CONTRADICTIONS IN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

A study of three minimum package projects
in southern Ethiopia
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I. INTRODUCTION

This research report is part of a more comprehensive study of structural change in the countryside of southern Ethiopia. The structural trend in the 1960's can roughly be expressed as a transition from subsistence-farming coupled with a kind of "feudalism" to agrarian capitalism. The problem under study in this report is, however, more limited. We will investigate how the Swedish Government's bilateral assistance to Ethiopia in the field of agricultural development, directly and indirectly affects the small farmers, notably the tenants, in the project areas.

The Swedish development assistance

One point of departure is the official goals of Swedish development assistance. The basic principles were laid down by the Parliament in 1962 and 1968. According to the Government bills, the goal of Swedish development assistance is to improve the standard of living for the poor peoples, the motive for development assistance is feelings of international solidarity.\(^1\)

The social and political aspects of the assistance are pointed out:

> It is difficult to set out social and political goals for development assistance. It cannot be taken for granted that those social and political systems and principles to which we adhere are relevant or attainable for all developing countries. Nevertheless it may be reasonable to try to direct the development assistance so that it, as far as it is possible to judge, contributes to a development of society in the direction towards political democracy and social equality. It is not in accordance with either the goals or the motives of the Swedish development assistance, that it should contribute to a conservation of an anti-progressive social structure.\(^2\)

It has often been noted that the principles of Swedish development assistance differ from most other aid-giving countries. The difference is marked by the above quotation, the essence of which is that production growth alone is not a sufficient goal, certain social groups must benefit from the assistance and also participate in the development efforts.

The officially laid down goals are partly economic (increase in production) and partly social and political (identification of a
target group and activation of this group for democratic ends).

In 1972 there were two large Swedish-supported agricultural development efforts in Ethiopia, the CADU³/⁴-project and the minimum package projects. They are part of the Swedish Government's bilateral development assistance to Ethiopia. CADU started in 1967 and is limited to the Chilalo district in Arussi province. One of CADU's goals is to create possibilities for an expansion of the project's activities outside Arussi. To this end a number of "mini-projects" have been launched in different parts of the country, starting in 1971. Their aim is to communicate the most important experiences gained by CADU to farmers throughout Ethiopia. CADU and the minimum package projects must be viewed together. The latter are extensions of the former.

In the preparatory period of CADU (1966) high priority was given to the goal of participation. The following goals were set out:

"a) to improve the ability of the local population to participate in and be responsible for the local administration and development effort and thereby improve the economic and social conditions in the area;

b) to create possibilities for an expansion of the programme." ⁴/

The importance of popular participation was enhanced:

"With respect to the first target it must be underlined that the project not only aims at an increased production. This could probably be achieved most easily through large scale farming and big industrial ventures, often under foreign management. The more important aspect of this project is, however, to develop the ability of the local people to deal with their own problems and to competently lead the progress of their society. This may perhaps be a slower but more secure and long-lasting approach, which will encompass and benefit the whole population and not just a fraction of it." ⁵/

This is all in accordance with the overall goal for Swedish development assistance. It is the emphasis on the "local people" (the small farmers) which from the Swedish point of view justifies a Swedish involvement in Ethiopia. Since 1966 the formulation of the goal 'participation' has undergone a slight change. For the period 1971-75 the "achievement of economic and social development throughout the project area" ⁶/ is said to be
one main goal of CADU. Activities towards this end "shall be
conducted so as to ensure the participation of the project area
population in and their assuming of increasing responsibility
for those activities".7/

Although the changes in formulation are slight, they indicate
difficulties in implementing the goal of participation in the
Ethiopian context as well as diverging opinions within the Swedish
camp concerning the priority of this goal for the project
activities. An analysis of the actors behind the changes in
formulation is beyond the scope of this report, however. Here we
choose to interpret the goal of the Swedish sponsored agricultural
projects as it is officially interpreted: an unambiguous effort
in favour of the poorest sections among the peasants, an effort
that is supposed to include mobilization of the target group to
participate in the decision-making in the projects.

The research task

Does the Swedish development assistance help the poorest farmers
in Ethiopia? The aim of this study is to illuminate this
question by confronting the officially prescribed goal of partic-
ipation with reality. Therefore, some important results of
CADU's activities are summarized as a background. The main part
of this report deals with the activities of three minimum package
projects during the period April 1971 - June 1972, which roughly
corresponds to their first year of activity.

The three project areas selected for this study - Shashamane,
Bako and Tullu Bollo - are (like CADU's project area) situated in
the southern part of Ethiopia. The social structure of
agricultural society throughout the southern provinces8/ possess
some basic similarities due to the fact that these provinces
were conquered by Menilek (Emperor of Ethiopia 1889-1913)
and incorporated into his expanding Ethiopian Empire. We must
therefore start with a general description of the social structure
in which our minimum package projects operate.

The structural environment

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Prior to the conquest of Menilek the various peoples had been
organized in small sultanats, kingdoms and pastoral tribes independent from the Abyssinian kingdom(s). After the conquest, structural change followed more or less the same pattern everywhere: the land was appropriated by Menilek who redistributed it to his officers and administrators as well as to co-operative chiefs from the subjugated peoples. The local population was, as a rule, reduced to the status of tenants, obligated to give part of their agricultural production and personal labour to their landlords. A concentration of ownership of land thus took place and at the same time there was a trend from pastoralism to increased emphasis on agriculture.\(^{10}\) The basic features of the social structure, that was established after the conquest, are still prevalent in the southern provinces. A calculation based on figures given in official Ethiopian statistical publications gives the following pattern: \(45\%\) of the agricultural holdings in the southern provinces are operated by owner-cultivators, \(46\%\) by tenants and \(9\%\) by persons who own part of the holding and rent part of it.\(^{11}\) More than \(90\%\) of all these holdings comprise a cultivated area of less than 5 hectares.\(^{12}\) These holdings are often split up into several fields. They are low-yielding. The agricultural work is in general performed by the family without hired labour, but it is usual that a number of farmers living in the same area go together for ploughing and harvesting. Oxen and wooden ploughs with metal share points are used. The agricultural production is dominated by cereal crops. Cattle herding is usually combined with agricultural production. The farmers are for the greater part subsistence farmers but depend on the local markets for such items as tobacco, salt and coffee (in the non-coffee producing areas). Farmers cultivating less than 5 hectares form the bulk of Ethiopia's population. They are estimated to compose about 4 million households of which more than 50% are located in the southern provinces. These farmers are the target group of the Swedish sponsored development projects, and among them the tenants form the poorest section.

Our three studied minimum package projects are all situated within or on the borders of Shoa province. The selection is made consciously and it indicates the limitations of this report. The conclusions which can be drawn from it are not applicable to all agricultural regions in Ethiopia, particularly not to the northern provinces\(^{13}\) where the pattern of land ownership is entirely
In this study, the Swedish agricultural development assistance is put into its structural context. Two structural factors, which contradict the development projects, are discussed. These are: the trend towards mechanization of cereal production in the southern highlands and the interests of the land-owning class (these two factors are interconnected). The argumentation runs like this: since the mid-1960's a growing number of big landowners have, as a consequence of the World Bank and F.A.O. inspired official agricultural policies, turned to commercial mechanized farming. Using tractors, fertilizers and improved seeds, they have started to produce wheat on their holdings for the growing urban markets. Tenant farmers, who previously operated these holdings, have, in the process, become economically superfluous. Since lease agreements as a rule are verbal and can be terminated by the landlord without the agreement of the tenants a growing number of them have been evicted since mechanization started around 1966-67. The mechanization/eviction process is restricted to the southern provinces, where - as a consequence of Emperor Menilik's land policies, private ownership of land prevails, and large holdings, with absentee ownership are numerous. Because of the communal form of land tenure in the northern provinces - land is owned by the village community or the extended family group and cannot be sold by individuals - little mechanization has taken place in the highland agricultural regions there.

The big landowners now involved in the mechanization process belong to different groups. Some of them are members of the traditional landed aristocracy, some of which have family ties to the ruling dynasty, which itself constitutes the biggest landowning family. Others are wealthy civil servants, who by purchase and/or by receiving land grants from the Emperor, have created large holdings for themselves. Still others are contractors, capitalist-owning agriculturally skilled persons who contract the land of a big landowner for a number of years. All these groups are privileged within the present political system of Ethiopia. They are unified by a common realization that big money is hidden in the green
revolution for those who are able to utilize the technical innovations.

**Experiences from CADU's project area**

It is undeniable that the economic goal of CADU during the period 1967-1971 has been realized even better than expected. The main activities achieving this end have been the demonstration of wheat seeds and fertilizers, provision of inputs, a credit programme and marketing of the production surplus produced by the farmers participating in the credit programme. The results are impressive. From a beginning of 6 extension areas and 42 model farmers in 1968/69 the corresponding figures for 1970/71 were 22 extension areas and 214 model farmers. Since 1972 the project activities cover almost all Chilalo. In 1967/68, 480 quintals of wheat was bought by CADU from farmers and sold to Addis Ababa and other major markets, in 1970/71 the quantity was 10,000 quintals. Even faster was the collection and sale of milk. In 1967/68 4,450 litres were sold and in 1969/70 311,126 litres. In later years the marketing of milk has drastically declined in importance due to the fact that most of the land in Chilalo is being used for cereal cultivation. The above may be sufficient to show that production growth, measured in agricultural products for market sale, has been affected by CADU in the project area. Turning to the target group for the activities, we find that the number of farmers participating in the credit programme has increased rapidly from a beginning of 189 credit takers in 1968 to 14,146 credit takers in 1971. (Approximately 20% of the total number of farmers in Chilalo.) Among the credit takers, owner-cultivators with less than 10 hectares of land have every year constituted the largest group of credit takers, varying between 40% and 50% of the total number. A growing number of tenants have also been reached by the credit programme. In 1968/69 they formed 9% of the credit takers getting only 4% of the credit value. In 1970/71 the tenants formed 32% of the credit takers getting 28% of the credit value. (It is estimated that 47% of the holdings in Chilalo are operated by tenants.)

Since 1969 large landowners (i.e. people cultivating more than 25 hectares) have been excluded from the credit programme.
On the basis of these figures it seems that CADU in addition to
creating economic growth in the project area, has been able to
direct its activities mainly to its target group. The figures
given above do not, however, give the whole truth of the state of
affairs in Chilalo. We must include some factors outside the realm
of the project activities. CADU has not been operating in a
vacuum. Since 1968 many large scale commercial farms have been
established in Chilalo. In the following paragraphs we will
present some important findings from an investigation about the
effects mechanized farming has had on peasant agriculture. The
investigation concerns the years 1968-70 for selected parts of
five sub-districts in Chilalo district. 16/

The investigation shows that mechanized farming in the study area
is of relatively recent origin. Before 1968 only a negligible part
of the area was under mechanized cultivation, but since that year
mechanization has been expanding at an increasing rate. In 1970
about 25% of the tractor-cultivable area17/ was under tractor
cultivation. During this period mechanization proceeded fastest
on lands belonging to persons owning at least 20 hectares,
holdings larger than 20 hectares comprised 36% of the surveyed
area). Of the tractor-cultivated area 58% was operated by the
landowners themselves, and 44% by contractors. In all, 9,700
hectares18/ were under tractor-cultivation in 1970.

In 1969 and 1970, 538 tenants moved out of the area under study,
of which number 392 tenants were evicted as a direct consequence
of mechanization. These figures were given by "golmasas", a kind
of official whose duty it is to keep records of people moving in
and out of their area of responsibility. The actual number of
tenants who had left the area seems to have been still greater.
According to the investigator the golmasas in many cases mentioned
that more tenants than the number indicated by them had left. The
author of the investigation calculated that the true number of
evicted tenants in 1969 and 1970, due to mechanization, may have
been between 450 and 500. The total number of tenants in the
surveyed area in 1968/69 was calculated to be 3,420. Thus, the
tenants evicted in 1969 and 1970 amounted to between 13.2% and
14.6% of the 1968 tenant population. If previous years are
included, approximately 20% of the tenant population may have been
evicted. The tenants were usually told to leave the land after
the harvest.

According to the investigation, some of the evicted tenants had moved to nearby areas while the majority had left Arussi province. It was mentioned that the tenants had left for places in southern Shoa province, and Bale and Harrar provinces in the belief and hope that in those places there was land available for cultivation.

According to the investigation, eviction is not the only negative consequence of mechanization for small farmers. The price of land is increasing due to mechanization. This means that tenants who are not yet evicted face higher rent rates.

Mechanization does not only effect agricultural land. Grazing land is also being mechanized, which means a decrease in land available for cattle-breeding. According to the investigation, this phenomenon has negative consequences for small farmers in general, both tenants and owner-cultivators. For the small farmers, cattle-breeding functions as a savings mechanism in that it acts as an economic reserve for unforeseen expenses, for social investments and the like. The small owner-cultivators do not possess enough land for both agriculture and grazing. Therefore, the usual practice has been to rent pasture land from big landowners. The introduction of mechanized farming on former grazing land means then, that the small farmers either have to specialize in crop production alone, or have to move to other areas where they can continue their traditional practices. The small farmers are reluctant to give up cattle-breeding because of economic insecurity, and some of them can be expected to leave the area. According to the investigation, some owner-cultivators had already left.

One more negative consequence for small farmers is that the mechanization of large areas block traditional paths between villages and markets. Thus, according to the investigation, mechanization destroys the traditional pattern of communication.

On the basis of these findings, the investigation predicts that if mechanization continues to expand during a number of years, it would mean the breaking up of traditional peasant society: an increasing part of the tenant population will be evicted (the
investigation predicts that if the trend continues 68% of the 1968 tenant population in the surveyed area will have been evicted by 1975 and more owner-cultivators will voluntarily leave the area because of the limited possibilities of cattle-breeding. Thus, the progressive de-population of the area may, at a later stage, in itself act as a catalyst for the remaining small-scale farmers to leave the region.

The findings and predictions of the investigation so far

Which is CADU's role in this process? Some critics of CADU have asserted that CADU directly encourages large scale mechanization and thereby is responsible for the evictions. It is true that CADU and the process of mechanization/eviction started at about the same time - in 1968. This co-variation does not, however, necessarily mean that the activities of CADU are the cause of evictions.

The perspectives must be broadened. In the later part of the 1960's policies of agricultural development were to a greater extent than before put into practice in Ethiopia. The impulses came from international institutions, among which the World Bank Group was perhaps the most influential. Since the 1950's the Bank has made economic surveys of Ethiopia. The Bank's recommendations for economic development have emphasized that agriculture must for a long period remain the backbone of Ethiopia's economy.

In Ethiopia's "Third Five Year Development Plan" (to a great extent the work of international experts) two policies of agricultural development are presented. One policy deals with large scale commercial agriculture, which in the short run is considered the only way to get the relatively quick increase needed in agricultural exports and supply of food stuffs for the rapidly expanding urban centres. To this end measures have been taken to a) invite foreign capital and skill to engage in plantations, livestock farms, etc., and b) to create possibilities for the emergence of indigenous Ethiopian agricultural capitalism. The mechanized farms increasing in number in the highlands, specializing in production of cereals for domestic consumption, are a result of this policy. Ethiopian landowners and contractors have been encouraged in engaging in commercial production by credit
possibilities from the Ethiopian Development Bank, by a decree of duty free tractor fuel for tractors used in agricultural work, etc.

The other policy deals with the peasant problem. The overwhelming majority of the Ethiopian people consists of close to subsistence small farmers. The economic welfare of this population must, according to the plans be promoted in order to provide a stable basis for taxation, which is a pre-requisite for further development. The policies towards the small farmers are far-fetched; results cannot be expected overnight. The concrete policy consists of measures to increase the productivity of the small farms, and organizations to make the surplus production dependent on a market mechanism.

CADU and the minimum package projects are to be viewed as components of this policy.

The experiences from northern Chilalo show, that these two development strategies, when promoted in the same geographical area, are not in harmony with each other. On the contrary, it would seem that they are contradictory - mechanization goes with eviction. When the strategies have been tried at the same time in the same area, the small farmers' interests have had to yield to the interests of the big landowners and contractors. This report provides more material on this point.

The role of CADU in the mechanization process in Chilalo is only indirect. Although CADU at its early stage did provide assistance to some big farmers, its main influence has been at the level of transmitting ideas. The experiment farm of CADU, Kolumss, cannot but have given the idea of the profitability of commercial agriculture to many big landlords in the region.

II THE MINIMUM PACKAGE PROJECTS; their organization, goals and activities

Organization

The minimum package projects form part of a special department within the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture. This body - the Extension and Project Implementation Department (hereafter EPID) -
was created in 1971 and serves as a co-ordinating unit for all agricultural development projects in the country, including comprehensive projects focusing on peasant agriculture as well as large scale commercial farming projects. The minimum package projects aim at promoting peasant agriculture.

In August 1971 the Ethiopian and the Swedish governments reached an agreement according to which Sweden gives personnel and financial assistance to the minimum package projects for the period 1971-75. The two governments are the main contributors to the projects. Sweden's contribution is calculated to amount to about 45% of the total costs, it is maximized to 12.5 million Swedish Crowns. Contributors of less importance are F.A.O. and DANIDA ( = the Danish development assistance authority). The Ethiopian Government has also applied for a loan from IBRD/IDA to cover investment costs for 1973-75.

The Swedish involvement is explained by the fact that the minimum packet projects are considered extensions of CADU. One of the goals of CADU is "the creation of possibilities for the application elsewhere in Ethiopia of the experience gained by CADU". The minimum package projects represent a realization of this goal.

According to the plans, ten minimum package projects are to be launched yearly beginning with 1971. In this way, in the later part of the decade, Ethiopia will be covered with a web of minimum package projects reaching farmers in all corners of the Empire. So far reality almost matches the plans: at the end of 1972 there were 18 minimum package projects operating along the main roads in 10 of the 14 provinces of Ethiopia.

Goals

Three main goals are stipulated for KFID's activities in the field of promoting peasant agriculture. The first of these goals refers to the activities of the minimum package projects:

"The first main goal shall be the achievement of an improved standard of living for the farm population. The activities towards this end shall be conducted so as to ensure the participation of the population in, and their assuming of increasing responsibility for, those activities."
Epid shall endeavour to avoid adverse employment effects and to observe opportunities to create additional farming possibilities. The activities shall be directed mainly towards farmers in the lower income brackets.  

The second sentence in the goal description emphasizes the participation of the target group. It can be interpreted in two ways. A narrow interpretation encompasses only participation of the farmers in the economic activities that the projects offer: participation in the credit programme. A broad interpretation includes, above and beyond the first interpretation, popular participation in decision-making concerning local development efforts. These political aspects of participation are not explicitly stated in the official documents, but they follow as a logical corollary from the principles of Swedish aid. Such a political participation was also the original aim of Cadu. It is obvious that an emphasis on this broad interpretation of the concept of participation necessitates local self-government, land reform, and education in the "development from below" approach.

It is to be expected that the Imperial Ethiopian Government, which holds an authoritarian attitude to its subjects, sticks to the narrow interpretation of the concept of participation, while Sida\(^{24}\) officially sticks to the broader interpretation.

The third sentence in the goal description is conditioned by Cadu's negative experiences of mechanization in the project area. It is the eviction of tenants that is referred to. The planners behind the minimum package projects realize that large scale commercialization/mechanization is a phenomenon that is not always consistent with the interests of small farmers. This is mentioned in the Master Plan for the projects' activities.

"The availability of new agricultural techniques has also encouraged large land-owners to take up farming themselves and to evict some of their tenants".\(^{25}\)

The discussion is elaborated like this:

"Although tractorization still may prove attractive to the individual it will lead to eviction of tenants or labourers. It will presently be impossible to find alternative employment possibilities for this labour if such eviction should take
place on a large scale. From the society's point of view the tractorization has in this case resulted in a substitution of scarce foreign exchange for plentiful labour."26/

The collision course between large scale commercial agriculture and development efforts directed to subsistence farmers is hence known to the planners. Which steps do they consider necessary to take in order to prevent the negative experiences of CADU from being repeated in the minimum package project areas?

Land reform is mentioned. The minimum package areas will be given priority in the implementation of legislation on tenancy relationships.27/ The reforms are contained in a draft Agricultural Tenancy Relationships Proclamation which, at the time of publishing this research report, is still pending in the Ethiopian Parliament. (A summary of the most important provisions of the draft proclamation is given on pp.49-55). The draft proclamation has, however, its limitations, a fact that the development planners are aware of. "The draft tenancy law when implemented may check this tendency/eviction/but in no way prevent it".28/

It is therefore suggested that the Ethiopian Government shall make an effort to reserve cultivable Government land for evicted tenants.29/ Furthermore the plan of operation suggests that the minimum package areas shall have priority in the implementation of future legislation on local self administration.30/

The above mentioned measures are enumerated in the plan of operation under the heading "supporting measures". It is accentuated that they do not fall under the responsibility of EPID. The reforms can only be undertaken by the Ethiopian Government (some of the reforms in collaboration with the Parliament).31/

This is a matter of course, but it is important to draw attention to it. The political pre-requisites for the successful performance of the minimum package projects, are in the hands of a government, based upon the support of a land owning class. In those areas where the bulk of the farmers are tenants, the success of the projects are ultimately dependent on the Government's will to reform and its capability for reform.
Activities

The activities through which the goals of the projects are to be reached, are laid down in the Master Plan and in the Plan of Operation for EPID. In a "model" project area, the following activities and personnel will be found: 32/ The main activities are the demonstration of the effects of using fertilizers in cereal production, the provision of inputs and a credit programme to make it possible for the farmers to benefit from the innovations. Every minimum package project will, as a rule, cover an area with 10,000 peasant families. The project personnel consists of one supervisor, one organizer, five extension agents and five trade centre foremen. The extension agents run the demonstration activities. They cultivate a demonstration field where the effects of fertilizers are shown. They also cooperate with and advise the model farmers (chosen by the project at the proposal of the local farmers) who are the ultimate link between the project and the population. The commercial activities (distribution of inputs and credit operations) are run by the organizer and the trade centre foreman. They arrange credit agreements, transmit supplies (= fertilizers) to the farmers and collect repayments. The project area is divided into five sub-districts. In each of these one extension agent and one trade centre foreman are responsible for the contacts to the five selected model farmers and to the approximately 2,000 peasant families.

The three main activities are closely connected. Their aim is to raise the productivity of cereal crops 33/ cultivated by the small farmers and to make the producers dependent on an emerging money economy and a market system.

The inputs, which the project supplies, consist mainly of fertilizers but also of seeds and farm implements. The credit programme is concentrated on these inputs. From the project, farmers can get credits in kind 34/ while the repayments are collected in cash. The repayment period is one year and the interest rate is 12%. 35/

In the credit regulations it is laid down that each applicant must pay in cash 25% of the value of the inputs before the fertilizers
are handed over to him. When the credit concerns seeds, the downpayment is 50%.36/

The credit regulations are influenced by the experiences of CADU. A person who owns and cultivates more than 20 hectares is not qualified to apply for credits from the minimum package projects. Each borrower must have two personal guarantors. If the borrower is a tenant he must have a written lease agreement with his landlord. The lease agreement must be consistent with the draft Tenancy Proclamation (cf. pp. 49-55), model leases have been worked out by EPID. One of the tenant's guarantors must be the landlord or the landlord's local representative.38/ A landlord who is competent to apply for a loan (i.e. he cultivates himself less than 20 hectares) must sign acceptable written lease agreements with all his tenants within the project area, before he can get a loan.39/

These regulations are intended to a) prevent big landowners from dominating the credit programme, b) force those big landowners who are qualified to apply for loans (those personally cultivating less than 20 hectares) to emancipate their tenants and c) guard the financial operations of the projects (it is obvious that a tenant without written lease agreements is an unsafe investment object - he can be evicted after having broadcast the fertilizers on his fields). Point c) turns our interest to the financial aspects of the credit programme. EPID buys fertilizers for the minimum package projects with money which it has borrowed from the Ethiopian Development Bank. The Development Bank and EPID have signed an agreement according to which the former has appointed the latter as its agent for the provision of credit to farmers in the project areas.40/ The agreement stipulates that unless at least 94% of the value of the credits distributed to farmers in a minimum package project area is repaid within due time (12 months + 2 months) the credit operations shall be discontinued.41/ The same conditions are valid for the sub-districts of a minimum package project. If 95% of the amount due in one trade centre area is not repaid within the agreed time, no further credit operations shall be undertaken in that sub-district.42/

One reason for these conditions is said to be the encouragement of "the principle of mutual responsibility between the farmers for
their loans.\footnote{43/} Another (not mentioned) reason is, of course, that EPID and the Development Bank are anxious about their money.

The regulations concerning downpayment, written lease agreements for tenants and the principle that the inability of a few borrowers to repay their loans shall have negative consequences for all borrowers in the area, are assuredly justified from a narrow banking viewpoint. Nevertheless, the two first mentioned of the regulations create an inner contradiction in the project activities. On one hand, it is said that the activities shall benefit the farmers in the low income brackets. On the other hand, these very regulations prevent farmers in the target group from participating in the credit programme. The poor farmers are per definition tenants without written leases and owner-cultivators who live in the periphery of the money economy. In the following description of the selected minimum package projects we will see how the regulations concerning written lease and downpayment, function as a barrier blocking the way to participation for a considerable proportion of the projects' target group.

**Co-operative societies**

In addition to the above mentioned activities, the minimum package projects are to gradually assist in the creation and management of co-operative societies. These vehicles for participation of the local population shall in theory have the ultimate function of making the projects superfluous - by taking over their activities. According to the plans co-operative societies are to take over the projects' role as a link between the Development Bank and the small farmers.

*It is the intention of the Bank, as soon as co-operatives can be formed in the various project regions ... to cease to use the Department/EPID/as its agent and to deal directly with the co-operatives*.\footnote{44/}

The co-operatives, when formed, shall be responsible for the following activities: applying for funds from the Development Bank, approving farmers' ( = co-operative members') credit applications, accepting down payment from farmers, distributing supplies to farmers, buying grain from farmers, collecting re-payments from farmers and distributing profits to farmers after
deducting their debts.45/

These activities show that the co-operatives are supposed to function as exclusively commercial institutions. This is the kind of participation which the planners have in store for the farmers.

The co-operative societies are to be formed within the projects' three first years. At the end of the third year the co-operatives are expected to take over the role of the project.

"The farmers in a trade centre area are required to form a co-operative association within three years. No individual farm loans ... will be given in the area by the Bank after that year".46/

Now, it is questionable whether it is a wise policy on the part of EPID to stipulate that co-operatives must succeed a minimum package project after such a short time. To form co-operative societies is, of course, very desirable. But success, from the farmers' point of view, is dependent on what kind of power structure will be established within the co-operatives. The target group of the projects comprises illiterate peasants, ignorant of modern organizations and used to holding a low position in their hierarchically structured rural society. If the co-operatives are formed as a result of persuasion by the project personnel and local authorities, without preceding political education of their prospective members, they run the risk of not being genuinely popular. It is not incongruous to assume that local "big men" will establish themselves as top functionaries of the co-operatives. Imagine a landlord as the president of the association and his tenants as the ordinary members!

Without complementary reforms, the replacement of the projects by co-operatives may mean only that the age-old exploitation of the farmers will continue - adapted to modern organizational techniques. This is not a far-fetched thought, since neither EPID nor the Ethiopian Government seem to have any serious plans to organize political education for the small farmers. The tasks of the co-operatives enumerated above, mention nothing about political education. In fact, EPID cannot even afford to set up a control organization to check how the profits of the co-operat-
ives are distributed among the members, at the time when the project activities have been discontinued.

Thus, the formation of co-operatives within the present power structure is no sure guarantee that the interests of the small farmers are in good hands.

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After these introductory remarks on the nature of the minimum package projects we will now proceed to treat the minimum package projects in Bako, Shashamane and Tollo Bollo during their first year of activity.

III BAKO MINIMUM PACKAGE PROJECT

The project's head office is situated in the town Bako on the border between the provinces Shoa and Wollega. The field activities are run within Anno, and Jere (and with effect from 1972 Sire) woredas 47/ in Nekemte awrajda; 48/ in Wollege and within Bako, Sheboka and Ejaji woredas in Jibat and Mocha awrajda in Shoa. The field activities are concentrated in the areas close to the main road Addis Ababa-Nekemte.

Description of Nekemte awrajda and Jibat & Mocha awrajda

Although several administrative borders split up the project area, it constitutes a natural and cultural geographical unity. The landscape is characterized by highlands over 2,000 meters cut through by valleys about 1,000 meters. The rainfall is abundant during the summer months.

The overwhelming majority of the population consists of the Galla people and gallinjia is the language of communication. The official language is Amharic, (as everywhere else in Ethiopia), which is generally spoken in the towns. The western parts of Shoa along with all Wollega were incorporated with Menilek's expanding Empire in the 1890's. At that time the different Galla tribes and clans were not unified politically, they were divided into small kingdoms and chieftaincies. In western Shoa and eastern Wollega real fightings occurred only sporadically. Instead, many
Galla leaders were persuaded to accept Menilek's sovereignty. This was a measure that the chiefs benefitted from. As independent rulers their authority had been shaky, always threatened by rivals. As Imperial officials under Menilek their real power was increased.

After the incorporation the land was redistributed. It is claimed that three fourths of the land was reserved for the Imperial Government while the remaining fourth was divided between co-operative chiefs and petty kings, who were reinstalled as local governors. Some of the Emperor's newly acquired land was used to supply the palace with food stuffs, some was kept by the Emperor personally and some was granted to members of the Imperial family, high officers and other aristocrats. These in their turn gave smaller pieces of land to their subordinates.

The population of western Shoa and eastern Wollege is rather homogenous. It consists of Gallas belonging to the Mecha and Tulama groupings. Among these, large landowners as well as small owner cultivators and tenants are to be found. But the Gallas are not the only ethnic group in the region. The Amhara people, form a considerable minority and among them there are many medium and big landowners.

In the 1960's the social structure of the rural societies around Bako minimum package project area was rather typical of the southern provinces in general. The available statistical information tells us that less than 20% of the total area in Nekeste and Jibat and Mecha awradja is cultivated. The holdings are small - 95% of the holdings in Jibat and Mecha comprise less than five cultivated hectares while no holdings with a cultivated area exceeding four hectares are reported in Nekeste. Cereal crops dominate agricultural production, teff and barley are grown in high altitude areas and maize in the valleys. The land tenure system is illustrated in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>owned</th>
<th>rented</th>
<th>partly owned/partly rented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nekeste</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jibat and Mecha</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The number of holdings in Nekemte awradja and in Jibat and Mechawradja is reported to be 37,000 and 76,000, respectively. The large proportion of tenant-operated holdings indicate the occurrence of absentee landlords. It is difficult to get accurate figures on their number. Anyway, it is reported that absentee landlords own 52% of the measured area in Nekemte. The largest area in Nekemte owned by one individual exceeds 3,000 hectares. The individuals owning the largest areas are often members of the Imperial family. We will meet one of these members below.

The majority of the tenants pay rent by share-cropping. Most of them keep their own bullocks and farm implements. The rent is then - with few exceptions - less than 50% of the harvest. In Jibat and Mocha it is reported that the rent in 46% of the cases lies between one tenth and one fourth of the harvest. Compensation for agricultural improvements are as a rule not paid to tenants. According to a survey of Nekemte, compensation was paid to only 11% of the surveyed tenant-holdings.

The social structure of the agriculture is, hence, characterized by small holdings, most of which are tenant-operated. There is a concentration of ownership of land which can be traced back to the end of the 19th century when the region was incorporated with the Ethiopian Empire.

In order to make the social structure more vivid we shall summarize the findings of three cultural geographical studies made by Ethiopian students of some villages in Jibat and Mocha awradja, somewhat east of Bako project area. The studies may illuminate the social structure in the project area (from which we do not possess similar studies).

Three villages in Jibat and Mocha

The first village with which we shall make acquaintance is Lege-Batu 84 km west of Addis Ababa along the road to Nekemte. The land around this village was at the turn of the century used for providing the Imperial Palace with food-stuffs. Later the Empress Menen received it as her personal property. When she died her children - the princes Makonnen and Sahle Selassie and the
princess Tenagne Werk - inherited it. These have granted some parts of their land to servants while their children have inherited other parts.

The study of ten peasant families living in a continuous area comprising 91 hectares was made in 1971. All the ten farmers were tenants cultivating the land of absentee owners (two members of the Imperial family and one previous servant).

The tenants have until recent times been sharecroppers, giving away one third of their harvest to the local representative of the owner as rent. Some years before the study was made the owners had abandoned the sharecropping system in favour of payment at a fixed amount of grain or money. This recently introduced system was called "contract" among the farmers. According to the author of the study, the fixed amount of grain to be paid was in 1971 a somewhat better deal for the farmers than 1/3 of the harvest would have been. But the owners are free to increase the amount to be paid.

The three owners are not personally present in Lege Batu. Their interests are handled by a local representative, who collects the rent. According to the representative a tenant may stay in the area as farmer as long as he is hard working and pays the rent punctually. If he is careless and not obedient enough, he can be evicted.

In addition to the rent, the tenants pay agricultural income tax to the Government. This tax is relatively moderate, it varies between 1.50 and 6 Bth.$.

The owners pay tax too. This is, however, a negligible amount compared to their incomes from the leased land. The author of the study mentions that one owner in the neighbourhood paid 90 Bth.$ in taxes while he the same year collected all in all 45 quintals grain as rent. This amount was equivalent to about 1,000 Bth.$ converted to money at prevailing market prices.

The second village is Botoche, a few kilometers east of Lege Batu.

The ten peasant families in the study cultivate a total of 63 hectares. They are all tenants and cultivate the land of one single owner. The owner has received the area as freehold by the
princess Tenagne Werk. He lives in Addis Ababa. Earlier the
tenants were sharecroppers, they paid one third of the harvest
as rent. In 1970 the owner introduced the same tenure system as
we have been acquainted with from Loge Batu, the rent is now a
fixed amount of grain. The change from sharecropping to fixed
rent was explained by the owner with the argument that as long as
sharecropping existed the tenants could afford to be lazy and
produce little. The fixed amount makes them produce more.

The ten tenant families together rent the whole area paying
60 quintals of grain to the landlord (1971). The tenants decide
in a meeting how much each of them shall contribute to the total
amount. The lease is drawn up for one year and is renewed
annually. According to the author of the study the tenants did
not like the new system of paying rent since they considered the
new rent too high. But they accepted the system because they were
afraid of losing their holdings. They had decided to ask the land-
lord to reconsider his decision, but should he refuse they would
pay if they could. If they could not, they would leave the area.64/

The local representative of the owner is a farmer on the land of
his employer. His duty is to collect the crops given as rent. In
return he pays no rent himself. The representative is Amhara.
The tenants are Galla.

The third village - Facha - is situated about 100 kilometers west
of Addis Ababa along the Nekemte road.65/ The ten peasant
families in the study live in an area comprising 140 hectares of
which 48 are cultivated. The ownership structure in Facha differs
from that of Loge Batu and Hotche. The majority of the farmers
are tenants, while a minority are owner cultivators who own a few
more hectares than they themselves can cultivate, and they
therefore lease out their additional land. Some of the tenants
cultivate land belonging to absentee owners. But these live in a
town not far from Facha.

In Facha we find a situation where owners and tenants live and
work side by side. The owners are also poor peasants (even if
they are somewhat better off than the tenants). In some cases
owners and tenants are relatives. They are all Galla.
The tenants are sharecroppers, most of them pay one fourth of the harvest as rent provided that they use bullocks and farm implements of their own.

The study gives the impression that the relations between owners and tenants in Facha are not characterized by antagonism. The owners participate themselves in the daily toils of agricultural work and this makes them sympathetic to the problems of the tenants. Owners and tenants co-operate in the choice of crops for each agricultural season. Evictions occur only rarely. When an eviction takes place, it is only after the elders of the village have found that the tenant in question is mishandling the farming plot.

The author of the study emphasizes that the decisive difference between owners and tenants in Facha is not economic but social. The owners are well respected, even if they only are owners of small farming plots. They are called upon to settle disputes, they are the informal authorities of the local society.

The three studies so far

The situation in Facha reflects a social value prevailing throughout Ethiopia: ownership of land carries prestige. However small the owned area is, the owner has a social position far above the tenant.

On the basis of the material contained in the three studies we can put forward another hypothesis: Monopoly or oligopoly ownership over an agricultural area goes together with an unsafe situation for the tenants in the area, while in an area where the ownership of land is spread among many owners the situation for the tenants in the area is more safe. We do not claim that this assertion is scientifically indisputable, our source material is too fragile. Nevertheless, we think that it is worth a discussion.

If a person owns several gashas of land (which is common in Ethiopia) and his land is divided into several small tenant holdings, it is impossible for him personally to supervise the agricultural operations, and above all, the collection of rent. Furthermore, such a big landlord is usually an urban resident,
holding a government office. So, in each woreda where he owns land, he must employ a local representative to look after his economic interests there. A landowner of this magnitude has probably received the land as an Imperial grant (or his parents have received the grant) so he is personally a stranger in the area where he owns land. His relations to the tenants are indirect and impersonal. The local representative of the owner is for his own living dependent on that the tenants pay the rent punctually. The representative cannot be too flexible since his fitness for the job is measured in his capability to guard the interests of his employer. It is not unusual that the representative is a stranger himself in the village he supervises. In such a situation, it is not difficult to imagine that the landlord's superiority, that is built into the tenancy relationships, is utilized to one-sidedly satisfy the owner's economic interest, without paying attention to the tenants' needs. The owners are only interested in the economic gains they can collect from the land and their local representatives are their instrument.

Persons who own smaller areas (less than 20 hectares) and who do not hold positions within the state administrative apparatus have for their own subsistence to practice agriculture. They live close to their holdings and co-operate with their tenants (who cultivate their additional land - an Ethiopian peasant family is not capable of cultivating more than 10 hectares using the traditional techniques and implements). The relationship between owners and tenants are direct and personal. In many areas they share a common language and cultural tradition and there may also be blood relationship between them. It is obvious that tenants on the land of such small holders in reality are in a quite safe possession of their holdings.

These general reflections on varying degrees of security of tenure, are relevant for the discussion about the possibilities of tenants to participate in the minimum package projects' credit programmes. In the following sections it will be clear that those tenants who have received loans from the projects, as a rule cultivate land belonging to owners of rather small areas. The big landlords have shown little interest in giving written leases to their tenants, or they are outspokenly opposed to giving written leases to their tenants, thereby making it impossible for their tenants
to participate in the activities of the minimum package projects.

The project area

In late 1971 the project activities reached an area 5km x 60km along the Addis Ababa - Nemekte road in the above mentioned woredas and an area of 5km x 15km along the road between Bako and Jere. In the spring 1972 the activities were extended to Sire woreda. In each of the five (since 1972 six) project sub-districts an extension agent and a trade centre foreman are working. The extensions agents cultivate a demonstration field and co-operate with and advise the five model farmers within their sub-districts. The head office of the project is situated in the town Bako, where the supervisor lives. Bako had about 3,400 inhabitants in 1968.

An agricultural survey of the immediate surroundings of Bako gives us the following information. Among the surveyed farmers (118 families) 70% were tenants and 30% owner-cultivators. Among the tenants 88% paid the rent as a fixed amount of grain or money ("contract"). The lease agreements were to 72% oral and to 28% written. The tenants had been living in the area for a long time: 40% of them had been residing on the same holding for more than 4 years, 32% for more than 11 years, and 8% for more than 21 years. The most generally grown crop was maize followed by teff and the oilseed nengu. None of the interviewed families cultivated more than 2.6 hectares, although some of the owner-cultivators owned a larger area. The farmers were for the greater part subsistence farmers, but they depended on the market in Bako for salt, coffee, wheat and tobacco.

Further information about the situation in the project area I have collected through informal discussions and interviews and through observations.

Most of the landlords leasing land live themselves in the town Bako. A small number of really big landlords - owning several hundred hectares - are living in Addis Ababa. The obligations of the tenants constitute more things than paying rent. It is customary that they give services to their landlord. The services consist of personal labour - the tenants cultivate the fields
that are reserved for the landlord himself, they herd his cattle and they erect fences and build houses for him. It is also customary that they pay tithe ("asrat") to their landlord: one tenth of the harvest before any other charges have been reduced. In addition to this, tenants are supposed to provide their landlord with gifts (honey, eggs, chicken or a sheep) on important holidays.

My informants emphasize the unsafe social and economic position of the tenants. They seldom have any alternative but to submit to the demands of their landlords. Disobedience or protest is rare, and when it occurs the landlord (or his local representative) can react by terminating the tenancy relationship. There are always people interested in farming on a tenancy basis, but it can be hard for an evicted tenant to obtain new land to farm. The tenancy conditions imply an exploitation of which the tenants are not unconscious, but the termination of the tenancy relationship means an acute catastrophe for the evicted family. Agriculture and cattle-breeding are its only sources of income available. For an evicted tenant family there is only one way out - to look for a new landlord and ask for a piece of land to cultivate. If an agreement materializes, it is easy to understand that the parties are not equals. The landlord has all the trump in his hand, and this is reflected in the tenancy conditions.

This does not mean that eviction is an everyday event around Bako, it means only that eviction is an ever present latent threat, which makes the tenants obedient to their obligations.

The land owned by the big landlords amounts to several hundred hectares. There is, however, one estate that is far larger than the others. It belongs to a member of the Imperial family. In and around the project area in Sheboka around 12,000 hectares are registered in the name of the late Prince Sahle Selassie. The holding is administered by a representative on behalf of the heirs. The tenants cultivating the land of the Imperial family have heavy obligations, they pay rent, agricultural income tax and tithe and they cultivate fields for the personal use of the administrator. Even if the tenants should know that some of these obligations are declared illegal by Parliament (personal labour and tithe) they have nowhere to take their complaints - it is the highest authority
in Ethiopia which has sanctioned their obligations. Indeed, the representative even keeps a private prison where he temporarily locks in trouble makers.

The project's field activities

During its first year of activity the Bako minimum packet project was engaged in demonstrating the effects of fertilizers (on demonstration fields as well as on the model farmers' fields) and giving loans to farmers for fertilizers. The following table shows how the credit programme reached different categories of farmers. The figures refer to the credits distributed in 1971.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subdistrict</th>
<th>Number of borrowers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>owner-cultivators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheboka</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ejeji</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anno</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jere</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bako</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tenants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>71 (89%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 (11%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The distributed amount of fertilizers was 105 quintals.

The modest total number of borrowers must partly be due to the fact that the project is a novelty in the area, it has not been preceded by other fertilizer demonstration programmes. Many farmers have not been reached by the information on the project and some of those who have been reached take a sceptical attitude to the innovations.

But the number of participants does not yet reflect the actual interest among farmers for the project activities. Other reasons for the modest number must be sought in the social structure of agriculture and in the structure of the project's activities.

One barrier is the regulation regarding downpayment. A borrower must pay cash 25% of the value of the credit before the fertilizer-
sacks are handed over to him. This regulation (see page 14) riddles away the poorest farmers, those farmers living in the utmost periphery of the money economy. Peasant families belonging to this group form a considerable proportion of the small farmers.

The fertilizers are distributed in sacks of one quintal. The price for one sack lies between 40 and 50 Eth.$ which means that the borrowers have to make a down payment of at least 10 Eth.$.

In international statistical publications the per capita income of the Ethiopians is said to be 150 Eth.$ A case study from western Shoa (a village close to Ambo, approximately 100km from Bako) classifies the interviewed farmers in the following income groups:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income groups</th>
<th>No. of households</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- 100</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101-200</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201-300</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301-400</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401-500</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Forty-eight percent of the households have an income below 200 Eth.$; and also the poorest group, below 100 Eth.$ a year, is fairly large. For farmers in this group, the downpayment exceeds one month's income. It is beyond doubt that this group cannot afford to participate in the credit programme, and it is dubious whether the 101-200 Eth.$ group can afford to participate.

The regulation concerning downpayment strikes at both owner cultivators and tenants. For the latter group, one more condition for participation in the credit programme is laid down. Tenants must be able to show up a written lease agreement on their holding, signed by the landlord or his local representative, who also must be one of the guarantors of the borrower.

It will be seen below that the big landlords especially are reluctant in giving their tenants written lease agreements.
Our conclusion then is that a majority of the project's target group is at present excluded from the project activities.

Let us now proceed to the farmers who have got credits. The table shows that 9/10 of them are owner cultivators. Among these, 23 farmers (32%) cultivate more than 10 hectares while the other 48 (68%) cultivate less than 10 hectares. Since a small farmer in Ethiopia is defined as a person cultivating less than 5 hectares, this means that at least one third of the credits were not given to persons belonging to this poorest (and very large) section of the farmers.

The figures presented above refer to credits given during 1971. Unfortunately we have not received the corresponding figures for the credits given during 1972. Preliminary reports from the project staff in Bako indicate, however, that the number of borrowers in 1972 will not increase substantially, and almost no change in the relative proportion of owner cultivators and tenants among the borrowers is to be expected.

On the basis of the figures for 1971 we have, of course, no right to predict how the credits will increase in total amount and among different categories of borrowers in the future. But we can at least point out one structural factor which is intended to block out the bulk of the tenants. This factor is the attitude among big landowners concerning written lease agreements. As long as the present power structure exists in the rural Ethiopian societies, the landowners' attitudes are of decisive importance for the possibilities of the tenants to participate in the minimum packet projects.

Many big landowners are negative to the concept of written lease agreements which would increase the security of the tenants. This holds true for the representative of the Imperial land in Sheboka too. It is common that the big landlords consider the activities of the minimum package projects (not only in Bako) aimed against their own interests. The projects refuse to give them credits and concentrate their activities on the small farmers. This is considered a hostile deed. It is also not unusual that the landowners see the project activities in a longer perspective. The projects aim at persuading the landowners to give their
tenants written lease agreements. From the point of view of the landowners, this would be equal to retreat from their present power position. It would result in an increased security in land for tenants and make them inclined to demand further rights.

In the extension of this perspective a change in the whole ownership structure of rural Ethiopia emerges - the tenants would at last demand ownership rights to their cultivated fields and redistribution of the holdings. Such a vision is a nightmare for the big landowners. Those of them who look at things this way consider the minimum package projects not only credit institutions for small farmers but also, in the long run, instruments of political subversion. To the suspicion, with which the minimum package projects are regarded by the big landlords, corresponds an awakening interest among the tenants. The demonstration fields and the model farmers' fields are making them conscious of the contradiction between the technical possibilities of practicing a high-yielding agriculture and the social situation which at present prevents most of them from utilizing these innovations.

Co-operative societies

For the philosophy of the minimum package projects the co-operative idea is, as we have learnt, central. In Bako, activities towards forming co-operative societies had not proceeded far in the summer of 1972. According to the project personnel, the organizer and the extension agents were to start explaining the advantages of co-operatives among the project area farmers as soon as the harvest was finished. Among other things, the argument that co-operatives tend to have a rising effect on producers' prices, was going to be advanced. That argument was considered to be accepted among the farmers since producers' prices at that time were extremely low. (The price fluctuations throughout the country are enormous due to limited organization among the producers.) No co-operative society had at that time been set up. The machinery that the project had at its disposal for promotion of co-operatives was not impressive. In each sub-district the extension agent and the organizer constituted this machinery. They were to run the propaganda among the approximately 2,000 peasant families in the sub-district.

The situation is not promising in relation to EPID's declaration
that the credit programmes are to be taken over by co-operative societies three years after the project has started its activities. Unless a broad campaign is started soon, connected to activation of the popular participation in other fields, there is a danger that the co-operative societies which must be formed are not genuinely popular. The danger of corruption and distortion of the idea of participation is then close at hand.

**Mechanized farms**

When I visited Bako in December 1971 there were not yet any 76/ commercial mechanized farms run by Ethiopians in the neighbourhood. The traditional structure was intact: large holdings divided into small tenant operated farms existed side by side with small holdings operated by owner-cultivators. Large areas are used for grazing.

In May 1972 the situation had changed. The first commercial entrepreneurs had discovered Bako. Parts of the Imperial land in Sheboka are going to be transformed to mechanized farming. Two individuals have bought land and two other individuals have contracted land from the Imperial family. In all around 900 hectares will be affected. The largest commercial farm to be set up in Sheboka will embrace approximately 400 hectares, the others 250 hectares, 120 hectares and 120 hectares.77/ The introduction of mechanized agriculture is going to take place successively. In 1972-73 only smaller parts will be ploughed by tractors, but in the course of a few years the bulk of the land will be transformed to mechanized farms. The entrepreneurs come from Addis Ababa, they are not local people. Ultimately, the planned commercial farms in Sheboka reflect the expansion of agrarian capitalism in southern Ethiopia. And the social consequences of this can already be seen. When I visited Bako in May 1972, 107 tenant families (approximately 500 individuals) had been informed by the entrepreneurs that their tenancy relationships were to be terminated.78/ They were threatened with immediate eviction. The tenants planned to send a delegation to the Emperor to complain.

**The future**

The soil around Bako is considered to be of good quality. The
communications to Addis Ababa are acceptable and improving. The region north of Bako, which so far has been "virgin land" will in 1973 be opened for motor traffic. In 1971 SIDA in co-operation with the local population started a labour-intensive road building project from Bako to Jere, 13km to the north. The road will later be continued 50km up to the town Shambu, capital of Horo and Gudru awrajja (the contribution of SIDA in this later part of the project is uncertain). This awrajja is fertile and the social structure of agriculture there is similar to those we have already described: 60% of the holdings in Horo and Gudru are operated by tenants. The road project is welcomed by all, this is expressed by the fact that 50% of the costs for the road project has been collected by the local population. The road will of course bring many advantages to the population. This should nevertheless not make us forget that, given the present social and economic structure of agricultural society and given the prevailing trend towards mechanization, the road building will open up the area for the same kind of agricultural development the beginning of which is to be seen in Sheboka: an entry of tractors and harvesters into the fertile lands and an exit of redundant tenants.

IV SHASHAMANE MINIMUM PACKAGE PROJECT

The project's head office is situated in the town Shashamane in the southernmost part of Shoa Province. Two of the project's sub-districts - Shashamane and Negele - are situated in this province, in Mekko and Butajira awrajja, while the three others - Leku, Tirga Alem and Awassa - are situated in Awassa awrajja in Sidamo province.

The town Shashamane has during the 1960's grown to a regional centre and motor traffic junction. The town is becoming increasingly important as the road from Addis Ababa is being built further south to the border of Kenya. Shashamane had 7,800 inhabitants in 1968. The field activities during 1971 and the greater part of 1972 were concentrated on Shashamane and Negele. Consequently, we will treat only these sub-districts.
Description of Haikoch and Butojira awradja

The awradja includes parts of the "lakes region", i.e. the volcanic lakes Zrai, Langano, Abiata and Shala and their surroundings. This region is part of Rift Valley and altitudes around 1,000 metres are common. The natural vegetation consists of tropical woodland and thornbush. The majority of the population is Gallu, the main language of communication in the countryside is Gallinjja, but also Guraginjja and various Siddaninjja dialects are used in the western and southern parts of the awradja. Amharic is to an increasing extent used in the towns. During the 19th century the area around the lakes was a border land between cattle-herding Gallu tribes and small kingdoms and chieftainships composed of agricultural Gallu, Gurage and Sidama groupings. After a series of military campaigns in the 1880's and 1890's the whole region came under Menilek's rule. Structural change after the conquest followed the same pattern as elsewhere: there was a concentration of ownership of land by the Emperor, his military commanders and civil servants and co-operative subjugated local rulers. There occurred a transition to agriculture in areas where pastoralism had earlier been predominant (this did not, of course, mean that cattle-herding ceased to be of importance).

The official Ethiopian statistical publications give us the following information about the structure of agriculture in Haikoch and Butojira. Around 13% of the total area of the awradja is under cultivation (approximately 144,000 hectares).\textsuperscript{83} Cereal cultivations dominate agricultural production, maize is the most important crop.\textsuperscript{84} Agriculture is practiced in small units, 89% of the holdings cover a cultivated area of three hectares or less.\textsuperscript{85} The tenure system is illustrated in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage of holdings by tenure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>owned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haikoch &amp; Butojira</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total number of holdings are estimated to be 87,000.\textsuperscript{87} According to the table one half of these holdings are tenant operated, which indicates a number of large landed estates with absentee ownership. We do not possess accurate statistics over these, but in all Shoa 45% of the measured area is estimated to be
under absentee ownership.  

More than one half of the tenants pay rent by a fixed sum of money. Among the sharecroppers (45% of the tenants) most have oxen and farm implements of their own. The rent varies then between 1/4 and 1/2 of the harvest.  

There is in the area land belonging to the Imperial family. 

This information suggests a picture in harmony with what we earlier have learned about the traditional rural society in southern Ethiopia. Data for the statistical publication referred to here were, however, collected in 1963-64. They tell us nothing about the commercialization and mechanization of agriculture which has taken place in parts of this region since the end of the 1960's. In 1968 F.A.O. in co-operation with various Ethiopian authorities started demonstrations of fertilizers in different places in the country. This project, called "Freedom From Hunger Campaign", aimed at raising agricultural production through the introduction of fertilizers. The campaign was active e.g. in Shashamane. In practice the campaign addressed itself to big landowners, i.e. persons who could provide security for credits and who had large enough pieces of land to make tractor operated fertilized production profitable. The F.A.O. project gave fertilizer credits and the Ethiopian Development Bank gave credits for purchase of tractors and other agricultural machinery. The result of the campaign has been that a growing number of big landlords have started commercial large scale production of wheat and maize. In many cases mechanization is also effected by contractors, capital owning individuals who contract land from a landlord for a period of 5 to 15 years, during which time they establish a commercial farm and run it as their own enterprise. 

In this region Shashamane and Negele have become centres of commercialization. This fact is of great importance for the activities of Shashamane minimum packet project. 

The project area 

In late 1971 the project area comprised a circular area around the town Shashamane with a radius of 18km and in Negele an area 2km x 20km along the Addis Ababa-Shashamane road. There was one
demonstration field in Shashamane and one in Ngele, these were complemented by seven model farmers in Shashamane and four in Ngele.\textsuperscript{91} The model farmers were chosen by the local farmers. All of them were owner-cultivators. Within each of the two sub-districts one extension agent, one organizer and one trade centre foreman were working.

An outstanding feature of agriculture in the project area is the numerous large scale commercial farms. In November 1971 there were nearly 40 mechanized farms around Shashamane.\textsuperscript{92} Most of them were operated by the landowners themselves, while about ten were operated by contractors. The cultivated area of the farms varied between 100 and 500 hectares. Wheat was the main cash crop, transacted in Addis Ababa. The farms are capital intensive but can in return be operated by a small number of workers. The importance of commercial farming in the area is shown by the fact that some firms importing agricultural machinery have established branch shops in Shashamane city.

In the neighbourhood of Ngele there were in late 1971 about 30 mechanized farms, with an average size of 300 hectares.\textsuperscript{93} Some of them were operated by the owners, some by contractors. The rapidly increasing tendency towards mechanization is illustrated by the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tractors</th>
<th>Harvesters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the project personnel the number of commercial farms had increased by about ten during the first half of 1972 alone.

The commercialization/mechanization has been accompanied by eviction of tenants. The mechanisation process has reached grazing land as well as tenant holdings. The evicted families have thereby been forced to give up agriculture as well as cattle-herding. That is why most of them have left the area and moved down to the nearby
lakes with their livestock. The influx of people to the shores have given the landowners there new sources of income - they charge rent from the evicted tenants grazing their cattle there.\textsuperscript{95/}

The breaking up of tenant families is a consequence of eviction. Parents and infants move around in the countryside with the livestock in the hope of finding land to rent. The teenagers prefer to make their fortune in the towns, where they form part of the growing number of coolies, criminals and prostitutes.

The praxis of eviction in the process of mechanization is approximately this: when the landlord has made up his mind for commercial agriculture, the tenancy relationships in the area to be affected by mechanization are terminated. Later on the tractors arrive. They plough up the land. The home of the tenant family (a house of wood, straw and clay, called "tukul" in Amharic) is generally situated in the immediate proximity of an acre. The tractors plough up the soil around the house and the tenant family is told that it is prohibited for people and cattle to walk in the furrows which extend right on to the house. The family has no choice but to abandon its home.

No statistical information on the number of tenants, evicted because of mechanization, are available for Shashamane and Ngele. Initiated persons have, however, estimated the frequency of evictions to be between 100 and 200 families a year since 1968.\textsuperscript{96/}

According to these estimations between 2,500 and 5,000 individuals (the average family has 5-4 members in Haikoch and Butajira\textsuperscript{97/}) will, by the end of 1972, because of mechanization, have exchanged their old misery in Shashamane and Ngele for a new and unknown misery.

All tenants have, of course, not been evicted. Some of them have managed - at least temporarily - to adapt to the process of mechanization. In the immediate neighbourhood of Ngele, all holdings are operated with machines. This holds true for the tenants' holdings too.\textsuperscript{98/} The tenants within a connected area go together and rent the agricultural machinery of their landlord. The hired labourers of the landlord perform the harvest work. If the tenants have money, they pay the rent for the machinery and
work in cash, otherwise they pledge to sell their harvest to the landlord. In this case, the landlord sets aside first the part of the crop equivalent to the value of the rent for land, then a part equivalent to the value of the services he has performed. For the rest of the harvest the tenants are paid in cash by the landlord.

How does mechanization affect those tenants who are not evicted? We possess findings on some of these aspects from a study of a village close to the project area (an area in Awassa sub-district). The area under study comprised 22 hectares on the southern shore of Lake Awassa. This area was at the time of the study cultivated by ten tenant families. The leader of the land is a commercial farmer, who altogether has 200 hectares under cultivation in the area. The farmer has contracted the land from its owner, the Government. The studied 22 hectares are ploughed and threshed with the machinery of the landlord by his employees. He decides unilaterally which crops are to be grown. During the agricultural season the ten families cultivate each by themselves a limited part of the total area (the plots of the individual families vary between one and four hectares). They sow, weed, harvest, and transport the crop (maize) to the store of the landlord. Four of the tenants work furthermore part-time as wage labourers of the landlord. They perform duties like watching the crops of the landlord in nearby areas and they assist the landlord's tractor drivers.

The ten tenants have written lease agreements with the landlord. According to these agreements 60% of the harvest from the plots of the individual tenants goes to the landlord and 40% to the tenant. The agreements are renewed yearly.

The study referred to above, gives the impression that the distribution of work between the landlord/commercial farmer and the tenants represent a transitional stage from the traditional system of tenancy to a system of owner/entrepreneurs using hired labour. It is not far-fetched to believe that the landlord after some time invests in more machinery, which makes it more profitable for him to employ workers, who at a fixed salary perform all agricultural work. Some of the present tenants may be employed at that time (those who already are part-time workers), while the rest become superfluous and must leave.
The argument is hypothetical and cannot be anything else, since mechanization is a new phenomenon in Ethiopia. Mechanization has a certain employment effect, people are needed to operate and give service to the machines. But the laying-off of labour effect is far greater. The choice of crop is also of importance in this connection. Wheat can be produced with very capital-intensive methods, while maize needs more workers during the harvest.

Before we proceed to examine the project activities, let us mention one more structural factor of importance in the area. One landowner in the surroundings of Negele is superior to the others in size of land - the Imperial family. The heirs of Prince Sahle Selassie (the same prince, whose name is known to us from Bako) owns almost one half of the area of Negele woreda. The land is administered by a local representative on behalf of the heirs. The majority of the tenants in Negele are Imperial tenants. Up to 1970 the Imperial land was used in the traditional way; parts of it lay unutilized, parts were grazing land and parts were cultivated by tenants. That year, however, mechanized commercial production was introduced on parts of the Imperial land. In 1971 about three hundred hectares were put under mechanized cultivation and the farm is expected to expand by about one hundred hectares yearly. For this reason a headquarters has been established in Negele city, with an office, storage facilities and machinery.

The mechanization process takes place partly on tenant operated land. The Imperial tenants have reason to feel unsafe. Their lease agreements, which are oral, are renewed for one year at a time. Some of the tenants have already been evicted, and the others know that their homes and fields will suffer from continued mechanization.

In 1971 units from the Ethiopian army were stationed in Negele. It is difficult to refrain from speculating on the possible connection between the location of troops to the area with the process of mechanization in general and with the mechanization of the Imperial land in particular. According to some sources some of the tenants have protested against eviction. It is said to have happened that tenants have refused to leave their homes. The mere presence of the soldiers was, however, sufficient to eliminate articulated opposition against this "modernization" of agriculture.
The tenants are now evicted without protest.

**The project's field activities**

Demonstration of the effects of fertilizers and a credit programme were the most important activities of Shashamane minimum package project during the first year of activity. In 1971 credits were distributed to different categories of farmers as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-district</th>
<th>Number of borrowers</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>owner-cultivators</strong></td>
<td><strong>tenants</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shashamane</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negele</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leku</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virga Alem</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>480</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In all, 813 credits were distributed of which slightly more than one third were given to tenants. When we only look at Shashamane and Negele the tenant-borrowers comprise close to one half of the borrowers.

In 1972 credits were, according to the plans, to be distributed twice, once for early crops (maize), and once for late crops (wheat). Fertilizer credits for early crops were distributed as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-district</th>
<th>Number of borrowers</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>owner-cultivators</strong></td>
<td><strong>tenants</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shashamane</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negele</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leku</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virga Alem</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>284</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Shashamane and Negele the proportions between owner-cultivators
and tenants were approximately the same as in 1971. The total number was, of course, smaller because only credits for maize were distributed.

The total number of participants in the credit programme is of a different size compared to that of Bako. This is due to the fact that farmers in the area had already, four years before the minimum packet project started, been exposed to fertilizer demonstrations. This happened through the above-mentioned F.A.O. campaign. When the minimum packet project came to the area farmers were already accustomed to the effects of fertilizing and the project found little scepticism among the farmers.

The number of borrowers could have been still higher though. But the poorest section of the farmers are locked out by the project's own stipulation that 25% of the credit's value is to be paid down in advance. Lack of money has prevented them from participating. The supervisor of the project mentions this in a report:

"The inability of paying the downpayment is another problem which has prevented an unknown number of convinced peasants from participating in the programme".104/

For comments on the regulation concerning downpayment we refer to the argument on page 28. The conclusion is the same: through its own prescriptions the project prevents the poorest sections of its target group from participation.

Apart from this, the majority of tenants in the area are also prevented from participation by the prescription of written lease agreements. As in Bako, the big landlords are generally negatively inclined to written agreements. What concerns the big landlords in Shashamane and Negale is their endeavour to expand the part of their land which is being used for large scale commercial production. This endeavour would be delayed by time consuming arrangements if the tenants were to have better security in land (written lease agreements) than they have at present.

Let us now proceed to examine those farmers who received credit. When it comes to credit takers, here classified as "owner-cultivators", it must be mentioned that 23 of them in 1971, and at least 20 in 1972 were big landowners.105/ They were competent
for receiving credits because they fulfilled the project’s prescription of personally cultivating less than 20 hectares and because they had signed written lease agreements with their tenants. But they owned more than 20 hectares.

From a first glance at the tables, the number of tenants seems amazingly high. We have here examples of co-operation between landlords and tenants. Unfortunately the co-operation does not in all cases function as RPTD’s strategies had hoped. Three ways of bluffing are reported to have occurred.\textsuperscript{106/}

It happens that a landlord visits the project office together with his tenants in order to sign written lease agreements with them, and be their personal guarantor. In this way the tenants are given fertilizer credits. The reason for the co-operative attitude of the landlord is that the tenants have secretly agreed with him to surrender a part of the fertilizers they get from the project to the landlord in exchange for the written lease agreements. The fertilizers surrendered to the landlord can be as high as one half of the amount the tenants receive from the project. This means that the landlord gets fertilizers gratis, and that the tenants do not get sufficient fertilizers for their fields.

A variation on this theme is that the landlord in person attends the project’s office together with his tenants, signs written lease agreements with them and becomes their guarantor for credits. Out of sight of the office the tenants surrender all the fertilizers they have received to the landlord, who uses them on his own fields. At the time of repayment the landlord provides the tenants, in whose names the credits are registered, with money (which is necessary in order to play the same trick again).

A third form of abuse is that a big landowner gathers a number of landless and unemployed persons whom he presents at the project’s office as his tenants. The landowner explains that it is his aim to sign written leases with his tenants in order that they shall get fertilizer credits. Lease agreements are signed and fertilizers distributed. Later, the false tenants deliver all fertilizers to the landowner and get some coins for the trouble. When the credits are due for repayment, the landowner provides these persons with
money.

The above quoted examples show that it is possible for big landowners to evade the prescription that only farmers in "the lower income brackets" may get credits. It is used by landowners who for some reason do not want to turn to the fertilizer firms. These kinds of abuse are known to the EPID-staff both in the project's offices and at headquarters in Addis Ababa. It is stressed that it is difficult to control to what extent they occur.

The conclusion is that we must reconsider the persons classified as "tenants" participating in the credit programme. Some of these persons (we do not know how many) do not personally benefit from the credits which are registered in their names.

The examples are characteristic of the power relations between landlords and tenants. Only intimidated persons lend themselves to such undertakings.

The crisis

In the summer of 1972 the activities of Shashamane minimum package project underwent a crisis. An unexpectedly high proportion of the borrowers had not repaid their loans (from 1971) at the time due. In the middle of June 1972 the situation was this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-district</th>
<th>Number of borrowers 1971</th>
<th>Number of loans not repaid (June 1972)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shashamane</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>71 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngele</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>119 (31%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tenants as well as owner-cultivators were found among the negligent borrowers.

The reasons for the inability to repay were, at that time, not entirely clear. It was, nevertheless, beyond dispute that one of the main reasons was the low level of producers' prices. The producers are not organized. Hence the small farmers who, thanks to the fertilizers, produce for the market, are at the mercy of the merchants.
The small farmers have deficient storage facilities and must sell their harvest at the latest one month after the harvest. At this time there is a high market supply of grain, which tends to press prices down. The agricultural year 1971-72 was good and the harvest above normal. The producers' prices were, consequently, extremely low. The borrowers who had not repaid their loans claimed that the market prices were so low that they had not made any profit and, hence, could not repay the loans. These borrowers were prosecuted by EPID.

The agreement between EPID and the Development Bank stipulates that 95% of the value of the distributed credits within a sub-district shall be repaid two months after the day of maturity. Shashamane and Negele could not make this. In these sub-districts 1/4 and 1/3, respectively, of the borrowers could not meet their credit obligations. The Development Bank is therefore free to deal with this issue as it sees fit. It is possible that the project's activities in Shashamane and Negele have no future.

The crisis illuminates one more weakness in the construction of the minimum package projects: the lack of organized marketing of the surplus production which the small farmers, thanks to fertilizer credits, produce. The small farmers do not benefit from an increased production, if it only results in the local merchants being able to double their profits.

V. TULLU BOLLO MINIMUM PACKAGE PROJECT

Lack of space prevents us from describing at length the activities of Tullu Bollo minimum package project. We shall, however, summarize some main findings as a complement to the description of Bako and Shashamane minimum package projects.

The project area is situated along the main road from Addis Ababa south west to Jimma. The project is active within the following woredas: Sabata, Ancore and Tullu Bollo in Menagesha awradja and Diella, Wolisso and Wolkite in Chebo and Gurage awradja. All these districts are situated in Shoa province. Geographically and historically the area has much in common with the area around Bako. North of the river Awash, the Galla people are predominant, south of Awash the Gallas are a minority while the Gurage people
constitute a majority. The whole region was incorporated with
Menilek’s empire in the late 19th century. According to the
official statistics land-tenure shows the following pattern in the
two awradjas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>awradja</th>
<th>owned</th>
<th>rented</th>
<th>partly owned/partly rented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Menagesha</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chebo and Gurage</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total number of holdings in Menagesha is estimated at 48,000
and in Chebo and Gurage at 78,000.109/

The structure of agricultural society in Gurage land shows
a somewhat different pattern from what we so far have been used to
in southern Ethiopia. Agricultural production is dominated by
a single crop, ensete (false banana) which can be extensively
cultivated in groves around homesteads. Due to this, the holdings
in the region can be of a very small size and yet yield enough
food stuffs for a family. In Chebo and Gurage 60% of the
holdings comprise one half hectare (1/2) or less.110/

The project’s field activities

Credits for fertilizers were distributed by the project to
different categories of farmers in 1971 as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-district</th>
<th>owner-cultivators</th>
<th>tenants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sabata</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascore</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tullu Bollo</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diella</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolisseo</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolkite</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>491 (82%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>111 (18%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


When it comes to the participating tenants, it was reported by the project staff that they cultivated land belonging to owner-cultivators who did not own much land themselves. The big landlords showed in general a negative attitude to the participation of their tenants in the credit programme. Co-operative societies had at the time of my visit (June 1972) been formed in some of the sub-districts. Not much was reported of their activities. At least one co-operative, however, showed signs of having got the traditional hierarchical power structure built into it - the co-operative in Woliso. The president of this co-operative society was a balabat (a traditional authority) who was not interested in the active participation of the members.\(^{112}\)

The structural environment

Since the project's six sub-districts are located far from each other, the structural environment is heterogeneous. In some places, particularly in parts of Garege-land, the small owner-cultivators are predominant, and in these areas the project can work successfully. In other places a few big landlords monopolize ownership of land, and here the project has difficulties in reaching its target group, since they are tenants. Between the sub-districts Sabaata and Ascore lies a large area cultivated by tenants. This area is owned by Ras Mesfin, the Governor General of Shoa province. It is known that the attitude of this landlord towards written lease agreements is entirely negative. None of his tenants can participate in the credit programme of Tullo Bollo minimum package project. Consequently, the project does not try any extension and demonstration activities on Ras Mesfin's land, since the project personnel consider this effort useless. In 1972 the Ras had started mechanized farming close to the road on a smaller part of his land.

Mechanization is also a fact in other areas close to the project. Woliso and Wolkite are regional centres of mechanized agriculture. The process of mechanization started there in 1969 as a result of fertilizer demonstrations by the earlier mentioned P.A.O. campaign. The commercial farmers are partly local landlords, partly people from Addis Ababa who have bought land. In Wolkite, land has been sold to commercial farmers by the Government. This land has been appropriated by the Government.
from small farmers through the "gebretel" method.  

From Wolkite an extreme example of an attempt at eviction of tenants is reported.  

In this area a retired colonel in the Ethiopian army owns 4,000 hectares. He has some 500 tenants cultivating different parts of this land. In 1969 the colonel started mechanized farming. At one point, he made up his mind to expand the process of mechanization rapidly and announced that he was going to terminate the tenancy relationships with all 500 tenants. The tenants, however, reacted violently. They are said to have tried to stone their landlord when he was leaving a bar in Wolkite. Since that incident the colonel has changed tactics. He mechanizes smaller areas at a time, thereby evicting only a few tenants. In 1972 he had 160 hectares under tractor cultivation and 140 tenant families are said to have been evicted as a result. These people have not, however, left the region. They still have the ensete cultivations around their houses, which give them a minimum of food stuffs. Some of them also work on the colonel's farm during harvest.

++ + + + + + + + +

The description and analysis of Bako, Shashamane and Tullu Bollo minimum package projects has dwelled at length on structural factors within the organization of the projects and outside its control, that tend to limit participation of the tenants and the poorest sections among the owner-cultivators in the project activities. This must not make us forget that the projects have indeed contributed to raise productivity on such farms where the operators have participated in the credit programmes.  

And the number of participants will probably increase rapidly in the next few years.

VI DISCUSSION

In the introductory remarks, we argued that according to the principles for Swedish development assistance, the justification for Swedish involvement in ethiopian agricultural policies, is the project's emphasis on a clearly identified target group and the participation of this group in the project activities. We also argued that the participation must mean more than receiving
fertilizer credit. It should mean a mobilization of the project area population to actively work for and assume responsibility for the development of the local society. Improvement of agricultural practices form an important part of such a development effort, but this must comprise also farmers' influence in local administrative decisionmaking. Viewed in this way, it is evident that the minimum package projects are not an end in themselves, but only the starting point for a development-from-below approach, which aims at political democratization and social and economic equalization. Let us now - for the sake of discussion - take this interpretation of the goal of participation seriously and ask whether it can be allowed to occur in the political system of Imperial Ethiopia.

The limits of Imperial reformism

Before we try to answer the question it should be repeated that the Swedish agricultural assistance is tightly tied to the Ethiopian political system. The administration of the minimum package projects (and CADU) is incorporated in the Ethiopian state administration. The Swedish experts are working with the projects in their capacity as Ethiopian government employees. The Ethiopian Minister of Agriculture is the highest formal authority on the projects.

Then, back to the question. A radical improvement of the tenants' situation (legislation on land-reform) and an administrative re-organization to provide for local initiative and responsibility (abolition of the governor-system in favour of local self-administration) are two of the most urgent structural pre-requisites for making popular participation possible. Such reforms would, however, not only affect the target group of the projects, they would also affect the ruling class; the big landowners and the Imperial regime.

Let us elaborate this point. The power of the Emperor does not emanate from the people, nor has the Emperor to justify his use of power by claiming that he is ruling in the interests of the people. The theoretical legitimation of Imperial power rests on a fundamentally different foundation. Haile Selassie belongs to the Solomonic dynasty, chosen by God to rule Ethiopia.
The Sovereignty of the Empire is vested in the Emperor and the supreme authority over all the affairs of the Empire is exercised by Him as the head of the State . . . "116/

"by virtue of His Imperial Blood, as well as by the anointing which He has received, the person of the Emperor is sacred, His dignity is inviolable and his Powers indissoluble . . . "117/

A politicization of the subjects through participation in democratically organized local development efforts would pull away the base for the imperial political system. It is, therefore, logical that the privileged members and officials of the system discourage such efforts, and that theocratic myth can be used as a barrier against efforts to initiate political participation among the grass-roots.

It is, of course, not only the Emperor as a person whose position is incompatible with the political aspects of the minimum package projects' goals. The same thing holds good about the class of big landowners, members of which also hold top offices at the local, regional as well as the national administrative levels. Members of this class are dependent on the Imperial theocratic myth for the sake of their own privileges (i.e. their landholdings and their offices). Experiences from Chilalo point out the retarding and counterworking influence that an unco-operative corps of local administrators has had on the CADU project.118/
The negative influence of big landowners on the minimum packet projects' goal of participation is shown by the above reported experiences from Bako, Shashamane and Tullu Bollo. The big landowners can act in two ways: 1) they can use their power position to prevent their tenants from participating in any way in the project activities. This can be done by refusing to give written lease agreements and undermining the activities of the projects (defaming the project personnel, casting suspicion on the motives of the projects, sabotaging the field activities, etc.). In this case the landowners react conservatively, they are spokesmen for status quo. 2) The big landowners can also react in a different way. Instead of fighting for status quo, they accelerate structural change by themselves implementing the innovations in agricultural techniques. This means that they introduce large scale farming on those parts of their holdings which have potential for mechanization. In this they are encouraged by the Ethiopian Development Bank, which provides credits for the necessary machinery. Structural change in this
direction "solves" the tenancy problem - the tenants are evicted and most of them leave the region while large scale commercial farms take over. This was, at the time of collecting material for this report, a trend of growing importance in many places in southern Ethiopia, and it goes without saying that it provided no improvement in the living conditions for the evicted families.

The two ways of protecting the interests of the big landowners indicated here, do not contradict each other. On the contrary, they complement each other. In order to benefit from mechanization, a big landowner must make sure that his tenants are withheld in their present position which gives them no legal protection until he finds the time ripe for introducing commercial farming. The costs for mechanization are high, and could be too high if they included paying compensation for evicted tenants. It is, hence, in accordance with the interests of a big landowner to preserve the traditional structure intact (no partial improvements for tenants), until the very time when the tenants are to be kicked out.

The draft Agricultural Tenancy Relationships Proclamation

So far, we have argued that the interests of the ruling class are in contradiction to reforms aimed at radically improving the conditions for the small farmers, particularly the tenants. At present there are, nevertheless, Government initiated proposals for reforms. The most important is a proposal on regulation of agricultural tenancy relationships. This proposal is at present (December 1972) pending in Parliament. Much hope is attached to it. The Swedish Government, which has been pressing for land reform in Ethiopia for many years, considers it necessary for the successful performance of the Swedish sponsored agricultural projects. In fact, when SIDA has been attacked in the Swedish debate for not being able to reach the poorest farmers through CADU’s activities, SIDA has as a rule fended off such criticism by referring to the future legislation on land reform. When this legislation is a fact and has started to be implemented, SIDA claims, the problem of participation of the tenants will be solved.

In this light it is important for us to review the content of the
draft tenancy proclamation since it illuminates how far the "gradualistic" imperial reformism carries. It also illuminates the future structural working conditions of the minimum package projects.

Before we go on to the details, it is important to note that the draft proclamation does not touch the fundamental issue of land reform - ownership of land. It only specifies the forms of tenancy relationships. The aim of the proclamation is said to be the encouragement of landholders and tenants to work in co-operation to increase agricultural productivity and contribute to the future prosperity of Ethiopia.119/ The main provisions of the tenancy proclamation are the following: agricultural leases, payment of rent, termination of tenancy relationships, compensation for improvements, pre-emption. It also provides for a new machinery of enforcement. We shall briefly present and comment on the most important provisions.

The lease agreements can be oral or written. Either party (landholder or tenant) may require that the lease be put into writing. The initiation may also come from the Minister of Land Reform and Administration, who can require that leases in a certain area shall be put into writing.120/

The rent refers to the payment by the tenant to the landholder for the use of the holding for one year. The rent can be paid in kind or in cash.121/ It may be paid as a fixed amount of agricultural products/money or by the division of the produce of the holding between the landholder and the tenant in proportionate shares. In the case of sharecropping the maximum share rent may not exceed one-third of the gross yield - i.e. the total produce of the holding excluding seed. 122/ The rent refers only to payment for the use of land. If the landholder contributes inputs to the holding (bullocks, farm implements, machinery), and/or performs services to the tenant (ploughing, harvesting, threshing, transportation, storage, etc.), the tenant shall give additional payment for these contributions. The total amount to be paid (rent + other payments) may not exceed one half (50%) of the gross yield of the holding.123/ If either party so requires, the rent shall be converted to a fixed amount of agricultural products/money.124/ The manner of conversion stipulates that an
amount of agricultural products, equivalent to one-third of the gross yield (or a smaller amount in areas where the share rent traditionally is less than 1/3), shall be put aside and recorded as the fixed rent of the holding.\textsuperscript{125/} Conversion to payment of rent in cash shall be calculated at the current market price of the fixed amount of agricultural products at the market where the tenant usually deals.\textsuperscript{126/} In cases of widespread disaster the Minister of Land Reform and Administration may order for a reduction in rent for one or more rental periods.\textsuperscript{127/}

Termination of tenancy relationship can be effected on agreement by the parties.\textsuperscript{128/} In cases where the parties do not agree, termination can be initiated by the landholder as well as by the tenant. The tenant can terminate the relationship by giving one year's notice to the landholder of his intention.\textsuperscript{129/} If the tenant can prove that the landholder has failed to comply with any of the provisions of the tenancy proclamation, the tenancy relationship can be terminated without his giving notice to the landholder.\textsuperscript{130/}

The tenancy relationship can be terminated by the landholder if he can prove that the holding is deteriorating on the default of the tenant (the tenant has abandoned the holding, failed to pay rent, failed to adopt sound farming practices, sub-let the holding, etc.) If, however, the damages can be quickly cured, the tenancy relationship shall not be terminated, provided that the tenant pays damages to the landholder and/or cures the default.\textsuperscript{131/}

The landholder has furthermore the right to terminate the tenancy relationship due to other causes. The most important of these is for the purpose of introducing large scale commercial farming. The landholder can form a company where he (or his spouse or grown-up child) is the major shareholder. If this company intends to start a large scale commercial farm in the near future, the landholder can terminate the tenancy relationships on the land after giving two years notice to the tenants.\textsuperscript{132/} If it is considered that the result of such termination would be severe hardship for the tenant, the termination shall be postponed for three more years.\textsuperscript{133/}

When termination takes place due to this cause, the landholder shall pay disturbance compensation to the tenant, a sum not less
than two years rent and not more than five years rent.134/

If it is discovered that a landholder has evicted tenants in violation of the provisions of the proclamation, it is stipulated that: "the tenant shall be entitled to damages for the losses suffered by him as a result of such eviction ... and may in addition, be reinstated on the holding where reinstatement is still possible*.135/

Compensation for improvements shall be paid by the landholder to the tenant when the tenancy relationship terminates, whatever the reason for termination.136/ The improvements comprise planting of long term crops (fruit trees, coffee trees), construction of permanent buildings, etc. The compensation shall be equal to the unexhausted value of the improvement at the time of termination.137/

Pre-emption. If the landholder intends to sell the holding, the tenant(s) shall have a right of pre-emption, i.e. the landholder must in the first case offer the holding at a reasonable price to the tenant cultivating it. If the tenant has not responded to the offer within sixty days, the landholder is free to sell the land to anybody.138/ The right of pre-emption is personal to the tenant and valid only for agricultural purposes.

Implementation and enforcement. The proclamation provides for a three-tier implementation machinery comprising the institutions of Tenancy Officer and Tenancy Committee on the local (awradja) level and the institution of Tenancy Tribunal on the provincial level. The Minister of Land Reform and Administration shall appoint a Tenancy Officer, a government employee, in each district he sees fit. Concerning application of the different aspects of the proclamation, landholders and tenants can in the first place turn to the Tenancy Officer for guidelines. The Tenancy Officer is the man on the spot at the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration. He is empowered to make investigations of cases of non-compliance with the provisions of the proclamation.139/

The following link in the implementation machinery is the Tenancy Committee (where the Tenancy Officer acts as secretary). It shall have five or seven members. Landholders and tenants shall have an equal representation on the Committee with an owner-cultivator
As chairman, among the duties of the Tenancy Committee shall be, to hear and decide appeals from the decisions of the Tenancy Officer, and to arbitrate disputes between landholders and tenants when requested by either party or by the Tenancy Tribunal. The Committee shall make its decisions by majority vote.

The third institution is a special court; the Tenancy Tribunal. It shall be conducted by one judge, experienced in land matters and appointed by the Emperor. The Tribunal shall be supervised by the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration. The Tenancy Tribunal shall function as a court of first instance dealing exclusively with the regulations of tenancy relationships. It shall hear and decide appeals from the decisions of the Tenancy Committees and its decisions shall have the same effect and be enforced in the same manner as decisions of regular courts. But not even the decisions of the Tenancy Tribunal are final. Discontented landholders and tenants can appeal to the High Court in the Governorate General (province) in which the dispute arises. The decision of the High Court is final.

Comments

When it comes to payment of rent we can note that sharecropping is not ruled out as a system by the proclamation. On the contrary, it is stipulated that the norm shall be one third to the landholder and two thirds to the tenant. The conversion to fixed rent has these proportions as its point of departure. Note that this rent only refers to the landholders contribution of the agricultural land. If he in addition to the land contributes implements or services, he is entitled to 50% of the harvest. The provisions of the proclamation thus seems to institutionalize prevailing customs. It is only the most extreme form of landholders exploitation of the tenants that is forbidden - the practice that the tenant pays 75% of the harvest as rent.

Concerning termination of tenancy relationships because of a landholder's intention to change the use of his land to commercial farming, we can note that the Tenancy Tribunal can, but does not have to, postpone termination by three years, when the two years notice of the landholder has expired. It depends on how the Tenancy Tribunal interprets "severe hardship for the tenant".
Besides, there is the possibility that the landholder and his tenants agree on the termination. We must in such cases be aware of the superior bargaining position of the landholder. What formally seems like an agreement on equal terms may in reality be the result of hidden threats and pressure. The provision that an unlawfully evicted tenant shall have the right to be reinstated on the holding where reinstatement is still possible is also a deceptive formulation. Firstly, we have learnt that the evicted tenants usually leave the region following eviction, and so, they are out of contact with legal procedures in that region. Even if we assume that an evicted tenant should stay in contact with the Tenancy Committee and Tribunal to try to guard his rights, the legal procedure is sure to take a long time. And even if the final decision would be in favour of the tenant the landholder might already have mechanized all his fields. In that case reinstatement is "not longer possible". We do not have to dwell long on the provisions of pre-emption. It is obvious that they are illusive as long as there exists no credit organization devoted to financing tenants' land purchases.

Concerning the machinery of enforcement we can note that it is unlikely that the Tenancy Officer can work effectively in an otherwise unchanged social structure. If he consequently sides with the tenants he can be the object of undue pressure from the landowners. The usefulness of the Tenancy Committees for the tenants depend on how much influence the tenant representatives can exercise. The highest tier in the new enforcement machinery, the Tenancy Tribunal, is not the final decisionmaker. It is possible to appeal from the tribunal to the High Court in the province. It is to be expected that in cases where important economic interests are at stake, the landowners will ultimately ask for justice from the High Courts. It will thus require a time consuming procedure to reach the final decision. And since the ordinary judges as a rule are recruited from the landed aristocracy it is not unlikely that the decisions generally will have a bias in favour of the landholders.

When it finally comes to legal sanctions against violations of the provisions of the proclamation, we can note that the penal consequences are vaguely formulated. According to the proclamation, violations against the most important provisions (e.g. illegal
eviction) "shall be punishable under the relevant provisions of the Penal Code of 1957". It is not explicitly laid down which these relevant provisions are. The field is free for interpretations. Note the formulation "punishable" which means that the court does not unconditionally have to levy straff. Lastly, we can note that the penal sentences only can be made by the ordinary courts. The Tenancy Tribunal is stripped of its powers in this field. It is laid down in the definition of its material jurisdiction that the Tenancy Tribunal shall "hear and decide any matters or dispute arising out of or concerning alleged violation of any provision of this proclamation other than the penal provision".

Conclusions

The draft tenancy proclamation speaks for itself. It illuminates the narrow limits of the Imperial "gradualistic" reformism. And in this case the Government is the progressive part, the majority of the members of Parliament consider it radical and are opposed to it. The tenants cannot expect any radical improvements in their living conditions as a result of this proclamation. Although it is still too early (December 1972) to be able to judge its effects on the tenants (the proclamation is still only a document), the above comments indicate the problems of implementation and the numerous loopholes the proclamation leaves for the interests of the big landowners.

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We prefer to refrain from drawing far reaching conclusions from the material presented in this report. It should be kept in mind that the minimum package projects have only been active in the field for somewhat more than one year, when the collection of material for this report was terminated. Therefore this report should not be regarded a summary of what the projects have accomplished/not accomplished, but rather a guide to some important principal problems which face them. And, once more it should be repeated that generalizations from the report can be extended only to such areas where agricultural society shows the same structural characteristics as described here. In Ethiopia those areas include in the first instance the cereal producing highlands in the southern
provinces.

To sum up, the philosophy of CAO and the minimum package project seems to rest on an unrealistic postulate: that the rural Ethiopian society is static (i.e. backward, ignorant) and that in this static backwardness the package projects enter as the only dynamic force. Hereby it is ignored that there is another dynamic force at work - the mechanization/commercialization process. Mechanization is now a self-generating process and it counterworks the goals of the package projects aimed at promoting peasant agriculture.

In such a confrontation between different agricultural development strategies the outcome is to a great extent dependent on which party the Government sides with. If the Government in the execution of agricultural policies, identifies with and supports the large scale commercial farmers (and the material in this report suggests that this is the case in Ethiopia) then it is unrealistic to think that efforts to promote the interests of subsistence farmers can be successful as long as their interests are in conflict with those of the commercial farmers.
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FOOTNOTES:


Det är inte i överensstämmelse vare sig med det svenska biståndets motiv eller med dess mål att det bidrager till att konservera en framstegsfientlig samhällsstruktur."

3. Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit.


5. Ibid.

6. CADU Project Description, October 1971, p.3.

7. Ibid.

8. The southern provinces are here defined to include the following provinces: Wollega, Shoa (except the northernmost part), Wollo (except Wag and Lasta districts), Hararge, Arussi, Illubabor, Kafa, Sidamo, Bale, Gamu-Gofa.

9. The period of conquest durationed from about 1870 to 1900.

10. In some areas pastoralists preferred to leave the region after the conquest and tenants from other parts of Ethiopia migrated to these areas.

11. Information compiled from Central Statistical Office, reports on surveys of Wollega, Shoa, Wollo, Hararge, Arussi, Illubabor, Kafa, Sidamo and Gamu-Gofa provinces (Bale was not included in the surveys). The information contained in these reports was collected in 1963-64, it rests on a not too solid foundation.

12. Information compiled from the reports mentioned in note 11.

13. Eritrea, Tigre, Beghemder, Godjam. To these provinces can be added Wag and Lasta districts in Wollo province.


16. The investigation is confidential.

17. The tractor-cultivable area comprised about 65-70% of the whole surveyed area.

18. In the investigation the area is measured in gasha, an Ethiopian square measure. One gasha is equivalent to about 40 hectares.


20. CADU, Project Description, October 1971, p.4.


24. SIDA (the Swedish International Development Authority) is the Swedish Government's instrument for development assistance.


30. Ibid.


32. A Master Plan for EPID, p.10f.

33. One quintal of fertilizers can, in general in Ethiopia, double the yield of cereal crops on one cultivated hectare.

34. Plan of Operation for EPID, Appendix 1B, p.2.

35. Ibid, p.3. The interest rate is 1% per month, but at least 8% is charged however early the loan is repaid.


37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

41. Ibid, p.4.
42. Ibid; Manual ..., p.4.
43. Plan of Operation for EPID, Appendix 1B, p.3.
44. Plan of Operation for EPID, Appendix 1A, p.5.
45. A Master Plan for EPID, p.21. One can speculate whether or not the statement that the co-operative society shall "buy grain from farmers" is purely an unfortunate expression, or whether it is really the intention that the societies shall function as an organization placed above the farmers.
47. The Amharic word for "administrative sub-district".
48. The Amharic word for "administrative district".
50. There is a difference, not always clearly identified, between the Emperor's land and Government land.
51. Nowadays there are Amharic settlers in northern Wollega penetrating further south. They come from the densely populated province of Gojam.
53. Survey of Shoa, p.27; Survey of Wollega, p.27.
55. Survey of Shoa, p.29; Survey of Wollega, p.29.
56. Survey of Wollega, p.26; Survey of Shoa, p.27.
60. Land Tenure Survey of Welega, p.44.
61. The following is a summary of a student paper by Mulugeta Tessema, Land Use Study in Lege Batu, 1971.
62. Ten Ethiopian dollars = four U.S. dollars.
63. The following is a summary of a student paper by Shiferaw Melesew, A Land Use Study of Botche, 1971.
64. According to the author, tenants could pay the rent, 1971.
65. The following is a summary of a student paper by Tefera Bitima, Land Use Study of Facha, 1971.
66. Information from the project office in Bako.


68. E. Kelber-Awole Mela, Agricultural Survey of Bako Area, 1970. The survey covers a circular area around Bako with a radius of 10 km.

69. The names of my informants may not be published.

70. The tithe was a tax payable by the tenants to the landlords which was then supposed to be further transferred to the Imperial Treasury. In 1967 the Parliament abolished the tithe. In many places, however, information concerning the abolition of the tithe did not reach the tenants who continued to pay tithes to their landlords. The landlords generally, are not interested in informing their tenants about the changed legislation.

71. The figures from the project office in Bako differ somewhat from the figures given by EPID's head office in Addis Ababa. The figures from the head office are used here.

72. Cf. Shashamane minimum package project.


74. Information from the project office in Bako.

75. The following information emanates from confidential sources. The information was gathered through interviews. It should not be apprehended as characteristic of the attitude of all big landowners. Nevertheless, we think it reflects a general opinion.

76. There were, however, one German experimental agricultural station and one mechanized farm run by a Swedish Mission.

77. This is the amount of land bought and contracted from the Imperial owners.

78. Confidential source.

79. The main objective for the road project is "to facilitate transports between Bako and Jere, which is expected to stimulate the development of the region", according to the Project Description. The first construction stage was completed in 1972, as documented in a series of Progress Reports of the construction work by the supervisors Lars Karlsson and Ola Lindersson.

80. Survey of Wollega, p.29.

81. SIDA contributes the other 50%.

81. Survey of Shoa, p.25.
82. Ibid, p.23.
83. Ibid, p.27.
84. Ibid, p.29.
85. Ibid, p.27.
89. Information from the project offices in Shashamane and Ngele.
90. Information from the project's office in Shashamane.
91. Information from the project's office in Ngele.
92. " " " " " "
93. Information from the project's office in Shashamane.
94. Confidential source.
95. Survey of Shoa, p.19.
96. Information from the project's office in Ngele.
97. The following information is a summary of Kebede Tsegama, Land Use Study in Loko, 1972 (student paper).
98. Kebede mentions that the area is classified as "Worregenu" (= "Wärä Gänä"), i.e. land reserved for providing the Imperial Palace with meat and butter, it has been Imperial pasture land. Cf. Pankhurst, op.cit., p.108 f.
99. Confidential source.
100. Information from the project's office in Shashamane and from EPID's head office in Addis Ababa.
101. Information from the project's offices in Shashamane and Ngele.
103. Information from the project's offices at Shashamane and Ngele. For 1972 we possess figures on landlords participating in the credit programme only in Ngele sub-district.
104. The following information is gathered from discussions with the project staff in Shashamane, Ngele and Addis Ababa.
105. Information from the project's offices in Shashamane and Ngele.
108. Survey of Shoa, p.29.
109. Ibid, p.27.
110. Ibid.
111. Information from the project's offices and from EPIO's headquarters in Addis Ababa.
112. Information from the project's office in Wolisso.
113. "Gebrekel" means that the Government takes the land from farmers who have failed to pay their taxes for two consecutive years.
114. Confidential source.
115. This did not, however, correspond to a raised standard of living for the 190 farmers in Shashamane and Negele who failed to repay their loans.
117. Ibid, Art. 4.
118. Bengt Nekby, chief executive of CADU 1967-71, writes: "Collaboration with the local administration ... has not proceeded without friction. On account of its bureaucratic, authoritarian structure and sometimes corrupt character, the local administration is often mistrusted by the farmers, and close collaboration would have implied certain risks to the project. Attempts to inform the local administration about the activities of the project and to interest them in it have met with a rather cool reception". Nekby, op.cit., p.83 ff.
120. Ibid, Art. 6.
121. Ibid, Art. 23.
122. Ibid, Art. 18.
123. Ibid, Art. 19.
125. Ibid, Art 21 (1), (2).
126. Ibid, Art. 23 (2).
127. Ibid, Art. 25.
128. Ibid, Art. 27 (1).
129. Ibid, Art. 31 (1).
130. Ibid, Art. 31 (2).
131. Ibid, Art. 28.
132. Ibid, Art. 29 (1).
133. Ibid, Art. 29 (2).
134. Ibid, Art. 29 (5).
135. Ibid, Art. 35.
136. Ibid, Art. 37 (1).
137. Ibid, Art. 38 (1).
138. Ibid, Art. 42.
139. Ibid, Art. 49.
140. Ibid, Art. 50.
141. Ibid, Art. 51.
142. Ibid, Art. 52 (4).
143. Ibid, Art. 53.
144. Ibid, Art. 54.
145. Ibid, Art. 56.
146. Ibid, Art. 60.
147. Ibid, Art. 54 (1 a).
Research Reports:

Nos. 1-3 and 5 are out-of-print.


