Ujamaa – Socialism from above

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Demonstrations ex
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Illustrations. The three sketches of life in Ujamaa villages in the end of the book are made by Hamza Hasani, Rose Hudson and Hidaya Mgomba
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Authors’ Preface

This book presents some of the results of a research study relating to development problems in West Lake Region of Tanzania, a study that was carried out by social researchers associated with the Institute for Development Research, Copenhagen, between 1970 and 1976. (The Institute has since become “The Centre for Development Research.”)

This period, the early seventies, was the most active time in Tanzania for the massive efforts of implementing the policies of “Ujamaa Vijijini”. This Swahili term literally means “Tanzanian Socialism in the villages”, the term ujamaa itself being difficult to translate in all its meaning, but referring specifically to the Tanzanian road to Socialism. Thus “Ujamaa Vijijini” can be taken to mean a policy of Socialism through Rural Development. Our study of the progress of this policy explains and introduces the change that occurred in later days in the priorities of the policy, a change towards a mass removal of all the rural population of the country into rural settlements. But essentially this book is about the initial, and original socialist experiment of Tanzania, known widely as ujamaa, as it worked originally under the principles of gradual and voluntary socialist transformation. It is about the stages of implementation, evolution and achievement and about the place that it occupied in the wider context of Tanzania’s role in the world economy and in Tanzania’s development objectives. It is also about some of the short-comings experienced in practice, and about the real difficulties and about the obstacles to progress. We offer our own interpretations of the developments we observed, but essentially the book is a record of the actual experience of ujamaa as it was felt in one Region of Tanzania.

Our basic field research was carried out in West Lake Region between June 1970 and August 1972 by the authors as a team: Tony Moody, agricultural economist, Birgit Storgaard Madsen, social anthropologist, and Jannik Boesen, political scientist.

The two latter subsequently returned to the region as members of another team, which worked in the Region from February 1974 to April 1975 to prepare an “Integrated Regional Development Plan” for the Tanzanian Prime Minister’s Office and the Danish Development Agency, DANIDA.

During these two periods, and also the intervening time at the Institute in Copenhagen, we had the opportunity to work with all levels of development in the Region, as well as with individuals connected with the overall national development of Tanzania.

The basic field research consisted of intensive village studies when we stayed for extended periods as “participant observers” in a limited number of ujamaa villages,
as well as traditional villages. These intensive studies were supplemented by a questionnaire survey conducted in a much larger number of villages by students from the University of Dar-es-Salaam. Further information was obtained from village and government files to which we were given access in the most generous way. Finally, we had many discussions with people at all levels, and participated—especially in the later stages of our role as a planning team—in numerous meetings with the administration at all levels, and not least with our colleagues in the planning team, Jens Müller and Phil Raikes. All these people did much to contribute to our understanding of the issues.

While many others have contributed, we ourselves are of course the only ones responsible for what is put on paper here. Each of us has had the main responsibility for certain chapters of this book, but as the whole project was carried out as a team-work we have preferred to share the responsibility for the work as a whole. The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, which has undertaken to publish the book, and DANIDA, which is part-financing it, cannot, of course, be held responsible for its contents.

We would finally like to express the hope that all those people who have contributed to our work will not regret their assistance when they see the outcome. This we find most problematic when we think of the enormous debt that we owe to the villagers of Tanzania, who spent so much unpaid time for our benefit, without having a chance to see and follow what we used their assistance for. We have at least tried to defend their case in the book—whatever effect that will have.

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Part I
The Setting
The Ideology and the Region
Chapter 1

Ujamaa as an ideology and a policy

Ujamaa is the Kiswahili word for the traditional kinship communalism existing in many rural communities in Africa. Though differing widely in extent from community to community this traditional communalism does or did not usually include communal production as a central aspect. When President Nyerere of Tanzania first identified his ideology of Tanzanian socialism with the ujamaa concept it still had strong traditionalist connotations. But as it developed over the years and was translated into actual policies these connotations have tended to disappear, and ujamaa is now almost exclusively understood to mean the contemporary Tanzanian socialist ideology and policies, with a strong emphasis on state-controlled or collective production.

As a modern, but still distinct, form of socialist development Tanzania’s ujamaa is widely acknowledged as an extremely important experience—not only for Tanzania and her own people, but also for other African and other underdeveloped countries. Among some of the more immediate neighbours, such as Mozambique and Zambia, and a bit further away, Angola, there are tendencies towards copying various aspects of the Tanzanian policies.

One central aspect of Tanzania’s socialism is its heavy emphasis on socialist rural development, ujamaa vijiji, as the basis for overall socialist and economic development in the country. Ujamaa vijiji means rural development through a gradual—but eventually complete—transformation of rural Tanzania into socialist communities, where all political and economic activities, especially production, are collectively organized. The five-year period from 1968 to 1973 marked the first stage of the policy of ujamaa vijiji, when mobilization of the peasants to establish communal economic ventures in the rural areas received top priority by the Tanzanian government and the single party, TANU. In 1973 the emphasis shifted towards compulsory mass villagization and resettlement of the country’s entire rural population, while ujamaa was only supposed to develop later in the new villages.

This five-year period is therefore of specific interest to any discussion of the development of socialism in Tanzania. The aim of the present book is to take a closer look at the development of ujamaa vijiji as a concrete policy in that period, to present detailed studies of its interpretation and implementation in one region in Tanzania, and finally to see this development of the policy, including its implementation, in the wider perspective of an analysis of general development trends in Tanzania. In a postscript the subsequent villagization policy is briefly discussed in the light of this analysis.
The ideology

*Ujamaa* is the official ideology of TANU, the Tanganyika African National Union, and its government. Its essential elements as well as most of its details are, however, personally conceived and formulated by the President and party leader, Nyerere, in numerous speeches, articles, and policy papers.¹

During the two decades that have passed since he was elected the first leader of the new nationalist party in colonial Tanganyika, Mwalimu (the teacher, as Nyerere is often called) has gradually developed the concepts of his Tanzanian socialism, *ujamaa*.

Nyerere has himself stressed that these concepts are not Marxist. If one was to attach to them another broad classificatory label, *ujamaa* could probably best be described as a type of idealistic, utopian socialism. Like the European classics, he presumes certain basic principles as objectives and justification of human society. These fundamental values, which he finds recurring also in the great world religions, as well as in traditional African society, are the right of all human beings to equal human dignity, the recognition of society as a necessary means to the common good, and by the same token, that society in the last instance exists for the sake of preserving and developing the human dignity of all individuals. Only in societies where equality and a combination of freedom and a sense of community prevail are these ethical/political principles fulfilled.

From this point of departure Nyerere has in the course of time presented a fairly detailed description of the ideal society, where socialist and democratic institutions provide the framework for equality, freedom and unity, while the “socialist attitude of mind” among its members ensures the adherence to these principles.

The ideal society is built up as a network of *ujamaa* communities, where all exploitation of man by man has been abolished, and everybody recognizes everybody else’s right to a fair share of the material and social benefits of the community, as well as the corresponding duty to cooperate and contribute with their work to the creation of these benefits. Through mutual cooperation the *ujamaa* communities are linked together in still larger units, up to the level of the Nation, which again cooperates with other Nations, ideally on the basis of equality, freedom, and unity among all mankind.

The philosophy is perhaps most clearly spelled out where Nyerere deals with *Ujamaa Vijjiini*, rural socialism, which also occupies a central place in the whole ideology. The establishment of *ujamaa* communities is to be started gradually through increased cooperation in the villages and—characteristically for Mwalimu—in the schools. Emphasis is on the development of the largest sector of the economy, agriculture, and on reduction of inequalities between this sector and the rest of society.

Most important is the development of a “socialist attitude of mind”. Without that the institutions are of little significance, so the socialist society must be built through dissemination to all its members of this socialist attitude of mind and the institutions must at first be adapted to this purpose. While there has been, especially
in later years, increasing talk about elimination of exploitation and exploiters, the ideology does not see socialist development in the African context (at least) basically as a matter of class interests and class struggle, which would reserve the socialist ideology for the exploited classes only, and necessitate that they must assert their exclusive power while they eliminate the exploiting classes and their interests and attitudes. Neither is there therefore any need for an élitist revolutionary party representing the objective interest of the exploited classes. On the contrary, the principal instrument in the move towards the ideal society is the national single party of the whole people, TANU. The party is seen as the institutionalised ideology, which step by step politicises the whole society, spreading the socialist attitudes and providing the framework and channels for democratic reconstruction.

The policy and its implementation
While the basic principles of equality, freedom, and unity pervade all Nyerere’s speeches and writings, the details of ideology and policies have only been developed in a long, gradual, and pragmatic process under the impact of concrete political and social developments in the country.

During the 1950s the African nationalists concentrated all their attention on the creation of a sense of national unity within one national movement, and on the demand for democratic elections at all levels of society that would ultimately lead to complete independence. The immediate task was to eliminate tribal, religious and racial conflicts, and the question of economic policies was largely left in abeyance whilst national unity was forged.

After TANU had taken over the government in 1961, it got a new party constitution which emphasized the active participation by the government in the nation’s economic life, and for the first time it was stressed that this would be through a democratic and socialist government.

Shortly afterwards Nyerere resigned as government leader in order to revitalise the party, and during one year out of government he formulated his visions of socialism and democracy in two essays on “Ujamaa–The Basis of African Socialism” and “Democracy and the Party System”. It was in “Ujamaa–the Basis of African Socialism” that he stated that: “Socialism, like democracy is an attitude of mind. In a socialist society it is the socialist attitude of mind, and not the rigid adherence to a standard political pattern, which is needed to ensure that people care for each others’ welfare.” This is then illustrated by a somewhat idealized picture of traditional African society, where the essential right of every man to a fair share of the benefits of the community as well as his duty to contribute to their production was recognised. Nobody needed—or had the possibility—to safeguard himself by amassing wealth and power, thereby dominating and exploiting others. It was only with the intrusion of the European colonisers that capitalist attitudes—the wish to appropriate more than one’s fair share of wealth and power—penetrated into the country and spread also among the Africans. The task
now, it is claimed, is therefore to restore the old African "socialist" attitudes while simultaneously extending them to apply not only to the men, but also to women, and not only to one's own clan or tribe, but to the whole Nation.

In "Democracy and the Party System" Nyerere argued that a one-party-system can be more democratic than a multi-party-system in a country where there is no disagreement, or conflict of interests, over the basic political principles, i.e. equality, freedom and unity, and where the party is open to all citizens.

The one-party-system was adopted by Tanzania in 1964–65, whereas the ideas about ujamaa and socialism did not seem to have any immediate effect on policies. But after a period of rather traditionally capitalist-oriented development policies, which did not however yield very impressive results, a new line was adopted by the party with its approval of the "Arusha Declaration" in 1967. The "Arusha Declaration" called for "socialism and self-reliance" and a determined struggle against economic inequality and exploitation as the basis for the country's future development. Its demand for nationalization of major parts of the 'modern' economic sector as a means towards these ends was implemented by the government shortly afterwards. Similarly the government was directed to transfer resources from urban to rural development. Aiming at the government and party itself, the declaration finally included a new "leadership code", which barred the top political and administrative leaders from enriching themselves through incomes other than those derived from their main professional occupation, thus banning etc.

Later in the same year the Arusha Declaration was followed by a policy paper issued by President Nyerere on "Ujamaa Vijijini (Socialism and Rural Development)", which called for "the establishment of 'ujamaa villages'—cooperative communities in which people would live together and work together for the good of all." After a detailed discussion of a variety of ways that the move towards ujamaa could start, the paper concluded: "What is here being proposed is that we in Tanzania should move from being a Nation of individual peasant producers who are gradually adopting the incentives and the ethics of the capitalist system. Instead we should gradually become a Nation of ujamaa villages where the people cooperate directly in small groups and where these groups cooperate together for joint enterprises.—This can be done. We already have groups of people who try to operate this system in many parts of our country. We must encourage them and encourage others to adopt this way of life too. It is not a question of forcing our people to change their habits. It is a question of providing leadership. It is a question of education. And it is a question of all of us together making a reality of the principles of equality and freedom which are enshrined in our policy of Tanzanian Socialism."

While the policy statements were deliberately open to many different interpretative forms of ujamaa villages and to various ways of starting them, there was no doubt about the importance attached to the fast achievement of at least some movement towards ujamaa in all parts of the country. Neither was there any
ambiguity with regard to the central role that party and government officials were supposed to play as the primary agents for the implementation of the policy.

This was further underlined both in the 1969–74 Five Years Development Plan and in a special "Presidential Circular no. 1 of 1969", which stressed that "it is to the building of ujamaa villages that government must turn its attention. We have to organize our party and government machinery to assist their establishment; we have to give them priority in all our credit, servicing, and extension services—at the expense of the individual producer." And it went on to give detailed instructions on how this should be organized institutionally, emphasizing that "no department of Tanu and no ministry of government is exempt from the requirement to participate and to contribute to the success of this policy". In the following years this was followed up by other directives and by reorganizations within the individual ministries, parastatals and party organizations both at the centre and in the regions in order that ujamaa villages could be more effectively promoted.

Regional leaders in government and in Tanu felt themselves under especially great pressure to show results while at the same time they enjoyed a large degree of freedom with regard to the ways and means to achieve them—and with regard to their actual content!

So, after five years of continuous campaigns, including several large scale "operations" to move the populations of whole Regions into ujamaa villages, the official figures were—in 1973–5,556 ujamaa villages in the whole country, with a total population of over two millions or about 15% of all Tanzanians.' These figures do, however, cover a conglomeration of extremely different situations, with regard to distribution between Regions, with regards to economic and social organization in the villages and with regard to the ways in which they were initiated.

In some Regions the majority of the population were already enrolled, while in others the ujamaa villages included only a single percent of the inhabitants. There were completely collectivized new settlements; settlements where the people had been moved together to become more accessible to government help and services, but with hardly any communal production activities; old traditional villages, where some inhabitants cultivate a communal field while retaining their private farms as their main occupation; and many other types of ujamaa villages. Incentives to establish ujamaa villages ranged from the ideological commitment and understanding by the villagers themselves, over different degrees of persuasion and coercion by administrative and political officials, to material rewards in the form of expanded services or direct support from the government.

To a large extent then, it was characteristic of the whole approach that it consisted at the ideological level of Nyerere's fairly detailed, 'utopian', description of the 'ideal' society, derived from a few basic ethical principles, and at the policy level of directives and suggestions from the centre concerning certain very concrete steps on the road towards ujamaa, often of an organizational nature, as well as of the actual tactics of implementation employed in the regions. The policy contained very little however in the way of a general strategy for the socialist transformation
of rural Tanzania, linking the ideology and the tactics of implementation together through analyses of such questions as: the role of the state in post-colonial Tanzania, development of the relations between agriculture and industry, the development of the country's external economic relations, the role of different Regions, large scale versus small scale production, or—perhaps including all the above—the relations between the different sectors of the economy and the corresponding relations between social classes, notably between the peasantry and other classes. Whatever thinking in Tanu there may have been on such questions, it was in any case not propagated as an essential framework for the implementation of the ujamaa policy, and as a tool for the peasantry in this implementation process.

One of the few published works about ujamaa implementation is an article by Göran Hyden, who draws on a number of more or less detailed case-studies done by students and staff from the University in Dar es Salaam. In this summary, which points out many of the same trends as we describe in Part II of this book, Göran Hyden, who cannot normally be accused of leftist extremism, concludes: "A main reason why the socialist results of the ujamaa programme so far have been meagre is that any revolutionary strategy is ultimately a class strategy and not a development strategy that can be bolstered by, for example, bureaucratic control and technical assistance inputs. For many reasons, some clearly beyond the control of a poor country like Tanzania, its socialist rural development strategy has been on the latter terms." Phil Raikes, basing himself on similar unpublished material, confirms the tendencies described by Hyden, but sees them in a longer historical perspective, to a large extent as continuations of well established bureaucratic rural policies."

While we find it doubtful whether the ujamaa policy did in fact include any strategy at all, or whether the problem had anything to do with Tanzania's poverty as such, it is clear both from the two articles mentioned, as well as from our own work, that the lack of a comprehensive revolutionary strategy (and class strategy) forced the local political and administrative hierarchies to—or perhaps rather left them free to—establish the tactics of the move towards ujamaa almost in a political vacuum, only vaguely demarcated by the yet only generally expressed ujamaa ideals, and unrestrained by any consciousness among the involved peasants as to how to use ujamaa to further their own interests as a class.

One serious consequence was, that there were no politically accepted criteria for the evaluation or criticism of these locally evolved tactics e.g. by the directly affected people, the peasants." Lacking this the only generally used measures of "success" were the number of nominal ujamaa villages established and the size of their membership, i.e. measures emphasizing the role of the local authorities. Sometimes also the acreages cultivated or incomes realised by single ujamaa villages or all ujamaa villages in a Region were hailed, but hardly ever analysed in relation to general rural transformation. There has therefore been a focus on "villages" as showpieces. Once the authorities could count certain named villages as their regional ujamaa achievement, they then concentrated their efforts on maintaining
these villages and resolving individual village problems. Regional ujamaa development often tended to become a holding operation by the bureaucracy rather than an evolving movement among the people.

The ujamaa village, rural development, and rural socialism

We mentioned above that there were no official political criteria for evaluation of ujamaa villages. On the contrary, a whole range of partial or intermediate objectives of the policy were expressed and given priority by leaders in different places and circumstances, with varying emphasis on such aspects as living together for easier provision of services (and control?), collective production, increased production through use of modern or intermediate methods, mobilization for self-help and self-reliance, or equality in terms of power or incomes. With its wide room for local manoeuvring this was completely in line with the official policy. And in spite of the variation in goals and implementation measures, studies from other regions show that the mode of operation of the regional government and party hierarchies was almost everywhere remarkably similar to that in West Lake Region, as described throughout this book. Some basic issues of rural development which we shall discuss later, were also encountered in most parts of the country. Finally it should also be possible, as an analytical tool, to deduce from the general ideology and from the wealth of concrete policy statements a few simple prerequisites which must be fulfilled by any ujamaa village, if it is to be regarded as having at all set out on the long course towards the ideal ujamaa community as described in detail by Nyerere.

First of all the whole policy aims at reorganizing the rural areas of Tanzania into new social and economic communities—new in terms of their internal social and economic structures, but often also in terms of location and/or the composition of the inhabitants. The first minimum prerequisite of ujamaa village development is therefore that such new communities after an initial period are, or at least show some capability of becoming, socially and economically viable. There must be among the members a mutual acceptance of each other as well as a general feeling of belonging to the community. There must be some stable interaction separating the community from other communities. And last but not least there must be a material basis for its continued existence and development as a community.

This viability demand of course counts for all new communities, be they ujamaa villages or any other of the numerous types of newly established but otherwise ordinary traditional villages. But it is probably more problematic when the novelty of the community includes some element of unfamiliar internal village structures.

And this is precisely the second conceived prerequisite for an ujamaa village. There must be some, if only feeble, signs of a transformation of the village economy. A transformation towards more cooperative organization of production, more equal
distribution of benefits, and utilization of scales of economy in adoption of new methods, diversification, and specialization in production.

Economic equality is one of the basic principles of Tanzanian socialism, and one of the major means to achieve it is cooperative production. Equality and cooperation, however, are not satisfactory if they do not go hand in hand with increased productivity and thereby with an overall increase in the standard of living. This has been stated again and again, sometimes even to the extent of overshadowing other ideologically more important aspects."

Such an overemphasis on production and productivity may become a critical source of conflict with the third fundamental requirement in ujamaa development, the often repeated claim that ujamaa must build on full democratic participation and decisionmaking by all the people involved. In the real world it may be necessary in an initial period not to make this demand too much of an imperative and there are numerous examples that it has not been so. But, as we have stressed before, no deliberate strategy exists which can justify a transitional period of some length with less than fully democratic structures (such as, for example, dictatorship of the proletariat for the sake of the struggle against the former exploiting classes). To avoid arbitrary compulsion the third necessary prerequisite for a village on the road to ujamaa must therefore be an early establishment of democratic procedures, as well as actual participation by the villagers in planning, organizing and cooperating in both the daily life and the future development of their community.

This attempt to draw out from the official ideology and the mass of concrete policy statements three simple prerequisites for the meaningful development of villages as ujamaa villages should not, however, be misconstrued to show that at least some kind of embryonic general strategy does exist. It is merely an exercise—for the sake of the present analysis—in defining some yardsticks which will allow a fairly systematic assessment of conditions in the many types of communities claimed to be developed as ujamaa villages.

As these yardsticks are—hopefully—reasonably consistent with the declared Tanzanian ideology they should enable us to analyse the existing ujamaa villages and the implications of the various tactics employed in their establishment and development within the ideological frame of reference of the Tanzanian leadership. That is at least what is attempted in Part II of this volume, where the different types of ujamaa experiences in one part of Tanzania, the West Lake Region, are presented. The ways they were established and their modes of operation are discussed here—particularly as seen in relation to their social and economic viability, their transformative elements, and their democratic and participatory development.

In so doing we encounter a number of basic issues, here recurring in relation to very different concrete situations, but which are also general for most relevant literature and discussions about development and underdevelopment.

Throughout the book we can trace the strains which are imposed on a post-colonial society by its past history of underdevelopment of internal as well as external structures. It has already been amply described elsewhere how the
economy of the colony was adjusted to the needs of the colonial power, leaving the post-colonial society with a disintegrated dependent economy, usually characterized by its weak industrial base and the export orientation of agricultural production (and mining). More directly connected with the theme of this study, it has also left a legacy of agricultural and infrastructural policies with strong continuing influence on contemporary events. Such policies include, among others, an elitist modernization approach to agriculture, which tend towards a combination of general, administratively imposed, regulations to control and increase export-crop production and capital intensive efforts at mechanization etc. A dominating rôle is acquired by a relatively strong tertiary sector, i.e. administration, trade, and transport, built into the economy to ensure the channeling into export of primary goods and import of manufactured goods. Physical infrastructures are established and designed to serve the same purpose. We shall see the continuing impact of this legacy, even as a very concrete thing.

One of the weaknesses of the ujamaa ideology, as we have discussed it earlier, is its underestimation of the need for a thorough analysis of class structure and class formation as the basis for a socialist rural development strategy in post-colonial Tanzania. Any policy acts upon and is reacted upon by the developing class-relations in the country and consequently its fate is to a large extent determined by how it—consciously or unconsciously—relates to different class forces. A central purpose of Part III is to analyse ujamaa development as an aspect of class-relations in post-colonial Tanzania, but already in Part II their importance in the implementation processes should become evident. For instance, the ambivalence of the policy towards the whole class question, gave room for the most varied tactics by local leadership with regard to recruitment and mobilization of layers of the local population, with far-reaching implications for the further development of ujamaa ventures.

This also points towards another basic issue in the development process, namely the relation between government, party and people, or to put it in the terms of one mainstream of contemporary development discussion, the role of the state in post-colonial development. All the experiences with ujamaa in West Lake Region described in Part II are in themselves concrete examples of this relationship which is then in the last chapters seen as perhaps the central factor in recent development in Tanzania. It should be mentioned already here that our analysis has led us to regard party, government administration, and the variety of public institutions in existence in Tanzania as primarily one state, or bureaucratic, structure, with the same or at least largely overlapping interests, functions, and behaviour. Only at a secondary level do their separate identities appear to be important. From this view results the undifferentiating use throughout the book of such concepts as ‘the regional leadership’, ‘local authorities’, ‘the bureaucracy’, etc. which are meant to convey such a broad meaning to the reader.

A society’s socio-economic structure has a heavy impact on the development or suppression of the human resources available to that society. Development policies
almost invariably stress the importance of developing and mobilizing human resources, but in implementation the emphasis is usually on technico-economic aspects, including training within this sphere, while socio-economic structures are left untouched by any deliberate efforts to effect basic changes. In our discussion of ujamaa development in Tanzania it will appear that while development and mobilization of human resources are essential to the whole ideology, it is highly questionable whether mobilization has in fact resulted from and at the same time been directed towards changes in the basic structures in the society, or it has rather been a 'mobilization' within the existing structures, enforced by them, and fortifying their basis. There are many examples of the last type of 'mobilization' being attempted, but leading in reality to little or no mobilization at all, which would seem to be a rather universal phenomenon.

This has of course been a very brief listing only of the basic issues involved in the ujamaa experiences in Tanzania, as exemplified in Part II of this book, where we try to discuss them within the framework of the official ujamaa ideology. That analysis does not, however, answer the crucial question about the potential of ujamaa as the principal element in the total socialist transformation of Tanzania. Being a strategic question it requires not only a study of political tactics and their implications for the development of certain ujamaa villages as such but also a discussion of the underlying economic and social structures and the political forces which determine the choice of political tactics. It calls for an analysis of the ujamaa policy as seen in relation to overall development in the society, including the interdependence of the basic issues mentioned above, which goes much further than assessing the internal potential of even a number of ujamaa experiences for development towards the ujamaa ideal.

That is therefore the purpose of our Part III, in which the ujamaa experiences in West Lake Region are related to the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the Region as a part of the political economy of Tanzania as a whole. The dominating economic structures, internal as well as external, and social classes are here seen as the determining factors in the country's development, and as decisive also in the choice of concrete political tactics, which therefore to a large extent depends on the already experienced and the expected implications of the different choices for the specific interests of the political forces at play.

Thus the ultimate fate of ujamaa as a means to socialist transformation is seen as being decisively dependent on by whom it is 'used' and how they adapt the ideology to their interests and transform it into policies.

It should be mentioned here, that the relative lengths of Parts II and III do not indicate the relative importance attached by the authors to the two levels of analysis. It reflects partly our feeling that the comprehensive body of information on the actual performance of a number of ujamaa ventures collected during the study may be of interest to a wider audience. But apart from that, the argument in Part III is to some extent based on the analyses presented in Part II, while of course also drawing freely on the work of other people. Finally the analysis of the
Tanzanian political economy can as yet be no more than a tentative sketch still needing at lot more research and analysis by us and others.

As further introduction to these two main parts of the book the next two chapters outline the main features of West Lake Region and its historical development as an important part of the setting for this study of ujamaa development.

The postscript is a brief extension of the development trends from the period 1968–73, which is the focus of the main body of this study, up to 1975, when some dramatic changes in policy had taken place, notably the decision to enforce total villagization of the rural population before 1977.

Notes

3. ibid. p. 162.
4. “The Arusha Declaration and TANU’s Policy on Socialism and Selfreliance.” Publicity Section, TANU, Dar es Salaam 1967. Also in Nyerere: “Freedom and Socialism/Uhuru na Ujamaa.” pp. 231 ff. Like all the other policy papers referred to in this chapter, the Arusha Declaration consists partly of principles and aims of a broad ideological character, partly of more concrete decisions of a policy oriented character. As it is used in the Declaration (the Kiswahili version) the term ujamaa comprises all the principles and policies of Tanzanian socialism as a whole. But since Ujamaa Vijjini occupies such a central place both at the ideological and at the policy level we shall in this book when there is no doubt what we are talking about use ‘the ujamaa policy’ as synonymous with ‘the policy of Ujamaa Vijjini’.
11. Sometimes the official rating in stages 1, 2 and 3 was used but this was merely formalistic as only villages in stage 3 could apply for–and get–bank loans. So in reality the stage 3 label, in principle meaning that the village was economically selfreliant and viable, was given even to villages still receiving food aid, while other actually selfreliant villages remained formally at stage 1.
12. See for example Hyden and Raikes, op. cit.
Chapter 2

West Lake Region: Socio-economic development

The Region

West Lake Region is located in the extreme north-western corner of Tanzania, bordering on Rwanda and Burundi to the West, Uganda to the North, and Lake Victoria to the East. Like most other population density concentrations in Tanzania, it is situated in the country’s periphery. The road links to the rest of the country are very poor, but the Region has for a long time had fairly easy access to the outside world via lake steamers and the Kisumu-Nairobi-Mombasa and Mwanza-Dar es Salaam railways.

Physically the Region is dominated by two ridge-systems: to the East along the lake shore and to the West along the Rwanda and Burundi boundaries. Each system consists of two to three main ridges running North–South with hills and plateaux dissected by numerous minor rivers and valleys leading down to the major rivers, lakes, and swamps between the ridges. Altitudes range from 1,100 metres a.s.l. at the lake shore to 1,500 metres on some of the ridges. Because of these altitudes, temperatures are moderate in spite of the Region’s location just south of the equator.

In general the soils are not very fertile, but there are great variations from one place to another, even within the same locality. It seems however, that rainfall is more important than soil fertility for the type of agriculture which is dominant in the Region. Although the whole Region is relatively well endowed with rain, with mean annual rainfall figures between 800 and 2,100 mm, the population is concentrated in the areas with highest rainfall. The higher the annual rainfall the better it is also distributed over the whole year, which is favourable for a prennial crop like bananas. All parts of the Region have two main rainy seasons: around October–November and March–April, which are also the two annual crop seasons.

West Lake Region is divided into four administrative units: Bukoba, Karagwe, Ngara, and Biharamulo Districts. Until 15 years ago the Region was fairly homogenous economically and agriculturally, with Biharamulo as the poorest and most sparsely populated of the Districts. Since then cotton growing has spread to the Eastern part of this District from the neighbouring Mwanza Region, which is part of the great Western cotton zone in Tanzania. Like most fringe areas of the cotton zone Biharamulo has experienced a rapid growth in population in recent years following the clearance of bush land for cotton cultivation. The District is now
dominated by a cotton, cassava, maize rotation system completely different from
the perennial banana/coffee complex in the rest of the Region. It shows the typical
signs of a frontier area of this type: large numbers of permanent and seasonal
immigrants, some opening up vast areas of land for cultivation, others working as
daily paid labourers, plenty of cash circulating at harvest time, prices fluctuating
accordingly, etc. The conditions in Biharamulo would thus demand a special study
related rather to the rest of the cotton zone, for which reason the present volume
is confined to the remaining three Districts Bukoba, Karagwe and Ngara. For
simplicity we have kept the term “West Lake Region”, which in this publication
then should be understood to mean only the three mentioned Districts.

A short history of the region

The basis of the economy of West Lake Region has for centuries been agricultural
production of the perennial crop bananas, the staple food crop, and additional
annual food crops like beans, maize, groundnuts, bambara nuts, sorghum, sweet
potatoes and cassava, which are interplanted among the bananas and/or grown
on land outside the banana shamba (kiswahili; meaning either a garden or a field).
A small coffee production and export was traditionally monopolized by the chiefs.

The traditional economic structure consisted of small individual peasant
households producing their own subsistence and a surplus for the political
overlords in the system of chiefdoms.

Well established trade was conducted with neighbouring chiefdoms and Arab
traders in specialized processed goods such as barkcloth for clothes, imported from
Buganda, and export of coffee (as chewing coffee) and iron tools (iron smelting and
production of tools and weapons were an important supplement to the agricultural
economy of Northern Bukoba for hundreds of years).

Germany was the first colonial power to establish itself in West Lake Region (in
1890) to be replaced later by the British after the first World War. On their arrival
the Germans found coffee (robusta) already being grown in West Lake, but only by
the chiefs on some of their tenants' plots, and only in small quantities as the market
was limited. The area being suitable for production of coffee, a highly valued
export crop from the colonies of that time, the chiefs were soon "persuaded" to give
up their coffee monopoly.

Over the next thirty years the Germans and their British successors succeeded
in raising coffee production from 235 tons in 1905 to over 10,000 tons in the
mid-thirties, employing the usual colonial methods of taxation and compulsion.

The completion of the railway from Mombasa via Nairobi to Lake Victoria in
1905 and the opening of a boat service on the lake in 1908 were convenient for
the development of coffee exports from West Lake as well as for the growing
import of manufactured consumer goods. Communications were further
improved when the Dar es Salaam–Mwanza railway was completed in 1928. This coincided with the first big boom in coffee production in the 1920s, which also attracted large numbers of agricultural labourers to the Region from Rwanda and Burundi.

Sometime in the 1930s the point was reached when expansion of coffee, which was interplanted with the bananas, had covered virtually all already cultivated land, and since then further expansion has mainly taken place in connection with establishment of new farms following population increases. The 1930s also saw a big slump in coffee prices so the immigration of labourers from Rwanda and Burundi ceased for a time. At the same time the first coffee trees planted were becoming too old and needed replanting and the use of better husbandry. The British colonial government, which had by then established its agricultural extension service, therefore tried hard to persuade the peasants to uproot old coffee stems and to improve husbandry. These attempts were met with firm resistance, resulting in several cases of open fighting between the peasants and the British authorities.

In the 1950s coffee prices rose again and new migrant labourers were attracted. At this time the extension work was extended to include attempts to improve food crop production. Once more the policy was rejected by the peasants and there were clashes between them and the British.

West Lake Region never became a settler area for Europeans, nor were any large estates established as in other parts of East Africa. Coffee was from the beginning introduced as a peasant cash crop, and was incorporated into the existing agricultural pattern without destroying its main features.

While the agricultural system has thus remained one of small individual peasant producers, the overall economic structure of the Region has undergone a thorough reorganization through incorporation into a colonial trade system with export of raw materials and unprocessed agricultural crops and import of manufactured goods.

From the beginning of this century Indian and Arab merchants moved in to organize the local trade links for the export of coffee and the import of European manufactured goods. Supply of these goods soon took over the demand for locally produced clothes, tools and utensils thus adding a further incentive for the peasants to concentrate on the only important cash crop, coffee. Christian, European, missions were at an early stage firmly established in the Region and the money to pay for European education and medical treatment also had to come from the coffee incomes.

These non-agricultural economic activities consisting of an integrated network of functions needed by the export-import system, such as distribution, trade and transport, financial operations, and administrative and social services controlled the new regional economic system. Consequently a new social formation was created dominated by a class of Arab and Asian businessmen and European administrators and missionaries.
Since Tanzania became independent in 1961 a racial—but not a structural—change has taken place, as Africans have become dominant also in the non-agricultural spheres, through education and investment, but especially through the assumption of political and administrative power by the African nationalist movement and the take-over of local coffee marketing by the cooperative society.

The existing socio-economic structure

Agriculture. The basic productive sector in West Lake Region is agriculture, and it is likely to remain so for many years to come. More than 90% of the regional population is at present involved in agriculture, and since the ujamaa policy, following the Arusha Declaration, was promoted as a means to transform the rural economic and social life, emphasis is given here to a description of the development of agriculture and its production relations, in order to throw light on the potentials for ujamaa and the problems facing its implementation in the Region.

The agricultural system in West Lake is based on small scale, individual, peasant farming, with the peasant household, usually consisting of little more than the core family, and its land as the economic as well as the production unit. There are three categories of land and corresponding crop patterns:

The most important part of each agricultural unit is the banana shamba, which is established on the most fertile and deep soils. It is permanently cultivated with a mixture of perennial crops, bananas and coffee, and annual crops, such as beans, maize, vegetables etc. The banana shamba provides its owner with the basic food and some cash, and it is the home of the family as their houses are built in the centre of it. The banana shamba is for all practical purposes regarded as private property.

Outside the banana shamba are plots, often of lower fertility, cultivated with additional seasonally planted foodcrops, such as bambara nuts, sweet potatoes, and sorghum. A rotation system of cultivation and fallow is applied, in Bukoba District with up to 7 years fallow after one year’s cultivation due to the low soil fertility. This land is under varying arrangements of private ownership or usufructuary rights.

Between the clusters of cultivated land areas (i.e. between the villages) there is open grass or bush land. Small parts of it may at a given time be under annual crop cultivation as described above, but most of it is only used for cattle grazing. The uncultivated land is communally or state owned, and only in a few cases under private ownership.

Access to all three categories of land is necessary for a viable household economy in the existing agricultural system, unless cash incomes suffice to replace the additional food production from the land outside the banana shamba, which is normally indispensable.
For the majority of the peasants coffee is the cash crop. As we have mentioned above, the production increased rapidly from 1905 to 1930, the period during which coffee trees were interplanted on virtually all land already under banana cultivation. Since then coffee production has only been expanded slowly, mainly as a consequence of establishment of new banana/coffee shambas concurrently with an increase in population, and only to a small extent as a result of the work of the agricultural extension service encouraging improved methods, such as pruning and replacement of old trees.

There thus seems to be little room for any fast increase in cash crop production within the present peasant household type of mixed agricultural economy which balances the need for food and cash incomes with the prevailing conditions of fertility and land supply. On the other hand there are no signs either of this non-capitalist mode of production being replaced by a capitalist one, as investment of any capital available is likely to be much more profitable in the commercial and financial sectors. Also, because of the “selfexploitation” of the peasant and the absence of profit as the driving force, the peasant household economy can produce the low quality robusta coffee, in demand for “Instant Coffee”, at extremely low and competitive prices.

While they can hardly increase production (nor productivity) very much, coffee is for the majority of the peasants the secure cash crop in so far as it yields some income every year—regardless of varying prices—to cover the minimal needs for cash incomes on top of subsistence production.

The staple subsistence food is the cooking banana. Approximately one hectare of land with bananas suffices to feed a family throughout the year. Beans, maize, sweet potatoes, yams and vegetables are interplanted with the banana trees, but a one hectare banana shamba is not enough to cover the family’s need for supplementary protein-rich food. So beans, bambarra nuts, groundnuts, sorghum and maize are also grown on the less fertile land outside the banana shamba in quantities adjusted to the needs.

At present the Region is not selfreliant in food production, in spite of its favourable climate. Certain areas (North Eastern Bukoba and Northern Ngara) face severe land shortage, while N-E Bukoba at the same time is hit by banana weevil attacks which reduce the productivity of the plants. In 1971 a deficit of some 5,000 tons of bananas, 400 tons of beans, 1,700 tons of maize, 1,000 tons of rice and 1,000 tons of wheat flour had to be covered from outside N-E Bukoba—just to illustrate the size of the problem.

There are other parts of the Region where land is abundant, and where production of a surplus would be possible. But these areas lack infrastructural facilities, limiting outlets for potential surplus production. Furthermore the marketing organization for all crops other than coffee is poor, often dependant on exchange of agricultural products and manufactured consumer goods through private traders, causing low and fluctuating prices. Only very recently has the cooperative union been told to take up marketing of beans and groundnuts.
Table (2.1). Distribution of households according to landownership and age-group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Distribution by size of land holdings</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Below the district mean</td>
<td>Above the district mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukoba</td>
<td>Under 40 63 %</td>
<td>37 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40–60 59 %</td>
<td>41 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>over 60 89 %</td>
<td>11 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karagwe</td>
<td>Under 40 70 %</td>
<td>30 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40–60 47 %</td>
<td>53 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>over 60 58 %</td>
<td>42 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngara</td>
<td>Under 40 76 %</td>
<td>24 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40–60 49 %</td>
<td>51 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>over 60 76 %</td>
<td>24 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even in the areas with plenty of land there is therefore little incentive for the peasants to produce food above the subsistence level.

In summary, the vast majority of the peasants have remained subsistence producers, producing from their land at best enough food and the little cash they need just to carry on their present existence.

_The farm-family-cycle._ The production unit is the household, made up of a nuclear family, and this is a dynamic unit. The size of the family and its composition change as the family passes through its biological development cycle, and the economic and social needs and interests of the family vary accordingly.

Normally a man is provided with the basic means of subsistence by his father. He is given the dowry to marry a wife, who is the stable labourer in his production, and he is given a piece of the father’s land large enough for him to build his house upon and to provide the couple with food. The piece of land, which is already established with perennial crops, has to be maintained by the couple and expanded as their family grows. Between the ages of 40 and 60 a man’s banana shamba reaches its maximum size and so does his family and its needs. As soon as the sons start working, they will be given parts of their father’s land. Concurrently with the establishment of the sons as independent production units the size of the father’s land decreases. However, the father keeps his position as family head and his authority and influence increases until the end of his life. If a man has more than one wife he will, if at all possible, establish each wife on a separate banana shamba to secure the subsistence for each wife and her children.

The expansion of land in accordance with the size of the family—the farm-family-cycle—shows that in each generation the productive efforts are primarily vested in the _maintenance of the means of subsistence and the provision of the means of subsistence for the next generation._
Table (2.2). Size of landholdings in West Lake Region’s three Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bukoba</th>
<th>Karagwe</th>
<th>Ngara</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean size</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The largest 10 % of all</td>
<td>3.7 ha</td>
<td>7.9 ha</td>
<td>9.9 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>landholdings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The next 30 % of all</td>
<td>2.0 ha</td>
<td>5.3 ha</td>
<td>4.8 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>landholdings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The smallest 60 % of all</td>
<td>1.0 ha</td>
<td>2.6 ha</td>
<td>2.2 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>landholdings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dispersion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largest 10 %</td>
<td>2.8–8.2 ha</td>
<td>7.0–13.0 ha</td>
<td>6.5–21.0 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 30 %</td>
<td>1.5–2.8 ha</td>
<td>4.0–87.0 ha</td>
<td>3.6– 6.5 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smallest 60 %</td>
<td>0.1–1.5 ha</td>
<td>1.2– 4.0 ha</td>
<td>0.7– 3.6 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of all land</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>owned by different groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largest 10 %</td>
<td>23 %</td>
<td>19 %</td>
<td>27 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 30 %</td>
<td>39 %</td>
<td>42 %</td>
<td>38 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smallest 60 %</td>
<td>38 %</td>
<td>39 %</td>
<td>36 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures shown in table (2.1) illustrate that the farm-family-cycle is still a dominant characteristic of the agricultural production pattern. There are more relatively large landowners among middle-aged heads of households than among young or old.

Also the overall distribution of land, shown in table (2.2) below shows the dominance of the farm-family-cycle adapted primarily to subsistence production and less to surplus production, by the lack of any class of markedly large landholdings that would indicate commercial production units. Few units have managed to break through the subsistence level and establish themselves with large plots. There is no division into qualitatively different classes and an absence of landlords controlling the major parts of the land, accompanied by any degree of landlessness.

However, a continuum of balanced farm-family-cycles can only exist if there is enough arable land and if all land has roughly the same value.

Developments during the last half century have changed the preconditions for a continued balance of the farm-family-cycle. The consequences of the intrusion of colonialism: introduction of cash crops, taxation, imported consumers’ goods, school fees etc.,—which made the access to cash a necessity—together with a more rapid population growth are now leading to a break-up of the farm-family-cycle as land resources become finite.

Some sons can no longer be established by their fathers as independent production units. Some do not get any land at all, others are as formerly, given a share of the banana shamba while the father keeps the control of the coffee
interplanted between the bananas until he dies. These sons are therefore only provided with basic food needs. For cash they either depend on their father or move into the non-agricultural sector.

The possibilities for expansion of the cultivated area are exhausted in large parts of the Region (northern and coastal Bukoba, northwestern Ngara, and isolated parts of Karagwe). Maintenance of the farm-family-cycle in these areas means moving away from the father’s land and home-area into areas where land is available. This makes the expansion more complicated as it is difficult to maintain the necessary links to the father’s land for food and for family labour until the new land has started yielding. In most cases it demands investment of money to buy food, tools, and labour to replace the family labour in a process which formerly only needed investment of labour available in the family.

Many families do not have the capital necessary to establish such a new farm. Nor do they like to move away and settle in “unknown” areas with poorer social facilities, which may also require new crop patterns and consequently new techniques and perhaps even a new social organization.

The farm-family-cycle is today, therefore, beginning to break down. New production units are, in an increasing number of cases, no longer established on shambas large enough to provide them with all food needed. They exist on fractions of the father’s land, or on the land of absent relatives, who are away in the hope of earning money to buy land. There is a land shortage. Such units now represent all stages in the family development cycle: Young households, mature households with grown up children, and old households, totalling an estimated 10% of rural households in the area.

Whilst the overall transformation of the regional economy into a colonial trade economy has thus started to threaten the socio-economic patterns with disintegration, it has not on the other hand promoted any transformation of agricultural production. The mass of peasants are still fighting to maintain their farm-family cycle to ensure subsistence and maintenance of the family. Few are able to produce a surplus which would allow them to transform their production unit into a profit and investment oriented enterprise. Furthermore the economic structures of the trade economy are such that investments—directly or indirectly through education—in the non-agricultural sectors are potentially much more profitable than agricultural investments. So eventual surpluses are invested either in improving the position of the family within the existing rural patterns, i.e. in quantitative expansion of the farm and the family, possibly by acquiring another wife and farm, improved houses, furniture, clothes etc., or in non-agricultural activities, including education.

The non-agricultural sector. The trade economy, the remote location of the Region, and its lack of discovered raw materials have contributed to the absence of any industrial development on a large scale—a typical situation for the peripheral areas in the underdeveloped world. The few existing industries, all concerned with
processing of agricultural export products, are: a coffee curing factory employing between 100 and 200 people depending on the season, an instant coffee factory, a sugar factory, and a tea factory, all employing less than 100 people each.

The Region has remained with an economy based on agricultural production with non-agricultural development limited to the non-productive sectors such as social services and administration, commerce, business, transport and construction—all on a scale adapted to the economic level of peasant agriculture.

Approximately 10% of the Region's population is full-time employed in the non-agricultural sectors of which administration and social services make up more than 50%. Since this sector is skill-demanding it restricts the access to the sector to a limited part of the population with formal education. Trade, transport and construction are open to skilled as well as unskilled people and to people who have some capital as well as to those who have only their labour to sell.

Approximately another 20% of the population are involved in these non-agricultural activities either as a part-time occupation or for periods to earn specific target incomes. Especially in Bukoba District it is common that a man supplements his income from agriculture with incomes from the non-agricultural sector and in certain parts of that District people are dependent on access to non-agricultural incomes even for subsistence because of pressure on the land and the consequent small production per family member. Since trade, transport, construction and small-scale industries have been organized on a private basis, as small enterprises, without registration and in practice unlimited by licences these sectors have been very flexible both in adapting to the market (e.g., have been able to expand rapidly at times when coffee prices were high, and reduce activities with decreasing coffee prices) and with regard to recruitment as they give access to skilled as well as unskilled people, or to those having much capital to invest as well as those having little or no capital to invest.

Arabs and Indians were the first to dominate these sectors, controlling all coffee marketing and wholesale, major parts of the retail trade, and some construction and transport business. On the fringes of this Arab–Indian sphere the African part-time peasant operated. Since Independence in 1961 these sectors have been more and more Africanized but at the same time they are increasingly being taken over by parastatals and government institutions and thereby bureaucratized. This results in decreasing social mobility, as recruitment demands, including formal educational qualifications, limit the possibilities of access.

The range of economic activities in which about one quarter of the population have been able to indulge to earn an addition to their small agricultural incomes is now being reduced. At the same time the formal bureaucracy is expanding, and has become economically and politically the dominating social stratum.

The gap is increasing between this group, limited to those with formal education and privileged through relatively high salaries, job security and other benefits, and the rest of the population whose activity is more and more confined to the agricultural sector.
Chapter 3

West Lake Region. Ujamaa in the context of agricultural development

By the late 1960s, when ujamaa was introduced in West Lake Region, there was some opportunity for positive response to a development policy to better the situation prevailing in the agricultural sector. The foregoing chapter relates how, with 90% of the regional population dependent upon agriculture, at least two major crises were prevalent in agricultural development.

The first of these was related to the high population density in some parts of the Region, and the uneven population density over the whole Region. This meant, that in the areas containing the larger parts of the population, the "farm-family cycle" was breaking down through a shortage of arable land within the village areas. More and more rural households were facing a problem of less and less land resources for the production of subsistence crops to feed themselves.

The second of these crises was that production of the main cash crop, coffee, had stagnated, with little real chance for an expanded production and, thereby, increased agricultural incomes. This was of course related to the first crisis, the pressure on land and the shortage of arable land for subsistence production. But the situation was exacerbated by the direct competition for the same land resources between coffee and subsistence bananas, in an eco-system where only parts of the total land area were suitable for the establishment of banana/coffee cultivation. But both these crises, shortage of arable land in the settled area and shortage of opportunities for increasing agricultural income, were related to some degree to the status quo that existed in agriculture. Remedial policies to administer change were already proposed in the region's development plans. The shortage of arable land would be tackled by opening up previously un-settled areas of the region for migration. The limit of expansion in coffee production was by-passed by introducing new commercial crops into the agricultural system.

As the traditional response to these crises seemed insufficient, so the national and regional government expected that specific plans to channel development expenditure in these directions would have some effect in improving agricultural development. Therefore, by the time that the ujamaa policy was to be introduced in West Lake Region, the administration had already embarked upon plans for resettlement campaigns and crop diversification within the Region.

A policy of social and economic transformation that is being introduced into a strongly traditional system, by a government with limited executive and financial resources may gain advances in its implementation if it is at first linked with other qualitative changes that are being introduced in the economy. In other words, the
meagre governmental resources of a large Region would find it easier to establish communities based on new principles of equality and democracy in rural areas if they were, at the same time, helping the communities to start to live in a new place or to grow a new crop. So it was in West Lake Region in the late 1960s. The Ministry of Agriculture had started a policy of crop diversification in 1963–64 with the introduction of tea into the traditional coffee area of Bukoba district. By 1968 the Bukoba Tea Scheme had just started on its first ambitious expansion and in 1969–70 the second phase of expansion was inaugurated.

At the same time, the Regional Executive had embarked on a re-settlement scheme, whereby they were taking people from traditionally crowded areas and establishing them in new settlements in the bush. By the time of the Presidential Circular of 1969, there were about 3,500 people living in 19 new settlements in the Region, which were largely located in previously unsettled areas. The emergent ujamaa policy was tied to these different elements of existing development plans.

The aim of this chapter is to examine the potential that ujamaa had within the planned development of agriculture in the Region. The immediate potential was most specifically in the fields of resettlement and crop-diversification, and we will now proceed to explain this in greater detail. The potential cannot be assessed without reference to the socio-economic background of these so-called crises, and we will give a summary of how policies of re-settlement and crop diversification had progressed up until the introduction of ujamaa. How ujamaa was actually implemented in relation to these policies is the subject of the main text of this book.

Re-settlement policies

(a) Population distribution in the region

The population of West Lake Region was unevenly distributed in 1967. This is shown on map 4. The most densely settled parts of the region were the lake-littoral areas of Bukoba District and Bugufi Division of Ngara District. 58% of the total 1967 regional population of 659,000 lived in these areas which covered less than 15% of the total land area of the Region. If we exclude both the land area and population of Biharamulo District from these calculations, as we must, to concentrate upon the area under analysis in this book, then the proportions remain similar in scale. For this reduced area, 67% of the population were concentrated in less than 24% of the land area.

Census figures give us only a static reference to the conditions of population distribution. At the same time as a census is taken, there are, of course, population movements taking place. It would be conceivable that even though the population distribution appeared very uneven, migrations were taking place as a response to this. However, if it is possible to infer from the comparative data of the 1957 and 1967 censuses of Tanzania, the evidence shows that such internal migrations that
Table 3.1: Projected natural growth of regional population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1967 pop.</th>
<th>Growth rate</th>
<th>1977 pop.</th>
<th>% area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Bugufi, Ngara</td>
<td>58,000</td>
<td>-1.0 % p.a.</td>
<td>52,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Littoral, Bukoba</td>
<td>521,000</td>
<td>1.6 % p.a.</td>
<td>576,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sub-total</td>
<td>379,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>428,500</td>
<td>23 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Total, Bukoba</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngara, Karagwe</td>
<td>567,000</td>
<td>2.7 % p.a.</td>
<td>740,000</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. As a % of 4. | 67 % | - | 58 % | -

took place were only partially instrumental in adjusting balances, and in giving more regional households more arable land to cultivate.

From an analysis of the population growth rates between 1957 and 1967 in different parts of the Region it was found that these were lower than the average growth rate (1.6 %) in the coastal part of Bukoba District, and of negative dimensions in Bugufi, Ngara (-1.0 %). At the same time there were higher than average population growth rates in Northern Karagwe District (5.1 %) and in the central low lands of the Region (4.1 %) between the Karagwe escarpment and the coastal ridges.

There was some internal migration taking place. But the question was: if the same rates were to be applicable to the subsequent decade, would there be enough movement to solve the problems of land availability in the heavily populated areas? There was also some external migration taking place from Ngara District—to the extent that the Ngara population was decreasing—and this was going to Uganda, Biharamulo District and to other parts of Tanzania.

If the same growth rates persisted over the subsequent decade then the populations of the heavily populated areas would assume the following proportions relative to the total regional population.

Other things being equal, assuming the continuation of existing trends in internal migration, the table shows that gradually the rest of the Region would be the home of larger parts of the regional population. This would be logical. But now we should turn to the actual conditions pertaining at the end of the 1960s in these heavily populated areas: because it can be demonstrated that other things were certainly not equal. This is largely to say that a) many households in coastal Bukoba District had deficient arable land resources for daily subsistence, let alone reproduction. b) The destinations of migrants from Ngara District were ceasing to be available to them.

(b) Land availability in littoral Bukoba District

In the previous chapter we referred to the impending collapse of the farm family cycle as a dominant feature in social development. This situation was already in existence for some households in the late 1960s, and we can illustrate this by calculating the gross availability of arable land in coastal Bukoba District.
Table 3.2. Areas of Land-use Types in Coastal Bukoba

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land-use Type</th>
<th>Hectares</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Swampland</td>
<td>88,900</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest</td>
<td>23,700</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cliffs, steep slopes</td>
<td>15,800</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banana/coffee cultivation</td>
<td>102,500</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassland</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>340,900</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From maps and air-photographs we have made a rough estimate of land-use areas in coastal Bukoba. They are as follows:

Living on this land in 1967 were 321,000 people in 87,000 household units. This implies that existing households in 1967 had an average banana/coffee shamba area (banana, coffee, beans, house, paths, yard) of 1.17 ha. This gross estimate of banana/coffee area per household included unproductive land (paths, tracks and yards for drying coffee) but the minimum needed to feed a family of average size between 0.4 ha and 0.8 ha., depending on yields. As the gross average amount of this land per household was only 0.3 ha. above the minimum needed and the distribution of household plot areas was such that 70% of households had less than the mean, then there were many households with plots of minimum size.

Within these areas there was some latitude for expansion on to the grassland, but not nearly so much as at first appearance; on the simple and mistaken understanding that rweya is un-used grassland. Although it appeared to be vacant, much of the grassland was extensively used within the limitations of its low-fertility. Approximately 2,300 ha. were planted, or reserved for planting, with tea. In most years there were approximately 6,000 ha of bambara groundnuts and sweet potatoes—extensions of food production to the banana areas. But the low fertility demanded a 7-year rotation (1 year planted and 6 years fallow) for this practice. Therefore 42,000 ha were involved in the production of these food-crops to supplement the bananas and beans from the banana/coffee areas. There were also approx. 50,000 head of cattle in the area, and as the holding capacity of the grassland is as low as 1 ha. per head, it can be seen that most of the rweya was, indeed, extensively used.

Still, under these conditions of land availability there was a positive annual increase in the population of littoral Bukoba District, and a lower than to be expected emigration of younger households. This was related to the strength of the ties to the traditional cultivation patterns in the social evolution of Bukoba District. Traditionally it was always considered essential that the basic element of a household economic unit should be a banana plantation.

This is one reason why the rate of migration from these areas had not been higher. Apart from central parts of Karagwe District, the rainfall regime in other central parts of the Region was not suitable for re-establishment of the banana area.
Another reason, referred to in the previous chapter, was that there were very poor infrastructural facilities in the less settled areas of the Region, compared to the populated areas. This situation inhibited individual families from decisions to move, perhaps only 50 km away and settle new, undeveloped areas.

The slow rate of migration from the heavily populated parts of Bukoba District, given the land-shortage must underline the conservative attitude of the Bahaya and their attachment to their traditional economic organization. It is true that infrastructure—roads, dispensaries, trading centres, and schools—were comparatively badly developed in the areas open to migration. But the distances from "home" were very small, nowhere greater than 50–60 km.

In other parts of East Africa tribal migrations to new land areas seem to have occurred more readily. In Kenya the Luo of Central Nyanza have been migrating to, and settling, South Nyanza since the 1920s, the Maragoli also to South Nyanza and Trans-Nzoia. In Tanzania the Nyakyusa whose agricultural system is similar to that of the Bahaya have been moving to the Usangu Plains where they establish completely different agricultural systems. And as near to Bukoba as Biharamulo District, Sukuma from Mwanza District have been settling for a long time. This is perhaps the most interesting comparison, because the newly settled areas of Biharamulo District are much nearer the traditional homes of the Bahaya than those of the Sukuma. Yet there are hardly any Bahaya settlers in Biharamulo. This would make them seem relatively conservative in relation to their traditional settlement areas, although the population density in those areas was high.

The main reason for the conservativism is the rigidity with which the Bahaya adhere to the subsistence production of bananas and beans. With one exception, all the other tribes mentioned from East Africa who have migrated from densely populated areas have agricultural systems built around annual crop production of maize, sorghum and millet. Annual crops are only a very short term investment—whilst the banana/coffee plots of the Bahaya represent the invested resources of several generations—and re-establishment of them in new locations takes a long time.

(c) Land availability for resettlement

The natural areas to receive any migration from littoral Bukoba District would have been Karagwe District and the central lowlands between Karagwe and Bukoba. Some migration had already occurred to places within these areas—but settlements had been very localized. The settling of land in Karagwe and "outer" Bukoba District (east of the Karagwe escarpment) is influenced by rainfall incidence and accessibility. The type of intensive food cultivation that characterizes the banana/coffee plantations generally demands a rainfall of over 875 mm per year. Variations either above or below this amount influence the intensity with which bananas can be grown, and the yield per hectare.

Accessibility and relation to existing infrastructure also influence the suitability of an area to settlers who are seeking to establish banana subsistence plots. The
nature of agricultural expansion based on this production system is different to expansion based on annual crops also in another way than that relating to the time-period of investment. Settlers expanding into new areas with annual crops usually start their emigration pattern in a partial way. They clear new land and plant an annual crop at a distance from their home whilst continuing to maintain their family and basic agricultural production on the home plot. Only after a few years of expanding the new plot do they move as a family unit—when the new plot is yielding sufficient food to maintain the family. This is related to the labour demands of annual crops which can be satisfied initially with a few separate seasonal periods of intensive work. Permanent Kibanja plots of intensive bananas, beans, and possibly coffee, have a much more even and intensive labour demand through the year so that in effect the whole family labour force must move to the new area from the start. This means that there is a greater tendency for agricultural expansion with permanent crops to follow existing infrastructure: in contrast to expansion via annual crops whereby infrastructure often follows the expansion especially where the latter includes a rapidly rising production of a cash crop.

If we look at map 2 again and note the relationship between rainfall and population density, we see that the densest population in Karagwe District is in the higher rainfall areas and that population densities in the central lowlands are related to distance from the traditional areas of settlement on the littoral. Rainfall and infrastructure are the dominant influences over this pattern. Schools and trading centres in Karagwe are also concentrated in the area of highest rainfall—the central ridge—where the administrative headquarters and missions were established. In Bukoba District most of these infrastructural facilities are in the traditional settlement area—so expansion of settlement in the central lowlands has followed a peripheral pattern—remaining as close as possible to the existing settlements and facilities.

Between 1957 and 1967 the population of Karagwe District grew at 4.3% p.a., a high rate. But it was a high rate from a relatively low starting point, and over and above the national growth rate of that period probably represented an influx of about 15,000 people, compared with an absolute population increase in the same period of 75,000 people in Bukoba District, where, as we have shown, the growth rate was only 1.6% p.a.

Compared with the land availability, this represents a fairly small migration, if the population density in the littoral of Bukoba was becoming critical. The main problem is that land availability in these other parts of the region is qualitative rather than quantitative.

Outside the main areas of settlement in Karagwe the rainfall is lower in quantity and less evenly distributed through the year.

So extensive settlement of larger areas of “available” land could only have been made under a changing pattern of development. Settlement of the lower rainfall areas could only have been made with a shifting emphasis for the main food crop from permanent bananas to annual crops—maize and sorghum.
These larger areas were also poorly provided with infrastructure. The only roads passing through them were major trunk roads that linked Bukoba with other regions. There were almost no feeder roads. The land was largely underdeveloped and infested with tse-tse flies. The only economic development of this land that had occurred were the cattle ranches of Kitengule and Missenye, and the sugar estates along the Kagera river.

(d) Resettlement—the case for intervention

Intervention, in the form of development policies had the option of easing the constraints that inhibited traditional settlement patterns from resolving the critical population pressure in the littoral of Bukoba District. It has been hypothesized that the main constraints to extensive settling of the emptier areas of the Region were a weakness of infrastructure, and the requirements for a shift in agricultural subsistence production from wholly bananas to a mixture of bananas and annual grain crops.

The problem of infrastructure could be solved by a public works programme, or by official encouragement and support of “self-help” (Kujitegemea) schemes carried out by settlers moving into a new area. The latter would be less expensive, in terms of capital cost, and would generate temporary employment, as long as government development agencies gave it support. Financial support would not be enough—planning support would also be necessary to ensure that the creation of new infrastructure was co-ordinated.

Diversification of the basic food crops would also demand government support in order to prove that new crops were a viable alternative to the old ones. Agronomic investigations and advice would be required to ensure that the new crops gave a positive yield that was comparable in rewards to labour-inputs with the traditional cultivation of bananas and beans. The administrator would be responsible for introducing the right varieties, and for ensuring the availability of the necessary inputs—seed, fertilizer, insecticide—where relevant. But further, right from the start, the administration would also have to make provisions in the existing marketing channels to handle surpluses and introduce cash-earning possibilities to the new settlements. Taste preferences for the traditional foods would be difficult to overcome unless it could be proved that the new production situation had positive advantages in food yields/labour input and cash income possibilities.

(e) Resettlement — the course of intervention

Pre-ujamaa intervention in re-settlement began in 1968 with the “Makazi Mapya”—new settlements. In chapter 5 we describe how the mobilization of settlers for these villages, which were directly inherited by the subsequent ujamaa village programme, was contributory to the slow development of ujamaa villagization.

We hypothesize that if the policy of ujamaa development in West Lake Region had orientated itself towards a re-settlement policy in a seriously planned way, then
the development of ujamaa might have had an opportunity to transform the rural economy by tackling one of the basic crises of the time, and thereby might have been successful. But as we see in chapter 5, the post-1969 ujamaa village policy of the region was limited to the legacy of the handful of "Makazi-Mapya"–and an attempt to create ujamaa villages out of them. What were these "Makazi-Mapya", and what was their locational context in the Region? Basically they were 15 settlements whose location had been decided as arbitrarily as one could imagine–by pointing out blank spaces on the map within the periphery of the closely settled areas of the Region. They were not part of any coherent plan to settle the larger empty areas of the Region. They were not initially provided with any infrastructural facilities other than a road which was at least necessary for the administration's lorries to carry in the first batches of forced settlers. The settlers were left to their own devices to try and reproduce their traditional agricultural patterns. (For a good description of the early history of one such new settlement, see the first part of Rald, "Ujamaa").

After the Presidential Circular of 1969, it was the responsibility of the regional authorities to seek to "transform the countryside" with the establishment of ujamaa villages. In fact, the Regional Government of West Lake conceptualized the implementation of the ujamaa policy with direct relation to resettlement programmes. But they mostly limited their approach to an "ujamaa-ization" of the existing Makazi Mapya. From the Presidential Circular it was made clear that all national resources of development funds and advisory personnel would have a priority availability for ujamaa programmes.

But instead of taking another look at the implications of the settlement policy, the suitability of the Makazi-Mapya, and the potential of more coherent policy for using these resources for ujamaa villages–the regional authorities accepted existing settlements and devoted most development resources to them. They used almost all the available resources in trying to create ujamaa villages from these settlements–whether they showed any promise or not–and the resulting experience is described below in Part II.

The Presidential Circular had also directed that state farms–parastatally controlled plantations and ranches–would receive equal priority in the future development of the nation. By that time there was one such enterprise in full operation–Kitengule ranch–and another under development, in the undeveloped areas of the central lowlands, that could have been considered suitable for expansion of settlement. But although there was a hypothetical conflict here, in terms of alternative land development policies, it was never conceptualized by the regional planning authorities.

Although nominally both were controlled by the Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of Lands and Settlement, there was hardly any co-operation between the bodies responsible for the state farms (the parastatals) and those responsible for agricultural extension and land settlement (the functional divisions of the ministries). Although both of them were nominally committed to the policy of
advancing socialism the one sought to implement this by running productive and profitable enterprises for the state, whilst the implementary approach of the other was more aligned to improving the condition of people on the land. The parastatals did not only use public funds, but contributed directly to public income whilst the regional offices of the ministries used public funds for the ujamaa programme, whose returns could only be measured in terms of welfare.

Therefore, when the regional authorities were approached by a parastatal (NACO) to approve expansion of state ranches in the region, they were not only respecting national policy towards state-farms when they consented but they were also approving a reduction in the land area over which they had direct developmental responsibilities. The state ranches were profitable, and contributed to the export earnings of the Nation. However, they had little other direct economic advantage to the Region—in relation to their size they employed very few people and they showed no other regional multiplier effects. Their stock was imported from another Region and they did not create any secondary processing industries, as all their production was exported “on the hoof” to Uganda.

Nevertheless ranch development went ahead on one quarter of the land area of the central lowlands. At a later stage (1971), the potential of these areas for ujamaa settlements was realised, and an ambitious scheme for ujamaa ranches was proposed for about 2/3 of the remaining areas. It was proposed to establish approximately 10 villages in an area of 200,000 ha. and equip them for village ranching schemes. In terms of relative land settlement capacity, a ranching scheme would have been nowhere near as successful as an agricultural scheme. But at least the proposal did consider the settling of land-less families in a coherent way on undeveloped land and it did incorporate the essential criteria of infrastructural development and alternative land-use patterns.

Eventually, the proposed project came to nothing. None of it had been implemented by the time the ujamaa policy of Tanzania was superseded by the villagization programme (see the postscript), and development of most of these areas seems to have reverted to the parastatal ranching schemes.

To summarize the course of intervention in resettlement, it can be said that no effective resettlement programme has so far been implemented in the region—despite the apparent need. Effectively the only attention given to the problem was the intensive government support of the scattered ujamaa villages between 1969 and 1972–73: a programme which never demonstrated any successful expansion. This programme is described in Part II.

Why do we attach so much importance to the potential for ujamaa that existed in relation to potential resettlement programmes? Because firstly, the aim of ujamaa village development was the establishment of village communities with a transformed political and economic organization. This was obviously very difficult to implement in the existing traditional villages without a revolutionary situation, that would have required a non-existent total commitment of the population. Within the areas of traditional settlement there were no vacant land resources for
alternative political and economic communities to be established. Secondly, the implementation policy of ujamaa was directed to be "gradual" and government supported. Therefore the easiest way to implement ujamaa villagization in this context would have been to help the classes of society with the lowest levels of land control, income and employment to start new agricultural settlements in undeveloped areas. The greatest latitude for gradual development of agricultural communities founded and managed on socialist principles, to grow as attractive and viable alternatives to the overcrowded, economically stagnant traditional communities would have been in new areas. The kind of support that the government was best equipped to give—agricultural extension, infrastructural planning, and political guidance was very suitable for this.

But why was this never conceptualised? In the rest of this book we go on to relate the implementation of the ujamaa policy to the villages which started life as "Makazi Mapya", and to the diversification of agriculture within the traditional areas. One of our conclusions as to the eventual fate of the policy is that the gap between ideology and implementary guidelines was too wide for the bureaucracy to handle.

Even the few villages that the bureaucracy administered and aided on a massive scale showed few changes of succeeding as the ujamaa villages of the presidential ideology. If this was so, then it is difficult to imagine that the bureaucracy could have conceptualized ujamaa as a policy they could have implemented on a broader part to effect real transformation of rural development on a regional scale. The only "massive" resettlement scheme that was proposed (the Mwisa scheme) and never implemented, received its implementary guidelines originally from the parastatal, NACO. This was not because they understood better how ujamaa should have been implemented on a large scale, it was because they were seeking external finance to pursue their ranch-development plans and they were aware that if their proposal was framed in the contemporary political colours—they had a better chance of succeeding in their application.

**Agricultural diversification policies**

(a) *The background*

In the previous chapter we referred to the fact that coffee was still the major cash crop of the Region and that its production came from the heavily populated areas of traditional settlement. Coffee production had not increased in volume much since 1935, although the demand for cash incomes in agriculture was potentially much greater. The lack of cash-earning potential in agriculture was turning many households to seek work in the non-agricultural sector, but the employment capacity of this sector was also low. Obviously development objectives had to consider all possibilities for diversifying cash-agriculture in the Region, These
possibilities had to be considered both with reference to the traditional agricultural areas, and to the areas that may have been opened for new settlement.

Resettlement policies did not only have the potential for widening the basis and capacity of subsistence agricultural production in the Region. There was also a market in the region, not very large, for just the kinds of crops that could have been produced for subsistence in the re-settled areas. The non-agricultural and semi-urban sector (small as it was) was a market for grain products which resulted in annual regional imports of grain of nearly 4,000 tons of wheat, maize and rice. However, diversification programmes into these crops would have been dependent upon a viable re-settlement programme. We have now seen that no such programme has yet gained any momentum in the Region.

The other area where crop diversification could be considered was in the heavily populated areas. We have already seen that the dominant land-use pattern in these areas was large areas of permanent banana/bean cultivation interplanted in places with coffee, separated by areas of infertile grassland, swamps and steep hillsides. In effect, land resources in these areas for the growing of new crops was limited to the grasslands. Although the grassland was infertile in relation to most crops (requiring long periods of fallow between cultivation periods) its particular acidity level made it suitable for tea cultivation.

Tea production, as a diversification of the coffee based economy had been instituted in 1963. It developed from the start as a small-holder scheme, and this development is traced later in chapter 6. Within areas of suitable soil and rainfall—all in the lake littoral zone of Bukoba District—there are possibly between 3–4,000 ha. that could be planted with tea.”

(b) Diversification—the case for intervention
Whereas, in a re-settlement programme, intervention could have been necessary to promote any development, diversification was already taking place on the initiative of the growers themselves by the adoption of tea as a new cash crop. Intervention was not primarily needed to encourage the expansion of tea cultivation. It was decided to introduce ujamaa into the tea expansion programme, when it had already been decided to expand tea production into other geographical areas, but tea would have been planted in these areas, with or without ujamaa.

With ujamaa defined as a policy of socialist transformation, one would expect that ujamaa intervention would try and influence which rural classes were to have access to the new source of agricultural income. Up until 1969 tea had been adopted by 862 households in Bukoba district. The first table in chapter 6 shows to which rural class some of these tea-growers belonged.

Although some of the households with the largest landholdings and agricultural incomes had adopted tea, the majority of tea-growers probably belonged to a median class. That is, they were neither land-less nor exclusively the wealthiest, in terms of land. Their average coffee incomes were somewhat lower than the general
average, and their subsistence plots were of median size. About one in five had a non-agricultural source of income. There was no evidence that the unemployed and/or relatively land-less households were adopting tea as a new source of income. Hypothetically, there was a case for an ujamaa programme to concentrate assistance on the lowest strata in becoming tea-growers.

In practice, however, this would have been virtually impossible—as there was no way of identifying such groups.

The only feasible remaining case for intervention lay along the lines of the administration’s interpretation of ujamaa, simply as communalism. Although ujamaa ideology saw communalism as only a step on the road to socialist transformation the administration saw communalism as an end in itself. And this was the course that intervention followed.

(c) Diversification, the course of intervention
The full account of the ujamaa tea schemes can be found in chapter 6. In short, what happened was that the administration left the individual, established, tea-growers alone, and declared that two new areas of expansion, to the south, should be developed exclusively by ujamaa groups. Access to tea planting material, advisory services and credit was limited to registered ujamaa groups.

It was open to any group of households to register themselves in this way, and as we show in chapter 6 the members of some of these groups turned out to be so occupied already with diversified household economies that they employed hired labour on their ujamaa plots. Ujamaa groups were as representative of the wealthier classes as of the poorer classes. Because, from the start, there had been no conception of using intervention in this way to introduce some social levelling, it could not have occurred spontaneously.

The only aim of the ujamaa tea scheme was to introduce communalism into the traditional economy. But it is also difficult to say whether this was achieved. By communalism one would expect that through a thoroughly democratic management, the enterprise would be shared equally by all members in terms of labour input and of physical output. But after a short time, in most groups, with differing levels of economic commitment, there were big differences in the rate of labour participation by members. This led to an eventual breakdown in communalism. The harder-working members of groups insisted on, and implemented, the division of communal plots into individual plots, to ensure that their eventual returns would be commensurate with their own labour input. Communalism first disappeared from labour organization, and as a consequence thereafter, from land ownership and share of production. The only communal relationship that remained was in access to institutional credit and advice.
Notes

3. Kibanja is the Haya tribal name for this banana plantation area where continuity of cultivation has changed the original structure of the soil. Now regarded as a land-use type.
6. The term "regional" applies to the administrative Region of West Lake Region, less the District of Biharamulo.
12. The Mvisa schemes.
Part II
Ujamaa Villages
in West Lake Region
The Problems of Social and Economic
Viability, Transformation, and Participation
Chapter 4

“Successful” ujamaa villages
in a peasant society under pressure

Ngara District is the most isolated and the poorest part of West Lake Region. But it is also supposed to have the most successful ujamaa villages.

This claim is based on the fact that although they were all new settlements, the Ngara ujamaa villages have had a relatively stable population, there were few major conflicts around their establishment, and by 1973/74 the members, who achieved self-sufficiency in food production at a rather early stage, enjoyed more or less the same standard of living as their neighbours—and relatives—in the surrounding traditional villages. So they did seem to be socially and economically viable.

Still, social and economic viability does not alone constitute a successful ujamaa village, and it is not at all equally clear whether the ujamaa villages in Ngara had also embarked on the transformation of economic patterns or establishment of participatory democratic decision-making. Policies which resulted in the viability of the new settlements may not have had the same positive effect in relation to the two other aspects; and local condition which facilitated a positive response to the resettlement policy may not in the same way have promoted economic transformation and democratization.

To answer these questions we will compare Ngara’s “successful” ujamaa villages with other villages in the District, and relate their development to the overall development trends in the area.

Ngara District and its traditional villages

Any recent development in Ngara has been conditioned by the major demographic features of the District. Although the two former kingdoms, Bugufi in the north, and Bushubi in the south, which constitute the District were only established a few hundred years ago by immigrants from Rwanda and Burundi, an immigration which continues, emigration from Ngara, especially to Uganda, is also important and is now so large that the population has been of constant size for the last twenty years. The resulting social instability as well as the distorted male/female ratio which is the lowest in Tanzania, has serious effects on agricultural production, and this again leads to further emigration.
This emigration is not caused by absolute overpopulation, but to some extent by relative land scarcity related to the very uneven distribution of the population with high densities on the Bugufi ridge and in the valleys along it and scattered small villages separated by bushland in the rest of the District. There has been a greater tendency to emigrate from this District than to expand settlements within the District and this is partly attributable to the history of the District, which was a colonial labour reserve area.

Regarded throughout the colonial period as a distant and isolated labour reserve, the District economy is completely dominated by subsistence peasant agriculture—in terms of employment and production, but not with regard to cash incomes which are concentrated in the small administration and service sectors.

The agricultural system based on small permanent farms centred around the perennial banana plantations supplemented by annual crops like beans, sorghum, cassava, maize, etc. was only established in Ngara District in this century, and many people still regard the annual crops, beans and sorghum as more important than bananas.

Several export crops have been introduced, but only the earliest one, coffee, has been maintained as an export crop, while others, such as tobacco and sisal, are now produced only in small quantities for the local markets. The very small coffee production compared to that of Bukoba and Karagwe Districts shows that even this crop has never really caught on in Ngara.

Such, in short, is the background for this description of “successful” ujamaa development. To lend more descriptive reality to the report, it will refer especially to seven actual villages, selected to be as far as possible representative of different locations and different types of villages within the setting.

They are in Bugufi:

Murgwanza and Mabawe which are old traditional villages located at each end of the densely populated Bugufi ridge, where there is hardly any uncultivated land in or between the villages. Both are fairly well served with social and physical infrastructure—schools, health services, transport, etc.

Mukumba village is situated below Murgwanza in one of the valleys leading from the ridge to the Kagera River. This large area between the ridge and the river was inhabited later than the ridge itself, but as Mukumba is right below the steep middle-slope of the ridge it is not a completely new village, and most of the inhabitants were born there. However, the area is not as densely populated as the ridge itself, and at least until recently it has been possible for newcomers to find uninhabited land there. The nearest services are all in Murgwanza, one hour’s walk up the hill.

And finally Ntobeye Ujamaa Village, which was established in 1968 in a large almost uninhabited area near the Kagera north of Mukumba and Murgwanza. In 1970 there were about 150 families in the ujamaa village of which less than 10 lived there before 1968. As a rather special feature Ntobeye did not however consist only of the new settlement. Between the new settlement and the lower part of the ridge
there were a number of recently established, small traditional villages, together known as Old Ntobeye, which in 1970 were incorporated in the ujamaa village.

There is plenty of uncultivated land in and around the village. From Ngara town there is a new 20 km bushroad to the settlement, but the walking distance is much shorter, taking about two hours up or one hour down the ridge. There is a primary school, a small dispensary, cooperative shop and bar and a weekly market in the ujamaa village.

In Bushubi Division the three villages were:

*Mbuba* and *Mukibogeka* which were old traditional villages, and like most traditional villages in Bushubi fairly small with about 50 households or 250 people each. Between them and the neighbouring villages there are rivers and swamps or uninhabited scrubby hills. Even within the villages there is uncultivated land. Mbuba has a church, primary school, dispensary and a weekly market. Mukibogeka has no services of its own. For both, the nearest trading centre is 8–10 km away.

*Nyabihanga Ujamaa Village* was started as a new settlement in 1968 on two of the many uninhabited hillsides in the Division. It is only a couple of kilometres from a small trading and service centre with which it is connected with a new bush-road.

As usual in Ngara District these villages were all located on hillsides which do not slope too steeply.1 On such a hillside the whole area between the summit and the swampy valley-bottom may be covered with small farms, each centred around a house or a cluster of houses where the owner, his wife/wives, children, other family members, and livestock (mostly goats) lived. Around the house was the banana shamba and on land outside but adjacent to the bananas were the annual crops. Some people had more than one farm like this, sometimes within the same village, but more often in different villages, and they usually had a wife and her children living on each farm. In the densely populated areas it was not unusual besides the regular farm or farms to have some land for annual crops in a less populated area which was not too far away. (See map 5.)

As shown in Table 4.1 the average landholding and the way it was used in our five traditional villages was remarkably uniform, especially when differences in soil fertility are taken into account.

All peasants grow bananas, and except for a few old people they were continuously expanding their banana shamba. The two major varieties, the cooking banana and the beer banana are the basis of the daily diet and the large quantities of local beer consumed in the villages.

Coffee was grown by nearly 2/3 of the peasants in Bugufi, but only by 1/7 in Bushubi where small plots of tobacco replaced coffee as the most important cash crop. The coffee plots were very small and poorly maintained, so about half the coffee growers claimed that they had no income at all from coffee in 1970–71.

Among the annual crops beans and sorghum (a red brewing variety) were by far the most important as they were not only grown by almost all households, but also occupy the larger part of the area of annual crops (Table 4.2).

All members of the household took part in the agricultural work. Although in
principle there is a certain division of labour between men and women it was quite normal to see man and wife working together in the fields. Only domestic work was strictly the domain of the women.

Some households would occasionally use hired labour for the harder farm work like bush clearing, cultivation, and digging holes for planting bananas. Most of these labourers came from Burundi to find temporary employment in Ngara at a payment of little more than one shilling a day. Some of the poorest peasants in Ngara also earned a little money in this way.

More than 2/3 of the households had livestock, in Bugufi mostly goats, while in Bushubi where grazing areas close to the villages are more extensive about 1/3 also had cattle.

The farm-family cycle under pressure

The farm-family cycle, as described above in Chapter 2, is a basic feature of the peasant economy. It is through the cyclical development of expansion and contraction that the family ensures its own social and material maintenance and continued existence over generations.

In Ngara the specific features of the farm-family cycle and its crises have had important consequences for the development of the new ujamaa settlements.

Ideally, when a young man became old enough to get married, his father would supply the dowry and land on which to establish a farm, including enough bananas to feed the son and his new wife. The main work done in the banana shamba is planting, so every year he will expand it and as the family grows, they will also be able to increase the area grown with annual crops.

After some years they might be producing a surplus, and he could then marry a second wife. If he had land enough she would be living and working on the same farm as the first wife, if not he could ask a relative or the authorities, formerly the chiefs, but now the Ward Development Committee, to be given uncultivated land in the same or a neighbouring village to establish a second farm.

When the farm or farms had again been expanded to give a surplus, the time had come when he had to start supplying maturing sons with dowry and land. In spite of continued expansion work, the farm would now be diminishing as would the family it had to feed, until in the end it was just big enough for the old man, his wife(s) and the youngest son, who with his family would stay on with the parents. He gradually took over the farming, had to support the parents in their old age, and inherited the remaining farm when they died.

This is of course an ideal, which in many cases was not fulfilled. In modern times two factors had especially contributed to the frequent non-fulfillment of the ideal.

For at least 20 years there has been population pressure in the densely populated areas around the Bugufi ridge, and in or between the villages there is hardly any
unused cultivable land left. Of the 23% of the sample households in "traditional" villages in Bugufi, who stated they were given a major part of their land by the administration (i.e., unused land) (Table 4.3), only one lived in Mukididili, and those in Mabawe all got the land before the second world war. Even in Mukumba, below the ridge, all who were given land by authorities came before or around 1950. With the heavy population pressure the possibilities for expanding the farms had become limited.

At the same time the establishment of a cash economy and of monetary demand for certain goods as "necessities" means that it is no longer sufficient to produce purely for the consumption of the family, and that it is necessary to earn a cash surplus. Thus a new demand on any surplus production is created in competition with the wish to use it to expand one's own family or to support maturing sons.

As a result it became normal, that only the youngest son who took over when the father died, and perhaps the oldest son, inherited any significant amount of land in the home village. Other sons got nothing or only a few banana trees in the shamba, the rest of which would belong to their young brother. To establish a farm and a family these young men then had to move away from their village, usually to an isolated place in the bush, which was the only area where they could get land. There they had to start the hard work of clearing bush, cultivating virgin land and building a house without any initial support from an already established shamba, with little access to social services etc. and with the crops continuously threatened by attacks from wild animals, such as wild pigs and monkeys.

While the subsistence needs at this stage in the family cycle were relatively small, some of the major demands for cash fell in this establishment phase. In the first few years he usually had to pay instalments on the dowry which nowadays can total 300–1000 shs. Housebuilding and household goods cost money. Soon school-fees and other costs in connection with the children were added.

To obtain the cash needed in this period, many young men went to Uganda for 6–8 months at a time to find seasonal work on the cotton and coffee farms there. With only the wife and children left behind to look after the farm, much work had to be done when the man returned just to get the farm back to where he left it, and not much time was left for expansion. Even if he decided to stay, and instead earned the smaller wage of a farm-labourer in Ngara itself, it would retard the expansion of his own farm. An example of such a village is Old Ntobeye where, although there were a few comparatively big landholdings, the average farm and the areas under the different types of use were smaller than the average in the three older traditional villages in Bugufi (Table 4.1).

The only alternative for the majority of young, uneducated men was to migrate for ever. Many chose this alternative, perhaps after some years as migrant seasonal labourers, and settled either as permanent labourers or got small farms of their own, usually in Uganda, but sometimes also in Karagwe or outer Bukoba on the way between Ngara and Uganda.

In Bushubi there was no problem of relative land scarcity as in Bugufi, but with
fewer local cash income sources the interference of the cash-economy into the traditional farm-family cycle was more marked, and seasonal migration to Uganda (and also to cotton-farms in Geita District) was widespread, whereas permanent migration seemed a little less common than from Bugufi.

**Village economy and socio-economic stratification**

The basis of the agricultural system and the ideal farm-family cycle just described is that production is first and foremost meant for home-consumption and that it has to satisfy the basic needs for adequate food for the families living and working on the farms.

But in spite of the importance of this "subsistence sector" it would be entirely wrong to describe the Ngara village economy as a subsistence economy—or even as mainly a subsistence economy.

First of all there was hardly a family which was not already deeply involved in the monetary sector to obtain a variety of essential goods, and to earn the money needed to buy them. Secondly, nearly all expectations and hopes for improvement of one's material and social situation were directed towards the monetary sector and the goods, services, security, and status obtainable only with money.

Even basic social institutions like marriage and beerdrinking have been monetarized. A normal dowry now includes a rather large sum of money, and beer parties are no longer part of a network of mutual obligations between friends and relatives helping each other with farm work etc. but are now rather a semi-public thing, where almost everybody can go to the home of a man who has brewed beer and buy and drink it at 50 cents a bottle.

The serious implications for the traditional farm-family cycle of the ever increasing importance of the flows of hard cash have already been discussed in the preceding paragraph. In the following we shall also see that the patterns of social differentiation have been strongly influenced by the cash economy.

Sample based estimates of household income and expenditure over a whole year are not very reliable. This is also the case with the information obtained in our Ngara villages, as it can be seen from the discrepancy between mean income and mean expenditure (Tables 4.5 and 4.6). It is however, the only data available, and without taking the absolute figures too seriously they may still give a certain picture of the general situation when we surveyed and allow comparisons in relative terms between groups and categories within the material. (For two of the villages in Bushubi the information was however deemed to be so "wild" that they have been left out of consideration here).

The figures first of all indicate the very low level of the cash sector in Ngara, and especially of cash incomes from agriculture, which was 109 shs on average in Bugufi traditional villages and 86 shs in Mpuba in Bushubi. The two major sources
of income were, characteristically enough, not the recognized cash crops, but non-agricultural employment and sale of local banana beer, "pombe".

On the expenditure side by far the largest part was paid out of the villages, for manufactured goods like kerosene, matches, salt, sugar, clothes etc. or for services such as education and hospital treatment.

Incomes and expenditures are important indicators of the existing pattern of social differentiation, which shows a general correlation between ownership of the main means of production, i.e. cultivated land, and all other indicators of material and social welfare. But it is also clear that a different stratification was being created between a small group of non-agricultural income earners and the majority of pure peasants.

In Ngara cultivated land as means of production can be of three categories: banana shamba and coffee shamba which are both regarded as more valuable—and are more productive when they are fully established—and land cultivated with annual crops. Uncleared bushland is only a potential means of production.

In order to study the distribution of land and its implications the sample households have been divided into three groups: Small peasants, Medium peasants and Big peasants, according to their ownership of the different categories of land.¹

An analysis of the differences between these three groups reveals a certain socio-economic stratification among the peasants in the traditional villages in Ngara. In both Bugufi and Bushubi about 25% of the peasants are, according to our criteria, regarded as Big, 30% and 15% are Medium and 45% and 60% are Small peasants in Bugufi and Bushubi respectively.

Table 4.1 shows that not only do the Big peasants own more land, they also have a larger proportion of it planted with bananas and coffee, than do the smaller peasants. More of them grow coffee and they generally have a larger variety of annual crops (Table 4.2).

Most people in all three groups acquired their land by inheritance, but among those who got land otherwise, the Big peasants have usually bought while the Small were allocated land by the authorities (Table 4.3). Bought land is of course better developed, better located or more fertile than the hitherto unused land allocated by the authorities.

Besides land the only other important means of production in Ngara villages is livestock. According to the information from the sample households ownership of livestock was closely correlated with ownership of land, the bigger landowners also having more livestock (Table 4.4).

The number of wives and the size of the family have several meanings in Ngara village society. On the one hand it is an indicator of the labour resources readily available for the household, and as such the money for dowry and other expenses in connection with expansion of the family can be regarded as an investment. A large family is on the other hand also regarded as a value in itself, increasing the welfare and social status of the head of household and the family as a whole. Again
our sample shows that the bigger landowners more often than the smaller were able to get two, three or more wives and to establish large families, thus obtaining the economic benefits, social status, and welfare accruing from these (Tables 4.7 and 4.8).

With regard to income and expenditure statistics we again have to confine ourselves mainly to Bugufi Division (Tables 4.5 and 4.6).

The mean incomes from agricultural products range from 55 shs. for Small peasants to 190 shs. for the Big peasants, who also have more varied sources of income, having earned a smaller proportion from "pombe" and larger parts from coffee, bananas and other crops than the Small and Medium peasants. The differences with regard to incomes from non-agricultural sources were however even bigger, so that the Small peasants got more than 4/5 of their income from sales of agricultural products, while this provided less than 1/2 of the mean income of Big peasants.

Also in Mbuba the high mean incomes from sources other than agricultural sales, comprising almost 60% of the mean total income for all households, derived mainly from a few of the bigger peasants having very high incomes of this kind.

All these statistics clearly indicate the existence of a social differentiation in traditional villages in Ngara district, where those who own more of the means of production, land and cattle, are also generally better off with regard to all other indicators of social and material welfare. However that should not be taken as a proof of the existence of a class-structure along the same lines, based on ownership of land and cattle. The presence of a statistical social differentiation in a society does not necessarily mean that the people in the different categories belong to structurally opposed classes.

The class-structure, which influences the development of a society, is based on definite, qualitative differences between the classes with regard to the system of control or ownership of the means of production, utilization of labour and the distribution of the surplus production. In the agricultural sector in Ngara District such a system of qualitative differences could not really be said to exist between what we have called Small and Big peasants.

Although there were, as described, differences in the amount of land owned, the system is based on every household owning land, and mainly depending on their own labour to produce on the farm, what they need to cover their own food consumption and a small surplus to sell for cash for other necessities. There was no landless class, just as there was no class of landlords basing their agricultural enterprises on the profits of combining landholdings and other means of production with hired labour.

The small group of agricultural labourers that did exist in Ngara, were usually not living there, but came temporarily from Burundi, and for those who hired them, even among the big farmers, the labourers were normally only a small supplement to the dominant household labour force.

Above, the figures in the tables were interpreted to show that for all social and
economic indicators there were a larger proportion of Big peasants than of Medium and Small peasants, who were above the mean values for those indicators, but the tables may also be read the other way around, to show, that even among the Big peasants there were still a majority who were not significantly better off than the majority of Small and Medium peasants.

For example in Bugufi, 63 % of the Big peasants have no formal education, 65 % have only one wife, 70 % own 10 or less livestock units, 82 % have incomes of less than 500 shs. a year and almost half have less than 200 shs. Nearly half of the Big peasants did not use hired labour, and those who did, used an average of less than 40 shs. a year on this, meaning about one man-month of hired labour each. There were also no major differences between the majorities in the groups of peasants with regard to land-use pattern and agricultural methods, and as a result the average income from agricultural products was less than 200 shs. a year even among the Big peasants.

The age distribution of heads of households in the strata (Table 4.9) moreover indicates that much of the difference that existed was related to the earlier discussed farm-family cycle rather than to a definite class-structure.

As most peasants start with rather small farms, the younger people are underrepresented among the Big and in Bushubi also among the Medium peasants.

The rather small number of young people in the Bugufi villages reflects the scarcity of land and the resulting crises of the farm-family cycle there. As it is mainly the young would-be Small peasants who emigrate, the young people are not as strongly represented in this group as should have been expected. Old people on the other hand are overrepresented as many Medium peasants reduce their land holding while fulfilling their obligations towards the end of their family cycle.

The abundance of unused land around the villages in Bushubi renders the picture there different, with a large proportion of young Small peasants and a very small group of old people among the Small peasants which reflects the possibility of helping sons to start on new land, without diminishing the fathers shamba significantly.

This analysis would tend to show the Ngara villagers, not as completely equal, but with regard to major socio-economic features as a structurally homogenous mass of peasants.

In the case-studies of villagers in Murgwanza and Mbuba there were however a few individuals who did not fit into this picture of the Ngara peasant. These are people with substantially higher incomes and expenditures than the ordinary peasants, and who derived these high incomes from activities outside agriculture, that is mainly from government employment or business. They included the Ward Executive Officer, the teacher, the "duka"-owner, who was also an official in the cooperative, and the cattle trader, who was a former government and later a TANU official. With annual cash incomes of say 5000 shs. or above their economic situation and behaviour was qualitatively different from that of other villagers, and although they lived in the village and were part of its social structure, a major part
of their social connections were outside the immediate village community.

In the villages where they lived, they had farms like everybody else. They were often among the bigger landowners in the village and they did use more hired labour than was generally the case, but it is more important to note that as a rule they did not seem to differ qualitatively from other peasants with regard to their land-use and agricultural techniques, capital or labour-inputs, labour organization and the outputs obtained from the farm.

This has two major implications. First, that the difference between this small group and the mass of peasants is not a sign of a class-structure embedded in the agriculture-dominated economic structure of the villages themselves. The few relatively rich people derived their positions from outside agriculture, and should probably be seen rather as the grass-root representatives, or the last fringes, of essentially urban based industrialists, businessmen and bureaucrats operating on top of peasant agriculture.

So any class differentiation would seem to be one not between small peasants, or landless workers and big farmers or "kulaks", or landlords, but between the peasants on one side, and the bureaucratic, industrial and business sectors on the other.

The second major implication, with more directly observable effects, is that people in Ngara (for whom this high income-group is the ideal—and often their leaders) had not experienced, and therefore did not regard, agriculture as a possible means for any considerable social and economic advancement—or development.

To get an income the villagers would look for employment outside the District, and those who had an income used it for consumer goods, or invested it outside agriculture in business or in education for their children. The few who did invest part of their high incomes from non-agricultural sources in their farms did it primarily to increase the capacity for the land of fulfilling its traditional role as a supplier of basic food-stuffs and security for the family, and not in order to change its output qualitatively to become a basis for "self-sustained growth" or further improvement.
Table 4.1. Land-use of Sample Households in Ngara June 1970–June 1971, by Location and Social Stratification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean sizes</th>
<th>Bannanas</th>
<th>Coffee</th>
<th>Other crops</th>
<th>Total cultivated</th>
<th>Uncultivated</th>
<th>Total land</th>
<th>Households with</th>
<th>Coffee</th>
<th>Land in other village</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ha</td>
<td>ha</td>
<td>ha</td>
<td>ha</td>
<td>ha</td>
<td>ha</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukididiili</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mabawe</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukumba</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbuba</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukobegeka</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bugusi total</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushubi total</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bugusi:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small peasants</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium peasants</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big peasants</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushubi:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small peasants</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium peasants</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big peasants</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ntobeye Ujamaa Village:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Ntobeye</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New settlement</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>10</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(land outside*)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small peasants</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium peasants</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big peasants</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyabihanga Ujamaa Village:</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(land outside*)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small peasants</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium peasants</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big peasants</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Mean ha of land outside the new settlement, for those settlers who have such land. All other figures are the sum of the land owned by the farmers wherever it is located.
Table 4.2. Annual Crops grown by Sample Households 1970/71 by Location and Social Stratification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional Villages</th>
<th>Beans</th>
<th>Sorg. hum</th>
<th>Maize</th>
<th>Millet</th>
<th>Roots</th>
<th>Groundnuts</th>
<th>Tobacco N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bugufi Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small p.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium p.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big p.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushubi Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small p.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium p.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big p.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upamaa Villages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ntobeye</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyabihanga</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3. Means of Acquiring Land by Location and Social Stratification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inherited 80%-100% of their Land</th>
<th>Bought 80-100% of their Land</th>
<th>Given 60-100% by Adm.</th>
<th>Inherited 40-80% bought</th>
<th>Former Tenants</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Villages</td>
<td>% of households</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bugufi Total</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small p.</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium p.</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big p.</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushubi total</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small p.</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium p.</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big p.</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

58
Table 4.4. *Livestock Ownership by Location and Social Stratification*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of households owning L. U.</th>
<th>1-10</th>
<th>11-20</th>
<th>21+</th>
<th>Mean L.U.:</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% of households owning cows:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-10</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21+</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushuki Total</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small p.</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium p.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big p.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ujamaa Villages</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ntobeye</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyabihanga</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Units: 1 goat = 1 sheep = 1/10 cow = 1 Livestock Unit (L. U.)
Table 4.5. Household Incomes by Source of Income, Location and Social Stratification 1970/71

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Bugusi Traditional Villages</th>
<th>Mbuba</th>
<th>Ntobeye Trad. Village</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incomes from agricultural products</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of households having:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0–100 shs,</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110 shs. +</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Income</td>
<td>109/-</td>
<td>55/-</td>
<td>128/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% from sales of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bananas</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other crops</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Pombe&quot;</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incomes from animal products</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of households having any</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean for all households</td>
<td>9/-</td>
<td>2/-</td>
<td>6/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incomes from Other Sources</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of households having any</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean for all households</td>
<td>82/-</td>
<td>10/-</td>
<td>99/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Incomes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of households having 0–200 shs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210–500 shs.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>510 shs. +</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>200/-</td>
<td>67/-</td>
<td>235/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-respondents</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.6. Household Expenditures by Type of Expenditure, Location and Social Stratification, 1970/71.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bugufi Traditional villages</th>
<th>Mbuba Trad. Village</th>
<th>Ntobeye Ujamaa v.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic expenditures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of households using:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0–300 shs.</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310–500 shs.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>510 shs. +</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>304/-</td>
<td>155/-</td>
<td>285/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% used for</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food crops</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal prod</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pomebe</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm expenditures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of households using:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hired labour</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean exp. all</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>households</td>
<td>10/-</td>
<td>3/-</td>
<td>11/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, mean all</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>households</td>
<td>9/-</td>
<td>6/-</td>
<td>9/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>323/-</td>
<td>164/-</td>
<td>305/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-respondents</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.7. Number of Wives of Heads of Households, by Location and Social Stratification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wives of Male Heads of Households</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>1 Wife</th>
<th>2 Wives</th>
<th>3+ Wives</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Households w. female heads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Villages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bugufi total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small p.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium p.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big p.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushiri total</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small p.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium p.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big p.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ujamaa Villages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ntobeye</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyabihanga</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Table 4.8. Size of Households, by Location and Social Stratification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1-2</th>
<th>3-4</th>
<th>5-9</th>
<th>10+</th>
<th>Mean persons</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Traditional Villages</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bugusi total</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small p.</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium p.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big p.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushuki total</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small p.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium p.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big p.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ujamaa Villages</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ntobeye</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyabihanga</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4.9. Age of Heads of Households, by Location and Social Stratification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>15-34 years</th>
<th>35-54 years</th>
<th>55+ years</th>
<th>Mean years</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Traditional Villages</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bugusi total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small p.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium p.</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big p.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushuki total</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small p.</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium p.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big p.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ujamaa Villages</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ntobeye</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyabihanga</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4.10. School-education of Heads of Households, by Location and Social Stratification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>None</th>
<th>1-4 years</th>
<th>More than 5 years</th>
<th>N</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Traditional Villages</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bugusi total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small p.</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium p.</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big p.</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushuki total</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small p.</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium p.</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big p.</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ujamaa Villages</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ntobeye</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyabihanga</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.11. Development of Ujamaa Villages in Ngara

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Adult members:</th>
<th>Communal planting and harvesting:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ntobeye</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>started 1968</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68/69</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69/70</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70/71</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71/72</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyabihanga</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>started 1968</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68/69</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69/70</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70/71</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71/72</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyamahwa, Ruganzo, and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katerere</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>started 68–69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68/69</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>71/72</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Villages</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>started 70–71</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>70/71</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71/72</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68/69</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69/70</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70/71</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71/72</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>725</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes.
Sources: Monthly reports on ujamaa villages from the District Agricultural Officer, Ngara, in Regional File P/Vil/Set/WL vol. 1–V.

Figures in brackets are author's estimates based on incomplete information.

"O" means less than one, "-" means none.

Recorded "bags" are normally approximately 90 kg.
The people and the private sector in the ujamaa villages

With the establishment of the first ujamaa villages in 1968 a new factor was introduced in the development of Ngara District.

During the first year they were actually nothing but normal government initiated new settlements—called "Makazi Mapya". "Makazi Mapya" were not a new thing in Ngara, as there had been in the 1950s and early 1960s government attempts to accelerate the move from overpopulated villages to unused bushland by promoting and supporting more organized new settlements. But these attempts had soon been given up as unsuccessful probably mainly because the administration lost interest too quickly, and the settlements took the same shape as all other recently but spontaneously established villages.

In the new drive, since 1968, government interest was consistent and intensive, and with the introduction of communal activities these villages became increasingly different from the spontaneous traditionally organized new villages.

In Ngara four such new settlements were started in 1968 and a fifth followed in 1969. They are all located on the outskirts of the more densely populated areas, from where people with little land were strongly persuaded to move to the new settlements.

During the first year there was a busy traffic of people moving in and out, but by the end of 1969 the situation had stabilized. By then there were about 800 families or 500 adults living in the four villages. In 1970–71 the next five ujamaa villages were started, so by the end of 1971, 3.5 years after the start, there were about 850 families with 1,570 adults in the ten new ujamaa villages (Table 4.11).

In Ngara District most of the settlers came from traditional villages relatively near the new settlement. Many were from the same villages and thus had already existing social ties with friends and relatives in their new villages. This meant that social relations in the new settlements did not have to be built up from nothing, but also that there existed a certain conflict of loyalties between the new village community on one side and the different groups and the villages from which they originated on the other. It was not unusual for instance, to find Ntobeye Ujamaa Village almost empty over the weekends, as the people returned to their old villages for social reasons. In Ntobeye there was no dominating group, and there were also close relations among the respective traditional villages, which all centred around Ngara town so it did not seem to have damaged the merging social cohesion in the new community. But in at least one other village, where the majority of the people came from two different parts of Bugusi, the village split up in two fighting factions, and finally one of them had to leave, for the village to function at all.

A further reason why people maintained ties with their former villages is the fact that most of them had land in those villages. Among the sample households in the new settlements 70% in Ntobeye and 63% in Nyabihanga had land in their old
villages (Table 4.1). These farms were generally small but there was a marked
difference between the settlers in Bugufi and Bushubi.

In Ntobeye the mean size of the settlers’ farms in their old villages was stated
to be 1.4 ha or exactly the same as for the Small peasants category in those villages.
Those who had moved to Ntobeye had a greater area of bananas and coffee and
a smaller area of annual crops than those who had not moved. The age
distributions show that those Small peasants who remained in the traditional
villages were largely older people in the later phase of their farm-family cycle,
whereas those who moved were younger peasants expanding their banana
shambas who had a dominant need for additional land for annual crops.

With the start of the new settlements they saw the opportunity to get this extra
land in a relatively convenient way. (In discussions a typical reason given for
moving was the need for land to grow annual crops.)

This fits well into the normal pattern in Bugufi. The young men with no, or
very little, land leave the old villages completely, to migrate to Uganda, or to open
new farms in the bush. But younger people, who have at least some land, start
expanding their banana shamba, and after some time they have to look for more
land for their annual crops. Usually they will not want to leave their old village,
so where possible they just start some fields for annual crops on unused land not
too far away from the old village.

If they later expand the new field to a full scale farm, they will normally marry
a second wife to live there, and live in both places themselves. Sometimes, when
the old farms are very small they may give up growing anything but bananas there
and then move completely to the new farms. At least most of the second generation
give up the old village and become permanent residents in the new village.

In Ntobeye many people still had their wives and children on their old farms,
resulting in the much larger number of males than females there although only
8% of the sample farmers were unmarried. And 29% had more than one wife,
compared to 17% in Bugufi traditional villages (Tables 4.11 and 4.7).

The new settlers in Ntobeye who retained land in their old villages had, as we
have stated, holdings there of the same size as the small peasants in these villages
which meant that in terms of total landholding the average for these new settlers
was similar to that of Medium peasants in the old villages. The 70% with land
outside are all in the categories Medium or Big peasants in Ntobeye, with mean
farm sizes about as large as the corresponding categories in traditional villages
(Table 4.1). So, with the expansion in Ntobeye, these rather young former Small
peasants have become Medium or Big peasants.

The ownership by the ujamaa villagers of farms in the old villages, and the
incorporation in the ujamaa village of some neighbouring, recently established, but
traditionally organized villages has meant that the stratification with regard to
farm-size is the same in the ujamaa village as in the traditional villages. All three
categories of peasants, Small, Medium and Big, have about the same mean size of
farm in both places (Table 4.1).
In the new settlement 70% were in the categories Medium and Big peasants, while in Old Ntobeye (the incorporated villages) they were only 40% and Small peasants 60%. None of the Small peasants had land outside the village, and most of them lived in Old Ntobeye, where they had started new farms by bush-clearance. The largest peasants also lived in Old Ntobeye, having inherited fully developed farms, or established them while being supported by a farm somewhere else.

In Nyabihanga Ujamaa Village in Bushubi, all the members lived in the new settlement. Fewer members of this ujamaa village had land outside the settlement, but the main difference was that even those who did, still had considerably less than even the Small peasants in traditional Bushubi villages, especially with regard to land with annual crops and uncultivated land (Table 4.5).

The age-distribution and the marriage pattern were the same as for Small peasants in traditional villages, with a large majority of young and middle aged with only one wife (Tables 4.7 and 4.9). There was not the same concentration of young heads of household as was found in Ntobeye. In Nyabihanga the mean family size was smaller than that of Small peasants in traditional villages, while in Ntobeye it was like that of the Medium peasants (Table 4.8). The educational level was lower in Nyabihanga, but higher in Ntobeye than in their respective traditional villages (Table 4.10).

In the Bushubi agricultural system land scarcity is not a problem, as the villages are surrounded with unused land of much the same quality as the already cultivated land. So young peasants in their establishment phase may always find land on the outskirts of their village and do not have to look elsewhere for land expansion. This is why there are many in this category among Small peasants in traditional villages in Bushubi. And—probably for the same reason—it seems that in Bushubi only the Small peasants with the minimal prospects for the future had moved to ujamaa villages. For them this move was more definitive. They took their wives with them (Table 4.11, Nyabihanga), and those who had any land outside, only had a small mean area of annual crops and uncultivated land because many of them had given up everything in their old village except the banana shamba.

When asked why they moved to Nyabihanga only 17% of the settlers answered that they wanted to get land, while 72% had a more vague and ambiguous idea of "following government policies". In Bushubi traditional villages 36% were more straightforward with the answer that people had moved to get government help, while 42% said they did it in order to get land. In Bugufi the answer "to get land" was given by 100% and 73% in Ntobeye and the traditional villages respectively.

There were still differences with regard to landownership in Nyabihanga, especially between those with land outside the village and those without, but even the Big peasants in Nyabihanga had only just the same area with bananas as Medium peasants in traditional villages and less other land than even the Small peasants there.

In the new settlements each family was given a private plot of 0.8 ha were they were supposed to build their house, and satisfy the family’s subsistence needs by
planting half with bananas and growing annual crops on the other half.

According to the study of Ntobeye, the settlers usually started to cultivate their plots about half to one year before they (more or less under pressure) began to live there, and quite often only the man had come to live in a rather provisional hut, while the rest of the family were still in the old village.

The settlers had to get banana stumps and seeds for plants from their old villages and for those without land there this was often a problem. Later some maize, groundnut, and bean seeds were distributed from the communal harvests, and the government organized collection of banana stumps in the traditional villages (resulting in many low quality and immature stumps).

Although it was frequently said that residents of the new settlement had 0.4 ha of bananas and 0.4 ha of annual crops the actual situation in Ntobeye was that after three years many settlers had far from finished planting bananas, and neither had they cleared and cultivated their whole plot. When the Agricultural Field Officer and some assistants in February 1971 made a rough measurement, 118 settlers in the Ntobeye New Settlement had an average 0.15 ha under bananas and 0.4 ha planted with annual crops, showing that banana planting especially lagged behind.

Most families in Ntobeye stated that their individual plot gave them sufficient annual crops, whereas the few bananas they had were hardly yielding anything (poor quality stumps take a longer time before they start yielding and then give smaller bunches). Those who had fields in the old villages were supplied with cooking bananas and local beer from them. Other residents had to go and work for other peasants for bananas or money to buy them with. Some still even went as far as Uganda to earn cash incomes.

In the first years the government supplied the settlers with some foodstuffs, mainly maize flour, but it was far from enough to cover the need, and it was later stopped completely, as the villagers were supposed to be selfreliant. The government also gave the settlers hoes and other hand implements, and these were used as much on private plots as on communal fields.

The most important government input into the individual sector was the supervision and advice of the Agricultural Field Officer stationed in the ujamaa village. In the first years, before the communal fields demanded all his attention, he put much effort into the promotion of more modern methods on the individual plots. But with limited resources and the quality of advice available the main results were that all bananas were planted in rows with "proper" spacing and that some other crops were also planted in rows and pure stands. It is worth noting, that planting bananas in rows with spacing spread also to Old Ntobeye, and to some of the settlers' farms in their old villages. (However the effect of these practices on productivity in peasant agriculture has never been established in spite of their "modernity").

In Nyabihanga the variety of crops grown on the individual plots was bigger than in the Bushubi traditional villages (Table 4.2), whereas it seems that the opposite was the case for Ntobeye. But this is also influenced by the inclusion of
Old Ntobeye. The above mentioned measurements made by the Agricultural Field Officer showed that in Ntobeye new settlement a larger proportion of the households than in the traditional villages grew crops like maize and groundnuts.

In none of the Ngara ujamaa villages had the members by mid 1971 earned any income from the communal sector, and as the individual plots could hardly cover their need for food, a main complaint from the ujamaa villagers was always the lack of money to buy even the most basic necessities like clothes, salt, matches and kerosene.

Our sample households in Ntobeye claimed a mean income of 40 shs. for the year 1970/71 and mean expenditures of 107 shs., both figures smaller than the corresponding ones even for Small peasants in the traditional villages. Although the interviewer had the impression that these figures were too low, because some people tended to "forget" their old farms, they did support the otherwise established impression, that money was very scarce among the ujamaa villagers (Tables 4.5 and 4.6).

It is interesting to note, however, that even in Ntobeye Ujamaa Village there were some people who employed hired labour.

The communal sector

Change from New Settlements to Ujamaa Villages

During 1969 the development of new settlements in West Lake Region was given a new direction with the introduction of communal production and the name for the villages was changed accordingly, from "Makazi Mapya" (New Settlement) to "Kijiji cha Ujamaa" (Ujamaa Village). The idea of adding more land to the individual holdings, when the originally allocated plots were fully cultivated, was shelved and the emphasis shifted to opening and expanding communal fields, to be owned and worked collectively "for the benefit of all".

In Ngara a few small plots were started in the beginning of 1969 but the new move did not gain full momentum until the second rainy season of that year.

Since then all government and Tanu efforts were put into encouragement of the communal spirit and work in the ujamaa villages. Government support like the supply of seeds and insecticides, tractors, draught oxen and implements, storage facilities and help with crop marketing were all directed at boosting the communal sector. Schools, Tanu Youth League and others volunteered to help the ujamaa villagers in their ujamaa fields. The agricultural extension personnel stationed in the ujamaa villages were occupied full time with the management of the communal work.

The emphasis was put squarely on developing communal agriculture—and the reported results of the efforts in the first three years, 1969/70, 70/71 and 71/72 are shown in Table 4.11. During the first year about 500 adult settlers cultivated and
planted 91 hectares of communal fields divided equally between beans, maize, sorghum and minor crops. The total harvests were stated to be 67 bags (6 tons) of beans, 180 bags (16 tons) of maize and 5 bags (0.5 ton) of sorghum.

Next year the same five “old” ujamaa villages, now with around 850 adult members, had 142 ha of communal crops, more than half of which was maize. Maize harvest increased to about 600 bags (55 tons), while the other crops gave about the same as the first year.

In 1971/72 ten villages were in operation, with about 1,600 adults and a communal hectarage of 185. Of this the five “old” villages comprised 940 adults cultivating 143 ha. No figures were obtainable for the year’s harvests at the time of our survey.

According to these reported figures the average yields in the region were by then 8 1/2 bags of maize or 2 1/2 bags of beans per hectare which was rather low taking into consideration the improved seeds, insecticides and full time expert supervision and direction provided by the government. It is also surprising that the total cultivated area increased only proportionally, or even less than proportionally, with the increasing number of adult workers although in the first year all work was done by hand, whereas in the second and third year some bush-clearing was undertaken with bulldozers and ploughing with tractors.

Most of the communal harvests have been distributed in small portions to the villagers or kept as seeds for succeeding seasons. Some of the harvested maize has however been sold to obtain a cash income for the villages. Very small amounts of money were for the first time distributed among the villagers in the middle of 1972, four years after the villages were started. Some money was invested in small shops or bars in the villages.

Ujamaa Village development plans

In the first half of 1970 West Lake Region was visited by a highpowered Economic Planning Team for West Lake Region Ujamaa Villages, consisting of an MP, a Regional Agricultural Officer, a Regional Economic Secretary, A Cooperative Officer, a Land Officer and a Water Engineer, all from different Regions. After visiting all ujamaa villages they made a Four Year Economic Plan (1970/71–1973/74) for each village which was then approved by the District and Regional Development Committees.

The recommendations and forecasts in the plans were never fulfilled, but they were continuously referred to as the aims for the development of the villages, and therefore they also influenced later short term plans, unfortunately in their own unrealistic direction.

We will take Ntobeye Ujamaa Village as an example to show the relationship between these plans, and the reality of achievement.

Ntobeye Ujamaa Village is the biggest and most developed ujamaa village in the District. In 1970 it was selected as the “best” in the whole Region. As such it is not

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Food Crops</th>
<th>Hectares</th>
<th>Cash Crops</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All crops</td>
<td>210–250</td>
<td>220–230</td>
<td></td>
<td>430–460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bananas</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>60–70</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td>120–130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>60–70</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>60–70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassava</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td></td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweet potatoes</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peas</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30–40</td>
<td></td>
<td>30–40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sisim</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

entirely representative of the ujamaa villages in the District, but it may be a proper choice for a discussion of the potential for communal production in these villages.

The Four Year Plan for Ntobeye is an impressive document. 46 pages with detailed plans, year by year (and sometimes month by month), on acreages and crops, labour and capital inputs, costs and incomes of every single undertaking and the sources of the money to invest.

The main points of the plan were as follows:
Bananas being a perennial crop, the accumulated banana area would be 80 ha by the end of the plan period. 4 ha should be planted each year with vegetables and fruit trees, 4 ha with trees for wood, and 24 ha of fodder grass.

From 1970/71 and onwards the village should communally own 30 dairy cows, 300 head of beef cattle and 320 goats. They should also keep bees and have a fish pond.

In order to achieve all this the village should have two tractors with implements, 20 ox teams with implements (a total of 80 draught oxen), a cattle dip, a store, four groundnut shellers, four maize threshers and a grinder. Bush would be cleared with a bulldozer and the village would have a piped water supply.

The total investments would be 1,289,000 shs., of which 823,000 shs. in the first plan year. The total surplus was estimated at 83,000 shs. in 1970/71, growing to 450,000 shs. in 1973/74.

One year later, in January 1971, the District Rural Development Officer, the village Agricultural Field Officer, and a village committee drew up a new short-term plan for the rest of the year 70/71 aiming at the crops as listed in Table 4:13, which would be accomplished with the one tractor and two ox teams already in the village.

While almost halving the planned hectarage this plan was still influenced by the four year plan, and the same was the case with two plans for the year 71/72 made in September and January of that year, although these were less unrealistic than the 70/71 plan.
Table 4.13. Planned Hectarage of Communally Grown Crops 1970/71, Ntobeye Ujamaa Village

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hectares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All crops</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bananas</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassava</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweet potatoes</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simsim</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trees, fruits, vegetables</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>September plan Hectares</th>
<th>January plan Hectares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All crops</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bananas</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simsim</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trees, fruits vegetables</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Actual size of communal fields*

The realities in Ntobeye were somewhat different to the plans. The first—and unplanned—year with communal production in Ntobeye was 1969/70, the results of which the planners could have taken as their point of departure.

We measured all communal fields under crops in 69/70 and 70/71. The areas we found were smaller than those reported by the Agricultural Field Officer, but even his figures were far below the aims of any of the plans:

Table 4.15. Actual Size of Communal Fields, Ntobeye Ujamaa Village (in hectares).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>69/70 Measured</th>
<th>69/70 Reported</th>
<th>70/71 Measured</th>
<th>70/71 Reported</th>
<th>71/72 Reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All crops</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bananas</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

71
Table 4.16. Labour input in communal work 1970/71, Ntobeye Ujamaa Village.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Man days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bush clearing and uprooting</td>
<td>2930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor cultivation</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ox cultivation</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand cultivation</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>3900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant maize</td>
<td>1450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weed maize</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvest maize</td>
<td>1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process maize</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>3750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans; plant, weed, harvest, process</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts; plant, process</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bananas, trees, fruits, vegetables</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>1450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total agriculture</td>
<td>9100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunting</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fencing</td>
<td>1400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total crop protection</strong></td>
<td>3350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building; school, store, fishpond, etc.</td>
<td>1650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road repairs</td>
<td>1150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charcoal burning</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total other activities</strong></td>
<td>2900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total labour input Sept.–Aug. 1970/71</strong></td>
<td>15350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Labour input**

While in the first year all work was done with hand implements, in the second year cultivation was done by tractor or draught oxen, which on the other hand meant that much more manpower had to be invested in the clearing of the land, as the ploughs could only work on fields where not only the bush coverage, but also all tree stumps and roots had been removed.

The following table shows the labour input over the whole year 1970/71:

It is interesting to note that about half the total labour input were in investments with rather long term effects for production and services, that is in bush clearing, tree planting, fencing, building and road repairs and construction.

About 15 ha were ox cultivated, but because of bad timing of cultivation and planting some of it had to be done again by tractor, so the tractor cultivated a total of about 50 ha. Only about 1 ha was cultivated by hand. The processing referred to is mainly that of the preceding year's smaller harvest.
Visitors, for example government or Tanu officials, often took part in the communal work, but the only input of this kind with any economic significance, was from 200 school children and their teachers, who stayed in Ntobeye during Youth Week to help weed the maize fields.

Communal works had taken place four days every week, Tuesday to Friday, since November 1970. Before that it was only three days a week. On these working-days one person from each household, in normal circumstances the man, was supposed to meet at 7.30 in the morning and work until noontime, that is about 5 hours, which with the time used for the roll call, going to and from the work, and resting gave less than 4 hours real work per man day.

Even then the figures show that the rate of attendance was very low. With 276 families, some being exempt from work duty for different reasons, the potential work force was around 255 per workday in 1970/71. The number of working days were about 180, so the total potential number of man days for the year were 46,000 of which only 1/3 were actually realized.

For the following year, 71/72, comparable data based on the daily work records are not available, but it seems that in contrast to the previous year, the attendance register for this year, showing work attendance of all members, was kept fairly efficiently, and that therefore the information it gives is sufficiently reliable.

Calculations based on this register give a total actual labour input in communal activities over 11 months (Sept.–July 1971/72) of 17,620, a small increase over the preceding year.* The potential number of days decreased to about 42,000, and the attendancy rate was somewhat higher, at 42 % compared to 33 % in 70/71. These results were, however, achieved by lowering the total number of working-days from 180 (12 months) to 145 (11 months) while at the same time the labour force increased from about 255 to 295.

The register also shows, that absenteeism was not evenly spread amongst all members, but that people from Old Ntobeye were especially negligent of their communal work responsibilities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attendance of labour force, per cent.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New settlement</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attendancy</strong>  Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Old Ntobeye</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attendancy</strong>  Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attendancy</strong>  Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jan.–June (9)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0–33 % attendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14  13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34–67 % attendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39  53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68–100 % attendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44  79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over 100 % attendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4   106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Jan.–June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101  62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total whole year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98  43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source:</strong> Attendance register, Ntobeye Ujamaa Village, 1972.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Generally the most consistent workers seem to be the elected office holders (who incidentally provide the information for the register) together with those new settlers who have no land outside the settlement—except when they are away to earn money as hired labourers.

**Communal harvests and incomes**

The harvests from the communal fields in Ntobeye have not been as impressive as the work-inputs. In the first year 154 bags of maize, 38 bags of beans, 6 1/2 bags of groundnuts and 2 bags of sorghum were harvested. In the second year 380 bags of maize and 28 bags of beans were harvested. This means average yields of 7–8 bags of beans, 12–13 bags of maize and 4 bags of groundnuts per ha in the first year, and 5 bags of beans and 10–11 bags of maize in the second year. The coffee, cassava, and sorghum in the first year, and groundnuts and vegetables in the second, were all complete or almost complete failures, mainly because of late planting.

Parts of the maize and beans harvests and most of the groundnuts were distributed among the villagers or kept as seeds for the communal fields. The rest of the beans were sold to a few villagers and to local traders.

Although the maize harvests were small seen in relation to the area or the number of families in the village, the amount was still big enough to warrant organization of its marketing. Unfortunately this was not actually done until over a year after the first harvest, when the Regional Cooperative Officer managed to sell what remained after marauding insects and pests had caused considerable loss and damage.

Obviously it was unsatisfactory—but not atypical—that ujamaa villages in Ngara should depend on the regional administration in Bukoba to organize the scale of their crops to some government institution somewhere else in the Region. So the surpluses from the 1970/71 harvests were taken over by the Ngara District Council, which in March 1971 installed a small petrol driven maize mill to be owned and run by all the Ngara ujamaa villages in common. Since then this mill (the first industry in Ngara District) has not only milled their communal harvests, but it also mills maize for individual peasants on payment of a small fee of 10 cents per kg.

After being milled the maize from the ujamaa villages was sold directly from the mill to local traders or government institutions like schools, the prison, and the hospital, who earlier got their supplies of maize flour from Bukoba or Mwanza. The profits earned from milling the maize in Ngara, saving the transport costs if it had been milled in Bukoba, were to be shared by the villages according to the quantity of maize delivered.

Ntobeye realized about 5,000 shs. income from the first year’s communal crops, and earned about 15,000 shs. for the 1970/71 harvest. After a long period of heated discussions on whether to keep the 69/70 money in the bank as a reserve, to invest them in a cooperative shop or to distribute them among the members, it was de-
decided by a meeting of the villagers in December 1971 to set a small amount aside for the shop and to share the major remaining part, 5,300 shs., in spite of the backing for the two first proposals from the government officials and village leaders. They maintained, that the sum was too small to divide and that no proper work records existed to direct the distribution. In fact the money, which was earned by the work done in 69/70, was finally shared according to the very incomplete work records for 70/71, with the exclusion of the members from Old Ntobeye, who did not join the communal work until 1970. All members in the new settlement got 0/27 shs. per recorded workday in 70/71. The minimum and maximum earned by a single family being 1/08 shs. and 60/75 shs. respectively. The method of distribution resulted in a lot of squabbles afterwards, when it was complained that people who had done no work in 69/70 had got a lot of money anyway.

The only non-agricultural production started in the village was charcoal burning on a small-scale, giving an income of 2–300 shs. per year. A communal bar was more profitable, as the fees paid by villagers who sold their "pombe" there totalled more than 350 shs. during its first half year in operation. The shop was—at best—a non-profit undertaking!

*Positive experiences from the first three years of communal production*

Altogether these results do not seem very encouraging, compared with the targets in the plans, the massive government support and encouragement, or the number of households in the village.

But there were some positive aspects of achievement.

If the government input is seen partly as ordinary free social service for the citizens (schools, dispensaries, water supply, and agricultural extension service) and partly as an initial grant for a development project, the 15,000 shs. income in 1970/71 should not be seen by the villagers as too bad a result of their labour. Even allowing for the fact that half of the labour input was essentially used for investments and services, the direct cash income was just about 1 sh. per man day, which was the same as the rate for hired agricultural labourer in Ngara, and besides this they could expect further benefits from the services and investments.

The labour input was still organized much as it is in individual, traditional agriculture, with all the members performing all the major agricultural activities with their hands, hoes, pangas and axes, the only difference being that on the communal field they did it together in one big field, instead of each doing it on his own small plot. But some beginnings of a specialization and division of labour were observed.

Those who assisted in ox ploughing were always selected from a limited group of members, who thus gained an increasing expertise in this operation. The government employed tractor driver had two assistants chosen from amongst the villagers, who had gradually learned how to drive the tractor and acquired some basic knowledge of its maintenance. The charcoal burning, the vegetable garden, the duka and the bar was handled by specific groups of villagers, and the leader of the
vegetable group had attended a short government course. Some villagers were receiving training in brickmaking and carpentry. This was of course only a feeble beginning, but it did show a potential for communal organization to combine large-scale mass activities with specific tasks undertaken by smaller groups, whilst the benefits were in principle shared equally by all.

In the plans hardly any new thinking appeared with regard to which crops to grow, or to the overall agricultural system. The planned crops were the usual range of traditional crops and were both food and cash crops. Seasons and timetables were the same as for the individual farms. However, in the realities of Ntobeye this was altered completely—probably unconsciously—so the communal sector became qualitatively different from and complementary to the individual sector.

While the individual farms were primarily supposed to provide the families with their basic foodstuffs and perhaps an occasional surplus to sell, the communal sector came to be regarded almost exclusively as a cash sector expected to bring increasing monetary incomes.

In the traditional system maize is only grown on a small scale and only to be harvested and eaten in the family as green maize. There was no maize mill or market for dry maize for flour in Ngara, so for the small-holders there was not much prospect in producing dry maize.

In Ntobeye’s Four Year Plan maize was also only stipulated as a food crop. However, in the first two years of communal production the only major cash crop was dry maize, and even more so in the second year than in the first. Not only does maize in itself seem very suitable for large-scale production at a rather low technical and managerial level but it also fits well into the existing agricultural system in Ngara.

The cultivation of the maize fields falls in the same period as all the cultivation and planting work on the private fields for the first rainy season in October and November, but in Ntobeye it was, except for the first year, done by tractor or ox plough with little hand labour.

The first major labour input on the communal maize fields takes place in December–January, when the maize has to be planted. This is just between the two labour-demanding cultivation and planting seasons on the private fields. Although some weeding work has to be done from February to April, the second and last labour peak in the maize is not until the harvest in the dry months of July and August, which is after the harvest of the individually grown crops.

West Lake Region imports maize, so with a large enough production in Ngara ujamaa villages to warrant its organized marketing, the market should be there, and this production can also give the necessary stable supply as the basis for a local maize mill.

Finally the communal organization also seemed to lead to a more efficient use of the knowledge about modern agriculture represented by the AFO. The size of the enterprise allowed a fairly reasonable utilization of the government investments in the tractor, oxen, maize threshers etc. Pure stand planting, proper spacing
and some fertilizer application was carried out on large areas. Experiments with vegetables, Irish potatoes, yellow sorghum etc., were carried out on a reasonable scale, but were still small enough compared to the total enterprise that failures were of little consequence.

Planning and participation—the problem for further development

Two main problems stand out as stumbling-blocks to any further development of the communal sector. One is the complete lack of planning, even of the agricultural activities in a single season. The other is the very low participation in the communal work by the ujamaa villagers.

Both the Four Year Plan and the One Year Plan for Ntobeye Ujamaa Village were, as demonstrated above, utterly unrealistic and completely out of touch with any possible development in the village. This surely must have been realized also by everybody participating in the planning and everybody who was at all involved in the ujamaa village policy in the Region. It seems as if they were mainly designed to look impressive to people with no knowledge of realities in the District and then to finish up deep in the desks of the administrators responsible for the implementation of the policies.

This at least was what happened, and if it had only been for the waste of government time and money, one could have regretted it, but it would not have harmed the actual development of the ujamaa villages. The villages, however, were inflicted with these plans, and therefore they never got the chance to engage in setting up and implementing workable, realistic plans, and to learn from such an exercise. The result has been that—as in Ntobeye—decisions on what crops to grow, what work to do, what services to invest labour in, how to organize labour, how to use the tractor and oxen etc., have often been taken or altered from one day to the next (or have not been taken at all) and quite often under the influence of government officials, who by chance were present, or of the village officials who were there at the time.

The outcome has first of all been a generally observable lack of rationality and coordination in the utilization of the available resources, as when an already ploughed field had to be ploughed again because the planting was not done in time, or a whole planting season was lost, because excessive clearing and cultivating was pursued to make the achievement look greater in the reports. There were complete failures because of late planting, and the whole labour-consuming task of erecting an electric fence around a maize field was almost a waste of time as it was started so late that it could not be done properly, and it was not ready until the end of the harvest anyway.

The lack of proper plans is also at least part of the reason for the unsatisfactory organization of the government support to the villages. Sometimes seeds arrived there too late and when finally planted the whole crop was lost through lack of rain or else the seeds were never actually planted. In other cases it was decided to
plant local low quality seeds because there were few or none of the improved seeds. The marketing was done on an ad hoc basis and easily delayed, with resulting losses from insect attacks, because there was no reliable and foreseeable production of any of the crops, and no organized concentrated effort to process the crops in time for early aggregate marketing.

However, the most damaging result of the existing unrealistic plans and the lack of realistic plans was the effect on the spirit of the ujamaa villagers, and thereby on their work attendance, the second major problem in the villages.

The villagers were told to discuss the plans, drawn up by high ranking government officials and presented to them by the same officials. Every villager who understood anything must have known that the targets in the plans were wild and must have been sure that, as experts, the officials knew so as well. Of course the villagers approved the plans because of the fantastic government support promised them, because they were presented by such high ranking officials, and because nobody could take the targets seriously anyway.

Afterwards most of the promised government investments failed to materialize, everybody forgot about the plans, and things went on in the same old haphazard way they had done before. The villagers were still being told to do this and do that and work hard, without anybody telling them why they were doing the opposite of what they had discussed in relation to the plans, without anybody seeming to know exactly what they were now aiming at, and therefore with nobody being able to explain or even understand what they had so far achieved and what was still left to be done in such and such a period. None of the villagers could have any clear idea of what was expected from them and what they could expect as a result.

No wonder then, that the ordinary villager, who had no experience in communal production, and who was treated to this theatre when he was for once given some concrete information instead of the usual general talk of hard work and work together for the benefit of all, had difficulties in seeing the purpose of the communal sector and failed to understand its functioning and his role in it.

So the main interest of the villagers remained their individual farms, expansion of which was their original reason to come to Ntobeye, and the other ujamaa villages. The participation in the communal work suffered accordingly whenever there were any work demands in the individual sector—or any social obligation that had to be attended to.

This emphasis on the individual sector could change when the villagers become more used to communal production, and especially when they begin to get an income from it. (In the discussions in Ntobeye on how to use the first year’s surplus there were signs—very small— that this was beginning to happen.)

It seems, however, that a necessary prerequisite for the proper functioning of the communal sector in the ujamaa villages, in terms of efficiency as well as in terms of the villagers’ participation, would have been the establishment of a completely new planning process in the villages.

Such a planning process would first of all have to be realistic, as that is the only
way it could fulfil its purpose. It should be realistic both in the sense of not promising more government help than the government is really prepared to give and is able to give it at the promised time, and in the sense that the villagers as well as experts advisers are completely aware of the real meaning of established targets and really believe that they can be fulfilled. This requires that the plans are primarily made by the villagers themselves in open discussions with the Government advisers. The advisers should see their role mainly as modern educators, who ensure that the planning process creates at least some understanding, awareness and commitment among the villagers in relation to communal activities they themselves have agreed upon.

The planning process, which is thus also an educational and a mobilizing process, should not stop with the agreement on the plan. It must be a continuous process, where the villagers are regularly kept informed about the accomplishments and problems in relation to the implementation of the plan, about the efforts of the different groups and about the participation of the individual members. On this basis alterations in the plan can be made by the villagers themselves, and they can discuss problems in relation to work attendance.

A successful execution of such a planning procedure would however have demanded two things of the officials involved.

First they would have to know how to use and be willing to use at least the most simple modern educational methods and aids, such as signboards and posters, and stop believing that speeches or lectures are enough.

Secondly in some cases there would be a need to change attitudes towards discussions with uneducated villagers. In recent years visiting government and party leaders have taken part in the manual labour side by side with the villagers, which is highly appreciated by them. However, it is probably even more appreciated when an official sits down and discusses with the villagers on an equal basis instead of making a speech or a lecture. Some do it, especially since publication of the "Mwongozo," but many still seem to lack confidence in their own ability to make themselves understood by ordinary people, and without even trying they abandon the favourable educational situation of a free discussion with the villagers, in favour of a speech to them, perhaps followed by a discussion with the leaders and officials in the villages.

In the educational and mobilizational process of planning and deciding for the development of the ujamaa village it is essential that all the villagers participate, and that they are encouraged and assisted in this situation by advisers who respect their right and ability to take decisions on their own problems, and who show this respect by using educational methods which can provide the villagers with knowledge they feel they need and are able to use.
Village democracy

In traditional villages in Ngara District no structure exists which enables decisions to be taken on behalf of, or by, the village as a unit. The only traditional institutions which still function to a certain extent are the clans and their clan assemblies, but they cover only part of a village or sometimes a part of each of several villages, and never one whole village. In the modern political and administrative organization there were no cadres between the small ten-house-cell and the Ward with its Ward Executive Officer (WEO), Ward Development Committee (WDC), and Tanu Branch, comprising dozens of villages. The administrative area of the earlier Village Development Committee (VDC) and Village Executive Officer was smaller than the Ward, but even that included several villages. The existing Reconciliation Committees (Baraza la Usuluhishi) took over the reconciliation functions from the VDCs.

So the ujamaa villages were the only villages in the District, which had their own "local government". They were even exempted from the jurisdiction of the WDC and the Tanu Branch of the Ward in which they were located, as they had their own WDCs and Branches, enjoying the same status as the larger local administrations in the traditional sector.

For some years none of the ujamaa villages had written constitutions, and their decision-making structures were a mixture of more or less formal groups with no clear division of functions and without clearly defined membership. Having become almost customary this situation was not deeply affected by the subsequent introduction of a constitution.

In Ntobeye the General Meeting (Mikutano Mkuu) and the WDC were the two official decision-making bodies. Their meetings were usually called by the WEO, who also had to be present and record the official minutes. Other government and party officials were also often present at these meetings.

The official General Meeting consisted of all adults in the village, all government staff and the WEO, as its secretary. It was called by the WEO or the village leaders through the ten-house-cell chairmen.

The General Meeting was the highest authority in the village, but it only met once every half year or so, and besides electing the Chairman, the Vice-chairman, the Secretary and nine members of the WDC, its functions seem to have been mainly ceremonial, such as receiving high ranking government and party leaders and listening to their speeches. Only a few times was it asked to approve decisions taken by the WDC. Participation in the meetings was highest when elections were on the agenda. In the latest election meeting we attended, about 300 villagers took part, out of a total of 775.

The WDC was in practice more important than the General Meeting. It deliberated and decided on all matters concerning the communal sector, services, the economy of the village, discipline and expulsions, allocation of membership and plots in the village, all relations with the government administration and its officials
stationed in the village. It was at the same time the Tanu Branch Committee.

The WDC consisted of the Chairman, the Vice-chairman, the Secretary, all ten-house-cell Chairmen, and eight members from the New Settlement and one from Old Ntobeye chosen by the General Meeting. The government staff and the WEO participated but were not supposed to vote.

The WDC had formed subcommittees for financial matters, for agriculture and to take care of guests. A women’s committee was also formed, consisting of the only female member of the WDC and one more member, but the last person later left the village without being replaced, and the committee did not seem to be active anyway.

The day-to-day work in the village was supposed to be organized by a work committee consisting of the Chairman, the Vice-chairman, the Secretary and the Agricultural Field Officer, but this was not a formally constituted committee and as the other three only turned up irregularly most of this work was done by AFO alone.

Finally there was a Staff Committee of all government staff in the village together with the three village leaders. The Staff Committee was mainly advisory to the WDC (though with much influence), and it took decisions on confidential matters relating to the government administration, the staff and discipline in the village.

The structure described above may seem fairly straightforward, but in reality the picture was much more blurred.

First of all, many meetings were held in the village which did not conform with any of the types described. There were also meetings which might be termed as informal General Meetings or as meetings more like informal WDC meetings. The Chairman, or another village leader, may have called a General Meeting without informing the WEO and thus without the meeting being reported in the minute book. An even more informal meeting may have been formed by people who were assembled for a completely different purpose, for example a group of members returning from communal work, with the Chairman or any other leader not necessarily present every time. It was also possible for the WDC to be called for a meeting without the presence of the WEO, and sometimes even a few of the WDC members who are incidentally together at a certain place and time may have gone aside, sat down and discussed and even have decided upon important matters.

Secondly it seemed to have been a matter of chance that an item was brought before one or the other of the different types of meetings. A few examples may illustrate this highly fluid situation.

When Ntobeye got its constitution in January 1971 it was discussed and approved by a formal WDC meeting, only to be amended by a 2/3 majority in a subsequent General Meeting, and several later WDC decisions have been postponed pending such changes.

None of the development plans were discussed and approved by official WDC or General Meetings as reported in the minute book. One of them was decided upon by a meeting called by the District Rural Development Officer, who arrived
unannounced at the village, and it consisted of those WDC members present at communal work that day. Another seems to have been set up by the work committee.

The financial committee was formed and its members were chosen in a formal WDC meeting, but when most of the members had left the village for different reasons new members were chosen by an informal General Meeting called by the Chairman to discuss the start of a cooperative shop in the village.

A meeting was held by members returning from work one day, and it was decided to grant a sum of money for the Secretary’s journey to a course in Moshi. Later some problems in connection with the same journey were brought up and discussed at a formal WDC meeting.

Sometimes the Chairman and the AFO decided alone when and what to plant, sometimes the same decisions were taken by the WDC. These flexible procedures may have had the advantage of expediency, but they were hardly democratic. It was often doubtful when, and if, a decision had been taken, and who was responsible for its implementation. Sometimes a decision was taken at one meeting and altered by a different meeting. Matters were left undecided, because nobody was clearly responsible for their solution. Coordination of decisions was almost impossible, as matters relating to the same problem may have been discussed by one body at one time and a different body at another time. All this contributed to the generally haphazard conditions of communal organization.

The village democracy also suffered because the many informal meetings not only excluded many of the villagers from the possibility of participating, but also made it seem rather unimportant to try to participate. Furthermore the whole uncoordinated and confused structure made it virtually impossible for any official to use the decision-making process as a coherent educational and mobilizational exercise, and for any villager to get a reasonably general idea about what was going on and to understand the basis and consequences of decisions they were supposed to have taken.

All this may at least have been part of the reason for the poor participation in meetings, both in terms of the number of people turning up, and in terms of their activity during the meetings. Another reason was probably the rather authoritarian attitude of leaders and officials.

Usually there was very little discussion at meetings, most of the talking being done by the Chairman or staff members, before a common agreement was reached on something close to the solution proposed by the leaders, who were also the ones who formulated the conclusions. Only very seldom was the summing up challenged and a vote taken, which even less frequently supported the challenger. In the meetings there was a “silent majority” of older people, who followed the leaders, and only a few outspoken younger ten-house-cell chairmen who would express opposition to the leaders. Only in court-like situations did the older people take an active part, when they eagerly discussed the evidence, rules and precedence of the cases. The younger people were becoming more ready to consider matters relating
to the communal economy and work, especially concrete questions where they were able to see that their own interests were directly involved.

Such a recent case was when they raised opposition to the Chairman’s proposal that some of the 5000 Shs. income from the communal fields should have been invested in a cooperative shop and demanded to have it distributed among the villagers instead. At first they managed to create so much dissatisfaction, that no decision was taken and the money remained in the bank, and later it was decided to share most of the money leaving only a small sum to be invested in the shop.

In 1971 the incumbent Chairman’s re-election was in doubt for the first time since the start of the village, as the younger group nominated the Vice-chairman as their candidate. They did not succeed in toppling the Chairman, who had strong support among the people in Old Ntobeye and the women, but they did get their candidate for the secretaryship elected, thus defeating the incumbent, a protegé of the Chairman.

There was hardly any element of ideological awareness or just political issues in this antagonism, but the very fact that some of the ujamaa village members broke out of their normal humility towards authorities may be taken as a positive sign of the development of some demand for democratization in the village.

Government support and personnel

Besides access to land, the main motive for joining and remaining in the ujamaa villages was the huge government support received by the villages.

In Ntobeye there was a primary school built by the District Council and two teachers employed by the government. The pupils in the school were exempted from paying school fees. There was a small dispensary supplied by the government with a Rural Medical Aid and Dispensary Assistants. A policeman was stationed in the village to ensure law and order, and to be in charge of the militia training. Game scouts came to the village regularly to help the villagers with vermin control. The village had got a piped water supply established by the Ministry of Water Development at a cost of about 100,000 Shs.

In short, Ntobeye had essential services, the lack of which normally makes life in the villages in the bush unattractive.

The ujamaa villages were given food assistance from the government in the establishment period. By 1970 Ntobeye was deemed self-reliant, but two of the five original villages were still getting food supplies in 1971, i.e. their fourth year of existence.

When the settlers started in 1968 they were given hoes, pangas and axes, and to strengthen the communal sector the government later provided the village with a tractor and its implements, as well as paying for both fuel and the driver who
was stationed in the village. It also gave draught oxen and implements and posted an AFO to be responsible for these only, and it built the store and supplied maize threshers. Seeds and insecticides for the communal fields also came from the government and in 1971 a large area was cleared by a bulldozer, and this was paid for by the government.

Some of the villagers have been to courses organized by the government, and experts, such as Land Surveyors, Tsetse Officers, and Forest Officers regularly visit the village.

All this of course had important effects especially on the development of the communal sector, but one government act has been more essential than anything else, namely the stationing in the village of an AFO, who had the overall responsibility to the government for the functioning of the village. Without his presence and direction, and often very hard work and commitment, it seems that the establishment and maintenance of any communal activities worth mentioning would have been virtually impossible.

The AFO in charge did not only have to be the agricultural expert, who gives advice on what to grow where, what techniques to use, and how to time the activities. He also had to be the daily initiator and organizer of all the communal work, ensuring that at least some decisions were taken and actually implemented. His duty was to see that tasks like keeping the attendance register and the cashbook were properly carried out and he sometimes did it himself. Whenever there were problems in the village he involved himself and was in the last resort responsible for their solution. As the "officer in charge of the village" he had to direct, support and coordinate the work of the other government employees in the village.

Finally the AFO was responsible for almost all communication between the village and the higher authorities, either in the form of requests from the village to the government or in the form of reports to keep the administration informed about the village. The detailed monthly reports were especially demanding on him and were a heavy burden added to the practical work in the village (and were probably not even used for any reasonable purpose—except further report writing and more or less useful research).

The high concentration of government personnel living in the ujamaa villages was not only a cost for the government, seeming very high compared with the limited economic potential of the villages, but it also meant that the earlier mentioned class-distinction between the peasants and the "salariat" was carried right into the supposed centres of socialist development.

The government personnel enjoyed standards of living and incomes, incomparable to those of the ordinary villagers. They hardly ever took part in manual work in the village. Except perhaps for the AFO in charge, they did not integrate themselves in the village life, nor did they seem committed to the overall development of the village. They carried out their specific duties and in their free time maintained social relations amongst themselves or outside the village only,
yet they were still the ones who communicated most with visiting leaders and officials and whose words carried most weight when decisions were taken. There was also a tendency for some of the village leaders to be incorporated in the staff milieu, thus being alienated from the ordinary villagers.

Very little has been done to improve the situation by putting more emphasis on programmes to train the villagers to take over the tasks themselves, or by making those officers who are indispensable take part on an equal basis in the communal work when they have nothing else to do. For example the assistants of the tractor driver were, on their own initiative, learning to drive, but with some further training they should have been able to take over this job completely. Likewise it did not seem necessary to have an AFO in the village solely to take care of the oxen and their work, which could have been done by trained villagers. The policeman in the village had hardly anything else to do but direct four weekly hours of militia training, but this training should not have been outside the ability of some former National Service members in the village, nor should an occasional proper police function have been so. At least it would have been less demoralizing if the policeman had done more than four hours work a week as long as he was there.

The little that was done in this connection shows, that a main problem might be the incorporation of such tasks into the normal work organization in the village, where the members are credited with the number of days they do communal work, whatever kind of work they are doing.

When the school was built in Ntobeye, there was a criticism that the District Council (DC) did not employ the village members who were skilled in housebuilding, but brought workers from outside the village. The DC then proposed that those members should work on the schoolbuilding, but that the salary be paid to the village as a whole and the workers credited by the village with the appropriate number of workdays done. The house-building members of the village refused this, preferring to continue going to the traditional villages to find work there. Why after all should a villager share his well deserved salary with the other villagers, when none of the officials and leaders, who proposed it, do it themselves? So the schoolbuilding was finished by the external DC workers.

Successful ujamaa villages?

The preceding paragraphs should leave little doubt, that the ujamaa policy as applied in Ngara District succeeded in creating a number of new settlements which fairly quickly became socially and economically viable communities, and which seem also to have embarked on a primary stage of economic transformation, especially with regard to production patterns. Our analysis further suggests that these
achievements can to a large extent be explained by development trends in the traditional villages, and the potential of the ujamaa policy as an outlet for the increasing pressure on existing socio-economic structures.

In the discussion of the traditional villages two problems stood out as the basic ones.

The first was the land scarcity in the densely populated areas of Bugufi Division, where the majority of the population lived. With little or no land available in the villages there, many peasants are no longer able to maintain the normal farm-family cycle, and are faced with the alternative of either leaving the District, permanently or seasonally, as migrant labourers or trying to open land in the bush and start a farm there. Hitherto the last solution had been a very slow process with plenty of inherent risks and problems, and many who chose it had to combine it with seasonal migration anyway in order to make a living. So, for many, migration has been the least unattractive possibility, thus probably depriving the District of a large number of its more enterprising men in the productive ages.

The second major problem was the difficulty within the existing agricultural system to satisfy the growing need for monetary incomes, and especially the conflict between the culmination of the farm-family cycle around the middle of a man’s life and the cash needs which peak during his establishment phase. Changing the agricultural system and investing more labour or capital in it has seldom been seen as a possible solution to this problem, which is regarded as almost exclusively surmountable by obtaining incomes outside agriculture, or if that is impossible, from migrant labour.

The establishment of the new settlements has in many ways been a continuation of the existing movement of people from the densely populated villages to the uninhabited bush areas, but was made more attractive by reducing the usual hazards of starting a farm in the bush. With many people starting at the same time at the same place, they are able to give each other help and moral support. The fields are not quite as open to animal attacks as normally in the bush, and the settlers are less socially isolated. Government backing appeared in the form of moral support by many visiting leaders and material help such as social services, advisers and free food, none of which are normally enjoyed by rural households.

By these means the new settlements lessened the barriers against moving from the old villages into the bush, and for many small peasants this turned out to be a feasible way to alleviate the problem of maintaining a normal farm-family cycle.

Had the new settlements been allowed to continue and expand along the original lines, they might have solved the problem of land scarcity, bush development and migrant labourers, but they did not contain any element which would otherwise make them different from the traditional villages. The problem would have remained to initiate changes in the agricultural system, which would enable people to continue to meet the subsistence needs and social demands varying with the family cycle and at the same time to satisfy the increasing demand for cash incomes.

The communal fields did appear to have some of the potential for becoming that
element, by facilitating the introduction and expansion of cash crops as a significant and consistent addition to the agricultural system on a broad and equal basis.

In any effort to change the agricultural system, support and encouragement from government and party are essential. The communal fields allow a concentration of the limited resources, without favouring individuals and endangering the social balance in the peasant society.

Government experts and capital inputs can be more efficiently exploited by the large enterprise than they can be on scattered small-holdings, and by being clearly separate from the existing agricultural system, the communal fields allow the inputs to be concentrated on this effort of change instead of being absorbed in the existing system.

Bearing in mind the weak marketing system in Ngara it is an advantage that the communal fields can produce a more reliable and larger aggregate crop, which is therefore easier to market than the occasional surpluses from individual smallholders.

The large scale makes it possible to rationalize some of the work operations, such as keeping watch against wild animals or processing the crops and, to a certain extent, planting and harvesting. Some new division of labour and specialization have been introduced.

The larger scale also entails a spread of risks. Damage of a field by animals, disease or unfavourable weather, which may be nearly catastrophic for the individual is a relatively minor loss for the collective, and experiments can be carried out on a reasonable scale without failures being fatal.

Perhaps the most important advantage, however, of the communal organization is that it enables the introduction of a distinct cash sector, which is neither weakened by being incorporated in the general agricultural system with its emphasis on subsistence production, social security and obligations, and a habitual work organization, nor destructive for that system. The communal fields seem to be regarded as something completely separate from the individual farm, an added opportunity, which may be beneficial, and at least do not interfere directly with the farm-family cycle etc.

A reasonably consistent labour input may be sustained even with irregular individual attendance caused by demands of the individual farm and existing work habits. Even absence for a longer time because of illness or migration does not undo an earlier effort as it often would on the individual farm. In the long run the organized character of the ujamaa activities, social pressure among the members and regular incomes may promote more consistent work habits in this sector and a shift of interest from the individual to the ujamaa fields. This can only happen gradually during the development of the ujamaa sector, but it was already evident that certain groups were beginning to see the profitability in their own situations of communal activities.

Even with initially minimal hectareage and labour input per member the communal field can still be large enough to ensure some of the advantages of large-scale
and a relatively stable output earmarked for marketing, thus creating a basis for further development.

Introduction of a cash crop with a stable and regular production on equally small areas on individual farms does not seem feasible. It would either be a new crop, at least in the beginning, giving rather insignificant incomes and having no established function in the farm-family cycle, and therefore it would not easily be integrated with the existing agriculture, but run a high risk of being more or less neglected. Or one of the existing crops might be tried, but in that case the difficulty of ensuring a reliable output specifically meant for marketing would remain. (The limited extent of an irregular coffee production is an example of the problems with the first type of crop, the losses incurred by the cooperative union when they tried to organize the marketing of beans an example of problems with the second type.)

Finally the communal activities can become a way to alleviate the problem created by the difference in time of the culmination of cash needs and of the farm-family cycle, by enabling the young people to become independent of their parental farm-family cycle by joining the ujamaa communities and earning the savings needed for marriage.

All these potentials of ujamaa in the development of the Ngara peasant society were far from being realized. The above analysis is however based on observable tendencies which we have described in earlier paragraphs.

Whilst the creation of viable communities which have taken the first steps towards economic transformation has thus been facilitated by their potential as solutions to some vital development problems within the peasant society, there had been little progress yet with regard to the emergence of general participatory democracy.

The prescribed institutions, such as elections and committees, had of course been introduced in the new ujamaa villages, but in reality major decisions regarding the life and the future of the village were not made through democratic procedures within these institutions, nor were there any strong demands that this should be the case. Consequently there were few incentives for the villagers to make any real effort at participation. This was especially so concerning the wider, long-term substantial questions, such as planning, although only to a lesser extent true in connection with limited short-term decisions such as the election of officeholders.

The development of traditional society has created no “need” for democratization similar to the “need” for resettlement and some economic transformation. On the contrary, humility towards authorities and the expectation that they take the decisions concerning the society as a whole, are old attitudes among Ngara peasants. Any reaction beyond passive submission may threaten the security of the community and at the individual level threaten the security of remaining unaccepted member of the community.

On the other hand no effort was invested either by the government or TANU leaders to encourage the real functioning of village democracy. The most important decisions were taken over the heads of the ordinary villagers, and—perhaps—
presented to them for their "approval".

Participatory democracy has not been an important part of the political tactics of ujamaa implementation in Ngara District. Emphasis has been on resettlement, and on economic transformation, but a transformation within peasant agriculture, not touching upon the relations between agriculture and bureaucracy, business and industry. Consequently there has been no attack on the major political and economic structures. These questions will be discussed further in Chapters 7 and 8, but we may conclude here by questioning whether it would have been possible in the longer run to maintain even these tendencies towards economic and social transformation within the peasant communities, which we have described above, if there continued to be no change in the relationship between the peasantry and the wider economic and political system. Many of the concrete problems outlined in this chapter clearly had their roots in this relationship.

Notes

1. In the most densely populated areas (e.g. around Mabawe village) even extremely steep hillsides are however under cultivation. Here, as the only place in the Region, an embryonic terracing system has been invented by the peasants. Also a drainage system has been developed to allow the use of the swampy valley bottoms for a third dry season harvest each year.

2. Big, Medium, and Small peasants are distinguished in the following way:

   For each village the average holding per household of each type of land, coffee, bananas, or annual crops, is computed as the mean ± 0.1 ha. In each village then:

   In Bugufs: Big peasants either are those who have more coffee or banana land than the average and not less than the average of the two other types of land or have more than the average of both coffee and banana land. Small peasants either are those who have less coffee or banana land than the average and not more than the average of the two other types of land or have less than the average of both coffee and banana land. In Bushui: Big peasants are those who have more coffee or banana land than the average and not less than the average of both the two other types. Small peasants are those who have not more than the average of coffee or banana land and at least two types of land below the average. In both areas the Medium peasants are those in between.

   In principle these criteria are purely statistical and arbitrary, but they are construed so as at least to some degree to take the local evaluations into account.


5. Source; Agricultural Field Officers daily work records. The AFO had to keep such records, based on reports from those in charge of the day's working groups. The reports give the number of people who participated in the groups' work that day. The material obtained includes the records for every day from September 1970 to August 1971, except February and three weeks of August. These figures were therefore estimated by the author, on the basis of the known data and information on the tasks completed in those periods.

6. Information for August was missing.

7. For September to December the information for Old Ntobeye is most incomplete.

8. "Mwongozo", the TANU guidelines on policy and leadership, which, amongst other things, called for less authoritarian relations between leaders and people.
Chapter 5

Ujamaa as forced and subsidised resettlement

In the previous chapter we focussed on the development and history of ujamaa villages in Ngara District, which have been regarded, at least in official circles, as the more successful ujamaa villages in the Region. It is a description of some length but we consider it important for an understanding of ujamaa to use these examples in this way. We use them to illustrate the local relationships between the ujamaa and the traditional sectors, and in this way, to assess the relative success of ujamaa in the local context.

In this chapter we present a broader and less detailed description of the emergence, development and fate of other ujamaa villages in the rest of the Region: that is to say Bukoba and Karagwe Districts. Whereas in Ngara District the ujamaa villages were located close to the traditional villages, whence their members came, ujamaa villages in the other Districts were usually at a distance from the traditional villages. They were much more clearly established as government directed resettlements for a certain overspill from crowded areas into undeveloped bush. This influenced their production patterns in that they were more dependent on external assistance for marketing and production planning. It also influenced their village democracy which had to evolve quite independently of traditional social ties. And it influenced the motivation of settlers to become residents. In Ngara it was quite possible to maintain links and land-holdings in traditional villages and consequently many residents of the ujamaa villages there enjoyed improved access to land over their fellows in the traditional villages who lacked this opportunity to diversify their own access to land. But in the other two Districts residents of these new ujamaa settlements were forced to choose much more directly between their access rights in either of two societies.

Unfortunately, the story of these ujamaa villages cannot be judged entirely on the effective role of transformed social and economic opportunities for it is apparent that many of the new ujamaa settlements in Bukoba and Karagwe were established in unfavourable physical locations. But we will try, through a historical analysis, to assess the development of these villages in terms of their economic and communal achievements in relation to the emergent pressures in traditional society that justified a need for this approach to development.

As we shall see at the conclusion of this chapter, this "line" of ujamaa development stagnated in West Lake Region and by the end of 1971 interest in them had waned considerably. Government involvement in them by that time was very much low-key and at best a maintenance function. By that time, a new line of uja-
maa development had emerged in the Region and this was related to the development of agricultural diversification back in the traditional villages. It was thought that if these developments could be confined to ujamaa organizations, then ujamaa would be introduced successfully into the traditional sector. This is the theme of Chapter 6.

Bukoba and Karagwe Districts and their traditional villages

Centre and hinterland
During the slave trade era Karagwe was the dominant centre of West Lake Region. One of the main East African slave routes from the coast passed along the Western Karagwe ridge through the Kingdom towards the Congo and the interior of Central Africa. After the slave trade had been stopped and when the German and later the British colonizers had arrived in the area, they made their administrative centre along the lakeshore at the site of what is today Bukoba town. Since then this site has developed to become the economic and political centre of the Region.

It is in Bukoba town and its immediate surroundings that we find today the biggest concentration of administrative, educational and health facilities, of the few industries, and of storage, marketing and communication facilities. The further one moves into the hinterland of Bukoba, the sparser the infrastructure. Coffe planting was first initiated near Bukoba, spreading outwards into the hinterland in such a way that it only reached the remoter areas of the Region many years later. Even recent development projects have been conceived and initiated under the same influence of Bukoba-centrism.

Population concentration
The concentration of economic development on Bukoba, reflects however, the existing distribution of the regional population. The variety of factors that caused the precolonial change in the economy from pastoralism to settled agriculture—the rinderpest epidemic, increasing population pressure etc.—led the centre of settlement to shift from the grassy uplands of Karagwe to the forested higher rainfall area of the lakeshore. This occurred quite some time before the colonial powers arrived, and thus, although the Kingdom of Karagwe was still the seat of political power in the late nineteenth century, the population was by then more numerous near the lake than inland. The forest had been largely cleared and the land had been settled in the pattern seen today.

Today only ten percent of the land area, that is the high rainfall areas of Bukoba District, is settled by nearly half of the regional population. It lives in densely po-
pulatred settlements which are several generations old, located on plateaux and hillsides surrounded by swamps, lakes and rivers which set a physical limit to the local expansion of these settlements. The rest of Bukoba District and Karagwe District (apart from the few areas where there is a local concentration of population) are sparsely populated. Here are large areas of rather fertile and potential arable land, but there is a lack of infrastructure which makes these areas accessible only with great difficulty.

Settlement pattern
The population live dominantly in nucleated villages. These villages are located where soil is deep enough for the cultivation of bananas. In some places the deep soils are found on the plateaux, in other places the rain has washed the deep soil down hillsides. Surrounding these pockets of deep soil, other soils are often thin and the rocky subsoil comes to the surface. On such land, permanent settlement is not possible under the existing patterns of agriculture.

Thus, between the villages, areas of open grassland are to be seen which are used for grazing, cultivation of annual crops with a seven-year fallow, and for the erection of schools, hospitals and churches, and where local markets are held.

Each village consists of a number of homes (between 50 and 800) and each homestead consists of land under permanent cultivation and a number of houses scattered amongst the bananas. Borders between the homesteads are well recognised locally, but are scarcely visible to the visitor. A special shrub is used to mark the border, intermittently spaced between bananas. Narrow footpaths wind their way between homes, and some wider cattle paths lead out to the grazing areas. There are only a few roads wide enough for lorries to pass, and open spaces for public gatherings are not commonly seen. Small businesses (shops and bars) and local industries and crafts (carpenters, cycle mechanics, blacksmiths and basketmakers) are operated from within the private homesteads. There are only a few market centres with distinct shops and business premises, and they largely owe their origin to administrative decree and are located along the main roads.

The village economy and socio-economic stratification

The agricultural sector
The basis of the economy in terms of production and employment is the production of the two perennial crops, bananas and coffee.

A piece of land with perennial crops makes up the heart of a farm and is called in Luhaya a "kibanja". Once established a "kibanja" only demands maintenance in terms of weeding, supply of manure, and occasional pruning and replanting. But
the establishment of a kibanja is labour-demanding and it takes two-three years before it starts yielding and up to ten years before it is fully established.

All land under perennial cultivation is privately owned and inherited in direct line from father to sons. If a man has no sons the land will revert to the clan who will decide who will take over the land after his death. People are much concerned about the ownership of their land, and clan books as well as the daily life in the villages are full of disputes and quarrels about land, especially about the exact borders between the farms. In recent time sale of kibanja land has become more and more frequent, especially among people who have little land and no possibilities for expansion near at hand. They sell their small kibanja in order to raise money to enable them to open up a new kibanja in areas of expansion and to survive until the new kibanja starts yielding.

Open grassland outside the perennial crop areas and unopened bushland is nationally owned, and distributed by government agencies. When expansion into such land is desired a peasant should apply to the local committee and will be given free usufruct rights to a designated piece of land. (Formally private ownership of land does not exist in Tanzania, but in reality people in these areas will regard land brought under perennial cultivation as private property, which can be transferred regardless of government sanctions.)

The size of a kibanja varies. Most kibanja are between 0.5 ha and 1.5 ha. Between 1 ha and 1.5 ha is the size which can be maintained by the labour available in a family and which can produce enough food for the family. A peasant may have more than one piece of kibanja in the same village or in different villages. This would also mean that the peasant would have more than one wife, with each wife settled on the different pieces.

Table 2.2 (see Chapt. 2) shows that the landholdings are generally larger in Karagwe than in Bukoba. The table gives the figure for the total areas of landholding, and not only for land under cultivation. If land under cultivation was shown, the differences between the two Districts would have been smaller.

Almost all peasants in Bukoba and most peasants in Karagwe grow coffee and obtain a regular, though not large income from the coffee. The average yearly income from coffee was 349 shs. in Bukoba and 386 shs. in Karagwe, as we observed in a sample survey in 1971.

Bananas are universally grown and are the staple calorific food grown for subsistence. Recently bananas have also become a cash crop sold a) to areas facing a shortage of subsistence production, b) to the banana-eating sections of the population in Tanzania’s bigger towns, and c) for local beer production. In Karagwe there is still a reasonable potential for surplus production, but export of the surplus from that District is hampered by the poor roads and the perishability of picked bananas.

Annual crops are interplanted twice a year in the kibanja and/or grown outside the kibanja. Beans, bambara nuts, and ground nuts are the most important annual crops in terms of size of production and nutritious supplement to the diet. They
also have the advantage that they can be stored. Beans—the least labour-demanding of the three—are increasingly grown also for sale. Maize is, at present, interplanted with beans and grown only in small quantities to be eaten green. Root crops (sweet potatoes, casava, yams) were mainly grown as supplementary food crops for the drier season, when the bananas yield less. Root crop production is increasing as existing banana production becomes less able to meet demand.

Since 1950 marketing of coffee has been undertaken by the Bukoba Co-operative Union (BCU), covering both Districts. It was not until very recently that BCU also started marketing food crops. Till then most food crop marketing had been in the hands of private traders and characterized by a large number of middlemen, fluctuating prices, and a haphazard organization in which the retail trade was dominant. Food crop marketing in the Region continued to be weak and badly organized and a constraint on increased production.

Family labour is the main source of agricultural labour, especially from female members who are responsible for the labour intensive activities of weeding, cultivation of annual crops, planting, harvesting, processing, and storing. The men adopt a more supervisory and specialised role concerned more with the tasks of the establishment or expansion of kibanja, pruning, and replanting of perennial crops, and harvesting coffee.

Organized co-operation in agricultural work was very rare. Men who own cattle may co-operate in grazing the cattle. In areas threatened by attack from wild animals men would co-operate in hunting. Women only co-operated in watching the annual crops on the open grassland outside the village to protect them from damage by birds and other animals.

It was very common to use hired labour of which there was a plentiful supply. People from Ngara on their way to Uganda as well as poorer people from within the area were prepared to accept work in the farms under a variety of contracts ranging from permanent employment to piecework for food or money.

The farm-family-cycle
The socio-agricultural pattern has been characterized by a continuous process of farm-family-development cycles aiming at the provision of subsistence for the present generation and securing the means of subsistence for the next generation, as it is described in Chapter 2 p. 27–29. Fathers were expected to pass on enough land for their sons to survive upon. Each son could claim the basic means of subsistence: a piece of land established with perennial crops, and a wife, from the father, and it was the duty of the son to expand his land in accordance with the growth of his family. If a man could manage his resources well and generate a surplus, such surplus (labour and capital) was invested in a new kibanja and a new wife (for whom he would have to pay the brideprice himself with no support from the father). Only in rare cases was it possible to get land bordering the inherited kibanja. This meant that a man owning more than one kibanja would be the owner of economic units scattered within one or several villages. It was often preferred to have land scattered
in several villages to avoid quarrels between wives and to reduce the risk of climatic or disease damage to crops.

In economic terms this system did not lead to accumulation as the resources were continuously split up into smaller subsistence oriented units. However, a man could gain social prestige and local political influence, the more he could claim to be a “manager” of a number of such small farm-family-units,

In more recent time the system has shown itself increasingly unfit for adjustment to the changed surroundings. As described in Chapter 2, arable land suitable for establishment or expansion of kibanja is not available within reasonable distance of the old settlements in the more central parts of the two Districts (especially Bukoba). A fragmentation of land into pieces too small for family subsistence is increasingly experienced. During the same period the demand for cash to cover the living costs and the expenditures for education and training has increased. Through this process can be discerned the emergence of a rural proletariat, a group of people who owns so little land that it has only a cultural and psychological meaning to them, and who are forced to sell their labour for mere existence. As mentioned in Chapter 2, arable land is available in the Region, but not close to the old settlements. But for people in this class there is a distinct lack of the necessary funds to invest in bush clearance and establishment costs.

A number of recommendations have been made on how to improve the agricultural production of the settled area. Some of the more common of these recommendations are: pure stand planting (which however has a tendency to use more land and is therefore not feasible on small landholdings), better husbandry in terms of more careful weeding, mulching, pruning, and spraying (which can lead to increased production, and which is mainly labour-demanding), fertilizer (which is too expensive for most farmers, and whose profitability is often marginal), and manure (a valuable addition to this type of soils, but in short supply). All these recommendations can, at best, lead to a quantitative improvement, they do not solve the problem of land-fragmentation, and they lead to no transformation of the economy.

The non-agricultural sector
The division of labour in the household economy has favoured the men in terms of labour inputs in agriculture. During the period of the kingdoms and well into the colonial period most men also had some traditionally defined, clan determined, non-agricultural occupations. Quite a number of men were involved in the iron industry, others in handicraft, construction work and administration. Skills were well developed to carry out these functions, and passed on from father to son within the clans.

During the colonial period imported goods replaced the locally made products and foreign administrators took over the administration. This had led to a loss of many traditional skills. But the tradition for male dominance had continued and is today even more pronounced than earlier. It has persisted through post independence of africanization of the administration, is found in all social services and bu-
siness, and has been reinforced by the slow development of the agricultural sector. In spite of the introduction of new crops and recommendations to “modernize” agriculture the men are mainly interested in their farms as owners rather than as agriculturalists. Few peasants really believe that they can improve their positions economically from an agricultural base. This is especially pronounced in Bukoba, where land shortage is more advanced and where non-agricultural job opportunities are better than in Karagwe.

The non-agricultural sector is the major factor in today’s socio-economic stratification. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this exists almost without any industrialization. The infrastructure has not been developed to support all agricultural production, as it is still mainly serving the single export-crop of coffee. Trade and transport as well as construction work suffer developments and cut-backs in accordance with the major fluctuations in coffee prices. The most rapidly growing part of the public sector are the social services (health, water and education) and the administration. This part of the non-agricultural sector is not directly productive, it is costly (high, regular, controlled salaries, expensive supportive equipment, etc.) and it absorbs the surplus from the basic productive sector, agriculture.

Since Independence the bureaucracy has become a bigger employer of skilled manpower and especially since the Arusha Declaration its relative importance has gained as bigger businesses have been nationalized and bureaucratized. This has led to the formation of an increasingly large group of public employees. Due to the privileges and the characteristics of this group, the salariat, and to its specific position in the economy it is developing into an upper class distinct from a peasant class. The salariat is provided with the benefit of regular salaries (even the minimum salary received by the unskilled employee in a bureaucratic institution is higher than the average income of peasants in the area). Through higher incomes the salariat can afford a higher living standard with more expensive consumer habits. The social network of a salaried employee is much wider through the medium of his working place which can vary over time, as he is transferred. And he can influence development strategies through his position and have more intimate knowledge of them, all of which improves his chances as a peasant at the same time. Through its economic base, its position, and its influence the salariat is setting a pattern and creating a level of expectations amongst the peasantry.

However, members of the salariat still maintain close ties with their home villages, and still have to respond to the pressures of extended family obligations. So even if this is an adverse trend over the longer term, as the opportunities and wealth of the salariat increase out of proportion to incomes in the agricultural sector, at least, in the short term and locally, their relative wealth is spread. Dependent on the level of salary, considerable investments may be made in improving the standard of housing on his village plot, and that of his immediate family who probably also made earlier sacrifices for the benefit of his preferential education. This also diffuses purchasing power in a limited way in the villages, particularly supporting the construction industry.
In some areas where population is very dense and whence there came many salaried employees, notably Kiziba and Kanyigo, agricultural incomes are at such a low level, that even a recipient of occasional "gifts" from a salaried worker is immediately more wealthy than a purely agricultural peasant.

If, at some stage, the salariat abandons its village base there will be a consequent loss to the village economy.

Village government
The nucleated villages as distinctive social units were, until Independence, the smallest administrative units. Since the mid-60s the administrative structure had been changed and the villages were no longer administrative units. The two lowest levels of administration were the *Ward* (covering 10,000 to 40,000 people) and the *10-cell* (covering approximately 10 households or some 50–70 people). The party was structured in a similar way to the administration. At Ward level the party as well as the government is represented each by their own officials, whereas at 10-cell level, party and administration are amalgamated in the office of the 10-cell leader, an unpaid post to which a person is elected from among the 10 household units. The Ward and 10-cell officials and party representatives are responsible for all formal local government.

Below this formal level, a network of *informal* responsibilities exist, which influence day-to-day activities in the village more than the formal administration and which are more important for the formation of a "public opinion" in the villages.

In each village a number of different clans are found, but most often one clan will be dominant in terms of number of members and "age", that is the number of generations which, undisturbed, have held land in the village. The clans are governed by their elders in a strictly authoritarian way. These elders deal mainly with division of land, registration of divided land in the clan books, and with disputes over rights to land. But they also supervise and influence the behaviour of their younger clan members and interfere in their activities to a strong degree.

Apart from the traditional authority of the elders, the village is informally influenced by the well-established villagers, who operate from a "diversified platform"; owners and managers of several bibanja and of businesses, and who live in the village or close enough to it to enable them to maintain frequent, personal contacts with the villagers. Such men are likely to be elected to the influential positions on the board of the co-operative society, on the church board, on the committee for adult education, etc. Also they are the persons who are able to extend private credits to all those for whom no formal credit facilities exist. They, more than any other group of people or institution, are in a position to influence the daily life of their neighbours.

Such, in brief, is a picture of the productive, social and political economy of Bukoba villages.
The “old” ujamaa villages—
the Makazi Mapya resettlements

The first step towards the formulation of a policy for transforming the rural economy of Bukoba was a paper written by the Regional Commissioner. In his paper the Commissioner showed his enthusiasm and full support to Tanzanian aspirations and presented his interpretation of the policies and his guidelines for this Region. In brief he said that since people were already living in villages the main problem of rural development was, then, not a scattered population, but landhunger. This should be solved by a government supported resettlement scheme, moving individuals who cultivated less than 1 ha of land into areas marked off as new settlements. These settlements should then develop into ujamaa villages.

The first phase of the resettlement—the selection of people and their transfer to new areas, with bush clearing and soil preparation was called Makazi Mapya (new settlements). The sites for the Makazi Mapya were only hastily chosen, often without ground survey and only from the consultation of maps. This was done by officials who were enthusiastic to show their support for the R.C., but as a result there was insufficient preparation—one site was located exactly on a traditional execution field—and many people were moved against their will to inhospitable sites. The selection methods and the transportation of people allowed misuse of power and harsh methods of treating people. Plenty are the stories of rude treatment and plenty are the people who left the new areas and returned to their old villages. Apart from leading to a bad reputation for the Makazi Mapya this first phase of ujamaa implementation led to the transfer of the Regional Commissioner following a presidential commission of inquiry into the matter.

Of the settlements started as Makazi Mapya in 1968, 5 survived the harsh start in Karagwe and 6 in Bukoba District and are now ujamaa villages.

The model for ujamaa villages
All the Makazi Mapya, later to become ujamaa villages, were laid out according to one model all over the Region:

The total area of the village was divided into privately owned and communally owned land. The privately owned land was divided into 0.5 ha plots (in Ngara into 1 ha plots) laid out side by side in rows. Each household was provided with a 0.5 ha plot on which to build the house. The communally owned land, belonging to the village, was divided into a small part in the centre of the village for communal buildings (store, shop, clinic, etc.) and a larger part for the communal fields, surrounding the household plots (see map 5).

Production was likewise divided into two sectors: a private one for family consumption, and a communal one for market sale and supplementary subsistence.

It was a conscious policy not to introduce coffee and bananas in order to avoid introducing biased attitudes attached to these crops inherent in the traditional
villages. A variety of annual crops was to be introduced: maize, beans, ground nuts, casava, sorghum, as basic crops. After two years of existence this policy was changed due to pressure from the members, and coffee and bananas were planted in the communal and the private fields.

The production on the 0.5 ha plots was to use family labour, and production on the communal fields was to be based on the man power available in the village (the total number of adults, irrespective of households). Each village was to determine its organization of labour, and communal participation was to be recorded in a register.

The harvest and/or incomes of the communal production was either invested in the communal sector or divided among the members according to the registered labour-input.

The formal social organization of the village was to be based on ten-cell units of households. The members of the village were to elect a chairman who would be head of the village and responsible for the daily running of the village and its communally owned assets. He, together with an elected committee of 4–6 members were to be the governing body, assisted in their work through formation of sub-committees responsible for various activities.

Recruitment to the ujamaa villages
By his choice of policies and its implementation to solve the basic problem of land hunger, the then Regional Commissioner had already identified the “proletariat” of the peasantry as those people who would be “persuaded” to go to ujamaa villages. In doing this he ignored the recruitment of the better off, the better educated, or the more dynamic parts of the population, who came to look upon ujamaa villages as places for unskilled, unlucky, poor, even half-criminal people.4

The majority of the poor peasants who were moved to the Makazi Mapya returned to their old villages within a very short time. Some stayed on for some time and participated in the difficult start before they gave up and left. A minority of the first settlers remained, mainly because they had no other alternative. They subsequently made up the core of the population of the original ujamaa villages. Since 1969 no forced settlement took place. Slowly the population of the old ujamaa villages increased again in response to the continuous appeal by government and party to the people to “go ujamaa”. But 4 years after the opening up of the new settlements there was still a fluidity of the population as individuals, though there was a trend for absolute numbers to stabilize.

Whilst there is a slight surplus of women over men in the regional population, the new villages contained a majority of males. There are several reasons for this: in the traditional system men alone inherit land, so during registration of land-holdings prior to the Makazi Mapya, only men were registered and subsequently moved. It is also a tradition that men open up new land to be joined later by women to cultivate. In some cases men joined, because they were short of
female labour at hand, and hoped for support in their work from other villagers and from the government.

Few old people moved to the ujamaa villages. Most people were between 25 and 50 years old and were in that phase of the family development cycle in which there is a need for expansion in the household economy. Almost half the ujamaa population were children below the age of 16 years.

Most women were married and joined as their husbands' wives, whilst 1/2 to 2/3 of the men were married, the rest being either divorced or unmarried.

All the areas available for new settlements in Bukoba District were far from the old overpopulated villages. There was, therefore, no chance to select a new settlement area so close to the old villages that it was possible to maintain close contacts and receive support while settling. So compared to Ngara the percentage of settlers in Bukoba District who had land in their home-area was much smaller. People came from a number of different villages into the new settlements. In one village 40 adult members came from 18 different villages, in another, 124 adults came from 24 different villages. Sometimes those who moved to the ujamaa villages after the first wave deliberately chose to go where friends had already settled. In Karagwe the biggest ujamaa village was like a refugee settlement populated almost entirely by people from Rwanda, and as such was an exception to the other ujamaa villages.

Economic development of the ujamaa villages
The ujamaa villages were all in “frontier areas” of bushland on the fringes of the densely populated areas. In some of these areas the soil turned out to be rather barren, only productive if heavily treated with manure and fertilizers. In most areas wild animals were a threat to people and crops. (See map 7, for an illustration of the location of one village. The dry weather road marked on the map had been built purely for the new village, and Omuranazi turned out to be one of the more successful ujamaa settlements.)

During the first year of resettlement all effort was devoted to the development of the private 0.5 ha plots. The government posted one or two agricultural officers in each new settlement to advise people on the establishment of their crops. The settlers were also provided with tools, seeds, and seedlings by the government, and ready food (maize, flour, beans, salt, and cooking oil) was supplied free. During the first year the government started the construction of certain services, mainly roads, water supplies and schools. During the first year no communal production was started.

Annual food crops for individual food production were recommended by the agricultural officers and people were advised to plant in rows with proper spacing. Although annual food crops were first planted, bananas and coffee soon found their way into the private plots in the same pattern as in the traditional villages. Apart from occasionally following the advice of planting in rows with proper
spacing, the techniques employed on the private plots became similar to that of the traditional villages, the same tools were used, the same crop pattern, and the same division of labour.

Even if each household was originally given 0.5 ha of land, after the first 4 years there appeared an unequal acquisition of private land. Some villagers managed to acquire and cultivate more than 0.5 ha. They succeeded because they brought into the village more private savings than the others, with which they even managed to hire labour, or because they used their positions as village leaders to further their own private resources.

On the other hand, the majority of the settlers did not even succeed in cultivating the whole of their 0.5 ha plot. Some managed only a few square metres, some half of the plot or a little more. It is rather difficult to see the reason for being unable to cultivate 0.5 ha within 4 years. An important reason may have been that settlers earned no income from the village. They were, therefore, forced to work for money (and also for food, as government food supplies failed, were delayed in arrival, or were of such bad quality that the villagers could not eat them) outside the ujamaa village. Most of them worked as unskilled land labourers, which meant that they were mainly forced to sell their labour at those times when their own fields demanded labour input for cultivation, weeding, and harvesting. But some other reasons mentioned by the settlers were that some plots were so infertile that poor returns to their efforts discouraged them, and that some of them never intended to stay in the ujamaa villages but used their stay as a platform from which to seek other possibilities for settlement. The general status after 4 years was that the ujamaa villages were not self-reliant in food, although the government was no longer supporting them with free supplies. Map 8 shows the distribution of ujamaa villages in 1972.

The communal sector
Communal production was started one year after the foundation of the villages. All possible effort from the government was devoted to supporting the start of communal production. Rather detailed annual production plans were prepared for the villages by the agricultural field officers who were supported by the staff in the district- and regional offices. A rural development officer was posted frequently to assist the agricultural field officer in planning and plan implementation. In the plans, directives were laid down as to how much land should be brought under cultivation, which cropping pattern and crop rotation should be followed, which types and amounts of inputs were needed, and how the labour should be organized. To start the communal production, the government would supply all requested inputs except labour, which was to be contributed by the villagers.

One theoretical advantage of the communal production was that it was possible to open a sufficiently large area of land so as to enable the introduction of improved and modern techniques leading to a gradual mechanization of agriculture. It would
also have been easier to supervise the cultivation and introduce the villagers to modern techniques. And of course communal ownership to land and communal production would lead to social and economic equality.

In all eleven ujamaa villages annual crops (mainly maize and beans, but also sorghum, ground nuts, and cassava) were planted in the communal fields, partly not to introduce the traditional perennial crops to the ujamaa villages, partly to make the villages selfreliant with food and market a surplus for cash incomes.

Keeping pace with the supply of the planned support to all the villages at the same time turned out to be impossible. Tractors were delayed in arrival and the land had to be cultivated partly by hand. Seeds did not arrive in time for planting, food supplies ran out. This together with the fact that the number of people present in the villages was very instable in the first years caused an irregular and slow start to communal production.

It has been difficult to judge the economic performance of these villages from official statistics which often reported grossly over-estimated crop areas. We were able to check these reported areas against more realistic estimates made on our visits (Table 5.1). The table also shows the lack of progress in communal cultivation from one year to another.

Table 5.1. Reported and actual communal crop areas in hectares in 1970–72 in one ujamaa village

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Reported area 1970/71</th>
<th>Probable area 1970/71</th>
<th>Reported area 1971/72</th>
<th>Actual area 1971/72</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peas</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After 3–4 years of communal cultivation a uniform trend can be seen in all villages. The size of the communal fields has not increased despite the heavy government support and has in many cases decreased. The amount of land communally cultivated per adult in all villages in 1971 was very small. The next table shows this.

Table 5.2. Communal crop area in hectares per adult village member, 1971/72

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Karagwe District</th>
<th>Bukoba District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>village 1: 0.12</td>
<td>village 1: 0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>village 2: –</td>
<td>village 2: 0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>village 3: 0.04</td>
<td>village 3: 0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>village 4: 0.004</td>
<td>village 4: 0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>village 5: 0.07</td>
<td>village 5: 0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>village 6: –</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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These figures are not very impressive. As they are based on reported figures, the
reality may well be worse. As the cultivation methods are rather extensive with
lower areal yields than intensive traditional cultivation methods, the figures
indicate that the villages were far from economically viable in their communal
production.

Neither were reported yields from the communal fields particularly impressive.
Examples of such yields were:

- maize: 700 kg per hectare
- sorghum: 720 kg per hectare
- peas: 140 kg per hectare
- groundnuts: 180 kg per hectare

Reasons behind low yields were late planting, poor weeding, and attacks from
wild animals. The harvest was small, and due to poor storage facilities part of the
harvest was always lost. No marketing system was planned for the villages in the
first years, so the government was forced to dispose of any surplus. During 1971
and 1972, 9 out of 11 villages were registered as co-operative societies, which
allowed them some autonomy in marketing.

Few villages received any income to share from the communal fields in the first
year, and after that incomes were small, never larger than 15,000 shs. per village.
When shared among the villagers according to their labour input, even the busiest
worker could not obtain enough to cover his minimum cash requirements.

Were there any real changes in the labour process?
(a) Labour input and division of labour
Most ujamaa villages started communal activities only with male labour, and the
late start in communal activities delayed any available income. Thus, many villagers
were compelled to work outside the village, which influenced attendance at
communal work in the villages. A vicious circle started, whose progress was difficult
to arrest.

Table 5.3. Actual days worked as a percentage of total available work-days (per month) in two
villages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Village 1</th>
<th>Village 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>51 %</td>
<td>81 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>40 %</td>
<td>79 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.</td>
<td>45 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr.</td>
<td>47 %</td>
<td>92 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>46 %</td>
<td>96 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun.</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>84 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul.</td>
<td>50 %</td>
<td>90 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>35 %</td>
<td>96 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep.</td>
<td>37 %</td>
<td>46 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>58 %</td>
<td>70 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>65 %</td>
<td>84 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>68 %</td>
<td>90 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In Village 1 the annual average worked was 50% of the available time, and in Village 2 it was 75%. In both villages there is a marked decline in Aug./Sep. and Sep./Oct.; the planting season, which reflects the need for work in private fields both outside and inside the village.

When planning for the agricultural production in the ujamaa villages it was taken for granted that the total labour input, female as well as male, should be divided between the private plots and the communal fields with priority given to the communal fields. The fact that the production from the very beginning has been divided between a food producing (private) and a cash earning (communal) sector has allowed a survival of the traditional division of labour. By being responsible for food production for the family, the women are less inclined to participate in the communal work, whereby their own access to a cash income is limited.

(b) Forms of co-operation

Food production was the sole responsibility of the individual households. No co-operation for productive purposes was formalized. No ways and means were developed in the ujamaa village for mutual support in food production. If support was needed (for instance in the case of sickness) the household depended on family and friends often living far from the ujamaa village. Co-operation was limited to the communal sector.

The establishment of communal fields implied forms of co-operation in decision-making involving all members of the village as owners of the land, in planning for production and distribution of the products, and in the division of work between themselves. In West Lake Region, such forms of co-operation never developed in the traditional society. The individual households were the basic production units and the head of the household was the “manager” of the household. Additional labour was bought for food or for money.

The understanding of a new and complex form of co-operation and the assistance required to develop this was an important task for the Party, supported by the government, as it was an important aspect of mobilization of the peasants for ujamaa development.

Unfortunately the Party as it is represented at regional, district, and village levels was not prepared for this task and mobilization was limited to endless repetitions of slogans and phrases and occasional contributions in terms of work with the villagers in the communal fields, to show the politicians’ devotion to ujamaa. The important task of mobilizing villagers for new forms of co-operation has been left with the government officials, especially the less educated lower cadres, stationed in the villages, who were not politically educated.

With the importance attached to ujamaa from the very top there was a strong pressure on these lower-cadre government officials to produce fast and good results.
The result has been that planning was often one man's work, that of the agricultural field officer, and that decisions on production and distribution of products were taken by the government officials together with the village leadership who merely consulted the village for approval. This means that the villagers found that their actual daily work was planned without reference to their own feelings or capability, and this gives communal work an aspect little different to plantation labour, making the communal sector less attractive and less competitive with work outside the ujamaa village, where they are free to choose what they do, to earn or not to earn.

Co-operation is reduced to participation in communal activities according to the individual's preferences, if and when he/she feels likely to, or if he/she has no other more directly profitable ways of using his/her labour.

The government officials stationed in the ujamaa villages are given the most important but at the same time the most demanding and difficult rôle to play in implementing the ujamaa policy. Not specifically trained technically and politically for their new jobs they are being pushed by higher level government officials to show results while at the same time they are accused by the villagers for trying to push them to work.

Technological change?
If the establishment of the communal shambas had not yet led to the hoped for forms of co-operation, it is worth examining if some technological changes have been feasible with the change in scale of operation.

The government introduced monocrop cultivation into the communal sector as opposed to the traditional interplanting in the private sector. New and improved seeds, supposed to give higher yields, were introduced, and some agricultural mechanization was begun. Tractors with ploughs and planting machines replaced human labour input in cultivation and planting. The new techniques introduced by the government were accompanied by staff from outside the village. The villagers themselves were not actively involved in the use of the new techniques, but were "used" as labourers to fill out gaps in the production process not carried out by the machines: weeding and harvesting, which was carried out with traditional tools and techniques.

Since the technological innovation is beyond the level of operation of the villagers they become dependent on conditions out of their control. Many cases were seen every year of tractors breaking down or being delayed, seeds not arriving, etc. delaying the production and leaving the villagers in a vacuum of uncertainty.

Three out of the eleven ujamaa villages attempted to introduce intermediate technology in the form of oxen and ox ploughs and carts, which should be more easily manageable by the villagers, and which should decrease the dependency of a slowly functioning bureaucracy and a poorly developed infrastructure. Latterly the villagers were learning how to utilize the oxen.
Village democracy
The introduction of communal ownership to the means of production implied
democratic decision-making involving all the members of the community.

The framework for village democracy was laid down in the design for the formal
organization of the village. The village got an elected chairman and an elected
committee who should sit for limited periods with possibilities for re-election
according to the village by-laws, and who should work through sub-committees
settled for specific tasks. Every adult member should have the right (and the
obligation) to vote. Procedures for meetings, in which presentation, discussion, and
decision upon village matters should take place, were formulated in the village
by-laws.

The elected leadership (chairman and central committee) soon realized that their
new positions gave them power. In the beginning their only power base was their
relations to the government and party representatives through whom the village
got support and allocations of funds and who visited the village frequently.
Gradually the village leadership was able to widen their power base through
collection of information from the government and party bureaucracy and gain
control over how much of the information to pass on, and how much to withhold
from the ordinary villagers.

For the village leadership it was a matter of a delicate balance in relating closely
enough to the bureaucrats and showing satisfactory solidarity with the ordinary
villagers vis-à-vis the outsiders. The more the implementation of policy was pushed
through the government and Party, the more strained became the relations
between the bureaucracy and the villagers, and the more delicate became the
village leadership positions. However, at this stage many of the village leaders had
started consolidating their power base economically through access to more land,
to benefits in business, to the village funds, etc.

Since there was no proper political education and no efforts to mobilize the
ordinary villagers and train them in subjects such as book-keeping, accountancy,
organization, co-operation etc. by the government and especially not by the Party,
and since the village leadership was not interested in furthering democratic
decisions which they rightly saw as undermining their own power base, it became
increasingly difficult for the ordinary villager to control the leaders and follow what
was really taking place. Meetings in the ujamaa villages clearly showed that
they were not the forum for basic and important decisions, but were reduced to
endless discussions of trifles.

Tensions in the relations between leadership and ordinary villagers occurred
and one example shows how the "outside" leader interfered in favour of the
village leadership:

At the annual meeting in one ujamaa village in 1972 the villagers had prepared
themselves to present evidence that the chairman had misused village funds for
personal gain and to propose dismissal of the chairman. A whole day's discussion
of the matter was followed by the chairman's admission of guilt and voluntary
resignation. An acting chairman was elected. The following day the annual meeting continued discussions under the chairmanship of the acting chairman until the arrival of the M.P. for the area, who came on his yearly "duty to work with the villagers". At the meeting he called in the resigned chairman, appealed to the villagers to excuse him "as everyone can make mistakes" and to re-install him. He was re-installed and has later been awarded by the Party with a trip to China.

This example indicates that interference in the internal attempts to settle the village problems on a democratic basis became a demonstration of the power base of the chairman based on his "external" relations.

Diversification of the village economy
The core of the communal sector and the basis of the village economy should have been the production from the communal fields. Surplus from this production should have been invested in further development of the village. In general, the results of the communal production were meagre and showed no signs of increase.

There was no systematic, critical analysis of the yearly development to enable a "learning from experience" process. The reasons for the meagre results have been pointed out, but no serious action was taken to seek solutions which would have led to increased production from the fields. Instead, emphasis was put on alternative communal production, introduced with heavy government support to compensate the failure of results from the communal fields.

During the 3rd and 4th year of the existence of the ujamaa villages the following alternative production oriented enterprises were introduced: bee keeping for honey production (in 3 out of 11 villages), upgraded dairy cattle (in 4 out 11 villages), beef cattle (in 5 out of 11 villages), wood-cutting (in 2 out of 11 villages), and small-scale industry (carpentry in 2 out of 11 villages). As all 11 villages were located in the fringe areas which were poorly served with infrastructure, retail trade and marketing were started in the ujamaa villages to serve their own members as well as villagers from the neighbouring villages. 9 out of 11 villages were, as mentioned, registered as marketing co-operative societies and the same 9 villages also opened co-operative shops.

These enterprises demanded skills which were not available in the ujamaa villages. They were therefore run by the "outside" bureaucracy who lived in the villages. Only at a later stage were efforts made in providing these skills by sending the villagers on courses and seminars (mainly for shop assistants and secretaries in the co-operatives, but also for carpenters and ox-handlers).

Each of the new enterprises led to the formation of new sub-committees with chairman and secretary and a division of labour emerged based on specialized skills within the village in so far as the people who learnt to deal with oxen or bee keeping or shops did not then participate in cultivation. In that way the labour force available for basic agricultural production in the communal fields was reduced. As the work in the communal fields had never been highly esteemed, a certain division
of prestige accompanied the division of labour between different communal enterprises.

**Provision of infrastructure**
One of the short-term aspects of the policy was to supply people with access to basic infrastructure to increase the rural standard of living. During the first 4 years priority was given to the ujamaa villages at the expense of allocations of development funds to the traditional sector, clearly expressed in the impressive number of infrastructural facilities supplied within such a short time. All villages were given access roads. 9 out of 11 villages had shops and marketing societies, 10 out of 11 had clean water supply, 9 out of 11 had schools and all villages were supplied with a first-aid box until dispensaries were built. Together with the facilities, qualified man power was supplied: school teachers, medical orderlies, rural development staff—all lower level government employees, who maintained their pensionable positions in the government bureaucracy and received salaries from government sources rather than from the village budget. These people were not full members of the village and did not have rights to vote, etc.

These government officials were used to the bureaucratic way of working—receiving orders and carrying them out. They were not trained for their new role as advisors and teachers of the villagers, who were in theory supposed to decide upon their own affairs. Because of their positions, their bureaucratic habits and their possession of the special skills to operate the innovations, they seldom could abstain from treating the villagers as their subordinates.

**Social stratification**
During the first couple of years of existence, especially during the first six months, the number of people living in the ujamaa villages varied from month to month. A number of people left the villages for good, some left for periods, and some joined the villages permanently. The total population of the 11 ujamaa villages in 1971 was 3059. The first years were thus dominated by a high degree of instability. As a consequence of this and of the fact that people came from many different villages, the social relations between people within the villages were rather strained and characterized by mutual suspicion. Concurrent with the increasing stability of the population the social relations became more and more relaxed and stable.

By far the majority of the people who were moved to the villages or who joined voluntarily at a later stage belonged to the peasant “proletariat” of the traditional villages. Considering the smaller variations among these people (some had no land in the traditional villages, some had small pieces of land, and some brought a little capital) the majority were a rather homogeneous group of poor and unskilled people.
Table 5.4. Number of villages registered as ujamaa villages year by year since 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bukoba District</th>
<th>Karagwe District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A minor fraction of the village population consisted of the government officials whose salaries—far above the level which the villagers can hope to obtain within a number of years—were not part of the village budget.

Among the peasant proletariat of the ujamaa villages a differentiation emerged through the bureaucratization of the village economy. These village bureaucrats consolidated their position through the establishment of an economic base different from the ordinary villagers, as pseudo-salaried workers (not receiving salary directly, their functions however counted a full day's work every day the year round, so that their share of the communal production was relatively higher) as owners of bigger plots, or in business.

Establishment of further ujamaa villages after 1968

Since 1968 a number of villagers "went ujamaa" as a response to the continued appeal by government and party to peasants to start ujamaa activities.

Ujamaa development since 1968 has followed 3 lines:
- a diversification of the village economy through introduction of new crops on a communal basis,
- cultivation of additional village plots of traditional crops on a communal level,
- expansion of old villages through communal efforts.

The total number of ujamaa based activities was not available, but those villages which became registered as ujamaa villages were recorded, and their annual registration is shown in Table 5.4.

The response to "go ujamaa" in Karagwe was not very impressive. For Bukoba the comparatively higher figures in 1970 and 1971 reflect the introduction of tea and dairy cattle on a communal basis as an attempt to diversify the economy and create additional income possibilities in the densely populated areas of the district, where establishment of new villages was impossible due to shortage of land suited for the traditional crop pattern but where grass land on which to grow tea and
graze cattle was available. These ujamaa activities are described in the following chapter.

Apart from the registered tea and dairy ujamaa units, the new ujamaa villages, which were started after 1968, were based on communal cultivation of traditional crops either within the traditional villages or as expansion into new land close to the traditional villages in the few places where this was possible. These ujamaa villages differed fundamentally from the old ujamaa villages from 1968 insofar as they were not settlement schemes and insofar as only a fraction of the villagers were involved in the communal production.

Of the total District population of approximately 400,000 they made up 2500 (923 adults). The area brought under cultivation was small and was on average a tenth of a hectare per adult. In economic terms this ujamaa sector meant little. The main labour input was still concentrated on the private plots in the traditional villages. Of greater interest were the attempts to open up new land on a communal basis. Through communal efforts and with the help of the government support which followed registration as ujamaa villages, some of these people, who might otherwise have been destined to landlessness, had a chance to improve their living conditions.

Conclusion

Involving a little less than 2% of the total population of the two Districts, Bukoba and Karagwe, the ujamaa sector was so small that it had little impact on the overall development trends in the Districts, it was rather a small enclave which was kept alive by the government and party with development funds and expertise, and which was increasingly dominated by the structures of the surrounding society.

From the very beginning the ujamaa policy was implemented selectively for the lower strata of the society and never succeeded in attracting the higher strata. What the ujamaa policy, in the way it was implemented in this Region, offered the peasantry was exactly what they needed: land, infrastructure, and support to open up new land away from the family land, a support which was not available from their families.

Yet, the response to this offer was meagre, partly because of the harsh start to ujamaa which gave it a bad reputation, partly because the peasantry did not see this so clearly as their chance to establish a solid economic base.

As new settlements the ujamaa villages did stabilize themselves socially, although in the first 4 years they showed no sign of reaching a stage of economic viability, not even of self-reliance in food. It is also questionable if it is possible to talk of any transformation of the economy which would have continued in momentum after the government withdrew its support.
Due to the lack of proper political education and mobilization based on explanation, discussion and understanding of the ideology, ujamaa development has been the management by disengaged bureaucrats of activities carried out by peasants who did not appear to shoulder initiative at any time, as government relief invariably saved disaster. This was their bargaining power, and it is still impossible to make a dispassionate judgement on the real popularity of ujamaa settlements.

Notes

1. P.C. Walwa: "The Plan for Accomplishing the Arusha Declaration in West Lake Region".
5. Kahinda ujamaa village in Karagwe was an exception. The Rwandese population of that village were used to cultivate large fields of a variety of annual food crops, so there was no fixed limit to the size of the private plots.
Chapter 6

Ujamaa enterprises in traditional villages

After the doubtful experiences of the West Lake administration in creating ujamaa villages as new settlements in the unsettled areas, through the transformation of the 1968 "Makazi Mapya", a fresh effort was made with the aim of introducing new single productive enterprises into "traditional" villages, as "ujamaa" enterprises. This was done initially with encouragement from the government to new agricultural activities—tea and dairy production—and subsequently with more tacit approval from the authorities, when the idea "caught on" and groups of villagers initiated their own ujamaa groups with less specific production plans. The two principal examples of this latter development, were the ujamaa women groups, and the spontaneous village groups in Karagwe.

In Tanzania there is a specific women's organization within the party called "Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania" (UWT), and this organization has cadres at all levels from the village through the ward, district and regional level, to the national level. It was the village cadres who, on the advice of the national cadre, began to organize village-based women's ujamaa groups in some villages of Bukoba District. The initial stimulus for this activity was a desire for this branch of the party to show its solidarity with party policy by participating in the national "ujamaa movement". In Bukoba District there was a tradition for communal working groups of women to deal with particular problems of family and community food supply, as for example in the cultivation of sweet potatoes and bambara groundnuts. This was part of the traditional system whereby the production of these food crops was the responsibility of the women. But the traditional system also put the women in an inferior position with regard to the control and disposition of productive agricultural resources. The expected advantage of these new ujamaa groups would now be that the women would get more of an opportunity to share the benefits from commercial agricultural production.

Most of the women's ujamaa groups in fact only varied their activities into tea cultivation, and the early experience of these is outlined later in the chapter. But, in brief, the experience of these ujamaa groups was much the same as that of the spontaneous ujamaa groups in some villages of Karagwe. Both were initiated by the people, but did not receive recognition, nor therefore the right kind of support from the government enabling them to become more important and significant elements of the development of ujamaa.

The spontaneous ujamaa groups in Karagwe were started by the villagers who had an ambition to improve the economic status of their communities. In one village that was situated on the frontier of uncultivated bush, the village members formed an ujamaa group to extend the cultivated area of the village for food supply.
Having achieved this they went on in order to produce a surplus for sale, with the intention of using the proceeds to establish a cooperative shop.

In the other village communal production was started with this as the immediate aim, and in the second year there was enough capital to start the organization of the shop itself. A major problem for these villages, contrary to the experience of the settlements, was lack of assistance in organizing their activities. The villages still had to buy stock for the shops from the organizations in Bukoba town which were primarily there to serve the retail shops in the larger towns, which already had the working capital to maintain large stocks, and the transport to collect them. Thus although this ujamaa organization was inspired from the grass roots as an attempt to take on one of the principal aims of the national ujamaa policy, viz. "transformation of the economy", little help came from the top when it came to breaking into the competition of the distribution sector that was dominated by marketing boards, parastatals, and larger retailers. Villagers had to pay the bus fares of their representatives to travel to Bukoba town, and because the quantities of goods required by small village shops were too small for the State Trading Corporation to sell directly, the villages bought from retail shops, at retail prices. This was despite the fact that the co-operatives had region-wide transport facilities, and probably the ability to act as wholesalers on their behalf.

Most people involved in ujamaa schemes incorporating the "Enterprise Approach", are in the ujamaa tea schemes and the ujamaa dairy schemes. Tea cultivation and dairy production were the agricultural innovations that were the principal concern of the regional agricultural department during 1968–1970. So in 1969 it was resolved that these two activities should become the basis of an official enterprise approach to the spreading of ujamaa into the traditional villages.

Generally, Tanzania was seeking to expand tea cultivation as much as possible, before international quotas could be established, and it was doing this with the aid of a World Bank loan. Every District of Tanzania where tea could be grown was given rather ambitious targets for acreage expansion and factory construction. Also, as part of a national policy for self-sufficiency in dairy production, every Region was encouraged to try and become self-sufficient in dairy products, and grade cattle and extension staff were made available for this purpose. These agricultural priorities coincided with the regional plans for diversifying ujamaa implementation. At a seminar of district departmental heads in May 1969 three resolutions were passed regarding the implementation of ujamaa, of which the third was:

"To recommend ways whereby the present scattered homesteads (i.e. the traditional villages) can live and work together communally, subsequently to turn into ujamaa villages."

This resolve was immediately incorporated in the agricultural development plans, and these were then formulated so that all future tea and dairy expansion should be with ujamaa production systems. The only directly stated aims of the authorities concerned the introduction of communalism into traditional villages.
But communalism was in practice distinct from socialism. In theory, a new productive branch could have had an effect of social levelling in traditional villages, if poorer strata had had a chance to a greater share of the new resources. Existing social inequalities were measured in terms of access to coffee/banana kibanja and resources of that were limited. Membership of ujamaa groups of the new enterprises would, in fact, indicate the degree of levelling they achieved. After these groups had been running for some time, it was found that the membership consisted largely of the households that already had higher than average incomes from coffee, and larger than average areas of food crops. Rather than change the social structure of traditional society, the new enterprises were entrenching existing differences. This trend was more pronounced in relation to the ujamaa dairy enterprises. Not only was the membership of ujamaa dairy units without any bias in favour of the rural unemployed, but it was an enterprise whose use of scarce resources was inefficient in terms of the opportunity costs of alternative use of land and capital in Bukoba District. It would be difficult to find an agricultural enterprise in Bukoba that could use so much land and capital and produce so little food or income for so few people. In an area with such a high population density as Bukoba District, it would—as part of a socialist policy—seem much more important to choose agricultural enterprises that intensify the production of protein food on the scarce land.

The ujamaa tea scheme

Tea-growing before ujamaa

Small-holder tea production had started in Bukoba in two phases: in 1963–64 planting season the first phase was established in the Maruku area (see map 9) just south of Bukoba town, and in 1966–67 the second phase, the Bugabobo scheme, was started in the area west and north of Bukoba. In the Maruku scheme all small-holder tea had been planted in individual plots where the small-holder had been able to obtain a piece of grassland. The pattern of tea production in this area was of fairly scattered plots in the grassland around the extensive villages where the small-holder had his own home and mixed holding of bananas, coffee and beans. By 1970–71, 1025 different small-holders in this scheme had planted 332 hectares of tea: about 1/3 hectare each. Thus in the space of seven years approx. 12% of rural households had taken tea as a new agricultural enterprise—even if limited land and labour resources restricted the size of their plot to an average size that would only bring a possible gross income of 1000 shs. once the tea became mature.
When the Bugabo scheme was started, as an expansion of the Maruku scheme, the agricultural department decided on a policy of block cultivation: all small-holders choosing to grow tea owning parts of a block of planted tea in the open grassland near their village. This decision was made primarily under technical considerations: tea cultivation was given an intensive extension input to control planting, pruning, fertilizing and plucking régimes and it was easier for the extension staff to work on tea that was planted in the same place. Furthermore, since the beginning of the tea scheme, initial cultivation of the land had been a totally free input from the Bukoba Co-operative Union tractors. It was originally intended to make a deduction from the buying price of tea to cover cultivation, but by the time deductions had been made for planting material and fertiliser, the price was already low relative to the slow growth in yields from immature tea. Because the tractor section of the Bukoba Co-operative Union had been running with a deficit since it started tea cultivation, there was an added stimulus to reduce cultivation costs with the block cultivation system. The nucleus of this scheme was Katoma cooperative society, and by 1970–71, 149 farmers there had 60 hectares of tea, about 0.4 ha each, and within 5 years about 6 % of the rural households in Katoma had adopted tea.

So by the time the third part of the tea scheme—the Katoke ujamaa scheme—was started, the other two schemes in Bukoba had attracted about 1300 individual farmers to grow tea on private plots whose average size was about 0.4 hectares. In the villages where, by this time, the number of new growers each year was becoming small, the proportion of all rural households cultivating tea was levelling off at about 12 %. This compared with proportions of between 40–60 % of households in the same villages who were members of the coffee-growers societies.

It is important to identify some of the more important characteristics of tea-growers amongst the total rural population. Did they also grow coffee? Did they have large or small food crop shambas? Why did they grow tea? These questions would have been relevant to the discussion about the future of the ujamaa tea scheme, because, without any controlling influence over the membership of ujamaa groups, it may have been expected that the ujamaa scheme would develop with a membership similar to the group of rural households who had by then chosen to be private tea growers.

These questions can be answered with reference to two sample surveys carried out by one of the authors. In one sample survey in the Maruku scheme, information is available from a sample of 23 tea growers who were studied very closely over a one-year period. In the other survey 42 growers participating in the Katoma (Bugabo scheme) block were interviewed in a one-visit survey. Some of the results of these surveys can be compared with the information available about the total number of households and land available in the villages where they were made, and with the information about membership of the coffee co-operative societies in these villages. This comparison is made below in Table 6.1:

The information in the table shows that in both areas the tea growers were
Table 6.1. Who were the Private Tea-Growers (1971)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Maruku-Kanyangereko (Maruku Tea Scheme)</th>
<th>Katoma Block (Bugabo Tea Scheme)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample size (tea growers)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of sample growing coffee</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>91 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village(s) size, households</td>
<td>3400</td>
<td>2100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of village households members of coffee society</td>
<td>51 %</td>
<td>40 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of village households growing tea</td>
<td>11 %</td>
<td>7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average coffee income/household, sample</td>
<td>322/50 shs</td>
<td>565/00 shs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average coffee income/household, society members</td>
<td>1082/00 shs</td>
<td>707/50 shs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average &quot;Kibanja&quot;/household, sample (a)</td>
<td>0.51 ha</td>
<td>0.84 ha (b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total land/household, village</td>
<td>2.06 ha</td>
<td>2.76 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Kibanja&quot;/household, village (c)</td>
<td>0.53 ha</td>
<td>0.71 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of sample with other jobs</td>
<td>17 %</td>
<td>19 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) "Kibanja": a mixture of bananas, beans, maize and coffee; the main family food shamba,
(b) Unmeasured, interview source only, so answers reduced by 25%.
(c) It was estimated that 26% of all land in this area is "Kibanja".

almost all also growing coffee: tea had not been adopted because they lacked a cash enterprise in agriculture, but because they wanted a supplementary source of income.

Very few of the peasants who had no coffee were able to adopt tea instead. It is also shown that amongst all coffee-growers, the tea-growers were a group with incomes from coffee lower than the average per member in their society. The table also shows that the sampled tea growers had the average size of food shamba and that some of them were also holding other jobs. In short it seems that the tea-growers, while not amongst the households with large coffee-enterprises, were amongst the households with an average livelihood from food crops shambas and an income from coffee, and in some cases, other jobs. They were households with a solid basis of traditional livelihood, and had adopted tea as a supplementary source of income. In fact they probably also had a preferential position in the access to grassland, as limited availability of this suitable land restricted the proportion of households who could grow tea. The labour demands of tea cultivation further restricted this proportion, as tea needs an average of 267 man-days per hectare4 or 107 man-days per 0.4 ha plot, and thus tea-growing was only feasible for households who could spare this labour over food production requirements.

Technical aspirations and progress
Before the decision was made to start an ujamaa tea scheme, it had already been decided to expand tea cultivation in the District, so that by 1975 there should be 2200 hectares of tea and about 3700 growers, This target was set by the Tanzania
Tea Authority, in a development plan that foresaw the yield from this new tea as filling the capacity of three tea factories in the District. Two new factories were to be built, as Tanzania had been successful in obtaining a loan from the International Development Authority with which to establish factories, feeder roads and nurseries in the tea-growing areas to facilitate expansion of planted tea.

By 1971, there were altogether 424 hectares of tea and 1350 growers; so the targets demanded an increased planting of 1800 hectares and an additional 2350 growers of tea over the five-year development period. Some of the new tea area would have been added by intensive expansion in the Maruku and Bugabo areas but it was forecast that 600 hectares was to be planted in a new area south of the Maruku scheme.

Although rainfall decreases both inland and southwards away from Bukoba, it is considered that 1500 mm a year is sufficient rain for good tea yields in Bukoba, and in the Katoke area there is suitable grassland with good rainfall where tea could be planted. Physically there is room for 600 hectares of tea in absolute terms, although increased use of these grasslands would reduce their cattle-holding capacity.

In 1970 it was determined that four co-operative societies in the Katoke area: from north to south, Muhutwe, Izigo, Katoke and Kahengere, should be the focus of the scheme (Map 10).

Initially 19 groups in various villages volunteered to start ujamaa tea plots, and 600 individuals in all volunteered to participate. The scheme started with a flourish. Bukoba Co-operative Union tractors were busy ploughing land in the 19 villages in early 1971 in anticipation of a March planting. Planting material from the new nursery at Katoke was plentiful—they were growing enough seedlings there for the projected 600 hectares, and by March 1971 60 hectares had been ploughed.

But as soon as the volunteering groups had to start their own work on the plots, the pace slowed down considerably. When the time came for action, the early volunteers found that more time was demanded than they had available, others were cautious about commitment to full co-operation in the first year. So by the time 1971 was coming to an end, less than 18 hectares had been planted, leaving 2/3 of the ploughed land unplanted, although almost 2/3 of the original volunteers to the scheme had confirmed their membership in ujamaa groups. This meant that, per member, the amount of tea planted was very little, and this feature persisted in the scheme. Compared to the 0.4 ha of tea per private grower elsewhere in the District, the ujamaa groups in Katoke had, by 1972, only 0.08 ha of tea per member.

This smaller planting is related to the labour organization of the ujamaa groups as they functioned. Ujamaa work was only considered to be practical when a majority of members could be present for work at one particular time, and the partial commitment characteristic of membership limited most groups to two mornings of ujamaa work per week.

In contrast to the decision of an individual producer about the scale of a new
Table 6.2. Planted Tea per Member, 1971, 1972, Katoke Ujamaa Scheme and 1964, 1965, Maruku Scheme. (Hectares)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Societies in Katoke</th>
<th>Muhutwe</th>
<th>Izigo</th>
<th>Katoke</th>
<th>Kahengere</th>
<th>Maruku Scheme (1964, 1965)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tea per member</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st year</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd year</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

enterprise to be adopted, the communal expectations of increased income were tempered by a far greater uncertainty factor regarding available resources, as long as the participants were all also individual economic units in their other agricultural activities.

But within the gross average amount of planted tea per member of those ujamaa societies, there was a variation between groups, depending on their age, which showed that in the two-year old groups, the tea per member had increased. This is shown in Table 6.2, and compared with the tea plantings per individual grower in the earlier Maruku scheme.

The table shows that although the absolute areas of planted tea were smaller per individual in ujamaa groups, these groups were expanding their tea on the same scale as the early growers did in the Maruku scheme. After two years it was impossible to forecast how ujamaa groups would function after five years.

The other variable which would determine the growth of the scheme was the membership, including the members of ujamaa groups that were formed. In the first year, 1971, a total of 19 groups were formed with 369 members.

In the second year, 1972, new groups were formed both in new villages and in the same villages, as “splits” of the original groups (the location of the original and new, groups is shown on map 10). This increased the total membership from 369 to 849 and the number of groups from 19 to 55. The details of this expansion are shown in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. Table 6.3 shows the expansion of groups, and Table 6.4 the expansion of membership.

The membership of the original groups did not change very much, except in Kahengere society (where tea growing was difficult, being so far south and lying outside the area of sufficient rainfall). But many of the original groups expanded with “splits”—that is, the original block of tea was expanded under the control of other ujamaa groups in the same village as the original group. More people in the village wanted to participate in ujamaa tea cultivation, but existing groups considered themselves large enough for organizational reasons. These “splits”
Table 6.3. Expansion of Ujamaa Groups in Katoke

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Societies in Katoke</th>
<th>Muhutwe</th>
<th>Izigo</th>
<th>Katoke</th>
<th>Kahengere</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total 1971 groups</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New groups 1972</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) &quot;splits&quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) new villages</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1972 groups</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.4. Expansion of Ujamaa Membership in Katoke

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Societies in Katoke</th>
<th>Muhutwe</th>
<th>Izigo</th>
<th>Katoke</th>
<th>Kahengere</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total 1971 members</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 members of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>original groups</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New members 1972</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) &quot;splits&quot;</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) new villages</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1972 members</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>849</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

numbered between 1 and 4 in each case, and Tables 6.3 and 6.4 indicate that the model membership of an ujamaa group was between 10 and 20 members. Further, in the second year of the scheme, as many groups had started in new villages, as had started originally in the first year.

After only 2 years' performance it was impossible to estimate when the technical targets will be fulfilled, but at least the record of the first 2 years showed a possibility.

The targets were for 600 hectares, and 1,000 participants by 1974; at least by 1972 there were 850 participants even if there were only just over 60 hectares planted. The small planting was due to the much more gradual expansion than expected of each group's tea plot, as the estimate for 600 hectares was based on each group rapidly expanding its plot to a size equivalent to 0.6 ha per member. However, the pattern of development in the early years indicates that the target area of planted tea could have been reached but probably over a slightly longer time, with at least double the estimated participants, and with therefore less than half the amount of estimated tea per participant. If these conditions had been reached by 1975, then by 1980 the green-leaf yield of the scheme could be 2,100 tons.

But there is one important factor which would condition this possibility—the labour factor. Until 1972, all the planted tea had been young and had not been yielding leaf. Once tea starts to yield then the labour requirements increase, and
the income obtainable from tea is directly related to the labour input in picking the leaf. Until 1972 the labour demands for the tea were small and only concerned with planting and weeding. In the earlier survey by one of the authors, some of the labour requirements for different operations in tea cultivation were measured. These are reproduced in Table 6.5 below, where they are given as man-days per hectare, and as man-days per 0.3 hectare, as that could be the maximum amount of tea per participant as the scheme continued.

Taking the labour requirement of mulching, planting and weeding (supposing all cultivation of ujamaa blocks by tractor) then the labour required in ujamaa blocks, where planted tea was only 0.1 ha per participant, was only about 66 hours per year. As most groups had two 3-hour days ujamaa work per week, these labour requirements were easily met even at a low rate of attendancy. However, when each participant was related to 0.3 ha of tea, and when this tea was being plucked, then the labour requirements would have been about two 6-hour days per week, at 100% attendancy.

Continuing to work on the basis of 3-hour days, groups would have had to increase the number of work days to 4 per week, or else extend their working days.

Small as the labour requirements were, some ujamaa groups were already employing migrant Barundi and Banyarwanda labourers to fulfill their tasks.

The use of hired labour was criticised very strongly by government personnel attached to the scheme, and one such criticism is quoted here, because it offers an outsider’s explanation of the reasons.

Farming/Cultivation, socially it’s a new innovation to the people. Traditionally they are used to hire labour from Barundi and Banyaruanda to work in their coffee and banana shambas. Usually supervision is done by wives, while husbands go out for business, employment or pombe. Traditionally males work in fields only if poor and it is considered a degrading practice. Thus working in tea shambas by their hands has shown a very big change in their sociology, They make poorer and poorer attendance.

However, they do share and help each other when in difficulty; as to bury a dead body, building etc. But working for money, this is a new practice. Usually, they possess individual farms or plots and work individually nearly competing with one another. Thus ujamaa, though they live together, is a strange thing since it involves working together and sharing of the benefits among large groups of people.
Even so, some of the well-off people do use hired labour to work for them in the ujamaa shamba/plot. This then discourages the poor ones from joining in since they feel they are being exploited by the rich ones since poor ones work with their own hands and sweat while rich ones do not. In the end these will get equal shares from profits which they did not sweat for.

Use of hired labour is also an important illustration of how social differentiation persisted in this type of ujamaa activity. There was a difference between the levels of personal commitment members felt regarding basic labour input. This could be interpreted more widely as the difference between those who used their share of the ujamaa block as a minuscule plantation–paying labour to do their work–and those who participated because they valued their own labour returns. Those who hired labour included many who had non-agricultural sources of income, for which the opportunity cost of their time was far higher than the 2 shs per day they paid for hired labour. A man could fulfil his share of the ujamaa work with hired labour, and still be entitled to a share of the yield for which the gross return would be 600 shs, less about 160 shs for labour.

The practice of labour hiring for ujamaa work–besides being so blatantly against all principles of ujamaa–encouraged “take-over” of others’ shares, unequal shares in the plot, and the emergence of differentiation tendencies based on, or reinforced by, the ujamaa enterprise. Bearing in mind the large government inputs and indirect subsidies the ujamaa tea had for establishment, this was an easy way for those with other cash incomes to enhance their position. Fortunately, most groups were fairly strict about “equal shares”–although a case-study shows that some groups were definitely not.

We have attempted to review mainly the technical aspirations of ujamaa tea schemes up to this point. To an unfamiliar reader this may seem an over-lengthy discussion–because the underlying aims of ujamaa are political. But on the other hand, there is some justification for this approach. So far, much of the effort behind implementation, and most of the institutional assessment of the scheme has been purely technical. The authorities in Bukoba felt more compelled to consider fulfilling Tanzanian tea production targets than to consider using ujamaa to solve any disparities in Bukoba rural society. This review of the technical aspirations and achievements does show that these aspirations were potentially in reach–even if the bare figures of area planted in the first 2 years represent only 1/10 of the target.

**Political aspirations and progress**

This section deals with the relationship between the basic Tanzanian principles of ujamaa and the interpretations of these that were made when Katoke Ujamaa Tea Scheme was started. These are the assessable aspirations. To assess the actual progress, reference will be made to two case studies where the author had a chance to conduct surveys of the membership of two ujamaa groups.

According to the stated principles of ujamaa, one would expect that the Katoke Tea Scheme was instituted in order to bring some social levelling to traditional
villages, in addition to communalism. If people were persuaded to participate communally in one productive activity, the germ might spread and they would then begin to share more resources in other branches of production, and through a creeping communalism would transform traditional private ownership to communal ownership, and thereby a socialist way of life. In addition, this type of ujamaa development would have provided new productive resources to classes of society who had previously been in a disadvantageous position in their villages. Tea was grown on grasslands that were poorly productive in other ways.

Were any of these notions behind the regional authorities’ aims when they began to implement the ujamaa scheme? What was their interpretation of ujamaa? Some answers to these questions were given in a district seminar in 1969 discussing the future rôle of ujamaa in West Lake development. The agenda relevant to the Katoke type of scheme took the form of comments from the Regional Commissioner, discussion and resolution. These are reproduced here.

The Regional Commissioner’s main concern with Tanzanian socialism was his own interpretation of “Self Reliance”:

The Regional Commissioner... talked on the theme of ‘Siasa ya Ujamaa na Kujitengenea’ (the policy of ujamaa and self-reliance). He elucidated on this topic and every member present in the seminar was left with a clear vision. He then noted that people in Bukoba are lazy (especially men—for women do most of the work). He therefore charged the seminar with the following tasks:

(a) To look into the setbacks of the present ujamaa villages.

(b) To look into the ways and means of making Bahaya peasants (especially the men) put more effort into farming. In other words to determine the possibilities and frontiers of exertion that an ordinary Mhaya can put into his farm; to “coax” a Mhaya to have pride and inspiration in farming and therefore to increase the acreage of his holding.

(c) To look into ways whereby the idea of communal working can be inculcated into the Bahaya and hence the introduction of the ujamaa villages ideology into the currently scattered homesteads.

There was not much interpretation of “self-reliance” here concerning the nature of reduced dependency: it was a simple interpretation concerning increased work. Also evident in this and the following discussion by other administrators was the frustration they felt at not understanding the strong social organization of the local people—expressed in epithets of laziness and lack of pride. The general consensus saw “self-reliance” by harder work as the most important “aspect” of ujamaa in traditional villages. No reference to any socialist aspects, but an interpretation of ujamaa as a communally based increased use of labour in production.

Thus the discussion continued largely on the Regional Commissioner’s theories:

Discussion:— In an attempt to meet the challenge left by the Regional Commissioner to the Seminar, the discussion was centred around the root cause of laziness among the Bahaya men. In the diagnosis the following points were noted:

(a) That drunkenness is the major root of laziness.

(b) That traditionally, the work routine gave more leisure time to men whereas the poor women were drudging for not less than 12-14 hours of the 24 hour day.

(c) That the perennial crops; coffee and bananas are inducers of laziness... People always expected to reap ‘from the tree that my grandfather, or my father passed on to me at his death’.

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And the relevant resolution became:

To recommend ways whereby the present scattered homesteads can live and work together communally, subsequently to turn into ujamaa villages.

This should be done in the following way:
1. Block farms of tea, sugar-cane, rice etc. should be started. These blocks should turn steadily into ujamaa farms.
2. Communal cottage industries should be encouraged. Also introduce cattle which will be reared communally and hence communally owned.
3. Let the people cultivate the conviction that working together in groups is more conducive to prosperity than otherwise. Hence let them work, plough, weed and harvest individually-owned shambas together. This is a good step to 'Communalisation'.

The nascent tea and dairy schemes were readily available mechanisms to implement the first two quoted "ways... to live and work together communally...". The third "way", the communalisation of established private production was never attempted.

It is interesting to note the reference to prosperity. Unqualified, it stands as a major aim of ujamaa production. But what is the real qualification of prosperity in Tanzania's ujamaa policy? Is it merely increased prosperity of established groups, or is it a new prosperity for marginal groups in society? Or has this distinction ever been made really clear, was it ever taken as an important starting point in ujamaa? These questions are elaborated in their general context in the conclusion of this book. In the context of this ujamaa scheme it referred to the prosperity of established groups. The selection of the groups who could operate ujamaa tea plots was on a voluntary basis. But this conformed with an interpretation of ujamaa, so the scheme developed in such a way that there was a difference in established private-ownership-prosperity between different groups, and also within every group between members.

Out of 8 groups we visited in 1972, only 1 group consisted of individuals who felt they shared a common lower-than-average access to traditionally productive resources, and hence had taken to ujamaa tea as a way of redressing this situation. The other groups, and by extension, probably the majority of the existing groups, were heterogeneous groups of village members, with representatives of both the well-endowed and the poor households in the village. Quite often the former households were very strongly represented. Two groups were chosen for closer study, and these are presented below as case-studies. One was chosen because it was the largest, and therefore, by consensus of local opinion, the most successful ujamaa group. The other was chosen because, although relatively small, it seemed to be one of the most enthusiastic groups, with more than the usual commitment to communal inputs. This group, and the group mentioned above, where a few individuals had adopted ujamaa tea because they felt a common need to improve their relative prosperity in the village, were the only 2 groups where ujamaa work was organized in a strictly communal way.

In these 2 groups alone of those visited everyone worked together over the whole
plot. In the other groups, including the large group, decisions had been adopted quite early that the “best” way to organize ujamaa work was to divide the plots equally between members, so that each member had a definite and equal portion to maintain. This was an interesting political development in the interpretation of communalism. When the leadership of the groups in question were asked why this system had been chosen, they replied “So that he who doesn’t do his share can be laughed at, or else, more tactfully, so that everyone knows how much they must do.”

To the leadership of ujamaa groups, this organization did not seem a radical departure from what they understood as communalism—but it is easy to see how it was already a significant departure from ujamaa principles. The opportunities for maximised output from economies of scale, from maximum use of available labour, were immediately constrained. And, worse, it strongly encouraged the use of hired labour.

One very simple extrapolation from this situation illustrates the dangers of what was apparently unimportant. In a properly organized ujamaa group, the member who found more and more constraints on his own labour availability, could still work at the infrequent times he was available—and share the overall reward accordingly. But under this system, his plot fell further and further behind the rest, and eventually he received an offer to be “bought out” by others, whose personal labour availability was as limited, but who could afford to substitute with hired labour.

It is in fact rather difficult to see that there is any major difference between this type of ujamaa organization and the earlier employed block farming system—except for the name.

The case studies

Pseudonyms are used for the villages, because if any criticism emerges, it is felt they are applicable to many villages, and should not be directed against any particular group. The leader of this group was very insistent upon his “open door” policy for membership and the pseudonym is Kiswahili for this.

Village No. 1: “Mlango Iko Wazi”
This was the first village to be established in Katoke Tea Scheme, and it boasted a leading politician as its honorary chairman. It was one of the largest groups in the scheme, and was frequently cited as the “most successful”. The growth rate of the village, in terms of tea and of members was as follows:
Table 6.6. Growth of “Mlango Iko Wazi” Ujamaa Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>June 1971</th>
<th>June 1972</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planted tea</td>
<td>4.05 ha</td>
<td>5.94 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planted tea per member</td>
<td>0.06 ha</td>
<td>0.10 ha</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was a drop in membership and obviously the “open door” covered all movements in and out.

While we were initially being shown the tea area by the politician he (the politician) proudly described how this was only a beginning, and that “his” village would soon expand their ujamaa activities. It was at this point that we first noticed the Wanyarwanda and Wahangaza labourers’ weeding the plot, and realized that hired labour was employed. When the politician was challenged about this, he explained loftily that of course some of the members were really too busy to work their own shares of the time, and that it was therefore necessary to hire labour. It was with some difficulty that we made him understand that the new ujamaa enterprises, could, in this way, become capitalist enterprise. Perhaps this was too sophisticated a criticism of ujamaa implementation to be accepted so early. But at least one of the Regional Commissioner’s more colourful explanations of the value of ujamaa in Bukoba—to make people work harder—had been successfully circumvented. The so-called “lazy” local people had not in this case been necessarily committed to increasing their work input in agricultural activities with the introduction of ujamaa.

To find out more about which part of society the ujamaa group represented, a sample of 22 members were interviewed (39 %). To compare these members with the ordinary households in the area, a comparison of some characteristic features is made below, on the same basis as Table 6.1, which made the same comparison for the private tea growers in the earlier parts of the scheme.

Table 6.7. The members of Katoke ujamaa group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mlango Iko Wazi</th>
<th>Katoke society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Coffee Growers</td>
<td>95 %</td>
<td>62 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Coffee Income</td>
<td>570 shs</td>
<td>305 sh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Kibanja”/household</td>
<td>0.89 ha</td>
<td>0.76 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with other jobs</td>
<td>32 %</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Similarly to the private tea-growers elsewhere in Bukoba, almost all the participants in this ujamaa group were coffee-growers, although the overall proportion of coffee-growers amongst all households in this area was only just over 60%.

But in contrast to the groups of private tea-growers, this group of ujamaa participants had a much higher than average income from coffee—indicating that they did not necessarily come from among coffee-growers whose coffee no longer gave them a significant cash-income. The private tea-growers of Maruku and Katoma had lower than average coffee-incomes. As coffee was the main source of agricultural income in the Katoke area, this indicates that the members of Mlango Iko Wazi came from the most prosperous strata of local society. Added to this, 32% of the sampled members of Mlango Iko Wazi, had other, non-agricultural sources of income, as artisans and traders, whilst 6 of 22 who were interviewed had children or siblings in élite administrative or commercial jobs elsewhere in Tanzania.

The sum conclusion of these observations is that the sample drawn from “Mlango Iko Wazi” membership, was a group of households most representative of the more prosperous social stratum in the area. Agricultural incomes and food production resources were higher than the local average, and access to secondary sources of income was widespread, either through direct employment outside agriculture, or through remittances from family members. It was later learnt that most ujamaa groups in Katoke restricted membership to people who were members of the coffee-producers society, as this was “some form of security”. Several other groups that were visited in Katoke showed the same tendency for the nature of membership. The next case-study, however, is taken from the single ujamaa tea village found outside the Katoke scheme.

Village No. 2: Mugata
Although outside the Katoke scheme, this group is described because the group was started entirely voluntarily; without any persuasion from outside, and it was interesting to see if the villagers had had any particular motive to start an ujamaa unit. Of course, the Katoke groups were also voluntary, but they had volunteered as a result of a specific appeal by the government officials. And they knew that they could not cultivate tea unless they formed ujamaa groups. The group in this second case-study referred to here as Mugata, in fact was established before the Katoke scheme was started, in 1970, and the reason the villagers had started was that “they had heard about ujamaa on the radio, and from the newspapers”, and they believed there were benefits to be gained from communal activities.

Mugata Ujamaa Tea was started in April 1970, and in 1972 there were about 6 hectares of tea, and 25 members. Ujamaa work was normally carried out 3 mornings a week for about 3 1/2 hours a day. The early planted tea was beginning to yield in September 1972, and the whole plot was being fairly well maintained. Communal work was organized as a communal operation: no definite shares of the
plot had been allocated for work, the work was simply divided according to the number of members who were present every day, and there had never been any use of hired labour.

The chairman of the group had a large coffee-farm in the village and was a very active leader with definite ideas about the goals of the ujamaa enterprise. "In this village we have many young children, but we no longer have land to give them. We want to make this ujamaa tea shamba a new piece of wealth in the village, that our children can use in the years to come." "If there are young boys in the village who have no land they must come to us."

Six of the 25 members were young men who were still living with their fathers, which confirmed these statements.

Mugata was an ujamaa tea-group that worked communally, apparently with enthusiasm, and one that had definite socially defined aims. The most striking feature of membership was the extent of family involvement in the group. The 25 members came from 13 households (if we define households as individual agro-economic units). 11 members were married heads of households, 7 were wives of these household heads, 4 were sons of these members, living at home, 2 were sons of other non-member households, and 1 was a young single man who had just inherited a piece of his father's land. Some of the member household heads had large families, containing potential future members. Diagram 11 illustrates the inter-relationships between ujamaa members and other family members sharing the same home.

Nine of the ujamaa members belonged to 2 main families, consisting of 4 household units, in which there were a lot of children. Two of these households belonged to the Chairman and the Secretary, who between them had 9 male children between the ages of 10–20, all potential members of the ujamaa group by the Chairman's definition. This may have influenced the Chairman when he proposed the idea of the ujamaa group to his village neighbours, but the membership did not indicate any intention of keeping the group as an exclusive family affair.

Once again, it is possible to compare the main economic conditions of the participating households, with estimates of the general level of agro-economic conditions in the village. For this, again, we use the same tabular comparison made in relation to the other case-study.

Table 6.8. The members of Mugata Ujamaa Group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mugata</th>
<th>Nyakato Village</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member households</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Coffee Growers</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Av. Coffee Income</td>
<td>877 shs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Kibanja&quot; area/households</td>
<td>1.21 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with other jobs</td>
<td>12 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although there was a multiplicity of ujamaa members in several households, the 18 households participating in Muguta were all coffee-growers, and their average coffee income was double that of the village’s of which only 40% of the households were coffee-growers. The holding of food-crop production land—“Kibanja”—by member households was also much larger than the average. The Mugata group, ignoring the special participation of young sons of households, was a relatively very prosperous group within the village. However, if the chairman’s policy continues, then, after some years, the incorporation of young households with small food-production and coffee-production resources, could affect the average prosperity of membership considerably.

These two case-studies confirm that awareness of political aims in ujamaa tea is related mainly to increasing agricultural activity, by group incorporation of extra tasks into traditional agricultural labour-use. This is to fulfil the limited political aim of proving the economic advantage of communal activity, and proving that anyone pursuing a traditional agricultural way-of-life can find the time to take up communal activities.

Both case-studies show groups of people who were relatively prosperous—but this did not run contrary to the stated political aims in West Lake. The leaders never put to the people any interpretation of ujamaa in traditional villages in terms of wealth redistribution. Without such guidance, the chairman of one ujamaa group had the foresight to consider the ujamaa tea enterprise in his village as an opportunity for providing agricultural resources to the landless. But this consideration was not part of the ujamaa enterprise policy pursued by the Region’s various rural development departments.

Accepting the limited political aims of the ujamaa tea scheme, what was the level of success in achieving these aims in the first years? Most of the ujamaa tea groups worked together on average two mornings a week, and attendance at work was approximately 50%. Some of the groups hired labour, although not always as regularly as “Mlangolo Iko Wazi”. The Regional Commissioner stated that the principal aim was to make people work harder; there probably was a net increase in the total amount of agricultural work. Another aim was, by introducing the “spirit of communalism”, that the traditional villages would sooner or later put all their resources and production in common, and thereby eliminate the inequalities existing in the villages.

At a general level there were not any signs of this, and without external interference it would have been hard to imagine any member of a Bukoba rural society making his personal investment/heritage of coffee and banana trees available to common access. Such was the importance of individual plots of bananas and beans in the Bukoba system, that even in the “New Settlement” ujamaa villages, there was a strong tendency to give priority to work on private plots and to treat communal work as a residual activity.

If ujamaa tea communities continue and consolidate their membership and production, the overall tea production targets may be achieved, and some parts of
some communities will be the better for it. But were there any alternatives to this pattern of development, and thereby, have any important opportunities been missed?

Conclusion—Missed opportunities?
One of the original aims for the “New Settlement” ujamaa villages in the Region had been to provide new agricultural resources to people who had poor land resources in their traditional villages. But this aim was not really integrated into the policy of “grafting” ujamaa enterprises on to traditional villages. This was probably because it was generalized that members of traditional villages already had their agricultural resources, and that the new enterprise could only be an addition to these, for general benefit and to introduce communalism. This generalization, when applied to a village in Bukoba District, disguises the fact that there are village members who now, or sometime in the future, will have a problem in securing sufficient resources to maintain a family. As it was impossible to survey every village for identification of the poorest households, it may have been possible to generalize that two particular groups of households, or members of society, did have an underprivileged access to productive resources in the system. One group consisted of the households of widowed and divorced women, who lived with a number of children; another group was of the young men in their early twenties, whose potential share of inherited land was very limited—and who stood to suffer as the pressure on land intensified.

The “New Settlements” were an extensive expansion of agricultural resources, but the tea enterprise, by developing hitherto unproductive land in the heavily populated areas, provided an alternative means of livelihood in agriculture. For the population groups, named above, whose means of livelihood in the traditional system were limited, ujamaa tea enterprises could have become the foundation of their economy. The government could organize ujamaa groups specifically for young primary-school leavers or for single women whereby, because the ujamaa tea was not merely a subsidiary but a main enterprise, the amount of tea cultivated per member would have been far higher than in the present ujamaa groups.

The economy of these groups would then have differed significantly from that of the traditional banana/coffee growers in the area. Inevitably, as there is now, there would have been less land available to them for banana cultivation and they would have to realise a higher proportion of their agricultural production as cash (from tea), than the established banana/coffee growers.

The young primary-school leaver group could have been encouraged while still at school to regard ujamaa tea as a viable prospect for their future. The education programme in Tanzanian primary schools has been organized to teach agriculture, and a few primary schools in the District had a very small plot of tea already for educational purposes. It was possible that one of the most relevant educations that the older classes in primary schools could have received would have been how to
organize a communal production of tea and how to operate on a commercial basis. Then school-leavers would have seen a realistic future in agriculture, rather than an aversion, which now leads frequently to a period of joblessness.

Finally, the social position of single women in Bukoba is not so easy in the traditional system, as it is, for example, in areas of annual cropping elsewhere in Tanzania. The proportion of single women amongst the Bukoba population is almost twice as high as the Tanzanian average (2.5 % of the total population, compared with 1.6 % for the whole country). Some of these single women manage to secure adequate agricultural resources to feed their families, but often only with the assistance of non-agricultural incomes from trading, bar-work, or prostitution. The majority of these women had very small plots to produce food for their children: hardly anything in terms of food requirements and inheritable land. Making ujamaa tea cultivation an active economic possibility for this group would have freed them from a very marginalized position in the traditional access to agricultural resources.

Improved access to agricultural resources was one of the principal aims of the national ujamaa policy, and while the ujamaa tea scheme had the potential of furthering this aim, this potential was largely ignored. Population pressure on land is very heavy in Bukoba District, and the more acute the situation became, the more some groups became marginalized in the agricultural sector.

The ujamaa dairy units

Ujamaa dairy units were started in 1970, at the same time as the ujamaa tea units. The intention of the government was to encourage modern dairy production units in traditional villages, using imported exotic cattle and cross breeds, which would both supplement the food supply of the village and provide a product for cash sale. The decision was based on two factors: first the Bukoba urban market for liquid milk, second the low protein component in Bukoba rural diets. The annual milk consumption of Bukoba town was some 250,000 litres of which between 100,000 and 200,000 litres were imported from Kenya. The Bukoba rural diet, in which the staple food is cooking bananas, one of the poorest staples with regard to protein content, is also known to be insufficiently supplied with supplementary protein: e.g. milk, meat, fish and even vegetable protein. Both beans and bambara nuts are grown traditionally, and both have high contents of vegetable protein, but for some reason possible expansion of these is usually disregarded when additional production of protein is considered. Hence the decision to inaugurate ujamaa dairy units.

The organization of the ujamaa dairy units was as follows. Groups of households in villages were encouraged to adopt ujamaa constitutions and declare their desire
Table 6.9. Government Assistance (Loans) Given to Dairy Ujamaa Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Itahwa</th>
<th>Ilemera</th>
<th>Bukeire</th>
<th>Bukambagamoi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member Households</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk Cows</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calves</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulls</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of livestock</td>
<td>30,000 shs</td>
<td>10,000 shs</td>
<td>12,000 shs</td>
<td>61,000 shs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash loan</td>
<td>15,000 shs</td>
<td>7,000 shs</td>
<td>13,000 shs</td>
<td>17,000 shs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

to start dairy enterprises. The administration would then offer assistance in the form of loans from the Regional Development Fund, and of advisory staff from the regional Veterinary and Agricultural departments. In most cases the loans were in two parts. One part of the loan consisted of a number of exotic breed cows-in-calf, or heifers, imported from Kenya. The other part of the loan was financial assistance in buying cement, wire, iron sheets etc. to build cattle-housing and fencing. By mid-1971 these loans had materialized for four groups, and groups in 6 other villages were ready to start. Table 6.9 shows the government assistance received by each of the four established groups by mid-1972.

The size of the loan was an estimate of the capital requirements needed to run a dairy enterprise of the relevant size. The Regional Economic Secretary had calculated a normative budgeting plan for a 10-cow unit and had incorporated into the budget a large allocation of capital, which, if secured as a loan, could theoretically be amortized in 8–10 years. But the estimate was based on the general assumption that the dairy units would be completely commercial enterprises, and the particular assumptions that there would be (a) 4 hectares per head of fenced grazing, (b) fodder crops, (c) modern cattle-housing, (d) a milk production function typical for an established European farm in the area and (e) cash sale of most of the milk.

The production function incorporated the assumptions that a 10-milk-cow unit could operate with 40 hectares of fenced natural grazing, with 10 hectares of planted fodder and with supplementary feeding of concentrates to calves. With these inputs there would be an average yield of 1,000 litres per milk cow, and a supplementary production of bullcalves and manure for sale.

This budget, although it did not become the actual production prototype for the groups, had a strong influence over the government policy towards the dairy ujamaa units, and easily seduced the technocratic planners, for whom the development process was simply dependant upon achieving production functions. Hence the purchase, in the first year, of 118,000 shs worth of Holstein stock from Kenya, and the distribution of 50,000 shs as loans for purchase of wire, iron sheets, fertilizer and grass-seed.

What the planners failed to realize was the relatively low availability of open
grassland in Bukoba District, and the very strict constraint imposed on the productivity of this land by its low fertility. They also failed to appreciate that a certain level of yield was crucial if any compatibility could be achieved between the aim of increasing village consumption of milk and the aim of meeting variable and fixed costs by selling milk to Bukoba and substituting the supply of imported milk in the urban market. But even more important, was the failure to appreciate the value of the opportunity cost attached to the major scarce resource: open grassland.

After one year of operation, it was possible to observe some of the yields of milk in the ujamaa enterprises. These were directly related to the amount of open grassland that each group could use. One group had 40 milk-cows, 42 ha of fenced grazing and 0.5 ha of fodder, and the average yield in the first year was only 202 litres per animal. Another group had approximately the recommended 4 hectares per head of grazing, but no additional fodder and they had an average yield of only 500 litres per animal. It seemed that 1,000 litres per animal was a yield that could only be achieved with supplementary feed.

If the ujamaa dairy scheme was to expand in such a way that there could be sufficient units, operating on this scale, to supply Bukoba town with all the milk it presently imports from Kenya, what would have been the overall effect on land use and land availability?

Within 15 km of Bukoba, the likely range of a transport and collection system, it can be estimated that there are 7,500 hectares of open grassland. If the aim was therefore to produce 150,000 litres of milk per year, then 300 milk-cows would have been needed and they would have required at least 1,200 ha. As there were already 400 ha of tea planted in the grassland in this area, milk production of sufficient scale would have reduced the amount of available open grassland by 20%.

But if, as can be expected, the members of the ujamaa groups were to consume some of the milk themselves, e.g. 0.5 litre per family per day, then the scale of production and use of land would have been greater. The pattern of ujamaa units that emerged indicated that about 1 1/2 times as many families were members of groups as there were milk-cows in the unit. In this case 2,000 ha would have been occupied, with a total herd of 500 cows. This would have resulted in a very uneven access to grassland—and would thereby have been very difficult to achieve. This fact was indicated empirically, by the largest ujamaa dairy unit, which, although it had mobilized interest and support to acquire a total loan worth nearly 100,000 shs, had not been able to gain control over sufficient grassland to give its 41 milk-cows adequate grazing—and was thereby experiencing low yields.

Not only was the total supply of grassland limited but there were also important considerations regarding the opportunity cost of using the grassland for other cropping patterns of food production.

**Dairy schemes vs. expansion of existing “Kibanja”**

In the area there is a continuous process whereby new “Kibanja” is always being planted on grassland. But it is a very slow process (it takes up to 10 years to establish
Table 6.10. Comparative returns of food and cash to dairy and “Kibanja” land-use, on 50 ha grassland over 20 years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dairy production</th>
<th>Kibanja (yields only for last 10 years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross returns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>100.6 tons</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calves</td>
<td>125 head</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bananas</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1,575 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>158 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net cash returns (gross)</td>
<td>75,190 shs</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(inc. capital costs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net return (discounted)</td>
<td>35,900 shs</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total protein consumed</td>
<td>1,817 kg</td>
<td>36,300 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total calories consumed</td>
<td>27.3 million</td>
<td>651.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families involved</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash/family per year</td>
<td>250.60 shs</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Discounted) Cash/family per year</td>
<td>119.65 shs</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protein/family per year</td>
<td>4,390 gram</td>
<td>18,150 gram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calories/family per year</td>
<td>91,00 calories</td>
<td>325,600 calories</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a new plot of bananas on open grassland) and is not very extensive due to the low marginal fertility of remaining grassland areas. Plantation of Kibanja on the grassland is completely dependent upon supplementary inputs of soil nutrients: grass-mulch, household waste and cattle manure and none of these is in very great supply. Only 10–15 % of existing grassland can become “Kibanja”, in which case the present area of Kibanja could only expand absolutely by 9 %.

But in a hypothetical area of 50 ha of grassland that was substitutable between new “Kibanja” and dairy production, it is interesting to compare the potential returns to each enterprise in a 20-year period. The comparison is very much a simplified and partial analysis. Very important factors it neglects are the increasing value of marginal land with a 20-year population increase, and the soil fertility factor, which is in favour of the Kibanja alternative. A partial analysis has been made and is shown here in Table 6.10 under the following assumptions.

(a) Crop yields are taken as Bukoba averages.
(b) The loan of capital for dairy production is returnable, interest free, over 20 years,
(c) Cash flows can be taken either discounted at 7 % p.a., or not.
(d) A dairy unit would consume 1/3 litre of milk per family per day.
(e) It would take 10 years before any yield could be obtained from a “Kibanja” plot.
(f) Food values, in protein and calorie content per kilo are based on standardized FAO values.
The dairy alternative certainly produces a cash income, which for 15 families was near the average cash expenditure per family in Bukoba District. But in terms of total food production it only produces 4% of the protein and 4% of the calorie food content that the "Kibanja" alternative would produce from the same land. And the "Kibanja" alternative would be producing mainly green bananas, with, per weight, low food values, and would only be fully productive for 10 of the 20 years. The "Kibanja" alternative could provide very low subsistence livelihoods for 100 families, and adequate subsistence livelihoods for 50 families, whilst the dairy alternative would only provide supplementary food and a cash income to purchase some other supplementary food for 15 families. The important conclusion to draw here is that when dairy production is considered "superior" to agriculture because its main product, milk, has high food values per unit weight, the areal yield of food, in relation to soil-fertility, is neglected. In Bukoba, where the scarce resource is productive land, the important criteria for selection of agricultural activities are (1) food output, (2) employment, and in these respects the example shows that for the population as a whole the "Kibanja" land use is preferable, while dairy production is more beneficial for a small group of people only.

Dairy scheme vs. tea cultivation

If 10% of the remaining available grassland is suitable for "Kibanja" cultivation, and the majority of it is suitable for grazing, possibly 40% of it is suitable for tea cultivation. In this respect, tea cultivation could be considered as a more significant alternative to dairy production. Tea can also be considered as a significant alternative, because it can be used similarly as an ujamaa enterprise. To continue the exercise, briefly, what are the opportunity costs of dairy production as an alternative to tea cultivation in terms of employment and food supply? A calculation of the financial returns from 50 ha of tea shows that it is possible for tea to provide a total net income of 2,194,200 shs over 20 years, which, discounted at 7%, is equivalent to a total of 952,700 shs. This is a net income to producers, because the price of 0.60 shs per kilo includes a deduction made to pay for fertilizers and planting material. Tea has no food production component. But the total amount of milk that could be produced over 20 years in the hypothetical 50 ha dairy project, 100,000 litres, could be purchased at "imported" Musoma milk prices (2.20 shs per litre) for just over 10% of the gross tea yield from the same piece of land over 20 years. The 20 year total of the value of the tea and of the cost of the milk if bought from Musoma are compared in Table 6.11.

(The amount of milk is equivalent to the milk yield of 50 ha. The quantity of tea is the expected yield from the same 50 ha.)

From these estimates it is possible to estimate the opportunity cost of choosing dairy production over tea cultivation in terms of both employment and food supply. In Table 6.10 above, an estimate was made of the employment possibility
Table 6.11. Value of tea production and cost of "imported" milk over 20 years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gross value</th>
<th>Value of discounted cash flow (7 %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tea Yield</td>
<td>2,194,200 shs</td>
<td>952,673 shs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of milk</td>
<td>220,000 shs</td>
<td>116,532 shs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of milk in % of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of tea</td>
<td>10 %</td>
<td>12 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(participation in ujamaa), the cash incomes, and the food supply of a dairy production unit over 20 years. If we take the tea alternative, and for the sake of comparison, standardize the targets of 250 shs per family per year as cash income, and 1/3 litre of milk per family per day as supplementary food income, we can compare the employment effects of the tea and dairy alternatives. To achieve these targets from tea production, a participating family must earn 257 shs additional cash income in order to buy the milk of the food target. Therefore, the total cash income must be an average of 507 shs per year. If the average gross value of the 50 ha tea yield was 109,710 shs per year then 216 families could achieve the same cash income and food targets from tea cultivation as could the 15 families who would share the dairy production.

In the case of substitutable land, this is a very clear indication of the influence of the soil-fertility and land-scarcity conditions of Bukoba. For even if the yield estimates made here should be disputable, it is possible to say that if a piece of grassland is suitable for tea cultivation, the opportunity cost of establishing a dairy-unit, instead, is some sort of livelihood benefit for at least 150 families.

Dairy scheme vs. traditional bambarra nut cultivation

Parts of the grassland have been used traditionally for the production of a protein-food, bambarra groundnuts (*voandzeia subterranea*), and cultivation of this crop is still an integral part of the Bukoba agricultural system. Although well suited to the type of land it can only be grown once in seven years in the same plot, but it yields approx. 1,200 kg/ha and the food values are 3,670 calories and 188 grams of protein per kilo of nuts. Vegetable and animal protein are not strictly comparable food values, and so it is not completely justifiable to make a comparison of dairy yields and bambarra nut yields as perfectly substitutable foods. However, in this final example of the opportunity costs of dairy production, we will merely show the comparison between the gross food values, per year, of the milk yield and the bambarra nut yield of 50 ha of grassland (like tea, bambarra nuts can probably be cultivated on about 40 % of the land). In this case we will assume that all the milk produced is available for local consumption. Table 6.12 shows this comparison between the yields of dairy production and bambarra nuts, annually, from 50 ha.
Table 6.12. Comparative food values of milk and bambarra nut yields from 50 ha grassland.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Milk</th>
<th>Bambarra Nuts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross yield/50 ha</td>
<td>5,000 kg</td>
<td>8,820 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calorific content</td>
<td>3.95 mill.</td>
<td>31.27 mill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protein content</td>
<td>190 kg</td>
<td>1,601 kg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of course, the dairy production alternative still gives a cash income in terms of calf-sales, but dairy production requires over eight times as much land to produce the same amount of protein as traditional bambarra nut cultivation. Even with the rotational limit on the cultivation of bambarra nuts, the food yields of this alternative are far superior to those of the dairy alternative and furthermore it is an alternative in which the soil erosion factor is negligible. This is very important too, if the land-supply of this poor grassland is so limited for the future.

Dairy ujamaa and social and economic tranformation
The discussion above has shown that the opportunity costs of dairy production on the Bukoba grasslands are very high when measured in terms of food output and employment.

Earlier in the chapter it was shown that the particular costs of dairy production were also high, and the only indication of the performance of a scheme with a high output, the Regional Economic Secretary's plan, also shows a very high level of capital costs and a high level of purchased inputs. As no dairy scheme in the District—neither the single large private farm nor the government units—has ever operated on this scale, it is not possible to check empirically whether an ujamaa unit could have produced milk on this scale, even if it had been possible to achieve the right level of capital intensity.

There was also a very clear political argument that the choice of the dairy enterprise was not compatible with the broader aims of ujamaa. Because so few families were able to benefit from it, in terms of the limited land available, its adoption was likely to make an even greater differentiation in rural society than already existed. It could have been the fastest way to occupy the available grassland, with the least absolute contribution either to total food supply, to total rural employment, or to rural transformation.

The ujamaa dairy groups, showed much the same signs of being dominated by the upper stratum of the Bukoba villages as did the membership of the tea ujamaa groups. The people, who were already better off in terms of land ownership and incomes, and here we may add cattle ownership, were thus able to avail themselves of additional sources of income. A source of income which was heavily subsidized, and was hardly economically viable without the subsidy, and which monopolized the use of large tracts of land which could otherwise have benefited a much larger proportion of the population.
The dairy enterprises had a communal element since the cattle and other assets were owned by the members, but communal labour was minimal since the cattle were mostly taken care of in the traditional labour extensive way, and even then a lot of hired labour was involved.

Women’s ujamaa groups

In the conclusion to the section on the ujamaa tea groups we made a reference to the “missed” opportunities. The ujamaa tea scheme could have been directed towards benefiting certain underprivileged groups in society, the school leavers and the single women, thereby contributing to social and economic transformation. The regional administration and party, however, did not take this opportunity.

The organization “Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania” (UWT—the Tanzania Women’s Union) is some steps removed from the direct line of government and party power and decision-making. So when the UWT national executive committee proposed that women members organized themselves into ujamaa groups, there was some notion that this could be one of the steps towards a new economic order, but it was primarily seen as a political expression of solidarity with the national ujamaa ideology.

This latter perception was also dominant in Bukoba. If the women wanted to participate in the new ujamaa tea scheme it was an appreciated show of solidarity with the policy and a welcome boosting of the nominal number of ujamaa groups. But their participation was not interpreted as a way to meet a need for changing the role of women in rural development. In this respect attitudes amongst the (predominantly male) authorities were still the traditional ones.

The reason that women traditionally organized their small communal groups was that they helped them circumvent some of the consequences of the men’s limited notion of a woman’s role and family needs. Similarly the majority of men in authority only saw the married woman as a dependant familyworker and the single woman as an active or former prostitute—not as heads of families or co-managers of households.

The UWT groups that formed the ujamaa groups consisted of both married and single women and could be seen as a way to achieve greater, sexually independent, control over production and its outcome. If the tea scheme was a good vehicle for this, the authorities never recognized it, and while there were women’s ujamaa tea groups in operation, they still only received a marginal share of encouragement and assistance. This is illustrated below and it is shown how the survival and success of some of the groups have therefore depended upon the enthusiasm and aptitudes of the women themselves.

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Traditional women’s groups as the basis for ujamaa groups
In almost every village there are traditional women’s groups. Almost every woman in the village is a member, she pays her membership fees and participates in the group’s activities. The activities are usually limited to assistance with work, food and money in cases of illness, death, or feasts in the house of one of the members. The groups are exclusively locally organized, in the village, and not at any higher level. They may be regarded as fairly smoothly functioning mutual insurance or public relief groups, which satisfy the need for some kind of external security for the survival of the household for which the women are otherwise directly responsible internally in the family.

Some of these traditional groups were registered as member groups of the UWT, and thereby became part of an organization with a hierarchical structure at ward, district, regional, and national level. They were also represented on various rural development committees, e.g. adult education committees, where the women thereby got a chance to express their interests and viewpoints. The UWT encouraged these groups to extend their activities from the traditional mutual assistance work into participation in education and training programmes and in self help projects, such as production and sale of handicrafts to raise money for a school, a clinic or a day-care centre.

It was from these UWT groups that the ujamaa groups were formed, with the aim of further expanding the activities into production as a communal economic enterprise. The full extent to which these ujamaa groups operated is not known, as there are no official records or registration. But it is known that there were quite many of them, often only existing for a short period.

The women’s ujamaa groups
The membership of such ujamaa groups varied between 8 and 80 members. The number mainly reflects the intensity of the relationships between the women in a certain village and to a lesser degree economic considerations. In some cases they comprised all the members of a traditional women’s group, in others only a fraction of it.

The members were women who already had some access to privately held land, either through their husbands, or their own land which they had bought (since women cannot inherit land). In other words the members were women with a respectable status: married women or divorced women, who had been able to earn enough money in “business” (usually prostitution) to enable them to buy land. Women who were still prostitutes, hiring a room in the village or staying with their relatives, were not accepted as members, the argument being that they were too unstable and not very interested in agriculture.

The economic activities of all the ujamaa groups had some common features: they were agricultural enterprises on communally owned land, acquired from the village land and not through pooling of their own land, they were started with little
or no initial capital investments, they were small in scale, and the production was meant for sale and not for home-consumption.

For illustration a few examples are given below, in the words of the members themselves:

Example 1. Cultivation of sweet potatoes
We are a group of eight women who live close together and know each other well. We are all members of the women's organization in the village. We started in 1971 to cultivate half an acre (0.2 ha) of land with sweet potatoes. We contribute with our labour once a week and with seedlings from our private fields. No money has been invested. We are not registered by the cooperative society as it does not market sweet potatoes. The crop is not ready for harvest yet, but we expect to sell the sweet potatoes at the local market and expect an income of 30–50 shs to be shared equally between us. We have not decided if we will continue to work together and perhaps take up cultivation of other crops.

Mama Felista, February 1972

Example 2. Cultivation of tea
We are a group of 30 women who are all members of the village women's organization, registered as branch of the UWT. We cultivate two acres (0.8 ha) of tea, work once a week, and earn approximately 45 shs each every fourth month from selling the tea to the cooperative society, where we are registered as an ujamaa group in the chairman's name. We have had many problems in starting the cultivation of tea, but now we have managed to organize our work, we receive a good income, and we are accepted as tea growers by our husbands.

The group was inspired to start meetings and work together by the examples of the men in the village long ago. In 1961 the women had decided to grow cassava and sweet potatoes together, but they failed to sell the harvest because there was no market for it. In 1962 they borrowed an unused piece of land, grew beans on it, harvested, and sold one bag for 38 shs. In 1963 they planted beans again and sold three bags for 75 shs. The group had then earned enough money to start to grow tea, so the chairman asked the Village Development Committee (now replaced by the Ward Development Committee) for land. The group was given 0.4 ha of grassland outside the village. They bought a share (20 shs) in the cooperative society in order to get seedlings and to be able to market the tea. They used 70 shs to have the plot ploughed by a tractor, and after that they planted the tea. In 1967 another 0.4 ha was added to the first plot, but now there is no more land available for further expansion.

The group had very big problems in taking care of the tea. The members turned up for work irregularly and worked very unconcentrated. At a certain time the group thought that it had to give up. But through meetings and discussions it was agreed by the members that the tea field should be divided into 30 equally large pieces. Each member should take care of her piece and the individual tea deliveries would be recorded by the chairman, so that each member receives money according to the kilos of tea delivered from her plot.

The tea field is now well maintained and yields well, giving a total income of approximately 4000 shs a year. The women enjoy the work and the income they get from it. They don't accept new members in their ujamaa group as they have no possibility of expanding the field. (Abbreviated by the author.)

Mama Zaolo, February 1972

Example 3. Cultivation of tea
We are the whole village women's organization, which is also registered as a UWT branch, consisting of 78 women. We used to plant bambarra nuts together as food for our families. When we heard about tea we decided to use one acre (0.4 ha) of the land formerly used for bambarra nuts for cultivation of tea. We then bought a share in the cooperative society where we are registered as an ujamaa group. From the society we received tea seedlings, to be paid through a deduction in the payment once we
started delivering tea leaves for marketing. We actually started with half an acre in 1967 and added another half acre the following year. We have never been able to organize proper care of the field, Not all the women are really interested, and only some tried to cultivate. We tried to fix a working plan, but we have got no income from it.

(This tea field was rapidly decaying and the group completely disorganized with regard to tea cultivation, whereas it functioned well as a group in connection with the traditional functions in the village. Author's comment.)

Mama Nestori, February 1972

Example 4. Cultivation of tea
We are 16 women registered by the UWT and the cooperative society as an ujamaa group. After starting with half an acre we now have one acre (0.4 ha) of tea. We mainly take care of the field ourselves, but to prune the tea we hired male labourers. We do not work on fixed days, everyone goes there when she has time and when she sees that the tea needs picking. We have earned 96 shs and 41 cents in 1970 and 41 shs and 85 cents in 1971, which we shared equally among us, after having paid the hired labour. We can't expand the field as there is no more land available.

(The field was not well maintained, the women just pick the leaves, they do not weed, mulch, nor apply fertilizer. Author's comment.)

Mama Karora, January 1972

Problems facing the women’s ujamaa groups
The examples above illustrate the activities of the women’s ujamaa groups. They also demonstrate that the groups faced problems in connection with these activities. All the groups faced a common set of problems:

1) *Irregular attendance*. All groups reported irregular attendance by the members. In certain cases the attendance was so irregular and low that the groups had to give up and dissolve themselves.

Apart from difficulties in the organization of the work, and lack of economic incentives, the main reasons for the irregular attendance were the work load on the women in their homes and their subordination to the decisions of their husbands. They had to cultivate their husbands' fields and keep the houses before doing anything else and they had to look after children and sick persons. Sickness, and their husbands' moods were particularly unforeseeable influences on the attendance of women in women's groups activities.

2) *Lack of proper organization of work*. In general is should be stressed that the women had had no assistance in starting their enterprises. This had been especially problematic when it came to organizing cooperation on the communally owned enterprise. Due to difficulties in organizing the work, it was unplanned, inefficient, casual, and often preceded by quarrels between the members.

In this connection it was important to notice that cooperation was not a new thing for the women. They were used to work together in the traditional women's organizations, where they supported each other socially, psychologically, and to some extent economically, when the needs arose.
They had a tradition for working together in an economic undertaking, the cultivation of the additional protein-rich annual foodcrops, bambarra nuts. All women from one village cultivated at the same time under the leadership of a man from a certain clan, responsible for this type of cultivation. Only the planting process was carried out communally. A time schedule was set up for the duty to watch the fields and chase away marauding wild animals.

What was new to the women was cooperation on a communally owned enterprise, with a communally owned output, which had to be distributed according to principles determined by the members themselves. It needed planning by the group itself, mutual confidence in each others responsibility towards the work, and an understanding of the rôle each one played for a successful result. In the traditional block schemes the result of one’s effort did not really depend on the participation and cooperation of the others.

In almost all the groups we studied, and in those examples used for illustration (except example 4), the members had not been loyal enough to the principles of communalism. Those groups, which had not dissolved themselves but had achieved some economic results, had given up the principle of communalism and cooperation and transformed the ujamaa based enterprise into individually based block schemes, with which they were familiar in the traditional system.

3) Uneconomic enterprises. Almost none of the enterprises run by women’s ujamaa groups produced much income in relation to the membership, for two reasons:

(a) The food crops chosen for communal activities were sweet potatoes, cassava, and sometimes beans, and the women hoped to sell them in spite of the fact that such crops were difficult to market. Each household normally cultivated what it needed, and as these crops were supplementary foods, people abstained from them rather than bought them. In several cases, where they were unable to sell them, the women had to consume their products themselves, and thus earned no cash at all.

(b) Even when tea was grown the number of members in the group was usually too many in relation to the scale of the enterprise (example 3 had 78 women to one acre of tea!). Such a relation between labour and scale of enterprise demanded an even more careful organization of work, and the share each member received was minimal.

4) Lack of integration and support. The women’s activities were seldom registered, and hence they were not integrated in the overall ward and district plans for rural development.

The lack of registration and therefore lack of support from the outside resulted partly from the inefficiency of the UWT with regard to communications and spread of information in the rural areas, and partly from the fact that hardly any interest was taken in the women’s groups by the responsible government department, the Community Development Department. The lack of government interest and
subsequent exclusion from its overall plans for activities in the local areas, meant that the women's groups were not included in the budget and got little support in terms of advice and finance.

However such groups were popping up like mushrooms—perhaps reflecting an eagerness among the women to respond to political stimuli—many only to exist for a while and then disappear.

Conclusion
The local basis for the women's ujamaa groups was the traditional women's organization which had a clear social aim in its activities, and which was based on cooperation and reciprocity.

Through UWT members of the traditional organizations were encouraged to involve themselves in activities with a political-economic aim.

From the point of view of the individual members of the ujamaa groups the dominant motivation for participation had been the desire to earn an income independently from their husbands, whereas in the view of the UWT the goal had been to involve women in the implementation of the national ujamaa policy.

The women had difficulties in carrying out their ideas and activities because their choice of economic enterprises put them in an unfavourable competitive position.

They had to compete with other groups for land, they had to compete with the private fields for labour input, and they had to compete with crops grown in the private fields, where more time and effort is used and which therefore showed better results. And they had to compete with men and their access to capital, advice, and support.

Economically the results of the women's ujamaa groups were generally meagre and in many cases they were a waste of resources and of good will. Many groups existed only temporarily.

Socially the ujamaa groups did not lead to positive results. Rather than being progressive in terms of creating political awareness, and improving the position of women and their living conditions they had a conservative effect. They maintained the social inequality already existing in the society by having the membership restricted to the established and accepted women and excluding the unestablished, unaccepted, divorced women, who did not have any other basis for their existence than prostitution.

A major part of the activities also helped to conserve the existing cultivation pattern, in which women grew the food crops, which had a limited market, while the men were concerned with the main export crop, coffee. Hereby they also help to perpetuate the traditional rôle of the women.

The women's ujamaa groups formed to start economic undertakings were small in scale, disorganized, and did not contribute to economic growth, rural development, or improved living conditions for the members.
Instead of encouraging women to start separate economic enterprises with which women competed on unequal terms with the men, women should have been encouraged to fight for participation in economic activities together with the men, and on equal terms with them.

The first task of the special women's organizations would then have been to work for the removal of the bottlenecks which prohibited women to participate on equal terms with the men in rural development. Such work would have been the establishment of day-care centres, the provision of better tools and aids for women, e.g. in their household work, provision of better education facilities for women, and better access to employment for women.

Notes

4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
7. Wahangaza from Ngara district and Wanyarwanda from Rwanda are migrant labourers in Bukoba district, (see chapter 4).
Chapter 7

Summary and concluding remarks on the development of ujamaa villages in West Lake Region

In this first section of the book we have presented and analysed rather briefly the ideology which is the basis for the Tanzanian version of African socialism. We have later in more detail focussed the description, analysis and evaluation on the implementation of Ujamaa vijijini, i.e. the transformation of a rural economy as it has been initiated in one Region. Hereby we have left out of focus other measures taken to initiate the total transformation of the society (nationalization of the industries, financial institutions and commercial enterprises, the leadership code, the wage adjustments, etc.). For analytical purposes we have tended to “isolate” the rural ujamaa sector from the non-ujamaa sector to enable us to describe and analyse the efforts used for its initiation and development, leaving an analysis of the development of the rural ujamaa sector as part of the overall development of the Region and the country for the second section.

It may to some degree be unfair to the ideology and its creator to give major emphasis to the implementation, in so far as the President himself through his numerous speeches and writings has given major emphasis to the explanation of the basic concepts and principles on which to form an alternative society and much less emphasis to the implementation. On the other hand it is only through the implementation that the ideology will prove its strength.

The data presented here were collected over a two-year period and give a four year perspective on the initiation and the beginning of a transformation in the rural economy. Four years is a short period to evaluate efforts meant to result in so drastic social and economic changes as is the aim in this case. The evaluation can, therefore, mainly indicate trends in the development, not results.

Tanzania is, as mentioned, one of the few countries on the African continent which has moved ahead to start implementation of a socialist policy on a broad front which, besides a transformation of the rural economy, includes measures such as the nationalization of industries, commercial enterprises and financial institutions, the formation of a one party system, etc.

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Of these measures the transformation of the rural economy is the most important for a successful socialist development in so far as agricultural production is declared the basis of the development, and in so far as 90% of the Tanzanian population is involved in agricultural production.

No firm guidelines for the transformation were, however, formulated. The transformation could start in many ways adapted to the different conditions in the various parts of the country and the Region. However, from the centre ideas, orders, opinions were communicated to be interpreted in the Regions.

Since the majority of the population were little educated, government officials and the party were given a central rôle to play and this was in the form of a frontal approach, starting the transformation all over the country and all over the Region, and not just in selected areas.

The transformation was to take place by mobilization of the rural population through education to voluntary participation. The education was to aim at creating a socialist attitude of mind to comprehend the institutions to be established.

The formation of villages was regarded as a precondition for the transformation, and within these villages a new mode of production was started, based on communal ownership of the means of production, co-operative efforts, democratic decision-making, and a derived network of social relations.

Within a longer term transformation of the economy, importance was given to a rapid increase in the living conditions of the population, specifically: access to education and health facilities, a healthy diet, adequate clothing, and acceptable houses. This could not have been fulfilled without an increased production.

As a frontal approach was chosen and as no firm guidelines were given as to how and on what scale to start the transformation, it was not possible in practice to set targets and decide upon the scale of government support to start the transformation. Because public resources were scarce maximum selfhelp contributions were stressed.

Nor was it possible to evaluate the development without such targets and defined scales of operations. To avoid ending up in biased discussions and evaluations of the ujamaa development, we tried to deduce from the general ideology and induce from the wealth of concrete policy statements some simple prerequisites which should have been fulfilled by any nominal ujamaa village, if it were to be regarded as having set out on the long course towards the ideal ujamaa community as described by the President. The three prerequisites we proposed were: 1) capability of becoming socially and economically viable, 2) some signs of a beginning in a transformation of the economy towards more co-operative organization of the production, utilization of scales of economy in adoption of new techniques, specialization, and more equal distribution of benefits, and 3) establishment of democratic procedures.
The size of the ujamaa sector
In our attempt to "isolate" the ujamaa sector for analytical purposes we may have given an exaggerated picture of the size and importance of this sector in relation to the rest of the West Lake society. The ujamaa sector is small in this Region. Over a four-year period from 1968 until early 1972 less than 2% of the total regional population were involved in some of the different ujamaa activities, and only 21 villages and 20 ujamaa units were registered.

The interpretation of the policy as basis for the regional implementation
Implementation of the ujamaa policies was started along the same lines all over the Region in 1968 through a first phase of forced resettlement of part of the population from the densely populated villages in areas of empty land. These measures were taken on the basis of the interpretation of the ideology by the Regional Commissioner at that time and the vague guidelines for implementation in relation to what he saw as the major development problems in West Lake Region: the overpopulated villages within which production could hardly be increased, and within which part of the population did not manage to move to areas of virgin land spontaneously.

These settlements were supplied with infrastructural facilities as an incentive, and as fulfilment of the aim of increasing the living standards of the population. Since the first forced resettlement took place in 1968 a few new ujamaa villages were formed on a voluntary basis.

Social viability
From the very beginning the ujamaa policy was interpreted by the regional leadership as a means for the poorer parts of the society to improve their living standards. Recruitment to the ujamaa villages was highly selective and involved only those with little or no land.

During the first years of existence the ujamaa villages all over the Region were characterized by a high degree of social instability. The number of families living in the villages differed from month to month. The harsh conditions persuaded a great number of people to leave the villages and some left temporarily to earn money. Some new families joined at later stages.

In Ngara social stability in the ujamaa villages developed faster than in Bukoba/Karagwe, because the resettlement was more of a continuation of the traditional expansion process and therefore less disruptive. People came from the traditional villages close by, were more familiar with each other, and were able to maintain close relations with their relatives in the traditional villages, while they themselves opened up the new fields.

In Bukoba/Karagwe social stability began to develop during the 3rd and 4th years. The number of families in each village was stabilized, networks of
personal social relationships developed and establishment of kinship relations within the villages began to take place.

At that stage, the achievement of social equilibrium depended on economic development.

Economic development and viability
All the ujamaa villages of West Lake Region were laid out according to one model as described in Chapter 5. Most of the villages were located in areas which in a number of cases had not been inhabited earlier, because they were known by the peasants to be infertile, and because they lacked infrastructural facilities, including access roads.

After bush clearing and the construction of temporary grass huts work started on the private plots. Cultivation of the private plots was carried out on an individual basis and under the supervision of government officials. Annual crops were cultivated to produce food for the villagers as soon as possible. In spite of the concentration of the villagers efforts solely on the private fields during the first year and even later, little land was brought under cultivation. In Bukoba/Karagwe only a few villagers managed to cultivate their total private plot of 0.5 ha in the course of four years. The majority of the villagers managed 0.25 ha or less. In Ngara the size of the cultivated parts of the private fields was bigger, due to the higher degree of individual support between the households in the traditional villages and those in the ujamaa villages, but in all ujamaa villages only a few households were self reliant in food from their private plots.

During the second year cultivation of the communal fields was started with massive government support. Overambitious, completely unrealistic plans for the development of the communal fields were prepared by the government.

Unfortunately exact figures on the size of the government support and reliable figures on the area of land brought under communal cultivation and the size of the harvest did not exist. It was impossible to make an exact evaluation of input in relation to output. During the 3rd year of operation the communal fields in all the villages were small, the average reported area per adult being only 0.15 ha in Ngara, 0.06 ha in Karagwe, and 0.5 ha in Bukoba. If the average sizes of communal and private land under cultivation were combined, the individual households had on average less than 1 ha, which is below the area needed for basic subsistence of the household.

Taking into consideration the input of fertilizer and improved seeds the yields have been comparatively low, for instance 700 kg per ha of maize in Karagwe and 900 to 1000 kg per ha of maize in Ngara.

The communal fields were from the start managed by the government directly by the outstationed staff or indirectly by officers at district and regional levels. The management has been incompetent in so far as it has not
been able to organize the timing and scale of the support, to coordinate activities, and to control the quality of the support given. This in turn has had a bad effect on the villagers’ contributions in terms of labour. The labour input has been irregular and modest. In Ngara (see Chapter 4) only 33% of the potential working days were actually used for communal work. In Bukoba (see Chapter 5) between 50% and 75% of the potential working days were actually used for communal work, and only 35% to 50% of the male labour force and 35% of the female labour force were actually contributing to the communal sector.

To this should be added the damage by wild animals. Frequently 1/3–1/2 of the communal maize fields were destroyed by wild pigs. Also vermin destroyed part of the harvest in bad storage facilities.

In spite of all these problems the communal fields started producing some results after the third and fourth years, and the villagers earned small incomes from the communal sector. But after four years of existence we have to conclude that the development had not made the villages economically self-reliant and the expansion of the communal fields had been slow at the best of times. The viability of these villages would depend on their stability at the moment the government support and government management were withdrawn. And their viability as ujamaa villages would depend on the efforts made to train the villagers to take over the management and manage their own resources according to the principles of communal ownership and co-operation.

Ujamaa-based diversification of the traditional economy

After the first years of experience with ujamaa villages a new approach towards a transformation of the rural economy was chosen. In the densely populated areas an ujamaa based diversification of the traditional economy was planned and initiated in 1970 and 1971. People were encouraged to form groups that were registered and offered support, partly as loans, to start communal cultivation of tea and production of milk from upgraded cattle.

The social and economic benefits of communal production were as relevant for these enterprises as for the communal fields in the ujamaa villages. Tea and dairy production were feasible on the grassland between the densely populated villages and gave the villagers a chance to expand their economy while staying in their traditional villages.

We have devoted more space to a discussion of the potential of these enterprises, than on their actual achievements because of their short period of existence at the time of our study.

During the one to two years of operation a number of problems which were faced in the ujamaa villages were similarly faced in the ujamaa diversifications. Propaganda exceeded training and explanation. Overambitious plans were worked out and managed by the government and not by the people themselves.
In spite of their short period of operation, there were some trends in the development of these enterprises. A rather impressive number of people had enrolled themselves in tea-growers’ groups, and the number increased from 369 in the first year to 849 in the second year. The area planted with tea was, however, far below the target and in 1972 was only 0.075 ha per member (compared to the district average of 0.4 ha per non-ujamaa grower). But the trend was towards a slow expansion of hectarage. The labour input had not become excessive, but when the tea matures the labour input will increase substantially. The effect of this upon the incentive to participate is not known. In the early phase the organization of the labour caused problems and it was difficult to involve the members on an equal basis. Some communal fields had been turned into blocks of individual plots.

As with the ujamaa tea scheme so for the ujamaa dairy scheme. The trend seen during the first year of operation was one of an unprofitable relationship between number of members, number of cows, and grassland available for grazing. Poor labour organization and a lack of skills in handling the exotic cattle also caused problems.

**Beginnings of a transformation?**

The traditional peasant agricultural system has had dynamic aspects but has not been geared to qualitative change. The peasant economy operates on a level where investments for increased production and change are beyond the scope of most households. Without government support the problem that the peasant economy would stagnate would, therefore, remain.

Communal fields opened in the ujamaa villages with government support and the ujamaa enterprises in the traditional economy could have been elements of a socio-economic change needed to meet the increasing demands for cash and food and to create an alternative organization of society. Expertise and capital inputs were more efficiently exploited on the larger communal enterprises than on the scattered small holdings, and they produced more reliable harvests of higher quality, which were easier to market.

The most widely implemented aspect has been the use of tractors and ploughs to clear the bush and cultivate newly opened land, which was done on a large scale and relieved villagers from a labourious and time consuming job. Co-operative organization of work was introduced in a few activities which had been traditionally carried out individually (weeding and harvesting). But as the communal enterprises were small, the benefits of the co-operative effort were hardly measurable.

In 1972 it was too early to judge whether a transformation was beginning. The potentials for the transformation were, in a formal sense, in the establishment of the communal sector and in the by-laws of democratic management and rule. But the actual beginning of the transformation
depended on the solutions to more pressing problems facing planning, organization, participation, and involvement, i.e. the mobilization and training of the participants in carrying out the transformation. If these problems were not solved in the right way, there was a big chance that the results of all the massive effort vested in the transformation would only be a few new settlements and new enterprises in which traditional modes of production would be dominant.

Village democracy
The formal institution of the village democracy involved the formulation of by-laws, the election of village leadership and the election of committees to support the leadership.

However, observations and data on the actual decision-making procedures and government in the ujamaa villages (see especially detailed description in Chapt. 4) show that planning, decision-making, organization, and evaluation was undertaken by government officials (and to some degree by party leaders) and not by the villagers themselves for all vital social and economic activities of the communal sector, whereas decisions on activities of the private sector were left to the villagers individually as long as their private commitments did not interfere with their contribution to the communal sector. Not only were the villagers not involved in vital decision-making, communication of the decisions to the villagers, taken by the government was not good, so the level of information among the villagers was low. As decisions on day-to-day activities were often left to be taken by the villagers, and such decisions were taken on an ad hoc basis without relevant and satisfactory information, the result has been waste of time and effort and a diminishing confidence in the government management.

This picture of the actual village government clearly shows that one aspect of the problem of non-developing self management is a lack of know-how about planning, organization, control, co-operation, decision-making and meeting procedures among the villagers, and a lack of ability and interest among the government officials in teaching such skills. Teaching efforts have been concentrated on literacy courses, selfdefence, and various techniques such as simple mechanics, carpentry, tractor driving.

The solution of the problem of developing proper co-operative forms of organization and democratic decision-making procedures is of vital importance for a successful transformation of the rural economy.

The difference between Ngara and Bukoba/Karagwe Districts
As a background to the rather negative picture presented of the initiation and first phase of the development of ujamaa villages, it is worth noticing that the
potentials of the ujamaa sector were more easily realized in Ngara District than in the two other Districts. Since the policy was implemented along the same lines all over the Region and led to similar problems in all Districts, the reason for this difference will have to be found in the difference in socio-economic conditions between the Districts.

Ngara District is relatively extremely remote from regional head-quarters. It is located far from the centre and cut off from communications with the centre during the rainy season. The infrastructure is less developed, fewer development projects are located in Ngara and the cash income possibilities within the District are few. Consequently the living standard is lower in Ngara. The expected and promised possibilities in the new ujamaa villages were, therefore, more easily competitive with those in the traditional sector, than was the case for the two other Districts. The choice of annual crops as cash crops and the planning of the communal sector as the main cash earning sector gave the Ngara people an opportunity to start cash crop production, with government support, whilst it did not interfere with their traditional subsistence production.

But even if the potentials were more easily realized in Ngara the successful beginning of the transformation was still very dependant on the proper mobilization of human resources in the vital job of implementation, as was the case in the two other Districts.

**Major problems in implementation**

Some problems, vital to the further developement of the Ujamaa Vijijini, were faced during the initiation and first years of ujamaa development. These problems can partly be traced back to the formulation of the ideology, which had not perceived adequately the real character of post-colonial Tanzanian society, and partly to the particular implementation of the policy in West Lake Region. We will try to elucidate these problems because of their importance.

We have shown that government officials and the party were given a central rôle to play in the beginning, on the assumption that the majority of the population were less educated, and not regarded as adequate to initiate and carry out the implementation on their own. A frontal approach was chosen and as resources were scarce maximum self-help contributions were neccessary, and were demanded.

Implicit in these vague guidelines for implementation were three delicate balances, the handling of which has influenced the initial process of the transformation in a not very successful way. These balances were;

- the balance between government and party involvement,
- the balance between material selfreliance and government support,
- the balance between popular involvement and government management.
Government and party involvement

It is reasonable to distinguish between the promotional and the technical material aspects of the implementation. The promotional work of explaining the ideology, gaining the support and confidence for the ideology among the people, and encouraging them to active involvement in the implementation was a natural task for the party leaders, whereas the task demanding specific technical skills was that of the government officials. A division of labour along these lines was not always clear, and proper channels of communication between the two bodies, which should have been a precondition for a division of labour, were not always established.

There was, however, little doubt that the party leaders at all levels—from the 10-cell leaders to the regional leader—had actively involved themselves in promotional activities. Numerous were the speeches given all over the Region, and all over the Region people were made familiar with the various concepts of the ideology.

But unfortunately, there is just as little doubt that people have not been able to fully understand or have in cases misunderstood the concepts communicated, the explanations given, and the way the implementation should have been carried out. This is one of the reasons for the poor response and the reluctance to respond from the side of the people. We can point out a number of explanations:

The assumption that a person holding office as party leader should automatically qualify for carrying out the tasks in connection with the implementation did not prove to be right. The general educational background and level of understanding of the local party leaders did not often differ from that of the majority of the people. And the political education of the lower cadres of the party had not been carried out commensurate with their responsibilities. These leaders were, therefore, as poorly equipped to carry through the implementation as the majority of the population. Yet they were given the power and responsibility, and the interpretation of information from the centre was left open and uncontrolled in the hands of these local leaders. To this should be added the language problem. Information from the centre that was spread through the local party leaders to the rural population was given in Swahili. New words were constantly added to the Swahili vocabulary in an attempt to make this the national language. The meaning of these Swahili words were not always known in the Region. The result was that too many of the local leaders were unable to understand the concepts of the ideology and the implications on its implementation. Consequently they were not able to explain the ideology to the people. The result was often a plethora of slogans, whose meaning was ambiguous.

Too many of the local leaders interpreted their role in the process of implementation as that of preachers and not as devoted activists. Active involvement was too often limited to the once or twice yearly “obligatory”
participation in work in the ujamaa villages. By this interpretation of his rôle, the local party leader strengthened the impression of himself as a sloganeer and supported the development of an opinion among the rural population that ujamaa was for the poor with no position and not for the office holders. This opinion gained strength from the attitude of the local leaders towards the ordinary people, who were often described as ignorant, lazy, and stupid. The result was strong scepticism and even resistance.

Due to the generally poor educational background and the lack of political training of the local party leaders it was also difficult to develop the necessary political follow up to the local technical implementation. Government officials were able to carry through the implementation along bureaucratic lines without political feedback at the right time or at the proper stage. Political feedbacks rather took the form of delayed counter orders or independent planning by the politicians for technical implementation, resulting in confusing situations in the ujamaa villages, as it is so clearly described in Chapter 4.

Selfreliance and government support

All three Chapters 4, 5 and 6 show that selfhelp contributions from the ujamaa residents themselves and from the rural population as such have been meagre and mainly limited to surplus labour.

Experience from earlier days shows that local resources were mobilized on a large scale for a number of projects ranging from building of churches, of schools, and dispensaries, to construction of roads and maintenance of roads, and in terms of cash, materials, or labour.

When a new attempt to mobilize local resources was launched for the implementation of ujamaa villages the meagre results were not just due to the inability of the people. The cause was rather to be found in the preparations, planning, and implementation of the mobilization. Too little effort was used in planning for the type of selfhelp contributions and for their efficient use. Already from the start emphasis was given to government support and selfhelp contributions defined vaguely as the labour of the people. The main selfhelp contribution was labour. Such contribution could have been highly valuable, but due to inefficient planning and organization of the voluntary labour input it was not fully utilized and the enthusiasm to contribute withered.

What should not, however, be forgotten is the unorganized, individual and private mobilization of resources which was initiated when the government support was offered. This was pronounced in Ngara, where the links between the households in the traditional villages and those in the ujamaa villages were close and where an easy flow of personal contributions took place once the government started its support. Without doubt these contributions were a major reason for the better results in Ngara.

If the selfhelp contributions had been meagre, all three chapters show that
the government support has been massive. Unfortunately it is not possible to quantify the size of the support. It was in the form of skilled man-power, finance, tools, equipment, construction material, and food. During two to four years a substantial part of the total regional development budget was on this support to the very small ujamaa sector at the expense of other development projects.

In all three chapters the scale and form of government support is a recurrent theme. In some cases, as for instance in Chapter 6 dealing with tea-and dairy ujamaa units, it is argued that the scale of the support was too little, in other cases, especially in Chapter 5, it is argued that the support was too big and in some cases almost nothing but artificial respiration to an otherwise dying community. The reason for this ambivalent situation on the scale of government support is to be found in the lack of firm guidelines as to how and on what scale to start the transformation, hence a failure to set targets and decide on a relevant scale of government support.

With regard to the form of support all three chapters show the importance of support in terms of infrastructure (piped/pumped water, roads, dispensaries, storage, shops, bus connections) insofar as lack of infrastructure in areas of potential arable land was one major constraint for expansion into such areas. Also the posting of skilled personnel in the ujamaa villages gave some positive results, especially in Ngara. The three chapters, however, reveal a lack of speed with which the support was given. And for reasons we will discuss below the support has not been extended in a way which has involved the people. It has rather had the opposite effect of removing the initiative from the people, pacifying them, and developing within them a feeling of being guinea-pigs. As the massive support cannot continue for ever and as the ujamaa sector is not selfreliant the critical point will come on how and when to withdraw or reduce the support.

Involvement of people and government management
A successful mobilization and involvement of people on a voluntary basis is preconditon by an understanding and acceptance of the ideology and the programme for its implementation, and by a meaningful relation of the programme to the reality and the possibilities as they are perceived by the people and to the resources available.

For reasons given above the party failed to mobilize and involve people on any noteworthy scale in West Lake Region. But the government also failed to involve people actively in the ujamaa villages, once they were formed.

The involvement has mainly been in terms of labour input, which was small and irregular, and in participation in meetings where the rôle of the villagers was mainly passive in approving the proposals presented to them by the government officials directly or through the village leadership. There was no
proper involvement of the villagers in such vital activities as planning and
decision-making, and very little “on-the-job” training of the villagers or learning
through “trial and error”, because discussions of errors were carried out among
the government officers and in the offices at district and regional levels, and
not with the villagers. We can, therefore, only conclude that during the first
four years of ujamaa development the ujamaa sector has been under
government management.

As managers the government officials were mainly concerned with the
support: planning for the support, organizing the supply of the support, and
controlling the use of the support. All three chapters give examples which
indicate that this management has been inefficient and incompetent in a
number respects (delayed supply of seeds, selection of wrong seeds, delayed
supply of tractors, selection of infertile areas for cultivation, etc.) which had a
negative effect on the development. This incompetence can be explained by the
lack of management training and political training of the government officials,
and also by their lack of knowledge about the local conditions in which they
had to work, and by their attitudes towards ordinary villagers as ignorant,
unskilled, subordinate people to whom it was useless to listen. The government
officials were never properly concerned with the human factor and they never
understood their rôle in this new development as one of advisors for—and
co-operators with—the villagers.

The division of the economy between a private and
a communal sector—a dilemma?
From the beginning the economy of the ujamaa villages was divided into two
different sectors based on two different modes of production. Inherent in this there
may well be an important dilemma.

On the one hand the communal sector enables the introduction of a distinct
cash sector (with the advantages of the economics of scale and of
communalism as discussed above) which theoretically is neither weakened by
being incorporated in the general agricultural system with its emphasis on
subsistence production, social security, and a habitual work organization, nor
destructive to that system. Through the private sector the peasant can maintain
his subsistence production as in the traditional villages and hereby gain the
feeling of security and lessening of risk. The communal sector he can regard as
something completely separated from the individual farm, an added opporunity
which may be beneficial, as it is argued in Chapter 4.

On the other hand the existence of a private sector based on the traditional
mode of production may well lead to a dominance of the socio-economic
conditions resulting from this mode of production which in the long run may
be a constraint to the development of the new mode of production. The
traditional division of labour and use of hired labour, exploiting the women
and the poorer members of society, is introduced in the ujamaa villages in not
only the private but also the communal sector, as described in Chapters 5 and 6, and a trend is seen of a development of socio-economic inequalities.

Whether this is merely a result of the way the communal sector has been managed and developed or whether these trends would also have developed if the total production had been on a communal basis from the beginning is difficult to judge.

The division into two sectors exists and the future development depends on the economic results of the communal sector combined with an understanding and acceptance of the new mode of production by the people during the period of cutting down government management and support.

Ujamaa and the class struggle
In his speeches and writings the President has not elaborated on the ongoing process of class formation in post-colonial Tanzanian society. The one-party-system was formed with the party open for all, not as an élite party formed among the oppressed groups to raise them against the oppressors. The ujamaa policy was not designed as a tool in the hands of the oppressed to help them through communalism and co-operation to carry out their struggle, it was designed as the policy to embrace all citizens who should in the final stage live in ujamaa communities. We will elaborate this further in the conclusion.

From the very beginning of the implementation in West Lake Region the policy was interpreted by the leadership as the policy for the peasant-cum-lumpen-proletariat. Due to the lack of political awareness among these peasants they never saw the policy as a tool in their hands to fight a class struggle.

The leadership, who were responsible for the implementation, rather interpreted the policy as a means they could use selectively to change the living conditions of certain strata in the society. And in their initial selection they limited themselves to the peasant-cum-lumpen-proletariat, overlooking other vulnerable groups which could have benfitted and perhaps responded more easily. Such groups were the single women and the primary school leavers. Both these groups had no access to land, were underemployed and dependant on their relatives. As it is dicussed in Chapter 6 these groups could have got their own economic basis for an existence, and a specialization within the agricultural production could have been initiated by designing the ujamaa based diversification of the economy (tea-dairy-production) for these groups. This was, however, not the case. The aim, as the leadership later saw it, was then to give the ordinary peasant additional income possibilities by offering him an agriculturally based enterprise which they could operate in addition to their traditional production. And as Chapter 6 shows, it was not primarily the peasant-cum-lumpen-proletariat who benefitted from the government support to these enterprises.
Part III

Ujamaa and the Tanzanian Social Formation
Chapter 8

The emergence of a new class structure

In Part II the variety of ujamaa experiences seen so far in West Lake Region were presented. Their scope and structures were discussed in terms of viability of the new communities, their transformative elements, and attempts to create participatory democracy. The concrete measures employed in the implementation of the ujamaa policy have been pointed out as being of major importance for the results.

Such concrete implementation measures should not, however, be regarded as merely administrative or technical. Just like ideologies and policies they must be understood in the context of the different economic and political forces operating in the society. At their level decisions about implementation—i.e. the tactics of policy implementation—also reflect the existing pattern of social forces—their relative power, their interests, their conflicts, and their alliances.

These social forces, at which we shall now take a closer look, arise from the historical development of the socio-economic structures in the Region as well as in the country as a whole. Their interest in and influences on the implementation of the ujamaa policy are therefore likely to be strongly affected by its potential implications for socio-economic development trends and thereby for their future positions in the society.

In this and the following chapter it is attempted to place the ujamaa development described in the preceding chapters in a wider context through a survey of the relevant social forces which are at play and an interpretation of the implementation process as a reflection of these forces.

In Chapter 2 it was shown how production in West Lake Region is dominated by peasant agriculture, and the agricultural system was described.

The “peasantry” is here defined as those “whose ultimate security lies in their having certain rights in the land and in the labour of family members on the land, but who are involved through rights and obligations in a wider economic system which includes the participation of nonpeasants”. Thus the ultimate consideration in peasant agriculture is the social and material maintenance and continuation of the integrated family and production unit, including its land as the basic means of production. In this there is a fundamental difference from the economic enterprise, which has its own profitability and growth as its motivating force.

In West Lake one consequence is, as we have seen, a cyclical development of the individual family and production unit, with alternating expansion and reduction of its size, following the biological development of the family.

In this peasant economy there is no built-in demand for profit maximization, capital accumulation, or continuous growth. They key concepts are security and
equilibrium. This does not, however mean that the peasant is living in eternal harmony or stagnation. The cyclical development implies in itself a drive towards expansion (based on the natural expansion of a family over generations), which is followed by competition and rivalry, especially between brothers and over already established perennial crop land. But it is an expansion which is limited by the precarious balance between family and production unit, and it is an expansion which is repeatedly broken up into new, restarting farm-family cycles.

Neither does it mean that the peasant recoils from innovations purely for traditional reasons. New methods and crops are taken up, but only when they are immediately advantageous for the family and constitute no threat to the continued security and equilibrium of the farm-family cycle. The peasantry respond to changing external circumstances, such as for example population growth or new possibilities in the wider economic system to which they belong, but only to the extent to which the peasant economy can be adapted to the new circumstances without losing its fundamental features. Changes going further must revolutionize the whole system, and have often been met with strong and efficient active or passive resistance from peasant societies.

The intrusion of colonialism by the end of last century constituted a complete change in the wider economic system of the West Lake peasants. While formerly dominated by elements of feudalism and simple commodity production and barter-like trade, the peasant economy was now incorporated in a colonial trade economy, with its emphasis on trade in raw materials from the colonies and manufactured goods from the colonial powers.

In Chapter 2 it was described how this took place, in the long run without causing fundamental changes in the agricultural system or the basic structure of the peasant economy in the Region.

Several factors can help explain this survival of the peasantry, and consequently the non-emergence of agrarian capitalism in its formal sense, in spite of the Region’s incorporation in the capitalist world economy.

Apart from the general peasant resistance to revolutionary changes, mentioned above, there are strong specific inhibitions within the villages in West Lake Region, such as for instance strict inheritance rules, social and economic obligations, and a vicious enmity towards individuals who try to break out of the peasant syndrome.

The survival of the peasantry has however also been favoured by the very character the Regions’ incorporation in the world economy, which took the form of an “économie de traite”, since the surplus from agricultural production can often more easily and more profitably be appropriated by establishing, developing and controlling extractive trade relations with the peasantry, than by changing the whole system into estate- or agrarian capitalism.

But in such cases of colonial trade economies based on peasant cash cropping a complete change of the whole social formation, of which the peasantry is only one part, is still the unavoidable other side—with rapid growth of the non-productive commercial, transport, administration, and service sectors.
The appropriation of surplus takes a wide range of shapes: trade and transport profits from the petty trader to the big international company, levies and cesses for the bureaucracies of cooperatives and other marketing organizations, taxes to maintain all the varied control functions of the government bureaucracy, etc.

Apart from the domination of the industrialized countries in the centre over the underdeveloped periphery, this colonial or neo-colonial social formation also leads to the emergence of new class structures in the peripheral countries. In the typical colonial situation there is the colonial bureaucracy, often in close collaboration with the foreign, European and sometimes Asian or Levantine, commercial capitalists, and there is the indigenous peasantry. With the development of the system, however, a need arises for recruiting an increasing number of local people into the lower echelons of bureaucracy and commerce. These groups became dominating in most of the African nationalist movements, and one of the major results of independence was the rapid Africanisation and integration of the political and administrative bureaucracies.

While under neo-colonialism the main division is still between the peasant producers and the non-agricultural extractive sectors, the international business and the local rulers do no longer have the same identity of interests as before. This may lead to increasing political support to the national bourgeoisie, or it may, as it did in Tanzania, develop into a struggle between the bureaucracy and the whole capitalist bourgeoisie. In Tanzania the major result, after nationalizations and establishment of a large number of government and parastatal institutions, was the near-elimination of the national bourgeoisie and establishment of a new working relationship between the emerging economic bureaucracy and international capitalism.

In Tanzania as a whole and in West Lake Region the material base is therefore still the capitalist trade economy, but with some changes in the external relations, because the dominating class is now the administrative, political and economic bureaucracy.

Taking a less general view of the local level in West Lake Region, the picture does however become more diffuse. The bureaucracy and the peasantry are the major classes, dominating and dominated, but within them or between them several other groups or strata must be distinguished.

Within the bureaucracy there are definite tensions between the government administrators, the TANU leaders, and the leaders of the cooperative union, and a fourth group, the religious bureaucracy, which has one of its strongholds in West Lake.

Although the main trade relations have been bureaucratized there is still room, at least at the local level, for the manoeuvring of petty-capitalists, often Asians, in commerce, transport, small-scale manufacturing of consumer goods, and repair business.

Most interesting perhaps are the divisions within the peasantry. A large part of the agricultural producers are of course simply peasants, but at least three deviant
groups can be identified.

Apart from the seasonal labourers from Burundi and Rwanda there are hardly any landless people in the Region. However, estimates show that perhaps 10% of the population stay on fractions of land so small that they do not produce enough food for the family all the year round. Nor is it possible to produce enough cash to satisfy the need for money to buy food and other necessities. Living in the densely populated areas, their father have not been able to secure enough land and if they have then tried to resettle in the bush their farm in the old village has often been too small to bring them through the establishment phase. This is the "peasantry-cum-lumpen-proletariat", who are forced more or less regularly to seek employment as labourers at whatever low salary they can get. With no education, no skills, and no capital they most often work as temporary labour for wealthier peasants, shop-owners or transporters, or the women as bar-girls. At the common salary of about 50 shillings a month some may succeed in getting started with a farm-family cycle, but for most of them it is not enough both to ensure their present necessities and to enable them to expand farm and family for the next generation.

Whereas for this "peasantry-cum-lumpen-proletariat" their mere existence on the land is dependent on the meagre incomes they can get from any occasional job available, the major part of the peasants can in general support themselves and their families on their land. However, the penetration of the trade economy has partly meant that in the farm-family cycle there are stages where many of them do not have enough money to meet all their obligations, partly that there is a sphere of economic activities open to people with limited education, skills, or capital, and which at least sometimes can be more profitable than agriculture.

This sphere includes rural retailers, petty traders and transporters, money-lenders, bar, hotel and house owners, beer brewers, and village "fundi’s", such as carpenters, masons, shoemakers and tailors, bicycle mechanics and other repair workers, and some surviving traditional potmakers and blacksmiths.

Working in these fields, mainly with their own labour and a minimum of skills and capital, they supplement the incomes from their farms with non-agricultural earnings, varying from small occasional sums to more regular incomes exceeding what they earn from the sale of farm products. What may perhaps be called the "peasantry-cum-lumpen-bourgeoisie" is thus basically dependent on their family farms, operating non-agricultural activities more or less as spare time occupations besides the work on the farms. It seems that they are able to survive in the above mentioned marginal trades—marginal in the sense that they are confined to limited localized markets, fluctuating with the variable buying power of the local peasantry—because they can sustain the low level and the irregularity of employment and incomes under such conditions, which more organized, profit-oriented enterprises could not.

As the access to this sector is almost unlimited many peasants get involved in it once or even several times during their life. For the same reason, however, the competition is fierce, and with their few resources they are extremely vulnerable
to any occasional setback. So many are also forced to leave the business again, while others do so voluntarily in order to reinvest the money gained in support of the development of their farm-family cycle. A few succeed in establishing more stable enterprises on a scale where they become more important economically than the family farm, thus entering the petty bourgeois class. Therefore there is a very big turnover of people in this "peasantry-cum-lumpen-bourgeois", which may not at any one time comprise more than 10% of all households in the Region, but is none the less regarded by the peasants as a more attractive possibility for individual progress and development than agriculture.

It is doubtful whether the last group to be mentioned here should at all be included in the peasantry, as they are agricultural households, where the owner is part of the bureaucracy or the petty capitalist bourgeoisie, as wage earners or businessmen—or both at the same time. Many of these people do however have farms where their families live and work. And it is important to notice that although they often use some of their non-agricultural incomes to further their agricultural activities, it is primarily as investments in quantitative expansion within the traditional development cycle of the family and the production unit, and not in qualitative improvement of the agricultural system and methods. The farms are kept as a subsistence basis for the families, and to secure the maintenance of the farm-family cycle and the social status of the owners in their home areas. Far from being profitable enterprises, a man who owns four or five farm units, each supporting a number of his relatives, may find himself as an improverished peasant with the farms in decay if he does not continuously have access to liquid capital which is needed to maintain the farms—and support the relatives.

Therefore in their behaviour as agriculturalists these bureaucrats and petty-capitalists are peasants, but their main interests lie definitely not with the peasantry.

The social formation with the classes and strata here described is characterized by a high degree of mobility across very diffuse boundaries between the classes and strata. Direct control or ownership of the means of production are of minor importance for the reproduction of the formation, which is primarily dependent on control over the trade relations in a broad sense. Positions of control are attained and maintained by means of social influence, organizational power, financial resources, and educational achievements.

The potential of the ujamaa policy to transform this social formation is therefore in the last instance determined by its ability to break the dominance of the neo-colonial trade relations in the economic structure, and simultaneously to break the power of those who control them.
Chapter 9

Bureaucratization of the ujamaa ideology

In its conception the ujamaa ideology is clearly revolutionary. It aims at a complete transformation of society, transferring the control of production to the producers through their multi-purpose producer co-operatives. Without directly saying so this would also imply the elimination of the present exploitative trade relations as well as their privileged controllers, enabling the producers themselves to redirect surplus production into productive investments (e.g. basic industries) favourable to the development of a balanced, selfcentered economy.

It has, however, had fatal consequences that this has never been clearly expressed in any ideological or policy statement. No Tanzanian leader has explained the socialist transformation in terms of the basic features of the existing social formation, its classes and patterns of domination. In the absence of such an analysis it has not been clearly appreciated that the success of the policy in its real sense must be mobilization of the direct producers themselves, i.e. primarily the peasants, based on their understanding of the policy as a tool with which to change their present conditions of suppression viz-à-viz other classes.

Admittedly, the actual formulation of the ujamaa ideology does stress the importance of its voluntary and participatory character, to be achieved through education and mobilization of the peasants. However, without any clear strategy for the content and direction of this mobilization, for allowing the necessary time for it to materialize, and for supporting it in the conflicts that might eventually follow it, it was left entirely to the local government and TANU leaders to "mobilize" the peasants with whatever means and for whatever implementation measures the leaders might decide to apply.

Once it was decided to embark full scale on the ujamaa policy these local leaders came under strong pressure to produce visible results. There was no time to train political cadres to work in the villages, and the existing local politicians were far from clear about the aims of the policy, nor were they selected with its implementation in mind. The only people who had both the resources and the motivation—because of pressure from above—to get things moving as fast as desired were therefore the government administration, and we have seen (Chap. 1) how all branches of government were instructed to become involved.

With the ability and efficiency of the bureaucrats being judged to a large extent on their success in implementing the broadly defined ujamaa policy, it was clearly in their interest to reinterpret the policy into more specific objectives, which were bureaucratically controllable and measurable. They could furthermore with few limitations ensure that these objectives were deliberately defined not to upset the
existing order of society—on the contrary they might often work to reinforce the class structure and its patterns of domination.

In general therefore the emphasis came to be placed on the number of ujamaa villages started and the size of the membership, the total hectarage under cultivation, and the support given to the villages.

The first response of the West Lake leaders, when they were called upon to implement ujamaa in the Region, was to think of resettlement. Creating new settlements had several advantages. They were highly visible, and easy to organize right from the beginning in the orderly, nice looking way preferred by bureaucrats (with the houses and shambas in straight lines etc.).

As resettlement aimed primarily at those peasants, whom we have here called the lumpen-proletariat, fairly forceful methods could be applied to get them to move without affronting the more articulate parts of the peasantry, especially the political and administrative bureaucracy themselves. In many cases it was even praised by villagers who found it a good way to get rid of petty criminals and other asocial elements.

The bureaucracy, which must necessarily be concerned about stagnating agricultural production, as its economic base is the control over the surplus from agriculture, has ever since the colonial times seen resettlement as one method to overcome the problem. By moving “the peasantry-cum-lumpen-proletariat” into organized new settlements it is expected at the same time to ensure their full-time participation in agricultural production, to facilitate the influence of the modernization approach of the agricultural extension service, and to retain an even tighter control over any surplus production.

The experiences with resettlement–or villagization–have however almost always been negative, as the settlers’ response to the directing and paternalistic behaviour of the bureaucrats has been a passive abandonment of the whole responsibility for their fate to the government—or to run away. The typical bureaucratic reaction, in West Lake as elsewhere, was to use more force and more control, and to pump in machines to do the work they could not get the settlers to do.

The efforts in the West Lake settlements’ second year to promote communal production was clearly seen by many settlers as a way to get them to work for “the government”, and in the face of their reluctance the administration saw no alternative to increasing mechanization, to achieve at least a minimum of the demanded collective production. This massive support to mechanization further enhanced the government control and the lack of responsibility felt by the settlers. Because of the bureaucratic budgeting and accounting procedures no kind of cost benefit analysis was—or could even be—applied, and the uneconomic capital inputs remained unexposed—and of no major concern to any single person’s responsibility.

There was no attempt to use the new communal organization to change the existing pattern of production, exchange and control. The new settlements were not supposed to extend their scope beyond the normal agricultural production of primary goods, i.e. food crops for their own subsistence and cash crops for sale.
through channels outside their control. In the few cases where non-agricultural activities were supported, they were of the type normally undertaken by the above mentioned "peasantry-cum-lumpenbourgeoisie", and thus constituted primarily a transfer from this uncontrolled sector to the tight bureaucratic control over the ujamaa sector. Apart from this the ujamaa policy has only justified further expansion of the bureaucracy to enable it to provide the new villages with "advice" and "services".

The major potential conflicts inherent in a situation where a bureaucracy, whose mode of operation is to direct and control, implements a policy, which has as one of its few clearly stated characteristics the call for democratic decision-making, were in general avoided.

First of all of course nobody tried to provoke this conflict by educating the peasants about their own specific situation and how they could use ujamaa and co-operation to improve it on their own conditions. Education and "persuasion" were rather seen as legitimate means to get the unavoidable democratic institutions to submit to advice from leaders and experts.

Furthermore this was favoured by the general "ndiyo bwana" (yes sir) attitude of the peasantry towards the bureaucrats, agreeing to their advice, but doing as little as possible to do anything about it.

Finally the government and TANU leaders have the power and resources to use material inducements to bring about the decisions desired by them—a game which does however become rather farcical in the many cases where neither the promised support nor the activity agreed to by the villagers ever materialize in reality.

In spite of the efforts of the bureaucracy the ujamaa villages did not provide the quick, impressive results. One leader voiced the interpretation of this lack: "Irresponsibility and laziness among the villagers are among the major factors which have hampered the development of certain ujamaa villages in West Lake Region", and this was the general reasoning.

Hardly any new villages were started for some years after the first big jump in 1968. The normal bureaucratic methods were apparently only partly effective, and the last resort of bureaucratic action, the use of open force, had been excluded since 1968 when certain instances had led to an open clash between the Regional Commissioner representing the government and party bureaucracy, and some members of parliament, who are also part of this bureaucracy, but who partly owe it to being elected by the peasants, their local power-base. With total refusal of the MPs complaints, the most severe being about the use of force in ujamaa implementation, and later their dismissal from Parliament and the party, the supremacy of party (and government) bureaucracy was upheld. But the President's removal of the Regional Commissioner shortly afterwards was also taken as a sign that force had been employed too openly.

Eventually a new approach was developed in the Region. This as we have seen consisted of encouraging ujamaa activities in existing traditional villages. Realizing the impossibility of transforming peasant agriculture—in the short run without
using considerable amounts of force, and in the long run without endangering the existing socio-economic structures—the activities chosen for ujamaa promotion were only marginal to the existing patterns of production.

As such tea ujamaa and dairy ujamaa farming, as well as ujamaa fishery, ujamaa shops, ujamaa bars, etc. were easily comprehended by the peasants as new heavily government supported methods to supplement the incomes from their individual family farms.

The incentives used to create these “ujamaa villages”, with very limited cooperative activity, involving only a small part of the village population and a fraction of their labour time, were persuasion combined with the interest of influential villagers in maintaining good relations with administrators and politicians, and material support.

With management advice supported by capital inputs provided by government very little was left to the initiative, responsibility and risk-taking by the villagers themselves. Although concerned with agricultural production these ujamaa activities were therefore for the villagers comparable to the variety of undertakings in the sphere of what we called the “peasantry-cum-lumpen-bourgeois”, with the extra advantage that they promoted favourable relations with the bureaucracy, which could also be useful in other connections.

The bureaucracy on the other hand could report good progress on the ujamaa front (so and so many new villages started, so and so many members, this or that support given), and also this type of ujamaa may eventually be a way to exert more influence on this hitherto uncontrollable sphere of economic activities.

Of course this policy did provide some new production and income opportunities, and as such it has not been a complete waste of time and money. It also facilitates the work of the modernizers in the extension services when adoption of their recommendations is traded for government support which minimizes the risks otherwise involved in innovations.

However, these results were already being realized by the Bukoba tea scheme run and tightly controlled by the Tanzania Tea Authority and to a certain extent by dairy development supported by Bukoba Co-operative Union and the Livestock Department. The ujamaa ventures gave more peasants a chance to earn a small additional income within these fields in return for extremely small contributions. But with their even more bureaucratic mode of operation, there was less incentive and less possibility to ensure that they were just to some extent economical, than in the schemes based on individual peasants. In the bureaucratic budgeting procedure realistic assessment of the profitability of capital investments is not a prime consideration, as they are not even regarded as investments, but as development expenditures (which are always good!), and as nobody stands to lose anything directly if they turn out to be uneconomical. On the other side, the peasants, trading their consent to a plan proposed by government or party representatives against promises of massive support, had nothing at stake either, and had no reason to make any special effort to make the investments economical.
The main shortcoming was again the complete lack of any attempt to use these limited ujamaa experiences as educational tools, to enable the average peasant to learn how his general situation might be changed through collective action—beyond the mere chance of getting a small additional income. Wanting this, there has been no sign so far of any change in the basic structures as a result of ujamaa activities in the traditional villages. On the contrary the tendency has been increased bureaucratic expenditures and control and a bureaucratic inroad on the growing activities of the petty bourgeois peasantry.

It may be taken as a sign of successful ujamaa implementation that the last type of ujamaa villages to appear in West Lake Region, while having some similarity with either of the two former types or combining elements from both, is characterized by being established on the spontaneous and voluntary initiative of the villagers themselves.

At a closer look they do however turn out rather to be examples of the adaptability of the peasantry to changes in the environment, showing that the peasants themselves have been quite able to make ujamaa implementation a learning process—within the limitations of the peasant economy and its place in the wider society.

In the last years an increasing number of villages had groups of villagers, or the whole village, joining together to start some communal activity within fields demonstrated to be acceptable by the older government initiated villages, and often limited to the extent of being merely symbolic. On this basis they applied for approval as ujamaa villages—and for the government support supposed automatically to follow this approval. In many cases such actions have been centred around genuinely felt needs, for example when a communal field is opened in a newly settled village in order to get a road “on which to transport the communal harvest”, or when the application is for money to start an ujamaa shop in an area where no private shop-owner has found it profitable to start business. Sometimes the motivation seems to have been plain envy at the—in fact seldom excessive—profits of some “petty bourgeois peasant”. Finally there are examples of small groups of people trying to attract government support to ujamaa enterprises, which were in fact closer to being private companies.

Whichever of these forms the new ujamaa villages may have taken, there have been no attempts in this movement to use ujamaa to transform the peasant economy or to change the peasants relations to the wider society, that is, to go beyond the interpretation of ujamaa established by the bureaucracy.

At first therefore the administrative and political leaders were only too happy to be able to include these villages in their reports, and to accept them as liable to receive government support as ujamaa villages. There were however signs that with this last addition the variety of ujamaa villages in terms of size, type of activities and organization, and location was becoming so wide that the administration found it increasingly difficult to extend effective control to all of them, especially the most successful, but also resource demanding, control through support. It is
probably in this context the tendencies among leaders to return to the old concept of resettlement or villagization should be seen. It is presumably expected, that regrouping the peasants in larger, more "orderly" settlements, with rules for what to be produced by whom and where, will facilitate more direct influence and control by administrators and politicians over the whole peasantry, and demand less material inputs than when the emphasis is mainly on supporting scattered, "voluntary" communal activities.

Obviously such a change of emphasis makes the intentions almost conspicuously clear, eliminating any remaining element of socialism from Tanzania's rural policy. It is hard to see how this is compatible with the ujamaa ideology.
Postscript

Ujamaa diverging into mass resettlement campaigns

In November 1973 the President was touring Kigoma Region to familiarize himself on the spot with "Operation Kigoma". This operation, in line with the earlier "Operation Dodoma" was a mobilization of all resources within the Region and the pooling of resources from other Regions for a concentrated effort to boost the rural development of one of the country's most backward Regions, Kigoma. During his stay in this Region the President delivered a speech which reflected a rather fundamental change in the approach to certain aspects of rural development.

During the years 1973 and 1974 Tanzania came into a difficult economic situation. The rise in oil prices hit the country very hard. This coincided with a rather widespread drought and a decreasing foodcrop production, necessitating a rapid increase in import of food, which drained the foreign currency reserves.

During the same period a certain despair followed the awareness among the leadership of the unbalanced relation between input and output of the ujamaa sector, which did not produce the expected economic results and which developed slowly in spite of the concentrated support.

It became clear that the country had to struggle more consciously to obtain as high a degree of self-reliance as possible. This could only take place through an increased production, especially of food crops. More firm measures and more control over the use of the resources were necessary to reach this goal.

Two measures were taken during 1974:

1. a nationwide campaign for increased food crop production, and 2. a nationwide "Operation Vijiji" ("Operation Villages").

These two campaigns were given priority at the expense of other development efforts, including the ujamaa villages. These villages were no longer given highest priority and the support to them was markedly reduced, The effect of this is, of course, not yet known.

The seeds for these two measures were laid in the President's Kigoma-speech in which he urged for a rapid villagization of the rural population as an absolute precondition for the development, and in which he expressed the need to use force to villagize people and speed up the production. The country had no time to wait for the voluntary villagization based on the education of people.
The nationwide campaign for increased food crop production

Two new elements were embedded in this campaign: 1) the utilization of empty land and unprofitably used land (gardens, golfcourses, beachlawns, etc.) in towns as well as in rural areas, and 2) the mobilization of the total population, not only the rural population, for food crop production. For the first time bureaucrats, businessmen, industrial workers, and students were forced to be actively and directly involved in the production of food. Offices, industries, shops were allocated land which they had to cultivate.

Some familiar problems of implementation cropped up again during this campaign. The use of tractors was not properly organized and coordinated, seedlings were distributed too late for planting before the rains, selection of crops was not always related to the dominant food pattern of the areas. In spite of this the result of the campaign was a marked increase in food production—at the expense of cash crops production. But the results show that a system for nationwide mobilization is established.

The villagization—“Operation Vijiji”

Operation Vijiji is based on a change in approach to some of the aspects of rural development. It is carried out as forced movement of people from small villages into bigger, and from scattered settlements into nucleated villages, if necessary by the use of force from the peoples militia, government officials, party, and military.

The villagization programme does not contain a programme for the introduction of a new mode of production as was the case in the Ujamaa Vijjini programme. It aims at a rapid formation of villages and a rapid increase in production on an individual basis through control of the peasants’ work and through a supply of farm-inputs which can more easily take place to fewer concentrated settlements than to scattered settlements. When this programme is successfully carried through a new programme aiming at introducing the new mode of production should in theory be started.

As resources to supply infrastructural facilities are scarce the existing infrastructural facilities have to be utilized maximally. Existing infrastructural facilities have, therefore, been the key determinant for the location of new villages and for the selection of those villages which should expand through amalgamation of small villages into bigger villages. This is a new approach fundamentally different from the earlier approach, where production potentials (size of available land, fertility of the land, rainfall, etc.), were the key determinants for location of
villages, and infrastructure to be supplied according to the funds available.

In our view the new approach is bound to have very negative effects on the economy if strictly followed in the villagization, because it will disrupt the production over a rather long period in three ways:

a) A number of villages are and will be located in infertile areas and will demand a heavy input of expensive fertilizer and manure and may have to be forced to move back to their original areas.

b) The production pattern is bound to be disturbed in drier areas, where an ecologically balanced pattern of rotation of crops and roation of fallow and cultivation is well established and demands rather big areas per family to allow for the fallow of land, which means that the population has to live scattered.

c) The planned size of the villages and the concentration of houses on tiny plots in the village area will mean a very long walking distance every day between house and farm, reducing the time available for the work on the farms.

In certain regions, among them West Lake Region, the existence of roads has been the key determinant for the location of villages. In Karagwe District this is a disastrous choice. Here the roads are mainly located along the top of the mountains where the soils are thin and sandy, excellent for roads, but unsuitable for cultivation. The traditional villages are located in the valley bottoms where the fertile soil has been washed down and where the drinking water is available. The Operation Vijiji in Karagwe planned to move people up to the roads “to secure an easier access to the villages” as it was argued, in spite of the fact that people had volunteered to build a road down to the villages from the major road on the top of the ridge.

The villagization programme contains a scheme for the agricultural production which besides aiming at increasing the production through control of the labour input and quality of the cultivation of each farmer, aims at area-wise specialization in crop production. The choice of crops is made by the government officials, and in some cases crops have been chosen for places where they do not grow very well or where the handling and cultivation of the crops is not familiar to the people.

From the launching of Ujamaa Vijijini in 1968/69 till today the move has been from government management to government control over the peasants at conditions which may not lead to the needed rapid increase in the basic production, but may be rather harmful to the peasant agricultural system on which the production is based.

The deadline for the full implementation of Operation Vijiji is the year 1977 by which time every person in the rural areas will be living in a registered village. Fortunately, at the time of writing the implementation is not yet carried out in all Regions and all Districts. There is, therefore, a hope for a realization of the potential dangers and hopefully an adjustment in the approach.

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Map 1. Location of West Lake Region in East Africa

[Map showing the location of the West Lake Region in East Africa, including countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia, and Mozambique. The West Lake Region is highlighted on the map.]
Map 2. Altitudes and mean annual rainfall: West Lake Region

Source: Statistics for rainfall stations, East African Meteorological Dept., Nairobi

Map 5. Ntobeye, Ujamaa village, Ngora District. Settlement development
Map 7. Location of Ujamaa village, Omulunazi

- • established 1971
- ○ established 1972
- ● split communities

KEY

- **male**
- **female**

- ▲ Ujamaa members
- ▲ ○ Non-members living in household
- ▲ ○ Dead, or living elsewhere
- ▲ 50 Age of oldest male in generation

- --- Household unit

Household members with regular other jobs, have these indicated.
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