proposal concerning pastoralists and small town development in northern Kenya to colleagues at IDS in Nairobi. The colleagues found it strange that I wanted to travel to the north and indicated that nobody had any interest in that desolate part of the country. The situation today is entirely different. The other experience is from 1979 when the idea of carrying out my fieldwork with the Beja in northeastern Sudan was presented to SAREC. The response was the question: why waste resources on such a desolate place of no development interest? The situation today is entirely different.

The situation is indeed different. The international community of development planners has gone through a crisis with regards to projects in drylands. The categorical proclamations of universal failure for all dryland development projects was followed by more or less classified evaluations by donors (the World Bank's being most classified of all) who were concerned with the efficiency of their projects, being under the pressure from sponsors (tax-payers and governments alike). This has occurred during the 1980s when a number of factors external to pastoral populations have also emerged:

1. The economic recession proved that there is also a maintenance dimension to development projects, implying running costs and leading to a more cautious attitude to high-tech solutions on the part of both planners and donors. A paradigmatic shift occurred gradually, opening up formerly taboo development prospectives such as the production of food for consumption and

not urban or international marketing. The notion of "food security", for instance, was permitted without ascribing the label "reactionary" to a proponent.

2. The international debate over the weak performance of African states; for being soft, exhibiting a top-heavy bureaucracy (Hydén, 1988) and poor leadership (Ward, 1989), they draw critique also for the non-democratic character of national politics. The arguments from independence that the new nations had to be kept militarily together in order to prevent disintegration were no longer accepted as universal by the international community. On the contrary, it was argued that so much time had now elapsed since independence that there must be other roots to many of the prevailing problems. Events in Eastern Europe naturally inspired and speeded up a democratisation process.
3. The so-called indigenous groups in the world have become more and more outspoken about minority rights—Indians, aborigines and Saamis have inspired human rights proponents also to look into situations in the African dryland areas. The Saami performance, with a livestock based economy, is of course particularly relevant for our discussion. Many issues concerning relations between a pastoral community and a state are similar for the Saami and African states (Cf. Hjort af Ornäs, 1990 b).
4. The end of a super-power competition in the Third World has drastically changed the economic and political situation for several countries. The interest of the US and the USSR in competing in international politics has decreased to the extent that many geopolitical cards can no longer be played. Countries like Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan, to mention some with vast drylands, discover a programmatic delinking taking the shape, even, of shrinking development aid budgets.
5. The international community's new attention to environmental problems and the issue of sustainable development (emerging in the UN-system through the Brandt, Palme and Brundtland commissions) sets the accord for a future "green conditionality". The expression has already been coined by critical Third World voices. Its substance will probably be severed at the 1992 conference in Brazil: the world means business on this issue. New forms for both North/South conflicts and cooperation are beginning to see the light of day. More global coordination would be my hypothesis.
6. The non-governmental organisation of development cooperation has grown in importance. It expresses a paradigmatic shift towards popular participation (even empowerment in some cases), democracy and smaller-scale development projects. Drylands prove particularly attractive for the approach.
7. Historical and political events, with war and refugee problems on a massive scale, are often located in drylands. Such facts naturally draw attention to disputed (dryland) territories, ecological refugees and similar issues.

The list of factors external to the pastoral community but with implications for it has become long. What *are* the implications? I think they add up to a pressure to deal more seriously with drylands problematics. Gone is the era of an arrogant centre looking down its nose on underdeveloped areas or people. Gone is also the selfish settler-like era which, true, included an interest for factual circumstances, but essentially disregarded the interests of dryland inhabitants. The call now is to mobilise pastoralists for their own development process. The

odds are not very encouraging, because pastoralists' have had bad experiences of the approach in the past.

Not least Kenya sees an upsurge of development projects concerned with arid and semiarid lands development. The projects provide a "smörgåsbord" (buffet) of approaches and in this respect offer a platform for an exposé of traces of paradigmatic shifts.

New wave of dryland development thinking

The scene is set for a paradigmatic change in planners' perceptions of dryland development. Contextual circumstances (war, disaster and political interference along with economic and moral pressure) obviously do have an impact. It can be registered or "measured", in several ways. One is the academic interest, another the competence and attitudes among planners and extension workers.

To start with first things first. The scholarly activity level of most African universities today has to stand back for scholars' needs to do consultancies. This is related to the general economic crisis. It provides donors with an instrument to identify the perspectives which should be given priority ("we'll have a range ecologist instead of another economist"). This tool is not much appreciated by project personnel seeking to follow a given time schedule, which lowers their threshold for academic input ("this economist will have to do as a range ecologist"). Donors support training of such categories which they from their short time perspective deem fit to support. A situation emerges with well-funded islands as centres of excellence and more or less devastated national universities (Cf. de Vylder and Hjort af Ornäs, 1991).

The competence on dryland development is built at these centres, prior to universities. It becomes excellent but vulnerable in that its existence depends on external sources such as IDRC, Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, SAREC, NORAD, etc. It also becomes cosmopolitan and brings the debate of the international research community solidly into national pictures. But universities play second fiddle, so to say, providing surveyors and assistants rather than the prime investigators of projects. The latter are cosmopolitans, not expatriates, and maybe nationally recruited, but still members of an international research community with its own problem identifications and priorities. This development is healthy for dryland development processes since it blocks potential tendencies to allow other considerations to enter the project picture. It contributes to bring an analytical debate closer to the problem arenas, i.e. the drylands.

The trend just hinted at follows, or even leads, much of the highly sophisticated research into run-off farming, water harvesting, etc, etc. The orientation is mostly towards natural science, often with due respect for social sciences. This perhaps emerges from the fact that research requires field experience, leading to interaction with and respect for, dryland citizens. We are back to the field syndrome of veterinarians mentioned above.

Another trend among scholars, indicating a shift of academia's paradigms, is to move closer to extension, doing research work on field stations or among local communities. In the realm of the natural sciences we find a whole range of experimental academic exercises, not of great theoretical or analytical value maybe, but of significance for an implementation of development projects.

The developmental perceptions in both quarters of scholarly interest in drylands may be highly specialised. But they represent a definite shift from disinterest to intensive interest in some aspects of life in African drylands.

There is also a corresponding interest on the humanistic side of academia. This concerns social and cultural aspects of pastoral lifestyles, oral history, oral literature, traditional medicine, pastoral associations, herd dynamics, etc. Also this academic interest seems to be boosted by external financing, perhaps more in connection with an NGO interest as compared with natural science trends.

We may thus speak about a paradigmatic shift in the research interest in dryland development, from a general disinterest to patchy flares of interest, at least to dig into virgin research lands to score the triumph of having articles published. Such motivation would not be valid for planners and extension workers. Their driving force is found within ministries rather than in international trend breaks. This means that we should expect great variations between different countries. Such is also the case. Let me give two examples from among the countries I have followed for a number of years:

1. Kenya. When I lived there in 1973 and 1974, I perceived the administration to be hostile towards the drylands. There was a popular notion from people in central parts of the country that these parts were lagging further and further behind due to lazy and backward inhabitants. Civil servants did all they could to avoid being based in these districts. It meant poor service and a high turnover of personnel, among other things. The strictly hierarchical and segmentary structure of Kenyan administration hampered interaction between civil servants from different ministries. Today the structure prevails, but is supplemented by two decisive developments. One is the so-called district focus, lifting decision-making from Nairobi to the various committees of District Commissioners. The argument for this approach from the Ministry of Finance and Planning is not decentralisation, but efficiency and economics. An effect, however, is that some decision-making is lifted a bit further towards the place where the action is. Insights by local populations become easier.

The other development trend in Kenyan administration is towards deepened training of civil servants. I had the opportunity to witness this demonstrated at a conference in Embu in September 1988. A range of papers and presentations highlighted various aspects of semiarid dryland development at a level of sophistication which few countries in the world could match.

2. Somalia. This country is in many ways different from what has been briefly mentioned for Kenya. Even before the current civil war, administration was weak and not very field oriented. Investments into the livestock sector were limited, indeed only a fraction of the returns which the international export of pastoral livestock brought the country. Practically the only return from development planning for the pastoralists was large-scale settlement projects and occasionally vaccination (and some other veterinary) efforts. And still: the majority of the inhabitants of Somalia are nomadic pastoralists.

The pastoralists come from the third wave of dryland development thinkers, together with scholars and planners. My prime observation in that pastoralists remain sceptical about the efforts by national planners and development agencies in drylands. There is good reason for such an attitude. Not only have many development projects of the past failed. They have also

brought destruction and devastation to many, through the direct or indirect consequences of poorly managed projects.

One kind of reaction, which has to do with perceptions of development, is to start guerilla warfare or similar protests. We may think of a number of serious incidents or states, both of the past and the present. The protest against the Rahad scheme in Sudan through trampling of harvests is one example at a project level. The regular guerilla warfare in Southern Sudan, in Ethiopia and Eritrea are other examples.

Another kind of pastoralists' response has to do with the contextual changes listed above. The interests in trying new methods, e.g. camel rearing by the Maasai in Southern Kenya, has caught on among the wealthy strata of pastoral populations. Their attitude has been to experiment, tempted perhaps by the potentially high gains. There is a margin, and they do not take great risks. The performance of these affluent pastoralists is rather like that of "progressive farmers" of the World Bank's early 1970 brand. The hope is now, as then, that there is a spread potential through a demonstration effect. As I read the situation that hope is real, at least to the extent that results are much discussed. Perhaps the mobile living conditions of pastoralists offer better odds for the transfer of new technology than the sedentary conditions among small-scale farmers.

Could we, after all the talk about the different development perceptions of various actors on the dryland scene, safely conclude that there is a new wave of dryland development thinking? Let me first summarise with a matrix:

	Local influence	National influence	International (contextual) influence
National scientists	To some extent	—	Significantly
Social scientists	Largely	Counter productive	To some extent
Planners	To some extent	Largely	No
Pastoralists	Through "elites"	Primarily negative	No

Influences obviously differ for the categories listed above. The important thing is that they do exist and that we see an emerging pattern of interdependences between various levels. At least, this is a paradigmatic shift from the earlier blunt disinterest and mismanagement. The interdependences naturally give rise to networks made up of "like-minded" scholars and planners. This is also a promising sign, since an emphasis on empirical and local level activities has soared in status internationally over recent years. The emphasis on extension is routine for many of the most prestigious institutes and consultants in the world (the International Institute on Environment and Development, started 20 years ago by Barbara Ward is a case in point).

Development trends for pastoral development

Popular participation is no longer in vogue among radical researchers and NGOs. The trend is for empowerment. Pastoralists should be empowered to control their own destinies. They should be the ones deciding over local resources, not a national interest in supplying urban markets with meat, for instance. Is it realistic? Perhaps to some extent under the pretext of food security. And perhaps the old geographers' push/pull argument will prove valid: secure rural food production lessens the seriousness of urban migration.

Administrators perform a parallel "eureka"-thought. The financial situation does not allow for large-scale projects to transform the entire countryside. An alternative strategy then is to build on those systems already there: supportive measures rather than alternative ones. Pastoral systems could, for instance, be coordinated through loosely organised pastoral associations rather than forced into rigid group-ranch projects.

Pastoralists then? They would probably offer the sound opinion that wars must be ended before we begin discussing development projects.

What looks promising is a set of changes in emphasis: more of pragmatic step-by-step solutions, more of empirical reality, more of interaction with those pastoral communities inhabiting drylands. The environments are reconsidered in such simple ways. But what seems simple has been said for 15 years with no response. Until the time was ripe; i.e. global demands were rising.

What I see, and have argued for in this paper, is a growing understanding of conditions for dryland development in decision-making circles. A paradigmatic front has been established through administrations, research groupings and local communities which is maybe more pragmatically than ideologically oriented. Theory and practice come closer when scholars, administrators and extension workers cooperate. Not only are important issues raised in each perspective, but the process includes also linking the analytical and implementation issues together. The end result might be one where production systems interact in two directions; with each other and with two "contextual patterns", the beneficiaries of production activities and the state. For instance, instead of seeking to organise state or group ranches with a heavy centralised national focus, there is a drive for more open pastoral associations, flexible in quality, depending on local circumstances.

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Marginalisation of gender issues in development thinking and strategies in Africa

Ruth Meena

The majority of African countries has been going through a series of socio-economic and political crises for the past three decades. Expressing the magnitude of the crisis and its impact upon the lives of the people, the delegates to an International Conference on Popular Participation In Development and Transformation stated that:

We are united in our conviction that the crisis currently engulfing Africa, is not only an economic crisis but also a human, legal, political and social crisis. It is a crisis of unprecedented and unacceptable proportions manifested not only in abysmal declines in economic indicators and trends, but more tragically and glaringly in the sufferings, hardships and impoverishment of the vast majority of African people. At the same time, the political context of socio-economic development has been characterized, in many instances, by an over-centralization of power and impediments to the effective participation of the overwhelming majority of the people in social, political and economic development. As a result, the motivation of the majority of African people and their organizations to contribute their best to the development process, and to the betterment of their own well-being as well as their say in national development has been severely constrained and curtailed and their collective and individual creativity has been *undervalued* and underutilized [African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, 1990, 17] (emphasis added).

While the above quotation is applicable to the majority of the toiling masses in Africa, the women of this continent seem to have had more than an equal share of the effect of the crisis. This is, despite of their marginal participation in the decisions leading to the current crisis. This paper posits that the development thinking which has guided development strategists for the past three decades has ignored a serious analysis of the issue of women's critical subordination to men and how this is affecting the development process.

Nevertheless, the existing literature has documented various aspects which demonstrate the relatively worse conditions of women than men. It is acknowledged by both policy makers and planners that in terms of the sexual division of labour, women and specifically rural and urban poor have had a heavier workload in both production and reproduction tasks. It is also acknowledged that legal practices and various existing pieces of legislation and property rights have discriminated against women as property owners. And yet, planners and policy makers have admitted that development programmes and projects have largely failed due to an inability to take gender concerns into the planning process (Wagao, 1991). The neglect of gender issues in development

thinking is reflected in gender insensitivity in the planning process of the majority of African countries.

During the colonial period, social anthropologists had studied various social cultural aspects of traditional society with a view to providing information which would have enabled the colonial government to create viable colonial entities (Vuorela, 1984). Social anthropologists, however, did not consider the issue of women's subordination as a problem as long as it did not negatively affect the colonial economies.

The newly independent states of Africa inherited colonial structures and institutions which had a very rigid and conservative perspective with regards to women's position in society. The colonial educational system, for instance, discriminated women and was at the same time gender stereotyped. Very few women were groomed into the service sector as social workers, nurses and primary school teachers. Thus, despite the fact that there were women activists in the nationalist movements, they rarely provided the movement with its intellectual leadership. Women's political activities during and after the colonial period were mainly mobilising men and women to support the nationalist movement. They did not constitute an independent lobby group demanding equality in the political process. This gave nationalist movements and later nationalist governments a loophole to pay a lip service to equality and respect for human rights, without taking serious measures to transform gender inequities within the socio-economic and political system. As a matter of fact, transformation of gender relations has never constituted part of the political agenda in most of the African states. Some countries, like Zimbabwe, did not even have the courtesy of forbidding discrimination on the grounds of sex in their constitutions (Steward and Armstrong, 1990).

But even countries like Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, Lesotho and Botswana, which had incorporated a clause forbidding discrimination on grounds of sex in their constitutions had at the same time in existence statutory laws which openly discriminated women. In the majority of these countries citizenship rights, for instance, openly discriminated women. In Mozambique, notwithstanding the official acknowledgement of the contribution of women in the armed struggle, citizenship rights which were passed after independence discriminated women. While a Mozambican woman automatically lost her citizenship rights upon marrying a foreigner, this was not applicable to a Mozambican man who married a foreigner (Casimiro, Chicalia & Pessoa, 1990). Although this law has been modified, citizenship rights remain essentially discriminatory. In Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zambia, a woman married to a foreigner cannot pass her citizenship rights to her children or spouse in the same manner as a man married to a foreigner (*ibid.*).

All countries in Southern Africa have invariably adopted a dual or mixed system of laws which includes the civil law inherited from the colonial state and the customary laws carried over from traditional practices of the indigenous population (Steward & Armstrong, 1990). The main thrust of preserving traditional or customary law has been to safeguard the patriarchal ideology which legitimises subordination of women in society. It is no wonder that customary law has been applied to issues pertaining to property rights, family law as well as citizenship rights. Invariably all traditional practices have discriminated against women as property owners.

From the above discussion, it is obvious that the majority of the newly independent states did not have the intention of transforming existing gender relations. This condition has been worsened by the fact that women, who were disadvantaged in terms of gender inequities, were not theoretically well equipped to challenge gender stereotyping in the socio-economic and political system of the new states. It is no wonder that the development paradigms which provided the new states with ideological direction were essentially unchallenged by female native citizens of these countries for over a decade. This factor made some Western scholars suspect that African women, including elite women, accepted the subordinate position to which they were being subjected in their respective societies. This is the context in which theories of development and development strategies have been based.

Marginalisation of gender in development paradigms

Development theories which have sought to explain the factors leading to a condition where impasse, decline, has come to dominate the discourse on African development have failed to grasp how the continued subordination of women, in both theory and practice, has contributed to the decline. The optimism of the 1960s would definitely lead to disenchantment with the development experience because of conceptual and practical problems of the modernisation paradigm. Modernisation was based on the assumption that it was possible to replicate the development experience of the Western developed state without destroying the traditional structures. The African states were indeed attempting to get the best out of the two worlds. Modernisation was supposed to have meant, "a process through which the underdeveloped countries acquire certain characteristics, that is social, political, economical and cultural, similar to those existing in the already industrialised, 'developed' countries" (Learner, 1968). Most of the African state leaders were not ready to forego some of their traditional sources of power for modernisation. In some countries where the land question seems to have been settled in favour of the indigenous population, it has essentially enhanced the power of the patriarch. In most African states women have no landrights other than the right to work on land. In cash crop growing regions, women do not have total control over the cash income generated by their own labour. Modernisation of agriculture was thus supposed to have taken place without altering the traditional land tenure system. Similarly, industrialisation was supposed to have taken place without altering existing the traditional sexual division of labour.

As a result of this, African economies are experiencing the existence of dual economies. There is clear division between the modern sector and the traditional sector, there is the urban sector and the rural sector, as well as the formal sector and the informal sector. In the modern sector, women provide the supporting services, such as secretarial services, nursing and other related social work. The men are either co-managers, share-holders or directors. The few women who have made it to executive positions constitute such a small group that it has no significant impact on the major decisions affecting the sector. This condition is perpetuated by continued gender stereotyping in the educational systems and discriminatory practices in the existing educational systems,

which constrain women from access to institutions of higher learning including university and technical education.

In the urban sector, women constitute either the unemployed, the semi-skilled or are largely engaged in the "informal sector". The informal sector includes activities ranging from prostitution, illicit beer brewing, vegetable vending to house keeping tasks. The informal sector has been expanding and provides the majority of women with sources of income, either as employees or as self-employed individuals. Yet, governments have shown very little interest of formalising the informal sector in the planning process, despite the fact that the informal sector has enabled families to subsist during the peak period of the social-economical crisis and has therefore also enabled governments to go through the crisis with a minimum of social upheavals.

The dual nature of the African economies, which is being preserved partly because of the desire to preserve those institutions which protect the power of the patriarch, is partly responsible for the failure to "modernise" these economies as envisaged by the modernisation theorists. African countries would not have been able to industrialise without destroying the traditional institutions and structures, which would have meant destroying the traditional land tenure systems, changing the traditional roles of the family unit, and re-defining the sexual division of labour in order to make possible the release of the African women's labour from domestic to public labour. There has been a conscious attempt by African states to preserve some of the traditional structures and romanticise the role of the traditional family with its extended structures in stabilising the society. This ignored the subordination of women in these traditional societies. It is no wonder that the modernisation experience brought into being the dual economy, which is neither modern nor traditional, and hence frustrated the architects of the model.

In the 1970s, however, development economists attempted to provide a new formula for solving problems of poverty. Within the modernisation paradigm one school of thought was of the view that the earlier model had failed because it failed to incorporate the poor, specifically women, into the mainstream of development. According to this school, the poor neither contributed effectively to the production of global wealth, nor did they benefit from global wealth.

African states were advised to incorporate poverty oriented aspects, which took into account distributive aspects, into their development programmes. This is the context which brought into being the basic service strategies. In the 1970s many development agencies started to incorporate gender concerns in their projects. The 1970s witnessed the establishment of Women In Development (WID) officers in development agencies, while government Ministries established either "focal" points, a department of women's affairs, or full-fledged Ministries of "Women's Affairs".

The main conceptual problem with the basic service strategy is that it considered women as "victims" and "passive" actors in the development process. As victims, women had to be given a modicum of assistance mainly in health, basic education, and water, as a way of making them less vulnerable to changes which were bound to occur in the development process. As passive actors, on the other hand, women had to be incorporated into the mainstream of development to facilitate their contribution in the production of national wealth.

This analysis ignores the fact that women had been fully integrated in the development process as producers of both cash crops and food crops, and as

reproducers of labour power. Most African countries had recorded a high increase of both cash crops and food crops in the 1960s, which had resulted from small-scale unmechanised producers, mainly women. The women who constituted the majority of producers were fully integrated in the world economy, as neatly expressed by Lappe et al. (1980):

... rather than being left out of the development process, the poor have been an integral part of the process, both as resources and as victims. The poor have provided their labour, their products and often their land. The issue then is not to bring the poor into the development process but for the poor to achieve the power they need to direct development process in their interest.

The issue of empowerment never constituted part of development agenda during the 1970s, despite the fact that development strategies paid a lip service to issues of social justice and poverty. The WID ideology sought to integrate women into the mainstream of development planning for purposes of controlling their activities rather than empowerment. Given the fact that women essentially dominated the informal sector, they indeed constituted what Hyden termed "uncaptured" peasantry. The government and the financial agencies were interested in controlling the activities of women, not in empowerment.

Nevertheless, the incorporation of gender concerns in the development agenda, including global propaganda such as the Women's Decade for Development, did have some positive impact in terms of creating awareness. It is not sheer coincidence that the 1970s witnessed a growing interest by many African born researchers who posed gender issues in their analysis of development theories (Vuorela, 1984).

During the 1970s, a few of the female graduates of the 1960s re-entered the University for graduate studies. If education at undergraduate level had not created gender awareness, their professional experience had. As they entered the labour market with their male counterparts, they had to grapple with their triple roles as mothers, wives and professionals. Sexual division of labour affected their job mobility and professional training. They also faced open discrimination and sexual harassment. The condition was worsened by the fact that their participation in workers' councils, where they existed, or in trade unions was marginal due to the unfair division of labour.

The above provided a context within which postgraduate studies of the 1970s were to pose gender issues. Studies include issues related to Women and Ideology, Reproductive Rights, Land Tenure Systems, and Women's Studies (ibid.). By the end of the decade, neither development planners nor policy makers were able to totally ignore gender concerns in the planning process.

The awareness of gender issues and how gender inequities were affecting the development process, did not seem to have made a significant impact on the development strategies which were pursued by the majority of African states during the 1980s. As discussed, the development strategies of the 1970s which had attempted to tackle issues of poverty and social justice did not provide a solution to the global crisis of production and distribution. Development economists did not hesitate to bring new formulas for the solution of development problems. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank took a lead in prescribing medicine to the "sick" of the world. Countries which were having acute problems in balancing their payments and in meeting their debt

obligations were advised to adjust and restructure their economies so as to stabilise and promote growth. While these institutions had formerly encouraged state intervention in the management of the economy, the same institutions were now blaming the poor states for their excessive involvement in the management of their economies. The poor states were advised to create space to allow market forces to play a dominant role in the management of their economies.

The social costs of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) are well documented and we need not go into a detailed discussion. We are only going to touch on those aspects which have had gender implications. Ideally SAPs should facilitate women's access to productive assets, should contribute to an increase of women's return on productive assets, improve women's employment opportunities, increase their participation in training and education, improve their access to health and other social services, and improve their participation in the management of the economy. SAPs should also contribute to a decrease in infant and maternal mortality rates as it improves production.

Using the above indicators, there has been sufficient literature which has documented negative impact of SAPs on women and children. SAPs have entailed devaluation of local currency, imposition of wage freezes, abolition of price controls, increases of agricultural producer prices, increase of interest rates, removal of import controls, and restraints on government expenditures (UTR, 1986).

Devaluation was based on the assumption that it would motivate agricultural producers to increase production because its effect was to increase the local value of domestic products. Since women constituted the bulk of agricultural producers, one would naturally have assumed that women would have benefited from agricultural price increases, and in turn that they would have improved their productive capacity. This assumption ignores the fact that women have had very little choice concerning agricultural labour including their own. In some countries, though not in the majority, they lack access to credit facilities, they do not control cash income from sales of agricultural products, and worse still, they do not have rights of ownership over the land they have been using. By implication, we are saying that even if we assume that all other factors will be under control, and that SAPs magically led to improvement of the domestic value of the agricultural products produced by women, women will not necessarily benefit from this increase.

But as pointed out in another paper (Meena, 1991), increased producer prices for cash crops may negatively affect women by forcing them to spend more of their time producing the cash crops and less of their time producing their own crops, such as fruits and vegetables. We also considered price increases as an ineffective instrument for motivating agricultural producers, because we had observed a mismatch between increased prices of necessary farm inputs and increased producer prices. Moreover, we noted that there has been no effective mechanism to ensure that the surplus which is accrued from the increased producer prices benefits the actual producers, especially women.

Moreover, in addition to price control, the IMF advised governments of Sub-Saharan Africa to re-direct investment priorities, away from "non-productive" sectors to "productive" sectors. Non-productive sectors refers to those service sectors which have been supporting the reproductive tasks such as health, education, and water. We need not go into details of the social costs of this policy

as they are well covered by other scholars (Campbell, 1986; Kiondo, 1988; Nkoma & Meena, 1990). Studies have revealed how maternal and infant mortality rates have increased during the adjustment periods, how school drop-out has increased especially for female students/pupils whose labour is required to supplement that of their mothers in various survival strategies. Although the World Bank and the IMF have been claiming that the social costs of SAPs are inevitable, but short term, women and children have remained the most vulnerable group. For women it has meant bearing the risks of death due to post natal and pre-natal problems and suffering the trauma of losing their under-fives due to malnutrition and other infectious diseases, etc. It has also meant an increased work load as each woman individually or collectively sought out personal and collective ways of adjusting to the crisis for their own survival and that of their families.

SAPs have indeed been insensitive not only to gender concerns but to human suffering.

Conclusion

As African states grapple with a way out of the SAP, and as development economists consider alternative paths to SAPs, there seems to be no way out but:

... re-direction of resources to satisfy, in the first place, the critical needs of the people, to achieve economic and social justice and emphasize self-reliance on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to empower the people to determine the direction and content of development and to effectively contribute to the enhancement of production and productivity that are required (African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, 1990, 18).

Empowering people should mean giving both men and women a right and space to participate in the management of society, which should start with the household economy where women are most disempowered.

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Gender issues in management development

An African paradigm

Hilda Tadria

The history of development in Africa is a history of an unbalanced development equation. An examination of the different phases of the development process shows that development strategies adopted in Africa have ignored the role of cultural ideologies in the Africans' daily lives. Consequently, cultural ideologies of gender roles and relations have not been adequately appreciated and accepted as important development variables. One should not get the impression that gender and culture have been the only missing variables in the development equation. However, I believe that a sustainable development strategy appropriate to the African context must also aim at identifying the socio-cultural, ideological and practical instruments of gender relations and inequalities.

The main thesis of the paper is that failure to treat gender and related cultural ideologies and practices as critical variables in the development process has weakened the effectiveness of development strategies adopted in the African context. The paper briefly discusses the weakness of the different phases of development strategies from the gender perspective. Research experiences are drawn upon to illustrate the pervasive nature of culture in organisations. The strategies of ESAMI (Eastern and Southern African Management Institute) as a management development training and research institute are discussed to illustrate the role of the institute in initiating gender focused development management.

A gendered development strategy

Development takes place in specific identifiable socio-cultural environmental realities in the African context. Development strategies for Africa must address the structural, ideological, and practical realities of gender based role relations, resource distribution, access, and control. *Poverty issues in Africa are more than issues of inequality.* They are issues of gender inequality, maintained and justified by a specific cultural ideology of female subordination at all levels of interpersonal relations both in the formal and informal organisations. Any concept, strategy and practice of development for Africa that does not address issues of gender inequality (ideological and practical) will continue to show marginal, illusionary results.

Analysis of development phases from the 1960s onwards shows how development on the African continent has overlooked the social and economic dynamics of inequality. Development statistics of the African region for the 1980s

confirm that despite all the development strategies adopted by the African governments, poor communities continue to be poor.

Although significant differences exist among countries and regional figures must be treated with caution, real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) for the region declined nearly 20% between 1980 and 1987, in 1987 alone, it dropped 4.7%. Export earnings fell about 40% from 1980 to 1983, recovered slightly, and then declined still further in 1986 and 1987. Import purchases fell about 40% during 1981–85 and have regained only 3% since then. The 1980s have been a decade of severe, if not unsurpassed, economic hardships, affecting millions of people in virtually every African country. The hardships experienced in the social sector have been exemplified by increased malnutrition, child maternal mortality, increased incidences of communicable diseases and declining literacy and educational levels (The Social Dimensions of Adjustment in Africa, 1990, 2).

If the economic indicators of development are miserable at a time when development strategies have been centred on economic growth rather than social development, how did the social sector (the people) fare? Again, the World Bank is clear about the situation of poor communities in Africa.

Behind these aggregate economic statistics lies the day-to-day reality of the development crisis confronting African countries: crumbling roads and deteriorating infrastructure; clinics without medicines, idle factories, growing unemployment and underemployment, schools without teaching materials, and deteriorating maternal and child health (Ibid.).

Today, there is a general agreement between different governments and major development donors on the need to shift from macroeconomic growth oriented strategies to "poverty oriented adjustment" strategies in which the participation of the poor is increased. The World Bank has outlined some of the necessary ingredients for a more "people" focused adjustment economic development strategy.

The poor and vulnerable as target groups

The poor and vulnerable have been identified as the target groups in the approach of the Social Dimensions of Adjustment in Africa (SDA)

Concern for social dimensions requires a clear picture of the vulnerability of particular socio-economic groups to adjustment programs and of the impact of adjustment on the patterns of poverty in a given country. Policymakers are faced with the task of deciding which of a wide range of competing social needs for various poor and vulnerable groups should be funded with available resources. Setting priorities is therefore inescapable, but determining the criteria for such choices is made more difficult by the limitations imposed by the adjustment process (The Social Dimensions of Adjustment in Africa, 1990, 2).

Broad categories of the groups have been identified as the chronic poor, the new poor and other vulnerable socio-economics groups.

Arguing that prevailing adjustment tends to increase the number of people living below the poverty line (Cornia et al., 1987), a UNICEF study advocates a strategy that addresses the human needs of the population. The "people"/

"poverty" centred development strategy has been further defined in the ECA Arusha Conference on "Putting the People First", held in February 1990, as one in which popular participation has been adopted as a means and an end in development. Outlining the basic characteristics of popular participation, the conference identified the following:

- Fundamental rights of people to fully and effectively participate in the determination of the decisions affecting their lives.
- Empowerment of people to involve themselves in policy development and effective participation in development.
- Popular participation must begin and be practised at family level.

The conference also recognised the role of women in development and advocated the elimination of female subordination as a priority of participatory development.

In general the illustrated shift from economic growth-centred development strategies to "people", "poverty" and "social" centred strategies is an important positive change relevant to the African environment. But however important the shift is, it still lacks a gendered approach. Even the popular participation approach seems to assume a basic non-discriminatory socio-cultural setting in which women just happen to be subordinate. The conference argued for an open political process, more accommodating state and international communities as pre-requisites for popular participation. But the role the social-cultural environment plays in influencing gender relations of inequality and related levels of participation or underparticipation is not explicit. Yet, elimination of gender inequality must be more than a priority in development, it is a precondition for development. As one politician once put it, "Development is not a right, it is a result of Rights".

The major development strategy must be able to identify and address itself at the basic development variables. If the new development approach is to address the "poor" the "vulnerable" and the "popular" these must not be seen as faceless, genderless masses of people. Even poverty in Africa is not genderless, as a cursory examination of major indicators of poverty shows.

Necessities for a gendered development approach

The following requirements are identified as necessities for a gendered development approach:

- Awareness and appreciation of socio-economic and political dynamics of different gender roles, relations and positions.
- Understanding and the will to address different, at times unequal, gender needs emanating from different gender roles, relations and positions.
- Understanding of and commitment to addressing the cultural gender ideologies which justify and maintain the cultural practices of gender inequality. A simple analysis of folk stories; songs and proverbs will give an indication of the focus on an ideology that emphasises gender inequality.

In ESAMI's ten years of management training, research and consultancy, it has become increasingly clear that both development workers and policy makers have very little appreciation of the pervasiveness and negative effect of cultural ideologies of gender inequality. Indeed the view held by many people, that women related issues are women's concerns, explains the continuing lack of appreciation of the relationship between gender inequality and economic underdevelopment. *ESAMI's approach to development management therefore, emphasises not only skills development, but also a change of attitude as a prerequisite to socio-economic changes and development.* But most importantly, ESAMI's gender focused training, manifested in the Women in Development and Management Programme, is based on the principle that gender inequality (whether culturally based or not) is unacceptable, not least because it is incompatible with sustainable, equitable development.

ESAMI's gender focused development management training

Gender focused training at ESAMI has a definite gender perspective based on observations of social realities. These realities are as follows:

- The situation of men and women in management and development is that of inequality and differentiation related at a certain point to the social cultural relations of gender inequality and the differences which exist in African social systems.
- Because of the above, women face more caring, social, psychological and organisational barriers than men do.
- The existing gender differences and inequalities in management and development are non-biological and therefore changeable. Change and development will come partly as a result of better understanding of the nature of existing gender inequalities and differences and the role of culture in maintaining these inequalities.
- Gender is a critical variable in social life because in many ways gender still dictates one's opportunities, privileges, statuses and even perceptions within the African setting. As such, a more gender focused development approach is a precondition of sustainable equitable development.

The gender perspective

Based on the identified gender perspective, ESAMI's Women in Management and Development (WID/WIM) training programmes address issues of gender inequality and change at several different levels. ESAMI's strategy is to initiate change at the individual level, the organisational culture the individual is operating in, as well as the total social, cultural and policy environment.

Development of management skills for women managers

According to the Forward Looking Strategies, "continued upgrading and the productive utilisation of human resources" is the strategy necessary for ensur-

ing 'effective participation' of women in development and in the strengthening of peace as well as the promotion of the equality of women and men". In this same line, ESAMI's perspective is that certain aspects of gender inequality at work emanate from unequal competence and skills levels. It is in relation to this that the management skills programme is offered to women: as a process of "continual upgrading".

There is no doubt that women are slowly but steadily joining the work force, either as public employees or private entrepreneurs even in the African region. Women's gradual, if low, participation in management has played a part in exposing gender based inequalities in different sectors of development. But it has also become especially clear that, in order to compete for, as well as participate in, high performance organisations on an equal footing, women need to acquire relevant skills, improve their work performance and develop enough self-confidence.

As a training institute, ESAMI's women in management programme focuses on issues of performance improvement for women. Within this programme one component deals with women managers in the public sector and the other with women in the private sector. The major objective of the programmes in both sectors is to improve management performance of individual women by equipping them with appropriate management skills. At this level, training individual women for competence, self-confidence, and positive self-image become the issue.

The basic question that is usually put to ESAMI is whether there is a need to have women only management skills training programmes. The answer is that as long as gender remains a critical factor in influencing access to management positions as well as performance at work, there is a need to have women only programmes. It is necessary for both men and women to grasp issues of gender role identity, self-confidence and self-esteem. But these issues may also have different meanings and consequences for women and men, even under similar circumstances. The importance of providing a free and conducive environment under which women can explore and understand their role identities and meanings of these identities cannot be overemphasised.

One of the major lessons learnt from these programmes, however, is that the bases of gender inequality at work places and other development sectors lie beyond lack of skills for women. Indeed, in many cases women's ineffectiveness and inefficiency maybe maintained and reinforced by the cultural beliefs, attitudes and practices which obtain within the African environment. It is one thing to expect equity on the basis of one's competence, it is another to be equitably treated. Any programme for change focusing on gender issues in development must, therefore, address the gender issues within the socio-cultural and policy environment and how they may affect equitable development. As ESAMI's Forward Looking Strategies state as their second area of concern:

What is now needed is the political will to promote development in such a way that the strategy for the advancement of women seeks first and foremost to alter current unequal conditions and structures that continue to define women as secondary persons and give women's issues a low priority.

Gender sensitisation and awareness creating programmes

The major objective of these programmes is to create the necessary political will and a positive cultural environment for integrating women in development.

At this level ESAMI's WID/WIM Programme addresses itself to the policy implementors whose role it is to integrate gender issues into development sectors. ESAMI's approach is based on the understanding that policy implementors and development workers need to have a proper grasp of women's roles and positions in development and the need for an equitable participatory role in the development sectors. In relation to this perspective the relevant personnel are introduced to basic gender issues pertinent to the planning and implementation of equitable development programmes. These programmes are for both men and women, although the major problem is that nominating agencies are usually reluctant to nominate men to gender focused programmes.

The second level of sensitisation addresses this view and attempts to enhance policies which are truly gender focused. ESAMI's WID/WIM Programme at this level aims at sensitising policy makers as a way of creating an enabling environment. Several studies have now revealed that among the constraints against a truly equitable development process is the social-cultural environment, expressed in attitudes and beliefs (*gender ideology*) of society to women's roles and statuses. Without exception, the gender ideologies of the subregion, which express societal views of the gender roles, relations and statuses, are ideologies of gender inequality. The ideologies play a crucial role in expressing, maintaining and justifying an inequality based on gender. No amount of skills training for women will produce the desired changes, within the desired minimum time, unless the ideologies of gender inequality, utilised by policy makers in decision making are also addressed.

It is now becoming increasingly clear that "sustainable growth with equity" necessitates fundamental "reorientations" in attitudes and strategies for development. The sensitisation seminars and workshops aim at reorienting attitudes of policy planners both in the public and private sectors to be more positive and realistic in evaluating women. In this way policy planning in the region will also be more positively focused on issues of equity in development. Negative and unrealistic attitudes and ideologies of gender inequality provide a basis for female discrimination. However, these attitudes and ideologies have tended to survive in most cases, of ignorance about the actual roles and positions of women in development. Even the relationship between existing gender inequalities in participation in development and the continuing economic underdevelopment in the subregion is not clearly understood. In most cases, the policies and projects that are based on gender stereotyping indicate a serious lack of actual data on gender role profiles.

Gender focused research programmes

ESAMI's third area of programming addresses itself to this critical issue. Among the strategies for eliminating gender based inequality, the Forward Looking Strategies state that "reliable statistics on the situation of women play an important part in the elimination of stereotypes and the movement towards full equality". For the last few years the WID/WIM Programme has sought to

redress the situation of lack of accurate gender focused data by offering several types of research training programmes. These have been targeted at development workers, researchers, trainers and statisticians.

The basic theme in all the programmes is the importance of gender focused or non-sexist research methodologies. In the last one and a half years, emphasis has also been placed on practical gender focused data collection.

Participants in ESAMI's research methodology workshops are encouraged to develop gender focused research proposals and funding is made available to researchers whose projects promise to close the information gap on the roles and position of women in development. This is a complementary aspect to theoretical training, which will go a long way to closing the existing information gap on the role women play in development.

The development challenge

ESAMI's biggest challenge continues to be the socio-cultural environment which is reinforced by the existing gender ideologies that state and justify unequal gender role relations, opportunities and privileges. Within this context it has been difficult to convince men, and women equally, that gender inequality is neither biological nor God-made and that it can therefore be changed. Everybody is convinced of the need to utilise women in the labour force. In this regard the need for skills development and performance improvement by women is taken for granted. However, it is not accepted that gender based, socio-cultural inequalities provide a strong base for all other inequalities, and is therefore an issue in the development process. Consequently a lot of men, and women almost equally, proceed as if gender and culture are not development issues.

The second challenge is that most of the training programmes have responded mainly to the immediate needs of individual men and women. The bulk of the programmes have, therefore, been useful in developing and changing individual behaviour but have not adequately addressed the context of the organisational and social cultural environment in which the individuals work and live. This has meant that even if the individual is ready for change, the organisation, if unchanged, is very constraining to individual initiative. The challenge for the future is to develop programmes which go beyond changing an individual, to creating an environment that is receptive to change. This means a total approach to training which address individuals' as well as organisation's policy needs for change. More intensive data gathering on actual organisational constraints in integrating women in management has to be undertaken.

The role of training in creating an enabling environment for women in Management and Development cannot be overemphasised. ESAMI's strategy for the future is to integrate gender focused training sessions in all other training programmes. This is already being done in the High-level Policy Makers Workshops and most of the Human Resources Management training programmes. Finally, training, research and consultancy offered by ESAMI must be seen as one method of intervention in an effort to create the necessary prerequisites for the economic development strategies being initiated in Africa. Whether it is development with a human face, participatory development or restructuring, the cultural environment in which development must take place

to be clearly understood. A cultural environment (even at an ideological level) that justifies and maintains any type of inequality is an important variable in the development equation.

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The change of public sector role in the economy of developing countries in Africa

Konstantin Remchukov

The objectives of this paper are to review the importance and performance of public enterprises in developing countries, to examine the character of state sector reforms in Africa and to discuss possible Soviet changes in approaches towards Africa as a result of perestroika.

Despite the considerable economic progress that the developing world has made in the last 30 years it is a fact that more than one billion people there are living in poverty. The situation is worsening, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, where slow economic growth and rapid population growth could mean an increase of nearly one hundred million poor people. By the end of the century Sub-Saharan Africa will account for more than 30 per cent of the developing world's poor as against 16 per cent in 1985 (World Development Report, 1990, 5).

After achieving national independence, African countries saw economic growth as the primary means of reducing poverty and improving the quality of life. The simplistic approach of regarding capital investment as a major factor to push development forward led the Third World countries of Africa to adopt certain patterns of industrialisation which failed to raise the living standards of their populations considerably.

The 1980s and 1990s have demanded a new strategy of economic and social development which should ensure politically sustainable progress. This strategy should include two inter-dependent elements—the productive use of labor and the provision of basic social services to the poor.

The implementation of this strategy in reality requires new approaches towards the main driving forces of development—the public and private sectors of the economy.

Recently, attention on macroeconomic adjustment in developing countries has significantly focused on the management of public sector deficits. While it is clearly important to consider the public sector as a whole for the purposes of macroeconomic management and stabilisation, most attention has traditionally been given to the finances of central governments and to a lesser extent to those of provincial governments. However, the public sector in most developing countries also undertakes a substantial share of its production of goods and services and especially its investment through state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

Governments have different reasons for creating SOEs. To some degree each case is unique; the decision to establish an SOE is always shaped by distinctive, situation-specific factors. Furthermore, the rationales are generally multiple

and interrelated, and vary among SOEs performing different economic functions in their respective national economies.

Despite this heterogeneity, we can distinguish four general sets of interrelated factors:

- political*: food security, strategic economic control, management of power blocks—multinational corporations or local businesses, minorities, etc.;
- economic*: (a) market failure factor—noncompetitive structures, capital scarcity, inefficiencies, and institutional requisites, and (b) economic benefits factors—economies of scale, externalities, foreign exchange and fiscal revenue control;
- social*: consumer price stabilisation and food access, producer income preservation, generation of employment, promotion of regional development;
- ideological*: state ownership is associated with socialism.

Important financial and economic actors are SOEs, government owned (more than 50 per cent) and controlled entities, which are supposed to “earn most of their revenue from the sale of goods and services, are self-accounting, and have a separate legal identity” (Shirley, 1983, 2).

In the least developed countries (LDCs), the reliance on public enterprises to achieve socio-economic goals has been great. Their contributions are significant; for example:

- in value added through manufacturing, in the case of a great many developing countries, exceeding 50 per cent of national totals;
- of total investment, averaging 28 per cent in what appears to be a representative sample of 37 developing countries (Nair & Filippides, 1988, 6);
- in shares of utilisation of LDC’s credit systems (at a rough estimate, averaging 30 per cent of domestic and 20 per cent of total foreign debt); and
- in nonagricultural employment, averaging about 15 per cent in developing countries (Nellis, 1989, 659).

There are at least three factors that contribute to this. First, SOE tend to be founded in capital-intensive activities such as power and water supply, telecommunications, rail transportation and ports as well as large-scale mining and manufacturing. Developing countries began with much lower stocks of infrastructure in these areas than did industrial countries. Second, there are possible biases in SOE choices of technology because of frequently subsidised or preferential access to capital and foreign exchange. In addition, governments have often had a preference for large capital-intensive investment and have favoured SOEs in the provision of investment finance. Third, for social and other reasons, governments in developing countries have often subjected SOE output to price controls and have thereby limited their market value.

The history of public enterprises in most of Sub-Saharan Africa dates back to the colonial period. It was however, after Independence that the sector expanded rapidly.

Africa’s SOE sector consists of nearly 3,000 enterprises; the median number per country is 64. Although the total number of public enterprises in Sub-Saharan Africa has remained steady on balance during 1980–86, it appears to be declining in most countries. For a sample of 25 countries, 13 have reduced the number of public enterprises, while seven countries have created new ones or

improved the classification of SOEs. (Swanson, 1989, 6) Nearly one hundred SOEs were expected to be privatised or liquidated in 1987, although an accurate updating of these efforts is unavailable.

Just as the 1960s and 1970s were characterised by a rapid expansion of the public sector in the developing world, the 1980s have seen widespread attempts by policy makers to curtail the economic role of the state. The divestiture, or privatisation, of SOEs has featured prominently in these attempts, just as an earlier generation of policy makers had emphasised direct state intervention to redress perceived failures in the operation of private markets.

SOE contributions to rising public sector deficits and growing foreign indebtedness are increasingly recognised as key issues in public finance. As an integral part of the public finance system, SOEs both affect and are affected by public finance policies and institutions. Direct transfers to SOEs from government budgets are the most obvious sign of this. Others are harder to see: inter-agency arrears and government guarantees of SOE; debts do not appear by name in the budget. Through these interactions SOEs have added to public sector deficits and to a lack of transparency in public finance (World Development Report, 1988, 168-181).

The roots of poor SOE performance are both internal and external. Internal factors include inappropriate investment decisions, an adverse operating environment characterised by a weak capital base and price controls, and institutional impediments such as insufficient operating autonomy and poor accountability. External factors include unfavourable export or import prices, limited access to markets and high interest rates. To deal with some of these factors many governments have started efforts to reform public enterprises, including financial and physical restructuring, and divestiture. These programmes are generally supported by macroeconomic reform, involving price and import liberalisation, and exchange rate realignment.

Stabilisation reforms are usually associated with International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality programmes and refer to currency devaluation, credit contraction, and reduction of public sector deficits. Insofar as selling or eliminating public enterprises may lessen fiscal pressures, privatisation measures are discussed as part of stabilisation programmes. Privatisation offers equity to the public as a way of moving toward fiscal balance instead of increasing public debt or, for that matter, increasing taxes. However, privatisation and public sector reform are usually discussed under two different headings from that of stabilisation: neoconservative transformation and structural adjustment. A "neoconservative transformation" is one in which a political leadership sets out to fundamentally reorganise social and political as well as economic agreements.

Lying between the IMF stabilisation packages and neoconservative transformations in terms of scope, are structural adjustment programmes associated with the World Bank and the USA administration's aid policies. Here loans, investments and aid are conditional on the design and implementation of a certain set of reforms. These include: trade liberalisation (moving away from licenses and quantitative restrictions on imports, to reducing the scope and size of tariffs); getting domestic prices in line with world market prices; improving revenues by widening tax bases and reforming the administration of taxes; diminishing government deficits by lowering public expenditure, especially

subsidies. In the first instance, reducing government deficits is seen as essential to lower inflation and allow for new domestic and foreign investment.

Formal adjustment programmes in Africa have all aimed at reducing state intervention in the productive economy, and at releasing the forces of private entrepreneurship, whether at the level of the small-holder farmer or in the industrial domain. In so far as adjustment programmes have been designed on a common pattern, it is questionable whether the standard model of deregulation and privatisation should necessarily apply to LDCs. If these countries are least developed, it is partly because they have so far proved unattractive to entrepreneurs and investors. This is not just an issue of foreign private investment and lending; LDCs also tend to lack a domestic entrepreneurial class, let alone local capital, to exploit.

The small entrepreneurial and industrial base means that the economies of Tropical Africa are dominated by the primary sector (mining or agriculture), and that the vagaries of the world commodity market largely determine the pace of growth in industry. Thus, recovery of rehabilitation measures adopted by governments for manufacturing enterprises will often be ineffective unless the world economic environment improves. Nevertheless, some 28 countries in the region are reportedly undertaking recovery or adjustment programmes, with or without IMF standby agreements or structural adjustment loans (African Development Bank, 1988, 13). Consensus on the need for reforms seems to have emerged since the Organization of African Unity adopted Africa's Priority. Programme for Economic Recovery. It gives priority to agriculture and resource-based industrial projects, with particular emphasis on small- and medium-scale enterprises (SME).

Such a shift provides a contrast to past industrialisation strategy, which stressed import substitution based on imported inputs, i.e. assembly-line production under heavy protection. Many modern industries, ranging from plastics to automobiles, were built in that manner. Experience during the world recession (1981-83) has, however, shown that such a strategy has reached its limits in view of the dwindling availability of foreign exchange. Shortages in imported inputs, equipment and spare parts, caused partly by austerity measures in foreign exchange allocation and partly by poor management procedures, have made a large number of manufacturing establishments idle, or forced them to run well below capacity. Current data on capacity utilisation is scarce, but available information suggests, for instance, a rate of 50 per cent (1984) for manufacturing in Madagascar, five per cent (1984) in Sierra Leone, 36 per cent (1985) in Liberia, and between ten and 40 per cent (1983) in Mozambique (Industry and Development, 1988/89, 71).

Under the circumstances, it is natural to search for an alternative industrialisation strategy for future growth, coupled with a programme of restructuring and rehabilitation for greater efficiency in existing industries. Privatisation is providing one form of restructuring in several countries, for example, in Gambia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal.

Along with the privatisation schemes, an emphasis on domestic resource-based SME looms large in the restructuring programmes. The basic aims are as follows: to maximise the domestic value-added content of manufactured output instead of import-intensive output; to mobilise domestic savings, investment and indigenous entrepreneurship; to create greater linkages between the agricultural sector and the industrial sector; and to reduce both the gap be-

tween urban and rural industry and the income gap. Such an industrial policy, combined with renewed agricultural demand, should enable industrialisation to become the engine of growth in the region.

One of the powerful economic arguments advanced in favour of SMEs comes from evidence that investments in SMEs are more productive (profitable) than in large-scale enterprises. Thus, giving equal opportunities to SMEs (that is, access to credits, commercial services, market information, etc.) could bring greater efficiency throughout the economy.

It cannot be over-emphasised that SMEs in the region operate in one of the most difficult and costly infrastructures, where the cost of information-gathering, communication and transactions are often prohibitive to SMEs. The lack of sufficient physical infrastructure, transportation, and communication were symptomatic of another serious problem in Africa—decentralisation of development planning—which is necessary for acceleration of economic growth and for the spread of its benefits to those groups that are traditionally bypassed by economic progress. Overcentralisation of authority has been a serious problem in administering local development projects in many developing countries. Decentralisation projects, in order to be successful, should be carefully planned, closely supervised and strongly supported. Crucial political, economic and social preconditions must be established before decentralisation becomes feasible on a large scale, and other conditions must be encouraged as decentralisation occurs (Rondinelli, 1983, 118).

These changes in African countries, aimed at achieving higher productivity and efficiency in the economy, are closely watched in the Soviet Union. For many years the USSR's assistance in social and economic development in Africa has been oriented toward the public sector. The Soviet concept of industrialisation implied the reliance on heavy industries, like steel-making, machine-building, power generation, etc. By 1986, the Soviet Union had exported to the Third World 4,716 complete plants, of which almost 2,500 were for industrial production (UNCTAD, 1989).

Technology flows from the Soviet Union to developing countries consist mainly of turn-key plant deliveries and technical assistance in the development of human resources. These two modes of transfer correspond to each other, and together form the core of Soviet's technology export policy. The Soviet Union, as a rule, delivers technology to large-scale projects and the combination of these forms of technology transfer is best suited to this. Two other fairly important modes of Soviet technological expansion abroad are industrial cooperation and licensing arrangements.

The economic relations between the USSR and African countries have recently been strongly criticised by some Soviet economists (Polyakov, 1989). Newly elected deputies in both the Union and Republican Parliaments have criticised the foreign economic policy of the government on the grounds that political and ideological reasons had always prevailed over rationality and commercial profitability. The total deficit in the Soviet economy pushes people to take extreme positions in regard to relationships between the USSR and Africa. The prospects for Soviet-African trade and technology transfers are conditioned by the possibilities of changing the present industrial structure of this trade, the foreign debt problems of both partners, and the search of new direct forms for technological cooperation (joint ventures). The pace of economic cooperation between the USSR and Africa would also depend on the ability of

the Soviet economy to take into account the new African anti-poverty strategy. It suggests that projects in at least the following areas reduce poverty: agricultural research (particularly on crops grown predominantly by the poor) and extension; the introduction of high-yielding varieties of good grains in Africa; basic infrastructure in rural areas, especially farm to market roads in many low-income Sub-Saharan African countries; primary education, basic health care and nutrition; and relief from natural and man-made disasters.

Although, in Soviet theoretical thinking and in the economic reality of the perestroika years, there is a shift towards the recognition of some forms of ownership other than by the state, the pace of their full scale introduction is still weak and controversial. Foreign economic relations are still heavily controlled by the government with its traditional "ministerial" approach towards new forms and methods of cooperation. This leads one to believe that in the nearest future the Soviet Union is more likely to be absorbed by internal structural reforms rather than to participate in the fulfilment of structural and management reform measures in Africa. This will inevitably lead to a reduction of the actual Soviet economic assistance to African countries.

At the same time, depoliticisation of Soviet international relations is likely to bring about new forms of cooperation with a wider range of African countries in those fields, including humanitarian issues, where the USSR holds competitive positions in world markets.

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Intermediate production enterprises

A challenge to policy makers

Arni Sverrisson

In this paper it is argued that current global trends will create increased scope for small and intermediate scale enterprises in Africa. An adequate policy response to these developments is a necessity rather than an option.

The prevailing growth and survival strategies of small and intermediate enterprises are then discussed from a community network perspective. These practices are related to current discussions about the merits of alternative technological trajectories and the role of flexible production *versus* mass production in the development process.

The discussion then turns back to the roots of the prevalent development paradigms that are one-sided interpretations of the European and American industrialisation experience. Opportunities and problems posed by alternative industrialisation strategies are discussed, and lastly, autonomous development, which amplifies the innate technological dynamism of African societies, is emphasised and a warning note is sounded against the imposition of abstract industrialisation models.

In the context of retarded global growth, deteriorating terms of trade for tropical products and stagnating capital inflows from aid and loans, industrialisation strategies predicated on export growth and large-scale importation of capital goods have become implausible in Africa. However, these developments also create new conditions for small and intermediate scale enterprises in African countries. The economic space in which they operate will probably expand, and the risks associated with technical change in intermediate scale enterprises should decrease.

This type of dialectic between the fortunes of import dependent and capital intensive technologies vs. locally adapted labour intensive technologies has occurred conjuncturally in e.g. Tanzania and Ghana (Havnevik, 1987, 277; Dawson, 1990, 41). Similar trends are at work in Kenya. This can be expected to occur more widely and become a secular trend if the current economic marginalisation of African societies continues.

As opportunities to profitably invest in and gradually improve domestically oriented manufacturing activities grow, so do both the numbers and the political leverage of the people involved. This creates a challenge to prevalent technology policies from within, as it were. In consequence, a technology policy which consciously seeks to support small scale and intermediate efforts becomes more relevant and more realistic as well as becoming a necessity rather than an option.

In order to be successful in *promoting industrialisation*, such a policy cannot be based primarily on traditional crafts and informal sector activities. There is already a substantial number of dynamic, partially mechanised, enterprises located in the amorphous social territory between the peasantry and the informal

sector on the one hand and the state and the "modern" sector on the other. (See e.g. House, 1981; Havnevik et al., 1985; McCormick, 1987; Kaplinsky, 1990). These enterprises form the social basis of alternative industrialisation strategies.

In order to provide these admittedly rather abstract remarks with flesh and blood, let me briefly recapitulate some observations from my research on furniture manufacturers in Kenya and Zimbabwe (Sverrisson, 1989, 1990, and forthcoming). This research has purposely been located in intermediate towns, Mutare in Zimbabwe and Nakuru in Kenya. Both towns are located near forestry areas and raw materials are plentiful. Both have railroad links, and are within half a day's drive from Harare and Nairobi respectively. The project, in other words, studies the dynamics of small and intermediate enterprise development in relatively favourable circumstances.

The approach adopted represents what can be called a community network approach, emphasising social relations within and between enterprises. It is suggested that groups of enterprises involved in producing the same kind of products, close to each other, create the prerequisites of a collective dynamic.

Among others, Schmitz (1989) has put the problem of collective innovation and diffusion in small enterprise clusters on the agenda by suggesting that efficiency is a collectively determined attribute of small enterprise *clusters*, rather than an enterprise-determined variable. Geographical discussions of the economics of aggregation move along similar lines, in that the clustering of enterprises is seen as an essential factor (Rasmussen, 1990). In addition, applications of specific sociological approaches to technological problems have led on to new conceptualisations of technological change, as is the case with the social constructivist approach and the study of interactive technological networks (Bijker et al., 1987). Carefully used, these approaches are very useful in Third World contexts. Last, but not least, among the sources of inspiration are historians of technology who approach standard explanations of industrialisation and technical change in Europe critically. Allen (1983) has documented collective invention processes in England. Samuel (1977) emphasised the role of technical and organisational flexibility in manufacturing development. Berg (1985) has described the many and varied forms of industrial organisation in the initial stages of the industrial revolution. Headrick (1988) has suggested that the elitist culture of local ruling classes has been no less an obstacle to technological change than the "traditionalism" of the peasantry.

Technical change and survival strategies

Why do small enterprises mechanise in the way they do and what obstacles do they have to overcome in the process? Part of the answer is that the character of the business environment *imposes the need for certain survival strategies*. This in turn makes it exceedingly difficult to realise the benefits of large scale, standardised and mechanised production. Rather, mechanisation must be flexible and gradual. The survival strategies referred to can be summarised under the following headings:

- Emphasising scope rather than scale of production;
- Production financing through deposits paid by customers;
- Minimum raw material stocks;

- Ad hoc* rather than systematic management;
- Parallel, rather than cooperative labour organisation.

It is important to note that these strategies are *rational responses* to a particular kind of business environment, characterised above all by extreme volatility, rather than being the result of inadequate education, traditionalism, or other commonly cited obstacles to development.

In many ways these strategies are analogous to the recommendations of the recent management theories developed in the industrially advanced countries, although they are applied within an altogether different context. The minimising of stocks in Nakuru and Mutare is largely a consequence of the relative scarcity of capital, as is the custom of demanding deposits when orders are made. The predominance of production by order in turn makes flexibility and maximal scope of production a sensible competitive strategy. To make it work, shrewd salesmanship and prudent purchasing is more important, however, than detailed production management. Such decisions are left to the workers, who produce and are paid for complete pieces, not parts. Behind this complex of relations, erratic demand looms as a central fact of life.

These practices are not the only ones possible, but, for small and intermediate scale carpentry enterprises in Nakuru and Mutare, they are viable alternatives to standardised products made in long series. This latter alternative presupposes protection from the instability of the environment, through the stockpiling of raw materials, vertical integration, institutionalisation of labour contracting, and organising the distribution of products (cf. Piore & Sabel, 1984). From the point of view of entrepreneurs with minimal political clout, the complete organisation of markets is obviously not a relevant option. More limited measures to get and protect an adequate share of the market and dilute the harmful effects of competition are, however, possible.

It is through the consideration of this aspect that the constricting effects of the current business environment are most clearly manifested. Most small and intermediate woodworking enterprises in Nakuru and Mutare are in a situation that reminds the observer of the perfect competition in elementary economics textbooks. None are in a position to control a sizeable share of the market, with the result that it appears to be an unpredictable natural force to the individual entrepreneur. In order to survive, risks must be minimised and purchasing according to orders, customer financing, and flexible production, that emphasise scope rather than scale, all serve this purpose.

Technological change and expansion

Survival, however, is not always the main concern. Provisionally, it is possible to identify two main types of entrepreneurs: survivors, who are mainly concerned with making a living, and expanders, who have gone beyond this and have embarked on a graduation process. Both groups share the survival strategies discussed above. In addition, the following types of expansion strategies can be identified:

- Employing more workers;
- Diversification;

- Vertical expansion;
- Trading in the products of other carpenters;
- Gradual mechanisation.

Increasing employment, adjusting it to the demands of the day, is the most obvious expansion measure, and is employed by all enterprises, with the result that size, measured by number of employees, is a somewhat variable quantity. However, such increases are seldom permanent. Demand subsides again, either generally, or because other carpentry enterprises increase their market share.

Diversification is common and most common is the two pronged strategy of combining agricultural activities with small or intermediate enterprises (cf. also Lone, 1987; Helmsing, 1987). It is also possible to be engaged in two or more different kinds of small enterprises in order to hedge against market fluctuations. The purchase of a welding machine can, for instance, serve this purpose in small and intermediate carpentry units. However, the most common avenue of diversification in the furniture business is building work and interior fittings, which require skills similar to those of furniture production. Running a shop on the side is also a possibility and in Zimbabwe rural shopkeepers employed carpenters and sold the products. Vertical expansion into saw-milling, or sawmills expanding into furniture production, were common in Kenya, where a few carpenters with workshops in out-of-the-way (and cheap) locations had established up to three separate outlets in shopping areas. This facilitated the buying of other carpenter's products and resale with a profit.

The important thing about all these strategies is that they do not presuppose any kind of technical change in the enterprise, but each, in its own way, can create such opportunities, by increasing and stabilising turnover. In view of this, it is not surprising that mechanisation is in many cases combined with diversification, vertical expansion or trading. However, the main prerequisite of successful partial mechanisation is vocational training and practical experience. In the Kenyan group, most mechanising entrepreneurs had received formal training and had then worked in established workshops before setting out for themselves. In Zimbabwe, experience from established companies was also characteristic of intermediate entrepreneurs, but it was not necessarily gained within the furniture sector. In both cases, understanding of the idea of mechanisation was diffused through these experiences, but as we shall see, it has been interpreted and practised in a peculiar manner.

Technological change and the labour process

Central to technological change is the type of labour organisation prevailing in both mechanised and non-mechanised enterprises. Basically, there are two modes of organising production. One will here be called the parallel mode, in which two or more carpenters work "each on his own thing" from the beginning to the end. Specialisation is minimal or entirely non-existent. The other will be called the cooperative mode, in which several workers contribute to the production of a single piece. These can be seen as two modes of manufacture, in the traditional terminology. The parallel mode is characterised "by one capitalist employing simultaneously in one workshop a number of artificers, who all do the same, or the same kind of work." The cooperative mode implies at

least a temporary subdivision of tasks and incipient specialisation, and Marx suggested that the logic of capitalist production would lead to the development of the latter out of the former (Marx, n.d.: I, 318).

The introduction of these terms implies an emphasis on a *particular step* in the progress of the division of labour. The issue here is not the introduction of a factory system nor even the diffusion of manufacturing proper, as exemplified by Adam Smith's pin factory, but rather the very beginnings of the dissolution of artisan culture.

The basic mode of work organisation in the enterprises considered here is the parallel mode. However, repetitious and boring tasks, particularly sanding, are often relegated to unskilled assistants or shop attendants. Varnishing calls for greater skill and accordingly is often done by the proprietors themselves or by a skilled worker. An additional example of incipient specialisation could be found in those enterprises which had padded chairs and sofas among their products. Making the frames is, in these cases, a particular task, calling for relatively simple carpentry skills, whereas padding and covering were done by specialised workers.

Lastly, lathe-work is a special category performed by a skilled worker. Particularly interesting is the nature of the lathe-work itself. All the lathers "played by ear"; the use of tool-guides was unknown. Even in this instance of the rudimentary division of labour combined with elementary mechanisation, it was the manual dexterity of the workers involved, not their submission to a mechanical contrivance, that set them apart from their fellows.

Is cooperation of the joiners in a workshop totally *unknown* then? This is definitely not the case, and the cooperative mode was occasionally applied when producing big orders. In the few cases where standardised "ready mades" make up a large share of the products, the practice of continuous and repetitive production had not led to cooperative organisation. The standardisation of production in these cases was of the same character as in enterprises producing predominantly on order. A *fundi* would produce one chair, then another, etc., from the beginning to the end, all from the same mental blueprint.

This example illustrates how enterprises can retain fundamental characteristics which are ubiquitous to the local environment, although they are relatively advanced according to some single criterion. This observation also applies to the mechanising enterprises, which assimilated the use of machines in the prevailing mode of labour organisation.

Enterprise networks

Up to now, individual enterprises have been in focus, and different aspects of the environment have been discussed from that point of view. Another perspective is to focus on the whole furniture network as the relevant totality or unit of analysis. This collective should not be understood in a restrictive sense, but as including, in addition to furniture manufacturers, all their suppliers and customers, the workers, and more peripheral participants, such as bankers, government officials, NGO staff, etc.

Within this network, relations are established, acted upon and terminated continuously. This mercurial quality of small enterprise networks accounts for their vigour and responsiveness in times of opportunity, but also their fragility

in face of unfavourable conditions. In expansion, entrepreneurs are not encumbered by old loyalties. In adversity, they cannot expect much support from their fellows.

Although these collectives can be empirically defined through some kind of involvement in furniture production or with furniture producers, the essential unity of the network is established above all by the pool of skills and labour available. Many workers move from one enterprise to another, constantly chasing the best rates available. Others, "work at home", i.e. take on work on their own account. Still others work one day for themselves, another for an employer. One irate entrepreneur actually maintained, with recent disillusionment fresh in memory, that the main reason for carpenters to take employment in "open" enterprises was to make contacts with customers for their own, "underground" production.

This situation is expressed in what can be called a "subcontracting culture". This culture is manifested in casual employment, piecework and the normal practice, that workers bring with them at least the most basic tools. The border between "internal" subcontracting where a *fundi* is contracted to make a particular piece in the workshop of an entrepreneur, and "external" subcontracting, where he makes the same piece at home, is diffuse indeed, and both forms could be found coexisting in the same enterprise.

Control over the making of things is, in view of these arrangements, retained by the workers. It is a fundamental aspect of this complex of relations in regard to technical change, because it poses a profound obstacle to cooperative organisation of production, without which the evolution of mechanisation is bound to be tardy.

The peripheral participants in the network are of many different kinds. Directly interacting with carpentry enterprises are suppliers of wood and hardware, final customers, and sometimes, government agencies, furniture shops and providers of credit. Indirectly interacting are training institutes, hardware importers, forest companies, booksellers and teacher training institutes and aid organisations. Sometimes, two or more nodes of the network are conflated, as for instance when one person controls all the links in the chain from the forest to the customers.

Most social networks are assembled through several kinds of relations. Formal and informal communication of technical information are two such aspects. Some networks are in addition manifested physically, e.g. railroad networks or electricity grids. Buying and selling of commodities and services is frequently a constitutive network aspect, and in typical economic networks, the dominating one. Lastly, networks are held together through shared frames of reference, creating a common ground on the basis of which expectations are formed, contracts honoured and the confines of acceptable conduct defined.

In analyzing networks, grasping their different aspects all at once can be difficult. Not only does the network "look" different, depending who are seen as its core members, but disjunctions also exist between different layers or aspects of the network. In our case, basic economic relations, entailing the flow of money in one direction and the flow of commodities in the other, are well developed. Some of the tentacles extend beyond the borders of the country and encompass at some point virtually everybody in the community in the role of customer. Other constitutive moments are very unevenly developed. Formal communication of technical information, for example, happens almost exclu-

sively through training institutes. The diffusion of their graduates brings this information into the core of the enterprise collective, where bits and pieces of technical information are also circulated, inexperienced workers observe their elders, etc. This largely tacit body of knowledge is in other words person-embodied and informal.

Supplier's credits are exceedingly rare, an expression of the circumstance that ease of entry is matched by frequent exits. Racially reinforced cultural contradictions also play a role here, as Asian or white suppliers deal with African carpenters. However, cultural disarticulation is also manifest when small and intermediate entrepreneurs deal with support agencies and banks, or anyone having to do with the "modern sector" (Cf. Swantz, 1989). This aspect was more pronounced in Zimbabwe than Kenya.

In addition, within the enterprise collective, individual enterprises are unevenly developed according to a range of criteria. Competent salesmanship and sophisticated technology do not necessarily go hand in hand, for example. Uneven development of different aspects, uneven growth rates of individual enterprises, the availability of several expansion avenues, an extremely volatile market, individualised production organisation and prevalence of tacit as distinct from explicit and formalised technical knowledge, all point to two important conclusions. One is that standardised support is inadequate. The other is that it is imperative to strengthen the network itself, stabilise and enrich existing relationships, and diminish the cultural dissonance between the enterprise collective and government agencies.

Policy conceptions and social science

From the summary description above, it can be seen that the problems experienced by dynamic small and intermediate operators are essentially different from the problems afflicting enterprises emulating the mass production paradigm. The third type of non-agricultural activity, i.e. peasant-based micro-enterprises oriented towards a supplementary cash income that usually operate on a part time or seasonal basis, also have their own distinct problems (Helmsing, 1987; Havnevik, 1987). These three major technological domains are manifested in somewhat different ways in different manufacturing sectors. Each embody particular opportunities for expansion, and each has to cope with specific constraints. Hence, they posit alternative but complementary technical/social or technological trajectories. One way to understand technology policy in a development context is to consider in which way strategies and policies facilitate or present obstacles to such generalised trajectories. A policy may enhance the opportunities of the flexible intermediate sector, but create problems for the mass-production oriented formal sector, and *vice versa*.

In order to develop policy prescriptions which have some chance of success, it is further necessary to take one's point of departure in the *co-existence* of these different technological domains and the variability of the relations between them. However, this is exactly where theoretical traditions fail us. Social science traditions are strongly focused on problems arising from contemporary problems in the industrialised world, and the analysis of *homogeneous* social systems (Killick, 1989).

In this context it is useful to note that the development paradigm, that informs currently prevalent conceptions of technical change, is derived from very limited and one-sided interpretations of European and American history. In essence, the European and American industrialisation experience has been seen as the triumph of mass production over alternative production systems. The celebration of this victory has tended to obscure the contribution of other production methods, often seen as "traditional" and therefore, uninteresting.

However, an accumulating body of historical research testifies to the complex and contradictory symbiosis of large scale production and small and intermediate enterprises, particularly during the initial stages of industrialisation in Europe (Kriedte et al., 1981; Berg, 1985; Berg et al., 1983). In some cases such competitive symbiosis has been found to extend well into the twentieth century, and even to this very day (Sabel & Zeitlin, 1985; Isacson & Magnusson, 1987; Scranton, 1991). Examples of this phenomenon are not particularly difficult to find in Africa either, if one only cares to look for them, for instance in the interrelations of sophisticated sawmills and small scale carpenters.

In addition, flexible production and utilisation of economies of scope, rather than economies of scale, have attracted increased academic interest as well as wider practical application following the crisis of the mass production paradigm in the last two decades (Perez, 1989; Peters, 1987). In Kenya and Zimbabwe, such management principles are applied to large segments of the manufacturing sector, although the immediate context differs.

It is, therefore, a matter of contention whether the conception of development, as the superseding of flexible artisan based systems by mass production systems, is a valid frame of reference for the question of industrialisation in Africa. The least that can be said, is that the imposition of the mass production paradigm from the outside figures on the long list of mistakes that can be drawn up after a quarter century of development efforts in Africa. Perhaps some kind of "appropriate technology" conception is more adequate, although this approach is not without problems (Willoughby, 1990).

However, although the mass production paradigm has not been successfully implemented from the outside, this does not necessarily mean that it is altogether irrelevant. But it needs to be recognised that the choice between one or the other is a decision that governments and "donors" impose at their peril.

To understand technical change it is, therefore, necessary to understand the complexities of industrial morphology. In addition to the literature referred to above, recent contributions to historical and development research inspired by some kind of articulation/disarticulation problematic and comparative perspectives are promising in this respect (Iliffe, 1983; Mouzelis, 1988; Evans & Stephens, 1988). They still have some way to go, however, before entering the mainstream of development discourse.

Meanwhile, the social sciences are not confined to the ivory tower. The influence of social science categories on political thinking within the large bureaucracies concerned with development is undeniable. Indeed, it could be argued, as does Killick, if I have understood him correctly, that political visions, vogues and moods in the North inundate the significance of the concrete experiences of development practitioners and policy makers, and do so largely through the channels of the social sciences. Receiving elementary instruction in the principles of some social science is, in addition, a prerequisite for civilian entrance to the governing apparatus.

Further, in the developing countries, or at least in Africa, "social engineering" projects derived from scientific precepts rather than the articulated needs of the population also play a large role due to the hypertrophy and elitism of the state. If the dominance of "donor" organisations in policy discussions is added to the picture, it is obvious that the state of "normal" northern social science, as distinct from the contemporary research frontier, is not tangential to the shortcomings of currently prevailing development strategies. Simultaneously, if we consider that the inadequacies of social science in this respect are by no means marginal, the conclusion is plain: Imposition, or what amounts to the same thing, heavy subsidisation, of new science-derived models of social, technological and economic development lead, in all probability, only deeper into the morass.

In particular, intermediate technology is useful and progressive only to the extent that it is absorbed by local enterprise collectives, and adapted, by themselves, to the particular conditions prevailing in their business networks. Likewise, the activity of non-governmental organisations generates dynamic effects only to the extent that they reflect genuine aspirations of the grassroots (Ng'ethe et al., 1990; Fowler, 1991). Hence, intermediate techniques and NGOs, which are mere artifices created by external sponsors, are likely to fail.

Interest articulation and policy options

Because of the reasons explicated above, increased opportunities for small and intermediate enterprises do not automatically create technical change leading to increased mechanisation. They can also lead to an increase in scale at the same technical level, or to the horizontal proliferation of small units. The same conclusion can be drawn, *mutatis mutandis*, about macroeconomic policies designed to e.g. change the income distribution in favour of low income groups, and thereby create increased demand for the products of these enterprises.

However, if such change is *sustained* over a period of time, and the environment in which small and intermediate enterprises operate is stabilised by other means, diffusion of mechanised production methods will probably follow. What is more important, is that this will create and stabilise a group with an *established interest* in measures supportive of indigenous production enterprises and in addition increase the *capacity to absorb* any appropriate technology initiatives that come along and expand the demand for vocational education, etc. The technological effects, in other words, are not direct. They rather happen as parts of a dynamic social and political process.

Small and intermediate enterprise interests can be articulated at different levels. A diffuse informal discourse on such matters can be observed within small enterprise networks. The focusing of this discourse may happen around organisations of small businessmen, community development issues, NGO activities, and even educational and promotional activities initiated by government projects, as observed by this writer in Kenya (Cf. Annis, 1987; King & Abuodha, 1991).

This problem complex, therefore, raises the question of the role of development agents, local government and other local power networks as conduits and promoters of small enterprise interests. Mann (1988) has, correctly in my view, maintained that the decentralised character of social power was central to de-

velopment processes in Europe, and this aspect merits more consideration from students of technological development than hitherto.

Schmitz (1989, 35) maintains, however, that "existing experiences tell us that local government has not been a strategic force" behind the success of small enterprise clusters. He notes that centralised decision making and fund allocation often stifle local initiative, and doubts on this account the potential of local government as an active promoter of small scale industry (cf. Helmsing & Wekwete, 1987). Industrial branch associations are more efficacious in this respect, according to Schmitz. "It is difficult to see how a substantial improvement can be 'engineered' without such associations" (ibid.).

The dominance of the central governments in Africa certainly poses obstacles to dynamic local government. African governments have also put in place various constraints on the activities of business associations, non-governmental organisations and other popular groupings, and generally view them with suspicion. However, at the local level, notables with a vested interest in the *status quo* can also resist measures conducive to intermediate enterprise, including those initiated by central government (Smillie, 1991). These interest conflicts at the local level between entrepreneurs, local peasant leaders and local agents of the central government, aid project officers, etc. are important indeed. Their solution calls for functioning fora for negotiation and compromise, in other words, for democracy.

In local as well as national interest conflicts, however, the intermittent nature of network interaction in small and intermediate enterprise collectives places them at a distinct disadvantage. Generally speaking, continuous network interaction is the basis of effective interest groupings and at the national level, social movements (Melucci, 1989). Such interaction does, as it were, create the collective interest. Hence, when business networks are unstable, as in our case, interest articulation suffers. If this instability is reinforced rather than counteracted by the technological configuration of the enterprises, organisational efforts are essential. Again, the issue is one of democracy, the right to freely organise in pursuit of a group interest.

Support for intermediate enterprises

Eventually, local leaders will occupy the political space opened by current developments, the activities of well-wishing organisations, of supporters within the ruling bureaucracy and democratic movements all over the continent. Until that time the question remains, what support measures are feasible. Admiration for the ingenuity of entrepreneurs in responding to unfavourable conditions should not lead to a "hands-off" attitude. Rather, the diversity and variable needs of small and intermediate enterprises must be taken into account in considering support measures.

Support to individual enterprises must be complemented by general support to enterprise collectives, the probability notwithstanding that some will make more use of such opportunities than others. The single most effective measure in this respect is preferential government purchasing from small and intermediate local enterprises. This presupposes that the state pays promptly, and for larger orders, partly in advance, which is usually not the case at the moment.

Support aimed at collectives must be continuous. Giving and then withdrawing support because the results do not meet the often inflated expectations, in the name of learning from mistakes, may in many cases be a mistake in itself. In such cases, an alternative should be immediately substituted. A conceivable argument against this is that clients become dependent on their supporters. However, the creation of such dependencies and inter-dependencies is the very stuff of development. Hence, what Smillie terms "the endemic donor fixation on projects, combined with an almost pathological abhorrence of recurrent costs" is particularly inappropriate where small and intermediate enterprise support is concerned (Smillie. 1991, 58).

However, it matters whom small and intermediate entrepreneurs become dependent on. Support should be given by organisations, which have a natural role to play in enterprise networks and are not controlled by outsiders, who often have an unsuitable cultural background and axes of their own to grind. To take the example of financial support, banks and savings societies, where these exist, are appropriate channels. Support should be channelled through organisations with sufficient resources to make a real impact, again favouring banks and the state, closely related in many cases anyhow, but not excluding self-help societies in various forms. Creating a dependence on subsidised short term projects can in contrast do more harm than good, by establishing entirely artificial relationships which crumble as soon as patronage is withdrawn and the experts leave.

Support to individual enterprises should be available when and in the way they need it. Usually, a capital boost is needed when an opportunity for the expansion of production arises, and giving support a year later, when the opportunity has passed, is of doubtful utility.

Other support measures are naturally conceivable, particularly sector specific and function specific technical support, including vocational training at the appropriate level, specific support to producers of appropriate machinery, writing of, importation and distribution of relevant literature, appropriate technical equipment, etc. In most cases, however, it is important to organise support in *specialised* units, and not impose e.g. formal management training requirements in connection with lending.

The more specialised support measures are, the larger the role that can be played by local commercial providers and NGOs, if the enabling environment is created for them e.g. by streamlining regulations, relieving import restrictions on selected kinds of machinery, recognising the sprawling plethora of private or NGO-run "business colleges", improving public libraries, etc. The basic requirement is that the suppliers of various services should be immersed in the community, continuously accessible and commercially viable.

However, the currently prevailing policies crystallised over a considerable period of time and the reorientation of the technology policy component of development strategies can only be expected to happen in conjunction with a general readjustment of political systems in Africa. This process will be both long-winded and tortuous, not least because a vested interest in the current system has been created. This interest is not only embodied in local bureaucracies, but in donor bureaucracies as well.

Further, although there is room for small and intermediate enterprises to play a substantially larger role than they do now, the promotion of technical change in that sector cannot constitute a strategy all on its own. Perhaps some

champions of the leap into large scale industrialisation believed they had discovered The Only Way. That at least is an error that does not need to be repeated.

What is called for is rather a matter of opening opportunities for new combinations of large and small, private and public ownership, labour intensive, capital intensive and knowledge intensive techniques, science training and vocational training, etc.

This approach, of opening opportunities rather than centrally directing economic activity, places new demands on government agencies, and by extension, their donor counterparts, but this is unavoidable. The multitude of small and intermediate enterprises, as well as local institutions and non-governmental organisations involved, can certainly be registered, regulated and taxed, but direct supervision and control in each case is far beyond the administrative resources available, and in any case, not likely to be productive.

An adequate response must, therefore, provide different kinds of initiative, with the headroom needed, and support the building of organic institutional links on the basis of what is already there, in such a way that the existing growth potential is amplified rather than impeded. Increased democracy in Africa will undoubtedly help in this venture. No less important is, however, that the North abstains from imposing precooked, ready-to-use solutions, which all too often are based on inadequate understanding of the northern experience.

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PERSPECTIVES ON AFRICA

The impact on Africa of the changes in Eastern Europe and of the Gulf War

Zdenek Cervenka

The profound political changes that swept through Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, resulting in the restoration of democracy and the transition to market economies, triggered off a spontaneous demand for democracy throughout the Third World, especially in Africa.

There is a constant evidence of strong public pressure to introduce multi-party democracy, and of revolt against one-party rule, and the abuse of human rights. The storm of protest rolling down the Atlantic coast of West Africa has already swept away the one-party regimes of the Ivory Coast, Cape Verde, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Mali, Congo, Benin and Gabon. On May 10, 1991, Ghana joined the list of countries pledging the introduction of a multi-party system based on free elections. Failure to move quickly enough to implement political reforms has brought violent reactions in Togo and Cameroon. Both countries however appear to have set out on an irreversible course towards a pluralistic political system. According to Olusegun Obasanjo, the former Nigerian President:

The 'Ceausescu factor' was the single most important event that led to a rapid re-orientation by many African leaders with a view to adopting political and economic reform programmes aimed, in varying degrees, at introducing accountability of political leaders and institutions, a multi-party system, participatory democracy and accessibility, rule of law, and observance of human rights.¹

In the past, African dictators simply shot protesters down.

Perhaps the most tangible evidence of the impact of events in Central and Eastern Europe was the dramatic release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC and the Communist Party in South Africa. This was largely because the apartheid regime's propaganda about alleged Moscow's ambitions to impose its rule over South Africa suddenly lost its *raison d'être*.

Political changes in Africa and the debate on democracy

Even before the winds of change began to blow from Central and Eastern Europe, the African drive for greater pluralism and accountability in its political systems had already been gathering momentum. Agitation for greater political freedom is not new in Africa. Peter Anyan'g Nyong'o and Thandika Mkandawire started a debate on democracy in Africa prior to the changes in Central and Eastern Europe.²

Nyon'go in his article "Democratization Processes in Africa"³ argues that, in Zaire, for example, since people have generally never experienced a positive

transformation in their lives since independence, they have always yearned for a "second independence" that will at least be meaningful for them. He quotes the Zairean author, Nziongola-Ntalaja:

The concept of "second independence" was developed, not by social scientists, but by ordinary people in the Kwilu region of western Zaire. For the people, independence was meaningless without a better standard of living, greater civil liberties, and the promise of a better life for their children.⁴

Nyong'o makes a valid point by reminding us that in post-colonial Africa, the state was regarded as an "agent of development", a view which, in the sixties, was shared by all Western development aid agencies. He says:

The state was expected to build schools, roads, industries, universities, airlines, armies, towns, etc. The state was expected to create African entrepreneurs by establishing credit lines for them and negotiating favourable market conditions. The state was expected to provide employment and to provide society with an insurance plan against unemployment.⁵

In short, government in Africa used to be judged by its development performance and not by the niceties of sustaining a democratic society.

However, the author supports the remaining advocates of the viability of socialism in Africa, such as Samir Amin and Joe Slovo, who argue, that the problem is not a centralized state *per se*, but the way in which political power is used in such a state. For example, Samir Amin sees the solution not in a multi-party democracy but in the concept of a "popular national state" based on reinforcing the capacity of people for self-organization, self-development and self-defence, thus insuring the process of social transformation and industrialization, which is first and foremost in their interest.⁶

Joe Slovo, in his discussion paper "Has Socialism Failed?" claims that:

... the major weaknesses which have emerged in the practice of socialism are the results of distortions and misapplications ... [and they] cannot be traced to essential tenets of Marxist revolutionary science.⁷

To many Africans, however, the term "popular national state" is nothing but the concept of the "one-party state" in disguise. After all, the rulers of one-party states have always praised the popular character of their regimes. President Arap Moi of Kenya, a country with widespread abuse of human rights and repression of all who speak out against one-party rule, is on record as describing Kenya as "model of democracy".⁸

A constructive contribution to the ongoing debate on democracy in Africa is the book *Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa* edited by Walter O.Oyugi, E.S. Atieno Odhiambo, Michael Chege and Afrifa K. Gitonga.⁹ The authors argue that the essential meaning of democracy is "good, fair and just government", corresponding to Abraham Lincoln's definition of "government of the people by the people". As Colin Legum points out,

... the current debate in Africa is not about the need for democracy, but about the definition given to democracy, and the right of Africans to decide for themselves how they should be governed.

He warns against the tendency to confuse "democracy" with "Western ideas about democracy" by emphasizing that this misses the crucial point that there are certain universal principles about democracy which are not just "Western ideas". He continues:

While models for democratic systems can, and should, reflect local conditions, whatever form these take should incorporate the distinguished hallmarks of a democratic society, e.g. the rule of law, the separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive, a universal franchise, exercised in secret, which will allow not only for the selection of members of parliament, but also for their accountability to their electorate, a free press, freedom of expression of opinion and organization, independent trade unions and protection of basic rights as defined in the Universal Charter of Human Rights subscribed to by all members of the United Nations.¹⁰

Linkage of development aid to democratization

By 1989, influential donors had begun to link levels of assistance to African countries to the amount of political pluralism they perceived to be appropriate. Thus Zaire, Kenya, Sudan and Somalia were among the countries whose aid was reduced by the US, Norway, Belgium and Denmark. The United Kingdom and France put forward similar views.¹¹ The British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, in the quarterly of the Conservative Bow Group, *Crossbow*, in October 1990, stated that:

... there is no reason why we should expect the Third World to accept lower standards than those which apply elsewhere. Poverty does not justify torture, tyranny or economic incompetence.

In an interview with *Africa Recovery* in October-December 1990, the US Assistant Secretary, Herman Cohen, said that the African one-party states had ended up in the Eastern European mode, where the absence of accountability inherent in a single-party state had resulted in corruption, non-productive economies and failing market shares of export commodities. He admitted, however, that it was not fruitful to talk about multi-party democracy in the African context but insisted that:

... changes that were needed should bring about greater popular participation, providing greater choices to people who should be able to change their leadership if they so desired.

The question arises, of whether African states have the capacity to respond to the dual challenge of halting their economic decline and reforming their political systems.

The need for change has also been recognized by African institutions.

In 1989, the UN Economic Commission for Africa's *African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation* was issued and adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). It explicitly linked Africa's prospects for economic recovery to the introduction of democratic reforms. In February 1990, the ECA also organized a major international conference in Arusha, Tanzania, which adopted the *African Charter for Popular Participation in Development*. The 1990 OAU Summit adopted

a resolution reiterating the OAU's commitment to further democratise its societies and consolidate democratic institutions in Africa. But the OAU Secretary General, Alim Ahmed Salim, made it clear that the process would take place on Africa's terms. He told the OAU Summit that:

... there are clear signals that multi-partyism will increasingly emerge as a political condition for aid or credit, but Africa would not allow the outside world to dictate how the continent should be run.¹²

Tanzania's Foreign Minister, Ben Mkapa, described the calls for a multi-party system as "imperialistic and unacceptable" and Nelson Mandela declared that:

Western countries should not dictate politics to Africa because they have no right to teach us about democracy.¹³

Colin Legum too strongly opposes the linkage of development aid to the introduction of multi-party democracy, a view which is also supported by Winrich Kuhne in his excellent study entitled *Africa and the End of the Cold War*.¹⁴ Colin Legum described the attempts at linking aid to democratization as follows:

There can be no objection to democrats living outside the Third World encouraging genuine democratic movements, but the proposal used of foreign aid as a lever to compel developing countries to conform with the ideal of donor countries is bound to be counter-productive. The kind of objections that used to be raised by the Western democracies against Soviet policies was that Moscow sought to export its Marxist ideas as an instrument of its foreign policies. If Western countries now try to use their economic power to enforce their ideas about democracy on developing countries they will rightly stand accused of behaving no differently from the policies of pre-Gorbachev's Soviet Union.¹⁵

In any event, no reforms will work unless they are nationally inspired, nor can the diversity of African nations be addressed through the application of the standard formulas that many donors advocate for all African countries.

Africa will be left to Africans

The author of this paper believes the linking of aid to democratic reforms has become a convenient excuse for cutting aid to Africa. Western leaders are fully aware that most African countries will not be able to meet the conditions for introducing democracy into their countries, where the roots of the dissent have economic rather than political origins. More than half—28—African countries are among the 42 countries classified by the UN as the "least developed". In Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Mozambique and Angola, where some 15 million people are near starvation, with the devastation in Liberia and the poverty of the majority of people in Togo, Benin, Cameroon and many other countries which witnessed outbursts of popular discontent, the key word is survival rather than democracy.

World concern is shifting away from Africa. As Kenyan diplomat, B.A. Kiplagat, put it:

People are tired of Africa. So many countries, so many wars.¹⁶

The ending of the Cold War stripped the continent of whatever strategic significance it once had. Added to this is Africa's tiny, and still declining, contribution to international world trade which has made it less and less relevant to the economic growth of richer nations. Africa, with its many problems and poor prospects for their solution, is on the verge of being ignored. Despite assurances of Western donors, Central and Eastern Europe will receive many of the funds which used to flow to Africa. Winrich Kuhne summed up the situation as follows:

African politicians, in their desperate search for more financial aid, are therefore well advised not to listen to Western politicians who promise that the change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union will have no repercussions on development aid available for the South, because European countries, especially Germany, can afford both. This is obviously not the case. Africa can no longer hope to be saved from outside.¹⁷

Development aid is a question not only of a political priority but above all of the availability of funds. For example, Germany, the fourth largest donor of development aid (\$ 5 bn in 1989), will be bogged down by the cost of German reunification estimated to reach around \$17,5 bn during 1991-1993.¹⁸ This excludes the cost of restoring the ecology of the former German Democratic Republic, estimated at around \$30 bn by the *Economist* of October 20, 1990. The resources of the largest three donors (Japan, the United States, and France) will go largely to the Middle East, a point to be developed later on.

The diversion of funds to Central and Eastern Europe at the expense of Africa has been criticized by the *Africa Leadership Forum*, an association of eminent African leaders chaired by Olusegun Obasanjo, the former President of Nigeria.

At a meeting on April 17-18, 1990, of the *Africa Leadership Forum* in Paris, in his statement Obasanjo welcomed the changes in Eastern Europe, but said they further aggravated the marginalization of Africa. He made the following remarks on the attitude of the Western countries:

One could not have thought it possible that the complacency of the consumer and increasingly inward oriented societies in the North would ever again be capable of bringing about such an outpouring of political and humanist interest at the highest levels, leading to the offer of substantial official and private resource flows, the proliferation of blueprints and development plans as well as the marshalling of talent and public goodwill and understanding. The intensity of political will and commitment, the widespread enthusiasm and idealism apparent in the industrialized countries, similar to what many African countries enjoyed some thirty years ago, generally betrayed the hollow arguments of aid fatigue among donors, unavailability of resources, and lack of public awareness and understanding, increasingly heard during the last decade.

The meeting expressed the hope that the changes in Eastern Europe will "consolidate the understanding and solidarity between Africa and Eastern Europe that has developed throughout the last 30 years".¹⁹

This did not sound very convincing considering the fact that not one single representative of the new democratic countries was present at the meeting. The *Africa Leadership Forum* also issued a strong appeal to the international community to redress the increasing eclipse of Africa and to counter the diversion of

resources. It warned that that postponing the solution to pressing problems may eventually have negative repercussions on other continents. The same applies to Europe, where the demise of the Iron Curtain left a wide gap between the economies of Western and Eastern Europe which will take at least 10 years to close. Economic assistance to Eastern Europe is also perceived as a necessary measure to stave off the influx of economic refugees and prevent the collapse of fragile democracies, some of which are also plagued by the rise of nationalist passions. These have already assumed threatening proportions in the Soviet Union and, also, more recently in Yugoslavia.

The establishment in April 1991 of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, whose sole purpose is to assist Central and Eastern Europe, made Western priorities quite clear. The pledged capital of the Bank (\$126 bn) is more than twice the total of the net official development assistance (ODA) disbursements to developing countries and multinational agencies in 1989 (\$52.5 bn).

African trade with Western Europe will also be affected. The European Community (EC) has already signed new cooperation agreements with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria, relating to all industrial and agricultural products. It also abolished all quantitative restrictions on imports from these countries. Clearly, this will considerably affect African exports of commodities produced in Eastern Europe—agricultural products, textiles, footwear and raw materials such as coal, sulphur, aluminium, etc.

In competition with Africa, Central and Eastern European countries will have the advantage, through their proximity to the EC markets and the goodwill of the EC governments.

The Nordic countries, while still professing their unswerving commitment to Africa, are already faced with the vast ecological problems of their Eastern European neighbours—Poland and the Baltic republics—which directly affect them, and with the public humanitarian concern for the people of Bulgaria and Romania living far below the "poverty line".

The impact of the Gulf War

The Gulf war affected Africa both politically and economically. At the political level, the Gulf war produced great animosity between Africa and the West. At first, most African leaders, including one of the most anti-American, Colonel Qaddafi of Libya, condemned Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. But after the allied forces' victory, a coalition of 28 national armies fighting under the United Nations' flag and including five African states, a substantial number of African countries were hostile to the manner of Kuwait's liberation. Strong objections were raised against the massive bombing of Baghdad and Basra. The former President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, compared the bombings to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and condemned what he described as careless disregard of civilian lives and the destruction of Iraq's infrastructure. The devastation of Baghdad and Basra brought tens of thousands of Algerians, Tunisians, Mauretanians and Moroccans onto the streets and led General Omar Bashir of Sudan to identify himself with Saddam Hussein. Even in Egypt, pro-Iraqi demonstrations took place. The military action was also condemned by the ANC, which was quick to point out that not even remotely similar measures,

comparable to those adopted against Iraq, had been applied by the UN against the apartheid regime in South Africa. Apart from this, little sympathy was expressed for Saddam Hussein, but the feeling was that the war was more about bringing down Saddam Hussein than freeing Kuwait, something which should have been left to the Iraqis themselves.

Many Africans also considered the United Nations to have been manipulated by the United States and saw the Western coalition as a new superpower and world policeman, and accused the US of having instigated the war because of its oil interests. This is, of course, not correct. The US obtains only 8 per cent of its oil from the Gulf; the oil wells are no longer owned by the multinational companies, but by the oil countries themselves; and last but not least, the US and other oil importers never feared a cut in oil supplies, as the oil exporting countries need markets for their oil stocks.

The real difference between South Africa and the Gulf is not oil, but the strategic location of the Gulf region for the containment of states posing threats to Western interests in general, and to Israel in particular.

After the Gulf war, Saddam Hussein, instead of being regarded as the instigator of the Gulf conflict, was seen by many Africans as the victim of the mighty military power of the West. This, in turn, irritated Western governments which showed their displeasure when compensation was allocated to countries which were adversely affected by the Gulf war. While Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Japan and West Germany have contributed billions of dollars to offset the cost of war to the US and the UK, very little has been done for African countries, with the exception of Egypt and Morocco. Seventy per cent of the \$14 bn pledged by the Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group, comprising several Gulf countries and members of the OECD, will go to Egypt, Turkey and Jordan. Consideration will also be given to Bangladesh, Pakistan, Syria, Lebanon and Morocco. Notable absentees from this list are Sudan and Ethiopia.²⁰ The hardship of the rest of the African continent brought about by the Gulf war was ignored.

Among the direct costs of the war were the temporary, but sharp rise in oil prices, the loss of trade and the departure of tens of thousands of African migrant workers, in particular the Sudanese, from Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, with the consequent loss of foreign earnings.

The total African foreign debt rose by 4.7 per cent to \$271.9 bn. The short term rise in oil prices has added \$1.7 bn to the import costs of African oil-importing countries.²¹

The consequences of international neglect of Africa on African research

The near removal of Africa from the focus of Western governments and from the public interest has also been reflected in the state of research on Africa. Thandika Mkandawire, the Executive Secretary of CODESRIA, describes the situation as follows:

African countries are witnessing the worst economic crisis since independence and this crisis has a dramatic impact on educational institutions. With adjustment programmes and austerity measures tending to disfavour expenditure and with the

widespread view that the 'rate of return' of investments on universities is low, real and in some cases even nominal expenditure has sharply declined.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the crisis of social sciences in Africa is the disintegration of the research infrastructure. Libraries are, as a result of the 'book hunger', collapsing, means for travel to carry out field work hardly exist ... Africa's underdeveloped acquisition of new technologies of information processing is proving a major handicap to research.²²

Ironically, the researchers in Central and European countries who contributed to the neglect of Africa are experiencing similar, if not worse, problems. African research in Central and Eastern Europe is virtually at a standstill. The numbers of scholars are rapidly decreasing and their dependence on the generosity of Western funds is as complete as is the dependence of their governments on foreign aid. While, however, aid to governments is still small and slow in coming, aid to research institutions is virtually non-existent.

In a sense, African researchers have a slight advantage since they had established contacts with their Western colleagues and institutions, while contacts between Central and Eastern European researchers with the West were almost totally disrupted during the communist rule of their countries. Up until now, contacts have not yet been properly restored. Inviting Africans to academic meetings on Africa held in Western countries has become an established practice. Eastern European scholars are barred from participation in international conferences through the absence of funds for such a purpose and by the unfavourable exchange rate of their national currencies, which makes self-financed journeys almost impossible. Perhaps, we should start to consider modest assistance to the Central and Eastern European scholar. The organisers of future international meetings on Africa held in a Western or African country should be obliged to invite at least one Eastern European scholar. There is no doubt that closer co-operation between the researchers of Central and Eastern Europe with their Western European counterparts will contribute to our efforts to keep African issues alive both in terms of research and public interest. Cooperation between African and Central and Eastern European academics is likely to contribute to the search for a model for democracy in Africa.

The overwhelming impact of the democratic changes in Eastern Europe and their pioneering role in dismantling autocratic structures has become very relevant for Africa. Furthermore, co-operation between Eastern European and African scholars, resulting in joint research projects, will facilitate economic co-operation between their countries, for which new forms are needed. Barter trade, which is the prevailing form of economic relationship between Eastern Europe and Africa, can hardly make much difference. It constitutes less than two per cent of the total trade of Eastern European countries. Its expansion has been restrained by lack of credit and development aid has already been drastically reduced for financial reasons. The only realistic course is tripartite cooperation, where Western funds would be used to finance a development project to be carried out by Eastern European enterprises and experts. Better knowledge of African problems must be first acquired by all parties involved in such ventures. This is where the cooperation of Eastern European, African and Western researchers is needed.

Notes

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The role of technology transfer in development assistance

Stein Kristiansen

In this paper I want to focus on the role of technology transfer in economic development and in development assistance. During 40 years of development theory discussions, the possibility of making short cuts to an advanced economic and technical position has been a leading issue. In the post second world war period we have seen an accelerating technological development, especially in the Western, capitalistic world. This development has seen technological progress as the main single cause of economic growth (Evenson, 1988). Whereas increased input of capital and labour were earlier the growth engines, we see today that countries which have a lead in technological progress, are also the ones with the best general economic performance. At the same time the expense of developing new technology has increased substantially and the effective, competitive working time of a new technology has become shorter. This has made it increasingly important for poorer countries with limited domestic research and development capacity, to enter into positions where they can learn and get technology transferred from other countries. A certain level of economic development and technological progress is also a precondition for indigenous entrepreneurship and competence building (Emmanuel, 1982).

In spite of all these general arguments for technology transfer among countries in our day, experiences of development thinking and real Third World development during recent decades have involved a mixed appreciation about technology transfers. Some development paradigms have put more emphasis on self-reliance and appropriateness in technology questions. Quite a number of technology transfer projects, both commercial and aid financed, have been exposed as being more a means of exploitation and impoverishment than a stimulant to economic development.

The aim of this paper is to throw some light on the very complicated process of technology transfer between countries and to re-examine the potential for the transfer of technical knowledge and competence as a strategy for development assistance.

The rest of the paper is divided into four parts. First, I will give a few examples of both commercial and aid financed technology transfer projects in Africa. This section will show the problems of really getting knowledge transferred. Then I will outline a model with the intention of understanding more about the decisive actors and processes in a transfer project. Thereafter I go into a short discussion about the real value of the transfer of modern technology in Third World development, before I give a few pieces of advice on a better utilisation of the dynamic forces in technology transfer in development assistance.

The paper is mainly based on my own research on technology transfer, especially from Norway to developing countries in both Africa, Asia and Latin-America. My point of view may have been influenced by my focus on hy-

dropower projects in some of this research. I am thankful to NORAD who has financed parts of this research.

Examples of technology transfer projects

Some years ago I made a study of Norwegian companies' engagement in business in West Africa and in general I found a remarkably low level of real technology transfer (Kristiansen, 1985). Among these projects was a cement factory in Ghana, which is a joint venture between the government of Ghana and the only Norwegian cement producer Norcem, now called Scancem. The project is fully based on commercial terms, but has been very effectively assisted by Norwegian development aid on two occasions. Norwegian management has been there since 1967, when they took over after an English company. The factory is a cement mill only, based on simple and generally well known technology. In spite of its long history and simple production technology, the company's management and board of directors find it necessary to keep the expensive Scandinavian expatriates there, though the costs of one expatriate is about the same as of three hundred ordinary Ghanaian workers.

The management gives three reasons for them to be there still:

1. The quality of the Ghanaian educational system is not good enough to produce graduate candidates who can match Scandinavians in the economic and technical fields.
2. The country lacks good leaders for management positions.
3. Ghanaians in leading positions in the company would result in a more corrupt and inefficient system of operations.

This project is profitable for Scancem and it is important for them to keep their management position. Thus it also becomes important for them to avoid the transfer of technology. The gap in knowledge and competence between the Scandinavians and the Ghanaians is the source of surplus profits for Scancem. Why should they go for technology transfer?

Another example from Ghana will illustrate the problem of dependency and vulnerability following insufficient technology transfer. Stephen Adei of the UNDP has studied the course of development of the Bansa Tyre Company, which was formerly a joint venture between the US-based Firestone company and the government of Ghana. Tyre production started in 1969, after Firestone was given a package of investment incentives, including a ten-year tax holiday, exemption from import duties and remittance of profits. As a kind of return service, a passage about technology transfer was included in the contract:

Firestone shall train Ghanaians in all aspects of the industry (Adei, 1990, 1503).

The problem was that no monitoring scheme was instituted. No time frames for training were set, neither were there any sanctions for failure to train Ghanaians. During the 1970s the factory was operated at times far above its rated full capacity level. No Ghanaians were trained for responsible management positions. There was a very limited investment in maintenance and part replacement. Firestone utilised the ten-year tax holiday to create maximum

profits. In 1981 the company decided to retire and to sell its 55 per cent of the shares to the Ghanaian government. Firestone gave technical and managerial assistance for a period, but the Bonsa Tyre Company was given only five years to find a new technical partner and to cease using Firestone technology.

The training of Ghanaians had been very defective and with the withdrawal of the foreign partners from the enterprise, local managerial and technical capabilities were extremely limited. The company suffered extensive losses during the 1980s. Capacity utilisation has been below eight per cent and an overall lack of competence building during the twelve years of foreign assistance has been very apparent.

The two examples from Ghana have demonstrated a general weakness in the national policy on technology transfer in the country. Technology transfer has been regarded as a private affair and even when the government went into partnership with foreign companies, no sincere attempts were made to use part ownership to secure the building of indigenous capacity. In the case of the Bonsa Tyre Company two new actors have now entered the scene. The one is the British Dunlop Tyre Company, to supply new technology, the other is the African Development Bank to secure financing. It remains to be seen if this development assistance will be accompanied by effective conditions about technology transfer and local competence building. The possibility is there, but history shows that development agencies have been of little value in securing real transfer of knowledge and technology. I will now give another example, from Norwegian development aid, to illustrate this problem.

The Norwegian government has given a grant of about 70 million Norwegian Crowns to the government of Lesotho to cover the full costs of building and equipping two small hydropower plants. A central objective has been to reduce this small country's dependence on South Africa. The agreement between the government of Norway and the government of Lesotho, represented by the Treasury, was signed in 1985. In this contract special emphasis is put on "the training element and the future maintenance aspect" and it stipulates that "efforts shall be made to utilise local resources as far as possible, like local manpower, local workshops etc.". In the contract, means are also earmarked to be used for training purposes, with a specification on each of the two power plants and also on the central administrative system. The costs of training in this preliminary budget sums up to twelve per cent of total contract value. It should be underlined that this is a tentative budget which clearly expresses an interest and a willingness between the two governments to put emphasis on a real technology transfer.

Later that same year, in 1985, a new contract was signed, this time between the Ministry of Water, Energy and Mining in Lesotho and a Norwegian consultancy company, Norplan. In this contract the Norwegian company is given full responsibility for all parts of the planning and implementation of the project.

In this contract, some verbal emphasis is also put on technology transfer and training. There is a specification of a wide range of areas where training is needed, for instance electrical engineering, technicians to be in charge of daily operation and maintenance of power stations, foremen, accountants and book-keepers. But the content of the training component is very imprecisely expressed. A typical sentence from this part of the contract is:

Training of unskilled labour to become more skilled.

The formulations in the contract do not give any guidance to how real technology transfer should be accomplished. Also when it comes to real figures in the budget appendix to the project contract, the guidelines are extremely weak. The costs of training are not expressed in this budget, which is the agreed basis for the whole 10 mn USD project. Without any budget items covering competence building and training, it is of course very difficult to monitor the efforts in this field. The costs of training are actually hidden in the contractors' work and thus it is also impossible to control the unit value of the contractors' work. The training element is simply used as an argument for Norwegian companies to avoid the internationally agreed terms of price calculations and payments for contractors. This may have resulted in a substantial exceeding of the budgeted costs.

After the finishing of this project it is clear that no courses have been arranged within the fields of contracting work during the project period. The reason is explained as a lack of economic means earmarked for this purpose. Instead, it is said, the means have been used for on-the-job training, but nobody knows how much. Neither has there been any training or competence building through a planned system of counterparts to the Norwegian management and technical staff. There has been some training of operational and maintenance staff, but the recipient organisation is very sceptical also of this part of the training programme. The electronic elements in the project represent technology on a very advanced level, far more advanced than the recipient would have preferred. The competence gap between what is needed in the project and what is available in Lesotho, is simply too wide to be bridged by the actual content of training in this project. This problem is also reflected in a very limited local participation in equipment deliveries to the plants.

The list of bad examples could easily have been extended, but I think so far I have made it clear that the presence of a donor with good expressed intentions on local competence building, is not sufficient to secure a real transfer of technology when Western commercial companies are selling their equipment or their services to a technologically inferior developing country. I will now try to illustrate the system of actors, interests and interrelationships in a process of technology transfer by means of a model.

The model

In Figure 1 there are four boxes, where each represents one of the main participants in the process of transferring technology from a developed to a developing country.

There is the supplier of technology, which is most often a private, commercial company, because that is the most common innovator and possessor of modern technology. On the opposite side of the model is the client, or the recipient of technology. This may also be a private company, or more often, when talking about Africa, a state company or organisation. There will be a direct line of communication between the supplier and his client during the whole project

FIGURE 1: THE ACTORS IN A TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROCESS

period, from the contract negotiations to the final acceptance testing. The upper box in Figure 1 represents the state, or government, of the recipient or purchasing country. This actor will have the opportunity to participate in the whole process, but most often is not very active after perhaps taking part in the initiation phase. In addition, technology transfer projects in developing countries, be they consultancy work, a turn-key project, contracting work, or a production investment, will usually have an external financier. This may be a commercial bank or a development agency, most often located in the same part of the world as the technology exporting company.

There will be lines of communication between these four main actors in a project, though the contact will be more frequent through the straight horizontal and vertical lines in the model, through the lines between the exporting company and its financier, and between the government and the recipient organisation. After this, we could put shaded sloping lines in the figure, between foreign and interior actors.

In this simple model of project participants, it is possible to include two main parameters of quality in a technology transfer project. One is that of price, which is shown on the horizontal axis in Figure 2. The other is the level of real transfer, which is local participation and competence rising in the recipient country. This is marked on the vertical axis. A relatively high price, compared to similar projects under comparable circumstances, would be indicated by a dot in the left part of the diagram. A high level of real technology transfer would be indicated by a dot in the upper part of the chart. Of course, seen from the point of view of the recipient country, an ideal result would be indicated by a location in the upper right part of the graph in Figure 2. Unfortunately, the opposite location is the most common in projects that I have studied.

FIGURE 2: A RESULT CHART

We can now combine the actor model with the result diagram by asking: In what directions do the different actors pull? What are the momenta of force of the individual actors in such projects and what will the sum of the different forces be? I will now go through motives and forces of the four actors. The illustration is given in Figure 3.

a) The technology exporting company will normally aim at maximum profitability in the portfolio of projects that it is engaged in over a period. This does not necessarily mean an objective of profit maximization in each single project, but it obviously gives this actor a momentum of force towards the highest possible price. At the same time an exporting company will normally be against a real transfer of technology above a certain level, which is combinable with its desire for sustainable competitiveness. A real transfer of knowledge might easily undermine the exporting company's competitive advantages, both within the recipient country and on other markets. In industries where technological development is especially fast and where the lifetime of most competitive technology is short, the technology possessor might, nevertheless, be interested in real transfer if that earns an extra income that can contribute to financing further technological development. (Kristiansen (1989) presents a more de-

FIGURE 3: THE ACTORS' MOMENTA OF FORCE

tailed discussion of the motives for technology transfer of commercial companies.) The result, however, of an exporting company's ordinary interests, will be a momentum of force down towards the left in my model, towards high price and low technology transfer. This is also documented by several empirical findings (Kristiansen, 1985; Tuma, 1987).

It should, however, be stressed that there are substantial potentials for increased willingness by this actor to bring about a real transfer of knowledge, provided competition is there to force him. The same is more apparently the case with regard to prices. A high level of competition will lower prices. This is important to remember when we below discuss the role of the financier.

b) The state or the government of a recipient country should ideally be interested in obtaining projects with the lowest possible costs and an optimal level of real technology transfer in order to secure a positive contribution to the development of the recipient country. This actor should accordingly be conducive to a substantial momentum of force towards the upper right part of our model. However, this is very often not the case.

In most Third World countries the state is as an actor very powerful and influential. There are several new theories about the roles of Third World non-democratic states and there seems to be a tendency to be increasingly critical of the motives and actions of such states. Earlier the general assumption may have been that the state was benign in its intentions, centred around the question of how best to maximise social welfare in the country (Killick 1989). More

probably the strategies and actions of a state should be analyzed against a background of a multiplicity of motives. These motives might be (according to Hadjor, 1987; Allende, 1988; Gulhati, 1990):

1. personal objectives of civil servants and politicians;
2. bureaucratic imperatives of government ministries;
3. to secure continued political power for a class or an ethnic group;
and, lastly,
4. to secure general social and economic welfare that is balanced between different interest groups.

It is very important that we are not blinded by an idealistic belief in the state, when discussing development strategies and development assistance. The recipient state obviously has a very important role to play in technology transfers to developing countries. *Firstly*, it is the state that defines development objectives and in this context also strategies for technological development. Through political and economic priorities for industrial development and through decisions about official incentives and interventions, the state sets the framework for all kinds of technology transfer projects. *Secondly*, the state has a role to play as a negotiator when technology is being imported. Most large technology transfer projects require the participation of the state as an accepting, financing, or guaranteeing institution. This at least gives the state the chance to act as the leader of negotiations when importing technology. *Thirdly*, the state may also have a central role to play in the concrete planning and implementation of projects, for instance in controlling and ensuring that superior objectives are met.

What then is a typical contribution of a Third World state in technology transfer projects? We have seen several examples of states acting on the basis of personal economic interests. Huge and costly projects have been initiated more to secure personal welfare and to build up foreign bank accounts for ministers and their subordinates than to secure social welfare for the people. The Carhuaquerro hydropower project in Peru is only one very obvious example. Here, more than 10 million USD of the foreign financing of the plant is documented as not having reached the project (Kristiansen, 1990).

Generally, we can also see a relatively weak state contribution in the negotiation process. In interviews, high ranking politicians and civil servants have told me that they feel powerless when confronted with the strong alliance between the exporting company and the financier (cf. my model). This has also been said with a clear address to Nordic aid agencies.

When it comes to state participation in the concrete planning and implementation of technology transfers, I have again found that the state does not utilise its potential to secure a real transfer of technology and knowledge. The result is that there is usually no strong momentum of force from the state actor in the model towards low price and high real transfer. Actually, personal interests have, in many cases, secured full state support for the foreign companies' interests in achieving a high project price without much leakage of knowledge.

c) Ideally the recipient organisation, or the client, should also contribute in this technology transfer process with a force towards high level of real transfer and towards a low price. This actor may be a private company, a state enterprise or

any other kind of domestic organisation. Very often, when talking about large technology transfer projects in Africa, we are talking about state enterprises filling this role. For instance, in my Lesotho case this is the state owned Lesotho Electricity Corporation, which is directly linked to the Ministry of Water, Energy and Mining.

As a state organisation, this actor may be an extension of the state power in its efforts to achieve the general objectives of the state. But we often see that the political system gives a high degree of autonomy to state enterprises in developing countries (Allende, 1988). There may, of course, be an unclear distinction between the state and the recipient organisation as actors in transfer projects, but generally the last actor is the one responsible for the implementation and long term running of the project. As such he has a superior interest in its smooth operation. This is an objective which may easily interfere with interests in real technology transfer. For instance, the element of training local personnel will often delay the implementation of a scheme. An individual project may be faster and cheaper when accomplished with the assistance of imported, specialised personnel and the recipient organisation may have no responsibility for the long term competence building and economy of the society at large.

Along the same line of argument this actor will often by far prefer a supply of equipment from a foreign company which has a good reputation and provides a guaranteed system before a supply from a local and inexperienced producer. In this way the local company or organisation will often destroy the possibilities for participation in equipment deliveries from other local companies. It is not difficult to find empirical support for this statement (Kristiansen, 1990).

The recipient organisation may thus have an interest in getting a cheap project, but has a limited interest in real technology transfer. The recipient organisation does not contribute very much to an aggregated upward force in the model.

d) Finally, is the financier able to balance the accounts of the forces in this game? Is he able to put in a force towards low price and a high level of real technology transfer? I will give a clear answer: Yes, he is, but we have not yet seen it happen.

The external financial institution will, because of the weak economic situation of most of the countries in question and the capital requirements in technology transfer projects, have a very central position in establishing the project. Its position in negotiations is today generally very strong. It has the ability to put clear conditions into tender documents and contracts. But what are the interests of the financier? Of course this depends on what kind of a financial institution we are talking about.

The financier may be a commercial bank with a clear interest in making a profit. Repayment will be partly dependent on the success of the investment project. A low price will contribute to success and to the repayment ability of the debtor. So, this financier should have an interest in stimulating competition among suppliers in order to lower the price, but he will probably be more indifferent to questions about the real transfer of knowledge, as long as this does not affect the price. Financing of technology transfer projects in developing countries is often a combination of a commercial bank effort and government credit guarantees from the country of the exporting company. In such cases

there will be a clear alliance between the company and the financier, represented by the bank, and the government. We can hardly expect actors like these to be the leading forces in the work of real technology transfer.

However, the financial institution may also be a development agency, bilateral or multilateral. This, I think, is an actor in which we, at this stage of political maturity in Third World countries, have to put our trust in, if we believe that development can be stimulated by a real transfer of modern technology. I make this statement, well aware of all the examples of aid financed projects with small learning effects in the recipient countries. The United Nations Industrial Development Organisation, UNIDO, itself representing a donor agency, has in a recent report clearly documented how aid institutions directly interfere in a technology transfer process in order to obtain maximum deliveries of technical equipment from their own countries and thereby prevent local participation and competence building in the recipient countries.

The "packing" of different equipment inputs and the composition of turn-key projects, based totally on foreign deliveries, are among the main means of this interference (UNIDO, 1987). The UNIDO report says (p. 13):

Among the broad set of constraints checking the development prospects of electric equipment industry in developing countries ... [are] policies of the funding agencies for packing power projects that efficiently exclude participation of the indigenous infant industries.

There are also many other indications, both empirical and theoretical, that in practice donor agencies work mainly for the interests of the donor countries (Maizels & Nissanke, 1984; Cracknell, 1988; Gang & Lehman, 1990).

So far, then, we have found only weak forces in the direction of high real transfer in the model. The sum of forces in the model definitely seems to be to the left, in a downward direction, towards high prices and low transfers. This is also documented in my study of externally financed hydropower projects in Latin America and Africa. To change that, especially on the African continent, we have to rely heavily on development assistance. But then we have to go further to discuss the interests and objectives of development aid.

When we find that development agencies are also putting their force in the direction of a low real transfer of technology, it can have two explanations: One is that the agencies are determined to work for the benefits of their countries and companies. The other, which has recently been put forward by the chairman of DAC, the OECD committee for development assistance, is that the agencies are not sufficiently aware of what they are doing and the effects of it (Wheeler, 1989). He says that there is a lack of real understanding of the development process in the rich countries' development agencies. He adds that these organisations are working without adequate clarity of their real objectives. It is necessary "to develop our common vision of what needs to be done" (*ibid.*, 40). This brings me to the next section of this paper: What is the real value of technology transfers?

The real value of technology transfers

Today we can see a schism in development thinking, as well as in strategies among development agencies, at least when talking about international relationships. On the one hand, we have what I will call the IMF-paradigm, supported by the dominant multilateral aid agency, the World Bank. This paradigm of development thinking is based on liberalism and the work of market forces. There is little room for artificial respiration and subsidies to support infant industries in building technological capacity and competitiveness. Instead, the basis for competition should be the countries' existing equipment of comparative advantages and prices should be decided by the existing system of the world market. This paradigm has caught the wind from the political changes in Eastern Europe and it has been allowed to dominate because of the growing deficits in Africa's and Latin America's foreign accounts.

On the other hand, there are theories that are more critical of the neoclassical economic system in poor countries' development (Ranis & Schultz, 1988). These theories focus on the necessity of a substantial state participation in regulating the economy of developing countries. Perhaps we can see the outline of a related alternative in aid strategies. The United Nations Development Program, UNDP, last year put transfers of technology as one of six key issues in their development strategy. It also puts strong emphasis on education and the human preconditions for economic growth (UNDP, 1990; Munthe-Kaas, 1990). In the World Bank, we can also see a new and growing awareness of the importance of local participation and competence building and of state participation in the development process (World Bank, 1991). There seems to be a new awareness of the growth potentials lying in the real transfer and adaptation of modern technology for industrialisation and building multiplicity in poor countries' businesses. This also can be seen in a recent publication from the World Bank (1989; Meier & Steel, 1989).

I will now go into more detail about technology transfer and development, to make clear the contents of these two ways of thinking.

I will start with another example. In Tanzania the World Bank has been involved in a huge programme for the rehabilitation of the road system, for several years now. The costs of the whole programme will be more than 500 million USD. Several bilateral donors give support to the programme through co-financing. NORAD has taken the financial and technical responsibility for the rehabilitation of a 65 kilometer stretch at the coast worth about 150 million Norwegian Crowns, one third of which is used for purchasing advanced technical equipment from abroad. This part of the work is done by a Norwegian company and there is nothing mentioned in the contract about training or technology transfer.

The underlying ideology is that high quality roads will give Tanzania a position where it can transport agricultural products to the port for shipment to export markets. As long as high quality roads, defined according to certain criteria, can be built more cheaply by foreign companies, then let the foreign companies do so. The aid is given to make it possible for Tanzania to utilise its existing competitive advantages, which are in the agricultural sector and not for developing competence in new industries. To support Tanzania in building its own construction capability and capacity would be to disturb the invisible

hand. Tanzania can instead be helped to export and further develop the production of items that are directly competitive on the world market today. Tanzania should continue to import equipment and services as long as that is the cheapest option.

The strategy leaves out the possibility of competence building in new sectors and thereby also the possibility of diversifying the economic basis of society. The IMF-paradigm does not realise that a main reason behind the crisis in Africa today, lies with external relations, such as the development of export and import prices. The deteriorating terms of trade for tropical agricultural products versus industrial products and thus for most African developing countries versus industrialised countries, is without doubt one of the main explanations for their foreign account deficit. According to World Bank data, the terms of trade index for low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa fell from 105 in 1974 to 72 in 1987 (World Bank, 1989). There is an elementary logical fault in a market based development strategy where lower prices are to be compensated for by increased supply to the market. Instead, focus should be led to diversification of the economies of African countries.

In general, there is an awakening awareness in development thinking and in development agencies of the necessity of building production capacity. Production capacity has at least to be lifted to be in accordance with the level of necessary consumption of private goods and official services. To be able to build up new industries that should be globally competitive within a reasonable time, two preconditions must be met. One is fast competence building and an effective instrument to achieve this can be technology transfer. The other, which must accompany the first, is government intervention to support the infant industries. The old infant industry argument is still valid (Weiss, 1988). Industries based on new knowledge have to be protected for a while against foreign competitors to be able to rise and develop their own sustainable competitive capability (Figure 4). Neither of these two preconditions are met by the IMF-strategy, the last one is directly opposed.

The alternative to the IMF-paradigm is one which does not throw out the baby with the unhappy experiences of technology transfer and import substitution. That is one which believes in the potentials of foreign companies' assistance in building competence and in regional cooperation in creating sufficient market areas within the Third World. Development assistance could be a main contributor to both.

How can development assistance contribute in technology transfer?

The last section of this paper contains advice on how to stimulate the real transfer of technology by one of the four actors in my model.

1. Development agencies have the opportunity of creating an interest in a market among technology suppliers. Even if a country is without pure commercial interest for a foreign private company possessing interesting technology, aid funding can create considerable interest and intense and fruitful competition. This possibility must be utilised to open even poor developing countries to the benefits of competing technology suppliers. Such benefits we have seen in

FIGURE 4: THE INFANT INDUSTRY ARGUMENT

China, for instance, where the population in itself is big enough to create an interest among foreign companies which gives the country a good bargaining position when buying technology (Kristiansen, 1986). Today we see that aid financing does open markets, but often to limited competition.

2. Development agencies have the possibility of laying down conditions for the other actors in the model. We see that the principle of conditionality is widely accepted today and the agencies should be within their rights to ask for the actions necessary to secure learning and local competence building.

3. Development agencies should be more active as parties in negotiating technology transfer contracts. The contract provides the basis of the success or failure of a project and donors should utilise their position to secure a good starting point. Specified conditions and requirements for training and local participation should be included in a contract.

4. Development agencies should also monitor the implementation of a transfer project properly. All details on training and local participation should be checked throughout the implementation period.

5. Development agencies should stimulate the environment of a transfer project. That can be done for instance by assisting other educational projects or other forms of industrial development. When purchasing equipment for other

aid projects one should also, to a greater extent than today, look for local or regional suppliers, so as to stimulate the local or regional market.

Lastly, it should be mentioned that all these steps should be taken on the basis of a systematic examination and a clear understanding of the real potentials and constraints for technological development and market creation within the recipient region.

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New paradigm in Soviet aid policy in Africa

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Intensive discussions concerning foreign economic relations held among Soviet scholars recently took into their orbit the problem of aid policy to less developed countries in general, and to countries in Africa in particular. The highly contradicting and complicated process of reconstruction of the Soviet society made it necessary to hold discussions for working out a balanced and efficient long term strategy in the USSR's aid policy to less developed countries. This strategy aimed at stopping the spending of national financial and natural resources to "nobody knows where and to whom". It does not mean that Soviet economic science never touched this problem before, but that it was high time to look at this problem from the position of the whole society, not just from the position of the narrow party and government stratum of Soviet society.

Data sources and limitations

The principal source of data for this paper has been statistical publications of the All-Union Market Research Institute of the USSR's Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, principal holder of comprehensive and reliable statistical information about the problem. But open publication of the information on Soviet aid policy is only being discussed, and information about aid in the form of arms is still confidential. Nevertheless, analytical publications of the officials of this institute have become a valuable source for analyzing new trends in the Soviet aid policy in Africa. I want to mention especially S.I. Belenchook and E.B. Pokrovskaya, members of the African department of the above mentioned institute.

A principal source of information has been the papers presented by the participants in the session of the Scientific Council on problems of economic, social, political and cultural development in Africa, held in May 1989 in Kiev¹ and organised by the Africa Institute, situated in Moscow, and Kiev State University. The author was among the participants.

Another important source of information is the published papers of the Fifth All-Union conference of scholars who deal with the problems of Afro-Soviet relations,² held in November 1989 in Moscow. In my view these two publications opened the process of working out some elements of the new paradigm in Soviet aid policy in Africa. Several articles appeared in Soviet journals during 1990 which were devoted to the problem of USSR's aid policy in less developed countries.³ Among these I want to mention publications by E. Simonov and L.Z. Zevin. Ironically, or unfortunately, the problem of USSR's aid policy in Africa has been discussed more intensively among Western scholars than

among Soviet scholars. As sources of information for this paper I want to mention publications by C.R. Saivetz, D.E. Albright, C. Fogarty, K. Tritle, P. Clement, E.K. Valkenir,⁴ and others.

Development cooperation reports, annual development reports, annual development cooperation reports, publications of OECD and UNDP were valuable sources of generalised statistical information on aid policy in Africa. The author used much information, which was scattered in several books and articles devoted to Africa and printed in the USSR and/or in Western countries.⁵

History and methodology of the problem analysis

When speaking about the aid policy of the Soviet Union in Africa we must note that a clear definition of "aid" is absent in Soviet economic publications. Economic aid, assistance, trading relations in the Western sense are heavily tied in the practice of Afro-Soviet relations. This was mostly due to the fact that the "aid" in Soviet economic policy in Africa was based primarily *not* on the evaluation of mutual interests of the USSR and countries of Africa, *but* on the ideological doctrine according to which countries of Africa were able to by-pass capitalism and to build a socialist mode of production. That is why trade, technical and economic assistance, and military assistance sometimes took the form of aid in cases when a particular African leader declared his socialist choice of socio-economic development.

After 1917 and until the middle of the 1950s the USSR was isolated from the world community because of its rejection of the fundamental values of the market economy. This heavily influenced the USSR's aid policy in Africa. Most of the aid was sent to countries with a socialist orientation.

Speaking about methodological approaches to the concept of socialist orientation, we must point out that it was based on the concept of socio-economic formation. The main point of this concept was that socio-economic development gradually moves from one to another of five steps of socio-economic formation: Communal, Slave, Feudal, Capitalist, and then Communist, of which socialism is the first stage. So if the final point of socio-economic development is communism, which was already built in the USSR, what use is it for others to pass through capitalist exploitation, if this could be by-passed with the help of the socialism built by the USSR. The formation paradigm was just the scientific core of the old type of economic and political thinking, which considers world economy and world society to be dichotomic and antagonistic. That is why the formation of modern Soviet aid policy to less developed countries began from the critics of formation theory.⁶

Modern analyses showed that although this theory can be used as a limited instrument for the most general analyses of world socio-economic development it is, however, useless in analyses of transitional socio-economic processes, concrete economic situations, etc. This theory did not take into consideration the multi-alternative and multifactoral nature of socio-economic development. It means that socio-economic development must be explained as one of the elements of the wide spectrum of factors in political, ideological, social, cultural, ethnic, and geographic spheres, which coexist, coinfluence each other, and constitute alternative ways of development within different civilisations. That is why ideological orientation lost its significance.

Besides, we came to the conclusion that traditional definitions of marxism are unlikely to be capable of explaining the realities of Africa.

To give an example: a lot of research in Soviet studies was devoted to analyses of the formation of classes, but African society consists of a wide spectrum of margins, and analyses of these social forces require instruments other than class theory.

So most of the Soviet aid in Africa was delivered to countries with a socialist orientation, aimed at helping them to by-pass capitalism. It is difficult, but let us try to make an analysis of the amount and structure of Soviet aid to countries in Africa. The geographical distribution of Soviet aid in Africa can be gathered from the list of major debtor countries.

TABLE 1
OUTSTANDING DEBT OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO THE USSR IN 1990
(bn roubles)⁷

Ethiopia	2,860
Algeria	2,519
Angola	2,028
Egypt	1,711
Libya	1,707
Mozambique	0,808
Tanzania	0,310
Mali	0,285
Somalia	0,260
Guinea	0,258

In Chrushev's era, USSR's aid policy in Africa was concentrated largely to economic aid, but in Brezhnev's era the emphasis in aid policy changed to a preference for military aid. In 1955-64 the amount of Soviet economic aid to Africa was 1.8 bn USD, and of military aid 1.4 bn USD. The major recipient of Soviet aid was Egypt. The necessity for the restoration of the Egyptian army after its 1967 defeat in the war with Israel was a basis for increasing deliveries of arms to Africa. The amount in 1965-74 was 3.2 bn USD, while Soviet economic aid for this period amounted to 1.2 bn USD.⁸

During 1975-79 the USSR delivered an estimated 23.2 bn USD worth of weapons and military equipment to 35 Third World states. Among these, 17 countries with a socialist orientation received 19.0 bn USD⁹, approximately one third of this amount went to countries in Africa. But the picture of economic assistance was quite different: between 1975 and 1979 the USSR offered economic credits to 44 Third World states and among these 17 countries with a socialist orientation received only 2.5 bn USD of the estimated total of 10.8 bn USD. African countries with a socialist orientation received approximately 1 bn USD. The USSR made large commitments to Turkey, Morocco, and Nigeria, which received 2.8 bn, 2.0 bn, and 1.2 bn USD respectively. During 1982-86, again according to US estimates, the USSR sent more than 59.7 bn USD worth of arms to 32 Third World states and about 46.3 bn of this was sent to 18 revolutionary democratic countries. The same 18 revolutionary democracies received approximately 48.8 bn USD of the more than 60.4 bn USD in arms that

the USSR delivered to 33 Third World states during 1983–87. During 1982–88 the USSR extended an estimated 23.1 bn USD in economic credits to 47 Third World states. 17 countries with a socialist orientation received about 11.4 bn USD of this amount.

The share of African countries in the USSR arms aid grew enormously in the 1980s. Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Libya had become main recipients of the USSR arms aid, and were also among the biggest recipients of Soviet economic aid. During 1984–85 and 1986–87 among Soviet military deliveries to Mozambique and Angola we could see some of the most expensive types of arms: MIG-23, SU-22 fighter aircraft, SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, armoured personnel carriers, tanks, MI-24 helicopter gunships, and P-76 light tanks.

The amount of military assistance to Ethiopia since 1982 was more than 2.2 bn USD; the amount of economic aid in form of economic credit and grant aid in 1980–84 was about 1 bn USD. The ratio between economic and military aid from the USSR to Africa was one to five during the 1980s. But the whole picture is more contradictory. During 1985–87, 29 Third World states obtained more than 8.6 bn USD in economic credits from the USSR. Of this sum eleven countries with a socialist orientation received only about 2.9 bn USD. In 1982–84 the USSR provided 6.9 bn USD from 7.7 bn USD in economic credits to 15 countries of socialist orientation. The commitment of the USSR to five countries with revolutionary democratic regimes in 1988 was 2.2 bn USD of the total sum of 7.3 bn USD.

Furthermore, the commitments that the USSR offered in 1985–88 to states in three of the regions with countries with a socialist orientation—North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central America and the Caribbean—went primarily to such countries. The shares in three cases were, respectively, 340 million USD of 355 million USD, more than 690 million USD of about 780 million USD, and all of nearly 2.1 bn USD.¹⁰ As far as particular countries are concerned, Angola received 5.8 bn USD worth of arms from the USSR in 1983–87, and Ethiopia 4.2 bn USD in the same period.

From OECD statistics of Soviet aid we see that of the whole sum of USSR disbursements in 1987, amounting to 4.861 bn USD, probably only 930 million USD went to Africa.¹¹

It is likely that 40–45 per cent of a total of 220 million USD for scholarships went to Africans. Open Soviet aid statistics in general and open Afro-Soviet aid statistics in particular have for a long time been playing the role of advertisements for the Soviet type of economic policy.¹² It is very difficult to do any type of serious socio-economic research on the basis of Soviet aid statistics. But I want to mention that we are now on the way to gradually improving the situation. 1990 was the first year of open discussion in the Supreme Councils of the USSR and Russia of the amount of aid and its geographical distribution. What are the general characteristics of Soviet aid policy in Africa before the Gorbachev era?

A low level of research in the field of long term interests of the USSR as a whole and of the member republics resulted in most of the aid being provided to countries with a socialist orientation on the basis of their declarations about their readiness to by-pass capitalism and build socialism. But maybe these countries have achieved some accomplishments in the socio-economic field? Let us have a look at some principal economic indexes of African countries with a socialist orientation.

TABLE 2
OUTSTANDING DEBT OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES OF SOCIALIST ORIENTATION
IN 1986 (bn USD)¹³

Country	Total (bn USD)	Debt export ratio	Debt GDP ratio
Zambia	4.2	464.0	455.3
Tanzania	3.4	743.3	62.5
Mozambique	2.6	1518.6	129.2
Madagascar	2.3	634.1	101.8
Ethiopia	1.9	339.4	36.5
Guinea	1.3	254.7	74.4
Congo	1.3	105.2	60.9
Benin	0.8	326.0	78.9
Burkina Faso	0.6	366.6	73.4
Guinea Bissau	0.3	1042.0	129.4

Algeria had the lowest debt-export ratio among all African countries with a socialist orientation, it being 147 per cent, which was better than other countries with a socialist orientation, but worse than Nigeria, which is the number one debtor country in Africa with a debt service of 134.6 per cent.

TABLE 3
SHARE OF OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT AID IN THE GNP OF THE COUNTRIES
OF SOCIALIST ORIENTATION IN AFRICA (%)¹⁴

Country	1960-1961	1970-1971	1982-1983	1984
Guinea Bissau	-	0.2	40.8	-
Burkina Faso	-	7.6	17.8	-
Tanzania	4.1	4.3	13.7	14.3
Benin	-	8.4	8.0	-
Zambia	-	1.1	7.8	-
Madagascar	-	5.3	7.8	-
Ethiopia	1.9	2.4	5.9	7.7
Congo	0.1	5.8	5.1	5.3

If we examine these two tables in connection with the figures of the annual growth of per capita GNP of the countries of socialist orientation, which had a variation of between one and two per cent during last decade¹⁵, the conclusion is clear: all the countries with a socialist orientation, irrespective of their leaders' ideological claims, were unable to work out real alternatives to the capitalist way of development and gradually moved in the opposite direction than planned for in Soviet aid policy. The indexes in Tables 1 and 2 show the high level of incorporation of African socialist countries into the world capitalist division of labour. Besides, all the countries of socialist orientation found themselves in deep socio-economic crisis. Pursuing mostly ideological, political, and

military-strategic interests, the USSR spent a maximum of aid money with a minimum effect.

So the second characteristic feature of Soviet aid policy was the absence of stable social strata recipients of Soviet aid. Pursuing short term political interests, the USSR could not create a socio-economic foundation for the development of an effective economic relationship with aid-recipient African countries.

Of course, the USSR had played a significant role in Africa at the stage of the development of African states, i.e. when they were establishing their political independence.

The internationalisation of the world economy, in which economic nationalism favoured an orientation towards the world market, restricted Soviet aid policy in Africa and sometimes made it irrational and useless. Moreover, African countries began to consider Soviet aid programmes as a possible source for financing the most unprofitable branches of industry and agriculture, and the Soviet Union itself as a market for sales of goods which could not be sold anywhere else.

New approaches to Soviet aid policy in Africa

To begin with, the working out of new approaches for Soviet aid policy in Africa needs careful examination of some of the lessons of Soviet economic policy both within and outside the country, of which aid policy is only one particular item.

The economic history of world civilisation showed that there is a strong correlation between the ideals and values which the society chose as relative final points in particular periods of its development, and the economic tools which the society used to accomplish these ideals. If the ideal is unclear, not understandable, it can provoke mass financial expenditures, "nobody knows what for", and mass persecutions of innocent people. In this case, the donor and recipient countries have a wide spectrum of instruments for different types of speculations. When the USSR was constructing the Aswan dam in Egypt, Soviet officials organising the whole deal were likely to be thinking about the geo-political position of Egypt, but told Egyptians about socialist orientation. Egyptians paid the USSR back in its own coin: speaking about the immortal friendship between the USSR and Egypt and thinking about the future of the Egyptian nation as part of Arab civilisation. It is unlikely that either Soviet officials or Egyptian ones really understood what socialism and socialist orientation could mean in economic policy.

Another important point of economic policy is the choice of a social base for its implementation. In most countries where a socialist mode of production was being established, the understanding of what socialism is depends on which of two big social strata the person belongs to. The first one consists of the most capable section of the workers, peasants, and intellectuals. They understand socialism as free competition, in the sphere of material and intellectual production, between either individuals or collectives. They reject any badly founded limitations in salaries, and consider competition and payment according to labour and capability of a person to be the main points of the system of motivation for labour.

The second one consists of a wide spectrum of strata, usually formed in transitional societies. They represent workers, peasants, intellectuals, who have not got their own face, their own way. Here we can see a wide spectrum of petty bourgeoisie, trying to make their own money, though lacking in skill and experience. Gunder Frank coined a brilliant term for this bourgeoisie calling it the "lumpen bourgeoisie".

The understanding of socialism within this stratum is based on the necessity of fair distribution of all that is produced and obtained within aid programmes. Here a contradiction arises: if economic policy is based on the most capable part of the nation, the effectiveness of production gradually grows, but inequality as well, which results in high social tensions and, in the cases of the USSR and African countries, in enormous prosecutions of wealthy and capable people; but if economic policy is based on the poorest part of society it leads to demotivation of intensive and qualified labour, destruction of traditions in the production sphere, and finally to economic collapse, because the most capable part of the nation does not work intensively, knowing that most of its income will be redistributed to favour the poor. The poorer part of the nation does not work properly, expecting its equal share of national income, irrespective of its labour productivity, capability, and talent.

From this the following conclusion must be made: aid programmes can succeed in African society only if combined with deep social reforms, which clear the way for enormous masses of the population to change their stratum in search for jobs which will improve the quality of their lives. The realisation, that an aid policy can be productive only if it is combined with a system of reforms in the social, political, ideological, cultural, etc. spheres, was connected not only with the failures of Soviet aid policy in African countries with a socialist orientation, but also with contradictory processes going on in more than 30 African countries implementing structural adjustment programmes. Enormous numbers of publications are devoted to this group of problems.¹⁶

A good push was given to Soviet scholars examining aid policy in Africa by the discussion carried on between the World Bank and the IMF, on one side, and the UN Economic Commission on Africa on the other.¹⁷

So, for the formation of Soviet aid policy in Africa, the conditions can be characterised in the following way:

1. Like the economies and societies of aid-recipient African countries, the economy of the USSR itself is experiencing a deep socio-economic crisis, which severely limits the financial possibilities of the donor—the USSR—on one hand, and makes the need for aid from the Soviet Union urgent, on the other.
2. Most of the African countries receiving aid from the USSR are implementing structural adjustment reforms within the agreements with IMF/IBRD. Different Soviet agencies have been practically withdrawn from participation in most development projects in the public and mixed sectors of African countries, because the USSR is not a member of the IBRD, and the World Bank is usually taking an active part in financing the above mentioned projects in the public and mixed sectors of the economy of African countries.

3. Moreover, the Soviet Union itself is implementing a highly specific and contradictory variant of structural adjustment reform, the fulfilment of which is much more difficult than in any other country, because of the highly diversified range of problems which the USSR faces in political, ideological, cultural, social, inter-ethnic, etc., spheres. That makes the Soviet Union itself a potential recipient of aid from Western countries. This made the aid strategy of the USSR to LDCs one of the most debatable questions among a bloc of questions in the relationship of the USSR with countries of different regions in the spheres of trade, economic cooperation, etc. Some deputies in the Supreme Council of the USSR, the Supreme Council of Russia and other republics are insisting on cutting down on the aid programmes to the LDCs of Africa because of the difficult economic situation in the USSR itself. In fact the USSR has striven particularly to enhance its economic relationship with the best economic performers among developing countries. These countries have been almost exclusively capitalist-oriented states, aid recipients from the West, with the exception of India, where the Soviet Union did quite a lot as a donor country. The most striking illustrations of such Soviet Union undertakings are found in India, Brazil, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, Tunisia, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia, as illustrated in Table 4.

TABLE 4
USSR's AVERAGE ANNUAL TRADE TURNOVER WITH SOME COUNTRIES
(bn USD)¹⁸

Country	1975-1979	1983-1987
India	1.2	3.1
Brazil	0.320	0.563
Singapore	0.260	0.115
Thailand	0.022	0.088
Turkey	0.170	0.4
Tunisia	0.017	0.043
Sri Lanka	0.030	0.046
Malaysia	0.170	0.235

If we look at the level of Afro-Soviet trading relations, we see a rapid fall in the share of the USSR in the external trading turnover of African countries, and a rapid fall in the share of African countries in the external trading turnover of the USSR.¹⁹

Thus, the formation of Soviet aid policy in Africa should begin by studying the problem of the USSR's interests in Africa.

As a rule, different Soviet scholars considered African countries as alternative sources of mineral and agricultural resources²⁰, which might weaken the situation in USSR's markets of oil, gas, cotton, etc. Africa is also viewed as a market for the export of Soviet machinery and technology.²¹ In turn, African countries themselves are developing their own attitude to the economic relationship with the USSR.²² We can see that there are some principal meeting-points in the national interests of African countries and of the USSR. They are: production and export to the USSR of agricultural products and some minerals in exchange for technical assistance in the construction of industrial enterprises

and in the export of machinery for different branches of the economy African countries. It means that the former meeting-point of national interests of the USSR and African countries, which mostly reflected the strategic contradiction of the USA and the USSR, has already ceased to play its role.

It also means that Soviet aid to Africa, which was more than 90 per cent in the form of weapons, must be completely stopped. It does not mean that the USSR will stop the trade of arms, but it must surely mean putting an end to aid in the form of weaponry. By the way, paradoxically, the countries, which now speak so much about peace and democracy are the biggest exporters of arms in the world (USA, USSR, Great Britain, France, and some others).

Careful and clear distinction between non-chargeable aid and all other types of economic and technical assistance is the next problem to be addressed in the formation of Soviet aid policy in Africa. In the past, the different Soviet agencies were not responsible for the return of money they spent in Africa and they converted most of the Soviet credits in Africa into the form of presents or grants, irrespective of their planned character. The decree by Gorbachev, on 24th July 1990²³ put an end to this practice. It is difficult to say whether different Soviet agencies will understand this decree constructively and not spend money in Africa without taking into consideration the financial possibilities of the national economy, or whether they will simply cut aid to Africa completely.

In the future, an aid policy of the USSR for Africa should be based on the OECD definition of aid. It will make it possible for the USSR to participate in the world system of aid coordination and make Soviet aid to Africa more controlled and more efficient. The USSR has already taken its first steps in this direction: participation in the working-session of the Conference devoted to the coordination of the development of the countries of Southern Africa, participation in the meeting of donor-countries, held in Mali, devoted to the reorganisation of the "Office du Niger", one of the regional aid-programmes in Africa, etc.

In my opinion, Soviet aid should be divided into two items:

- a) grants mostly in the form of scholarships amounting to 150–160 bn roubles;
- b) loans amounting to around 1 bn roubles on a traditional Soviet aid policy financial basis.

If we speak about aid in the form of grants, it must be completely referred to maintaining different training facilities which were built by the USSR in Africa and in the USSR itself (e.g. Peoples' Friendship University).

The Soviet Union has trained more than 450,000 specialists and skilled workers for Africa, some 250,000 of them being trained at different institutions and training centres set up in African countries with Soviet assistance; another 150,000 acquired their skills during the construction and operation of projects; and more than 30,000 graduated from Soviet universities and special secondary schools. About one hundred different educational establishments were set up and equipped in African countries with Soviet aid, including ten high schools, six specialised secondary schools, and more than 80 vocational training schools and centres.²⁴

This part of Soviet aid to Africa meets interests not only in Africa but in the USSR itself too, because the adoption of Soviet credits and technical assistance requires a particular type of working force, which unlikely can be prepared either in Western educational facilities or in African educational facilities.

Raising the share of support to Sub-Saharan Africa is among the main trends of developing Soviet aid in the form of technical assistance. The share of Soviet technical assistance to Africa in this domain is likely to rise to 20 per cent of the total in the 1990s. It was planned that most of the aid would be directed to African farming in the following sectors:

- inauguration of new farm lands and comprehensive use of water resources in Algeria, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Guinea, Madagascar, and Tanzania;
- mechanisation of agriculture and the creation of maintenance and repair centres for farm machines and equipment in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Guinea, and Madagascar;
- construction of storage and processing facilities and the improvement of sea fisheries in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Sudan, Guinea Bissau, Ghana, Uganda, and Tanzania;
- the training of African farm specialists at Soviet educational establishments or at local training centres in Mali, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda, Cameroon, and Madagascar.

The first steps in Soviet aid policy which promoted the realisation of this trend showed that assistance was directed at the creation of large state farms, e.g. in Tanzania, which proved inefficient in conditions of African agriculture. Here a problem arose: concentration of agricultural production on big state farms decreases the initiative of farmers, reduces the motivation for intensive labour, enhances corruption among managers of such farms. If, however, we listen to World Bank advisers and diversify agricultural production on small and medium sized farms, it is difficult to forecast the decline in prices that would inevitably follow a widespread acceptance of that advice. This contradiction can be solved by coordinating aid programmes with a development scheme of African agriculture which reflects the main cultural and ethnical peculiarities of African countries, but not the ideological contradiction between East and West.

Among one of the major trends in the formation of Soviet aid policy in Africa we want to single out the aid for developing different types of compensational projects, within which the USSR gets needed minerals or agricultural products in exchange for the equipment or technical assistance required for their production. The only successful compensational project between the USSR and Africa is the production of bauxite in Guinea. The others are still in the process of being planned.

Don C.I. Opala, in analyzing the role and influence of external assistance in the planning of development and management of African human settlement systems, stresses some disproportions in the distribution of aid for this purpose.²⁵ Among them are: a high proportion of aid to human settlements is spent in cities, very low shares of external technical assistance and external capital assistance to human settlements are among the sectoral distribution of aid. In my opinion there are some niches in this sphere for Soviet aid, especially for a wide spectrum of petty business which is likely to be formed in the near future.

Future perspectives for the Soviet aid to Africa

The key issue in the formation of the Soviet aid policy in Africa is the socio-economic situation in the Soviet Union itself. Among all existing alternatives in the formation of Soviet aid policy in Africa we can point to a minimum of two:

- a) the formation of aid policy within the USSR as the union of sovereign republics which entrusts the centre to spend their own money within aid programmes in Africa;
- b) the formation of different aid programmes by the republics, or a group of republics which come out of the union and develop their own approaches to aid programmes in Africa.

The second alternative will make Russia, the Ukraine, Khazakstan, and Byelorussia the most probable donors of financial and technical assistance to African countries. Paradoxically, partial disintegration of the Soviet Union can enlarge aid programmes to Africa, because some financial resources, of e.g. Russia which formerly were redistributed within the state budget of the USSR to other republics, can be reserved in Russia's budget and used for other purposes.

Conclusions

1. Soviet aid policy in Africa is experiencing a phase of moving from its heavy burden of ideological and military heritage and is now searching for new paradigms for the formation of an effective aid policy in Africa. Mutual national interests of African countries and the USSR in the development of an agricultural complex, development of the production of mineral resources, energy, development of the educational system, and reconstruction of human settlements are gradually becoming the basis for a long-term USSR aid policy in Africa.
2. The necessity of gradual incorporation into a system of world coordination of aid policy for Africa is another fundamental trend in the formation of Soviet aid policy in Africa. Here the need for careful studying of the experience of OECD countries' aid policy in Africa arose. Studying Swedish aid for development is likely to be most useful for the formation of Soviet aid policy in Africa. It has to do with the relative proximity of ideological backgrounds (ideas of social equality), the same aid-recipient countries (Tanzania, Ethiopia, Angola, etc.). Besides, there is principal correspondence between Swedish approaches to the understanding of what is going on in Africa, and Soviet ones (see the works of G. Adler-Karlsson and G. Myrdal, for example). It is significant that the first papers about the Western experience of aid policy in Soviet economic journals were devoted to analyses of Swedish "aid for development" (see MEiMO, Nr 12, 1989, 112-117).
3. Reorientation of Soviet aid policy to humanitarian and economic spheres on a compensational basis is another fundamental demand and is most urgent for modern Soviet aid policy in Africa. Compensational projects are becom-

ing the main aid recipient subjects within African aid recipient countries. It is likely that they will take the form of mixed Afro-Soviet companies.

4. The rise of the share of aid to the countries of sub-Saharan Africa compared with the total aid to Africa is a significant trend in the geographical distribution of aid to Africa. Irrespective of the highly contradictory experiences of Soviet aid policy in countries with a socialist orientation, we must point out that through this bitter experience many valuable things were accomplished in the spheres of education, agriculture, energy supply, etc. It will not be wise to lose all these relative accomplishments. They can be used as a ground for the future development of Afro-Soviet relations.
5. The social stratum of aid-recipients of Soviet assistance represents one of the core problems in the formation of USSR aid policy in Africa. Usual aid recipients—the national state bureaucracy—must be added to the wide spectrum of other subjects of aid-recipients: national small and medium bourgeoisie, members of the different agricultural associations (cooperatives etc.) mostly on the basis of aid for receiving education either in the USSR or in the educational facilities created with the help of the USSR.

Notes

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2. *Novoje myshlenije i Afrika*, Institut Afriki. AN SSSR, Moscow 1990.
3. See for example: L. Z. Zovin, L. Z. and E. L. Simonov, Pomosh i ekonomicheskoe sotroodnichestvo SSSR s razvivajushimisja stranami: ooroiki, problemy, perspektivy, *Dialog, Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 2, pp. 5–17, 1990.
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5. See for example:
Structural Adjustment in Africa. Edited by Campbell, B. K. and J. Loxley, 1989.
Bandow, D. *Economic and Military Aid Intervention in the 1980s*. Boulder, London 1989.
6. Among a lot of publications devoted to critical examination of the formation theory I want to refer to the brilliant article of Cheshkov, M., "Ponimaniye tselostnosti mira: v poiskah reformatsionnoi paradigmy." in *MEIMO*, No. 5, pp. 33–48, 1990.
7. *Argumenty i fakty*, No. 52, p. 5, December, 1990.
8. *Eho planety*, Nos. 35–36, p. 22, 1990.
9. See note 4. Statistics given by Albright, L. and P. Clement were especially valuable. They were based on Intelligence Agency (CIA).
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US CIA, *Communist Aid Activities in non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1979 and 1954-1979*.
10. See note 4 and:

- Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in non-Communist LDCs, *Holding Their Own in 1986*. Washington D.C., August 1988.
- US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1988*. Washington, D.C., June 1989.
11. "Development cooperation", Report by J. C. Wheeler, pp. 228. OECD, December 1988.
 12. See for example:
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 13. African Debt and Financing. Special Reports 5. Edited by Lancaster, Carol and John Williamson, pp. 38–39. Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C., May 1986.
 14. Ibidem, pp. 110–111. Report by the Chairman. OECD, Paris 1985, 1988.
 15. World Bank, *Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*.
 16. See for example:
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See also: *Vneshnjaja trgovlja*, No. 8, p. 56, 1990.
 20. See note 1, paper prepared by Belenhook, S. I., p. 66. See also:
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 21. See for example: Sokolov, A. A., *Vneshnije faktory vosproiz-vodstva v stranah Severnoi Afriki i Ekonomicheskije otno-shenija SSSR s gosoodarstvami regiona*. Moscow 1989.
 22. See for example: E/ECA/Trade/90, "Prospects for developing trade between African countries and the USSR and major market opportunities", 28 August, 1987.
 23. *Ukaz Prezidenta SSSR*, "O vnesenii izmenenij vo vneshneekono-micheskooju praktiko Sovetskogo Sojuza", 24 July, 1990.
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Evolving development studies in Finland

Marja-Liisa Swantz

Development studies got off to a late start in Finland. To explain why this was the case it is not enough to point to the slowness with which new ideas generally reach Finland. It is also necessary to know something about the history and background of Finnish social science scholarship in general and of the earlier contacts Finland had with the other continents.

The account of Finnish development studies I give here is selective. On the one hand, I bring out aspects which in earlier writings have been given less attention. Such is the emphasis given to the missionary contacts with Africa as a precursory phase to later scholarship. On the other hand, for the sake of the non-Finnish reader, I review briefly relevant Finnish scholarship and some in other languages.

In Finland, the social studies, strangely enough, oriented themselves first toward cultures outside Europe, starting from the end of the last century and continuing until the Second World War. Edvard Westermarck in Morocco, Rafael Karsten in South America, Gunnar Landtman in Papua New Guinea and Hilma Granqvist in Palestine represented this orientation. Knut Pipping and Veronica Stolte-Heiskanen called it Westermarckian Sociology and Social Anthropology (Pipping & Stolte-Heiskanen, 1984, 161-195).

The war was the turning point in the orientation of Finnish social studies. It changed conditions radically in the country. The need for a completely new orientation grew out of the new post-war situation. Over 400,000 Carelians had to be resettled and given land and compensation for the property they lost in the territories that were occupied by USSR. Massive industrialisation was prompted by the heavy war reparations Finland was paying to the USSR in the form of industrial goods. Completely new lines of production had to be set up overnight. The resulting migration to cities and to other industrial centres dislocated large parts of the rural population. The great social changes demanded new kind of social science for which modernisation theories and survey methodologies were borrowed mainly from the USA.

This meant that, at the time when colonial countries were beginning to prepare themselves for independence and the scholarship concerning them turned from cultural studies to economic and developmental problems, Finland made an about turn to study its own society and completely disregarded its earlier interest in other continents. It also meant that Finnish development studies almost escaped the powerful thrust of modernisation theories prevalent elsewhere in development research. Finland had no substantial economic interests in colonial countries before or even after their independence, apart from the "colonial goods" it imported. Even these goods were not imported directly. They were exported from the colonies and processed by the ruling colonial

powers to be sold in "colonial goods stores". Thus Finnish scholars had little interest in development economics, a situation which has continued until today.

Visits of Finns to other continents were accidental before the Second World War, except for migration to North America. There was, however, a sizable group who had worked as Christian missionaries in Africa and Asia. An announcement that someone had chosen to move to Africa was received with great astonishment. At the level of the state, the work of the missionaries went unnoticed. There was, however, widespread knowledge of this work through religious instruction given in all the schools in Finland. Missionary work, which had linked Ovamboland in Northern Namibia with Finland already 130 years previously, later contributed to the positive orientation of the Finns toward the liberation struggle of Namibia.

The geographic and political position of Finland, sandwiched in between East and West and bordering on a large neighbour, has not only coloured the nation's history, but it has also facilitated her relative isolation. Against this background, the role that the early pioneers played in the opening up of the horizons of the Finnish public needs to be given due weight, despite of their limitations. Not only has missionary work created awareness among Finns of people and life in Africa, but it has also produced significant scholarship.

Predecessors of Finnish development studies

The first Finnish missionaries arrived in Ovamboland in 1870.¹ They were ordinary Finnish peasants who after seven years of training started work in Namibia. Among them was Martti Rautanen, a son of a serf from Novasolka, Inkeri, near St. Petersburg. The other six sent together with Rautanen came from peripheral areas of Finland, which then was a Grand Duchy in the Russian Empire. They needed permission from the Czar to be consecrated as missionary pastors for Ovamboland. Others were sent as practical workers, masons, carpenters and smiths. Women followed soon after as wives or single workers (Peltola, 1958). Rautanen became the founder of the literary culture in Ovamboland, where he remained until his death in 1926. He was granted an honorary doctor's degree in Theology by the Theological Faculty at the University of Helsinki for his scholarship and translation of the Bible into the Ndonga language.

The Church which began in Ovamboland and later in Okavango became independent and was registered by the government of South West Africa in 1957, over forty years before the country gained independence.

As a result of this connection with Namibia, Finland has valuable missionary scholarship on the history, culture and languages of Namibia and a large collection of archives, of which the Emil Liljeblad collection has become the richest source for scholars. Through the missionary work started after the World War II in Tanzania, considerable missionary scholarship is also available from there. The previous missionary contacts also influenced the choice of Tanzania as the first country with which development cooperation was started. Missionary writing was inspired by contemporary ethnographic and linguistic scholarship or simply grew out of the necessity to get to know the land and its people, among whom the writers lived and worked. Other published writings were in

the form of popular literature, addressed to the supporting community in the Church of Finland.

Most of the written missionary material and archival collections are available in Finnish and some in Swedish. Aspects of Ovambo culture are documented in the German language, especially those recorded by Rautanen, and of the Uukwanyama, written by August Pettinen in *Zeitschrift für Eingeborenen Sprachen* in 1924–1927 (Eirola et al., 1983). The first history of Ovamboland in the Ndonga language was written by a longtime missionary, Erkki Laurmaa, in 1949, *Afrika juuningin omutenja*. Toivo Tirronen, a mathematics teacher, completed demanding work on the Ndonga language, publishing a Ndonga Grammar and a Ndonga-Finnish Dictionary.²

Bibliographical accounts of the Finnish missionary literature of Namibia and a guide to the use of the Archives have been written by Martti Eirola and a team of scholars from Joensuu who worked under the leadership of Seppo Rytönen (Eirola et al., 1983; Eirola, 1985). A bibliographic study of Finnish missionary literature in general was compiled by Thea Aulo in 1965.

Among the more recent scholars of missionary theology one could mention Seppo Löytty, writing on Ovambo sermons; Henrik Smedjebacka, on the history of the Northern Diocese of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania; Raimo Harjula, who studied Meru religion and traditional medicine; and Arvi Hurskainen, professor of African languages and culture, who has done his major research on the Maasai pastoralists of Tanzania. Maija Tuupainen-Hiltunen, after doing her doctorate on marriage customs in Namibia, has drawn on the material in the Liljeblad-collection and written about witchcraft and sorcery in Ovamboland.³ The writer of this paper, as well as Taimi Sitari, represent a tradition of Finnish missionary scholarship which can be classified as development studies, based mainly in Tanzania. Both of us have written extensively on various aspects of rural development; much of my work relates specifically to women.

Studies which critically evaluate the cultural, political or developmental effects of missionary work began to appear when the former mission churches strove to free themselves from missionary domination and became independent, concurrently with criticism of Anthropology as a colonial science. Within Finnish scholarship Tuula Varis has applied Foucault's theory of power to the "pastoral form of power" used by missionaries in Ovamboland (Varis, 1986). Martti Eirola's forthcoming doctoral thesis will analyse the role Finnish missionaries played as mediators between the German colonial government and the Ovambo people.⁴ Professor Peltola is at present finishing an exhaustive biography of Martti Rautanen. Prof. Heininen of the Theological Faculty of the University of Helsinki is launching a history project on African culture and Christianity in Ovamboland in cooperation with some Namibian scholars. Dr. Harri Siiskonen only marginally discusses the role of the missions in his work on the early economic development of Northern Namibia.

Critical research by Namibian researchers began during the long struggle for liberation. Several theologians have written critically on missionary work using mainly source materials from the German missions. Dr. Shekutamba Nambala has done his doctorate on Lutheran missionary work in Namibia; Zedekia and Emma Mujoro have written on the same subject. The well known historian Peter Katjavivi belongs to these critics, as does Kaire Mbuende.⁵ As a historian, Juhani Koponen has placed missionary scholarship within the evolution of de-

velopment studies (Koponen, 1986, 11–12) whereas several others have referred to it only in passing (Melasuo, 1984, 12; Pipping & Stolte-Heiskanen, 1984, 186).

On a more superficial level there has been a rather general and simplified condemnation of the effects of missionary work on traditional culture. Missionaries had rejected most of the traditional rituals outright because of those elements which they, together with African church leaders, considered were superstitious and pagan and thus incompatible with Christianity. While it is true that most missionaries had little understanding of the meaning of the various features of culture, the fact that the modernising Africans went further in their demands for rejection of the old customs is forgotten. Nor has the Churches' reaction to traditional culture been systematically compared with the similar and even more radical changes effected intentionally through development work and political intervention.

Today's modernisers of independent Africa reject many of the same elements on the grounds of development, although token dances are kept up to give an appearance of tradition. The paradox in wanting to preserve while at the same time aiming at full structural transformation has not been adequately analyzed.⁶

Research is in progress, however, which reconstructs meanings of cultural institutions. Frieda Williams has recently finished her doctoral dissertation at the University of Joensuu, writing on history of Northern Namibia and using first hand and archival cultural material. Märtha Salokoski is reconstructing history from the symbolic aspects of kingship. The Namibian elites reject the non-modern culture of the leather-clad Ndimbas and Himbas or the San, in much the same way as the Tanzanian bureaucrats rejected the pastoralist culture of the Maasai and Barabaig. The latter were given the ultimatum of dressing themselves in pants under government threat of punishment. In this case a mission station came to be a place where the Barabaigs went to borrow pants when they had errands to perform in public places and were exposed to the public eye.

Much deeper understanding of the meaning of cultural institutions has to be gained before criticism of cultural destruction under mission influence can comfortably be levied. A transfer from one symbolic system to another is much less destructive than a jump to a rational system with little or no room for intuition, associative thinking and sharing of symbols. Jung's presentation of archetypes and shared symbols across cultures, as well as Mircea Eliade's convincing account of comparative patterns of religion and numerous other works on human capacity to communicate with symbols, indicate that symbolising is thoroughly human. To be deprived of all symbols through a secular development scheme that is imposed onto people's lives would thus be a greater loss than to move from one symbolic system to another.

The transition to development studies

The story of development studies in Finland has been told in different ways by different writers, depending on the writer's own interest, background and angle of viewing the matter. There is general agreement that, at the beginning, these studies missed the modernisation phase. There had been some research as a continuation of Westermarckian Sociology in the sense that the students of

Karsten, Erik Allardt being the foremost of them, were converted to a new kind of sociology which had been developed in the USA. Allardt used the central concepts of modernisation theory in his case study in what then was Australian New Guinea. In 1972 Allardt also wrote an essay on *Development, Growth and Modernization*. The analysts of this period point out that the change of paradigm required, in accordance with Thomas Kuhn, rejection of the earlier paradigm. In this case it was done by creating a new discipline, Sociology, and later Social Anthropology as a sub-discipline. There was a tendency to think that Sociology was a discipline for modern societies and Social Anthropology for non-modern, primitive societies. Development studies as they were first pursued within the Institute of Development Studies, became a broadened and radicalised version of Social Anthropology.

Anthropology is also the link between missionary scholarship and development studies. In the mid-sixties it was difficult to find a discipline at the University of Helsinki within which a study of symbols could have been looked at in the perspective of directed development. My own study of changing symbols fell in many ways between disciplines. It attempted to formulate a holistic and thus interdisciplinary approach to ritual symbols and their significance for development. With hindsight, had Development Studies or Women's Studies gained more ground by then in Scandinavia, it would have been categorised as Development Anthropology (Swantz, 1970; 1986).

An anthropological orientation formed a bridge from the missionaries' local knowledge of Africa and their familiarity of the vernacular to the scholarship which laid stress on participation and closeness to the "object" of study. It also generated a participatory research approach which turned the usual "object" to the "subject" of research. This approach has played an important role in Finnish development research within the IDS.

An account of Finnish development research in English was written by Helena Rytövuori, who describes the earlier major research projects (Rytövuori, in Berger et al., 1983, 121–154).

Finnish development assistance, first in cooperation with other Nordic countries in the early 1960s and later as a separate programme, prompted interest in development research. However, Siitonen draws attention to the fact that Finnish development cooperation did not demand research nor did it facilitate institutionalised forms of development research as elsewhere in Scandinavia (Siitonen, 1984, 320).

The differences in opinion and orientation between those engaged in development research as to the nature of this research becomes evident in the articles of a 100-page publication called *Kehityksen tutkimus ja tutkimuksen kehitys* (The Study of Development and the Development of Study), eds. Juhani Koponen and Lauri Siitonen (1986), published by the Finnish Society for Development Studies. The articles were initially given as introductory lectures on a debate whether development studies is a separate field of study or only an aspect or an application of basic disciplinary research. Whatever the stand taken in these debates, the need for an interdisciplinary approach is emphasised.

With development cooperation and development aid requiring a research component, development research is often identified as applied research for development projects. Over and against this tendency development researchers have asserted the right to develop their field independently from the requirements of development cooperation. They claim the right to study development

as a phenomenon critically, especially as it is conceived within the predominant world economic system or within the dominating techno-scientific system of knowledge. The development concept as such is challenged by many. These debates also reflect the opinions of various interest groups among Third World scholars. They similarly have their hard-line promoters of development within the dominating model, but also defenders of the poor for whom development has brought little visible improvement and whose living choices have narrowed down rather than increased.

Timo Kyllönen, one of the writers of the opus referred to above, gives perhaps the most penetrating analysis of the evolution of development studies in Finland (1990).⁷ His work concentrates on changes in development thinking and development studies within the social sciences after the Second World War. According to Kyllönen, development studies was a reaction to modernisation and the economics-oriented development in developing countries.

In Finland, the task of development studies has not been to facilitate mainstream development. It has inherited a mood of resistance from the period of radicalism and has sought to find oppositional views in defence of the weak, poor and oppressed, among whom women have also been counted. Development research has chosen its topics from outside the themes of the mainstream disciplines. According to Kyllönen, this gives the study space for movement but also institutionalises its marginal position. When development research matured and took its present form in interaction with "third worldism" and with dependency and neo-marxism, it considered itself to be radical criticism of the dominating social studies. The search for alternatives has been central and binds development studies to the on-going discussion about the crisis in which societies find themselves (Kyllönen, 1990).

Tuomo Melasuo's critique of development research arises from another basis. In the book, *Wallinista Wideriin* (From Wallin to Wider, 1984), which he edited, several writers who represent a disciplinary approach give their views on the position of development studies in relation to the earlier scholarship on non-European cultures and continents. Scholarship of these cultures has old roots in Finland. Oriental languages have been taught for 350 years in the University. Already centuries ago Finns have taken part in exploration on other continents and scholars such as Edward Westermarck have advanced human sciences long before development studies began to dominate the scene.

In his way Melasuo also represents an "anti-development" view. Together with several other writers he points out that the concept of development has given a biased view of ancient Third World cultures. But Melasuo's hope that a return to a more discipline-bound mode would produce less biased research is not yet fulfilled on the pages of the book he has edited. The Euro- and ethnocentric view and subjective orientation of the pre-development orientalists, geographers and anthropologists do not free them from the same basic evolutionism which underlies most European development and Third World scholarship.⁸

In the opus edited by Melasuo, Juha Holma builds a theoretical model which he then uses to analyse how different ontological interpretations of development have led to corresponding approaches to development studies (Melasuo, 1984, 241–298). According to Lauri Siitonen, the coming of development studies into the social sciences can be explained by factors which, in relation to science, are either internal or external (social). Common structuring elements are

needed before a new field of studies can gain its own identity, both analytically and in relating the action models to the explanatory models. Although development problematics are dealt with in many sciences, the social sciences act as a coordinator for development studies. All development has a social component.

In common with several other writers, Siitonen traces the actual beginning of development studies in Finland to an interest in peace and development questions which arose within the peace and student movements. It was enhanced by the visit of André Gunder Frank to Finland in 1969. After this visit research began to be oriented towards the dependency and articulation theories, an orientation which dominated for over a decade.

The role of development research has also been looked at from the angle of development projects (Virtanen, 1987; Jyrkiäinen, 1986). Osmo Apunen, writing in English, approaches the topic ontologically, using a semiotic framework through text analysis and has a following of students doing development research in that framework (Apunen, 1987).⁹

A broader view of development studies would require the inclusion of all the research done in and on developing countries. Works published by the Societies for Oriental Studies (established in 1917), Egyptology (1969), Anthropology (1975) and Development Geography would then be added, not to speak of studies in fields directly related to practice (Forestry, Health, Water Supply and Sanitation, Environmental Hygiene, Architecture, Dentistry, Fisheries). The key differentiating factor is whether the issues treated—either theoretical or practical—are dealt with in a developmental perspective and whether the developmental aspects have been problematised. Does the very fact that research is done in a developing country qualify it as part of development studies? No purist or reductionist view is intended here. Development is a human and social concern. It is differentiated from mere social change in that it is a conscious process on which society places value. Development research is part of that social process, whether it identifies itself with it or not.

As indicated above, Finnish development research has largely lacked an economic dimension. The main reason for the lack of interest in development economics is that Finland's trade with less developed countries is almost nil. What trade there is, about 9 per cent in volume, is carried out with a few NIC countries. This lack of interest has left the field open for social and cultural research. The impetus for development work has rested on human motivation, yet in practice development work has been carried out from economic profit motives, if the choice of methods and projects provides any measure.

A notable exception to this is the large Finnish government endowment given to the United Nations University research institute WIDER, World Institute of Development Economics Research, situated in Helsinki. It has recently added to its programme a major effort to assist the former socialist countries in analysing the new economic situation in these countries. A large research programme has been conducted on hunger, another relates to environment. WIDER's research is policy oriented and it participates in international debates. Only a very small part of WIDER's research has links with Finnish research.

Development research is being expanded to all the universities of Finland, including the technical universities, especially in the water technology department in Tampere. Tampere University has also started an International School

of Social Studies in which development studies plays a major role. Kuopio university trains marine biologists and health personnel, Turku university specialises in the Far Eastern countries and Oulu in Arctic scholarship.

In conclusion, Finnish development research is closely tied to the interests of the government and the human interests of the citizens. This account of Finnish studies is very limited for the reasons given above. There is a certain discrepancy between the needs of development cooperation and the orientation of development researchers. The critical view of the dominant development mode has provided the orientation of development research. Development studies are still in formation and it is not clear what their fate will be; perhaps they will evolve into another discipline or maybe dwindle and diffuse into merely another aspect of study in the dominating old disciplines.

Notes

1. The present name Namibia is used for what was then South West Africa.
2. *Ndongan kielen sanakirja*, 1980, and *Ndongan kielen oppikirja*, 1977.
3. Other names at the doctoral level could be mentioned who have worked and written about the Far East, for example, Toivo Saarilahti, Mirja Pesonen and, in Israel, Aili Havas. Eila Helander wrote her thesis on Trinidad.
4. The title of the thesis is *The 'Ovambogefahr': the Ovamboland Reservation in the Making. Political Responses of the Kingdom of Ondonga to the German Colonial Power, 1884-1910*. Harri Siiskonen's doctoral thesis deals briefly with the role of Finnish missionaries in trading in northern Namibia, 1990.
5. The articles by Mbuende in *Church and Liberation in Namibia*, eds. Peter Katjavivi, Per Frostin and Kaire Mbuende. Pluto Press, 1989. Shekutamba, V. V. Nambala, "Church and State in Namibia 1806-1989". *Lutheran Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1987.
6. For example many newly independent countries have demanded continuous revolution and keep it in the names of their parties, like *Chama Cha Mapinduzi*, the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania, which in its name has the Swahili word *mapinduzi*, meaning "turning everything upside down".
7. Timo Kyllönen, Timo, *Kehitysajattelu ja kehityskaatutkimus: esseitä, hypoteesejä, materiaalia*, lic. thesis, University of Helsinki, 1990.
8. Melasuo is dissatisfied with the term Third World but considers it better than calling ancient cultures "developing countries". I share this view but consent with him to use the term for the lack of another short term.
9. Cf. also FINNIDA: *The Role of Research in Finnish Development Cooperation*, 1990. A brief introduction to Finnish development research is also given in the Handbook of Nordic Development Studies, 1990.

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The goals of development and environmental security

Can they go together well in Africa?

Mikhail N. Kopylov

In the middle of 20th century we saw our planet from space for the first time. Historians may eventually find that this vision had a greater impact on thought than did the Copernican revolution of the 16th century, which upset the human self-image by revealing that the Earth is not the centre of the universe. From space, we see a small and fragile ball dominated not by human activity and edifice but by a pattern of clouds, oceans, greenery and soils. Humanity's inability to fit its doings into that pattern is changing planetary systems, fundamentally. Many such changes are accompanied by life-threatening hazards. This new reality, from which there is no escape, must be recognized and managed. (*Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development*. Oxford, 1987, 1).

The love of nature is a value widely shared by people throughout the world. For many centuries the world's people took earth's natural bounty for granted. Through agricultural, technical, and scientific development man adapted nature to his needs and desires, changed it, and subordinated it to himself. While animals meet their needs according to their biological "givens", man goes beyond these "givens" and uses materials and machinery to survive and to create amenities. Not only does this maximise the efficiency of man's actions but it also multiplies the impact of those actions on the environment and on the ecological balance. As V.I. Lenin put it, "man is not satisfied with nature and he decides to change it with his own action".¹ Finally, he achieved the result that "nature that preceded the history of mankind does no longer exist anywhere".²

In the last three centuries mankind has rapidly depleted resources that took millions of years to form. Starting from the year 1600 one per cent of our superior animals have disappeared, and about 2.5 per cent are endangered. During a time span of two thousand years 106 species of large mammalia, 139 types of birds and a large number of other animals vanished. Some scientists consider that by the year 2000 some 185 species more will disappear, and if the environment continues to degradate, about 718 species will become endangered.³ During the past hundred years the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has increased by 12–18 per cent which may lead to the restoration of the chemical composition of the ancient atmosphere.

It may seem as if increased efficiency of economic activities, artificial changes in conditions of work and life, and medical services have, to a great extent, protected man from an adverse impact of the environment and eventually from adverse antropogenic factors. But it only seems so. Such security is relative, since man is yet unable to entirely control the evolution of nature and to foresee all the possible consequences of such an evolution.

Every year we see on the world market about seven thousand new types of chemical substances whose biological effect scientists can judge only approximately. Millions of tons of hazard substances created by man are now circling in the world, and a half a kilo of pesticides per capita is produced every year.

Such antropocentric strategy which is oriented towards satisfaction of the closest, present-day needs of society through changing separate elements of nature without taking into account its systematic organisation, has finally led to malfunctioning of global biogenic factors and degradation of the quality of nature. By trying to achieve first of all the goals man intended, he eventually got consequences which he could not anticipate and which can eliminate all the positive results.

Only now, faced with the fact that energy supplies and the capacity of land, water, and air to absorb the effects of human activities are limited, there is a growing and deepening awareness of the finiteness of the global environment. Real *limitations* exist for natural resources, including those resources which mankind has only recently recognised as finite: water and air.

"Irresponsible" and "uncivilised" behaviour with regard to nature should be relegated to the past once and forever. A high degree of environmental interdependence of nations at regional as well as at inter-regional levels, a high degree of inter-relation of natural resources lead to a speedy growth of many national environmental problems into international, both regional and global. An increasing number of complex environmental problems of regional and global dimensions threaten to grow beyond human control. The present environmental tension transforms preservation and improvement of the environment into the most crucial and paramount productive and political task.

This demands immediate action, because our civilisation can survive only when the earth can sustain itself. Let government officials, diplomats, political scientists and international legal experts argue about the severity of environmental problems and the degree of their potential consequences, stressing some uncertainty in scientific prognoses. The best and final diagnosis can be made only when you deal with a corpse. We cannot afford such a luxury, due to the so called "time factor". Otherwise we shall miss the proper moment to adopt concrete and effective measures protecting our environment, as has already happened to a world-wide convention on global climate, according to the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (the Brundtland Commission).⁴ A characteristic of truly civilised men is foresight, and if we do not exercise that foresight, the future will be dark.

For several reasons the attainment of solutions for environmental problems is difficult. At least two of them are decisive: the inherent complexity of the problems, and contemporary economic, political and legal structures, which do not readily acknowledge environmental interrelationships and are not yet ready to cope with such global issues.

Environmental problems, such as pollution, are pervasive problems in every country. These problems are global by definition. Unlike other global issues, environmental problems call for close cooperation and integration at all levels. There is a manifest need for all governments to adopt an environmental protection programme.

We do not attempt to underestimate regional and local measures which to a certain extent may contribute to combating pollution. There are local tasks, such as controlling local construction in order to prevent siltation of a stream

and allocating land use in order to preserve environmentally sensitive areas, e.g. by identifying the location of aquifers to prevent surface wastes from entering the groundwater. Other tasks require regional control. A pristine small river in a nature sanctuary may be degraded due to runoff of pesticides and fertilisers from farms located upstream. In the Soviet Union, the *zapovednik* officials, located near Voronezh, cannot stop such contamination; in Chesapeake Bay (USA) officials cannot stop the Susquahanna River wastes from Pennsylvania. Similarly, many birds, butterflies and other creatures migrate vast distances, and one local authority can in vain act to safeguard their habitat if the species also depends on another habitat which the other local authority destroys.

Regional or subregional cooperation can contribute to solving questions of normal development of international relations, if peculiarities of specific regions are taken into account. Such cooperation is justified because there are concrete environmental difficulties common to all states of any region, which makes it possible to identify more rapidly and efficiently ways and means of overcoming them.

At the same time it is impossible to imagine how a small or large group of states at a regional or subregional level can struggle effectively with radioactive contamination of the World Ocean, depletion of the stratospheric ozone shield over the Antarctic and Arctic areas, the "greenhouse" effect or long-range transportation of pollutants. These problems undoubtedly demand universal action.

Today we witness the second wave of environmental concern, sweeping over the world in such a way that governments around the world finally brought themselves to take action. Even UK's former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was said to have changed from the "Iron Lady" to the "Green Goddess", and President Bush early in 1990 when addressing environmental issues particularly underlined the White House effect on the "greenhouse" effect. In their 1989 summit conference in Paris, the leaders of the Group of Seven industrial democracies devoted nine pages to environmental issues in their 24-page communique. While calling for decisive action to protect the environment, the leaders also recognised the importance of further research into methods of implementation for solving environmental problems. Another high-level meeting in June 1990 stressed the same ideas. Today, 144 countries have environmental protection agencies, compared to 26 in 1972, when the UN Conference on the Human Environment was held in Stockholm. A network of more than one hundred multilateral and several thousand bilateral agreements and conventions exists.

At the same time such impressive achievements cannot hide the continuing catastrophic deterioration of the environment. A parallel development of these two processes points to the imperfection of a methodological approach to the regulation of the protection of the environment, at the lack of reverse connection between the mechanism of such regulation and its object. As professor Oleg S. Kolbasov mentioned in 1988, "the most serious problem, that became the largest obstacle on the way to further progress in the use of nature in the world, is a world-wide *sui generis* sabotage of ecological requirements".⁵ There is an urgent need to change the main conceptual approach to environmental problems. We have to change our traditional "reactive and corrective" ap-

proach for a "preventive" one. We can no longer indulge the attitude of "Out of sight, out of mind".

Among the factors actively affecting the interrelation between mankind and the environment, law in general and international law in particular occupy a specific place. Under the conditions of contemporary social structures only strict wording and juridical fixation of ecologically sound rules of uniform behaviour of persons and states, the correlation of new rules with already existing legal norms can provide a harmonisation between the development interests of human society and the interests of preserving its habitat.

Plainly understanding this fact, the United Nations Commission on Environment and Development in its report, "Our Common Future" called it "the challenge for institutional and legal change". The Commission described the problem as follows:

Each area of change represents a formidable challenge in its own right, but the fundamental challenge stems from their systematic character. They lock together 'sectors', such as industry and agriculture; and they lock countries together as the effect of national policies and actions spill over national borders. Separate policies and institutions can no longer cope effectively with these interlocked issues. Nor can nations, acting unilaterally.

The links between environmental and economic factors are numerous. Economic activities depend on natural resources for raw materials and energy supplies. Production, in turn, generates pollution, thus "environmental costs". This dual impact gains importance with economic growth, a concept upon which many of the world's economic and social systems are based and on which developing countries bank their fight against poverty. Finally, economic decisions have an environmental impact, while environmental decisions generally have economic repercussions.

These interrelations and contradictions are important for African countries with their largely agrarian base, where environmental issues have previously revolved around the destruction of tropical forests, desertification and resource depletion rather than industrial pollution. A vast spectrum of already existing environmental problems in Africa was shown in the book prepared in 1989 by the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, "Ecology and Politics: Environmental Stress and Security in Africa".⁶ Ecological stress is so aggravated in Africa today that the notion of ecological refugees is already well established with regard to Uganda, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon. Continuous environmental degradation has already severe negative effects on the economic potential of many developing countries in Africa, eroding the agrarian base upon which further industrial growth is predicated. Reversing the once popular paradigm, developing countries in Africa do not have the luxury of ignoring the environment in their striving for a better standard of living.

Desertification is a socio-economic and natural process which reduces the fertility and biological productivity of the soil to the level which characterises deserts. Recent estimates show that 230 million people are directly threatened by desertification. Altogether, 3.6 bn hectares of the world's rainfed cropland and irrigated land are affected, and each year a further 21 million hectares are reduced to a state of near or complete uselessness.

Traditional societies in arid and semi-arid lands develop appropriate economic systems for their fragile and hostile natural environment. The relation-

ship of dryland societies to the environment is precarious because of the characteristics of the environment and because of the relatively low technological development, which reduces the ability to respond to change and to adopt alternative solutions. These societies tend to adapt to the natural environment rather than to dominate it.

The extremely precarious balance between society and nature is greatly affected by the increasing integration of populations in an international economic system which has failed to provide feasible development alternatives, thus bringing about a socio-economic and environmental crisis in lieu of development.

The ultimate response to desertification is migration, the consequences of which should be considered both from the point of view of the abandoned area and of the receiving area. In certain countries, such as Mali and Burkina Faso, one sixth of the population has been uprooted as a result of desertification. It led to the destruction of family patterns and, as in Burkina Faso, reduced population growth by 40 per cent. Similarly, it has been reported from Niger that the number of children born has been reduced by one third by migration. Difficult problems also arise in the recipient areas. Many people from Burkina Faso and Mali moved to Senegal and the Ivory Coast, causing pressure on poorly equipped services and intensifying marginalisation.

The increasing vulnerability of those directly affected by desertification causes social and political instability, greater inequality in wealth distribution, and delayed development. We can agree with the following conclusion by the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues:

There is a serious dilemma: if sufficient resources are not provided immediately to cope with the present dramatic situation, many people may starve to death. But if the structural causes of the problem are not dealt with today, more resources will be needed tomorrow to alleviate the plight of an even greater mass of deprived people and not just to cope with increasing environmental deterioration.⁷

Another environmental problem, widely shared by the majority of African countries, is deforestation, which in case of arid lands constitutes an additional cause of desertification and undermines the huge ecological value of the rain-forest.

According to scientific estimates, forests produce more than 60 per cent of the biologically active oxygen. Nevertheless, the way forests are exploited leads to a dramatic decrease of their quality and quantity. Each year about eleven million hectares of forests are destroyed. The speed of deforestation in the tropical areas of Africa is about 0.61 per cent. In some thirty years the area of vanished forests may be equal to the territory of India. Deforestation has been regarded as one of the main characteristics of a civilised world.

According to the FAO, deforestation of arid lands affects four million hectares per year, of which 2.7 million is in Africa. It is due partly to the reduction of pastures and partly to the increasing demand for fuel-wood which has been accelerated by urban expansion. Woodland clearance for charcoal production is a main cause for dryland deforestation. Wood, charcoal and agricultural wastes meet almost one hundred per cent of household energy needs in the Sahel. 82 per cent of the total energy used by eight Sahel countries is derived from wood. According to the FAO, the present shortage of fuel-wood in arid regions is equivalent to the production of 25.8 million hectares of inten-

sive cultivation of fast-growing fuel-wood plantations. The shortage affects mainly the Sahel, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia.

At the same time, the cutting down of forests in these countries as well as in Central Africa does not and cannot provide an increase in the volume of agricultural production. It should rather be described as the ineffectiveness of the agricultural system adversely affecting ecology.

Desertification and deforestation in Africa are symptomatic of the lack of development. These processes cannot be effectively coped with by the use of different technical means, since such an approach deals only with their consequences.

In the long term, desertification and deforestation affect the very process of development, because they reduce the natural system's carrying capacity. Environmental deterioration is the main cause of social and economic insecurity, resulting in greater vulnerability to both natural and man-made hazards.

At the same time, lack of development leads to excessive use of the natural environment, adoption of inappropriate technology, lack of environmental management, and eventually, to increasing desertification and deforestation. As Eric Eckholm pointed out, people are forced by circumstances to undermine the ecological base of their future welfare in their struggle for survival.⁸ Therefore solutions should be worked out as an integral component of development plans. Such a development approach emphasises two elements: its holistic character and the human component. The first one is of paramount importance, since the aggregation of isolated sectoral projects which ignore the holistic character of the problem is not enough and does not amount to an actual plan. At the same time the second element should not be underestimated, since any struggle against adverse environmental effects is conducted for the benefit of people. Conservation of nature is needed not for the sake of nature, but for its rational use, which takes into consideration present and future needs of mankind.

Environmental stresses already existing in African countries will quite probably be accompanied by other environmental problems generated in the course of the industrialisation that is the main hope of these countries for a rise in the standard of living. The "achievements" of the relatively small developed world in this regard may serve as an illustration of what energy demands, the depletion of resources, and pollution would be like. This formidable "side effect" is of particular importance in the developing countries of Africa, and should also be of great concern to the developed world because of the global dimensions of these environmental issues.

Due to the region's economic, geological and climatological features the problem of transnational air pollution and acid precipitation is likely to emerge in the near future. Given the costs and difficulties of "after the fact action", African countries should try to prevent acid pollution from growing into a problem of North American and European dimensions. It is quite possible from the technical point of view, and, all in all, this is less expensive than a *laissez faire* attitude and economic growth at any cost.⁹ Taking into account the rapid population growth in Africa, these countries cannot afford to jeopardise their soils and water resources which are desperately needed for food supply.

In other words, development strategies that should be worked out for developing countries in Africa must, on the one hand, reflect the idea of sustainable environmentally sound development of these countries and, on the other, rely

upon the lessons drawn from the experience of the developed world. In turn, it is now also undergoing serious changes in terms of transaction from "indifferent observer" and "polluter" status to the "environmental partner" of the Third World.

In this context several steps and measures may be suggested for African countries, within the framework of their continent as well as at the global level.

1. As already stated, a present-day international legal and institutional mechanism of environmental protection does not operate properly. Contemporary international legal order is based on the concept of national sovereignty, and states declare their sovereign right to adopt independent economic, ecological, and other decisions, as well as to be free from foreign interference into their sovereign interests. Article 2 of the UN Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States of 1974 stipulates that:

Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activities.

This may be regarded as a potential cause of conflict situations, since any activity affecting the environment in one country leads to negative effects on the environment in the others.

To avert this negative effect the same Charter in says Article 30 that:

... All States have the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.

The same article clearly underlines the close links between the environment and development stating that:

The problem, preservation and enhancement of the environment for present and future generations, is the responsibility of all States. All States shall endeavour to establish their own environmental and development policies in conformity with such responsibility. The environmental policies of all States enhance and not adversely affect the present and the future development potential of developing countries.

The same ideas can be found in the World Charter of Nature adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1982 (the initiative to draft it came from President Mobutu of Zaire in 1975).

Recognising these ideas and principles one should think about their implementation: how to make them work.

A well known characteristic of international law is that it lacks a superior authority capable of enacting and enforcing laws. This particular feature is a result of the fact that international law regulates the relations of, legally speaking, sovereign equals. And the reason why it is difficult to adapt principles of general international law to environmental needs lies in the various nations' reluctance to surrender any of their sovereignty, and not necessarily by submitting themselves to any kind of higher authority alone.

We think that there are three approaches which today hold real promise of providing a solution to international environmental issues. The first is a preventive approach through the elimination of national boundaries with regard to environmentally relevant decisions. (The "Nordic Convention" on the Protection of the Environment between Denmark, Finland, Norway and

Sweden of 1974 is an example.) The second is the adoption of binding supranational law with direct action (examples can be found in the practice of the European Economic Community). The third, or Vienna, approach consists of the negotiation of framework agreements under the auspices of an international organisation (the term comes from the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer of 1985).

All three approaches have their attraction with regard to the problems of African countries. The first approach is most appropriate when dealing with environmental issues of a subregional dimension and allows concentration on the efforts of the limited number of states concerned and touched by these issues.

The second approach demands adoption of binding legal rules and norms of states' behaviour, which was especially stressed by Eastern European countries in 1988.¹⁰ This procedure should not be regarded as some sort of sovereignty limitation. The states entering such a process do not lose any of their sovereignty, but delegate, independently exercising their sovereign right, some of their rights to such a supranational body, as they frequently do when they become members of this or that international intergovernmental organisation. More than that, they even enlarge the scope of their sovereignty to the extent that other states also delegate their relative rights.

The third approach supports the desire of most states to retain as much sovereignty as possible. States are the negotiators and remain the decision-makers. At the same time, international interest is represented and promoted by an international organisation serving as a forum for the negotiations. Through its relatively broad terms a framework agreement can provide the required basis for communication and cooperation between a great number of economically and politically different countries. And, as a first cooperative step, the framework invariably leads to research and monitoring. This is of course of the utmost importance, because it is only when the main scientific uncertainties are eliminated that more specific obligations are envisaged. On the basis of results yielded through scientific-technical cooperation the most urgent action can be identified and addressed in annexes or protocols that become integral parts of the framework agreement.

A particular feature of the this approach is that it is directed more towards the "management" of the endangered resource than towards the promotion of general rules of international law. It is a more pragmatic approach that asks the participating states not to commit themselves to general obligations, but to take those measures that are required to restore and maintain the resource concerned.

2. In setting up any of the above mentioned approaches, the question of improving and revising existing institutional structures or even of creating new elements for such structures inevitably arises. The most general approach to institutional change is obviously not in creating new international bodies, but first of all in improving and adapting the existing organisational system, its restructuring, the redistribution of functions, improving coordination, etc. States, as a rule, regard proposals for the creation of new international institutions with suspicion, feeling that there are already enough complex and ramified organisational structures.

Nevertheless, proposals existing today for the institutional improvement of the activity of the world community in the area of environmental protection include both a redistribution of authority among existing agencies, and the creation of new institutions.

The first group of proposals consists of the following:

- a) Strengthening the role of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) by expanding its plenary powers and financial support (Brundtland Commission)¹¹; by turning UNEP into a specialised UN institution (Great Britain)¹²; and by turning UNEP into a Council of Ecological Security (USSR)¹³;
- b) Placing ecological problems under the aegis of a special institution in the system of the main UN organs by expanding the authority of the UN Security Council according to article 34 of the UN Charter and by creating a special sessional committee of the UN General Assembly (Great Britain)¹⁴; or by transforming the UN Trusteeship Council into a Council of Ecological Security.

The second group consists of the proposals to create:

- a) a UN Commission on Sustainable Development headed by the UN Secretary General (the Brundtland Commission);
- b) a Center for Emergency Ecological Assistance (USSR)¹⁵
- c) a new major UN organ on the environment (Conference in the Hague, March, 1989).

At least two proposals out of those listed above should be examined and studied separately and with great attention. The first one concerns the strengthening of the role of the United Nations as a whole and the UNEP as its part. The second one deals with the establishment of a UN Center for Emergency Ecological Assistance.

UNEP with its "catalytic" functions is a very small UN body which enjoys the status of an auxiliary organ of the UN General Assembly. It has a professional staff of only 300 persons, a "small" secretariat and limited budgeting, lacking resources to do much to prevent environmental degradation. There is no doubt that UNEP should be strengthened in order to be more than just a semi-autonomous subsidiary of the UN Organisation. It should be empowered to establish international operating norms in the area of pollution control, and environmental safety standards world-wide. For that purpose the experience of the International Civil Aviation Organisation can be useful, since its Council has similar rights to adopt "Standards and Recommended Practices" which are contained in Annexes to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation and are binding for all member-states. Such strengthening and reorientation of UNEP will be possible if it gains the status of a Council of Ecological Security.

The idea of establishing a UN Center for Emergency Ecological Assistance was launched by Mikhail Gorbachev at the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly on December 7, 1988. It was further developed and specified in a letter from the former USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs to the UN Secretary General dated May 3, 1989¹⁶. The main function of a Center is supposed to be

the analysis of environmentally difficult situations in different parts of the world and the working out of recommendations on the limitation of adverse effects and their abolition. In the future it will be able to make technical and economic evaluations of different construction projects which might potentially have negative environmental consequences, especially in the areas with a difficult environmental situation.

These two projects might be regarded as a first step towards the establishment of a supranational institutional structure with a vast spectrum of powers in the field of environmental protection. But beyond creating a new body or strengthening UNEP to be able to better coordinate national and regional environmental measures, there is an institutional need to direct aid to areas where urgent environmental protection is needed.

Finally, all bilateral and multilateral development assistance programmes, such as the UN Development Program, should at once establish environmental protection goals for all their undertakings. An urgent task would be to help developing nations build environmental stewardship roles into the activities of their social organisations.

3. Since 1982, the Third World debt crisis has hung like a sword of Damocles over the international financial system and the future prospects of developing countries.¹⁷ According to the most recent World Bank debt tables, the debt of African countries has increased to more than 220 billion USD. Unlike Latin America, which owes the bulk of the Third World debt and which gets most of loans from commercial banks, official creditors in Africa are the chief source of funds. Sub-Saharan Africa as a region, for example, owes about 76 bn USD in long-term debt to official creditors and 33 bn USD to private creditors. While Ghana, for instance, owes about 196 million USD in long-term debt, of which 70.5 million USD is owed to official creditors; in Zambia, 371 million USD of its 437 million long-term debt is owed to official creditors.

As a result of the growing total debt and debt services requirements since the 1970s, an increased proportion of the GNP of most developing countries is spent for interest payments rather than on productive investments. Some scientists consider that by the year 2000 African countries will have a debt of about 600 bn USD and will have to spend about 72 per cent of their export revenues on paying it off, which will prevent these countries from resuming growth and will substantially limit the financial basis of environmental protection projects.

In a situation when the African states declare at different forums within the Organization of African Unity that they are unable to pay off the external debt in the near future, some mechanism to reconcile the debt with environmental needs should be worked out.

In this context so called "Debt-for-nature" swaps should be mentioned. In 1984 Thomas Lovejoy, then vice-president of World Wildlife Fund-US, in his article "Aid Debtor Nations' Ecology" published by the New York Times, suggested a programme to use the debt of less developed countries for conservation purposes.¹⁸ This proposal was met with some incredulity. The obstacles appeared insuperable at the time:

—Debtor countries needed to be convinced that such a programme was not a way for creditor countries to obtain control over Third World resources (the "imperialism" issue);

- Banks needed to be convinced that such a programme was in their interests;
- Governments of creditor countries needed to be convinced that debt/nature swaps were compatible with regulations governing the activities of non-profit organisations;
- Conservation organisations needed to be convinced that debt/nature swaps were a better use of their staff and financial resources than alternate programmes and that they would deal successfully with all the parties involved;
- Conservation organisations' contacts in Third World countries did not generally include the kinds of people who would need to approve debt-related operations; and
- In some creditor countries, the tax situation with regard to donations of less developed countries' debt to conservation organisations was murky at best.

All these issues need continued attention. However, during the past five years several breakthroughs have made debt/nature swaps a realistic proposition. The basic idea is deceptively simple. If conservation organisations acquire title to this debt, they may be able to negotiate with the debtor countries to obtain repayments in local currency at a favourable conversion rate and use the proceeds for conservation in the country concerned. Depending on the costs of such transactions, conservation organisations may be able to realise a significant increase in the resources ultimately available for conservation in the debtor countries.

Examples of debt-for-nature exchanges can be found in the practice of the United States with regard to some Latin American countries and the Philippines:

The first debt-for-nature swap was in July 1987, when Conservation International, a Washington-based non-profit organisation founded in 1987, purchased for 100,000 USD about 650,000 USD of Bolivia's commercial bank debt, using Citibank as its agent in the secondary loan market. The debt was bought at approximately an 85% discount of its face value, that is, at 15 cents per dollar. A 100,000 dollar grant from the Frank Weeden Foundation financed this transaction.

Pursuant to an agreement signed July 13, 1987, Conservation International cancelled Bolivia's obligation to pay the 650,000 USD debt in exchange for a package of measures relating to the establishment and maintenance of a biosphere reserve, adjoining protected lands, and buffer zone totalling over four million acres in the eastern foothills of the Bolivian Andes.¹⁹ Specifically, the Bolivian government agreed to give the maximum legal protection, by raising the legal status from protection by decree to protection by legislative enactment, to the 334,200 acre Beni Biosphere Reserve, the adjoining 877,205 acre Yacuma Regional Park and Cordebeni Water Basin, and in additional 2870,561 acre Chimane Forest Reserve, as a buffer zone for sustained development and use. The government also agreed to establish an operational fund in local currency worth 250,000 USD to manage and protect the Beni Biosphere Reserve and its additional buffer zones. For its part, Conservation International, acting through a local non-governmental organisation, agreed to provide ongoing technical, financial, and management assistance in connection with these protected areas.

There are several lessons that emerge from this first experience. The transaction did not result in a transfer of ownership of equity or other property to Conservation International. Under the terms of the agreement, the nature reserve and adjoining lands remain under the ownership and control of the

Bolivian government. Conservation International has only become a scientific and technical adviser on conservation and resource management to the Bolivian government.

A national commission was formed which is responsible for carrying out the environmental programmes.

A 250,000 USD operational fund in local currency was created with 100,000 USD in pesos from the Bolivian government and 150,000 USD in pesos contributed by the US Agency for International Development from its local currency, which was a sufficient incentive for the Bolivian government to further protect the nature reserve and to provide initial funding for its maintenance. Administration of the operational fund rests with the Ministry of Agriculture and the Bolivian non-governmental organisation designated by Conservation International as its representative and approved by the Ministry of Agriculture.

A second debt-for-nature swap can be found in Ecuador, which holds a wide variety of ecological riches:

On October 8, 1987, Fundacion Natura, the leading non-governmental conservation organisation in Ecuador, reached an agreement with the government's monetary board, enabling the Foundation to exchange up to 10 million USD in debt for local currency bonds.

In December 1987 the World Wildlife Fund-US signed an agreement with Fundacion Natura, pursuant to which it agreed to arrange for the acquisition of indebtedness of the Central Bank of Ecuador in a principal amount of 1 million USD.²⁰ The Ecuadorian debt was sold for just over 35 cents per dollar, thus 354,000 USD bought 1 million USD from commercial lenders to Ecuador. The bonds were provided by the government at the full amount of the debt note, 100% of face value, and were converted into sucres at the official exchange rate, which is substantially less than the floating rate. The programs supported by these bonds include management plans for protected areas, development of park infrastructure, acquisition of small nature reserves, and training of park personnel, in addition to broader environmental education activities. Fundacion Natura will use the principal paid on the bonds, which will finally mature in nine years (in 1996), to establish an endowment fund in support of its general activities.

As we see, this transaction differs from the Bolivian deal in several important respects. *Firstly*, unlike the Bolivian swap, which was an *ad hoc* transaction, the Ecuador exchange was the first step in a programme approved by Ecuador's government that could eventually exchange up to ten million USD principal debt. While a ten million USD programme may not have much impact on the country's debt, the interest from the bonds in the first year alone permitted a doubling of what the country now budgets for its parks. In addition, Ecuador's government permitted the exchange to proceed at a time when Ecuador's debt exchange programme was otherwise dormant. *Secondly*, the Ecuador debt-for-nature exchange is one of the earliest examples, in Ecuador or elsewhere, of a debt-for-debt exchange, in which foreign currency debt was cancelled in exchange for new local currency debt. This debt-for-nature exchange illustrates an interesting opportunity for individual commercial banks or other investors to negotiate with debtor countries for the release of debt from the restrictions of complex syndicated rescheduling agreements, since the parties to such an exchange are generally free to negotiate the terms of the new debt to be issued.

Debt-for-nature exchanges have also been agreed on in Costa Rica and, in the first such transaction outside of Latin America, in the Philippines.

All the above mentioned cases gain additional attention and importance in connection with Africa since debt-for-nature programmes, or specific debt-for-nature transactions within the context of broader debt exchange programmes, are already under active consideration in Madagascar, Nigeria and Tanzania. Bearing this in mind, we should like to suggest some of the fundamental principles and steps that need to be followed and observed in developing debt/nature programmes:

- Debt-for-nature exchanges are sophisticated business deals that require a careful evaluation of the financial, as well as the conservation, aspects of the transaction. The economics and the politics may be complex and it may not always be possible to measure the anticipated benefits of a debt-for-nature swap accurately in dollars and cents. All the above mentioned deals illustrate the most important characteristic of a debt-for-nature swap—its relative cost advantage. Structured properly such swaps can significantly reduce the costs of promoting conservation in Africa.
- Debt-for-nature transactions establish an operative link between conservation and the financial markets, something that it has long been suspected is possible, but which has not yet been made tangible.

Generally, there are several steps in every debt/nature swap:

The first step is to obtain approval in principle from the debtor country. This may involve negotiations with three key parties: the government, the central bank, and an appropriate non-governmental conservation organisation that will receive the funds and manage the agreed programme. Such a conservation organisation in the debtor country is probably the most important of these three parties, because they must relinquish effective control over the funds to avoid the "imperialism" issue and must also be able to vouchsafe the continuing responsible use of these funds to domestic donors and tax authorities. Only strong conservation organisations in the debtor country can meet this double criterion. In other words, debt/nature swaps are only possible where strong conservation institutions exist in the debtor country.

The second step involves obtaining the debt instrument. The secondary market for Third World debt will establish a base price for the debt of the country concerned. Market prices for Third World debts vary considerably, ranging from a few cents on the dollar all the way to parity. Clearly, the lower the price, the greater the leverage potential. However, it is also clear that the secondary market is very imperfect for less developed countries' debt. It cannot be freely sold by banks because of covenants that have been entered into in the course of rescheduling negotiations, which essentially ensure that none of the major creditors dispose of the debt without approval from the others. Transactions can occur only if there is a reasonable prospect of obtaining approval from the debtor country (otherwise the debt cannot be converted), so that the debtor country also exerts effective control over the transactions which take place. The prices on the secondary market are subject to fluctuation and may prove to be negotiable, providing significant opportunities for conservation benefits.

The third step is the transfer of title to the debt. Technically this is a quite complex transaction. The most important question is who the actual purchaser shall be. In some instances, it may be appropriate for a conservation organisation in the creditor country to acquire the debt and then donate it to its partner

in the debtor country; in others, it may be possible to donate the necessary resources to permit direct acquisition of the debt by the debtor country organisation. In a third version, debt may be donated directly to the lesser developed country's conservation organisation. The factors governing the choice of actors in this situation are mainly financial and tax-related.

The fourth step is conversion of the debt in accordance with the agreement reached with the debtor country's government. This may involve the issue of local currency bonds, measures to protect certain sensitive areas, the cash payment of local currency in redemption of the debt, or any combination of these.

The final, fifth, step is the execution of the agreed conservation programme. It is the ultimate goal of the entire programme, which is why the importance of this step should not be underestimated.

- The transactions contemplated by non-profit groups are often too small to maximise the potential savings. Transaction costs are high and a great deal of management time is typically necessary to complete an exchange. For this reason, debtor countries may also wish to consider mechanisms enabling non-profit groups to pool their resources in connection with the purchasing and exchanging of debts. Such a mechanism would permit the establishment of an entity to administer the disbursement of the exchange proceeds to the intended beneficiaries in the debtor country. In this context the Costa Rican debt-for-nature programme contains elements that may be useful as a model for a debt exchange programme that permits a pooling of the funds donated by a number of foreign groups for the benefit of various private and governmental interests within the debtor country. This general structure deserves close study by the international conservation community, by other non-profit organisations, and by debtor countries that are interested in establishing more formal non-commercial debt exchange programmes.

- Debt-for-nature swaps should integrate with overall debt strategies which can only be developed by debtor countries. Today, only one African country, Nigeria, has proposed such a programme, but at least one other, Madagascar, is considering one.²¹ Once a consensus is reached among representatives of the various governmental and private interests in a debtor country, it will be necessary to ensure that the programme meets the requirements of the international nonprofit community and that it can be accommodated within the framework of the country's debt agreements. Assuming that most debt exchanges by non-profit groups will be financed by the purchase, rather than the donation, of bank debts, the encouragement of the use of debt exchange programmes by non-profit groups may significantly increase demand for a country's debt in the secondary loan markets. Because of the relative lack of commercial investment opportunities, this may be more probable in the case of the poorest debtor countries in Africa than in many Latin American countries.

4. Environmental Impact Assessment should be adopted by the governments of all African countries and become a routine operating procedure. EIA (environmental impact assessment) is a formal study process used to predict the environmental consequences of proposed major development programmes and projects. Environmental impact assessment concentrates on problems, conflicts or natural resource constraints that might affect the viability of a project. It also examines how the project might cause harm to people, their homeland or their livelihoods, or to other developments in the vicinity. After predicting po-

tential problems, the environmental impact assessment identifies measures to minimise the problems and outlines ways to improve the project's suitability for its proposed environment. As professor L.K. Caldwell noted in 1982:

... we are environment-shaping animals, sufficiently intelligent to recognize that our survival requires self discipline. In this perception of our need to supplement our inherent nature with social inventions designed to protect us against our susceptibility to error may lie our best hope.²²

The key tool in environmental impact assessment is the selection of mitigation techniques to minimise the unavoidable environmental impacts. They conserve scarce budget dollars and scarce natural resources. First introduced in the US National Environmental Policy Act of 1972, the process continues to demonstrate its usefulness in making smart decisions. Solutions can emerge only from an intelligent, informed assessment of options, their advantages and detriments. Properly employed, the environmental impact assessment process encourages participation and informed decision-making.

It is remarkable that legislatures in 36 states have each independently enacted environmental impact assessment. In the USSR this process is known as "ecological expertise" and began to be applied from January 1, 1990. The UN Economic Commission for Europe is considering a draft treaty for transboundary environmental impact assessment²³, and the UN Environment Program has proposed that all developing nations use environmental impact assessment.²⁴ The World Bank has adopted such rules for its lending programmes. The UN World Commission on Environment and Development noted that

... several countries have already formally instructed their representatives on the Board of the World Bank to ensure that the environmental impacts of projects proposed for approval have been assessed and adequately taken into account. We recommend that other governments take similar action, not only with regard to the World Bank but also in the Regional Banks and other institutions. In this way they can support the on-going efforts within the Banks and other institutions to reorient and refocus their mandates, programmes, and budgets to support sustainable development.²⁵

As the world's population grows by over one billion more people during the next decade, the world will see a rapid deterioration of environmental quality as a result of the cumulative effects of many small actions, unless each major development to accommodate this population growth is accompanied by environmental impact assessment in every country. This is why more and more widespread use of environmental impact assessments should be encouraged.

The aim of an EIA is to ensure that potential problems are foreseen and addressed at an early stage in the projects' planning and design. To achieve this aim, the assessment's findings are communicated to all the various groups who will make decisions about the proposed project: the project developers and their investors, as well as regulators, planners, political leaders and the public. Having read the conclusions of an EIA, project planners and engineers can shape the project so that its benefits can be achieved and sustained without causing inadvertent problems.²⁶

This formula goes a long way towards integrating the economic engine of development with the analytical tool of environmental impact assessment which helps assure sustainable development.

5. From the theoretical point of view, the most attractive concept which can simultaneously reflect the ideas of development and the needs for environmental protection in Africa is the concept of security in its new, contemporary meaning, and, as a result of this new understanding, the concept of environmental security, a previously unknown form of security. Today scholars stress that contemporary global changes require a new and broader understanding of the idea of national security that includes issues of resources, environment, and population.²⁷ They express the opinion that "ecological security is by its content significantly higher than the traditional idea of 'national security', it speaks to the interests of all of humanity and can only be universal, common to all mankind".²⁸ The achievement and maintenance of environmental security is the common responsibility of the entire world community.²⁹

A key feature of environmental security is that, based on an ecosystem approach, it considers the problem of environmental conservation as a problem of the survival of human civilisation, giving it the same priority as the problems of averting thermonuclear war, and ensuring military and political security. Environmental security is recognised as an integral element of comprehensive international security. At the same time it is very important to understand environmental security not only as a sub-system of comprehensive security, but also as an independent system, based on certain special principles of behaviour of governments in the sphere of natural environment that should be predictable and stable.

Summarising the already existing achievements in environmental law and general rules and norms which characterise the construction of any security system, the following principles of environmental security may be proposed: equal ecological security, banning ecological aggression, control over the observance of agreed-upon requirements of environmental security, exchange of information on the ecological situation at the national and regional level, prevention of transboundary environmental damage, cooperation in emergency ecological situations, exchange of ecologically safe technologies, peaceful settlement of ecological disputes, international responsibility for ecological damage, sustainable development, and the right to a favourable environment.

The world is but one country and mankind its citizens. As Yevgeny Yevtushenko said in his book "Divided Twins", "In order to come together, people must see each other even through the walls erected by politics, and understand that beauty is not the exclusive property of politics but the common property of all the inhabitants of the earth. Nature is a potential means of mutual understanding".

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