Lars Rudebeck

GUINEA- BISSAU

A Study of Political Mobilization

Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala

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Preface

Most of the writing of this book was concluded before the young officers of the Portuguese army seized power in Lisbon on April 25, 1974, thus breaking the rigid structures of dictatorship and paving the way for an end to the last old-style colonial empire in Africa. But every single word of the text portends the important and dramatic events of the spring and the summer of 1974 in Portugal and her former African possessions. The last additions to the manuscript were made in late July, while the dates of Portuguese recognition and United Nations membership of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau were added in the last proofs coming from the printer. The work of collecting the facts and writing the text thus began while the people of Guinea-Bissau were still fighting, arms in hand, to throw off colonial rule; it ends at the very moment the difficult struggle for continued development under conditions of peace is beginning.

In the swamps and jungles of Guinea-Bissau, António de Spínola was forced to learn that military victory for the colonial army was impossible against the determined will and the revolutionary strategy of the people under the leadership of Amílcar Cabral and the PAIGC. Spínola was carried to the presidency of Portugal thanks to his reluctant acceptance of this hard lesson. The lesson was forced upon him both by the people of Guinea-Bissau and by a group of clear-sighted officers in his own colonial army in Bissau. Thus, after devoting a large part of his life to the military defense of Portugal's colonial empire in Africa, Spínola, despite himself, was pushed by the forces he helped release to preside over the first phases of the dismantling of that same empire. This may appear as a paradox. But in reality it is quite comprehensible. Some of the decisive political processes and mechanisms behind it are analyzed on the following pages, where an attempt is made to grasp and comprehend the political mobilization of a people against colonialism and imperialism, for liberation and development.

The different versions preceding the final text of this book have all been discussed in the frank and constructively critical atmosphere of our special seminar for politics and social change in the third world at the Political Science Institute of Uppsala University. Many other careful readers of my

manuscript have also made important comments and suggestions. In fact, no book or article I have written before has ever been scrutinized, criticized, and discussed from such a great number of different points of view, and by such a great number of comrades and colleagues, as this one. I thank you all most sincerely — both for the advice I have followed and for the advice I have only listened to with respect.

Thanks are due also to the Swedish Council for Social Science Research and to the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies for their financial assistance.

But most of all I want to thank all the struggling comrades of the PAIGC — including Amílcar and Luis Cabral and Aristides Pereira as well as numerous other militants and ordinary citizens of Guinea-Bissau—who trusted me enough to open their country and their organization to me during my visits in 1970 and 1972. I have tried to do justice to their generous and comradely confidence in me by making this book true to the reality of their revolution, as I have seen and understood it.

Amílcar Cabral was murdered, but the defeat of imperialism in Guinea-Bissau could not be stopped. As Cabral was a socialist revolutionary, he saw the struggle of his people both in its historical and in its global perspective. He used to remind us that their struggle was our struggle, for imperialism is the enemy of all the peoples of the world. In the same sense, the defeat of imperialism in Guinea-Bissau is a victory for all the peoples of the world. Such victories make it possible to hold some hope for the future. I would like to dedicate this book to the memory of Amílcar Cabral, to the people of Guinea-Bissau, and to all others, all over the world, who contribute to keeping that hope alive.

Uppsala, September 1974

Lars Rudebeck

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I. Introduction

We became so tired of the Portuguese . . . tired of being used and exploited . . . It is no good to work every day without getting anything in return, so we decided there had to be a change. Now we are working for ourselves and for our own interests. Therefore we don't get tired any more, in spite of difficulties and hard conditions.

Pungana Nabila, vice-president of a village committee in south-western Guinea-Bissau,
November 1970

This is a book in which concrete facts are presented about the struggle for national liberation and development in Guinea-Bissau, and particularly about the new society under construction in the liberated areas of that small West African peasant country, while the armed struggle was still going on. But it is also a work of social science. This means, among many other things, that the facts are presented not only in order to provide reliable information about the particular case of Guinea-Bissau, but also in order to improve our systematic understanding of some of the more general political principles and mechanisms involved in the emancipation of oppressed societies. It is therefore necessary to include in the text some theoretical and comparative remarks as well, in order to relate the present contribution to its theoretical context.

To some extent such theoretical considerations will naturally be woven into the text throughout the chapters of this book. But a more systematic theoretical presentation will not be given until the concluding chapter. The main reason for this arrangement of the text is the author's desire to create a natural bridge from the reality of Guinea-Bissau and the struggle of the PAIGC to more general theoretical reflections about the politics of underdevelopment and development.

Our design is simple, but our purpose ambitious, perhaps overly so. By presenting important facts in a theoretically ordered way, we hope to make those facts better understood. But we would also like theory to be illuminated and possibly improved by the confrontation with those same facts. For only by letting theory work upon facts and facts upon theory is it possible to come to grips with reality.

II. Guinea and Cape Verde: Past and Present in Relation to National Liberation

Capitalism as a world system had its origins in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries when Europeans, mastering the art of long-distance navigation, broke out of their little corner of the globe and roamed the seven seas, conquering, plundering, and trading.¹

When Portuguese navigators and sailors, probably in 1446, first sighted the green and swampy coast of present-day Guinea-Bissau, they were no doubt unaware of the fact that they were beginning to lay the foundations of an international economic and political system that more than five hundred years later would still continue to dominate the lives of the majority of the world's inhabitants. Nevertheless, that is what they were doing. Nor did the Portuguese sailors realize that the land they were about to "discover" would not only be among the very first included in this world system yet to be born, but also among the very last to be forced to belong to it in its classical form of direct colonialism. Nevertheless, that is what happened. Thus, in the history of colonialism, imperialism, and world capitalism, important roles, far out of proportion to the small geographical importance of the two territories, have been forced upon Guinea and Cape Verde — both at the very first beginnings of and at the present turning-point in the history of capitalism as a world system of economic and political domination.

Early Portuguese presence

Guinea-Bissau ("Portuguese" Guinea) and the archipelago of Cape Verde are geographically far apart, but the history of Portuguese colonialism has linked them to each other in numerous economic, political, social, and cultural ways.

¹ Paul M. Sweezy, *Modern Capitalism and Other Essays*, New York and London, Monthly Review Press, 1972, p. 5.

Although the bulk of this book is going to deal with developments in mainland Guinea and not with the islands, it is still necessary to emphasize the important historical links between the two areas in the brief survey of historical background to be given in this chapter.

Present-day Guinea-Bissau was delimited as a Portuguese territory covering 36,125 square kilometers in the midst of French-claimed West Africa after and as a result of the Conference of Berlin in 1884–1885. This decision confirmed the fact of Portugal's decline as a colonial power compared with the situation during the second half of the sixteenth century, when the region the Portuguese termed "Guinea of Cape Verde" was, from a European point of view, the almost exclusive preserve of Portuguese traders settled on the islands of Cape Verde. The region thus termed encompassed not only present-day Guinea-Bissau but the entire coast from the mouth of the river Gambia in today's Republic of Gambia all the way to Cape Mount in present-day Liberia near the Sierra Leone border. But during the following centuries, the influence of the Portuguese was gradually reduced under the impact of English and French competition, and it was only thanks to British protection that a piece of West Africa was allotted to the Portuguese when the European colonial powers met in Berlin to apportion Africa between themselves. The Portuguese presence on the islands of Cape Verde was scarcely challenged at the time, however, neither by the European great powers nor by the local population.

As mentioned above, the historical origin of Portuguese activities in this part of the world ties the mainland and the islands closely together. In fact, the ten islands of Cape Verde, together encompassing 4,033 square kilometers in the midst of the Atlantic Ocean, about 900 kilometers north and west of Bissau, seem to have been uninhabited at the time of the arrival of the Portuguese around 1460. Their present population of about 270,000² is made up of the descendants of Africans brought as slaves from the mainland to the islands and of Portuguese settlers. In 1582, the combined population of the two large islands of Fogo and Santiago was reported to be 1,608 whites, 400 freed slaves, and 13,700 slaves.³ But as early as in 1466, the first Cape Verde settlers received their charter from the Portuguese crown: "allowing them to have a judiciary and a revenue department, giving them absolute rights over the Africans, and granting them exclusive licence to trade on the adjacent mainland."⁴

² 201,549 inhabitants according to the 1960 census: *Anuário Estatístico, Vol. II, Províncias Ultramarinas, 1969*, Lisbon, Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 1971, p. 11. A decade later, in 1970, the islands were reported to have 272,000 inhabitants; *Súmula de Dados Estatísticos, Províncias Ultramarinas*, Lisbon, Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 1971.

³ Contemporary Portuguese source cited in Walter Rodney, *A History of the Upper Guinea Coast 1545–1800*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 72.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

The foundations had thus been laid at a very early stage for a form of colonial economy managed by Cape Verde settlers of Portuguese origin and based upon the labour of African slaves as well as upon the profits from ordinary slave trade. This economy is described by Walter Rodney, the historian cited above, in the following passage:

The Africans provided techniques as well as labour for the cotton and dye processing. The Cape Verde islands specialized in the manufacture of 'country cloths', using the small loom introduced from the mainland. At the same time the Portuguese provided the organization for a large-scale industry, and experimented with new fibres brought from Europe. The net result was that the products enjoyed the highest esteem among the peoples of the Upper Guinea Coast, being preferred to the cloth imported from Europe.

Slavery was the basis of the Cape Verde society in yet another sense. The Portuguese settlers were not only interested in the import of their own labour force, but they also regarded the re-export of slaves as a priority. Cloth, dyes, hides, and livestock were exported to Europe and the New World; but the Cape Verdeans concentrated on exchanging most of their own products on the mainland for slaves to be sold to Europe and the Americas.⁵

Gradually, through the centuries, this Cape Verdean economy and society became less flourishing, but the fact that it was a direct creation of colonialism can hardly be questioned. On the mainland, the Portuguese presence, and later at times also other European presences, was very different. As late as in 1936, the Portuguese colonial government had to fight militarily in order to "pacify" the colony received more than half a century earlier at Berlin, and this was only the last of a long series of colonial wars against the peoples of Guinea.⁶

Before 1880, through the long centuries of systematic slave trade, the Portuguese traders and settlers (*lançados*), some of whom intermarried with Africans, had been limited to a few coastal towns, forts, and trading posts, such as Cacheu in northern Guinea and later also Bissau, the present capital, farther south. The Europeans in these settlements — in Cacheu, for instance, there were 500 whites out of a total population of 1,500 in the early seventeenth century — lived not as colonial rulers but as settled foreigners or guests, subject to local laws, militarily threatened, fighting small wars at times, and dependent upon continuous negotiations and agreements with African kings and notables. As is well known, for instance, the Europeans did not hunt their slaves themselves, but received them, as well as other export goods, from the Africans, in exchange for various manufactured goods imported from Europe or from the islands of Cape Verde.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 72 f.

⁶ Cf. Basil Davidson, *The Liberation of Guiné. Aspects of an African Revolution*, Harmondsworth, Penguin African Library, 1969, pp. 22 f., and Ronald H. Chilcote, *Portuguese Africa*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1967, pp. 94 ff.

What is most important to note for our present purposes is the limited character, all the time up to the twentieth century, of Portuguese and any other European settlement on the mainland of Guinea, as well as the persistence of the various African peoples' own forms of social and political organization, although weakened, in the area.⁷ We must note also that the Europeans did not provide the only external influence upon the peoples of the West African coast, although indirectly the strangers who came by the sea seem to have exerted influence also from the interior of the continent. Of this Rodney writes:

The impact of the interior can be seen in part as the continuation of a process which had been going on for centuries; but by the eighteenth century the hinterland too had immensely strengthened ties with the Atlantic trading system, so that, paradoxically, even influences from the interior reflected contacts with Europeans.⁸

The inhabitants of "Guinea of Cape Verde", and more specifically the inhabitants of that heartland of the area which makes up present-day Guinea-Bissau, were thus profoundly affected first by Portuguese and later also by other European colonialism from 1460 onwards, but they were not politically subjugated in any systematic manner until the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Their societies were dislocated and new social elements — such as outright commercial slavery among the Africans themselves — were introduced during this long period of intensive interaction with the enterprising and rapacious strangers from Europe. But internationally, the African peoples and societies remained in the subordinate role of suppliers and were never able to take over the lead from the Europeans, neither economically nor politically. Basil Davidson has raised the question of why this was so, and he has also attempted to give an answer based upon an analysis of the social structure of the African societies. What he writes has much relevance to what happened in Guinea under Portuguese influence:

If one asks . . . just why it was that these coastal peoples, faced as they were for so many years with the clear evidence of technological superiority on the European side, still failed to learn its lessons and launch some kind of technological revolution of their own, one is brought back again to the nature of the systems within which they lived. To the strength of these systems; but also to their weakness. They were strong because they were the product of centuries of successful trial and error by which men had worked out ways of living in the tropics and the forests, in the grasslands and the mountains of this often harsh continent. These systems were, if you like, the outcome of a long period of natural selection of a social kind . . .

The systems were strong, in other words, because within the limits of the world they knew they worked manifestly better than anything that was offered them in exchange. They worked

⁷ Cf. Basil Davidson, *Africa in History. Themes and Outlines*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968, pp. 175 ff. and 195 ff.

⁸ Rodney, *op.cit.*, p. 223.

better not only at a material level but also in terms of spiritual, moral, and socially constructive behaviour.

These traditional systems were weak for at least two large reasons. First, and above all, because they were the victims of their own success. They might be flexible in day-to-day adjustment. Towards all question of structural change they showed a fundamental hostility. They were conservative by the strictest definition . . . Although the outcome of a great deal of daring experiment in the past, they had reached a self-perpetuating level where further large experiment seemed not only unwise, but also, given the spiritual sanctions that helped to stay them up, positively wrong.

Secondly, these systems were very numerous . . . Underlying unities of culture there might certainly be: seldom or never did they lead to unities of action. This was the political weakness of Africa in face of the slave trade, and afterwards of the slave trade's natural successor, colonial invasion. Individual kings and merchants might perceive the damage of the slave trade. They could never prevent it, or turn it to more than local or immediate profit, because they could never achieve unity with rivals and competitors; and the same was to be true of the European imperialist challenge . . . They (the Africans) needed a structural revolution in the content as well as in the form of their societies, and the circumstances in which this could take place were not yet present.⁹

In what ways then, if any, would the more direct kind of colonial rule the Portuguese attempted to establish in Guinea after the Conference of Berlin contribute to the necessary structural revolution mentioned by Davidson?

After the Conference of Berlin

In a strict formal juridical sense and seen from the Portuguese viewpoint, the Conference of Berlin and the subsequent border agreement with the French in 1886 did not in themselves change the status of Guinea nor the character of the Portuguese presence there. From the beginnings of Portuguese interest in the area until 1879, the Portuguese crown had tried to administer the islands of Cape Verde and mainland Guinea as one entity in varying ways. Originally, as we have seen, Guinea was regarded as a kind of appendix to Cape Verde. Later, somewhat different forms evolved. In 1834, for instance, the two territories became one prefecture within the ordinary Portuguese administration, with Guinea regarded as a canton governed by a sub-prefect. But in 1879 the age-old administrative link was severed, and Guinea and Cape Verde became separate provinces. Since then they have continued to be governed separately as provinces, colonies (1927-1951), and again as provinces or territories forming "integral parts" of the national territory of Portugal.

⁹ Davidson, *Africa in History*, pp. 266 f.

Our purpose at this point is not to analyze the formal details of Portuguese colonial rule in Guinea but only to note its continuity in slightly varying forms through the centuries. The important new elements introduced in the picture toward the end of the nineteenth century thus cannot be traced to changes in administrative forms, although the separation of the islands from the mainland was of course important in itself. What was truly new at this time was the enormous upsurge of European imperialism. For the inhabitants of black Africa this meant that the old mercantile form of colonialism was supplanted by energetic efforts on the part of the European powers to occupy Africa militarily and politically.

As already pointed out, the Portuguese tried to follow suit in the areas allotted to them at the Conference of Berlin. But the economic and military weakness of Portugal, as compared with the other colonial powers, as well as strong African resistance and the small economic gains to be had from Guinea-Bissau — all this combined to produce a particularly backward form of direct colonialism. After 1945, Guinea-Bissau emerged as one of the most undeveloped countries of Africa. The net effects of colonialism were even more negative there than in most other countries of Africa: even fewer schools, even more illiterates, even less economic development, about as bad health conditions as elsewhere, and even more obstinate refusal to introduce political reforms. The dialectics of colonialism initiated by the Portugal of Salazar were thus probably destined to become different from those initiated by the French and the British in the rest of West Africa. With regard to politics in particular, it is reasonable to assume that the stubborn character of Portuguese colonialism has paradoxically accelerated the process of political development in Guinea by provoking a higher degree of political mobilization than would otherwise have been needed in order to achieve formal independence.

The peoples and the people of Guinea-Bissau and of Cape Verde

Guinea-Bissau

Before the colonial conquest, the African societies existing in the region of present-day "Portuguese" Guinea presented several different stages of evolution. Principally they were characterized by the gradual dissolution of the primitive community and by the appearance and development of different degrees of economic and social dependence, such as patriarchal slavery, more or less accentuated sovereignty, etc . . . Money and private ownership of land, however, did not generally exist at this stage. Portuguese colonial domination, and before that the slave trade, changed these societies in significant ways, but the characteristics of the old structures and their economic and social superstructures still persist, more or less evidently. In

some cases, these characteristics are still dominant, in spite of the intrusion and superposition of the Portuguese system of colonial domination and exploitation.¹⁰

When the Portuguese arrived in Guinea, they met more or less the same ethnic groups and peoples who live there today and who still display many of the same cultural and language differences between themselves as they did then. The most important exception is provided by the Fula people (see below) who did not move into the territory of present Guinea-Bissau in great numbers until the eighteenth century. They then came from the fringe of the high plateau of the Futa-Djalon in the present Republic of Guinea.

The official Portuguese figure for the size of the population dates as far back as to the census of 1960. It gives the number of inhabitants as 521,336.¹¹ PAIGC sources give the approximate figure of 800,000,¹² which should be closer to the truth, for the reason, among others, that the population can hardly be assumed to have been stagnant since 1960. Note also that the statisticians of the United Nations have accepted a higher figure for 1960 than that shown by the 1960 Portuguese census.¹³

Seven main ethnical groups are usually distinguished in Guinea-Bissau. The population figures given below are approximate:¹⁴

Balante 250,000
Mandjaque 140,000
Fula 100,000
Mandinga (Malinke) 80,000
Pepel 50,000
Brame 35,000
people of the Bijagos islands 15,000

¹⁰ *Guinée et Cap-Vert. Libération des colonies portugaises*, Algiers, Information CONCP (Conférence des Organisations Nationales des Colonies Portugaises), 1970, pp. 16 f. (translated by the author). This book was written collectively by a group of PAIGC members.

¹¹ *Anuário Estatístico, Vol. II, Províncias Ultramarinas, 1969*, p. 11. There exists an official population figure also for 1970 as well, but it is so low that we find it hard to accept it as serious: 487, 488 inhabitants. This is found in *Súmula de Dados Estatísticos* and in *Síntese Monográfica da Guiné*, Lisbon, Edição da Agência-Geral do Ultramar, 1972, p. 31. It is difficult to understand why the Portuguese authorities, without any comments whatsoever, report a considerable population decrease in Guinea between 1960 and 1970. A possible explanation would be that this was a tacit recognition of the fact that large portions of the territory were no longer under the effective control of the colonial authorities. Cf. pp. 47 ff. Note also that *Súmula de Dados Estatísticos* gives the population figure for 1969 as 530,300 while mentioning in a footnote that the 1970 figure is "provisional". Still it is amazing that the *Súmula*. . . reports a decrease of 42,852 inhabitants in one single year.

¹² *La République de Guinée-Bissau en chiffres*, Commissariat d'Etat à l'Economie et aux Finances (mimeo), February 1974, p. 1.

¹³ Cf. table 10, p. 34.

¹⁴ This division into seven ethnical groups is found in various books, for instance in David M. Abshire and Michael A. Samuels, eds., *Portuguese Africa. A Handbook*, New York and London, Praeger and Pall Mall Press, 1969, pp. 110 ff. The approximate population figures quoted here have not been taken from the handbook—which has lower figures—but from *Guinée et Cap-Vert*, p. 10.

In addition to these groups, there are several other smaller groups, including the Lebanese traders and the Portuguese minority. The latter probably number only a few thousand, not counting the military.

The great majority (around and probably over ninety percent) of the population of Guinea are peasants whose main crops include rice in the coastal lowlands and peanuts in the interior. The oil palm (in the west) and cattle, among others, are also important resources. Land is usually held in common by members of the same village, according to customary law, but tools and produce are most often considered private or family property. The implications of common ownership of land naturally vary between peoples with egalitarian forms and peoples with hierarchical forms of social organization (cf. below). Forms of cultivation vary with crops and local customs.

According to a professional assessment made in the early nineteen-fifties, the various ethnic groups of Guinea cultivated only about 12 percent of the total land area. Most land was cultivated by the following four groups: Balante 30 percent, Fula close to 29 percent, Mandinga close to 16 percent, and Mandjaque close to 13 percent of the cultivated area.¹⁵

In spite of the small size of the country and the relatively high population density (over twenty inhabitants per square kilometer), forms of inherited social organization and structure vary greatly. The two extremes, dominant in the western and in the eastern parts of the country respectively, are represented by the Balante and by the Fula peoples.

Balante society is generally described as "stateless" and egalitarian, each family working for its own gain on the communally held lands and the women participating on a fairly equal footing with the men. This society has offered strong resistance to Portuguese penetration.

The society of the Fulas, on the contrary, is characterized by a strong hierarchy of chiefs who exploit "their" peasants and at least until very recently were prepared to cooperate with the Portuguese in order to retain their power and social position. Another feature of Fula society is the subordinate position of women, as pointed out, for instance, in a well known text by Amilcar Cabral: "Among the Fulas women have no rights; they take part in production but they do not own what they produce. Besides polygamy is a highly respected institution and women are to a certain extent considered the property of their husbands."¹⁶

¹⁵ Assessment made by the late Secretary-General of the PAIGC, Amilcar Cabral, while still serving as an agronomist for the Portuguese government in the early nineteen-fifties. Quoted from Chilcote, *op.cit.*, p. 90. Part of the article quoted by Chilcote has been reprinted in English in *Ufahamu* (Los Angeles), vol. 3, no. 3, 1973, pp. 32-41, under the title "On the Utilization of Land in Africa." The figures cited here are found on p. 39.

¹⁶ Amilcar Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea. An African People's Struggle*, London, Stage 1, 1969, p. 47.

With regard to the degree of social stratification, the Mandinga people in the central northern and eastern parts of the country occupy a position between the two extremes. They have a more stratified and hierarchical type of society than the Balantes, but less so than the Fulas. When the Portuguese arrived, there were two well established Mandinga kingdoms in Guinea.

As in other parts of West Africa, we also find in Guinea a class of itinerant traders, the Dyulas, constantly on the move between different parts of the country. The original Dyulas of Guinea were of Mandinga origin, but Fulas are also found among them.

The Mandingas, among others, had through successive wars pushed the Balante, Mandjaque, Pepel, and Brame peoples toward the coastal lands which they now inhabit. The three latter peoples, who share the western parts of the country with the Balantes and who dominate in the Bissau region, also share with the Balantes a long history of violent opposition to Portuguese rule. It was the Pepel people, for instance, who resisted "pacification" as long as until 1936. The social organization of these three peoples is different from that of the Balantes, however, and had in fact already developed a fairly high degree of social stratification at the time of the arrival of the Portuguese. This gave the Portuguese the opportunity to make use of the traditional social structure by tying the chiefs and notables (*régulos*) to their own interests and thus to wield power and influence through these chiefs in classical colonialist manner. At times at least, this strategy seems to have met with some success from the Portuguese point of view, although, at other times, it gave rise to violent revolts.

Religion is of course an important aspect of culture, and it is in fact possible to discern a patterned relationship between the forms of social organization adopted and the religious beliefs espoused by the peoples of Guinea: the religion of Islam is predominant in the more highly stratified Fula and Mandinga societies, whereas the Balantes maintain their traditional animist beliefs to a much larger extent. The correlation between hierarchy and Islam on the one side and communal egalitarianism and animism on the other is by no means perfect, however, as the Mandjaque-Pepel-Brame group is fairly socially stratified but still not very penetrated by Islam.

It is generally considered that about one-third of the inhabitants of Guinea-Bissau are Moslem and about two-thirds animist, whereas the percentage of Christians reported by the sources varies between four and less than one percent.¹⁷ While there is no reason not to believe in the general correctness of these figures and proportions, it is nevertheless important to note, with Cabral, that . . .

¹⁷ *Guinée et Cap-Vert*, p. 11, and Chilcote, *op.cit.*, p. 35, both say "less than one percent". Abshire and Samuels, *op.cit.*, p. 110, say 4 percent.

there are still a lot of remnants of animist traditions even among the Muslims in Guinea; the part of the population which follows Islam is not really Islamic but rather Islamised: they are animists who have adopted some Muslim practices, but are still thoroughly impregnated with animist conceptions.¹⁸

It may seem that we have now tried to characterize the people of Guinea by stressing unduly the differences between the various peoples who make up that people. It should be pointed out therefore that it is probably easy to exaggerate the importance of these differences, as they are counteracted by several opposing influences, both old and recent. Among these opposing influences, the following may be mentioned.

If Guinea had never been colonized, the dynamic of internally generated development would probably in the long run have worked in the direction of greater unification. This possibility never materialized because of the arrival of the Portuguese. But colonialism itself also worked to undermine the traditional structures, not least by relying upon them for the exercise of oppressive power.

It is probably also true that a few meagre effects of western civilization, even under Portuguese rule, have worked to widen the horizon of some people beyond their own village or ethnic group. It is noticeable, for instance, that a *lingua franca*, Creole, made up of both Portuguese and African elements, is understood and used by a considerable number of people in most parts of the country.

Another important point about ethnic diversification in Guinea is its weak basis in the economic and productive life of the people: because of the undeveloped character of the economy, there are no important economic interests among the Africans that oppose them to each other. It should thus be possible, through modern education and political and economic organization, to bring them together and to surmount the inherited differences, by uniting the peoples of Guinea into one people. This is in fact a highly important goal/effect of the struggle for national liberation carried on since the beginning of the nineteen-sixties under the leadership of the PAIGC, and it will be noted also in other parts of this book, as it constitutes an essential aspect of our main theme. It is fair to assume that the struggle for national liberation has been the most powerful force of national unification in the history of Guinea.

The islands of Cape Verde

The struggle for national liberation has also resulted in a re-affirmation of the age-old ties between the islands of Cape Verde and mainland Guinea. This is

¹⁸ Cabral, *op.cit.*, pp. 49 f.

true both in the sense that many Cape Verdeans are active within the PAIGC and in the sense that the ideology of the movement emphasizes the unity of the two territories. On the other hand, the fact that PAIGC activities have been concentrated to the mainland resulted, at the same time, in a growing awareness of the many differences separating the two territories.

As the level of modern education on the islands is considerably higher than on the mainland,¹⁹ it is only natural that many of the Cape Verdeans who have joined the PAIGC have also come to occupy positions of responsibility in the movement. For the same reason, the Portuguese have traditionally employed Cape Verdeans in the colonial administration, a fact which has not contributed to bridging the social gap between Cape Verdeans and mainland Guineans.

The policy of the PAIGC, however, has been to try to counteract all tendencies toward disunity and separatism between Cape Verdeans and mainland Guineans, for the same reasons and in the same ways that such tendencies among the ethnic groups of the mainland are opposed. Still it cannot be denied that there are many more objective material and cultural reasons for separatism in the relation Cape Verde/Guinea than in the relations between the various ethnic groups of Guinea. For in spite of the fact that the two territories have a common history, it is also true that this history has generated important differences between them. It is not surprising that the Portuguese have been more anxious than the PAIGC to emphasize these differences,²⁰ but it is impossible to overlook them. Circumstances surrounding the murder of Cabral in early 1973, for instance, indicate that the unity postulated by the PAIGC is still quite fragile (cf. pp. 112 ff.). Let it merely be noted here that both unity and differences are facts, both of the present and of the past.

The majority of the approximately 270,000 inhabitants of the islands of Cape Verde are of mixed Portuguese and African descent — sixty percent according to one source²¹ — but there are also many pure Africans, particularly on the large island of Santiago. The Europeans are only a small minority, at most a few thousand people. The predominant language is a kind of Creole with strong elements of archaic Portuguese, but closer to ordinary Portuguese than the Creole of mainland Guinea.

¹⁹ Cf. tables 10 and 11, pp. 34 and 36.

²⁰ See for instance an article by Luis Fernando Dias Correia da Cruz in the Portuguese journal *Ultramar*, Lisbon, April–June 1968, pp. 125–147. The title of the article in English is “Some Aspects of Subversion in Portuguese Guinea”. It has been available to the author in partial translation published in the series *Translations on Africa*, no. 767, Joint Publications Research Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151.

²¹ Abshire and Samuels, *op.cit.*, p. 108.

The great majority of Cape Verdeans live precariously on the meager earnings they receive as small farmers, share-croppers, and tenants, in an agricultural economy at the mercy of frequent droughts and geared toward export in spite of seriously unsatisfied local needs which the economy theoretically could meet. Fishing activities are underdeveloped in spite of considerable potential, and industrial activities are limited to a few factories and plants for the production of food-stuffs, salt, shoes, lime, etc. Unemployment is naturally a serious problem in this kind of colonial economy, where local resources are exploited only to the extent that an external demand is found for them, and great numbers of Cape Verdeans have been forced into exile in order to look for work, if indeed they have not been deported to the plantations of São Tomé. The emigrants have gone to the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Senegal, and in recent years also to Portugal in increasing numbers.

An important reason for the migration to Portugal has been the lack of manpower in Portugal because of the great number of soldiers kept in Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique, and because of the migration from Portugal to other European countries caused by the war and by the low level of earnings in the underdeveloped economy of the metropolis. Thus, through a paradoxical mechanism, the very war of national liberation has caused many Cape Verdeans to support the Portuguese economy with their labour.

The economy of the islands of Cape Verde can be characterized as an economy in a fairly advanced stage of *underdevelopment* as compared with mainland Guinea, the economy of which is to a larger extent *undeveloped*. From a social and political point of view this means that the people of the islands are at the same time more integrated into and more actively rejected by Portuguese society than are the more self-subsistent people of the mainland. The national liberation movement therefore faces very different situations in the two territories. To these social and political differences should be added the highly important geographical differences between a widely dispersed archipelago of small islands and a continuous mainland territory favorable to guerilla warfare.

The combined socio-political and geographical differences are in fact so great that all of the islands were still under effective Portuguese rule until the *coup* of 1974. The PAIGC had not yet even attempted to establish any liberated areas there, but confined itself to a few strikes, some propaganda work, and attempts at various kinds of underground political activities. Strictly speaking, therefore, the situation on the islands of Cape Verde only indirectly belongs to the topic of this book. On the other hand, no political analysis of Guinea-Bissau would be complete, if the fact of its close relationship with the islands were to be ignored.

The modern colonial system at work in Guinea-Bissau until 1963

We have already mentioned the difficulties encountered in Guinea by the Portuguese, as they tried, by military means, to establish themselves as modern colonialists after the Conference of Berlin. It is nevertheless a fact that they dominated the territory effectively around 1945, as the tide of decolonization started to rise in Africa. Against what kind of society, then, were the first efforts of the PAIGC directed, when the party was founded in 1956 by a small group of comrades under the leadership of Amílcar Cabral?

The economy in colonial Guinea-Bissau

From the end of the nineteenth century and until the firm establishment of the regime of Salazar in Portugal, at the beginning of the nineteen-thirties, the Portuguese colonies in Africa had been wide open to the commercial and economic activities of other colonial powers. But one important aim of Salazar's policies was precisely to forge unbreakable links between metropolitan Portugal and her territories "beyond the seas". To this end a Portuguese monopoly of trade and shipping was established and enforced. In the case of Guinea after World War II, the monopoly was concentrated into the omnipresent hands of the internationally financed trust *Companhia União Favril* (C.U.F.). Around 1960 the Portuguese monopoly was enforced with great efficiency, as we can see from table 1 below:

Table 1. *Destination of exports from Guinea-Bissau, in percentage of value*^a
(Figures within brackets refer to absolute value in thousands of contos)

	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
Exports (total)	(198.6)	(125.9)	(211.2)	(188.8)	(166.5)
Portugal	93.4	94.6	80.6	89.6	92.3
Other colonies	2.1	1.5	1.4	1.0	1.0
Abroad	4.5	3.9	18.0	9.4	6.7
total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

^aThe table is based upon information from *III Plano de Fomento para 1968-1973, Guiné*, Lisbon, Presidência do Conselho, 1968, p. 12. The *conto* is the equivalent of 1,000 *escudos*. The official rate of exchange escudo/U.S. dollar was stable at about 0.035 dollars to one escudo from the nineteen-fifties until 1972. This is thus the rate at which *escudos* have been converted into dollars in all tables of this book where such calculations have been done. In the summer of 1974, the rate of exchange was approximately 0.041 dollars to one *escudo*.

The share of the imports into Guinea-Bissau coming from Portugal was lower than the share of the exports going there, but still high, averaging around two-thirds during the same period: the lowest share was 51.1 percent in 1960 and the highest 74.5 in 1963.

The products that Portugal obtained from Guinea-Bissau were almost exclusively agricultural and non-industrial and dominated by peanuts, a crop which had been forced upon the peasants by the colonial authorities, with destructive consequences for the African subsistence economy, but providing the Portuguese with a suitable export commodity. Table 2 shows the composition of Guinean exports until the start of the war of liberation, which changed the picture radically, as we shall see later.

Table 2. *Exports of vegetal origin and exports of peanuts*^a
(In percentage of value of total exports)

	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
Exports vegetal origin	91	83	85	92	91
Exports peanuts	65	63	43	70	75

^a The table is based upon information from *III Plano de Fomento para 1968-1973, Guiné*, pp. 12 ff. More detailed information is given in table 16, p. 50 of this book.

The export statistics for these years contain no manufactured products, except small amounts of vegetal oil made from peanuts and from the oil palm. The most important product besides the peanut is the coconut, the export value of which is about one-fourth or more of the value of the peanuts exported. No other product accounts for more than a few percent of the total value of the exports; the most important among the products not yet mentioned being raw timber, sawed timber, leather, and animal wax. The entire difference between total exports and products of vegetal origin consists of products of animal origin.

A striking feature of Guinea's economic relations with the outside world during the nineteen-fifties and sixties was the stagnation of exports as compared with increasing imports and consequent deterioration of the balance of external trade. This trend indicates the colonial economy's increasing vulnerability and incapacity to develop.

Table 3 has been taken from a PAIGC source, and no information has been available to the author as to the source used by the PAIGC authors. But in table 15 on page 49 of this book, we find a table based upon official Portuguese sources, with equivalent information for the years 1959-1970. The information is not quite identical, in the two tables, for the two overlapping years 1959 and 1960. Note, however, that the PAIGC source reports a smaller deficit for 1960 than does the Portuguese source, while there is a slight difference in the opposite direction for 1959, although the PAIGC source reports higher exports than the Portuguese authorities for this year also. The trend is at any rate the same in both tables. Combined, they show a balance of

Table 3. *Balance of external trade during the nineteen-fifties*^a
(Value in thousand of contos)

	Exports	Imports	Pos. balance	Neg. balance
1951	168.3	188.1		19.8
1952	221.1	254.1		33.0
1953	211.2	188.1	23.1	
1954	217.8	201.3	16.5	
1955	178.2	221.1		42.9
1956	240.9	231.0	9.9	
1957	221.1	267.3		46.2
1958	257.4	287.1		29.7
1959	224.4	283.8		59.4
1960 ^b	145.2	267.3		122.1

^a The table is based upon a table contained in a report presented to the United Nations by the PAIGC in June, 1962. The source used here is *Guiné et Cap-Vert*, p. 30.

^b Estimated figures (by the PAIGC authors).

external trade deteriorating at a more or less steady rate until the beginning of the struggle for national liberation in 1963, after which the trend accelerated sharply.

The goods imported into Guinea in exchange for the products bought from the peasants, at prices completely controlled by the Portuguese exporters, were mostly consumer goods, hardly likely to generate any economic develop-

Table 4. *Composition of imports*^a
(In percentage of value of total imports)

	1961	1962	1963
Living animals and products of animal origin	2.6	2.7	2.9
Products of vegetal origin	3.5	7.2	7.4
Products of foodstuff industries, beverages, tobacco	19.5	18.1	18.7
Mineral products	8.5	9.5	11.2
Products of chemical and related industries	6.5	5.9	5.6
Textile materials and products	20.0	24.8	16.7
Metals and metal products	6.2	6.1	5.6
Machines and instruments, electrical material	6.1	7.8	6.0
Transport material	7.6	7.4	14.7
Arms and munitions	10.9	1.6	3.4
total	91.4	91.1	92.2
(Value of total imports in thousands of contos)	(292.1)	(343.4)	(407.2)

^a The table is based upon information from *III Plano de Fomento para 1968-1973, Guiné*, p. 14. For reasons unknown to this author, the table in the development plan specifying imported products excludes about 8 percent of total imports, which is why the percentages do not add up to 100.

ment. Figures have been available only for the nineteen-sixties, as shown in table 4, above, but the percentage of capital goods imported during earlier years is likely to have been even smaller than it was in 1961.

The almost exclusively agricultural character of the economy of Guinea is revealed also by the official estimates of the composition of the gross domestic product. According to these estimates, industrial activities accounted for only 1.3 percent in 1963 as compared with 1.8 percent of the gross domestic product in 1953. Besides agricultural incomes, commerce, and administrative and social expenses dominate completely, as we can see from the following table:

Table 5. *Contribution of various activities to gross domestic product*^a
(In percentage)

	1953	1962	1963
Agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing	22.7	17.9	18.0
Extractive industries	—	—	—
Manufacturing industries	1.8	1.2	1.3
Construction	1.0	0.9	0.9
Electricity, gas, water	0.5	0.8	0.7
Transportation, distribution, and communications	0.6	0.3	0.4
Commerce, wholesale and retail	29.7	29.3	29.2
Banks, insurance, and real estate transactions	x	x	x
Ownership of private dwellings	0.5	0.6	0.5
Public administration and defence	9.5	11.0	11.1
Services	33.7	38.0	37.9
Gross domestic product at market prices	100.0 ^b	100.0 ^b	100.0 ^b

^a The table has been borrowed in its entirety from *III Plano de Fomento para 1968–1973, Guiné*, p. 7.

^b The absolute value of the gross domestic product in 1953, 1962, and 1963 was reported to be 429,700,000, 703,800,000, and 783,700,000 *escudos*, respectively.

The figures of table 5 concern only the monetary sector of the economy, however, and according to the same source, the non-monetary (subsistence) sector of the economy accounted for close to three-fourths of the national income: 74.6 percent in 1954 as compared with 72.1 percent in 1963,²² although it is hard to see how reliable estimates of such elusive parameters could ever be made with such precision.

From the facts and figures now presented about Guinea-Bissau's economy, during the short mature period of successfully enforced colonial peace, emerges the picture of a traditional agricultural subsistence economy, on top

²² *III Plano de Fomento para 1968–1973, Guiné*, Lisbon, Presidência do Conselho, 1968, p. 7.

of which was superimposed an alien structure aiming at extracting a surplus from the peasants in exchange for a limited amount of certain consumer goods. The small surplus was created by forcing the peasants to grow an export crop — peanuts — of very limited usefulness in their own economy. The prices in this exchange were naturally set by the Portuguese alone, and much of the labour contributed was in fact forced labour in various forms.

This kind of colonial economy had no developmental dynamic of its own, nor did it produce many tangible benefits for the people of Guinea. In order to function at all, it had to rely upon a heavy administrative, judicial, political, and repressive order-maintaining machinery.

The state in colonial Guinea-Bissau

Portuguese efforts to rule Guinea and the islands of Cape Verde have taken different forms at different times through the centuries. Designations have shifted back and forth between colony, overseas province, overseas territory, autonomous region, and even at times complete absence of any special designation distinguishing between the overseas territories and the territory of Portugal itself. The principles of decentralization and centralization have been variously emphasized.

During the first two decades of the rule of Prime Minister António de Oliveira Salazar in Portugal, the overseas territories were officially designated as colonies and the emphasis was more on centralization than on decentralization.²³ In 1951 the Portuguese constitution was revised, the Colonial Act of 1930 was abolished, and so was the term “colony”. Most of the provisions of the Colonial Act were, however, incorporated without substantive change as Chapter VII of the second part of the revised constitution, and the centralizing emphasis on political unity, economic solidarity, and spiritual assimilation between metropolitan Portugal and the “overseas provinces” — as they were now once again called — was at least as strong as ever.

In connection with the 1951 constitutional revision, Marcello Caetano, professor of public law, one of the main authors of the constitution of 1933, minister of the colonies 1944-49, and Prime Minister of Portugal 1968-1974, defined the principles of modern Portuguese administration in Africa in the following terms:

European and overseas Portugal forms a political unity, differentiated administratively in its various parts, because each one must have the organization and the laws that best fit its position, its economy, its population, and its social development.

These differentiated laws and administration correspond to a common spirit of nationality,

²³ Cf. Michel Frochot, *L'Empire Colonial Portugais, Organisation constitutionnelle, politique et administrative*, Lisbon, Editions SPN, 1942.

a political and spiritual community reflected in certain uniform juridical rules, applied in territories with a moral personality and financial autonomy.²⁴

These were the abstract principles according to which Portugal claimed to rule in Africa, before insurrection broke out in Angola in 1961 and in Guinea and Mozambique in 1964. And these were still the principles that Portugal pretended to defend against the movements of national liberation up to the very eve of April 25, 1974.²⁵

The general and abstract principles cited were applied somewhat differently in the smaller territories than in Angola and Mozambique. In the latter territories, legislative councils with elements of citizen representation were, for instance, introduced as early as in 1953. But in Guinea of the nineteen-fifties, the Portuguese governor ruled alone — and it was not until 1963, after the PAIGC had started armed insurrection, that legislative councils were introduced in Guinea and also in Cape Verde.

As our interest in this section is focused upon the colonial system of Guinea at the time when the system was still intact, the functions and the composition of the Legislative Council will not be dealt with in detail here. Suffice it to say that a majority of the eleven elected members of the Legislative Council introduced in 1963 were elected by various authorities and corporations, and that the minority elected by direct suffrage were elected only by the tiny fraction of the population able to meet the literacy and tax payment requirements for being registered as a voter.²⁶ In 1972, the Legislative Council was renamed Legislative Assembly; the total number of elected members was increased to seventeen and the number of members elected by direct suffrage was increased to five.²⁷ At the end of March, 1973, elections for this new Legislative Assembly were held in Guinea-Bissau. Only 7,824 voters had been registered, out of whom 89.4 percent were reported to have voted.²⁸

The chief representative of state power in each Portuguese province, until the new developments of 1974, was the governor (governor-general in the cases of Angola and Mozambique), ordinarily a military officer. He was appointed by the cabinet (*Conselho de Ministros*) in Lisbon upon the nomination of the overseas minister, who was the head of the Ministry of Overseas Affairs (*Ministério do Ultramar*). The powers of the governor were very wide. In fact, in Guinea until 1963, he was not only the chief executive officer of his

²⁴ Quoted from Abshire and Samuels, *op.cit.*, pp. 137 f.

²⁵ Cf. *Statut Politique-Administratif de la Province de Guinée*, decree no. 45 371, Lisbon, November 22, 1963 (official French translation), and *Estatuto Político-Administrativo da Província da Guiné*, decree no. 542/72, Lisbon, December 22, 1972.

²⁶ *Statut Politique-Administratif de la Province de Guinée*, decree no. 542/72, Article 20:3.

²⁷ *Estatuto Político-Administrativo da Província da Guiné*, decree no. 542/72, Article 19.

²⁸ *Marchés tropicaux* (French), April 6, 1973 (*Facts and Reports*, cutting no. 509, Vol. 3, no. 9, April 28, 1973).

province, but also its legislator, because of his wide powers to legislate by decree on so-called native affairs and on all other provincial affairs not covered by general legislation applicable to Portugal and her overseas provinces as a whole or to all of the provinces together. The governor also administered public finances and levied taxes, the latter form of activity subject to the formal approval of the overseas minister in Lisbon. He was, of course, responsible for the maintenance of law and order. After 1963, the basic legislative powers were taken over by the Legislative Council renamed Legislative Assembly in 1972. But due to the composition, indicated above, of the council/assembly, this did not imply any reduction of the governor's powers except in a very formal sense.²⁹

Until 1963, besides the governor, the only governmental organ for all of Guinea was the Government Council (*Conselho de Governo*), a purely consultative organ. The council had seven members, three of which were elected, after 1963, by and among the members of the Legislative Council, the rest being appointed by the authorities.³⁰ In 1972, the Government Council was renamed Consultative Provincial Committee (*Junta Consultativa Provincial*). This new *junta* assisting the governor had no representatives of the Legislative Assembly, but five of its members were elected by various administrative authorities and cultural and professional corporations.³¹

The government of the province of Guinea was thus a government appointed by the central authorities in Lisbon and held responsible by these same authorities. But there were even more fundamental obstacles to popular participation in the government of colonial Guinea than the centralized and authoritarian character of the executive and legislative institutions. In actual fact, most inhabitants of "Portuguese" Guinea were excluded from the enjoyment of their formal rights of citizenship.

Under the Colonial Act of 1930 and the Native Statute of 1954 a legal distinction was made in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea (but not in Cape Verde) between *indígenas* (indigenous inhabitants, natives) and *assimilados*, i.e. persons who had fully assimilated the Portuguese language and civilization. Only the latter were regarded as proper subjects for the unrestricted application of the public and private law pertinent to Portuguese citizens, and consequently only they were allowed to exercise the few "democratic" rights granted the people of Guinea, such as influencing the choice of deputies for the province in the National Assembly in Lisbon or the choice of a minority of

²⁹ Cf. *Loi Organique des Provinces Portugaises d'Outre-Mer*, law no. 5/72, Lisbon, June, 1972 (official French translation).

³⁰ *Statut Politico-Administratif de la Province de Guinée*, decree no. 45 372, Article 37.

³¹ *Estatuto Político-Administrativo da Província da Guiné*, decree no. 542/72, Article 38:2.

the members of the Government Council in Bissau. Less than *four-tenths of one percent* of the African population were classified as *assimilados* during the nineteen-fifties.³² This figure gives the true measure of "democracy" in colonial Guinea.

An official United Nations publication summarizes the implications of the special *indígena* legislation as follows:

An African could change his status and acquire Portuguese citizenship if he fulfilled all the following: (a) he was over 18 years of age; (b) he could speak the Portuguese language correctly; (c) he was engaged in an occupation, trade or craft from which he derived sufficient income to support himself and his family, or had adequate resources for this purpose; (d) he was of good conduct and had attained the level of education and acquired the habits which are a condition for the unrestricted application of the public and private law pertaining to Portuguese citizens; and (e) he was not on record as having refused to perform military service or deserted. Upon fulfilment of these requirements, an African was accorded citizenship as *assimilado*.

As a result, the majority of Africans living in the three territories where the Native Statute applied, were not accorded Portuguese citizenship and were not governed by Portuguese civil law. As a rule, indigenous persons were governed by "the usages and customs pertaining to their respective societies" and were not granted political rights in "non-indigenous institutions".

The special status of an *indígena* carried with it an implication that he was not "civilized". Census figures taken in the Territories under Portuguese administration, as well as other statistics up to 1959, listed the population in two major sections, the *civilizado* (civilized) and *nao-civilizado* (non-civilized) . . .

The *indígena* status also carried with it economic and social implications. The *indígena* status made it an obligation for an African to work and, through the operation of the labour laws, frequently subjected him to forced labour both for public works and private enterprises. as in the forced cultivation of cotton which at one time involved some 500,000 Africans in Mozambique.

Particularly important were the restrictions on land ownership. In general, Africans could not acquire title to land. Africans living in traditional societies were "assured the joint use and enjoyment in the manner prescribed by customary law, of land necessary for their settlement and for the growing of their crops and the grazing of their cattle". Even under the special provisions by which he could acquire individual title, this could be and was in most cases limited to the right of usufruct only.

The system established under the Native Statute of 1954 was officially explained in the Constitution as one designed to protect the Africans by giving formal recognition to, and guaranteeing the African, that he will continue to be governed by usages and customs pertaining to his own society . . .³³

Under international pressure — in particular, the United Nations General Assembly declaration on decolonization: resolution 1514 (XV) of December

³² The figure 0.39 per cent, calculated on the basis of the 1950 census, is given in James Duffy, *Portugal in Africa*, Harmondsworth, Penguin African Library, 1962, p. 10 (in editorial foreword by Ronald Segal).

³³ *A Principle in Torment, II. The United Nations and Portuguese Administered Territories*, New York, United Nations, 1970, pp. 7 f.

14, 1960 — the Portuguese government started to introduce a number of reforms in the African territories. The most important of these was the repeal in 1961 of the Native Statute of 1954.

As a result of the repeal of the Native Statute, the African inhabitants of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea were all, for the first time, formally regarded as Portuguese citizens. All special requirements and procedures for the acquirement of citizen status were abolished. The Portuguese government assured that all Portuguese citizens, regardless of whether they were inhabitants of metropolitan Portugal or of the provinces, would henceforth be subject to the same *public* laws, although indigenous customs and usages were recognized as separate systems of *private* law.

Other seemingly important reforms introduced in 1961 and 1962 concerned the employment of African labour. Special government orders were issued to put an end to the recruitment of workers through administrative authorities. Forced labour was formally abolished, as can be seen from paragraph 3 of the preamble of a decree of April 27, 1962, where the rural labour code is characterized in the following terms:

All distinctions between ethnical or cultural groups have disappeared and in the future all workers, whatever the ethnical or cultural group to which they belong, shall be subject to the same law; compulsory labour in any form is not permitted; no penal sanctions are provided for the non-fulfilment of labour contracts; there is no paternalistic guardianship of workers; the recruitment of workers through the intervention or with facilities granted by authorities is forbidden; there is no intervention of the authorities in the elaboration of labour contracts.³⁴

The quoted paragraph can be regarded as an official recognition, in unequivocal terms, of what conditions had been like up to the publication of the decree. But in practice very little seems to have changed, even after the new rules were introduced. As late as in 1970, the PAIGC claimed that "the conditions of work remain the same".³⁵ The Portuguese authorities, of course, made the opposite claim. It seems probable that some changes did occur, but none with very great practical consequences for the masses of the people.

There were some other reforms too, concerning, for instance, local government and the judiciary organization. According to the Portuguese government, all these reforms were "far-reaching" — and at first glance they may indeed give that impression. But they came late, were superficial, and easy to circumvent in practice. They were regarded with the greatest suspicion by the nationalists, and they did not stop the insurrection from developing in Angola and spreading to Mozambique and Guinea.

The Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration appointed by the General Assembly of the United Nations to investigate the new

³⁴ Quoted from *ibid.*, p. 22.

³⁵ *Guinée et Cap-Vert*, p. 71.

situation was also forced by the facts to conclude that the reforms introduced by the Portuguese government were far from satisfying the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the provinces:

In the Committee's view, the reforms which Portugal claimed to have introduced not only failed to meet the basic aspirations of the peoples of the territories for self-determination, but did not even bring about any significant changes in political, economic, social and educational conditions. Further, despite so-called far-reaching reforms, many of the fundamental laws, as well as the discriminatory status of the indigenous inhabitants, remained unchanged.

The Committee noted that the majority of the territories' inhabitants could not have elected representation in the territorial organs of Government since the right to vote still depended on both a literacy qualification (the ability to read and write Portuguese) and the payment of a minimum tax of 200 *escudos*.

The Committee further reported that all the representatives of the political parties which had been heard, even those whose parties were committed to direct action — for example, those in Angola — were prepared to negotiate with Portugal on the actual transfer of power if Portugal recognized the right of the peoples to self-determination and independence . . .

The Committee found that it was Portugal's continued insistence that there could be no change in the status of the territories and the denial of the political aspirations of the people that had led them to despair of a peaceful solution. Therefore the Committee stressed that for Portugal the most urgent step forward would be to recognize the right of the peoples of the territories to independence.³⁶

The conclusions of the committee were shared by the General Assembly, which incorporated the principal conclusions of the former in a resolution adopted on December 14, 1962. In this resolution the assembly condemned the attitude of Portugal and urged it to take steps

to recognize the right of the territories to self-determination and independence, cease all acts of repression, promulgate an unconditional political amnesty and establish conditions permitting the free functioning of political parties, negotiate with representatives of political parties for the transfer of power to freely elected and representative institutions, and immediately thereafter grant independence to all the territories.³⁷

It is true that the United Nations committee had not been able to visit Portugal's African provinces in order to carry out its investigations. Instead, the committee visited neighbouring countries and tried to collect information from representatives of political organizations and persons who had recently left the territories claimed by the Portuguese. Naturally, the government of Portugal did not accept the committee's findings as objective and impartial. But it is difficult to avoid the general conclusion that the reforms of 1961 and 1962 did not fundamentally change the status of the inhabitants of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea in relation to the authorities imposed upon them. The literacy and tax payment requirements alone disqualified approximately 99 percent of the people of Guinea from influencing the choice of their own

³⁶ *A Principle in Torment*, p. 24.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

representatives, just to mention the most blatant illustration of the hollowness of the reforms.³⁸ And even the utterly few who were allowed to vote could elect only a minority of members in a body which the all-powerful governor was asked merely to consult before deciding on his own. The introduction of the legislative council in 1963 did not substantially change this situation, as the composition of the council ensured the approval of all measures proposed by the governor.

In a document presented to the United Nations Special Committee in June 1962, on behalf of the PAIGC, Amílcar Cabral made a thoroughly documented analysis of the legal framework of Portuguese colonial domination in Guinea and the Cape Verde islands.³⁹ It is not surprising that the conclusions of the committee are close to those arrived at by Cabral, as both follow very logically from the elementary facts of the case. With regard to the repeal of the Native Statute and to certain other measures announced in simultaneous decrees on September 6, 1961 (an administrative reform decree had also been published on June 12), Cabral demonstrates the superficiality of the hastily announced reforms, and he also stresses the important point that the people of Guinea had not been consulted in any way whatsoever on the contents of the new legislation.⁴⁰ It would thus be difficult to claim even juridical legitimacy for these measures, let alone sociological legitimacy.

Administratively, the Portuguese had divided Guinea into twelve subdivisions (nine *concelhos* and three completely rural areas called *circunscrições*). In the *concelhos* some representation was in theory provided for *assimilados*/registered voters, but considering the percentages mentioned above, it is easy to understand how purely theoretical these rules were from the people's point of view.

It is noteworthy too that below the level of the entire province — where the judges were appointed by the Ministry for Overseas Affairs in Lisbon — there was a fusion between administrative and judiciary authorities. In this way, as pointed out by Cabral in his report to the United Nations Committee, the officers of the administrative subdivisions became “absolute masters” over the Africans, considered either as a group or individually.⁴¹

From the point of view of the rural people who make up the vast majority of Guineans — the capital city of Bissau is reported to have had no more than

³⁸ According to the 1950 census, 99.7 percent of the “non-assimilated” population and 45.1 percent of the “assimilated” population were illiterate. *World Survey of Education, II, Primary Education*, Paris, UNESCO, 1958, p. 885. The latter figure indicates that literacy was not an absolute condition for acquiring *assimilado* status.

³⁹ The version of the document used here was prepared for the International Conference for Solidarity with the Peoples of the Portuguese colonies held in Rome, 1970: Amílcar Cabral, *Sur les lois portugaises de domination coloniale*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), 1970.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 29 ff.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

25,000 inhabitants in 1960 — colonial state authority was personified most frequently in their daily lives by the chiefs of the *postos* and the subordinate associates of these chiefs. The *posto* was the lowest administrative subdivision, and the official in charge of it was both chief of police, tax collector, and in other ways responsible for his area to higher authorities. He was aided by Africans of local standing, traditional chiefs and others (called *regedores* on the level of the *canton*, which grouped one or several villages). These African officials were appointed by the Portuguese authorities after local consultation. They helped collect taxes, maintain order in the villages, and in general keep the authorities informed of what went on.

Such were, in rough outline, the general characteristics of state power and authority in colonial Guinea-Bissau. This was the kind of state against which the PAIGC took arms in 1963, after careful preparation and several futile attempts to reach an agreement with the Portuguese by peaceful means. And such were still, in early 1974, the general characteristics of state power and authority in what little remained of colonial Guinea-Bissau — in spite of some modifications and Portuguese claims to build a “better Guinea” (cf. pp. 62 ff). Although the report given by Cabral in 1962 to the United Nations Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration was obviously prepared with a clear political purpose in mind, it would be difficult to raise any objections at all from a scientific point of view against the following summary of the situation made in that report:

What has now been said demonstrates that the constitutional, political, legal, administrative, and judicial situation of “Portuguese” Guinea is very far from being the situation of a “province of Portugal”. It is, on the contrary, that of a non-autonomous country, conquered by force of arms, and dominated and administered by a foreign power. The economic, political, and social life of the people of “Portuguese” Guinea is subjected to laws and norms which differ from those applied to the people of Portugal. The people of Guinea have no political rights, do not take part in the functioning of their own country’s institutions or in the elaboration of the legal texts they are obliged to respect and follow; they do not elect and cannot appoint or dismiss the political and administrative leaders of their country; they do not enjoy either the most elementary of the rights of man or the fundamental liberties. The people of “Portuguese” Guinea are therefore far from having a juridical personality of their own. They are, on the contrary, a colonized people, dependent and profoundly affected in their human dignity. They do not have the power to determine, either directly or indirectly, their own present or future destiny. It is thus an incontestable fact that the people of “Portuguese” Guinea have been deprived of their right to self-determination, a right proclaimed and established, for all peoples, in the Charter of the United Nations.⁴²

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 28 (translated from the French version by the author).

Education, health, and welfare in colonial Guinea-Bissau

We have pointed out, in a different context, that the material net effects of colonialism, from the people's point of view, with great likelihood were more negative in "Portuguese" Guinea than in most other African colonies: even fewer schools, even more illiterates, even less economic development, and health conditions at least as bad as in most other parts of colonized Africa. It is a commonplace to note the poor performance of Portuguese colonialism in these respects. Not even the Portuguese authorities themselves have seriously attempted to deny it.⁴³ Their own figures, which at the very least cannot be suspected of giving an exaggeratedly negative picture, are there to support the charge. While there may have been a few signs pointing in a different direction during the liberal Portuguese republic preceding the military *coup* of 1926, these were soon extinguished by the "New State" of Salazar.

The statistical information available on education and health care is comparatively easy to deal with, although the problems of validity (as well as of reliability) certainly cannot be ignored even here. Knowledge of the officially reported number of schools and pupils or of hospitals and doctors and nurses in a country nevertheless gives us a rough image at least of the size, if not the quality and contents, of the effort made. This of course presumes that the figures can at all be trusted. But the opposite presumption would make any attempt at investigation superfluous — and in the case of Portuguese colonial statistics on education and health, we find it reasonable to accept them, at least as indicators of upper limits. Our discussion of the economy of Guinea earlier in this chapter was based upon a similar presumption with regard to data.

The Portuguese third development plan for Guinea contains information about the situation around 1960 with regard to education and health care. The following table gives the rate of primary school enrollment in Guinea, but it does not tell us anything about the number of teachers.

Table 6. *Primary school enrollment until 1964–65*^a

School years	Enrolled students	Population of school age (7–14 years)	Percentage enrolled
1961–1962	11,967	71,451	16.7
1962–1963	11,842	72,166	16.4
1963–1964	11,891	72,887	16.3
1964–1965	12,173	73,616	16.5

^a The table has been borrowed in its entirety from *III Plano de Fomento para 1968–1973, Guiné*, p. 79.

⁴³ Cf. Chilcote, *op.cit.*, p. 93, for instance, where a critical article in the *Boletim Cultural da Guiné Portuguesa* is cited.

It is quite probable that the enrollment figures of table 6 are exaggerated, as they belong to the group of very sudden changes appearing after the United Nations General Assembly had adopted its resolution on decolonization in December 1960. But other official sources give even higher estimates of the number of students enrolled in primary schools: 20,579 students in the school year 1961–62, the latest year for which this particular source contains information.⁴⁴

One explanation of the discrepancy between these two official sources may be that the figures which UNESCO received from the Portuguese authorities refer to the total number of children in both public schools and in private missionary schools, whereas the figures of the development plan possibly refer only to the public state schools.⁴⁵ Until 1961, when the Native Statute was abolished, the state schools were not even open to “native” children, who were therefore restricted to the private missionary schools. According to a PAIGC source there were 43 such private primary schools in 1962 with altogether only 800 students.⁴⁶ An official version of the amount of primary education offered during the nineteen-fifties is given in the following table:

Table 7. *Primary education in the nineteen-fifties*^a

Type of institution	School year	Number of institutions	Number of teachers	Number of students
All kinds	1953	60 ^b	—	3,150 ^b
”	1954	122	—	6,811
”	1955	145	305	9,573
”	1956	136	169	10,178
”	1957	161	181	11,142
Primary and rural mission schools, aided private	1957	150	150	10,401
Public primary schools	1957	11	31	741

^a The table is based upon information from *World Survey of Education, III, secondary education*, Paris, UNESCO, 1961, p. 995.

^b Not including rural mission schools.

The kind of statistics now presented obviously calls for extreme caution with regard to conclusions. But regardless of the exact figures, it is easy to understand how limited the educational possibilities had been at least until 1961

⁴⁴ *World Survey of Education, IV, Higher Education*, Paris, UNESCO, 1961, p. 962. An almost identical figure (20,482 students in 1961) is found in *United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1966*, New York, United Nations, 1967, table 142.

⁴⁵ But this is only a reasonable guess. The text of the development plan does not enlighten us.

⁴⁶ *Guinée et Cap-Vert*, p. 64.

for the over 99 percent of the children of Guinea whose parents were not Portuguese or *assimilados*. As for the situation after 1961, it is curious that the official figures remained stationary until 1965 (table 6). For the second half of the nineteen-sixties, when the PAIGC was already well established in large parts of the country, the statistical yearbook published in 1971 only lists the number of teachers and schools, but not the number of students enrolled in Guinea.⁴⁷ More recent statistics tell us, however, that there were 26,172 primary school students in 1969–70 and as many as 31,952 in 1970–71.⁴⁸

The official Portuguese information is somewhat confusing also with regard to secondary education. The development plan conveys the impression that the one secondary school (*liceu*) open in Bissau in 1958 was the first of its kind in the country.⁴⁹ This is also the impression given by the PAIGC source quoted above.⁵⁰ But according to the statistics presented to UNESCO by the Portuguese statistical services, there were 46 *liceu* students and 67 vocational school students as early as in 1950.⁵¹ According to the same source, the combined number of secondary and vocational students had increased to 1,423 by 1961–62.

But the development plan makes no mention of any secondary education before the opening of the *liceu* Honório Berreto in 1958. Enrollment figures are available from 1959–60 until 1965–66:

Table 8. *Secondary education until 1965–66*^a

School year	Enrolled students	Students actually attending	Teachers
1959–1960	283	200	8
1960–1961	293	182	9
1961–1962	272	196	10
1962–1963	272	143	10
1963–1964	343	203	11
1964–1965	345	157	14
1965–1966	391	x	10

^a The table is based upon information from *III Plano de Fomento para 1968–1973, Guiné*, p. 79.

The difference between the number of students enrolled and the number of students actually attending the Honório Barreto secondary school is notable, especially in 1965–66, when courses seem to have been cancelled entirely (or attendance unknown: the “x” is ambiguous).

⁴⁷ *Anuário Estatístico, Vol. II, Províncias Ultramarinas, 1969*, p. 55.

⁴⁸ *Síntese Monográfica da Guiné*, Lisbon, Edição da Agência-Geral do Ultramar, 1972, p. 49.

⁴⁹ *III Plano de Fomento para 1968–1973, Guiné*, p. 79.

⁵⁰ *Guinée et Cap-Vert*, p. 65.

⁵¹ *World Survey of Education, I, Handbook of Educational Organization and Statistics*, Paris, UNESCO, 1965, p. 543. Also *Síntese Monográfica da Guiné*, p. 47, mentions an earlier *instituto liceal* created in 1949.

As far as vocational training is concerned, the development plan gives the following information:⁵²

One vocational school was started in 1959. In 1963–64 it had 367 students enrolled, and in 1965–66 the number had increased to 602.

In 1959, training was also begun for nurses at the hospital of Bissau: in the period 1959–64, 29 nurses, 44 assistant nurses, and 57 midwives were trained.

Courses in mechanics and electricity began to be offered by the public transport company in 1959. During the first year 19 students were enrolled in this vocational training, but in 1965–66 the number was down to 13.

The only information on educational expenditure during the period under consideration is found in UNESCO's World Survey of Education. According to the Portuguese statisticians upon whom the survey relies, total expenditure in 1950 (including subsidies to mission schools) was 652,000 escudos.⁵³ In 1954 the figure had increased to 818,000 escudos,⁵⁴ and in 1960 it was up to 5,655,000 escudos.⁵⁵ But this latter figure includes 2,150,000 escudos spent on capital investments.

If we accept the official 1960 census figure of 521,336 inhabitants and include capital investments in school expenditure — two conditions tending to overestimate per capita spending — we still arrive at a per capita spending on education in 1960 that was only slightly higher than 10 escudos. This is the equivalent of 0.37 U.S. dollars.⁵⁶ The figure speaks for itself.

We have now tried to give as well documented a picture as possible of what the Portuguese state was offering the children and youth of Guinea in the way of education, before the struggle for national liberation was begun by the PAIGC. We have not discussed the contents or the quality of the education offered, only its quantity. But for the purpose of demonstrating the utter emptiness of Portuguese claims to have performed a great "civilizing mission" in Guinea, this is more than sufficient. Naturally, the only thing we can be absolutely sure of is that the figures presented do not underestimate the Portuguese effort. Accepting the figures as indications of upper limits, it is important to note that hardly anything was done until the end of the nineteen-fifties, with the exception of the private missionary schools. But even after educational expenditure had increased several times during that decade, no more than thirty-five U.S. cents were spent and invested per capita in 1960.

⁵² *III Plano de Fomento para 1968–1973, Guiné*, pp. 79 ff.

⁵³ *World Survey of Education, I, Handbook of Educational Organization and Statistics*, p. 543.

⁵⁴ *World Survey of Education, II, Primary Education*, p. 886.

⁵⁵ *World Survey of Education, IV, Higher Education*, p. 961.

⁵⁶ The difference of one U.S. cent between this figure and the figure given in table 11 is caused by the difference between the population estimate of the Portuguese census of 1960 (used here) and the United Nations estimate used in our comparative tables (tables 10–14).

No wonder then that less than four-tenths of one single percent of the people had been able, in 1950, to meet the condition of literacy in Portuguese required for *assimilado* status.

Health conditions among Africans were notoriously bad in colonial tropical Africa, not only in the Portuguese colonies. As we shall soon see, available information — whatever its reliability may be — about infant mortality and number of physicians per thousand inhabitants does not support the charge that Guinea-Bissau in the nineteen-sixties was on the average worse off than other West African countries. As the situation in Guinea was very bad, however, this probably only means that it was very bad in neighboring countries too. This is how the official development plan describes the health situation of Guinea-Bissau in 1960, without giving any quantitative indications:

Around 1960, the most important causes of death were, in decreasing order, the following: malaria, diseases of the digestive system and gastritis (inflammations of the stomach), enteritis (inflammations of the intestines), and colitis, tuberculosis, and tetanus.

Even when the people have access to the food-items necessary for a balanced diet, traditional customs and lack of foresight or deficient storage arrangements cause nutritional imbalances with the most serious consequences, for instance with regard to sanitation, low work productivity, and low resistance against infectious diseases.

Among children, diseases resulting from deficient nutrition are the most frequent. They constitute the main cause of infant mortality.⁵⁷

The second report on the world health situation published by the World Health Organization lists the causes of death and the frequency of various diseases in Guinea.⁵⁸ The wording of the report is such that we must conclude that it is based upon the same source as the paragraph just quoted from the development plan. The difference is that the WHO report contains the quantitative indications missing in the development plan. From these we learn that the total number of registered deaths, upon which the statement in the development plan most probably is based, was as low as 1,286. This is obviously only a minor portion of the total number of deaths in Guinea during one year, and so we are again reminded of the fragility of the type of information we are dealing with here.

The WHO report also gives some figures on the reported number of cases of various diseases. We quote them here in order to demonstrate the concordance with the information provided by the development plan:

malaria (66310) cases; diseases of the digestive system, other than gastritis, duodenitis, enteritis and colitis (16804); gastritis, duodenitis, enteritis and colitis (9899); anaemias (3970);

⁵⁷ *III Plano de Fomento para 1968–1973, Guiné*, p. 90 (translated by the author).

⁵⁸ *Official Records of the WHO, No. 122. Second Report on the World Health Situation 1957–1960*, Geneva, WHO, 1963, p. 82.

leprosy (2712); measles (2166); yaws (2064); trachoma (1376); tuberculosis, all forms (1243); and avitaminosis and other metabolic diseases (1168). Altogether 18502 accidents were reported in 1960.⁵⁹

On the following page, the report also states that the "main public health problems are tuberculosis, trachoma, malaria, onchocerciasis, ancylostomiasis, bilharziasis and filariasis".⁶⁰

Also with regard to the number of hospitals and other health establishments, the Portuguese officials who provided the WHO with information seem to have relied upon the same primary sources as those used by the authors of the development plan, although the material is presented in slightly differing ways in the two sources. Table 9, which gives information for 1960 by "health delegation", is taken from the development plan:

Table 9. *Health establishments (estabelecimentos de saúde) in 1960*^a

Kind of establishment	Bafatá	Bijagós	Bissau	Bolama	Catió	Farim	Mansoa	Nova Lamego	S. Domingos	Teixeira Pinto	Total
Hospitals:											
Central			1								1
Regional	1			1						1	3
Rural ^b		1				1	1	1	1	1	6
Rural maternity posts	2			1	2	2	1	3		6	17
Maternal and child health centre			1								1
Leprosy aid centre			1								1
Open infirmary for tuberculosis			1								1
Dispensary for mentally ill			1								1
Sanitary posts	3	6	4	4	6	5	5	8	4	6	51

^a The table has been borrowed in its entirety from *III Plano de Fomento para 1968-1973, Guiné*, p. 91.

^b These "rural hospitals" are called "health centres" in the WHO report (p. 83).

The WHO report adds that "284,480 attendances were registered at these units in 1960".⁶¹

The following information about "health service personnel and training facilities" is also given by the WHO report:

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

In 1960 the health personnel included 25 doctors, 3 pharmacists, 26 nurses, 73 auxiliary nurses, 1 midwife and 38 auxiliary midwives. The present doctor/population ratio is 1 to 22800.⁶² Medical training is given at universities in Portugal. The training school in Bissau offers a two-year course for nurses and a two-year course for auxiliary nurses and midwives. In 1960, 3 nurses, 3 auxiliary nurses and 13 auxiliary midwives qualified.⁶³

Finally, it is interesting to note that in financial terms the Portuguese effort in the field of health and sanitation was about three times greater than the educational effort. According to the WHO report, 16,664,846 escudos were devoted to health services in 1959.⁶⁴ Accepting the official 1960 population figure, this means 32 escudos per capita, or just over 1 (one) U.S. dollar. Although this must be regarded as extremely modest by any standard, it still gives some rough credibility to the impression imparted by the comparative statistical tables presented below, that colonial Guinea-Bissau was even worse off with regard to education than with regard to health and sanitation in comparison with other colonized countries of West Africa.

In order to support our previous statements about the backwardness of colonial Guinea-Bissau, even compared with other colonial territories, some *comparative data* enabling us to place Guinea in its West African context will now be given. This is done with great hesitation, as the data are not only approximate, but also of dubious reliability and uncontrollable validity. But they are at least official, for we have used the simple procedure of selecting the most relevant among the few tables included in the United Nations Statistical Yearbook that contain information on "Portuguese Guinea". These data are thus no better and hopefully no worse than other similar data used in thousands and thousands of research reports, articles, and books on the problems of underdevelopment. Let us only hope that they are good enough for the sort of rough comparisons we are interested in here.

Our first comparative table concerns primary and secondary education. In it we have related the number of students enrolled in schools in different countries, according to the statistics accepted by the authors of the U.N. Statistical Yearbook, to the total population figures given in the same source. This is of course not the same as "percentage enrolled of population in school age", but for comparative purposes our simple measure is more reliable, considering that the statistics are so approximate that more complicated estimates probably would lead to less rather than to greater clarity. Included in the comparison are the two countries immediately adjacent to Guinea-Bissau — Senegal and the Republic of Guinea — as well as a number of other sub-

⁶² Cf. table 13, p. 38.

⁶³ *Official Records of the WHO, No. 122...*, p. 82.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

Saharan West African countries previously colonized by Britain or France (with Liberia included, because of geographical and historical proximity, although never a colony in the formal sense; with Mali included as a border case; and Saharan Mauritania because of geographical proximity). The Cape Verde islands have been included for different but obvious reasons. An attempt has been made to find statistics referring to the situation around 1960. It must be remembered that by that time, African governments had already started to improve the situations inherited from the colonial regimes. These efforts are of course reflected in some of the statistics included in the following tables.

Judging from table 10, school enrollment in Guinea-Bissau around 1960

Table 10. *Primary and secondary education in selected countries in relation to total population*^a

(Figures within brackets refer to year of estimate)

	Number of inhabitants	Primary enrollment total	%	"Secondary enrollment" ^b	
				total	%
Guinea-Bissau	544,184(60) ^c	20,482(61)	3.8	1,520(61)	0.3
Cape Verde islands ^d	201,549(60)	9,383(60)	4.7	1,670(60)	0.8
Gambia	315,999(63)	7,663(61)	2.4	2,141(61)	0.7
Ghana	6,726,815(60)	483,425(59)	7.2	178,581(59)	2.7
Guinea (Republic)	2,570,219(55)	116,351(61)	4.5	13,065(61)	0.5
Ivory Coast	3,100,000(58)	265,937(61)	8.6	13,334(61)	0.4
Liberia	1,010,000(62)	63,989(60)	6.3	3,000(60)	0.3
Mali	4,100,000(60)	64,902(60)	1.5	4,097(60)	0.4
Mauritania	1,050,000(65)	15,000(61)	1.4	909(61)	0.1
Senegal	3,109,840(61)	126,000(61)	4.0	11,955(60)	0.3
Sierra Leone	2,183,000(63)	91,895(61)	4.2	10,094(61)	0.5
Upper Volta	4,300,000(61)	73,477(61)	1.7	3,393(61)	0.1

^a The table is based upon *United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1963*, New York 1963, tables 2 and 184.

^b As the information on secondary education, technical education, and teacher-training in Guinea-Bissau is combined into one measure in the original U.N. table, we have combined them here for the other countries too, although this was not done in the original table. Thus the term "secondary enrollment" in reality refers both to secondary education, technical education, and teacher-training, although ordinary secondary education dominates quantitatively.

^c This figure is slightly higher than the official Portuguese figure of 521,336 inhabitants in 1960 (cf. p. 9).

^d According to the third development plan for Cape Verde, there were 6,167 students enrolled in primary schools on the islands in 1953 and 18,150 in 1964. The number of secondary students, according to this source, was 635 in 1963 and 1,076 in 1964, while the number of students in technical schools was 193 in 1957 and 737 in 1964. *III Plano de Fomento para 1968-1973, Cabo Verde*, Lisboa, Presidência do Conselho, 1968, pp. 68 ff.

was lower than in the two immediately adjacent countries, and also lower than in the other coastal countries of West Africa included in the table (Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Ghana), with the exception of Gambia. But the enrollment figures of Senegal are almost as low as those of Guinea-Bissau, while those of the countries of the interior (Mali, Upper Volta) and of the desert country Mauritania are even lower. Although these figures definitely place Guinea-Bissau in the lower half of the table, they still convey the impression that the British and the French, in some of their colonies, had paid even less attention to education than the Portuguese had done in Guinea.

If we use the official figures of the Portuguese development plan for Guinea instead of the figures reported to the U.N. statisticians, the comparison comes out more disadvantageously for Guinea-Bissau. The percentages then become 2.2 percent of the total population enrolled in primary schools and 0.1 in secondary, technical, and teacher-training schools (cf. pp. 27 ff.). But even in this case the figures of Upper Volta, Mali, and Mauritania are lower than those of Guinea-Bissau with regard to primary education, while those of Upper Volta and Mauritania are equally low, but not lower, with regard to secondary education.

The school enrollment figures do not allow us to go any further. We can only conclude that they show Guinea-Bissau to have been among the West African countries with the lowest school enrollment percentages around 1960. Those readers who had possibly expected the statistics to "prove" beyond doubt that the educational situation at that time was considerably worse in Guinea-Bissau than in *all* other West African countries will have to ask themselves whether they have more faith in statistics produced by the British, French, or independent African governments than they have in statistics produced by the Portuguese government. The answer to that question will decide whether they can maintain their hypothesis or not.

Another statistical measure, with some validity, of a country's educational effort, is expenditure per capita for educational purposes. In order to supplement the uncertain information provided by table 10, we have used UNESCO's figures on educational expenditure to calculate per capita spending in the countries included in the table. The per capita figures would naturally have been more realistic, had it been possible to calculate them only for the population of school age around 1960. But for comparative purposes our estimates in table 11 are equally valid and more reliable. Note that the figures for some countries include spending on higher education, which does not exist in Guinea-Bissau, although a few Guineans study at universities in Portugal.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ *Síntese Monográfica da Guiné*, p. 47, mentions that there were 54 Guinean scholarship holders studying in metropolitan Portugal during the academic year 1971-72.

Table 11. *Educational expenditure per capita in selected countries*^a
(Figures within brackets refer to year of estimate)

	Educational expenditure per capita, recalculated in terms of U.S. dollars
Guinea-Bissau	0.36(60)
Cape Verde islands	1.74(60)
Gambia	3.08(61)
Ghana	7.28(61)
Guinea (Republic)	2.84(61)
Ivory Coast	3.20(60)
Liberia	1.93(61)
Mali	1.73(61)
Mauritania	3.60(61)
Senegal	no inf.
Sierra Leone	3.61(61)
Upper Volta	0.80(60)

^a The information on size of population is the same as in table 10 above. The information on educational expenditure has been taken from the articles on the individual countries found in *World Survey of Education, IV, Higher Education*, Paris, UNESCO, 1961.

It is probably easier to give an exact estimate of the amount of money set aside for education in a national budget than it is to count the number of children attending school in the bush. It is quite possible, therefore, that table 11 is more reliable than table 10, although nothing can be said with certainty about this. Be that as it may — table 11 is at least totally unequivocal with regard to the position of Guinea-Bissau. The second country from the bottom (Upper Volta) spent more than twice as much on education per capita in 1960 as was spent in Guinea-Bissau, judging from the table, and the neighbouring Republic of Guinea, while still modest in relation to some other countries, spent eight times as much.

Tables 10 and 11 together thus support our previous statements about the extremely limited educational achievements of Portuguese colonialism in Guinea, not only in comparison with official “civilizing” pretensions, but also in comparison with educational achievements in most other colonized countries, however poor the average record of the colonial powers in those other countries has been.

Included in our third comparative table are three indicators that can be assumed to reflect vaguely both “cultural modernization” and general level of modern consumption (number of newspapers, cinemas, and radios) and one indicator of the presence of modern techniques in households, production, and transportation (energy consumption). The average position of Guinea-Bissau in this table resembles its position in table 10 on school enrollment. Consequently, the types of conclusions table 12 allows us to draw resemble those that were drawn from table 10.

Table 12. *Number of daily newspaper copies printed per thousand inhabitants, absolute number of cinemas, number of radio receivers or licenses per thousand inhabitants, and energy consumption per capita expressed in kilograms of coal equivalent, in selected countries*^a

(Figures within brackets refer to year of estimate)

	Newspaper copies per 1,000 inh.	Number of cinemas	Radios per 1,000 inh.	En. cons. 1962 per cap. in kgs of coal equiv.
Guinea-Bissau	2.0(60)	1(60)	3.3(60)	40
Cape Verde islands	no inf.	8(60)	8.8(60)	100
Gambia	5.0(60)	no inf.	6.4(60)	39
Ghana	32.0(61)	112(61) ^b	16.1(59)	97
Guinea (Republic)	0.2(59)	16(59)	15.6(60)	99
Ivory Coast	3.0(61)	17(59)	17.9(60)	83
Liberia	1.5(62)	4(60)	100.0(60)	123
Mali	0.2(60)	17(60)	1.9(60)	16
Mauritania	no inf.	1(59)	11.4(60)	25
Senegal	6.0(60)	51(59) ^c	41.7(60)	116
Sierra Leone	7.0(62)	9(62)	4.2(60)	72
Upper Volta	0.1(57)	5(59)	0.8(59)	9

^a The information on newspapers, cinemas, and radios is taken from *United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1963*, New York 1964, tables 188, 190, and 191 respectively. The latter table only gives absolute numbers but has been recalculated here for comparability. The information on energy consumption is taken from *United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1966*, New York 1967, table 142.

^b 41 of these cinemas were mobile.

^c This figure includes 16 mm cinemas.

Our fourth comparative table is an attempt to present quantitative indicators of the health situation in Guinea-Bissau around 1960 as compared with the other countries included in our tables. Even considering that the only vital statistics for Guinea-Bissau found in the United Nations statistical series refer to the second half of the nineteen-sixties, these figures alone do not allow the conclusion that Guinea-Bissau at the time was worse off than the other countries. It is true that there is only one country in the table where the expectation of life is estimated to be lower than in Guinea-Bissau (the present Republic of Guinea during the last years of the colonial regime). But the reported infant mortality rate of Guinea-Bissau is lower than all the others, and the density of physicians is above average — judging from the figures of table 13.

The only conclusion table 13 permits us to draw with regard to Guinea-Bissau as compared with the other countries of the table is the following: available comparative statistical data do not indicate that the health situation in colonial Guinea-Bissau was much different from the situation in most other

Table 13. *Infant mortality rate per thousand, expectation of life at birth, and number of inhabitants per physician in selected countries*^a
(Figures within brackets refer to year of estimate)

	Infant mortality rate	Life expectation	Inhabitants per physician
Guinea-Bissau	80.2(66)	33.5(65-70)	20,000(62)
Cape Verde islands	91.7(68)	no inf.	14,000(61)
Gambia	no inf.	41.0(65-70)	16,000(62)
Ghana	156(60)	46.0(65-70)	21,000(60)
Guinea (Republic)	216(55)	27.0(57-58)	19,000(61)
Ivory Coast	138(57-58)	41.0(65-70)	19,000(64) ^b
Liberia	140-145(69)	37.4(62)	16,000(61)
Mali	120(60-61)	37.2(65-70)	39,000(62)
Mauritania	187(64-65)	41.0(65-70)	26,000(62)
Senegal	92.9(60-61)	41.0(65-70)	21,000(61)
Sierra Leone	no inf.	41.0(65-70)	22,000(62)
Upper Volta	182(60-61)	46.0(65-70)	76,000(61)

^a The information on infant mortality and life expectation has been taken from *United Nations Demographic Yearbook 1970*, New York 1971, table 3. The information on inhabitants per physician has been taken from *United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1964*, New York 1965, table 184 (one exception to this is mentioned in the following note).

^b The 1964 edition offered no information here, so *United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1965*, New York 1966, table 193, was used instead.

West African countries. This is perhaps not very surprising. For, as already suggested, the general situation of colonial Africa with regard to health and health care was so bad that it would have been quite difficult for any one country to be considerably worse off than the average of the others.

But in order to pursue the investigation a little further, we tried to find data permitting us to calculate also the amount of money annually spent per capita on health and health care in the countries included in our comparative tables. Unfortunately such data were available only for a few of the countries, but a clear tendency still emerges, as is seen from table 14.

In the same way as with regard to educational expenditure, Guinea-Bissau occupies a very definite bottom position also with regard to health expenditure, in spite of a much better position when other kinds of statistical data are used. One possible explanation has already been suggested: that information on government expenditure is more reliable than the other kinds of statistical information we have been using. But in the case of health expenditure, the small number of countries included in the comparison still makes it difficult to draw any very definite conclusions.

All that can be said with certainty is that available information is somewhat contradictory, and that the general situation with regard to health and health

Table 14. *Health expenditure per capita in selected countries*^a
(Figures within brackets refer to year of estimate)

	Health expenditure per capita, recalculated in terms of U.S. dollars
Guinea-Bissau	1.1(59)
Liberia	1.6(60)
Mali	17.0(66/67)
Mauritania	4.2(59)
Sierra Leone	19.1(60)
Upper Volta	7.6(67)

^a The information on size of population is the same as in table 10 above. The information on health expenditure has been taken from the articles on the individual countries found in the *Second Report* and the *Fourth Report* (Mali and Upper Volta) on the *World Health Situation*, Geneva, WHO, 1963 and 1971, respectively.

care was very poor in Guinea-Bissau and a number of other West African countries around 1960. We may also venture the proposition, in spite of table 13, but with the weak support of table 14, that the situation *possibly* was worse in Guinea-Bissau than in the other countries. But this does not follow conclusively from the data presented.

In this section of the present chapter we have attempted to document, in quantitative terms, the most important cultural and socio-economic achievements of the Portuguese colonial government in Guinea during the period immediately preceding the open struggle for national liberation begun in the nineteen-sixties. Most of the statistical data presented refer to education and health, but we have also been able to include a few indicators of general modernization and economic development.

It seems safe to conclude that the record of Portuguese colonialism with regard to cultural and socio-economic development in Guinea-Bissau was poor — by any standard.

Although statistical figures of apparent exactness but doubtful reliability may not be the best way of communicating to the reader the sense of the situation as being absolutely intolerable that drove the founders of the PAIGC to organize the people for national liberation, and that also drove the people to listen to the party's message, we still think that the kind of documentation now presented adds to the objectivity of an attempt at scientific analysis. After all necessary reservations have been made about the fragility and weakness of the data, the picture is still somewhat clearer after they have been presented than it was before. Some important reasons for the illegitimacy of the colonial system have been concretized.

Social structure and social change in colonial Guinea-Bissau

In spite of the relative stagnation of Guinea under Portuguese colonial rule, it would certainly be incorrect to leave the reader with the impression that no social change at all occurred until the nineteen-sixties. The colonial economy, the imposed political and administrative structures, the introduction of some social services, however limited, a beginning process of urbanization, migration to neighbouring countries, close contacts with the more cosmopolitan Cape Verdeans — these are the most important among a number of factors that left their imprint upon the social structure of modern Guinea, even before the struggle for national liberation under PAIGC leadership began.

An important point of departure for the men who founded the PAIGC was in fact their attempt to analyze the social structure of their country in order to define the positions of the various classes, strata, and groups in relation to the goals of national liberation and development. Who lost most and who benefitted through the colonial system? The results of this analysis have been presented by Amílcar Cabral — and one important conclusion we may draw from his presentation is that although colonial Guinea was very predominantly rural, it was not exclusively so, nor was it the rural strata who initiated the process of national liberation.⁶⁶

In spite of the very limited development and modernization that had taken place, Cabral is able to distinguish several important strata and groups in the towns. These groups and strata are important, not because of their numerical strength, which is insignificant in comparison with the overwhelming numerical dominance of the rural population, but because of their exposed positions in the complex play of social forces resulting from the confrontation between African society and the externally imposed colonial system.

It is extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to make a reliable and valid estimate of the degree of "urbanization" in Guinea-Bissau of the nineteen-fifties. The provisional official Portuguese census figure for 1960 is, as already mentioned, 521,336 inhabitants. It probably somewhat underestimates the population at the time. But let us for a moment accept the official figure and compare it with the number of inhabitants of Bissau and the other urban centers of the country:

The *concelhos* of Bafatá, Cacheu and Gabu are the most densely settled, but everywhere population is basically rural. Outside the city of Bissau with close to 25,000 residents, only Bafatá and Bolama have a population even slightly more than 3,000.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ "Brief Analysis of the Social Structure in Guinea", text presented to a seminar held in the Frantz Fanon Centre in Treviglio, Milan, from May 1 to 3, 1964, pp. 46–61 in Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea. An African People's Struggle*. Correia da Cruz, *op.cit.*, also emphasizes the important role of the urban population in initiating "subversion" and then spreading it to the countryside.

⁶⁷ Abshire and Samuels, *op.cit.*, pp. 18 ff.

This remark, which obviously is very approximate, refers to the situation around 1960. In order to at least avoid underestimates, let us assume then that there were about 50,000 "urban" residents in Guinea-Bissau at the time. This gives us a rate of "urbanization" lower than ten percent, at a generous count. In relation to this estimate, we also have to remember the extremely fluid line of distinction between most of these urban residents and their relatives in the countryside. This fact works two ways: it can be interpreted as signifying both that urban influences extend far beyond the number of people actually living in the towns and that the majority of the town-dwellers are in fact still more rural than urban with regard to culture, attitudes, etc.

Keeping all this in mind, let us now see how Amílcar Cabral and his comrades analyzed the social situation on the eve of the struggle for national liberation.

In the towns, Cabral writes, the first distinction to be made is that between *Europeans and Africans, a distinction that is superfluous in the countryside*, as in Guinea there are no rurally settled Europeans:

The Europeans can easily be classified as they retain in Guinea the social stratification of Portugal (obviously depending on the function they exercise in Guinea). In the first place, there are the high officials and the managers of the enterprises who form a stratum with practically no contact with the other European strata. After that there are the medium officials, the small European traders, the people employed in commerce and the members of the liberal professions. After that come the workers, who are mainly skilled workers.⁶⁸

Let us add here, although Cabral's discussion does not include any quantitative estimates, that this entire group of Europeans did not consist of more than a few thousand people.

Among the Africans (among whom Cabral includes also the Cape Verdeans)...

... we find the higher officials, the middle officials and the members of the liberal professions forming a group; then come the petty officials, those employed in commerce with a contract, who are to be distinguished from those employed in commerce without a contract, who can be fired at any moment. The small farm owners also fall into this group; by assimilation we call all these members of the African petty bourgeoisie...⁶⁹

Next come various kinds of wage-earners, all of whom Cabral is careful not to combine into what might be called a proletariat or working class, as they lack the homogeneous consciousness which these two terms imply:

among these there are certain important sub-groups such as the dockworkers, the people employed on the boats carrying goods and agricultural produce; there are also the domestic servants who are mostly men in Guinea; there are the people working in repair shops and

⁶⁸ Cabral, "Brief Analysis..." in *Revolution in Guinea*, pp. 47 f.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

small factories and there are also the people who work in shops as porters and suchlike — these all come under the heading of wage-earners.⁷⁰

Finally Cabral distinguishes what he calls the *déclassés*, i.e. people who are marginal in relation to the social structure. In this group of uprooted individuals there are two sub-groups:

the first sub-group is easy to identify — it is what would be called the lumpenproletariat if there was a real proletariat: it consists of really *déclassé* people, such as beggars, prostitutes and so on. The other group is not really made up of *déclassé* people, but we have not yet found an exact term for it; it is a group to which we have paid a lot of attention, and it has proved to be extremely important in the national liberation struggle. It is mostly made up of young people who are connected to petty bourgeois or workers' families, who have recently arrived from the rural areas and generally do not work; they thus have close relations with the rural areas, as well as with the towns (and even with the Europeans). They sometimes live off one kind of work or another, but they generally live at the expense of their families. Here I should just like to point out a difference between Europe and Africa; in Africa there is a tradition which requires that, for example, if I have an uncle living in the town, I can come and live in his house without working and he will feed me and house me. This creates a certain stratum of people who experience urban life and who can, as we shall see, play a very important role.⁷¹

As far as the rural people, as well as most of the urban residents, are concerned, the ethnical structure is the one described above in the part of this chapter devoted to the people of Guinea. The distinctive social and cultural characteristics of the various ethnic groups result in distinctively different effects of the confrontation with the colonial power. The hierarchically organized Fula people have been more easily assimilated than the others to the colonial system, through the chiefs and their entourages. This was particularly easy to achieve with the Fulas of present-day Guinea-Bissau . . .

. . . as in Guinea the Fulas were already conquerors (the Portuguese allied themselves with the Fulas in order to dominate Guinea at the beginning of the conquest). Thus the chiefs (and their authority as chiefs) are very closely tied to the Portuguese authorities.⁷²

Considering the goals of national liberation and development, it is clear that the group in Guinea with the greatest long-run interest in the struggle initiated by the PAIGC is the peasantry as a whole, whose normal development, regardless of ethnical group, is blocked by the colonial structure of exploitation to which it is tied. But, as Cabral points out, "the question is not simply one of objective interest".⁷³

Given the fact of their social organization, the Fula peasants have a strong tendency to follow their chiefs, and as long as these collaborate with the

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

colonial administration, it is naturally difficult for the organizers of national liberation to sway the population. Among the Balantes and other groups without any defined forms of state organization and with strong traditions of resistance to the Portuguese, the situation encountered by the PAIGC was very different. "This is the group that we found most ready to accept the idea of national liberation."⁷⁴

A general point that Cabral makes about the peasantry of colonial Guinea is that it does not constitute a revolutionary force, "which may seem strange, particularly as we have based the whole of our armed liberation struggle on the peasantry".⁷⁵ But according to Cabral a distinction should be made between "a physical force" and "a revolutionary force", which here meant that the peasants' support for the revolutionary struggle had to be won through conscious and diligent work of political mobilization.

Among the town-dwellers of Guinea, Cabral's analysis distinguishes almost as many ways of relating to the colonial power and to the movement of national liberation as we find groups and strata:

The Europeans are, in general, hostile to the idea of national liberation; they are the human instruments of the colonial state in our country and they therefore reject a priori any idea of national liberation there. It has to be said that the Europeans most bitterly opposed to the idea of national liberation are the workers, while we have sometimes found considerable sympathy for our struggle among certain members of the European petty bourgeoisie.⁷⁶

The African petty bourgeoisie can be divided into three sub-groups:

First, there is the petty bourgeoisie which is heavily committed, and compromised with colonialism: this includes most of the higher officials and some members of the liberal professions. Second, there is the group which we perhaps incorrectly call the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie: this is the part of the petty bourgeoisie which is nationalist and which was the source of the idea of the national liberation in Guinea. In between lies the part of the petty bourgeoisie which has never been able to make up its mind... Next come the wage-earners... here, too, there is a majority committed to the struggle, but, again many members of this group were not easy to mobilise — wage-earners who had an extremely petty bourgeois mentality and whose only aim was to defend the little they had already acquired.⁷⁷

Finally come the two groups of urban *déclassés*:

The really *déclassé* people, the permanent layabouts, the prostitutes and so on have been a great help to the Portuguese police in giving them information; this group has been outrightly against our struggle, perhaps unconsciously so, but nonetheless against our struggle. On the other hand, the particular group I mentioned earlier, for which we have not yet found any precise classification (the group of mainly young people recently arrived from the rural areas

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 50 f.

with contacts in both the urban and the rural areas) gradually comes to make a comparison between the standard of living of their own families and that of the Portuguese; they begin to understand the sacrifices being borne by the Africans. They have proved extremely dynamic in the struggle. Many of these people joined the struggle right from the beginning and it is among this group that we have found many of the cadres whom we have since trained.⁷⁸

This is how the social structure of Guinea-Bissau appeared to the founding leaders of the PAIGC around 1960. Their analysis, as presented by Cabral, is based upon an intimate knowledge of the country.⁷⁹ Combined with the facts presented in the preceding parts of this chapter, it gives us a highly credible picture of a country forced into stagnation by foreign oppression, but simultaneously developing — as an unintended but probably inevitable result of the system of colonial oppression — both latent and open contradictions awaiting ignition by the spark of competent political leadership.

Insurrection and national liberation

The governor who ruled in Bissau in 1954 was considered to be a relatively liberal man. Among the persons employed in his administration was the young Guinean agronomist Amílcar Cabral (born in 1924) — one of about fourteen Guineans who had received higher education during the five hundred years of Portuguese presence in Guinea. Since 1952 he had been travelling around the countryside in order to prepare an agricultural census. But Cabral had also been active in other ways, trying to organize the youth of Guinea into a sports and recreational association. Although this appeared innocent enough on the surface, the suspicions of influential Portuguese had been aroused, and the governor called Cabral to his office to warn him in subtle and ambiguous words: "Do not cause me any trouble, but be a man of our times. Live in accordance with the epoch into which you have been born."⁸⁰

Cabral heeded the warning, and soon afterwards left Bissau. While working later in Angola, he re-established close contacts from his student years in Lisbon with the Africans who were, in late 1956, to found the MPLA

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁷⁹ The analysis presented by Correia da Cruz, *op.cit.*, is in fact very similar. Cf. also an article by Fernando Rogado Quitino in the Portuguese journal *Boletim Cultural da Guiné Portuguesa*, Bissau, January–April 1967, pp. 5–40. The title of the article in English is "Physical and Biological Environment", and it contains detailed information on living conditions, age groups, etc., of the various ethnic groups inhabiting Guinea-Bissau. Translation available in the series *Translations on Africa*, no. 762, has been used here.

⁸⁰ This is how the story was told to the author by a high PAIGC leader. Davidson, *The Liberation of Guiné*, pp. 30 f., has a slightly different version. As this story has by now become part of the revolutionary folklore of the PAIGC, different tellers tell it in different ways. The point, however, remains the same.

(*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*). But earlier in the same year, during a visit to Bissau, he had himself been the leader of a small group who founded the PAIGC at a clandestine meeting in September 1956.

Outwardly nothing much happened during the following three years, but the ideas of independence and national development began to spread in the towns.⁸¹ On August 3, 1959, a strike broke out among the dock workers of Bissau, at Pidjiguiti. The police were called in to "restore order", which they did, at the cost of the lives of about fifty workers. The repression of the strike was commanded and led by the PIDE, the Portuguese secret police, which had operated in Guinea since 1957.

One month after the Pidjiguiti massacre, the PAIGC militants held a secret meeting in Bissau, at which it was decided to liberate Guinea and Cape Verde "by all possible means, including war".⁸² The following principles of action were adopted:

1. Without delay mobilize and organize the peasant masses who will be, as experience shows, the main force in the struggle for national liberation.
2. Strengthen our organization in the towns but keep it clandestine, avoiding all demonstrations.
3. Develop and reinforce unity around the Party of the Africans of all ethnic groups, origins, and social strata.
4. Prepare as many cadres as possible, either inside the country or abroad, for political leadership and the successful development of our struggle.
5. Mobilize émigrés in neighbouring territories so as to draw them into the liberation struggle and the future of our people.
6. Work to acquire the means that will be needed for success.⁸³

Several years of patient political work now followed. A clandestine labour union was formed, the *União Nacional dos Trabalhadores da Guiné*, UNTG (cf. note 43 p. 165). The links with the nationalists of Angola and Mozambique were strengthened, and the PAIGC joined a common front organization formed in Tunis in 1960, which was reorganized a year later in Casablanca into the *Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas*, CONCP, and later moved to Algiers.

But most importantly, from 1959 and onwards, PAIGC militants started to travel around the country. They talked to the people of the villages, and they tried to make them see the connection between colonialism and the serious difficulties of their own daily lives.⁸⁴ From 1960 this work was carried on from Conakry, capital of the now independent Republic of Guinea, where Cabral

⁸¹ Cf. Correia da Cruz, *op.cit.*

⁸² Davidson, *The Liberation of Guiné*, p. 32.

⁸³ According to confidential party report quoted in *ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 42 ff; Correia da Cruz, *op.cit.*

had started a small political school in order to train the cadres of the PAIGC.

By this time the PIDE had become very active in trying to capture the members of the PAIGC, and in March of 1962, they even managed to capture the party president Raphael Barbosa, together with many others. Barbosa then remained in jail and house arrest in Bissau, until he was released around 1970.⁸⁵

Although both the repression of the nationalists by the Portuguese and the preparations for armed struggle carried on by the PAIGC accelerated during the first years of the sixties, the PAIGC leaders never ceased to emphasize that they were prepared to negotiate a gradual and peaceful transition to independence in cooperation with the Portuguese. The following quotation from a report submitted by Cabral in June 1961 to the United Nations Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration is characteristic of the official PAIGC attitude both then and later:

The people of "Portuguese" Guinea are convinced that it is not yet too late for reason to triumph, and they are therefore always prepared to negotiate, through their legitimate representatives, with the Portuguese government in order to establish the forms of peaceful liquidation of Portuguese colonial domination and define the ways and means through which "Portuguese" Guinea can accede to independence.

Under such circumstances it is obvious that consideration would be given to Portuguese interests that have developed in our country without being incompatible with national sovereignty. This would naturally be done without compromising the intransigent defense of the rights of the people of "Portuguese" Guinea.⁸⁶

But the Portuguese government simply ignored this and all other similar invitations from the PAIGC, basically because the government did not regard the PAIGC, but itself, as "the legitimate representative" of the people of Guinea. This was a dispute that could not be settled through juridical discussion, but only through the direct confrontation of the two points of view with the reality of social structure.

It is an important question — although somewhat outside the focus of the present work — why the Portuguese colonial power for so long refused formal political decolonization in Africa, while the other colonial powers more or less willingly ended up by admitting that new times required new ways of maintaining influence. But it is probably true that an essential part of the answer to this question has to do with the fact that Portugal herself is a rather un-

⁸⁵ After his arrest, Barbosa came under the influence of the Portuguese authorities. Very probably, he was even closely involved in the murder of Cabral. Cf. pp. 113–114.

⁸⁶ *Un crime de colonialisme (Fondements juridiques de notre lutte armée de libération nationale). Extrait du rapport présenté par le camarade Amílcar Cabral, au Comité Spécial de l'O.N.U. pour les territoires administrés par le Portugal*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), 1961, p. 5 (translated by the author). Other examples of similar texts from this period could also be cited.

derdeveloped and dependent country, with a rather subordinate position in the global system of imperialist domination. It will therefore be very difficult for Portugal to substitute the subtle economic mechanisms of neo-colonial influence and domination for the direct political domination maintained through the mechanisms of old-style colonialism. To the rulers of Portugal, before the *coup* of 1974, the choice may thus have appeared to be between an obstinate and violent struggle to maintain the old order or complete loss of the limited benefits still possible to draw from Portugal's intermediate position between the capitalist West and Africa in the system of imperialist domination of Africa. It is well known that they chose the path of resistance at all costs against national liberation. Nor did they have to bear these costs alone, but were on the contrary able to rely upon the active military and economic support of the ruling classes of the dominant capitalist countries of the West.⁸⁷

In 1962 the PAIGC began sabotage actions within Guinea-Bissau, and in January, 1963 armed struggle on a larger scale was begun. The PAIGC's initial successes were considerable, and they were also recognized by the Portuguese. In July the Portuguese defense minister declared:

Numerous and well armed groups, trained for subversive war in North Africa and in the communist countries, have penetrated the territory of Guinea in an area encompassing fifteen per cent of the territory.⁸⁸

In spite of setbacks and difficulties for its cause, the struggle proceeded during the following years, until the PAIGC in 1968 could make credible claims to control about two-thirds or even three-fourths of the territory of mainland Guinea, with about half of the population.⁸⁹ It is of course difficult to make such calculations — or to check the calculations made by others — in any very exact manner, and the Portuguese authorities for obvious reasons rejected and denounced the PAIGC claims.⁹⁰ But the simple fact that the Portuguese were unable to reach most of their own fortified camps in the interior, except by air,

⁸⁷ Interesting documentation of the support given to Portugal by her NATO allies is found in *Portugal and NATO*, third revised edition, Amsterdam, Angola Comité, 1972, as well as in William Minter, *Portuguese Africa and the West*, New York and London, Monthly Review Press, 1972.

⁸⁸ According to the Lisbon newspaper *Diário de Lisboa*, quoted in Gérard Chaliand, *Lutte armée en Afrique*, Paris, Maspero, 1969, p. 35.

⁸⁹ "About half of the population" is of course a very approximate estimate. Cf. also pp.

⁹⁰ See for instance the Lisbon newspaper *Diário de Notícias*, August 5, 1971, where we find an article about the governor of Guinea, who in one single day is reported to have visited a number of villages in territory the PAIGC claims to control. Cf. also an article by F.J.H. Rebelo de Andrade in *Ulamar*, April-June 1968, pp. 176-200. The title of the article in English is "Armed Forces Activities in Portuguese Guinea". It is available in partial translation in the series *Translations on Africa*, no. 767. The claim is made by its author, for instance, that "it could be said that subversion in Guinea has not succeeded in gaining control of any part of the territory." No evidence is presented, however, in support of this and similar statements, at least not in the excerpt of the *Translations*...

supports the PAIGC claims. Numerous visitors have also testified to the reality of effective PAIGC control of large areas.⁹¹ The present author in 1970 walked through large areas of the South — Balana, Cubisseco-de-Cima, and Tombali — without meeting a single Portuguese. And in 1972, walking from the Senegalese border, the author arrived at a point some twenty kilometers from the town of Mansoa, in its turn only about forty kilometers from Bissau, the capital city. This latter visit was to the northern sectors of Sara and Candjambary, and here, as in the South, the PAIGC was very visibly in administrative, political, and military control of the country.

Groups and individuals who by interests, habits, instinct, and social conditioning generally tend to give the benefit of the doubt to those who defend the established order rather than to those who challenge it are never absent in connection with social conflict situations. Usually they dominate numerically. It is, in a way, understandable that such groups and individuals have found it hard to believe in the detailed and often well-documented bulletins and reports of the PAIGC as well as in the analyses and reports published by serious visitors to the liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau, who have tried to be objective without hiding their basic sympathy for the PAIGC. It is important therefore to emphasize that also official pre-1974 Portuguese sources can be found that do not deny the fact of PAIGC successes, but are on the contrary very much preoccupied with this fact, although they naturally do not interpret it in the same way as the PAIGC sources.⁹² The most eloquent sources in this respect, however, are the official Portuguese statistical publications.

Portuguese statistics on Guinea demonstrate very clearly how the colonial authorities during the nineteen-sixties became increasingly cut off from the province they claimed to be governing. With 1961 as the only exception, the balance of external trade deteriorated both steadily and rapidly until 1970, the last year for which statistics were available to the author, when table 15 was compiled. Note that the external trade of Guinea is very heavily oriented toward metropolitan Portugal (cf. table 1, p. 15). As late as in 1970, 55.3 per-

⁹¹ See Davidson, *The Liberation of Guiné*; Chaliand, *op.cit.*, and numerous others, including the author's article "Political Mobilisation for Development in Guinea-Bissau", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* (Cambridge) vol. 10, no. 1, May 1972, pp. 1-18, as well as the important report made by the three members of the United Nations special mission visiting southern Guinea-Bissau in April, 1972, *Report of the Special Mission Established by the Special Committee at its 840th Meeting on 14 March 1972, A/AC.109/L.804*, United Nations, General Assembly (mimeo), 3 July 1972.

⁹² An important example of this is the article "Armed Forces Activities in Portuguese Guinea" by F.J.H. Rebelo de Andrade, in *Ultramar, op.cit.*—In early 1974, the PAIGC was able to publish extracts from confidential Portuguese documents where the considerable increases in agricultural production achieved in the liberated areas were referred to. See *La République de Guinée-Bissau en chiffres*, February 1974, pp. 32 ff.—Cf. also the inside report from "Portuguese" Guinea in 1971 by the South African journalist Al J. Venter, *Portugal's Guerilla War. The Campaign for Africa*, Cape Town, John Malherbe Pty Ltd, 1973.

cent of the imports came from Portugal, while 87.9 percent of the exports went there.⁹³

Table 15. *Value of Guinea-Bissau's imports and exports 1959–1970*^a
(in thousands of contos)

	Imports	Exports	Deficit
1959	243.3	198.6	44.7
1960	321.8	125.9	195.9
1961	292.1	211.2	80.9
1962	343.4	188.8	154.6
1963	407.2	166.5	240.7
1964	431.5	156.2	275.3
1965	419.3	105.8	313.5
1966	433.5	85.1	348.4
1967	471.9	91.2	380.7
1968	506.7	87.5	419.2
1969	672.3	104.9	567.3
1970	786.0	89.8	696.2

^a The table is based upon information from *III Plano de Fomento para 1968–1973, Guiné*, p. 12 (1959–65), *Anuário Estatístico, Vol. II, 1969 Províncias Ultramarinas*, Lisbon, Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 1971, p. 137 (1966–68), and *Síntese Monográfica da Guiné*, Lisbon, Edição da Agência Geral do Ultramar, 1972, p. 85 (1969–70).

A more detailed examination of the trade statistics yields even more revealing information. As already pointed out, peanuts were the great colonial export crop of Guinea, originally imposed upon the peasants by the authorities and bought at very low prices to be shipped to Portugal. Rice is an important crop for consumption in Guinea. Let us single out these two crops and study them together with the evolution of imports and exports of all products of vegetal origin, as well as with the evolution of total imports and exports. This has been done in table 16, where empty spaces indicate that no information has been available.

Table 16 demonstrates at least four things quite clearly: (1) After the armed struggle for national liberation had begun, the quantity of peanuts that the peasants could be forced to grow and sell for export declined drastically and in 1970 was smaller than ever reported before, with the sole exception of 1968. (2) Exports of vegetal origin account for about nine-tenths of total exports, and exports of peanuts occupy a very dominant position among exports of vegetal origin. Consequently the drastic decline of exports of peanuts is mirrored in a drastic decline of total exports. (3) Agricultural exports in

⁹³ *Síntese Monográfica da Guiné*, p. 87.

Table 16. *Value of exports of peanuts and rice, imports of rice, and imports of products of vegetal origin*^a

(In thousands of contos. Figures within brackets are percentages of value of total either import or export respectively)

	Exports peanuts ^b	Exports rice	Imports rice	Imports vege- tal origin	Exports vege- tal origin
1959	128.0(65)	4.154			182.3(91)
1960	78.8(63)	0.004			104.9(83)
1961	126.3(43)	1.970		10.1(3)	179.9(85)
1962	133.3(70)	0.851		23.8(7)	174.3(92)
1963	125.4(75)	0.030		30.3(7)	152.3(91)
1964	119.2(76)	0.030		46.8(10)	148.0(95)
1965	64.3(60)	—		42.1(10)	97.3(92)
1966					
1967					
1968	52.7(60)	— ^c	18.3(4)	42.2(8)	79.4(90)
1969	66.0(63)		106.3(16)	135.0(20)	90.1(86)
1970	61.2(68)		49.3(6)	80.0(10)	80.3(89)

^a The table is based upon information from *III Plano de Fomento para 1968–1973, Guiné*, pp. 12 ff. (1959–65), *Anuário Estatístico, Vol. II*, pp. 137 f. and 194 f. (1968, except imports of rice), *Síntese Monográfica da Guiné*, p. 86 (exports of peanuts 1969–70 and imports of rice), and *Súmula de Dados Estatísticos, Províncias Ultramarinas*, Lisbon, Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 1971 (imports and exports of vegetal origin 1969–70).

^b Both with and without shells.

^c No rice was exported, but 278 contos worth of husks were exported to neighbouring countries, probably in order to be used as cattle feed.

general have declined almost as much as exports of peanuts, and after 1964 no rice at all has been available for export. (4) Food imports increased after the armed struggle began, and have since remained higher than before, although still not very significant in relation to total imports, except in 1969. The fact that rice has been imported since 1968 is, however, most significant.

These facts all point in the same direction: they support PAIGC claims to have eliminated or decisively reduced Portuguese presence in large parts of rural Guinea. The fact that the cultivation of peanuts has been cut back is particularly significant. Among other things, it probably means that the peasants devote more energy now than before to production for their own consumption — in other words, many probably eat better than they did before.

It is important to note, too, that the elimination of rice exports and the recourse to imports do not mean that less rice is cultivated in Guinea now than before. On the contrary, the detailed statistics kept by the PAIGC in Conakry show that the “People’s Stores” of the party since 1968 (when these statistics begin) have been able to buy larger annual quantities than the Portuguese have been able to export after 1961. The figures on this are given in

table 17. The rice quantities acquired by the PAIGC are surpluses, after basic consumption needs have been met, that the peasants exchange at the People's Stores for such necessities as cloth, needles, sandals, matches, soap, sugar, etc. The People's Stores are discussed in greater detail in a different context (cf. pp. 178 ff.).

Table 17. *Exports of rice from colonial Guinea-Bissau and purchases of rice by the PAIGC from the peasants of liberated areas*^a
(In tons and during years for which information is available)

	Exports through colonial authorities	Purchases by the PAIGC
1959	1,269	
1960	1	
1961	604	
1962	261	
1963	9	
1964	9	
1965	—	
1966		
1967		
1968	—	442
1969		369
1970		906
1971		669

^a The table is based upon information from *III Plano de Fomento para 1968–1973, Guiné*, p. 18, and from unpublished statistics kept at the PAIGC secretariat in Conakry and studied by the author during a visit to Conakry in May, 1972.

It is probable that the line between territory still controlled by the Portuguese and territory under PAIGC administration was fairly stable between 1968–69 and the spring of 1974, but that the PAIGC greatly improved its capacity to strike inside territory still held by the Portuguese. In June 1971, the PAIGC even attacked Bissau and Bafata, the two largest urban centers in the country.⁹⁴

In early 1974, the Portuguese remained in the few cities and towns of the country, and they held some coastal countryside as well as a number of fortified camps in the interior, although many of these had also been evacuated. But the most important military fact was that the Portuguese in practice seemed to have given up the hope of reconquering lost territory. With some exceptions, such as the Christmas attack on Morés in December 1971, which

⁹⁴ *PAIGC Actualités*, Conakry, no. 30, June 1971.

was a complete failure from the Portuguese point of view,⁹⁵ and a reported attempt by "thousands of Portuguese soldiers and marines" in December 1972 to "dig themselves into new positions in rebel-infested strongholds in southern Portuguese Guinea",⁹⁶ the Portuguese limited themselves to terrorizing the population with bomb and napalm attacks. Now and then they landed helicopter-borne troops to burn a school, a hospital, a field, or a village. But this appears to have been done more in order to maintain a constant feeling of insecurity in the liberated areas than in order to reconquer.

The children in the PAIGC-schools, hidden away in the woods, thus gave a correct picture of the situation in the liberated areas, when they sang the following song about the distribution of power between the modern colonial army and the people of Guinea:

Up in the clouds the Portuguese hold power
but on the ground the guerilla decide . . .

During the first half of 1973, only a short time after the murder of Cabral, Portuguese power was beginning to waver even in the air-space of Guinea-Bissau. On March 23, 1973, two Fiat G-91 fighter bombers were shot down by ground-to-air missiles from a PAIGC anti-aircraft unit. The bombers belonged to a consignment of forty planes supplied by West Germany to Portugal in 1966.⁹⁷ This was the beginning of an important new phase in the military struggle between the PAIGC and the Portuguese colonial army, and it caused great alarm to the Portuguese authorities. The concern of the Portuguese was naturally seriously aggravated, when they had to admit a few days later that even their air force operational commander in Guinea, lieutenant-colonel José Brito, had been shot down and killed by PAIGC anti-aircraft artillery.⁹⁸ With the aid of their new efficient missiles, supplied by the Soviet Union, the PAIGC forces were able during the following months to shoot down a considerable number of Portuguese planes. According to the PAIGC information services, the exact number of planes lost by the Por-

⁹⁵ A mimeographed PAIGC communiqué, dated January 4, 1972, cites a "communiqué spécial" from the Portuguese military headquarters, according to which the operation *Safira Solitária* on December 20-26, 1971, against the sector of Morés had been unsuccessful. The Portuguese, however, blamed the failure of their operation upon the infiltration of Cuban-trained "foreign African mercenaries" infiltrated from Senegal, while recognizing the "advanced technique" of their adversaries.

⁹⁶ This was reported from Bissau by the correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, London, December 15, 1972. (*Facts and Reports, Press Cuttings on Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, Portugal & Southern Africa*, edited by the Angola Comité, Amsterdam, cutting no. 1304, Vol. 2, no. 26, December 23, 1972.) Nothing has since been heard of this reported Portuguese offensive.

⁹⁷ PAIGC communiqué, read on Radio Conakry in French 1945 gmt 25 Mar 73 (*Facts and Reports, cutting no. 451*, Vol. 3, no. 8, April 14, 1973).

⁹⁸ *Daily Telegraph*, April 3, 1973 (*Facts and Reports, cutting no. 446*, Vol. 3, no. 8, April 14, 1973).

tuguese between March 23 and June 10, 1973, was eighteen.⁹⁹ In March, 1974, the reported figure was up to thirty-six.¹⁰⁰

Another important military success scored by the PAIGC during the first half of 1973 was the capture on May 25, 1973, of Guiledje, a strong Portuguese military base in southern Guinea-Bissau, close to the strategic supply route leading into the country from the Republic of Guinea.¹⁰¹ The fall of Guiledje was a serious blow to the position of the Portuguese within the liberated areas of the South.

On April 13, 1972, the United Nations Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples met in Conakry to examine the provisional report delivered by the three members of the special mission who had just returned from an official visit to the liberated areas of southern Guinea-Bissau. On the basis of this report, the committee declared that it recognized the PAIGC as "the sole and authentic representative of the people of the territory" of Guinea (Bissau).¹⁰² On November 14, 1972, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution to the same effect, based upon the report of the Special Committee.¹⁰³ A week later, on November 22, 1972, the Security Council followed suit and unanimously urged Portugal to open a dialogue with the movements of national liberation in her African territories.¹⁰⁴

These were important political and diplomatic successes for the PAIGC, and they seemed to portend dramatic and decisive changes inside Guinea-Bissau as well. A month earlier, Cabral had appeared in person at the United Nations in New York, before the fourth commission of the General Assembly.

⁹⁹ *Communiqué*, issued on June 13, 1973, and signed by Aristides Pereira, interim secretary general of the PAIGC, for the *Comité Executivo da Luta*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), 1973. A Portuguese military communiqué, issued in Lisbon on June 21, 1973, admitted *inter alia* the loss of 5 planes "since the beginning of March". See *Le Monde*, Paris, June 23, 1973.

¹⁰⁰ Interview with the head commissar of the government of Guinea-Bissau, Francisco Mendes, in the Algerian journal *Revolution Africaine*, March 7, 1974 (*Facts and Reports*, cutting no. 453, Vol. 4, no. 7, March 30, 1974).

¹⁰¹ *Communiqué*, issued on June 6, 1973, and signed by Aristides Pereira for the *Comité Executivo da Luta*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), 1973. The fall of Guiledje has been described in *Revolution africaine*, June 14, 1973 (*Facts and Reports*, cutting no. 733, Vol. 3, no. 13, June 23, 1973), and in an article by the reporter Richard Lobban in the English journal *Africa*, August 24, 1973 (*Facts and Reports*, cutting no. 1147, vol. 3, no. 18, September 1, 1973). Lobban visited Guiledje about a month after the fall of the base and was thus able to report in great detail on the effects of the PAIGC assault.

¹⁰² *Résolution adoptée par le Comité spécial à sa 854ème séance, le 13 avril 1972, à Conakry (Guinée)*, AF/109/63, provisional, April 13, 1972 (mimeo), p. 2.

¹⁰³ *Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, 2918 (XXVII). Question of Territories under Portuguese Administration, A/RES/2918 (XXVII)* (mimeo), November 15, 1972, p. 2. The vote was 98 for and 6 against, including the United States and Great Britain. Eight countries abstained, including France.

¹⁰⁴ *Le Monde*, November 25, 1972.

He had then announced that the newly elected National Assembly of the People of Guinea would soon be called upon to proclaim the existence of a sovereign state inside liberated Guinea-Bissau. Cabral was convinced, he said, that not only the independent African states, but also the United Nations and "all truly anti-colonialist states would know how to draw the necessary consequences" from the new political and juridical situation that would then be created.¹⁰⁵ Two days later, in connection with a meeting of the Security Council called to consider a complaint by Senegal against a Portuguese incursion with tanks from Guinea-Bissau, Cabral gave a press conference in New York, where he specified that Guinea-Bissau would demand to have her independence recognized around the end of 1972 or the beginning of 1973.¹⁰⁶ He repeated this announcement at Algiers on November 6.¹⁰⁷ This was a far step from the secret founding meeting of the PAIGC held in Bissau in September 1956.

The murder of Cabral on January 20, 1973, caused the PAIGC to postpone the proclamation of the independent state of Guinea-Bissau for eight months. But on September 24, 1973, the promises given by Cabral were fulfilled by his comrades, with the proclamation of the sovereign Republic of Guinea-Bissau. These dramatic events in the history of the PAIGC and of Guinea-Bissau will be dealt with in Chapters IV and V.

Note on the international relations of the PAIGC

The remarkable achievements of the PAIGC since it was founded in 1956 are mainly the result of the people's own efforts, mobilized and directed by the PAIGC under the leadership of Amílcar Cabral. This is the subject matter of the following chapters. But another important aspect of Cabral's success was also his ability to establish good international relations on behalf of the PAIGC. For however much we emphasize the fundamental fact that the people of Guinea-Bissau carry on their own struggle, it is nevertheless also a fact that without international support the struggle could not have advanced so far as it has. A few brief comments on this aspect of the struggle are thus in order here.

The decisive support received by the PAIGC has come from the socialist countries of Eastern Europe in the form of arms, educational opportunities, and other material and political support. Relations with China have been less intimate, although initially quite good. After a cool period during the second

¹⁰⁵ Cabral, *O Povo da Guiné e Cabo Verde perante a ONU*, speech made before the fourth commission of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), October 1972, p. 19 (translated by the author).

¹⁰⁶ *Le Monde*, October 20, 1972.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, November 8, 1972.

half of the nineteen-sixties, they have again become normal. Relations between the PAIGC and Cuba have always been very good, and material assistance has also been given by the government of Fidel Castro.

In quantitative terms, the assistance received by the PAIGC from socialist countries is certainly dominant. It is not the only assistance received, however. Cabral always carried on very active diplomacy at the United Nations — he even used to speak of the soldiers of the PAIGC as “anonymous soldiers of the U.N.”, defending the ideals of the world organization although without wearing blue helmets.¹⁰⁸ As we have seen above, this diplomatic work led to important political and diplomatic victories. UNESCO as well, has established cooperation with the PAIGC in several important ways, of which the PAIGC-school that opened in January 1974 in Ziguinchor, southern Senegal, is a notable example.

Besides the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is naturally a particularly important forum for PAIGC diplomatic and political activities. Both official and unofficial contacts between the OAU and the PAIGC have been numerous through the years. The decision taken, for instance, by the Heads of State of the member states of the OAU at the summit conference in Rabat in June 1972 to augment contributions to the liberation movements by fifty percent was a success not least for the PAIGC, although of course also for the other liberation movements concerned.¹⁰⁹ It should be noted too, however, that the material consequences of this decision were far below what might have been expected, as a majority of the member states of the OAU are very slow in paying their contributions to the special fund set up for the liberation movements by the OAU. According to one writer, the majority never pay at all, and “the revenue contributed by member-states to the (liberation) Committee was only slightly more than the Nordic countries and the Churches gave the liberation movements.”¹¹⁰

On November 19, 1973, the Republic of Guinea-Bissau became the forty-second member-state of the OAU. The decision was taken at a special meeting of the Council of Ministers.¹¹¹ Guinea-Bissau has also become a full member of the FAO, the international organization concerned with problems of food and agriculture.¹¹² Membership in the United Nations would soon follow.

¹⁰⁸ See for instance Cabral's speech at the 1632:nd session of the Security Council of the United Nations held in Addis Abeba on February 1, 1972, p. 2 of the mimeographed French version published by the PAIGC, Conakry, 1972.

¹⁰⁹ *Le Monde*, June 15, 1972.

¹¹⁰ Article by Peter Enahoro in *Africa*, March, 1973 (*Facts and Reports*, cutting no. 290, Vol. 3, no. 5, March 3, 1973).

¹¹¹ *PAIGC Actualités*, Conakry, no. 56, December 1973.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

Outside the socialist, and some African, countries, the only governmental assistance offered the PAIGC has come from Scandinavia. Neutral Sweden — but still a co-member-with-Portugal of the European Free Trade Organization — began offering so-called humanitarian assistance in the form of various kinds of non-military equipment as early as in 1969. The amount of this support has increased very rapidly, but is naturally small in comparison with total aid to the PAIGC. From a political point of view it is very important, however, coming as it does from a capitalist country governed by socialdemocrats. In 1972, a diplomatically even more striking breakthrough came, as NATO-members Norway and Denmark declared themselves willing to give humanitarian assistance to the PAIGC.¹¹³ In 1973 Finland and the Netherlands followed suit.

Besides official relations with governments, the United Nations, and the OAU, the PAIGC has numerous friendly connections with political and other organizations and private institutions in many countries, not least in Western Europe and in the United States. It is notable that the World Council of Churches is among these organizations. Even more dramatic — and embarrassing for the Portuguese government — was perhaps the fact that Amílcar Cabral was received in audience by Pope Paul VI on July 1, 1970. Together with Cabral the Pope also received the vice-president of the FRELIMO, Marcelino dos Santos, and the president of the MPLA, Agostinho Neto. On this solemn occasion, the following words, among others, were spoken by the Pope:

The Church and we ourselves are on the side of those who suffer. We are for the peace, the freedom, and the national independence of all peoples, particularly the African peoples . . . We pray for you.¹¹⁴

After the declaration of independent statehood on September 24, 1973, and the *coup* in Portugal of April 25, 1974, a new phase has naturally begun in the development of the international relations of the PAIGC and of Guinea-Bissau. Most of the necessarily very brief comments made in this book on these new developments will be found at the end of the present chapter and in Chapter V.

Note on rival nationalist organizations in Guinea-Bissau

This is a book about the PAIGC and its efforts to construct a new society in liberated Guinea. No other nationalist organization has ever liberated any part of Guinean territory and challenged colonial authority by establishing

¹¹³ *Financial Times*, London, March 27, 1972 (*Facts and Reports*, cutting no. 350, Vol. 2, no. 7, April 1, 1972).

¹¹⁴ *PAIGC Actualités*, Conakry, no. 19, July 1970 (translated by the author).

alternative political and administrative structures. There is therefore no need, in this book, to say much about the parallel nationalist organizations that showed some activity during the first years of the existence of the PAIGC. But in order to complete the background picture, some information will still be given.

The PAIGC had in fact been preceded by another nationalist organization, the *Movimento para a Independência Nacional da Guiné Portuguesa*, founded in 1954. This organization was never very active, and it left few traces. It was soon dissolved and succeeded by the PAIGC in 1956.

A great many Cape Verdeans, as well as exiles with nationalist political ambitions from mainland Guinea have settled in Dakar, the capital city of Senegal. Together with various organizations representing these groups, Cabral and the PAIGC formed a united front in 1961.¹¹⁵ The front soon split, however, and the PAIGC continued on its own course. In 1962, a number of smaller groups and organizations — but not the Cape Verdeans of Dakar — joined into the main rival organization of the PAIGC, the *Frente de Luta pela Independência Nacional da Guiné*, FLING.

The FLING can be characterized as a coalition of ethnic groupings, and it has never been able to achieve any important results, whether political or military. One faction has probably had fairly close contacts with the Portuguese, and the political work of the FLING has always been carried on from and in Dakar rather than inside Guinea-Bissau. Apart from some actions in northern Guinea-Bissau in early 1963, no military activity by the FLING has been verified. It can be stated without any exaggeration whatsoever that the FLING, during the following years of the nineteen-sixties, was effectively superseded by the PAIGC. Although still talked of now and then as an existing organization, the FLING was not even listed in the telephone directory of Dakar in 1970, let alone any activities reported.

During the negotiations held between the Portuguese government and the national liberation movements in Africa after April 25, 1974, there has never been any question whatsoever of admitting any other organization than the PAIGC as representing Guinea-Bissau.

The official Portuguese position, before and after the coup of 1974

Before the coup

The Political Constitution (of 1933) defines the Portuguese Nation as a unitary State in the complex of territories by which it is constituted and of the peoples inhabiting those territories.

¹¹⁵ Cf. Chilcote, *op.cit.*, pp. 100 ff. and Paul M. Whitaker, "The Revolutions of 'Portuguese' Africa", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* (Cambridge), vol. 8, no. 1, 1970, pp. 15–35, especially pp. 26 f.

The constitutional formula, in this regard, is no more than a declaration of a state of conscience which has been stratified in centuries of history and, down these centuries, by the work of the Portuguese and by the Christian humanitarianism which they carried with them.¹¹⁶

The quoted statement by Salazar is only one among a very great number of similar statements made both by Salazar himself until his retirement and subsequent death, by his successor Marcello Caetano, by Overseas Minister Adriano Moreira, and by numerous other representatives of the pre-1974 Portuguese regime. The particular statement quoted here was chosen for its reference to the constitution of 1933, and also because it was made in 1963, not long after international pressure had caused Portugal to introduce a number of legal reforms in her African territories. The reference to the constitution reminds us of the rigidity of the old official Portuguese position with regard to the overseas territories; and the fact that the statement was made so soon after the reforms of the early nineteen-sixties demonstrates that these reforms were literally concerned with the form alone and not the essence of the colonial system.

In February 1972, for instance, Prime Minister Caetano was still able to declare that "the territories that today make up the Portuguese overseas provinces will never cease to be Portuguese".¹¹⁷ This declaration was made in a speech at the first annual conference of the *Ação Nacional Popular*, the official political organization that succeeded Salazar's *União Nacional*. And as late as on March 28, 1974, Caetano emphatically reaffirmed, in a radio-broadcast speech, that the African territories would not be "abandoned" to the movements of liberation. Portugal defended in Africa, Caetano said, "the Portuguese of all races and colours who have confidence in the Portuguese flag".¹¹⁸

Even more than a decade after the colonial regime had been ousted from Goa in India by force (1961), Portugal still continued to regard Goa as a Portuguese province under foreign occupation, and Goa was included in official publications as "Estado da Índia".¹¹⁹

From a juridical point of view, Portugal's position was in fact crystal-clear: the overseas "provinces" were not "colonies" or "non-self-governing territories" within the meaning of the United Nations Charter, but integral parts of the Portuguese nation. Hence there existed no obligation for Portugal, as a member state of the United Nations, to transmit information to the world organization about Portuguese overseas territories, and all efforts by the

¹¹⁶ H.E. Prof. Oliveira Salazar, Prime Minister of Portugal, Broadcast on 12 August 1963, *Declaration on Overseas Policy*, Lisbon, Secretariado Nacional da Informação, 1963, p. 4 (official English translation).

¹¹⁷ *Diário de Notícias*, February 29, 1972 (translated by the author).

¹¹⁸ *Le Monde*, March 30, 1974 (translated by the author).

¹¹⁹ See for instance *Anuário Estatístico, Vol. II, Províncias Ultramarinas, 1969*.

United Nations to compel the Portuguese government to adopt certain measures with regard to these territories were in fact considered as interventions in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of Portugal.¹²⁰

It is true, though, that Caetano presented a plan for constitutional revision to the National Assembly in Lisbon on December 2, 1970. And, although the "basic idea" of the plan was that "the political structure of the 1933 Constitution must be maintained",¹²¹ it is also true that Caetano spoke of "far-reaching changes to be made in the constitutional articles dealing with the overseas provinces".¹²²

Did the proposed changes imply any important change in the relationship between metropolitan Portugal and her overseas territories? Even a close examination of the text of Caetano's speech does not reveal any such intention. The overseas provinces would in the future be defined as "autonomous regions within the unitary Portuguese State".¹²³ But, as Caetano himself pointed out, this was not new, but recognized in the old constitutional texts as well, where it was stated that the overseas territories should have "a political and administrative organization suited to their geographical situation and the conditions of their social environment".¹²⁴

The impression given by Caetano of very limited substantial change was confirmed in June 1972, when the new Organic Law for the Overseas Provinces was published.¹²⁵ According to the text of this law, the official designation as a "state" would be maintained for "Portuguese" India (Goa), but it would also henceforth be extended to Angola and Mozambique.¹²⁶ This, however, was only an "honorary qualification" that could be made when "the progress of their (the provinces') social environment and the sufficiency of their administration" so justified.¹²⁷

The province of Guinea, although, like the other provinces, henceforth an autonomous region within the Nation, was not granted the honour of being

¹²⁰ The Portuguese position is well explained by Franco Nogueira, foreign minister during the nineteen-sixties, in his book *The United Nations and Portugal, a Study of Anti-Colonialism*, London, Tandem Books Limited, 1964. The position has been reiterated numerous times in the United Nations, for instance on November 23, 1972, after the Security Council on the previous day had passed a unanimous resolution demanding that Portugal open a dialogue with the movements of national liberation in the African territories under Portuguese administration. See *Le Monde*, November 25, 1972.

¹²¹ Marcello Caetano, *Revision of the Portuguese Constitution, Speech delivered before the National Assembly on 2 December 1970*, Lisbon, Secretaria de Estado da Informação e Turismo (official English translation), p. 15.

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ *Loi Organique des Provinces Portugaises d'Outre-Mer*, law no. 5/72, Lisbon, June, 1972 (official French translation).

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, Chapter II:II:2.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, Chapter II:II:1.

defined as a "state". Nor were there any other very important changes to be registered. As we have already seen earlier in this chapter, the most notable changes contained in the decree through which the new organic law was later put into application for Guinea was that the number of members of the legislative body elected by direct suffrage was increased from three out of eleven to five out of seventeen elected members, while the direct link which had previously existed between this legislative body and the governor's consultative organ was severed.¹²⁸

In theory, thus, and as far as the Caetano government was concerned, the basic nature of the relationship between Portugal and her overseas territories had been constant for centuries, it was not changing in the early nineteen-seventies, nor would it change in the future. The rebellions of the "terrorists" would be crushed, and the union of Portugal and her provinces would eventually emerge fortified from the struggle. Speaking in Bissau on the occasion of a brief official visit on April 14, 1969, Caetano expressed this position in absurdly rhetorical terms and with particular reference to Guinea:

To protect the admirable fidelity of the people of this land thousands of soldiers, sailors and airmen, from Portugal and the other provinces, have come to strengthen the security forces of Guinea. The local forces and the expeditionary forces have been united in the same difficulties, the same risks and the same dangers and they have carried out the same task of vigilance. In so doing they have created a solid spirit of comradeship. In the course of the actions during which they have had to face foreign arms wielded by the adepts of subversion, the soldiers of Guinea and of other Portuguese lands have fallen side by side, their generous blood mingling to defend the common cause.

The sorrows, the privations, the suffering, the wounds and the deaths of Portuguese soldiers cannot be in vain. This land, thus fructified by their blood, must blossom forth. This miracle will take place, for it depends on the will of all the Portuguese, whatever their race, for whom Guinea is a part of our Homeland. This miracle depends on nothing else; by it we shall cause a land where our enemies would have sown mourning and ruin to flower with goodness, where wealth shall be multiplied and well-being shall spread, bathed in the joy of understanding among men, in the light of justice and according to God's law.¹²⁹

Apart from historical and juridical arguments, the official Portuguese position also rested on political and ideological arguments. The old idea that Portugal had a special "civilizing mission" appeared in partly renewed shape, during the years of the Caetano regime, in the form of general promises to bring development and prosperity to the overseas territories. As we shall see, the governor of Guinea-Bissau, appointed in 1968, even developed a kind of ideology around his stated ambition to create a "better Guinea". But before turning to this fairly recent phenomenon, it is necessary to stress the strongly

¹²⁸ *Estatuto Político-Administrativo da Província da Guiné*, decree no. 542/72, Lisbon, December 22, 1972, Articles 19 and 38. Cf. also pp. 20 ff. of this book.

¹²⁹ *Portugal's Reasons for Remaining in the Overseas Provinces, Excerpts from Speeches made by the Prime Minister Prof. Marcello Caetano*, Lisbon, 1970, pp. 17 f.

anti-communist accent characteristic of the official Portuguese argumentation. In the case of Guinea and Cape Verde this aspect was particularly important, as the theme of Occidental-Christian values versus Communism was presented not only in terms of ideology but given immediate strategic significance as well. This is demonstrated in the following passage from a speech by Caetano before the National Assembly in Lisbon on November 17, 1968. The same passage also illustrates the Portuguese thesis that the rebellions in Africa were manipulated consequences of foreign "subversion" rather than genuine nationalist uprisings:

Can anyone doubt that behind the groups which make themselves out to be the defenders of the rights of the native population there are imperialist designs which struggle for world supremacy? We have constant proof of this, but nowhere so clearly as in Guinea.

The great majority of the population of Guinea are fighting with the regular forces against the terrorists. But in this province the terrorist movement appears to be far more extensively and effectively supported by the socialist powers, especially the U.S.S.R., than in other provinces. The impression is that a persevering, urgent effort is being made there, with no restriction on supplies of weapons and other aids. The reason for this special interest is not hard to find. Those responsible do not hide the fact that Guinea is a necessary basis for an attack on Cape Verde, the islands which occupy a key position on the lines of communication between the northern and southern halves of the Atlantic, and also between the two shores — east and west — of that ocean.

At a time when the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean is daily growing and when Russia is seeking to set up military bases, and cement alliances, in the Middle East and North Africa, no one can be blind to the importance of Cape Verde if it were in power of those friendly to Russia. Europe is being surrounded.

Nowadays the security of countries cannot be defended on their frontiers. Nations are integrated into vast blocs, whose common fate they share. The liberty and independence of the countries of Western Europe is at stake both in Europe itself and in Africa. This is why we must defend Guinea: in its own interest, of course, but also on behalf of the West of Europe and even the Americas.¹³⁰

"Do we then remain in the Overseas Provinces to defend the West?" Caetano asked again in a different speech. "Of course", he answered, "for defending the West also means defending the essence of the Portuguese national spirit".¹³¹ Yet, if the defense of the West alone were at stake...

... my position would not be so firm as it is, for is not our obligation to bear alone the support of a cause that affects so many countries and people, when they are unaware of their vital interests and neither recognize nor are grateful for the service we do them.¹³²

Of course, Caetano was very far from the truth when pretending that Portugal single-handedly supported the burden of colonialism in Africa. Without

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 11 ff.

¹³¹ Marcello Caetano, *Portugal Belongs to Us All, We All Go to Make up Portugal*, Speech made before the district committees of the National Popular Action Movement on 27 September 1970, Lisbon, Secretaria de Estado da Informação e Turismo, 1970, p. 11 (official English translation).

¹³² *Ibid.*

the very substantial military aid received in various ways from NATO-allies Britain, the United States, and West Germany, as well as from France, Portugal would certainly have been unable to fight her colonial wars in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique, thus fulfilling in her own way the function of maintaining these African territories under partial imperialist domination.¹³³

But Caetano not only avoided discussing this fundamental aspect of Portugal's presence in Africa. He even denied that Portugal in any way watched over anyone's economic interests on that continent. He also made the reasonable statement that Portugal's survival as an independent country would not be endangered by the loss of the provinces. But this was not used as a point of departure for questioning Portugal's presence, but as proof of her noble unselfishness:

No: our Overseas Provinces have to be defended because millions of Portuguese people, black and white, live there, trusting in Portugal, who want to go on living under our flag, enjoying our peace, who are irrevocably opposed to the idea of being handed over to the savagery of those who, in the last ten years, have given very ample proof of the hatred that inspires them and the ferocity of conduct which is their guide.¹³⁴

How did all this appear then, when viewed from the horizon of Portuguese-controlled Guinea-Bissau?

Policies during the last years of colonialism in Guinea-Bissau

In 1968 the assignment of General Arnaldo Schultz as governor of the province of Guinea came to an end. His main task had been to crush the PAIGC and to re-establish "law and order" in the province. But Schultz had failed. Instead, high hopes were now placed in his successor, Brigadier António Sebastião Ribeiro de Spínola (1910-), a military officer who had served successfully – from the Portuguese point of view – in several parts of the empire, including northern Angola. According to an Angolan newspaper commenting upon the nomination of Spínola, the new governor of Guinea was a man of "professional knowledge and great leadership ability", and during his service in Angola he had "produced a state of insecurity among the terrorists" and scored "brilliant victories".¹³⁵

But when Spínola's regular four-year term as governor of Guinea had come to an end in the spring of 1972, the position of the PAIGC was stronger than ever before, and the governor's term in office was therefore prolonged for two years, in order to give him another chance. By this time, however, Spínola

¹³³ See *Portugal and NATO*, 1972, and Minter, *op.cit.*

¹³⁴ Caetano, *Portugal Belongs to Us All...*, p. 12.

¹³⁵ *ABC Diário de Angola*, Luanda, May 3, 1968. Quoted here from partial translation available in the series *Translations on Africa*, no. 719.

seemed to have given up any serious hopes of military victory, although he commanded an army of approximately 40,000 men.¹³⁶ As the PAIGC likes to point out, this is a greater number of soldiers per Guinean inhabitant than the United States ever had in Vietnam. But no more than the U.S. armed forces in Vietnam were the Portuguese in Guinea able to gain a victory against the revolutionary strategy of their opponent in a war that was as much political as military. Instead Governor Spínola himself, after some time in Guinea, began to talk about mobilization and even about revolution:

The first responsibility of any government to the people is to lead them toward progress and welfare. But in order for these objectives to be carried out it is necessary, first of all, to define them concretely according to the specific characteristics of each society. And being so, the people are the ones who must inform the government of their aspirations, become aware of the possibilities of their realization, and participate actively in building their future.

That is why the policy of a government can never be real if it is not oriented toward the aspirations of the popular masses, listening, by means of a permanent dialogue, to their most representative elements. Only in this manner will it be possible to define valid objectives, which form the bases for the plans of action leading towards effective progress and welfare.

Now we are about to carry out in Portuguese Guinea a real social revolution, above all to enhance the worth and dignity of the people of this land. A revolution which has to be conducted in a climate of peace and harmony, without which fruitful and lasting changes will not be possible.¹³⁷

Although not using the term "mobilization" in the particular statement quoted here, this is clearly what Spínola was referring to. Even the term would soon appear in his terminology. In September 1972, Spínola was interviewed by the editor of the Lisbon newspaper *Diário de Lisboa*. In one of the questions put to him, he was asked what he thought of the statement that he had "disarmed" the PAIGC by carrying out a program of economic and social development called for by Amílcar Cabral". Spínola answered:

The statement you made represents a real fact, to the extent that since the popular mobilization by means of persuasion and the consequent winning over of the masses of people were the real weapons in this war, it can in fact be said that we disarmed the PAIGC, since we are now in the full process of carrying out the program of social advancement which led to the annulment of the basic reasons for subversion.¹³⁸

¹³⁶ According to Whitaker, *op.cit.*, p. 27, there were 38,000 Portuguese soldiers in Guinea at the end of 1968. Since then the numbers has certainly not decreased. Although no certain information is available, about 40,000 appears to be a reasonable estimate. According to Davidson, *The Liberation of Guiné*, p. 104, the Portuguese garrison in Guinea numbered "certainly not fewer than 30,000" in 1967. In the *Daily Telegraph* (London), December 20, 1972 the paper's correspondent writes from Bissau about "Portugal's 30,000-strong army". (*Facts and Reports*, no. 26, Vol. 3, no. 1, January 6, 1973.)

¹³⁷ Speech at "the first plenary meeting of the people of Portuguese Guinea", reported in the Lisbon newspaper *O Século*, August 7, 1970, in an article available in its entirety in the series *Translations on Africa*, no. 939, from which it has been quoted here.

¹³⁸ *Voz da Guiné*, Bissau, September 14, 1972, the bi-weekly newspaper of Bissau, reprinted the entire interview. Quoted here from the series *Translations on Africa*, no. 1229.

Spínola was thus on the verge of saying openly that he had taken over the ideas and program of the "terrorist" leader. Such words may sound strange and alien, coming from the mouth of a colonial governor and high military commander who liked to wear his monocle and white gloves even on mission in the jungle. But they may also be interpreted as an indication that Governor Spínola had learnt something from his disappointing experiences in Guinea — that he may have begun to perceive the mechanisms eroding and undermining whatever authority the colonial system might have had and turning it thereby into an illegitimate system: a system possible to maintain only by brute force and in the long run not even by that method. How were Spínola's new insights demonstrated in practice during the last years of the colonial regime in Guinea-Bissau?

Politically, Spínola's program for a "better Guinea", as he called it,¹³⁹ was mainly limited to attempts to establish new links with the people through a series of congresses with ethnic groups.¹⁴⁰ Spínola characterized this "new" policy in the following way:

In the political sector, maintaining respect for the traditions deeply rooted in the various ethnic communities, we have been utilizing the traditional structures with a view to their gradual change into administrative structures . . .¹⁴¹

This means that Spínola was trying to base popular participation in politics upon ethnic groups. Another way of putting it is that he was trying to exploit tribalism for purposes of political domination. This can hardly be regarded as very revolutionary. It is, on the contrary, a classical device of colonial rulers in Africa.

Even the material consequences of Spínola's new insights were rather limited, if we are to judge from the official statistics published by the Portuguese authorities. The most marked quantitative increases occurred with regard to the reported number of students enrolled in primary and secondary education.

As noted earlier, the number of students in primary schools is reported to have increased almost threefold between 1964–65 and 1970–71: from 12,173 pupils to 31,952 (cf. pp. 27 ff.). According to official calculations, this is equivalent to an increase from 16.5 to 38 percent of the population of school age (7–14 years).¹⁴² It is impossible for the author to judge the reality

¹³⁹ See, for instance, a speech before the Legislative Council in Bissau, quoted in the *Diário de Notícias*, November 1, 1971.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. the meeting mentioned in the preceding note. Another Lisbon newspaper, *Epoca*, July 18, 1972, reports on a three-day conference with the Beafada tribe, presided over by Spínola. Article available in the series *Translations on Africa*, no. 1204.

¹⁴¹ Interview with Spínola in the Angolan newspaper *Notícia*, Luanda, December 18, 1971. Quoted here from the series *Translations on Africa*, no. 1111.

¹⁴² Cf. table 6, p. 27 and *Síntese Monográfica da Guiné*, p. 49.

behind these figures, although there is reason to believe that they do express an improvement in comparison with the situation before the start of the struggle for national liberation.

With regard to secondary education, as well, considerable increases in the number of students enrolled have been reported by the Portuguese authorities. But here the statistics are self-contradictory. The following figures have been published:¹⁴³

1963–64 580 secondary students

1969–70 2,028 secondary students

1970–71 2,693 secondary students

The relatively high figures for the two latter school years are impossible to check, but for 1963–64, contradictory figures are found in the development plan. As shown in table 8, p. 29, the plan gives the number of secondary school students as only 343 for that school year, indicating furthermore that only 203 of the 343 actually attended school. This discrepancy inspires at least some doubt with regard to the reliability of the more recent figures. But in any case, it is highly probable that secondary education in Guinea, as well as primary education, expanded under governor Spínola.

As far as health and medical services are concerned, the most interesting piece of official information about recent years tells us that 28,991,000 escudos were spent on such services in 1970 as compared with 16,986,000 in 1960.¹⁴⁴ The sum reported for 1960 is very close to the sum reported by the WHO for 1959 (cf. p. 33), and it probably comes from the same primary source. If we calculate per capita spending on health services in 1970 on the basis of the same population figure as for 1959, we thus get an increase from 32 escudos to 56 escudos, or just about 2 U.S. dollars per capita in 1970. Even if this means that per capita spending almost doubled in a decade, the figure is still extremely low, even in comparison with other West African countries (cf. table 14, p. 39). It can of course be accepted as an indication of relative improvement, but in absolute terms it signifies social misery.

In fact, it is perhaps not quite fair to use the figures now quoted as indicators of Spínola's desire to carry out a social "revolution" in Guinea. His efforts had only begun in 1970, while the statistics do not go beyond that year. But in October 1970, Spínola spoke again, this time to the Legislative Council in Bissau.¹⁴⁵ An important part of his message contained the news that another 50 million escudos (1.75 million dollars) would be added to the investment program of the third development plan for 1968–73, which in its original version foresees investments for 1,259 million escudos.¹⁴⁶ But 50

¹⁴³ *Síntese Monográfica da Guiné*, p. 49.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

¹⁴⁵ *Diário de Notícias*, November 1, 1971.

¹⁴⁶ *III Plano de Fomento para 1968–1973, Guiné*, p. 92.

million escudos was only an increase of 4 percent. It cannot qualify as a revolutionary measure.

Even granted that some material progress was achieved in what remained of "Portuguese" Guinea under Spínola, this does not mean that Spínola or anyone else would have been able to create any legitimacy for the colonial system. It was never reasonable to expect the people of Guinea to have much faith in the sincerity of the representatives of the colonial system, who spoke of progress and cooperation, and even of mobilization and revolution, but let their words be accompanied by a merciless war of terror against the very movement that had forced the new language upon them. Nor could the people reasonably be expected to interpret the material improvements hastily introduced after the successes of the liberation movement as proof of the sincerity of the colonial authorities. The reforms appeared rather as unwilling concessions, forced upon the colonial authorities through the new situation created by the liberation movement.

In spite of his public oratory, Governor Spínola was himself beginning to despair of success in the struggle to uphold the colonial system in Africa that he was helping to lead. On August 31, 1973, many months before his second term as governor was due to expire, he was suddenly removed from his post, for reasons of "bad health". He was replaced by another general, 55-year old José Bettencourt Rodrigues, a former army minister under Salazar who had also served as commander in eastern Angola.¹⁴⁷

Portugal and the future

Upon his return to Lisbon, in September 1974, Spínola was received as a national hero and, in December, appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, a post created especially for him. But Prime Minister Caetano was soon to be bitterly surprised by the man he had hoped, in this way, to tie to the official line of the regime.

On February 22, 1974, Spínola published a book entitled *Portugal and the Future*, where he formulated the most important of the lessons he had learnt as commander of a colonial army engaged in an attempt to hold back national liberation.

The central political message of the book was that "an exclusively military victory was impossible" in the kind of war Portugal was fighting in Africa.¹⁴⁸ Furthermore, the war was catastrophic to the Portuguese nation itself in numerous social, political, economic, and moral ways, as analyzed in the first

¹⁴⁷ *Financial Times*, August 31, 1973. (*Facts and Reports*, no. 1194, Vol. 3, no. 19, September 19, 1973). After the 1974 coup, Bettencourt was removed from his post by the new government in Lisbon.

¹⁴⁸ António de Spínola, *Portugal e o futuro*, Lisbon, Arcadia, 1974, p. 45 (this and subsequent translations have been made by the author).

chapter. It was therefore necessary to accept the principle of self-determination for the African territories, Spínola wrote,¹⁴⁹ pointing out in his concluding chapter that he was fully aware of the "risks" involved in such a policy of "respect for the right of peoples to determine their own fate" (although within the framework of union with Portugal) but that he was equally conscious of the "still more serious risks involved in ignoring or refusing" such a policy.¹⁵⁰ A few pages earlier, Spínola had declared:

We must continue in Africa. Yes! But not by the force of arms, not by suppressing the Africans, not by sustaining myths that enrage the world. We must continue in Africa. Yes! But with a clear vision of the problems within the framework of a Portuguese solution.¹⁵¹

Portugal and the Future rapidly became an enormous best-seller in Portugal, and on March 12, 1974, only a few weeks after it had been published, its author was dismissed from his post as Deputy Chief of Staff.¹⁵² The grounds for the important and dramatic events that followed afterwards had been prepared by the Armed Forces Movement of younger officers who were dissatisfied with the meaningless colonial wars and the deteriorating social and economic situation at home in Portugal. This is not the place for a further analysis of these events.¹⁵³ But it is difficult, in the context of the present book, not to ask oneself whether António de Spínola would ever have become President of Portugal, had it not been for the lessons he learnt from the people of Guinea-Bissau and from the PAIGC.

The coup and after

On May 28, 1926, a military *coup* paved the way in Portugal for a dictatorship that would last for almost half a century and would become the last of the classical colonial powers. On April 25, 1974, the young officers of those very same armed forces, as in 1926, overthrew the dictatorship by a second *coup*.

On the day of the 1974 *coup*, the Lisbon daily newspaper *República* carried the following front-page headlines:

The Armed Forces have taken Power. For the People and for its Freedoms.¹⁵⁴

At the bottom of the same page it was specifically announced that this issue of the paper had not been "scrutinized by any censorship commission what-

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 242 f.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 236.

¹⁵² *Le Monde*, March 17–18, 1974.

¹⁵³ A thorough analysis of the information available by the end of May 1974 has been made by Gerald J. Bender in "Portugal and her Colonies Join the Twentieth Century. Causes and initial implications of the military coup", *Ufahamu*, vol 4, no. 3, winter 1974, pp. 121–162.

¹⁵⁴ *República*, Lisbon, April 25, 1974, 2nd ed. (this and subsequent translations have been made by the author).

soever". A number of demands for the immediate future, formulated by the Lisbon section of the rebelling soldiers, were also published on the back page of the *República*. First among these demands was the following:

End the colonial war and open negotiations with the movements of liberation, on the basis of the right of all peoples to self-determination and independence.¹⁵⁵

Some shooting was reported but not much blood was shed. The response of the people to the fall of the old regime was overwhelmingly positive and enthusiastic. A provisional military government, headed by António de Spínola, was installed almost immediately. Three weeks after the *coup*, on May 15, Spínola was sworn in as the new President of Portugal. On the following day he appointed a new government. Among the ministers were Alvaro Cunhal, the formerly exiled Secretary General of the Communist Party of Portugal, and, as Foreign Minister, Mario Soares, Secretary General of the Social Democratic Party, formerly exiled as well.¹⁵⁶

On the very day of his appointment, Soares flew to Dakar, the capital of Senegal, where he met with Aristides Pereira, Secretary General of the PAIGC.¹⁵⁷ Thus began a long series of both official and unofficial meetings and complicated negotiations between the various liberation movements and representatives of the new Portuguese regime. As far as Guinea-Bissau was concerned, the status of the islands of Cape Verde was the most difficult problem to resolve.

Here, we shall not attempt to follow the various twists and turns in the negotiations, which had not yet been concluded as the manuscript of this book went to the printer. But after an intensive power struggle among Portugal's new rulers, President Spínola finally had to announce, in a broadcast speech on July 27, 1974, that Portugal was prepared to grant independence to Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique:

The moment has come to recognize the right of the populations of the overseas provinces to take their destinies in their own hands. We are, as of now, ready to begin the process of transferring powers, in particular to the populations of Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique.¹⁵⁸

In this central part of his declaration, Spínola still avoided the use of the term "independence", according to the report available to the author. But the term appeared in another passage. Portugal was ready, Spínola said, to

welcome all initiatives towards preparing and carrying through the process of decolonization in Africa, including the immediate acceptance of the right to political independence.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁵ *República*, April 25, 1974.

¹⁵⁶ *Le Monde*, May 17, 1974.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, May 18, 1974.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, July 28–29, 1974 (this and subsequent translations of the reports quoted from *Le Monde* in connection with Spínola's declaration have been made by the author).

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, July 30, 1974.

On the day before Spínola's speech, Foreign Minister Soares had been even more explicit with regard to Guinea-Bissau:

We are about to settle the last details in order to arrive at recognition of the state of Guinea-Bissau.¹⁶⁰

Soares refused to state, however, whether he included the islands of Cape Verde in his statement.¹⁶¹

When Spínola spoke of independence in his July 27 speech, this was the first time he did so in public. But ever since the month of May, other members of the Portuguese government had been less reserved. On the day before Spínola's speech, for instance, Soares had spoken not only of Guinea-Bissau and the islands of Cape Verde, but he had also made a statement referring to all three territories of mainland Africa. In this statement, Soares used the term independence, while recognizing that the problems were more complicated with regard to Angola and Mozambique than with regard to Guinea-Bissau:

We are anti-colonialists. We are prepared to carry the process of decolonization to its very end. For us, this means self-determination and independence.¹⁶²

A few days earlier, on July 23, the permanent representative of Portugal at the United Nations had declared that Portugal intended to vote for the admission of Guinea-Bissau as an independent member-state of the United Nations at the coming autumn session of the General Assembly.¹⁶³

On the day of the declaration by the President of the Republic, a new constitutional law was published in the Official Journal:

The principle that the solution to the overseas wars is political and not military, according to the program of the Armed Forces Movement, implies the recognition by Portugal of the right of all peoples to self-determination, in agreement with the Charter of the United Nations.

The recognition of the right to self-determination, with all its consequences, includes acceptance of the independence of the overseas territories and the abrogation of article 1 of the Constitution of 1933.¹⁶⁴

The abrogated article 1 of the 1933 Constitution stated that the overseas territories were integral parts of Portugal.

On the same day, Luís Cabral, President of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, issued a statement from Algiers:

We are optimists at this decisive moment of the history of our two peoples. We believe that the Portuguese have decided to fulfill their responsibilities with regard to our people. Today, at the beginning of this new era, we hope that all will pass excellently. Thus, fraternal cooperation will be established, in the interest of our two peoples.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁰ *Le Monde*, July 28–29, 1974.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, July 26, 1974.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, July 30, 1974.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

A few weeks later, on September 10, 1974, the Republic of Guinea-Bissau was formally recognized by Portugal.¹⁶⁶

On September 17, 1974, the Republic of Guinea-Bissau was unanimously admitted by the General Assembly as a member-state of the United Nations. As early as on August 12, this had been unanimously recommended by the Security Council.¹⁶⁷

The right to independence recognized on July 27, 1974, was a considerable step from the self-determination "within the framework of a Portuguese solution" still proposed by Spínola five months earlier in the book that had sparked the chain of events leading to the *coup* and finally bringing himself to the presidency. And it was a giant step from the position maintained by Spínola while he was still the governor of Guinea, not so long ago.

In March 1972, Spínola had spoken in Bissau to a group of soldiers on their way back to Portugal after having served in Guinea. The soldiers were told that they had been fighting for the "welfare of their African brothers":

We do not strive to achieve military victories for futile and transitory satisfaction. We merely wish to gain peace in order to build a better life for the Portuguese to be born in this country, Portuguese of a different skin colour than ours, but as Portuguese as any of us. We fight for a life of more justice, more equality, more welfare, and above all for a life in which all will have an equal chance to succeed.¹⁶⁸

Such was the official Portuguese position with regard to the liberation of Guinea until the eve of April 25, 1974. We have seen earlier in this chapter that the credibility of that position could not stand confrontation with the relevant facts of the case. It was in fact hard to see how it could possibly have been more hollow than it was. In the following chapters we shall examine the alternative offered by the PAIGC.

¹⁶⁶ *Le Monde*, August 28, 1974, publishes the agreement. The fact of recognition was reported on September 12, 1974.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, September 19 and August 14, 1974.

¹⁶⁸ *Diário de Notícias*, March 21, 1972 (translated by the author).

III. The Ideology and Concrete Goals of the PAIGC

The PAIGC is a national liberation movement. This means that it is a political organization working for the liberation of a country which has come under alien rule through the historical process of classical colonialism and which has not been able through peaceful means, even in the period of "decolonization", to persuade the colonial power to give up its direct political control over the territory and resources of the country. Consequently the most immediate goal of the PAIGC, until 1974, was to achieve political independence from the Portuguese colonial power by all possible means, including armed struggle.

But political independence is not an ultimate goal in this context, it is merely a necessary station along the road leading into the future. The broader and more comprehensive goal is social and human liberation from the underdevelopment imposed by history upon Guinea-Bissau and the islands of Cape Verde. In this chapter we shall study the political ideology through which this broad and comprehensive goal is concretized into more specific short- and long-range goals for the work of social transformation. We shall also try to establish the character of these more specific goals, and we shall note the intimate connection, both in theory and in practice, between the achievement of the goal of political independence and the chance to achieve the other specific goals of the national liberation movement.

Our main sources for this study of the ideology and concrete goals of the PAIGC are the party program, the guidelines for the party workers written by Amílcar Cabral, and some of the most important among the many other political and ideological analyses and declarations made by Cabral during the course of the struggle. In addition to these main sources, we shall also use some such material as programs of study for the schools, political tracts and booklets, internal party journals, and other similar types of documentation.

As far as written presentations of ideology and concrete goals are concerned, the position of Cabral has been so dominant within the PAIGC that this chapter will inevitably develop into a brief summary and analysis of the political thinking of Cabral. Hopefully, this will demonstrate to the reader the

independence and sharpness of Cabral's contributions to the analysis of the problems of development in the so-called third world.

General ideology and analysis of society

The word "socialism" is not found in the party program of the PAIGC.¹ Nor is it used very often in other documents and policy declarations. Still there can be no doubt whatsoever that the ideology and social analysis of the PAIGC that we encounter in these documents are socialist in character — to an even greater extent than many other "ideologies" whose representatives brandish the value-loaded label of socialism more readily than does the PAIGC. The reason is simply that Amílcar Cabral always made an unusually clear distinction between the formulation of concrete goals attainable for a country in the historical situation of Guinea-Bissau and the type of theoretical thinking necessary to come to grips with the reality of such a country. According to Cabral's view, the goal of a socialist society in Guinea-Bissau is still very distant, as Guinea-Bissau is still an economically and technologically undeveloped agricultural country, which has also become underdeveloped through the mechanisms of colonial dependency. The social analysis applied to the situation of Guinea-Bissau, on the other hand, can still be socialist in the sense of using marxist points of departure and consequently viewing socialism as a natural and desirable long-range goal for the development of society. In this perspective, socialism, and ultimately communism as well, simply become synonymous with human emancipation and liberation.²

The weapon of theory

The most complete version ever given by Cabral of his general theoretical view of the conditions of social transformation in a colonized, dependent, and underdeveloped country, such as his own, is found in the address he delivered to the first Tricontinental Conference of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in Havana in January 1966.³ In this address Cabral develops a clear and systematic marxist view of history, which he applies to the problems of

¹ See Appendix

² Cf. note 1, p. 227.

³ This text has been published in a number of versions, in several different languages. The most complete printed version is found in English, entitled "The Weapon of Theory", in Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea*, pp. 73–90. A briefer French version was first printed in the journal *Partisans* (Paris), no. 26–27, 1966, pp. 109–119, under the title of "L'arme de la théorie", and later reprinted under the same title in a book with speeches made by Cabral, *Guinée "portugaise": le pouvoir des armes*, Paris, Maspero, 1970, pp. 41–62. The quotations given in the following text follow, with some very minor modifications, the English-language version of Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea*. But they have been checked against a mimeographed

national liberation in the third world of our times. The remainder of our source materials do not contain any more clearly stated, additional, or essentially different, general ideological formulations, that would in any important way change the picture given by Cabral in Havana of his own ideological frame, and thereby of that of the PAIGC. In dealing with the general ideology and social analysis of the PAIGC, we may therefore concentrate our attention to Cabral's speech at the Tricontinental.

An important introductory point made by Cabral is that the struggle for national liberation is a struggle that has to be carried out by the peoples themselves in their own countries and against their own weaknesses:

Obviously, other cases differ from that of Guinea; but our experience has shown us (the PAIGC) that in the general framework of daily struggle this battle against ourselves — no matter what difficulties the enemy may create — is the most difficult of all, whether for the present or the future of our peoples. This battle is the expression of the internal contradictions in the economic, social, cultural — and therefore historical — reality of each of our countries. We are convinced that any national or social revolution which is not based on knowledge of this fundamental reality runs grave risk of being condemned to failure.⁴

In order to successfully carry on the struggle against the contradictions of your own society, it is necessary to know what you are doing, what you are able to do, and what you want to do. It is necessary in other words to have an *ideology*, a system of valuations and factual knowledge that ties together your political goals and the conditions of reality:

The ideological deficiency, not to say the total lack of ideology, within the national liberation movements — which is basically due to ignorance of the historical reality which these movements claim to transform — constitutes one of the greatest weaknesses of our struggle against imperialism, if not the greatest weakness of all.⁵

By way of these and a few other introductory points, Cabral approaches his main subject, which is an attempt to survey the historical reality within which the global rising of our times against colonialism and imperialism is taking place. By offering his analysis of this historical reality, he wishes to make a contribution to our knowledge of "the foundations and objectives of national liberation in relation to the social structure". As we have seen, Cabral was of the opinion that no effective ideology could be worked out without such a theoretical knowledge of reality.

At the beginning of his theoretical analysis, Cabral discusses the old question of what constitutes "the motive force of history". He accepts the

version of the original, published by the PAIGC secretariat itself: *Fondements et objectifs de la libération nationale. I—Sur la domination impérialiste*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), 1966. This version, however, which is only an extract, does not contain the last three passages quoted here. These have therefore been taken directly from Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea*.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

traditional marxist view that this motive force is provided by class struggle, but he wishes to revise and specify this classical postulate in order to make it more applicable to the situations of colonized and imperialistically dominated peoples. Thus he broadens his analysis to include international conditions and factors, and the effects of these upon the internal conditions of particular countries.

To begin with, Cabral views the genesis of social classes in the following way:

The socio-economic phenomenon 'class' is created and develops as a function of at least two essential and interdependent variables — the level of productive forces and the pattern of ownership of the means of production. This development takes place slowly, gradually and unevenly, by quantitative and generally imperceptible variations in the fundamental components; once a certain degree of accumulation is reached, this process then leads to a *qualitative jump*, characterised by the appearance of classes and of conflict between them.⁶

Thus far Cabral remains within the framework of conventional or classical marxism. The same is true also of the next step in his argument, where international and global conditions are brought into the picture:

Clearly, however, the possibilities of this process are noticeably influenced by external factors, and particularly by the interaction of human groups. This interaction is considerably increased by the development of means of transport and communication which has created the modern world, eliminating the isolation of human groups within one area, of areas within one continent, and between continents. This development, characteristic of a long historical period which began with the invention of the first means of transport, was already more evident at the time of the Punic voyages and in the Greek colonisation, and was accentuated by maritime discoveries, the invention of the steam engine and the discovery of electricity. And in our own times, with the progressive domesticization of atomic energy it is possible to promise, if not to take men to the stars, at least to humanize the universe.⁷

Here Cabral arrives at a point in his argument which is essential to him in his capacity as political leader of a people whose internal class struggle up to the present has not been very pronounced. This is also where Cabral wants to revise and specify the traditional marxist postulate about the motive force of history:

This leads us to pose the following question: does history begin only with the development of the phenomenon of 'class', and consequently of class struggle? To reply in the affirmative would be to place outside history the whole period of life of human groups from the discovery of hunting, and later of nomadic and sedentary agriculture, to the organization of herds and the private appropriation of land. It would also be to consider — and this we refuse to accept — that various human groups in Africa, Asia and Latin America were living without history, or outside history, at the time when they were subjected to the yoke of imperialism. It would be to consider that the peoples of our countries, such as the Balantes of Guinea, the Coaniamas of

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 76 f.

Angola and the Macondes of Mozambique, are still living today — if we abstract the slight influence of colonialism to which they have been subjected — outside history, or that they have no history.

Our refusal, based as it is on concrete knowledge of the socioeconomic reality of our countries and on the analysis of the process of development of the phenomenon 'class', as we have seen earlier, leads us to conclude that if class struggle is the motive force of history, it is so only in a specific historical period. This means that *before* the class struggle — and necessarily *after* it, since in this world there is no before without an after — one or several other factors was and will still be the motive force of history.

It is not difficult to see that this factor in the history of each human group is the *mode of production* — the level of productive forces and the pattern of ownership — characteristic of that group. Furthermore, as we have seen, classes themselves, class struggle and their subsequent definition, are the result of the development of the productive forces in conjunction with the pattern of ownership of the means of production. It therefore seems correct to conclude that the level of productive forces, the essential determining element in the content and form of class struggle, is the true and permanent motive force of history.

If we accept this conclusion, then the doubts in our minds are cleared away. Because if on the one hand we can see that the existence of history before the class struggle is guaranteed, and thus avoid for some human groups in our countries — and perhaps in our continent — the sad position of being peoples without any history, then on the other hand we can see that history has continuity, even after the disappearance of class struggle or of classes themselves.⁸

If we accept the view that the origin of social classes is found in the interaction between the productive forces at a given level and the relations of production⁹ — i.e. in the mode of production, which in marxist terminology is the comprehensive abstract term for the totality of this interaction — then we may also accept the formal logic of Cabral's reasoning, when he argues that the *mode of production* is a more basic factor than the class struggle itself, and that consequently the level of development of the productive forces ought to be designated as "the true and permanent motive force of history". But then again, it does not seem to be in very good agreement with the dialectical view of marxism to regard a *level* of development as a *motive force*.

According to Marx himself, it is precisely the dialectical tension, the contradiction, between the level of productive forces and the relations of production that generates classes and class struggle, accelerating thereby the development of history. It is true that the level of productive forces is the ultimate determining factor in this process, but this hardly makes it the sole motive force. There is no way of getting around the fact that history is moved by *contradictions* according to the dialectical view. It appears therefore that Cabral could have refuted more effectively the polemical and superficial view

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

⁹ As seen from the last quotation, Cabral does not say "relations of production" but "pattern of ownership". But there is nothing in the context indicating that by this he would mean anything different from what marxists generally call relations of production.

that some peoples lack history¹⁰ by arguing instead along the lines of Mao Tse-tung, basing himself upon the Chinese leader's statement that "contradictions arise continually and are continually resolved; this is the dialectical law of the development of things".¹¹

As is well known, Mao recognizes the possibility of contradictions arising also in a socialist society. But these are "contradictions among the people" and not contradictions between the people and their enemies. Consequently, the contradictions of a socialist society are non-antagonistic rather than antagonistic. It is of course possible to imagine, in analogous manner, that history was moved by non-antagonistic contradictions also before the emergence of class struggle. If so, also primitive hunting and nomadic peoples would have their places in history secured. Moreover, Mao himself writes, with a formulation supporting this interpretation, that "contradictions among the people have always existed".¹²

But regardless of whether Cabral is true to dialectics or not on this specific point, he is obviously on safe factual ground when arguing for the right of all peoples to their own history. The idea that living and working peoples would not have any "history", simply because they do not meet certain formal requirements raised from the outside, is so clearly unreasonable that it may seem surprising that Cabral even bothers to argue against it. But he wishes to safeguard against any attempt to use the criterion of class struggle ethnocentrically, in order to place the peoples of the third word "outside history" until the arrival of the Europeans.¹³

After having made this politically important point, Cabral goes on to the question of stages of historical development. He starts by presenting a three-step scheme of his own, that differs at a couple of important points from the

¹⁰ This is not the view of classical marxism, nor, of course, does it have anything to do with social science. In his preface to the 1883 German edition of the *Communist Manifesto* (here quoted from *Communist Manifesto, Socialist Landmark*, with an introduction by Harold Laski, London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1948), Friedrich Engels wrote, referring to "the basic thought running through the *Manifesto*", that "... (ever since the dissolution of the primeval communal ownership of land) all history has been a history of class struggles", p. 109. And in a footnote (no. 1), on p. 125, to the categorical formulation in the text of the manifesto that "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles", we find the following reservation: "That is, all *written* history."

¹¹ Mao Tse-tung, *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1957, p. 26. Cf. also the preceding pages of the same essay.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹³ A characteristic example of the kind of schematic thinking Cabral was arguing against is found in Endre Sik, *The History of Black Africa*, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1966, Vol. I. In his introduction; Sik writes, for instance (p. 17), that it is unrealistic to speak of the history of most African peoples—"in the scientific sense of the word"—before the arrival of the Europeans, because "the State, taken in the real sense of the word, was a notion unknown to most African peoples, as classes did not exist there either. Or rather—both existed already, but only in embryo." And specifically with regard to the peoples of the Guinea coast, Sik allows his terminological apparatus to trap him into writing (p. 45) that "we cannot speak of their history prior to the end of the 15th century".

classical marxist scheme, in which feudalism-capitalism-socialism are preceded by primitive societies (sometimes also slave societies) and eventually end up in communism. In the three-step scheme of Cabral, traditional agricultural societies have a place of their own and are not regarded simply as pre-stages to feudalism. Instead, feudal and bourgeois societies are regarded as sub-stages of one and the same general stage, i.e. the stage of private appropriation of the means of production. Thus we again see that Cabral is anxious to do justice to a historical perspective differing from the one-eyed occidental perspective, but without abandoning the theoretical tools of marxism. He may, on the contrary, have contributed to sharpening these tools through his effort to make them more globally applicable:

The foregoing, and the reality of our times, allow us to state that the history of one human group or of humanity goes through at least three stages.

The first is characterized by a low level of productive forces — of man's domination over nature; the mode of production is of a rudimentary character, private appropriation of the means of production does not yet exist, there are no classes, nor, consequently, is there any class struggle.

In the second stage, the increased level of productive forces leads to private appropriation of the means of production, progressively complicates the mode of production, provokes conflicts of interest within the socio-economic whole in movement, and makes possible the appearance of the phenomenon 'class' and hence of class struggle, the social expression of the contradiction in the economic field between the mode of production and private appropriation of the means of production.

In the third stage, once a certain level of productive forces is reached, the elimination of private appropriation of the means of production is made possible, and is carried out, together with the elimination of the phenomenon 'class', and hence of class struggle; new and hitherto unknown forces in the historical process of the socio-economic whole are then unleashed.

In politico-economic language, the first stage would correspond to the communal agricultural and cattle-raising society, in which the social structure is horizontal, without any state; the second to feudal or assimilated agricultural or agro-industrial bourgeois societies, with a vertical social structure and a state; the third to socialist or communist societies, in which the economy is mainly, if not exclusively, industrial (since agriculture itself becomes a form of industry) and in which the state tends to progressively disappear, or actually disappears, and where the social structure returns to horizontality, at a higher level of productive forces, social relations and appreciation of human values.¹⁴

Thus Cabral does not hesitate when speaking, at this theoretical and abstract level, about the long-range goals of the development of society. He presumes that man through history strives to achieve the total and free development of his possibilities in life. He defines the goal of this universal striving in socialist terms. He also analyzes the long road leading toward that goal — i.e. the past and probable future history of mankind — by applying the perspective of historical materialism. But the vantage point of Cabral is not

¹⁴ Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea*, p. 78.

that of a European or North American theoretician, but that of a leader of a people engaged in a most concrete struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Therefore, the perspective of historical materialism as applied by Cabral does not always catch exactly the same nuances as those we have become used to encountering in the literature. The main differences, as we have seen, concern the emphasis Cabral places upon the existence of a pre-colonial history, and his consequent ambition to avoid defining traditional agricultural societies as mere pre-stages to history. By grouping feudal and bourgeois societies in the same broad category, Cabral also articulates a message of historical relativism that may have been useful to some of his European listeners in Havana.

Another theoretical problem of special importance for Cabral, because of his political role and tasks, concerns the time sequence of the historical stages of development. Do all countries have to go through exactly the same stages in exactly the same sequence? Cabral avoids having to answer that question in the affirmative, *inter alia* by drawing our attention to the fact of uneven development: some societies may be unevenly developed in the sense that different stages simultaneously manifest themselves concretely within the same society. Another important point concerns the fact of uneven international development, in itself often a cause of uneven internal development. Against this background Cabral claims that the countries and peoples of the third world, in spite of their present unfavorable positions, have a certain chance to free themselves of exploitation and underdevelopment by advancing fairly rapidly through the stages. In some cases, it may even be possible to bypass or jump the middle stage. The actual existence of socialist states in the world today is an important factor in this context:

We should also note that in the present phase of the life of humanity, and for a given socio-economic whole, the time sequence of the three characteristic stages is not indispensable. Whatever its level of productive forces and present social structure, a society can pass rapidly through the defined stages appropriate to the concrete local realities (both historical and human) and reach a higher stage of existence. This progress depends on the concrete possibilities of development of the society's productive forces and is governed mainly by the nature of the political power ruling the society, that is to say, by the type of state or, if one likes, by the character of the dominant class or classes within the society.

A more detailed analysis would show that the possibility of such a jump in the historical process arises mainly, in the economic field, from the power of the means available to man at the time for dominating nature, and, in the political field, from the new event which has radically changed the face of the world and the development of history, *the creation of socialist states*.

Thus we see that our peoples have their own history regardless of the stage of their economic development. When they were subjected to imperialist domination, the historical process of each of our peoples (or of the human groups of which they are composed) was subjected to the violent action of an external factor. This action — the impact of imperialism on our societies — could not fail to influence the process of development of the productive forces

in our countries and the social structures of our countries, as well as the content and form of our national liberation struggles.

But we also see that in the historical context of the development of these struggles, our peoples have the concrete possibility of going from their present situation of exploitation and underdevelopment to a new stage of their historical process which can lead them to a higher form of economic, social and cultural existence.¹⁵

In order to be better able to judge how real the possibility indicated here by Cabral actually is, it is necessary to make a detailed analysis, both of the international relations of dominance and dependence and of the effects of these relations upon the internal social structures of the dependent countries. It is necessary, in other words, to analyze imperialism and its effects. Cabral begins his version of this analysis by defining the concept of imperialism in accordance with the tradition of Lenin:

We will simply state that imperialism can be defined as a worldwide expression of the search for profits and the ever-increasing accumulation of *surplus value* by monopoly financial capital, centred in two parts of the world; first in Europe, and then in North America.¹⁶

In one sense we may say therefore, Cabral goes on, that imperialism is "piratry transplanted from the seas to dry land, piratry reorganized, consolidated and adapted to the aim of exploiting the natural and human resources of our peoples". In a slightly different sense, "we will not shock anybody by admitting that imperialism . . . has been a historical necessity, a consequence of the impetus given by the productive forces and of the transformations of the means of production . . ."¹⁷ But the most important thing is not to choose between moralizing and analytical ways of describing imperialism:

The important thing for our peoples is to know whether imperialism, in its role as capital in action, has fulfilled in our countries its historical mission: the acceleration of the process of development of the productive forces and their transformation in the sense of increasing complexity in the means of production; increasing the differentiation between the classes with the development of the bourgeoisie, and intensifying the class struggle; and appreciably raising the level of economic, social and cultural life of the peoples. It is also worth examining the influences and effects of imperialist action on the social structures and historical processes of our peoples.

We will not condemn nor justify imperialism here; we will simply state that as much on the economic level as on the social and cultural level, imperialist capital has not remotely fulfilled the historical mission carried out by capital in the countries of accumulation. This means that if, on the one hand, imperialist capital has had, in the great majority of the dominated countries, the simple function of multiplying surplus value, it can be seen on the other hand that the historical capacity of capital (as indestructible accelerator of the process of development of productive forces) depends strictly on its freedom, that is to say on the degree of independence

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

with which it is utilized. We must however recognize that in certain cases imperialist capital or moribund capitalism has had sufficient self-interest, strength and time to increase the level of productive forces (as well as building towns) and to allow a minority of the local population to attain a higher and even privileged standard of living, thus contributing to a process which some would call dialectical, by widening the contradictions within the societies in question. In other, even rarer cases, there has existed the possibility of accumulation of capital, creating the conditions for the development of a local bourgeoisie.¹⁸

Cabral then distinguishes two general forms of imperialist domination:

The first is direct domination, by means of a political power made up of people foreign to the dominated people (armed forces, police, administrative agents and settlers); this is generally called *classical colonialism or colonism*. The second form is indirect domination, by a political power made up mainly or completely of native agents; this is called *neo-colonialism*.¹⁹

As far as classical colonialism or colonialism is concerned, Cabral distinguishes three types of consequences for the dominated people:

(a) total destruction, generally accompanied by immediate or gradual elimination of the native population and, consequently, by the substitution of a population from outside; (b) partial destruction, generally accompanied by a greater or lesser influx of population from outside; (c) apparent conservation, conditioned by confining the native society to zones or reserves generally offering no possibilities of living, accompanied by massive implantation of population from outside.²⁰

The two latter cases are relevant to the problem of national liberation. In both types of cases, imperialism produces paralysis, stagnation, and in some cases even historical regression. But this paralysis is not complete, Cabral emphasizes:

In one sector or another of the socio-economic whole in question, noticeable transformations can be expected, caused by the permanent action of some internal (local) factors or by the action of new factors introduced by the colonial domination, such as the introduction of money and the development of urban centres. Among these transformations we should particularly note, in certain cases, the progressive loss of prestige of the ruling native classes or sectors, the forced or voluntary exodus of part of the peasant population to the urban centres, with the consequent development of new social strata; salaried workers, clerks, employees in commerce and the liberal professions, and an instable stratum of unemployed. In the countryside there develops, with very varied intensity and always linked to the urban milieu, a stratum made up of small landowners.²¹

Cabral also points out that imperialist domination in the neo-colonial form is maintained by relying upon a local "bourgeoisie or pseudo-bourgeoisie". Both under colonialism and neo-colonialism, "the essential characteristic of imperialist domination" therefore remains the same, he says:

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 80 f.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 81 f.

The negation of the historical process of the dominated people by means of violent usurpation of the freedom of development of the national productive forces. This observation, which identifies the essence of the two apparent forms of imperialist domination, seems to us to be of major importance for the thought and action of liberation movements, both in the course of struggle and after the winning of independence.²²

It follows from this observation that "national liberation exists only when the national productive forces have been completely freed from every kind of foreign domination".²³ Only then will a people "return to history", as Cabral likes to put it.

This means that, bearing in mind the essential characteristics of the present world economy, as well as experiences already gained in the field of anti-imperialist struggle, the principal aspect of national liberation struggle is the struggle against neo-colonialism. Furthermore, if we accept that national liberation demands a profound mutation in the process of development of the productive forces, we see that this phenomenon of *national liberation* necessarily corresponds to a *revolution*. The important thing is to be conscious of the objective and subjective conditions in which this revolution can be made and to know the type or types of struggle most appropriate for its realisation.²⁴

These conditions are both favorable and unfavorable, but Cabral wants to call attention to the unfavorable conditions existing both internationally and internally, within the dominated countries:

On the international level, it seems to us that the following factors, at least, are unfavourable to national liberation movements: the neo-colonial situation of a great number of states which, having won political independence, are now tending to join up with others already in that situation; the progress made by neo-capitalism, particularly in Europe, where imperialism is adopting preferential investments, encouraging the development of a privileged proletariat and thus lowering the revolutionary level of the working classes; the open or concealed neo-colonial position of some European states which, like Portugal, still have colonies; the so-called policy of 'aid for undeveloped countries' adopted by imperialism with the aim of creating or reinforcing native pseudo-bourgeoisies which are necessarily dependent on the international bourgeoisie, and thus obstructing the part of revolution; the claustrophobia and revolutionary timidity which have led some recently independent states whose internal economic and political conditions are favourable to revolution to accept compromises with the enemy or its agents; the growing contradictions between anti-imperialist states; and, finally, the threat to world peace posed by the prospect of atomic war on the part of imperialism. All these factors reinforce the action of imperialism against the national liberation movements.²⁵

It is true that "the repeated interventions and growing aggressiveness" of imperialism can be seen as signs of weakness and desperation. But they can also be explained as resulting from the weaknesses produced by the international factors unfavorable to the anti-imperialist struggle listed above, to which we must also add the internal factors:

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 82 f.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

On the internal level, we believe that the most important weaknesses or unfavorable factors are inherent in the socio-economic structure and in the tendencies of its evolution under imperialist pressure, or to be more precise in the little or no attention paid to the characteristics of this structure and these tendencies by the national liberation movements in deciding on the strategy of their struggles.²⁶

By saying this, Cabral does not mean to understate the importance of other internal factors unfavorable to national liberation, "such as economic underdevelopment, the consequent social and cultural backwardness of the popular masses, tribalism and other contradictions of lesser importance".²⁷ But he wishes to distinguish between factors of greater and lesser importance, and he is anxious to emphasize that the national liberation movements must seek the answers to their strategic questions by analyzing the social structures of the societies they want to transform.

The basic questions implied in Cabral's analysis are apparently simple but nevertheless fundamental: what social groups and classes will lose and what social groups and classes will gain from continued underdevelopment? What social groups and classes stand to gain from national liberation? By putting these kinds of questions, the analyst will be able to see more clearly. The problem of tribalism, for instance, will be reduced to reasonable proportions. For as Cabral points out, tribal sentiments are often exploited by opportunistic leaders, who themselves have ceased to conceive of reality in tribal terms. "Contradictions between classes, even when only embryonic, are of far greater importance than contradictions between tribes."²⁸

At this point we may leave our summary of Cabral's speech in Havana, as its remaining parts deal mainly with organizational problems and questions of how national liberation movements are to use, concretely, various social contradictions in their struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism, and imperialism. We shall return to some of these problems later in this chapter, when dealing with the concrete short-range goals of the PAIGC. But our presentation will then be based upon more relevant source materials than the general analysis of principles delivered to the international audience in Havana.

By presenting this summary of important parts of Cabral's main theoretical contribution, we have also given a picture of the general ideology and analysis of society embraced by the PAIGC.

We have shown that the official views of the PAIGC on the problems of colonialism, neo-colonialism, and imperialism are in agreement with modern marxist views. The conclusion that no meaningful liberation is possible for the

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

peoples of the third world, unless their ties of unilateral dominance by and dependence upon the developed capitalist countries are broken, is fully consistent with the theoretical points of departure of the analysis. that the main burden of carrying out the task of liberation falls upon the peoples of each country themselves.

But Cabral hardly even touches the difficult problem of how such small, poor, and economically underdeveloped countries as Guinea-Bissau will ever be able to manage alone the task of breaking out of underdevelopment, even if they were to succeed in establishing independent revolutionary regimes. By extending his argument logically, however, we may conclude that a common international strategy for revolutionary countries is a precondition for the fulfillment of third-world national liberation in the direction of socialism. But this problem is not dealt with by Cabral in the document we have now analyzed. Nor does he seem to have made it the object of thorough analysis anywhere else, at least not in published writings.²⁹

This theoretical lacuna — for it is a lacuna — is obviously connected with the fact that the PAIGC in practical politics, ever since the foundation of the movement, has been so intensely preoccupied with the struggle against *colonialism*. But the problem now indicated will make itself felt again at the very moment this preliminary struggle is won and is succeeded by the equally necessary struggle against *neo-colonialism*— i.e. the struggle against imperialist domination of independent states. In order to remain true to its basic objectives, as outlined by Cabral, the PAIGC will then have to develop the ideology of the movement on this particular point. As we have now seen, the general theoretical framework for such an ideological development has already been clearly stated by Cabral. But this does not mean that the concrete obstacles to international revolutionary solidarity in a harsh and unevenly developed world have been cleared out of the way.

Internally manifested ideology

In order not to rely exclusively upon a document presenting the ideology and general analysis of society of the PAIGC to an international audience, we shall now for the sake of comparison consider also a few important points in

²⁹ In 1972, the Finnish author Mikko Pyhälä sent Cabral a number of written questions, the answers to which he was going to use for a book. Pyhälä has kindly made both his own questions and Cabral's answers available to the present author. One question concerned the possibility for such a small country as Guinea-Bissau to exist, in the future, "as an independent economic unit in the integrating world economy." Cabral answered (letter dated Conakry, April 24, 1972), *inter alia*, that there were many other countries, both in Europe and elsewhere, of about the same size as Guinea-Bissau. There was no reason to expect any blockade against Guinea-Bissau after independence. Certainly, the PAIGC would welcome economic relations with all countries respecting the sovereignty of Guinea-Bissau. "We shall never refuse, *a priori*, to establish economic relations with the capitalist countries, within a frame of mutual advantages: all will depend upon the conditions they propose to us, and we shall never accept conditions contrary to the interests of our people."

an entirely different document: i.e. the internal program of studies prepared for the political and military training of soldiers and medium-level party cadres within the army and inside the liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau. This training is offered at a kind of folk school set up for about three hundred students of varying age and background, close to the south-eastern border between Guinea-Bissau and the Republic of Guinea. The school is called the *Centro de Instrução Político Militar* (CIPM, center for political and military instruction).³⁰ We are interested here in seeing to what extent the way in which theoretical and ideological problems are approached at the CIPM reflects the general ideology manifested in more externally oriented political declarations. In a different context we shall return to the organization and practical work of this school, while confining ourselves here to the general ideological contents of the program of studies.

A translation of the entire program of studies of the CIPM is given in Appendix II. A summary is given on p. 222. In studying the different points of this program, the observer is soon struck by the fact that the more general points can easily be related to the ideology presented by Cabral to his audience in Havana — an ideology found also in other official documents of the PAIGC. There is nothing surprising about this. It is noted here merely as an indication of ideological consistency.

The marxist points of departure for the program of studies are obvious, as is the effort made to relate directly to the concrete reality of the third world, of Africa, and above all of Guinea-Bissau and the islands of Cape Verde. Examining the various headlines of the program a little more closely, we also find, among many other things, the same emphasis as in Cabral's text upon the internal social structure and the concrete consequences of colonial domination within the particular country under consideration — Guinea-Bissau in this case (points I, II, VIII of the more general program, and points 2, 5, and 7 of the more detailed program). At the same time, the authors of the program do not hesitate to locate the situation of their own country within its international political and economic context (points XII, XIII, and 11). Special attention is devoted to the more specifically African context (points X and 9). The meaning of national liberation is studied in a general way, but also specifically in relation to Portuguese colonialism (points XI and 10). Considerable attention is given to the problem of how to define the enemy — it is energetically emphasized to the soldiers and to the party cadres that the PAIGC is struggling against the Portuguese colonial regime and its imperialistic allies, but not against the Portuguese people (points IX and 8).

³⁰ In 1974, a second branch of the CIPM, with about 300 students, was at work in northern Guinea-Bissau, near the Senegalese border, south of Ziguinchor.

National and universal culture

Before proceeding to the section of this chapter dealing with the concrete goals set by the PAIGC for its work of social transformation in Guinea-Bissau, it is appropriate to give some attention also to the general ideological approach of the movement to the problem of national versus universal human culture. This problem is obviously of great importance for a movement of national liberation, aiming precisely at reconquering and defending the historical identity and self-esteem of a country. It was dealt with by Cabral in a memorial lecture, delivered on the first anniversary of the murder of Eduardo Mondlane, the late leader of the national liberation movement of Mozambique, FRELIMO.

Cabral's main point is that culture is a kind of total expression ("resultant") of the historical existence of a people. "It is perhaps the total expression of its (the people's) history, in the same way that a flower is the expression of a plant."³¹

As imperialist domination means that the center of gravity of a people's history is dislocated and appropriated by alien rulers — the historical process of the people is negated, as Cabral puts it — it also follows that imperialist domination halts or negates the process of cultural development of a people:

From this, we understand why the exercise of imperialist domination — as all other kinds of foreign domination — demands, for its own security, the oppression and attempted, direct or indirect, liquidation of the essential factors of the dominated people's culture.

If we study the history of the struggles for liberation, we find that they generally have been preceded by an upsurge of cultural manifestations, gradually concretizing themselves into an attempt, successful or not, to assert the cultural personality of the dominated people by an act of negation of the culture of the oppressor. Whatever the conditions under which a people have been subjected to foreign domination, and whatever the place of economic, political, and social factors in the practice of this domination, it is generally in the cultural realm that the germ of contest is found that leads to the structuring and development of the liberation movement.³²

Cabral then repeats his view — known to us from his speech in Havana — that the main objective of national liberation is to reconquer each people's right to its own history, and thus to liberate "the process of development of the national forces of production". This liberation will open new cultural perspectives for the society in question, "by returning to it its entire capacity to create progress".³³

After having freed themselves of foreign domination, the people will not be culturally free, until they return to the roads toward the future indicated by their own culture, and do this without

³¹ Cabral, *Libération nationale et culture*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), 1970, p. 4. This and subsequent translations into English from *Libération nationale et culture* have been made by the author.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 4 f.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

complexes and without underestimating the positive contributions of the culture of the oppressor. The people's culture is nourished by the living reality of their own environment. It rejects all harmful influences, as well as all subjection to foreign cultures.

We see thus that national liberation necessarily is an *act of culture*, in the same way that cultural oppression is a vital necessity to imperialist domination.

On the basis of what has now been said, we may regard the liberation movement as the organized political expression of a struggling people's culture. It is necessary, therefore, for the leadership of the movement to have a clear notion of the value of culture to the struggle, and also to have profound knowledge of the culture of their own people, regardless of the people's level of economic development.³⁴

In the subsequent parts of his memorial lecture, Cabral goes into these ideas in considerable detail. He concludes by restating his main theme, offering the following definition of the main goals of *cultural resistance*:

1. Development of a people's culture, and of all positive traits of the indigenous culture.
2. Development of a *national culture* on the basis of history and the gains made during the struggle itself.
3. Steady growth, within all social categories, of the people's *political and moral consciousness*, of *patriotism*, and of the spirit of sacrifice and devotion to the cause of independence, justice, and progress.
4. Development of a technical, technological, and *scientific* culture, in accordance with the demands of progress.
5. Development of a *universal culture*, aiming at total integration in the modern world and its perspectives of evolution, but based on a critical assimilation of the gains made by mankind in the fields of art, science, literature, etc.
6. Infinite and general elevation of human feelings, of solidarity, respect, and altruistic interest in fellow human beings.

It is quite possible to attain these goals. For under the concrete conditions of life of the peoples of Africa confronted with the challenge of imperialism, the armed struggle of liberation becomes an act enriching history — it becomes the main expression of our culture and our existence as Africans. At the moment of victory, it ought to manifest itself through a qualitative leap forward in the culture of the people in the process of freeing itself.

If this does not happen, then all the efforts and all the sacrifices of the struggle will have been in vain. The goals of the struggle will not have been reached, and the people will have spoiled a chance to make progress within the general frame of history.³⁵

As we shall see, both in the parts of this chapter dealing with the more concrete and specific goals of the movement and in the following chapters about the work and functioning of the PAIGC in reality, this view of the role of culture exists not only in the elaborate formulations of solemn declarations. It is, on the contrary, a well integrated and essential part of the ideology of the PAIGC. Thereby it is also an implement to be used for the systematic transformation of society, by contributing to the clarification of connections between the conditions of the present and the human emancipation that remains the goal of the PAIGC at the most general level.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 5 f.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

The concretization of ideology into political, economic, cultural, and social goals

It is natural to begin the investigation of the more specific goals of a political movement by looking at its program or political platform. The party program of the PAIGC is included in Appendix I of this book.³⁶ We can see there that it is divided into two parts: a "minor program" for the immediate struggle against colonialism, and a "major program".

It is obvious from the contents of the minor program that it was formulated at an early stage of the struggle — in actual fact as early as in 1961–62 — before the political organization had grown as strong as it did later and before the armed struggle had begun. The goals indicated in the minor program are therefore very basic ones, and even self-evident for a movement of national liberation on the threshold of armed struggle.

The major program, on the other hand, is more informative — both because of what it says and because of what it does not say. As already pointed out, it does not even contain the abstract term socialism. But we do find, instead, fairly concrete formulations of certain social and economic developmental goals.

Chapters I-V deal with the political goals. Just as with the points of the minor program, these must be regarded as rather self-evident in the present context: immediate and total independence, unity in various respects between Guinea-Bissau and the islands of Cape Verde, African unity, a modern democratic regime with explicit anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist aims. These goals can be said to follow directly from the fact that the PAIGC is a national liberation movement organized with the aim of liberating Guinea-Bissau and the islands of Cape Verde from Portuguese colonialism. Whatever the ideology embraced by the movement, these goals would probably still have had to be formulated in approximately the same manner, although the strong emphasis on African unity indicates political radicalism, as point V:1 also naturally does, stating that the democratic regime shall be not only democratic and non-confessional, but also anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist. But such political declarations belong rather within the frame of general ideology, and we must proceed to the following chapters of the program in order to get a somewhat more concrete image of the society the PAIGC claims to be aiming at.

Chapter VI of the program is entitled *Economic independence, a structured economy, and the development of production*. The first two points of this chapter are generally formulated: they tell us that all colonialistic and im-

³⁶ See pp. 253 ff.

perialistic relationships shall be terminated, and that the economy shall be planned and directed according to the principles of democratic centralism. It will certainly not be easy to apply these principles in a small and economically under-developed country, strongly dependent upon the outside world. Nor is anything concrete said about how the PAIGC proposes to go about this task, although it may be noted here that the task would be facilitated, were the PAIGC to succeed in carrying through the following points.

Under point VI:3 we are told that the PAIGC envisages four types of ownership: state, cooperative, private, and personal. The three first types concern the means of production and public services of various kinds. The intention is obviously to let state and cooperative ownership dominate, while the condition for private ownership is that "it be useful to rapid economic development". With regard to agriculture, the production of consumer goods, and handicrafts, it is explicitly stated that ownership will gradually become cooperative "on the basis of free consent", while the state will own all natural resources, means of industrial production, and means of communication and collective transportation.

Point VI:4 is about the modernization and diversification of agriculture in a more technical sense, while point VI:5 deals with the forms of land ownership. An agrarian reform is envisaged for the Cape Verde islands, with the purpose of putting an end to large-scale land-ownership and tenancy farming, and introducing instead a system under which land is owned by those who cultivate it — in other words, a strategy that can be seen as aiming either at the creation of a class of self-sufficient small landowners or as the first step toward one form or another of socialization of agriculture. From point VI:3 above, which foresees cooperative forms of agricultural ownership, we may conclude that the latter interpretation comes closest to reflecting the intentions of the authors of the program.

The conditions defining the agricultural problem of the mainland are completely different from those encountered on the islands, as there is no large group of private landowners exploiting landless agricultural workers or tenants on the mainland. Instead, as we saw in the previous chapter, land is owned in traditional collective forms, and the program only mentions in general terms that the traditional agricultural structures will be used and renewed in "the manner that will most benefit the progress of the people". In any case, no sudden or dramatic restructuring is envisaged.³⁷

³⁷ In a conversation with the author and a few other visitors from Sweden in December 1970, in Conakry, Cabral emphasized among other things how complicated it is to take the step from the traditional collective (communal) forms of land ownership and cultivation to modern forms of cooperation: "It is a positive thing that land is owned collectively. But this fact has also a negative aspect: the people do not love the land in the same way as farmers who own their land themselves." According to Cabral, it was necessary to move forward step by step, without dogmatism.

Point VI:6 suggests that the long-range economic goal of the liberation movement is industrialization, but that this will be introduced gradually and in forms that neither encourage speculation nor disturb the balance between urban and rural areas. Nothing is said, however, except perhaps by implication, about how this is to be achieved.

The final problem mentioned in the chapter dealing with the future economy of the country, in point VI:7, may perhaps be said to have been raised somewhat prematurely. It is difficult to see how Guinea-Bissau would be more able than other countries to manage the contradiction between the desire to have budgetary balance and no inflation on the one side and the desire to reach the goals of socio-economic development on the other. It has sometimes been difficult to avoid this contradiction even in completely state-controlled economies, and as far as the countries of the third world are concerned, the prescription of budgetary equilibrium has usually been given by various "experts" from the capitalist industrialized countries whose objective altruism in these matters may be questioned.

Chapter VII bears the general title *Justice and progress for all*, with two sub-headings: *at the social level* and *at the educational and cultural level* (in the following designated by A and B respectively).

Point VII:A:1 begins with the classical socialist formulation "elimination of the exploitation of man by man". It also contains a general declaration of intentions to struggle against all forms of humiliating oppression and exploitation of human beings, as well as against unjust profits and various kinds of social misery.

But we do not have to go any further than to point VII:A:2 in order to find more concrete formulations. In connection with guarantees for the protection of the rights of workers, this point promises an end to all kinds of forced labour, the centuries-old plague of the inhabitants of Portugal's territories "beyond the seas". The right to work for all who are able, is also mentioned here.

Points VII:A:3-6 speak of freedoms for unions and of various kinds of social welfare policies that will be introduced in the future independent state. Here, the most ideological formulations are found under point 4, which demands both active participation of workers "at all levels of national leadership" and active support of urban and rural mass organizations. The remaining social welfare policies suggested are similar to what is found or envisaged in most modern states, more or less irrespective of ideology.

The section dealing with education and culture (VII:B) takes for granted that all educational institutions shall be state-owned. Illiteracy is to be eliminated, free and compulsory primary education introduced. The need for vocational training is also emphasized. These matters are dealt with under the first two points.

Under points VII:B:3, 4, and 5, some of the thoughts dealt with in a general way in our presentation of Cabral's lecture in memory of Eduardo Mondlane are concretized. All cultural inferiority complexes that colonialism may have created in the minds of the men and women of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde shall be eradicated. In practice this means, among other things, that the development of existing local languages will be encouraged, as well as other expressions of popular culture. At the same time the gains and discoveries of the universal culture of mankind will be brought within reach of the people.³⁸ We learn from point 6 that sports and physical education will also be regarded as important components of culture and education. Finally, the principle of religious freedom is established in point 7. This is important because of the cultural, and thereby also religious, heterogeneity of Guinea and Cape Verde, in spite of the small size of the country.

Chapter VIII deals with questions of national defense. The most important political principle in this context is that the national defense of the country will be a people's defense — democratically organized internally and subject to the political power of the people externally. Foreign bases are categorically prohibited, and solidarity is promised to African nations that become the victims of colonialist or imperialist aggression.

This brings us to the realm of international politics, dealt with in *Chapter IX*, the last chapter of the program, which establishes in a few points the PAIGC view of the main principles of peaceful collaboration with all the peoples of the world and peaceful coexistence with all states. The most important principle is that all international exchange must be based upon a foundation of mutual respect and equality. Respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter is also stressed as an important principle in its own right.

We have thus surveyed the major program of the PAIGC, in an initial attempt to investigate how the general ideology of the movement is concretized into specific goals for the work of social transformation. With a few exceptions, we have found that the program itself does not have any very explicit ideological character beyond what can be logically expected from any movement engaged in a struggle for national liberation and development. Still, it is clear that almost all of the points of the program can also be deduced from the socialist ideology and view of society manifested in a general way in other documents of the PAIGC. We may note too, that the limited number of outspoken ideological formulations and expressions still found in the program are without exception socialist in character. There can be no doubt, therefore, that we must characterize the PAIGC as a *socialist* national liberation move-

³⁸ Although not mentioned in the program, it deserves to be mentioned here that the official language of the independent state of Guinea-Bissau is Portuguese. This is precisely in order not to break the link with "the universal culture of mankind".

ment, in spite of a certain reticence with regard to verbal manifestations in the formulation of short-range goals.

This reticence — motivated among other things by a conscious desire to formulate the aims of the movement in terms that ordinary people can relate to their own experiences — is even more pronounced in the document we shall now study a little more closely: Amílcar Cabral's general guidelines to the party workers.³⁹ In these guidelines Cabral gives advice and instructions on how to convert the ideology and goal formulations of the PAIGC into daily work aiming at the transformation of society. We encounter here, in other words, the view of the PAIGC on how to mobilize the energy of the men and women and the material resources of Guinea-Bissau in order to reach the goals of the liberation movement.

A different way of putting it is to say that we encounter in this document the view of the PAIGC with regard to the main theme of the present book.

Converting ideology into political action

As the idea basic to Cabral's and the PAIGC's view of the mechanism of mobilization is that people must be brought to see for themselves the connection between the goals they are striving towards and the means that are necessary in order to reach them, we shall be dealing with concrete goals in connection with the guidelines. For it is in the very formulation of goals in close contact with the experiences of people and the possibilities offered by reality, and in the simultaneous realization of what obstacles must be removed in order to make possible the attainment of those goals, that we find the focal point of the mobilization process. The following often-quoted passage, from the section on economic problems found in the party guidelines illustrates how clearly and simply Cabral poses the basic problem of political mobilization:

Always remember that the people do not fight for ideas, for things that exist only in the heads of individuals. The people fight and they accept the necessary sacrifices. But they do it in order to gain material advantages, to live in peace and to improve their lives, to experience progress, and to be able to guarantee a future for their children. National liberation, the struggle against colonialism, working for peace and progress, independence — all these will be empty words without significance for the people, unless they are translated into real improvements of the conditions of life. It is useless to liberate a region if the people of that region are then left without the elementary necessities of life.⁴⁰

It is a reasonable thought that development of society and political mobilization in this concrete form condition each other mutually in all

³⁹ *Palavras de ordem gerais do camarada Amílcar Cabral aos responsáveis do partido, Novembro de 1963*, PAIGC, 1969. All subsequent translations into English from this document have been made by the author.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

situations where development cannot be expected to occur spontaneously, but must instead be seen as an effect, vitally necessary but difficult to attain, of conscious efforts to overcome all obstacles raised by the intertwined structures of the international and national political, economic, and social systems. And it is precisely in such a situation that Guinea-Bissau, like most other countries of the third world, finds itself.

The guidelines to the party workers cover about thirty pages, divided between eight chapters under the following headings:

I. To be conscious at every moment of the situation of the struggle. "To hope for the best, but be prepared for the worst."

II. To continually develop and strengthen both the political work and the organization of the party.

III. To constantly improve the organization of our armed forces. To act, and to simultaneously reinforce our action.

IV. To know well our own strength, as well as that of the enemy. "To guarantee access to information."

V. To reinforce security and discipline in all the sectors of the struggle.

VI. To destroy the economy of the enemy and to construct our own.

VII. To improve our knowledge. To defend our health.

VIII. To apply the principles of the Party in practice.

Let us briefly consider the chapters one by one.

The principal counsel contained in *Chapter I*⁴¹ is to found action upon realism and upon the study of reality. The main thought is summed up in the following formulation, strongly reminiscent of Mao Tse-tung: "Think in order to act, and act in order to be able to think better."⁴² The principle is applied in the following way to the concrete question of when to extend the armed struggle to the islands of Cape Verde:

We must do this (extend the armed struggle to the islands), but we must do it under the most favorable circumstances possible, and with special attention given to the particular characteristics of armed struggle of liberation in such a special geographical environment. We must move quickly, but not run — we must act without opportunism and without getting so enthusiastic that we lose sight of concrete reality. It is better to start the armed struggle with apparent delay, but with guarantees of being able to continue, than to start too early or at whatever moment, before all conditions are present for the successful fulfillment of the struggle until victory for our people.⁴³

In *Chapter I* we also encounter — in the form of criticism against certain leaders within the country — a frequently recurring theme in the external and internal ideological declarations of the PAIGC: the struggle for liberation is a *political* struggle, even when it must be carried on with military means, and

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1–4.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 1 f. This was written about ten years before it became clear that the PAIGC would not start any armed struggle on the islands.

consequently the political work — among the people, among the party activists, and among those who take part in the armed struggle, and even in the ranks of the enemy — is “the fundamental, vital aspect of our daily action”.⁴⁴

In *Chapters II and III*⁴⁵ certain detailed organizational directions are given, some of which have grown more or less irrelevant because of organizational changes since the first years of the armed struggle, when the guidelines were originally worked out. More interesting to us in the context of this chapter are a number of very clear political directions given in chapter II, the most important of which can be summarized as follows:⁴⁶

1. Take all measures necessary in order to consolidate various organizational levels, from the village and upwards, and to make them function normally. Hold meetings with the people at regular intervals in order to inform them about the struggle and about “the criminal intentions of the enemy”.

2. Develop clandestine work of information, intelligence, and organization in the areas still occupied by the enemy.

3. Develop political work among members of the armed forces and never lose sight of its importance. Establish political committees in basic units of the people's army.

4. Develop work of political information and propaganda within the ranks of the enemy. Distribute tracts and similar materials,⁴⁷ establish prudent contacts with enemies whose minds are open to such approaches, and encourage by all possible means the soldiers of the colonial army to desert.

5. Do everything possible to make Africans who collaborate with the enemy change their minds, but “deal severely” with those who betray their people consciously.

6. Do everything possible to reinforce “fraternal relations”, both with the peoples and with the authorities of neighbouring countries. Never allow party members to interfere with the internal affairs of these countries.

All six points summarized here are highly illuminating and informative with regard to the concrete political goals of the PAIGC. We shall return to most of them in the following chapters of this book, in order to study the extent to which they have been attained in practice.

In addition to the formal organizational directions contained in Chapter III, we also find a few pages with both general and more detailed directions about how to carry on guerilla-warfare.⁴⁸ It is tempting to call these points of view classical — when reading them one is strongly reminded of the principles familiar from Chinese, Indo-Chinese, and Algerian experiences, among others. The enemy must never be left in peace, he must always feel insecure, constantly be fooled into traps. The people's forces must never act without knowing exactly what they are doing, never expose themselves to unnecessary risks, never accept unnecessary losses, always exploit the moral,

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 5–7 and 8–12.

⁴⁶ The following six points have been summarized from the text on pp. 5 f., *ibid.*

⁴⁷ Some examples of such materials are found in Appendix IV.

⁴⁸ *Palavras de ordem gerais*, pp. 10–12.

political, tactical, and strategic weak points of the enemy. The populations of the liberated areas shall be armed as soon as possible and encouraged to take responsibility for various tasks of security and economic production. The discipline of the armed forces must be independent and based upon the soldiers' own understanding of the nature of their tasks. The desire of the soldiers to take initiatives and make decisions on their own responsibility must be encouraged and developed. The initiative in relation to the enemy must never be lost.

The greater part of *Chapter IV*⁴⁹ deals with the participation of the people in the work of transportation and maintenance of the troops.

The transportation of munitions and other materials was a very sensitive point for the PAIGC, as everything had to be carried on the heads and backs of men, women, and children, through deep forests and muddy swamps — except when river transport was possible with small boats or log canoes. A prerequisite for success in the struggle was therefore that the people accepted their part in the hard work of transportation. The principle was to “achieve the voluntary cooperation of the people”. But the guidelines also mention that it is necessary to act “firmly and with justice” against those who refuse to cooperate.

The basic principle with regard to the maintenance of troops is that the armed forces should be maintained and nourished on the basis of the country's and the people's own production. “The people must aid by giving food to the soldiers, but the soldiers must always, whenever possible, assist the people in their agricultural work or other kinds of work, such as rebuilding houses, taking care of the cattle, fighting against storms and floods, etc.” But it is also stressed that the armed forces must do everything possible to maintain themselves — by opening up new fields and by establishing collective farms together with the local populations of the liberated areas. Only under extreme and exceptional circumstances can the soldiers count upon the party to find food from the outside for them. “At whatever costs, we have to guarantee the maintenance of our fighting men from the country's own production.”⁵⁰

As far as internal information is concerned, the obvious importance of well-functioning channels of information between all levels and in all directions inside the organization, both inside the country and abroad, is emphasized in Chapter IV of the guidelines. The need for internal radio communications is particularly stressed.

Security and discipline — strongly interdependent problems — are dealt with in *Chapter V*.⁵¹ The military aspects of the judicial problems that the emerging organization of the new society will have to face are also discussed, among

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 13–16.

⁵⁰ Note that the system of “People's Stores” in the liberated areas had not yet been established when the guidelines were first written and distributed. Cf. pp. 178 ff.

⁵¹ *Palavras de ordem gerais*, pp. 17–20.

other things. As the judicial system will be described in some detail in the next chapter, here it is sufficient to mention that the guidelines express the wish that the PAIGC establish its own courts. The two principles of military security and political and military discipline that will have to be upheld for the duration of the war are "justice" combined with "firmness" in relation to those who fail in their duty. It is explicitly stated that conscious deserters — as opposed to those who may have been deceived, for instance by agents provocateurs — will be punished by death.

We also find in Chapter V some paragraphs of interest from the point of view of political theory. In one of them it is stated, in no ambiguous terms, what people belonged and what people did not belong to the "people" of Guinea-Bissau at the time of the armed struggle. In a subsequent paragraph we encounter the theoretical view of the PAIGC with regard to the problem of how to define the "state" and its tasks. This problem is of some importance in the present context, as the PAIGC — with good reason — defined itself and the institutional structures evolving under its direction precisely as an emerging state (cf. Chapter V).

To define "the people" in a way that makes sense from the point of view of political theory is not as easy as it might seem. The concept has strongly positive evaluative connotations in general, but particularly so within the kind of ideological perspective embraced by the PAIGC. As a political and theoretical concept, "the people" usually refers to an abstract category rather than simply to all human beings inhabiting a certain territory. In the PAIGC guidelines the problem is brought up in connection with discipline, the guiding principle of which is that all members of the PAIGC must "respect the people". The following paragraphs dealing with this problem deserve to be quoted in their entirety:

It is always necessary to develop and to strengthen the best relations possible between the armed forces and the people. Every fighting man must be aware that he is the son of the people, serving the people. Every individual within the population must be aware that our fighting men are the sons of the people, defending, arms in hand, the sacred interests of our people against the Portuguese colonialists.

No fighting man and no party member in position of responsibility has the right to use arms in order to frighten the people or in order to obtain personal advantages against the interests of the people. The fighting man must live in the midst of the people, as their son and defender, and the people must be his first and principal support.

The people, for us, are any and all of the children of our land who support our struggle against Portuguese colonialism, and who cooperate either overtly or covertly with our party (our italics). Those who are against the struggle and against the party, those who serve the Portuguese colonialists or in any other way seek to destroy our party, do not deserve to be counted among our people. They are not our people.⁵²

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 17.

This is an openly normative definition of “the people”. It is particularly interesting because of its frankness, which must be understood against the background of the context where it has been formulated — i.e. in a text giving direct guidance and instructions for practical political work. The concreteness of the formulation, necessary because of the context, has also made the definition exceptionally clarifying. If we wish to express the idea in more abstract terms, related to the PAIGC’s general theoretical and ideological analysis presented earlier in this chapter, the same principle might be formulated somewhat as follows: those who consciously refuse to take part in the historical process of development of their own country do not belong to the people.

The second problem of definition mentioned above is brought up, within brackets, in connection with the necessity to “suppress with rapidity and justice all actions that are against the interests of the party and the struggle, and consequently also against the interests of our people”. Within the brackets we find the following statement:

As the party functions as a state in the process of development, we have in our hands today effective means of stopping those who commit crimes. *The fundamental characteristic of a state is its ability to suppress those who act against the interests of that state* (our italics). Our interests, the interests of our party, which directs our state, these interests are also the interests of our people: complete liberation, peace and progress in Guinea and Cape Verde.⁵³

By defining the state in this way, Cabral anchors himself firmly in the traditions of both marxist and non-marxist thinking within social science and political theory. His definition reminds us both of the marxist notion of the state as the instrument used by the dominant class(es) in society to defend their interests, and Max Weber’s notion of the state as the monopolistic wielder of legitimate physical force within a given territory.

But regardless of theoretical tradition — and we already know that Cabral belongs in the marxist tradition — it is clear from the quote that the ideology of the PAIGC, like that of most other political movements supporting a state, identifies, by definition, the interests of the state with those of the people.⁵⁴ Less is said in this connection, however, about how to make it possible for the people to control the power of the state. This problem is easy to define away in theory, but it still remains real in practice, in almost all countries, systems, and political contexts. We shall have to return to it, therefore, in the following chapter of this book, when considering the concrete societal organization in the process of emergence in Guinea-Bissau.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁵⁴ As we shall see in the following chapter, the PAIGC in fact, long before the final defeat of the Portuguese colonialists, regarded itself as a “party” which had established itself as a “state”.

It is emphasized in the introduction to *Chapter VI*⁵⁵ that the struggle is not only political and military, but that it must be carried on in all aspects of the life of the people. "We must destroy everything the enemy can use for their continued domination of our people. But at the same time, we must be able to construct and produce everything that is needed in order to create a better life for our people in our own country." In addition to the political and military struggle, the PAIGC must therefore also strengthen the economic and cultural resistance of the people and improve the people's health. Chapter VI deals only with the economic resistance, while the two other types of activity are discussed in Chapter VII.

The economic struggle within the liberated areas mainly involves a systematic effort to expand production as quickly and efficiently as possible. Above all, it is necessary to develop agriculture, both by the intensification of cultivation and the adoption of new practices in already cultivated areas and by the clearing of new land. On this decisive point, the guidelines become very concrete, as shown in the following paragraph:

In the liberated regions we must develop agricultural production, both by extending the cultivated areas and by improving our work. It is necessary to devote more attention to our agricultural work, and to increase the number of crops. We have to pay special attention to the task of growing food for ourselves — rice, corn, manioc, potatoes, beans, vegetables, bananas, cashew nuts, oranges, and other fruits. We have to pay special attention, too, to the task of taking care of our cattle and breeding animals — pigs, chickens, sheep, etc. — and to feeding the animals and preserving their grazing lands. It is important to demand effective control of fires in order to avoid the destruction of our forests. The soldiers must devote all their spare time to helping the peasants, especially during harvest-time. Everything must be done in order to finish the harvest as soon as possible, to avoid its destruction by the enemy. The people must be convinced of the necessity of saving and preserving their products in the best way possible.⁵⁶

Although the production of foodstuffs for the people's own consumption is fundamental in the present situation of the country, this is not enough. According to the guidelines, it is also necessary to develop Guinean traditions of artisanship and handicrafts, and to produce such things as desks for the schools, baskets, brooms, chairs and other kinds of furniture, as well as to weave cloth and make pottery. The art of forging metals is important too, not least in order to be able to make and repair agricultural tools. The production of coconuts and palm-oil must be intensified, as well as the production of homemade soap and other traditional products. Another important matter is the preparation for taking over properties, such as saw-mills, abandoned by the Portuguese. As far as the organization of agriculture is concerned, various forms of cooperation within and between the villages are to be encouraged —

⁵⁵ *Palavras de ordem gerais*, pp. 21–23.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

one example of such a form being the cultivation in common of crops requiring large-scale work. It is important, too, to carry out experiments with simple forms of producers' cooperatives, for instance by handing over abandoned properties to be cultivated and directed by committees of citizens. Finally it is emphasized, in this part of the guidelines, that ambitious workers and cultivators ought to be encouraged with various kinds of rewards. One idea, it is suggested, would be to offer opportunities of further vocational training abroad to successful farmers.

The words about the connection between political mobilization and the satisfaction of material needs already quoted above on p. 91 are in fact taken from Chapter VI, which we are now in the process of presenting. Considered in their proper context, these words lead up to the instruction that "People's Stores" (*armazens do povo*) be organized in all liberated areas. In these stores, the people shall be able to get the most basic consumer goods in exchange for their own produce. The system of people's stores, which aims, among other things, at breaking the economic dependence of the people upon the Portuguese, is an important instrument in the struggle of the PAIGC against the colonial system. It is dealt with in detail in Chapter VI of this book.

The economic struggle in the areas still held by the Portuguese naturally must take forms different from those used in the liberated areas. The guidelines emphasize mainly the necessity of sabotaging, by all available means, the production of the export goods essential to the colonial system (above all peanuts). Instead, the production of foodstuffs for local consumption as much as possible is to be developed.

Particularly with reference to the economic struggle, the guidelines also stress how important it is that the people do not flee their country because of the war of liberation. They must be encouraged instead to move to the liberated areas. Those who leave in spite of this can expect to see their properties confiscated and handed over to popularly elected management committees.

We have thus reached *Chapter VII* of the guidelines,⁵⁷ where instructions are given on how to carry on the struggle within the fields of education and health.

The education of both children and adults is naturally of fundamental importance to the development of the country and of the people. The guidelines stress a number of principles intended to guide those who are engaged in the practical work of organizing the activities of the schools. It is important to establish as many schools as possible, but without becoming overly ambitious

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 24–28.

and thus perhaps being forced later to disappoint the people by closing down the schools again because of the lack of resources. The teachers must be supervised to check that they follow the instructions of the party and do not apply incorrect methods. It is prohibited, for instance, to use corporal punishment in the schools. The work of the schools must aim systematically at counteracting certain harmful customs and negative aspects of the people's traditional ideas and notions, but without hurting popular feelings. Parents must be made to understand the absolute necessity of allowing their sons and daughters to go to school. The education offered is to be as efficient as possible, in spite of limited resources, according to the principle that "all those who know have to teach those who do not know". Another important aspect of the educational work is its role in the recruitment of new members to the party. It is necessary to watch for the most intelligent and open-minded among the children, in order to later be able to encourage them to become engaged in party work.

With regard to culture in a more general sense, the guidelines advance the same ideas as the party program: support of the people's own culture, "as long as this is not contrary to human dignity and the respect we must have for each man, woman, or child". The fear of nature should be fought against and conquered: "man is the most powerful force of nature". Various artistic practices are to be encouraged, oral traditions and tales noted in writing and preserved. At the same time it is necessary to work against particularistic tendencies that weaken the united front against the enemy. Racial and religious discrimination must also be fought. Children must be protected against arbitrary power, and their personalities must be given the chance to develop. The rights of women must be respected. At the same time, women must understand that their liberation depends upon themselves and their own work. They will be liberated through work, devotion to the party, self-respect, and firmness in the face of everything opposed to their dignity.

The party cadres will have to study the problems of life and of the people's struggle seriously — "in their fundamental and essential aspects, and not only superficially". They will have to realize that "nobody can know anything without learning, and that the most ignorant person is he who knows without having learnt". Those who have positions of responsibility within the party must stop being childish, irresponsible, and careless. Instead, they must face their tasks with seriousness and responsibility. This is in no way, the guidelines emphasize, "against the joy of life, the love of life and pleasures, nor is it against that confidence in the future which must inspire the action, the struggle, and the work of all of us".

Small libraries are to be established in the liberated areas, where those who already know how to read can help others learn. The periodicals and journals of the party must be distributed as efficiently as possible: groups should be

formed for the purpose of reading and distributing them.⁵⁸

"Our health is our greatest treasure and the most important strength of our soldiers and militants",⁵⁹ according to the introductory words of the part of Chapter VII dealing with health and health care. It is inevitable under present circumstances that the very limited resources at hand for health care are used mainly for the benefit of the members of the armed forces. But it is also evident that a health and sanitary organization, reaching all inhabitants of the liberated regions, must eventually be set up. It is important, however, "not to create illusions among the people, for the people must understand that we will not be able to offer really good care until after the liberation of our country, and then on the basis of our own work and with the help of taxes all of us will have to pay in order to build our country in all respects".⁶⁰ It is obviously necessary not to be wasteful with medicine, but "we must never allow ourselves not to take care of somebody in need of help, if we have the means of doing so". The guidelines point out, too, that the traditional medicaments offered by nature may often be beneficial, and that they are to be used in all cases where they do not have any demonstrably harmful effects.

Chapter VIII of the guidelines is called *To apply the principles of the party in practice*.⁶¹ Here the four principles of organization and work accepted by the party as "fundamental to its activities" are presented and explained to the readers of the guidelines. The four principles are: (1) *criticism and self-criticism* in order to resolve internal problems and contradictions, (2) *collective leadership*, (3) *democratic centralism*, and (4) *revolutionary democracy*.⁶²

Criticism shall be both given and taken in a spirit of openness, without hidden thoughts and suspiciousness. A critical spirit must be developed by and between everybody active within the party. The implications of this are specified for instance in the following characteristic paragraph:

Always remember that criticism is very different from disparagement and intrigue-mongering. Criticism is and should be an act through which a sincere and open opinion is expressed to those concerned, on the basis of facts and in a spirit of fairness, with the purpose of improving the thinking and action of others by judging them. To criticize is to construct, and to assist in

⁵⁸ Most important in this context are the two journals *Libertação* (Liberation) and *Blufô*, which are distributed in the liberated areas in mimeographed editions of varying size. *Blufô* (an African word designating those who have not yet been circumcised, i.e. the youth) is a journal intended specially for youth. It has been published by the Pioneers' organization (cf. pp. 221 f.) since 1965 in three to four numbers per year. It contains simple and educational articles about life, school, and work. Small cross-word puzzles and similar pedagogical diversions are also found in *Blufô*. *Libertação*, on the other hand, is intended for the party workers, who are supposed to spread to the people the political information offered in the journal.

⁵⁹ *Palavras de ordem gerais*, p. 26.

⁶⁰ As we shall see in Chapter VI of this book, the PAIGC has in fact done more in the field of civilian health care than seemed realistically possible to hope for, at the time when the guidelines were first written and published.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 29–35.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 29.

constructing. It is a demonstration of sincere interest in the work of others, in order to improve it.⁶³

A spirit of *self-criticism* must also be developed among the members of the party. This implies, according to the guidelines, that everyone must have . . .

. . . the capacity to make his own concrete analysis of his own work, in order to distinguish that which is bad from that which is good, the capacity to see his own mistakes, and to discover the reasons and understand the consequences of these mistakes.⁶⁴

Self-criticism has nothing to do with false regret, and it is not a ceremony for the confession of sins with subsequent absolution, making it possible to continue with a good conscience along the road of the same errors. Instead, self-criticism is . . .

. . . an act of sincerity, courage, comradeship, and consciousness of our responsibility, a demonstration of willingness to do our work well, an expression of our determination to improve ourselves every day, improving thereby our contribution to the progress of our party . . . To criticize oneself is to reconstruct oneself, in order to be able to serve better.⁶⁵

The principle of *collective leadership* is to be introduced gradually at all levels of party organization. Everything is to be done to make "the leading organs of the party function not on the basis of one, two, or three persons, but on the basis of all members, both men and women".⁶⁶

Collective leadership, the guidelines explained, implies the common study of common problems in order to arrive at the best solution. It thus becomes possible to profit from everyone's intelligence and experiences. Collective leadership gives the chance to all members of the party who hold positions of responsibility to think and to act, to develop their capacity of taking initiatives, their determination and their creativity, within the framework of common efforts to reach the common goal. But by no means does collective leadership imply anarchy, meaningless discussions, and the mania for holding meetings leading nowhere:

Although it is true that two heads are better than one, we must be able to distinguish between different heads, and each head must know exactly what it is supposed to do. Within the frame of collective leadership, we must respect the opinions of the most experienced comrades and learn from them, while they on their side must help the others, the less experienced comrades, to learn new things and improve their work.⁶⁷

The principle of collective leadership also requires a struggle against all tendencies toward laziness and fear of responsibility, a struggle against blind obedience without thought. It is important, therefore, to struggle both against

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 30 f.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 31 f.

authoritarianism and against servile submissiveness among party members. Finally, it is also emphasized in this section of the guide-lines that collective leadership may contribute to keep divisive factions within the party from gaining strength.

Democratic centralism is the third among the basic organizational principles proclaimed by the PAIGC. By embracing, openly and explicitly, this much-debated principle, the PAIGC places itself and its work within the theoretical and political tradition of revolutionary socialism. This is how the meaning of democratic centralism is defined and explained to the party workers:

Democratic centralism means that the power to make decisions, to formulate instructions, to define tasks — to direct and to lead — is concentrated to central organs with well-defined functions. But the principle also means that these decisions, instructions, etc., have to be arrived at democratically, on the basis of interests and opinions expressed by the representatives of the masses, on the basis of respect for the opinions and interests of the majority. This means that each decision concerning a new problem will have to be made after a full and free discussion within the organs touched by the problem, from the base to the top, if the matter in question concerns the life of all the party. After this discussion and in accordance with the facts it has brought into the light, the central organs will make their decision, which shall then be applied immediately at all levels concerned and without further discussion.

Centralism is necessary, because the power to make decisions and to lead is concentrated to special organs, and because no other organ and no single individual has the right to exercise this power. *Democracy* is necessary, because the powers of these organs depend not only upon the will of those who give the orders but are based upon the interests and expressed opinions of the majority. In order to be able to constantly improve the practice of democratic centralism, we must pay attention to the aspirations and opinions of the masses of the people with regard to everything that touches important problems of our life and our struggle, we must develop our capacity for criticism and self-criticism, and we must reward with high regard those who do their duty well.⁶⁸

Like other definitions of democratic centralism, the PAIGC definition demonstrates how this organizational principle attempts to combine in theory two principles difficult to combine in practice, *efficiency* and broad *participation*, by basing centralized decision-making upon broad and full discussions among all concerned by the decisions. It is no secret that democratic centralism in practice has often degenerated into hard party dictatorship in countries and parties which have tried to apply the principle. It is an important part of our purpose in the following chapters to investigate the reality of Guinea-Bissau with regard to this problem. But in the present chapter, our purpose is limited to specifying how the PAIGC itself views its tasks and its goals.

The fourth and the last of the organizational principles of the PAIGC is *revolutionary democracy*. The successful realization of this principle is ob-

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 32 f.

viously closely connected with the simultaneous realization of both of the two steps contained in the concept of democratic centralism. As long as revolutionary democracy remains alive, centralized decision-making is counter-balanced by popular power. But if democracy is emptied of its contents, centralism will degenerate into dictatorial government.

The essential aspect of revolutionary democracy, as defined in the guidelines of the PAIGC, is that all relations between the leaders, the party cadres, and the people must be based upon mutual respect and upon the respect of truth. Those who have political responsibilities must live "in the midst of the people":

Within the frame of revolutionary democracy, we must avoid all demagoguery, we must avoid giving promises that we cannot keep, avoid exploiting the sentiments of the people and the ambitions of opportunists. We must act in accordance with reality. We must give everybody the chance of making progress, and to verify for him- or herself, through his or her own actions or through those of others, that the party is the result of our own common work and that we all belong to the party, that the party is the instrument created by our people for the conquest of their own freedom and for the construction of their own progress . . . To never fear the people and to bring them into participation in the making of decisions that concern them — this is the fundamental condition of revolutionary democracy, which we all have to realize little by little, in accordance with the development of our life and our struggle.⁶⁹

Concluding comment

It has already been pointed out that our purpose in this chapter is limited to specifying the view held by the PAIGC itself of its tasks and goals. We have attempted to accomplish this purpose by letting the party and its foremost leader speak to the reader through quotations and summaries of the most important programmatic writings and other similar documents of the PAIGC. It follows from this that the entire chapter is in itself a summary, and that it is therefore very difficult to summarize it further.

We may conclude in any case, on the basis of the material presented, that the PAIGC is a national liberation movement with a clearly socialist ideology, based upon marxist-inspired theoretical thinking. Its concrete goals are down-to-earth, formulated in close connection with the historically given reality of Guinea and the islands of Cape Verde. The ideology of the movement thus tries to synthesize a long — and a short — range perspective. Somewhere in the future, the free socialist society is discerned, the result of a long and difficult development consciously called forth through political action. But at the pre-

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

sent, the country is only in the initial stages of this development. The best way of fulfilling the movement toward this goal is, according to the ideology of the PAIGC, to allow the solutions to the developmental problems of society to emerge in constant interaction between the concretely experienced reality of the people and the long-range historical and ideological perspective of the liberation movement.

In the following chapters we shall confront the official ideology and the openly declared goals of the PAIGC with certain important aspects of the reality of Guinea-Bissau which we have had the privilege of being allowed to study closely. We hope thereby to be able, as well, to shed some light upon the theoretical problems suggested in the introduction to this book and further discussed in its concluding chapter.

IV. The Emerging Social Order (1): Political, Administrative, Military, and Judicial Organization

In this chapter we shall be concerned with the basic structures and principles of the system of government actually functioning in the liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau on the eve of the declaration of independent statehood in 1973. Resulting from the experiences of many years of hard political and military struggle, these basic structures and principles will no doubt continue to be relevant in the future as well, in spite of the important additions and innovations leading up to the declaration of independence which will be analyzed in the following chapter — and also in spite of further additions and innovations bound to be introduced at later stages, especially after the *coup* of April 1974, which has set events moving at an accelerating rate.

In fact, “flexibility” and “adjustment to the shifting conditions of the struggle” are key expressions in the organizational vocabulary of the PAIGC. In notable agreement with these principles, the general institutional and structural framework of the revolution in Guinea-Bissau is characterized by a combination of continuity and frequent pragmatic adjustments. This combination is likely to survive even such momentous events in the history of the country and of the movement as the murder of Amílcar Cabral on January 20, 1973, the institutional innovations connected with the declaration of a sovereign state on September 24 of the same year, and even the introduction of stable peace after the recognition by Portugal herself of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau on September 10, 1974.

The party as a state

The following statement from an official publication gives us the key to the practice and theory behind the PAIGC system of government, as it had

evolved into functioning through the experiences of the struggle for national liberation:

By providing the people of Guinea with political, social, and economic institutions in accordance with the spirit of their traditions, and by facilitating progressive measures for their emancipation, and also by maintaining the control and administration of the liberated areas, the *party* PAIGC has today established itself as a *state*.¹

The same point was made by Cabral on several other occasions, as well, for instance in his October 1970 report on the situation of the struggle, where he emphasized that the role of the party was becoming more and more that of government ("*direction d'un état*") whose territory is partially occupied by foreign troops.² According to Cabral, the days when the PAIGC was only a rebel movement had thus passed long ago. It is easy to confirm this opinion after having spent some time in the liberated areas of the country. There can be no doubt that the PAIGC, during the first half of the nineteen-seventies, is a revolutionary movement building a new society with broad popular support, and a small but well-organized people's army.

How does it look, then, in practice, when the "party" functions as a "state"?

If it is true that one party legitimately represents the people and manages the affairs of the whole society, then it is obviously difficult to maintain a very clear distinction between citizen and party member. Unless we think in terms of a superimposed elite party, the natural tendency in such a situation will be in the direction of some kind of fairly open mass party, the membership of which cannot easily be calculated in terms of exact numbers. This is also, very characteristically, the case in Guinea-Bissau at present. "Membership is not a clearly defined concept" was the typical answer received, when the author discussed this problem with various persons within the PAIGC.

Membership is rather something that comes "naturally", through participation in the struggle for national liberation and development. The basic precondition for almost any work carried on by the party is the fairly broad popular support which it enjoys. But this has to be maintained and reinforced continually through concrete action related to the people's needs and claims for dignity, self-respect, daily bread, a house to live in, a future for their children, and a life of peace and security. From the sympathetic villager and upwards in the hierarchy there is thus a gliding scale of gradually-more-active membership, culminating in the totally committed cadres and leaders who devote all their time and energy to the party. But it is impossible to state exactly where on this imaginary scale "membership" begins.

¹ *Guinée et Cap-Vert*, p. 24 (translated by the author).

² Cabral, *Sur la situation de notre lutte armée de libération nationale, janvier-septembre 1970*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), 1970, p. 7.

On the other hand — and this should be noted — people active within the PAIGC sometimes talk about “the party within the party”. This expression refers to the backbone of the emerging state, i.e. to all persons with special responsibilities and tasks, from the local village committees to the full-time cadres of the party, within the administration, the educational and social services, the local defense forces, and the army. The number of party members defined in this restricted way would possibly add up to something like five thousand, not counting ordinary soldiers, although this is nothing but a very rough estimate. In any case, the term “party member” will not be used in this study, because of its great ambiguity in the Guinean context. “Cadre” is a more accurate term for those belonging to “the party within the party”.

As we shall see in the next chapter, during the nomination and election campaigns in liberated Guinea-Bissau in 1972 a clear distinction was drawn by the PAIGC between cadres and representatives of the people, the latter being defined as candidates not directly involved in party (government, administration) work. Both on the single lists of candidates presented to the voters within each electoral district and in the elected assemblies, the proportions were one-third cadres and two-thirds representatives of the people.

What has just been said about party membership refers explicitly to the situation up to 1973 within the liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau. In Chapter V, we shall follow as far as possible the steps that have been taken and are in the process of being taken in the direction of a growing division of functions between (1) the people in general and their representative assemblies, (2) the party, with some minimal ideological criteria for membership, and (3) the state apparatus. But this is not how the system functioned up to 1973, and it will probably be quite some time before it begins to do so consistently. At least for the period under consideration in this book, the image of “the party as a state” is an inadequate one, as we may see from the diagram on page 108, which shows the political and administrative organization of the PAIGC in the liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau as it existed and functioned until the proclamation of a sovereign state by the newly elected National Assembly on September 24, 1973. In spite of the establishment on this occasion of new executive state organs, tendencies during 1973 and 1974 do not point in the direction of any drastic or far-reaching changes within the immediate future of the structural pattern indicated by the diagram.

Some fairly important changes in the political and administrative organization of the party and hence of the country were nevertheless decided upon early in 1970. The formal decisions were taken by a body of 30–50 leading members (the “enlarged Political Bureau”) meeting on April 12–15.³ Their

³ Cabral, *The Eighth Year of our Armed Struggle*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), January 1971, p. 18.

main purpose was to clarify the division of labor and responsibility at the higher organizational levels, which appear to be more difficult to handle from the point of view of democratic organizational procedure than the basic party structures.

But the 1970 changes are also a clear case of the organizational structures proving to be more permanent than the terms employed to label them. As our main interest is in how the PAIGC functions as a political and organizational link between the developmental needs and aspirations of the people and the systematic action of their leaders, there is thus no need for us to go very deeply into a comparative analysis of pre- and post- 1970 organizational structure. At the local and regional levels inside the country, the 1970 changes were insignificant. At the central level, on the other hand, it is true that the important organs were somewhat reshuffled and re-named, but this did not imply any institutionalization of a less heavily centralized organizational top-structure than before. If any real change occurred, it would seem to have been in the direction of further centralization. For these reasons, our attention in the following will be directed at the organization which the PAIGC was trying to institutionalize after April 1970. This organization is an ever-evolving synthesis of accumulated experiences gathered since the creation of the party in 1956.

The central organs

Until September 24, 1973, the central organs of the national liberation movement and of the evolving state were identical for the party, the civil administration, and the army. At the highest formal level was the Party Congress, which so far has met only twice: in 1964, at Cassaga in the southern part of the country, and in 1973, on July 18–22, in the eastern part. The official reason for not convoking any party congress at all between 1964 and 1973 was that the risks involved in gathering simultaneously all active leaders of the movement at the same place, under conditions of war, would have been too great. This is an understandable reason. As we shall soon see, though, it is somewhat doubtful if the PAIGC leadership, during the period under consideration in this book, even seriously considered the party congress as their highest organ, except in a very formal sense.

Next in the PAIGC hierarchy – but in reality on top, at least until 1973, as seen from Cabral's statement below – is the *Conselho Superior da Luta*, or "The Highest Council of the Struggle", with a fairly broad membership of about 70. This is roughly the equivalent of the Central Committee, which existed before the 1970 reorganization. According to the formal rules established concerning the frequency with which party organs on various levels are expected to meet in formal session, the *Conselho Superior da Luta* shall

meet once a year.⁴ Its first session was held on August 9–16, 1971, in Boké in the north of the Republic of Guinea, with the participation not only of the formally appointed members of the council but also a number of other people with important posts and tasks in the movement. On this occasion Amílcar Cabral, speaking as the Secretary-General of the party, explained the functions of the council in the following terms:

I would like to remind our comrades that the *Conselho Superior da Luta* is the highest organ of our struggle at present. It is the highest both with regard to the number of members, and within the framework of our revolutionary democracy. It is the organ before which all the leaders of the party have to account for their work; the organ in which children of our country, and members of our party, with important functions in our organization and our struggle take part. It is thus the organ which has to study, analyze, and judge the action of the leaders of the party and all its organizational parts, and to orient this action in accordance with the fundamental interests of our party, of our struggle, and of our people.⁵

Cabral also pointed out that “in another type of party, for instance, which is not ours,” the *Conselho Superior* might well have been called Central Committee. But the choice of the new designation had been made precisely in order to avoid “all kinds of confusion” and in order to be “in accordance with the realities of our country”.⁶

About one-third of the roughly 70 members of the *Conselho Superior da Luta* comprise the *Comité Executivo da Luta*, in which are also found the members of the seven-man War Council, the *Conselho de Guerra*. The “Executive Committee of the Struggle” is the nearest equivalent of what was previously called the “enlarged Political Bureau”. The original 15-man Political Bureau existing before 1970 has no place in the present organizational structure, which means that there is no institutionalized political organ between the large, 24-member executive committee, which was difficult to gather during the war, and the very top leadership of the party.

Until the murder of Amílcar Cabral, the day-by-day top leadership of the party was the responsibility of a powerful three-man executive, called the *Comissão Permanente*: Amílcar Cabral was the secretary general of the party and responsible for the political and military leadership of the national liberation movement; Aristides Pereira was vice secretary general of the party and responsible for economy and security questions; and Luis Cabral, a younger brother of the secretary general, was responsible for “national reconstruc-

⁴ *Decisão*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), August 30, 1970, p. 1. This is a three-page document through which certain decisions made by the Permanent Commission of the party (in application of general decisions and suggestions made earlier by more broadly representative organs) are communicated to the cadres.

⁵ Cabral, *Sobre a Situação da Luta*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), 1971, p. 5 (translated by the author). Text from a tape-recording of Cabral's opening speech at the meeting of the *Conselho Superior da Luta*, August 9–16, 1971.

⁶ *Ibid.*

tion", which in the PAIGC terminology includes education, health, and other civilian tasks in building a new society. All three were also members of the *Conselho de Guerra*, and thus directly involved in the highest military leadership of the national liberation movement.

The only outwardly visible organizational change directly caused by the murder of the secretary general and founder of the party was the substitution of a four-member Permanent Secretariat for the three-member Permanent Commission introduced in 1970. This was decided by the party congress meeting on July 18–22, 1973.⁷ Aristides Pereira, who had acted provisionally as secretary general since January 20 because of his previous position as vice secretary general, was now confirmed in his new position and formally elected by the congress to be the successor of Amílcar Cabral as secretary general of the PAIGC.

The three other members of the Permanent Secretariat chosen by the congress were Luis Cabral, vice secretary general, and Francisco Mendes (Chico Té) and João Bernardo Vieira (Nino), secretaries.⁸ When the National Assembly met two months later in order to designate the members of the executive organs of the new sovereign state then proclaimed, these three members of the Permanent Secretariat all received important posts: Luis Cabral as president of the collective head of state, Francisco Mendes as head commissar ("prime minister"), and João Vieira as president of the National Assembly and commissar ("minister") for the armed forces.⁹ This considerable overlap between the *de facto* leading organ of the party, the Permanent Secretariat, and the key positions in the leading organs of the new state confirms what was said above about the low probability that the establishment of new state organs will lead to important changes in the existing patterns of political leadership, at least within the immediate future. The relationship between party and state in Guinea-Bissau is further discussed in the following chapter, where the great continuity between the idea of "the party as a state", predominant until 1973, and the new idea of a state separate from the party, is indicated.

The only concrete recognition of the principle of division of functions between party and state in the new party organization is the fact that Aristides Pereira, the secretary general of the PAIGC, has no official post within any of the new state organs. He is, however, a member of the seven-man War Council, as are also the three other members of the Permanent Secretariat.

As late as the spring of 1974, no permanent headquarters or "capital" of the state had yet been established inside liberated Guinea-Bissau, because of

⁷ *Communiqué spécial*, issued by the *Comité Executivo da Luta* on July 24, 1973, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), 1973, p. 1.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Cf. pp. 171 f.

the danger of Portuguese attacks from the air. The secretariat of the party was still located in Conakry, capital of the Republic of Guinea, as it had been throughout the years of armed struggle. It was, and is, under the direct supervision of the secretary general and his associates. But the vice secretary general and the two secretaries of the Permanent Secretariat in particular carry on a great deal of their activities, and spend a considerable part of their time, inside liberated Guinea-Bissau, rather than in the offices of the secretariat in Conakry. Since the *coup* in Portugal on April 25, 1974, no real military danger for the PAIGC exists any longer in Guinea-Bissau, as a *de facto* armistice was soon established. This naturally means that conditions for the political work of the PAIGC are now changing in important respects. These changes, however, are beyond the scope of the present work.

It seems clear to the present author that the central organs of the party met fairly irregularly during the years of politico-military struggle preceding the proclamation of the state of Guinea-Bissau in 1973, and that even when they did meet, not all members always managed to be present. This kind of irregularity and informality can be understood and explained against the background of the difficult conditions the war imposed upon all PAIGC activities, but in the long run it also implied an undeniable risk of organizational top-heaviness and centralization of decision-making to the most authoritative leader(s). During the period under consideration in this book, however, which does not involve the functioning of the new *de jure* state, existing tendencies in this direction — indicated *inter alia* by some of the circumstances surrounding the murder of Cabral — appear to have been counterbalanced by the systematic emphasis given to the concrete tasks of political mobilization inside the country.

The regional and local levels are thus the key levels we have to observe, in order to understand how the “party as a state” functions. But before we turn to this, the main subject of the present chapter, a few words must be said about the murder of the founder of the PAIGC on the evening of January 20, 1973.

The murder of Cabral: some facts and implications

The immediate problems involved in ensuring the orderly succession of the assassinated leader of the national liberation movement were successfully and fairly rapidly overcome. As described above, the vice secretary general functioned as secretary general during an interim period of five months before he was formally elected to the post of secretary general by a party congress. As will be described in the following chapter, Amílcar Cabral's last great project, the proclamation of the sovereign state of Guinea-Bissau by the elected National Assembly of the People of Guinea, has also been carried out. The leader is dead, but his political and organizational work continues to live. In

this, the most important, sense, the death of Cabral has been turned into a strong confirmation of the solidity of his political work. This is the overriding implication of the murder of Cabral. It is a firm refutation of all hopes to the contrary nourished by the Portuguese colonial power and its friends and allies.

But even so, an objective consideration of available facts indicates that some of the more immediate circumstances surrounding the murder can be traced to a lack of sufficient two-way political communication between the respected and powerful leader, on the one hand, and the rank and file of the party cadres on the other hand. It is difficult, otherwise, to understand the fact that Cabral was murdered by his own associates, long-time members of the PAIGC, in all probability recruited and inspired by the Portuguese, true, but nevertheless comrades-in-arms, several of them even held in confidence until the very end.¹⁰

Cabral was shot, in front of his home in Conakry, at 10.30 p.m. on January 20, 1973. The man who held the gun was Inocencio Kani, member of the *Comité Executivo da Luta* until August 1971, when he was expelled from the committee for some kind of apparently non-political misdemeanor, by a unanimous vote of the *Conselho Superior da Luta*. After his expulsion he still retained command of one of the PAIGC vedette-boats, based in the harbor of Conakry. According to the journalist Aquino de Bragança, whose analyses published in the journal *Afrique-Asie* appear to the author to be the most complete and trustworthy so far, Kani belonged to the second among the following three groups of conspirators:¹¹

1. The first group consisted of militants from the pre-revolutionary period of the party, who had later come under the influence of the Portuguese and allowed themselves to be recruited by the secret services of the colonial power in Bissau. Foremost among these was Raphael Barbosa, once president of the party, but jailed in March, 1962, and since then under the in-

¹⁰ The factual basis for the following reflections upon some of the circumstances surrounding the murder of Cabral has been found primarily in the reports written by the only two professional journalists present in Conakry during the days and weeks after the murder: A. N'Diaye Baudin of the Senegalese daily *Le Soleil* (Dakar), and Aquino de Bragança of the journal *Afrique-Asie* (Paris). Their articles are found in *Le Soleil*, January 29 and 31, and February 3-4, 1973, and in *Afrique-Asie*, no. 24, February 19-March 4, 1973, pp. 8-15. Baudin seems to have relied, to a considerable extent, upon de Bragança's material. *Afrique-Asie*, no. 23, February 5-18, 1973, pp. 10-11, has an article written by another journalist but based upon material sent in from de Bragança. *Afrique-Asie*, no. 25, March 5-18, 1973, p. 23, presents what is said to be the main points of a secret PAIGC document, written in March, 1972, in which Cabral foresaw and analyzed the various stages of a Portuguese plan to destroy the PAIGC. A copy of this document had been given to de Bragança. Other sources used by the author are official PAIGC releases, such as the typewritten *Comunicado* issued by the *Comité Executivo da Luta* on January 26, 1973, private conversations with some persons who were present in Conakry at the time, and the often contradictory and confused messages reaching the international press by way of Radio Conakry and the news agencies represented in Dakar.

¹¹ *Afrique-Asie*, no. 24, February 19-March 4, 1973, p. 14.

fluence of the Portuguese. Barbosa's closest ally in Conakry was Mamadou Touré, who had been jailed by the PAIGC in Conakry in 1971, suspected of collaboration with the Portuguese. Touré had been a member of the former Central Committee of the PAIGC, before 1963.

2. The second group, including the actual murderer, was made up of "elements who were corrupt or worn out by the war, and who had therefore become easy targets for the recruiters of the Portuguese agents."

3. A third important group was made up of specially trained anti-guerilla experts, recruited among the people of Guinea-Bissau and sent to Conakry as "deserters" from the Portuguese colonial army.

This information is based upon the confessions made by the murderers and their accomplices before an investigation committee consisting of the ambassadors of Senegal, Algeria, Cuba, Tanzania, Zaire, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Egypt, to the Republic of Guinea, as well as of leading representatives of the PAIGC and the FRELIMO.¹² It is the best information available, and even if new facts may well be revealed in the future, nothing has been produced so far to contradict de Bragança's analysis, except the blank denials of the Portuguese authorities of any involvement whatsoever.¹³

It is not surprising that the Portuguese colonial power would have wanted to weaken the PAIGC by depriving the movement of its foremost leader. The same tactics were used against the FRELIMO, when Eduardo Mondlane, the late leader of that movement, was murdered in 1969. What is more surprising, however, at least at first glance, is that the instigators of the crime were able to count upon the active cooperation of a number of active members of the PAIGC, at and around the secretariat in Conakry.¹⁴ Apparently the group at Conakry had also counted upon military support from PAIGC troops in the south of Guinea-Bissau. But this failed to materialize, after the *coup* itself had been stopped through the intervention of Sékou Touré, the president of the Republic of Guinea.

The most frequent official explanation given after the murder was that Cabral and some of his collaborators had been guilty of "lack of vigilance". Cabral had shown too much confidence in people not worthy of confidence, it

¹² *Le Soleil*, January 31, 1973.

¹³ See for instance *Le Monde*, February 3, 1973.

¹⁴ According to de Bragança, *Afrique-Asie*, no. 24, 1973, p. 9, the investigation committee heard 465 persons, of which 43 were considered to have been active participants in the conspiracy, 9 were classified as accomplices, and 42 remained suspect. According to A. N'Diaye Baudin writing in *Le Soleil*, January 31, 1973, the investigation committee heard around 500 persons, of whom 55 were kept in jail for future trial. Of these, 12 were classified as active participants and the remaining 43 suspected of more or less active complicity. On July 30, 1973, the newly elected Secretary General of the PAIGC, Aristides Pereira, announced in an interview with the news agency AFP, in Dakar, that five of the murderers (among them Kani) had been executed by a firing squad inside Guinea-Bissau, while the others involved in the conspiracy had been condemned to hard labor for the party. (*Facts and Reports*, no. 1089, Vol. 3, no. 17, August 18, 1973.) According to unverified information the number of executed was greater than five.

was said.¹⁵ However true this may be, there still remains the question why so many PAIGC cadres in Conakry had actually not been worthy of the confidence of Amílcar Cabral. Portuguese infiltration is not a satisfactory answer, for without some response within the PAIGC, the work of the infiltrators would have been in vain.

A clue is perhaps provided by one of the witnesses heard by the investigation committee. The witness is reported to have quoted the Portuguese as speaking in the following way to the Guinean conspirators:

Portugal is prepared to grant independence to the black people of Guinea-Bissau on the condition: (1) that they abolish the PAIGC, and (2) that all Cape Verdeans be excluded from any nationalist movement, for Portugal intends to keep the islands of Cape Verde, which constitute a strategic base of utmost importance for her and her allies. Thus, the black people ought to get rid of all half-breeds. Afterwards Portugal will form a government with those who have carried out this task effectively. The Portuguese forces will withdraw to the islands of Cape Verde, and from there they will offer all cooperation necessary for the protection of the black people of Guinea-Bissau.¹⁶

Other witnesses gave similar testimony.¹⁷

If this testimony is anywhere near the truth, it would appear that the Portuguese had been successful in exploiting more or less latent divisions within the PAIGC between mainland Guineans and people of Cape Verdean origin: particularly by playing upon suspiciousness — partly based on racial prejudice—among some mainland Guineans against the fact that Cape Verdeans are numerically over-represented among those having leading positions and/or having fairly comfortable jobs at the secretariat in Conakry. Although this over-representation in relation to population is understandable and explainable against the background of colonial history and the higher levels of modern education enjoyed by the Cape Verdeans than by the Guineans of Guinea-Bissau, it may still have caused bitterness and resentment among some Guineans.¹⁸ But if this were so, it would obviously be a sign of political weakness and insufficient work of political education—a sign of insufficient political mobilization. This was also the interpretation offered by Sékou Touré in his opening speech at the memorial symposium organized in Conakry, in

¹⁵ See for instance *Le Soleil*, January 29, 1973, where Luis Cabral is quoted as having said (translated by the author): "My brother's mistake was that he trusted everybody. Without doubt, Amílcar Cabral was not vigilant enough. For the majority of those who executed this crime belonged to the Portuguese colonial army and had been sent to Conakry under false guise as deserters or nationalists sympathizing with the PAIGC. Here they had been engaged at once in the ranks of the fighting forces of the PAIGC."

¹⁶ *Afrique-Asie*, no. 24, 1973, p. 13. *Le Soleil*, January 29, 1973, reports almost identically.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, and also p. 14 in *Afrique-Asie*.

¹⁸ Cf. Chapter II of this book, pp. 3 ff., 12 ff., and 33 ff. By emphasizing the "blackness" of mainland Guineans, the reported Portuguese offer aimed insidiously at stimulating suspiciousness of the "half-breeds" of Cape Verde among mainland Guineans.

honor of Cabral, only a few days after the murder. Among many other things, the president of the Republic of Guinea had the following to say:

Within the movement of national liberation, this contradiction (between the people of Guinea and the people of the islands of Cape Verde—according to Touré, a direct result of the “Machiavellian tactics of Portuguese colonialism”) will have to be resolved through the intensification of the ideological and political education of the people. Once the militants have become conscious through such education, they will move beyond their more or less real internal contradictions, and be guided only by their sense of common struggle for the rapid and total liberation of their country.

Another contradiction arises from the differences in ways of urban and rural living, differences that are notable with regard to housing, health protection, food, clothing, with regard to all relative facilities enjoyed by urban residents in comparison with the difficulties and insufficiencies of all kinds that the villages of the interior have to live with.

This kind of contradiction is accentuated when a combatant from the interior thinks about the relatively easy life enjoyed by his colleague or leader who lives in the city.

In the interior of the country there are no roads, not enough medicine, not enough security. For the bombardments of the enemy are permanent and murderous. This is understandable. But the enemy can use this situation, which is possible to explain objectively, in order to create an atmosphere possible to exploit subjectively in his favour, in the same way as he tries to dig a trench of incomprehension or envy between the intellectuals and the toiling masses, largely illiterate.

It is thus by way of clear explanations, ideological education, that all militants should be able to move beyond these contradictions—ever arming themselves with courage and unselfishness for an improved struggle of liberation. Only the victory of this struggle will give the supreme solution to the problem of liquidating these kinds of contradictions, by giving a democratic and progressive character to the political action among the people, a character expanding across all lines of division.¹⁹

What Sékou Touré implies is clearly that, in his opinion, it should have been possible to prevent the Portuguese from infiltrating the ranks of the PAIGC, if the work of political and ideological education had been carried on more energetically and thus more successfully. His interpretation of the internal situation of the PAIGC in this respect supports what was said earlier in the chapter about organizational top-heaviness and possible lack of easy two-way communication between the highest leadership of the party and the rank and file cadres. It is possible that not enough democratic vigilance was exercised against the risks of excessive centralization of decision-making and reliance upon the leader—risks that are ever-present within the institutional structure of democratic centralism and must therefore constantly be guarded against.

Nevertheless, as also stated above, this probable lack of balance between revolutionary democracy and central leadership within the PAIGC appears to

¹⁹ *Crime crapuleux de l'impérialisme*, Conakry, Imprimerie Nationale 'Patrice Lumumba', January 31, 1973, pp. 22 f. (translated by the author).

have been confined largely to the very top structure of the movement. Nor is it possible to say anything very certain about how serious it has been. During the long years of armed struggle inside Guinea-Bissau, the PAIGC has become deeply rooted in the self-experienced and concrete developmental needs of the people themselves. Counterbalances have thus been created. This is a result both of the dynamics of the politico-military struggle itself and of the conscious application in practical politics of Cabral's political thinking. The organizational links between the concrete needs of the people for a better life and the PAIGC as a political and military force have been forged at the regional, sectoral, sectional, and local levels inside the country. We shall now turn our attention to these key organizational levels of the movement of national liberation.

North and South: two "National Committees"

The liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau have been administratively divided into *the North* and *the South*. These two main divisions are each headed by a 12-man "National Committee". Within each of these we find a three-member Permanent Commission with the same division of labor as in the central Permanent Commission existing before the death of Cabral, but with the important addition that general political leadership at this level is connected with responsibility for production. This is a 1970 innovation, and demonstrates the *political* importance attached to economic output and material improvement by the PAIGC leadership. As "finances" does not exist as a special function on this level, the three members of the "national" Permanent Commissions thus have the following functions: (1) political commissar, also responsible for production, (2) member responsible for security, and (3) member responsible for "national reconstruction", i.e. primarily education and health.

In addition to the members of their Permanent Commissions, the two National Committees are each made up of the four political commissars and the four members in charge of security questions within the leading committees of each of the four *regions* into which both the North and the South are further subdivided (cf. below). The twelfth member, finally, is in charge of maintaining liaison between the armed forces of the liberation movement and the Permanent Commission of the National Committee.

According to the party document cited above on p. 110, the National Committees are supposed to meet for four working-sessions a year. It is possible that this did not happen to begin with, as Cabral spoke of "certain difficulties which have arisen in getting the National Committees of the liberated zones (CNRL) off the ground" in his January 1972 report on party activities.²⁰ But

²⁰ Cabral, *Rapport bref sur la lutte en 1971*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), January 1972, p. 5 (official PAIGC English-language version).

at any rate, the first meeting of the National Committee of the South was held as early as on June 21–23, 1970,²¹ and in 1972, during the author's second visit to Guinea-Bissau, the party organization appeared to be functioning well at this level.

On April 21–22, 1972, the National Committee of the North met at a place far in the interior of the country, in the sector of Sara. The previous meeting was then said to have been held about two months earlier. The author was present as observer in the background at the April 1972 meeting, and is able thus to report the following facts, among others:

The meeting began in the morning of the 21st and lasted throughout the day, with a break for a meal and some rest. The discussions re-opened the following morning, and did not close until after noon on the 22nd. The meeting lasted altogether about ten effective hours. Twenty-six people were present at the meeting, which was led by Luis Cabral (member of the Permanent Commission) and Francisco Mendes (member of the War Council and the Executive Committee of the party). As is common at PAIGC meetings, various people with important functions in addition to those formally belonging to the particular organ holding the meeting were also present. Of the 12 regular members of the National Committee, 10 were present. Of the two absent members, one had been captured by the Portuguese, and the other had been unable to come because of the long distance involved and important duties retaining him elsewhere.

The discussions at the meeting covered the whole range of subjects important to the liberation movement: security, education, health, transportation, production, political work, etc. The debates were lively, and most of those present took active part. A Portuguese Dakota plane flying over the area did not affect the serious but relaxed atmosphere.

The group to which the author belonged spent the following day marching about fifty kilometers to a place in the neighbouring sector of Candjambary. On the afternoon of the 24th, a courier who had started the same morning arrived with a long written report of the deliberations and decisions of the National Committee. The report, which had been written by the political commissar of the National Committee, was handed over to the political commissar of the sector of Candjambary, who was then to proceed to the application of the decisions through the various organs of the sector organization (cf. below).

An important organ directly dependent upon the political commissar of the National Committee is the "brigade for political action" (BAP). As there are two National Committees, there are also two brigades, one in the North and one in the South. Each brigade is made up of six well-qualified and trained people who can be dispatched to places where special political tasks need to be performed. A special effort is made to include women in the brigades, in order to facilitate political contacts with the female population (cf. pp. 225 f.). In 1972, the brigade of the North had one woman member, and in the South there were said to be two. At the moment of the author's visit in the North in 1972, a group of the northern brigade had been dispatched to the region of Cantchungo, in the northwest, in order to prepare the ground for the election of the regional councils.

²¹ *Decisao*, p. 1.

Let it be noted, finally, that no National Committee had been set up before 1974 for the eastern parts of liberated Guinea-Bissau. Most of what is called *the East* was still under military PAIGC administration, under Portuguese control, or controlled by neither side. Considerable parts had even been emptied of people because of the war — some had fled to the Portuguese and some to the nationalist side. But in the region of Boé, in the far south-east, there existed an ordinary *Regional Committee* (cf. below) which was formally considered to depend upon the National Committee of the South, although in reality it was probably more autonomous than the eight other regional committees.

Regions

The liberated areas of the North and of the South are each divided into four *regions*: Sara-Candjambary, Oio, Cantchungo, and the frontier region of S. Domingos and Sambaia (usually simply called *Frenteira*) in the North; and Catió, Cubiseco, Quinara, and Balana-Quitafine in the South. To these we can also add the eastern region of Boé, mentioned above.

Political and administrative leadership at the regional level is in the hands of the Regional Committee, which has four members: three with the same internal division of labor between themselves as the members of the Permanent Commissions of the two National Committees, and a fourth member (added by decision of the 1971 *Conselho Superior*) who is identical with the regional commander of the local defense forces (cf. pp. 136 f.).

Formally, the Regional Committee is required to meet once a month, but in reality there is fairly continuous contact between the different members of these committees where the political commissars, with their important responsibilities for political work and production, function as chairmen. If the need to do so is felt, any Regional Committee may of course also call in representatives of their sectors for consultation and information. The sector, as we shall soon see, is the next level in the organizational hierarchy of the PAIGC.

The author's conclusion from numerous interviews and conversations with members of Regional Committees, both in the North and in the South, is that the party organization is well established at this level. In other words, the regional organization described to visitors at the secretariat in Conakry could be observed, existing and functioning in reality, within the liberated areas of the country.

Each of the regions is further subdivided into *sectors* or *zones* (the terminology is not fixed), within which are found a large number of *tabancas*, or villages. Between the sector and the village, there is also the level of the *section*, which was still in the process of being institutionally shaped in 1972. These three levels will now be presented one by one.

Sectors or zones

No party congress was held between 1964 and the summer of 1973. During this entire time, the membership of the three levels dealt with thus far—at the centre, in the North/South National Committees, and in the nine regions—was renewed by appointment and co-optation rather than by election. It is significant, for instance, that the 1970 reorganization was decided by a body not much larger than the present *Comité Executivo da Luta*, and in any case smaller than the *Conselho Superior*. This does not mean that the central organs are not representative in a more general political sense—they probably are—but it does mean that at least until 1972 there has not been any institutionalized formal procedure by which the people directly select their national leaders. On the other hand, concrete formulation of policies that concern the people directly is carried on in close contact with the basic levels of the party.

Since the introduction of the 1970 official terminology, the subdivision of the region should properly be called *zone*. In daily speech, however, the zone is still called *sector*, in accordance with former usage. The term *sector* is so well established among the people and the party cadres that it will be employed in this book as well.

The regions are thus divided into two or three sectors (four in the case of Quinara). In 1972 there were altogether twenty sectors in the eight regions of the North and the South.²²

From the point of view of popular representation, the structure of the organization in the sector differs somewhat from that encountered at the higher levels, in that an element of direct local representation has been introduced. This has been attempted in the form of a special committee of village representatives, intended to function side by side with an appointed committee of party functionaries. Both committees have five members, and we thus find two distinct five-member committees working together with each other at the level of the sector. According to the official terminology encountered in recent party documents,²³ the committee made up of party functionaries should be called the Zone Committee. But for the reason just mentioned, the term Sector Committee will be used here. In fact, the term Zone Committee is rarely heard inside Guinea-Bissau, where the group of five village representatives working with the Sector Committee are usually quite simply called *colaboradores*.

²² *North*: Sara, Candjambary (region Sara-Candjambary); Morés, Maqué, Biambi (region Oio); Bula, Cantchungo (region Cantchungo); S. Domingos, Sambuía (region Fronteira). *South*: Como, Cubucaré, Tombali (region Catió); Cubisseco-de-Cima, Cubisseco-de-Baixo (region Cubisseco); S. João, Fulacunda, N'Djassane, Xitole (region Quinara); Balana, Quitafine (region Balana-Quitafine).

²³ For instance *Decisão*, p. 1. Cf. also note 38, p. 136.

In the South in 1970 the *colaboradores* were clearly conceived of as each representing each about one-fifth of the villages of the sector, and they were not usually looked upon as having a specific mutual division of functions. In the North in 1972, on the other hand, the five *colaboradores* were all regarded as having specified functions equivalent to those of the members of the party-appointed Sector Committee. Still, the function of representing the villages was also stressed as important by people with whom the author discussed this particular point. It is probable that the "model" of the North can be regarded as more definitive than the model found in the South in 1970, at the time of the author's first visit, when the system of *colaboradores* had just barely been introduced.

The five appointed functionaries of what we here call the Sector Committee have clearly defined tasks: the *political commissar*, besides his political work, is also in charge of supervising and directing the sector's economic production, and the *other four* have specific responsibility for security, local defense, education, and health. Note that education and health have been split between two members at this level, as opposed to the higher levels, whereas the idea of combining political leadership with responsibility for production is retained even at the sector level. As opposed to the *colaboradores*, whose very function makes it almost inevitable that they be natives of the sector, the five members of the Sector Committee do not necessarily have to be of local origin, although they must of course master the local language. They are generally well-trained cadres with a good background of political work in the party. This is indispensable, as the party organization at this level has the crucial task of providing the focus for, or—to put it somewhat differently—the direct link between, the general policy aims of the party and the concrete needs and claims of the people. This is naturally why the attempt has been made to introduce an element of direct representation into the sectorial organization, by the creation of the committee of *colaboradores*, selected among people held in trust and esteem by the villagers themselves.

Formally, the Sector (Zone) Committee is required to meet twice a month alone, and once a month together with the *colaboradores*.²⁴ In reality, there is continuous contact between most of the members of the committees, and without being able to confirm whether formal meetings are held exactly in accordance with the required schedule or not, the author is well able to testify to the active existence of Sector Committees and *colaboradores* both in the North and in the South of liberated Guinea-Bissau.

In order to convey a more vivid and concrete impression than is possible by way of mere abstract description of the organizational structure, we shall now

²⁴ *Ibid.*

let a few PAIGC militants, active at the level of the sector, speak directly to the reader, in their own words, about the way they look upon their political work and responsibilities. What follows are literal transcripts, from the author's notes, of interviews made in *November 1970* with two *colaboradores* and four members of the *Sector Committee of Tombali*. The statements were made in Balante or Creole and were simultaneously translated into French. The notes were thus taken on the spot from the oral French interpreted version. Many similar statements were made to the author by other party militants in other parts of the country, both in connection with formal interviews and during private informal conversations. A striking feature of almost all such interviews and conversations is the close concordance between the organizational structure as described to visitors at the secretariat in Conakry and as viewed by party workers, themselves active inside the country in daily political work among the people.

Madi Camara, 49, colaborador de sector:

We have suffered much through the ages. But today we live as free men in the forest, and our troubles and worries are nothing in comparison with what our forefathers and families had to suffer before . . .

The Portuguese insulted and humiliated our forefathers, although they were well received when they first came to our country. When meeting people for the first time, one ought to be courteous and receive them as honored guests . . .

It is a great pleasure for us to see you here, you have come as friends and so we receive you in the right way. But if you had come in order to insult us and hit our children, then it would not have been right to receive you well. It is not possible to forget the insults and the humiliations we were subjected to by the Portuguese. Therefore we are cautious.

Our life was very difficult before. We had to pay taxes for everything, and when we did not have any money, they took either us or our wives to jail.

We cannot suffer any more. It is much better for us to die here in the forest than to go on under colonialism. And we know that even if the Portuguese kill us all, our children will be free.

Sana Camara, 31, colaborador de sector:

We have had to suffer so much that we cannot look upon the Portuguese as our friends. We can never forget the insults and humiliations we were subjected to.

Things are difficult today. But we accept carrying heavy burdens now, as we know that things are moving forward.

The Portuguese hid us to the world. They did not want to talk about us, for fear that other countries would come to know how they exploited us.

The Portuguese did not do anything useful here. We were the only ones who worked. Therefore we are prepared to fight to the last African in order to get rid of them.

The Portuguese attacks do not bother us much; they cannot make us change our minds.

We cannot look upon the Portuguese as our friends. Nobody in the world is worse than the Portuguese colonialists. They prevented and prohibited our parents from living lives worthy of human beings.

Therefore the Party was right in deciding to take arms.

It is a great step forward for us in our struggle to see you here today. We have never seen such European faces before.

Estevão Fernandes, about 30, political commissar in the sector of Tombali, appointed six months earlier, had previously held the same post for one year in a different sector, soldier in the PAIGC armed forces before that:

My main task is to work among the people and with the people. Organize meetings, explain the policies of the party, encourage them not to collaborate with the enemy.

Life was difficult before, under the Portuguese. Therefore it is possible to persuade the people to help us, for instance with transport service from the border.

Ansumane Camara, about 30, responsible for health, has held the post for five months; his predecessor was a woman; he himself was attendant at a sanitary post before this appointment:

My main task is to see to it that our nurses and attendants take good care of our people.

We have two sanitary posts here in Tombali, and I have had plenty of problems, because many things do not function as they should.

There are many things we do not have, although we must have them in order to give people the assistance they need. Certain nurses and attendants, for instance, are not well prepared. Even the majority of them have not had enough practice.

(In answer to direct question if this has not caused discontent among the people.) People are not satisfied, but they understand that our possibilities are limited. Lack of medicines, etc . . . instruments, scissors, injection needles . . . But it is natural that the people support us, as they see that the party tries to help them with such things as health care.

Mamadu Cassama, about 30, responsible for education, has held the post for five months, was a teacher before, and at the same time responsible for a school cooperative where a few schools had a common rice field and chickens, etc.:

The lack of school material is a great problem. The people demand schools. In principle the party is for providing schools, but we have a lack of school material.

Last year we had nine schools in the sector. This year we have started six new schools, and so we have altogether fifteen at present. There are about 3-4 villages per school. We have two teachers per school. The teachers have the additional task of being clerks at the People's Courts (cf. p. 138).

We have 1,097 pupils in the sector, of these 497 are girls (cf p. 224). But it has been hard work to get the girls to come to school . . . We have to argue with the parents and tell them that the girls will have a better future, if they go to school; that they will be able to become nurses, for instance.

In some cases the parents try to take the girls away from school in order to marry them. Then we try to persuade them to change their minds. Sometimes we are successful, sometimes not.

Generally the boys remain in school longer than the girls.

In this sector we have had schools since 1965.

António da Silva, about 30, responsible for security, has held the post for three years and eight months, was a soldier before that:

Twice a month I meet with the other four members of the Sector Committee. I see the *colaboradores* and the leaders of the villages continuously. Our meetings twice a month are general sessions, devoted to problems that concern the whole sector.

As far as my own work with security questions is concerned, naturally I cannot talk about that. But we do have problems with enemy agents, civilian agents. Inside the army, we have not had any such case.

In this sector we do not have security problems in connection with migration.

Sections

The *section* is found at the level between the sector and the village. It is thus a level close to the people. Therefore, when the decision was taken in 1970 to introduce a party committee at this level as well, the idea was to have a committee elected by the inhabitants of the villages. This had not yet materialized in 1972, however.

In the South, there probably did not exist any Section Committees at all in 1972. Nor is it certain that they will be organized in the future in most southern sectors, as the idea of sections in the South had been introduced only into the judicial system (cf. pp. 138 f.), where in nine cases, the sections coincided with the sectors, and in two cases (Balana and Tombali) there were two judicial sections within one sector.²⁵

In the North, in 1972, the organization of the sectors had advanced a little further than in the South. Here, it had been decided to divide the sectors of Morés, Maqué, Biambi, Candjambary, and Sara into ten, four, seven, six, and eight sections respectively.²⁶ But the extent to which these decisions had been implemented varied among the sectors. At some places, probably no Section Committee whatsoever was yet in existence during the spring of 1972, whereas at others only a single person had been appointed to coordinate the work of the Village Committees of the section. What was at any rate very clear—and this was also pointed out to the author—was that the Section Committees were *appointed* and *administrative* organs with the function of coordinating the work of the villages in such areas as health, education, production, and local defense. Where committees actually had been appointed in the North, they therefore usually contained a teacher, a nurse, a representative of the local defense forces, and a chairman with general coordinating functions.

We can thus conclude that the idea of the Section Committee as a politically elected, representative organ had not yet taken root in 1972. On the other hand, it had not been entirely abandoned as a project for the future, although it may be indicative of priorities that it is not found among the organs for which the required frequency of meetings is listed in the document quoted earlier on this matter.²⁷

Villages

The basic unit, finally, in the political and administrative structure of liberated Guinea-Bissau is the *Comité de Tabanca*, or Village Committee. This is a pop-

²⁵ According to documents shown to the author in Conakry, May 1972, by an associate of the party's Secretary of Justice.

²⁶ According to documents shown to the author in the North, April 1972, by the political commissar of the National Committee of the North.

²⁷ *Decisão*, p. 1.

ularly elected five-member committee that the PAIGC attempts to establish in all liberated villages.

The five members of the Village Committee have clearly defined functions which reflect, in a most revealing manner, the essential tasks of the national liberation movement. The *president* directs and leads the activities of the village in general, including agricultural production—naturally the most basic activity. At his side stands the *vice president*, with specific responsibility for both security and local defense, necessary until the summer of 1974 in case of Portuguese attacks by, for example, helicopter-borne troops. The *third member* is in charge of education, social affairs, health, and child care. The *fourth member* is responsible for the organization of the village's deliveries to the party and the army, and for the care of visiting soldiers or party members who stop for rest during their marches. The *fifth member* is in charge of the civil register, which includes data in connection with the census planned and partly already carried out by the PAIGC (cf. pp. 143 ff.). In case the fifth member does not know how to read and write, which is often the case, the village teacher acts as his or her assistant. It should be noted, too, that, according to the party rules, at least two members of these Village Committees have to be women. This appears to be followed quite scrupulously, and is consistent with other systematic efforts to improve the traditionally subordinate position of women.

The division of functions now described is the one described to the author by high officials of the party in both 1970 and 1972. It is also the division of functions actually found by the author in a number of real committees, the members of which he met and interviewed about their political work. But in the party document already cited several times, a slightly different division of functions is prescribed for the Village Committees. In this source it is said that there ought to be two members responsible for the organization of food deliveries and related work, whereas responsibility for the social register should be combined with "social affairs".²⁸ But in 1972 at least, this idea had not left the paper stage.

Once elected by more or less unanimous acclamation at a general meeting of the inhabitants, the Village Committee remains in office until some concrete reason for dissatisfaction with one or more of its members arises. Thus the local leaders do not have to stand for re-election at regular intervals. As indicated in the preceding chapter, these African villages have a very different kind of social structure from that which historically has given rise to the elaborate procedures of liberal representative democracy in the western world. The main point is that the action of the committee members becomes impossi-

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

ble unless they are held in trust and confidence by their fellow villagers. This is the mechanism through which local representativeness is maintained.

The formal requirement with regard to meetings of the Village Committee is one meeting per week plus one meeting with the whole population of the village once every two weeks.²⁹ It is probable that this rule is not kept very strictly, but on the other hand, people live so close to each other in these villages that it would hardly be exaggerated to say that daily life itself is like a general meeting. In any case, the members of the village committee have continuous and daily contact with each other.

The number of villages in an agricultural peasant country such as Guinea-Bissau is, of course, very great. No exact figure has been published or otherwise made known, but the number of villages with committees in the sectors visited by the author in 1970 and 1972 varied between approximately ten and forty. The sector of Morés and Biambi, in the northern region of Oio, have as many as 55 and 49 villages respectively, according to the notebook of the political commissar of the North.³⁰ It should also be noted that a village must have at least about one hundred inhabitants, probably not counting small children, in order to be allowed to form its own committee. Smaller villages, which are numerous, are supposed to form joint committees. The normal number of inhabitants in Guinean villages, in the areas visited by the author, is from about one to several hundred inhabitants, but of course larger villages may be found. Many people also live in and around military and administrative settlements established in the forest by the PAIGC during the war, away from the normal sites of the villages.

On the basis of information made available to the author, it is perhaps possible to estimate the number of village committees established in liberated Guinea-Bissau until the end of the armed struggle at about 400 or somewhat less. But this is a very roughly calculated figure and advanced only hesitantly. Furthermore, it is of course impossible to know if all committees really function everywhere in the intended manner. It is quite probable that not all do, and the PAIGC leaders themselves readily concede that their political work is much easier in some areas than in others, depending upon the different cultural and social characteristics of the various ethnic groups.³¹ Above all, it is a time-consuming job to mobilize previously quite isolated people into understanding the connection between colonialism and underdevelopment, and consequently, the connection between national liberation and chances for development of one's own life and country.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

³⁰ April, 1972.

³¹ Among the conclusions of a message from Cabral to the people on the occasion of the 14th anniversary of the foundation of the PAIGC we find the following: "Improve our political work and develop the participation of the people in the guidance of their own lives. . ." Conakry. PAIGC (mimeo), p. 14 (translated by the author). Cf. also pp. 9 ff. above.

All that can be verified by the present author, in the very strictest and most empirical sense, is that in some fifteen villages visited during several marches back and forth in the southern, south-western, and northern parts of the country, the Village Committees were always present, organized and conscious of their tasks. The division of functions between the five members of the committee was everywhere the same, and there were always at least two women on the committee. The author also met many village officials, whose villages he did not visit, who informed him about the work of their committees. This information always gave the impression that the party line was well known to the party militants active at this basic level of the new society emerging in Guinea-Bissau.

If the observations made by this author, as well as the testimony of other visitors, are added to the fact of political and military success in the struggle against the Portuguese colonial system, it seems reasonable to conclude that the number of effective Village Committees in liberated Guinea-Bissau probably is quite considerable.

In the same way and for the same reason as given for the Sector Committees above, the authentic words of a number of Village Committee members, interviewed in November 1970, will now be transmitted directly to the reader. In the opinion of the author, this is the best way available of providing some concrete insight into the social mechanisms and conceptions that keep the political and social system of liberated Guinea-Bissau going at the level where ordinary people are most able to participate directly. The idea, obviously, is not to present the words of a statistically representative sample of members of village committees, but to give illuminating and authentic illustrations.

Pungana Nabila, 28, vice president of Nkomne Village Committee, sector of Tombali:

We became so tired of the Portuguese . . . tired of being used and exploited . . . It is no good to work every day without getting anything in return, so we decided there had to be a change. Now we are working for ourselves and for our own interests. Therefore we don't get tired any more, in spite of difficulties and hard conditions.

I am very happy that you came here. To us it is a victory in our struggle against colonialism. Previously we did not know that there were other foreigners than the Portuguese.

Thank you. That's all I have to say.

Sitna Nantote, 31, responsible for social affairs in Nkomne Village Committee:

This is an important occasion, it is a great pleasure for us to have you as our guests today.

I don't want to talk about the Portuguese. We suffered so much under them. We received them well and regarded them as our brothers—and what did they do to us? They beat us and enslaved us. We have no obligation to regard them as our friends.

They said we were their friends, if we looked happy when receiving their punishments. But today we have new friends.

I ought not have come dressed in these simple clothes to receive such honored guests. But it only goes to show that this is all we can afford.

But we can manage ourselves . . . we need mosquito nets and sewing needles. Because of the war, we have no use for luxury, but we need good and durable things. We have more medicine than we used to, but in comparison with our needs, it is still far from enough.

Ansumani Sambu, 48, president of Kuduko Village Committee (established in 1963), sector of Tombali:

I am a bit old. I have lived with the Portuguese. It would take too long to tell you all the troubles I have had with them, so that is not possible. But I would still like to say a few words.

I myself worked to construct the highway you have seen nearby, which we have closed to the Portuguese now. Both I and my wife had to work there, when it was under construction. We had to leave our homes. I worked on the road itself and my wife carried sand and stone.

At six o'clock in the evening we were forced to take off all our clothes, so that we would not be able to go home and stay away from work the following day.

Thanks to the Party we have been able to unite in struggle against all this.

But with helicopters above us in the air, we are not able to make clothes as before, and so we cannot receive our guests the way guests ought to be received.

I used to have three wives at the same time, and therefore I had to pay a lot of taxes—even when I couldn't find work. If I was unable to pay, I was taken away to forced labor.

Therefore we have to live in the forest today.

Another thing I could mention is that we need carding-combs in order to prepare our wool.

Molan Ngoi, 43, vice president of Kuduko Village Committee:

There is so much I could tell you about the colonialists. If I started to talk about all the hardship we have had to suffer, I would not be able to stop even tomorrow. But I am going to talk about our daily problems instead.

We have no factories. We cultivate the rice fields you have seen with our own hands. We clear the roads with our own hands.

I am a blacksmith and I make agricultural tools. We need a lot of tools to be able to work more efficiently. The Portuguese isolated us in order to keep us from getting any friends.

You have seen that we have schools today. Previously we did not even know what reading and writing meant. If we wanted to learn anything, we had to go away to Senegal or the Republic of Guinea.

The worst thing about the Portuguese was that they were so mean that I cannot even bear to talk about it.

If I couldn't pay the taxes, they came to my house and insulted me and beat me in the presence of my family. Or they took my wife and left me with the children.

We had to live and work without hope. Many of our relatives had their land and their homes taken away from them.

But it is a waste of time to talk about the Portuguese. It is more important to talk about how to make it easier for us to benefit from our work and our hands. We don't have to beg for food, we can work ourselves. What we need is some raw materials, iron, so we can make agricultural tools, machetes and similar things.

Bakarmani, 34, responsible for social affairs in Kuduko Village Committee:

Since I was a child, I was told that I was a Portuguese citizen with all rights. But I never saw any result of all the work I had to carry out.

I worked hard, but when I brought my rice to the depot, they used false scales—50 kilos became 30—and they only paid what they wanted to pay. From the age of fifteen I was supposed to pay taxes, regardless of whether I worked or not.

That's all I have to say.

Famara Djai, 36, president of Cã Village Committee (established in 1964), sector of Cubisseco-de-Cima:

I direct the work and the struggle in our village, as the Party has given me that task. In order for me to receive that task, it was necessary that the whole population of the village came together and elected me . . .

We want to have dignity as human beings, that is why we fight, because the Portuguese did not want to admit our dignity as human beings.

I am responsible for the work of the committee and I work together with the other four members.

When the time comes to work the fields, I assemble the people and explain what has to be done . . .

We have to work and struggle. Through the struggle we change, and our lives improve. We want better lives, we want roads, clothes, food, security, good lives. We are not tired, and we shall fight until victory.

We want freedom, we want to be free. Therefore we don't get tired.

We are fighting for freedom, because it can no longer be as it used to be, when we were treated with sticks, beaten. We see truth now, and we know the direction in which we are heading.

We are not against the Portuguese, but we are against the colonialists. Nor are we against the Africans who side with the Portuguese, only against those who come with arms in their hands.

The struggle is no easy. The forest is dark. But before knocking down big trees, it is necessary to cut off the small branches. This we know. Therefore we don't get tired.

The struggle has already been going on for many years. But when parents have children, it takes much time and much effort to raise them, and still, after they have grown up, all difficulties are forgotten. As we know this, we are prepared to suffer a great deal. Victory will come. God (Allah) willing, it may come tomorrow. But it may also come later.

The struggle is hard, arms have to be cut off, people get ill, suffer. But we are not tired.

I conclude with these words. This is what I wanted to tell you.

Tjalté, vice president of Cã Village Committee:

I am responsible for the militia and for the security of the people. If anybody wants to leave the village, he must inform me. And if anybody has evil intentions, I inform the militia so we can keep him from putting them into effect.

When the president is away from the village, I take his place, just as the president takes on my tasks, when I am away. We do it in this way, because all tasks have to be performed, so that the Party and our work can develop and go on all the time.

We had to suffer much before, but now the Party has organized the Village Committee in order to improve our lives.

We were severely used and exploited. We were forced to build roads with whips swishing over our backs. But when the roads were finished, not we, but others had the cars to drive on the roads.

Therefore we have to continue forward now, not go backward. There is no return. We have risen and taken our arms. No return. We have to defend our homes and our families.

The Portuguese used to come and tell us: tomorrow you will have to pay taxes, personal tax and all other kinds of taxes. And if we could not pay the next day, they would come and take the husband to one prison and his wife to another.

We can never get tired . . .

Bediende la Belinka, responsible for the civil register and the census in Cã Village Committee:

I am responsible for the civil register and for the census.

If anybody intends to marry, he talks to me. Then I talk with both of them and also with the parents. We have eliminated forced marriages. The girl has to give her consent freely.

If anybody dies, I have to be informed of the cause and all other circumstances. I even have to attend the funeral.

I register when children are born, when people marry or die, and everything that happens.

We have eliminated the system of dowry and bride-purchase. But naturally we hold on to certain customs. When a man comes to ask for the hand of a girl, it is customary that he brings a liter of wine, for instance. Usually he also helps out with the funeral of his father-in-law.

Tale Na Sum, a woman, responsible for social affairs in Cã Village Committee:

I am responsible for the schools and for health care in the village.

The Portuguese never built any schools before. They have started doing it first now, when they are about to lose the struggle. Therefore the parents are not used to sending their children to school. We have to persuade them. This was not always easy to begin with. But I explain to the parents that they have to send their children to school, because it is important for our country.

I also see to it that the teachers get what they need, food and laundry and other such things . . .

It is important that the school is not too far away from the village, so the children will not have to walk too far. I discuss this with the teachers. I also discuss with the parents. I ask them to keep their children neatly dressed and clean, and to take care that they get the help they need to do their school work.

(Cf. also pp. 186-7 for Tale Na Sum's description of her tasks in the field of health care.)

Media Te, a woman, responsible for deliveries and the care of visitors in Cã Village Committee:

My responsibility is to provide for the soldiers when they come to our village. see to it that they get what they need and that they are well taken care of. We make food, wash their clothes, and take care of the comrades.

Why do we do this? The answer is simple. They fight for our cause.

I am not satisfied, I would have liked to talk to you all day. There is so much to say, and now it is already night. I would have liked to explain everything, to make you understand really.

It was terrible during the time of the Portuguese. We lived under the whip, permanently humiliated . . .

When we did not pay the tax immediately, they came to get our husbands and beat them.

I am happy that you have come here.

We fight with arms in our hands. Women who give food and water to the soldiers are also in the struggle and pull the triggers of the guns. Our contribution is as essential as anybody else's . . .

If we had had more time, I could have told you much more about the struggle. But the night has come, I have been fasting all day (the month is Ramadan), and now I think I have to go home . . .

The statements just quoted were made by members of the Village Committees of Kuduko and Cã in the form of small speeches and in response to a demand that they themselves talk about what they considered most important to tell the visitors from abroad. In the North, most of the time, the author did not belong to a group of visitors but was alone with the members of the

PAIGC. Therefore the interviews could sometimes take a different and less formal course, as in the case of the following meeting with four members of the *Village Committee of Manhau in the sector of Sara, April 1972*. The members of the committee spoke in the Mandinga language, which was interpreted into Creole and French:

The president, a man of about 45 and wearing a long Moslem dress, begins by saying that his most important duty is to take good care of the guests of the village. Reminded by the interpreter, a PAIGC medical doctor, that this particular guest is interested in politics, the president defines his tasks in the following words:

"Most important of all, I am the interpreter of the party line. I explain policies and guidelines to the people. When we have to organize the transport of munitions and other things from the border, it is my duty to find people willing to take part. In our village, I have to watch that people carry out the work of the fields at the right time."

The president also mentions that the village has about 240 inhabitants. Asked if there is anything more he would like to talk about, he continues:

"We are at war, and in a situation like ours there are many problems and enemies. But the very fact that I am aware of this helps me to carry on and do what I have to do."

"I have been president for eight years and during all that time, I have never crossed the river Farim (which means that he has not been very far away from home). The war is caused by the presence of the Portuguese in our country. I have put my head, my arms, my feet, my entire body into the struggle."

"Some things begin in great difficulty, but afterwards there is rest. The greatest happiness of all is to have a child, but to give birth to a child is the greatest labour a human being can perform, the most difficult labour. Revolution is also like that."

Another member of the committee, a woman, agrees emphatically. The president continues:

"At birth, human beings are suspended between life and death, in fragile equilibrium . . . But all will end well, and precisely for this reason I don't leave my country."

The vice president of the committee is not there, but another man who sits next to the president introduces himself as a farmer and assures that he is always prepared to carry out the tasks of the Party. The next person to speak is a woman, about 30 years old. She is a member of the committee and describes her task as being in charge of providing for the army:

"My task is to find rice and other things to eat for the members of the armed forces who pass by our village. We can never foresee when they will come, and for this reason it is necessary to keep supplies in stock. These can also be used for other members of the party."

Asked to define the tasks of the vice president (who is absent), the president says:

"He has to supervise the supplies of the People's Store (cf. pp. 178 ff.) and see to it that the products brought there by the people are in good condition."

Does he have any other functions?

"Security. He has to know how many guns there are among the inhabitants and how they are kept. It is also necessary to watch that not too much smoke is produced when food is being prepared. And he has to find out the true cause, if anybody says he cannot take part in the transport service."

A second woman is in charge of the civil register. She calls it "finances", and when reminded by the interpreter that finances has to do with money, she is supported by the president who says that this is how the party guidelines define her task: to register marriages and the amount of the dowry . . .

There are three women on the Manhau Village Committee. The third defines her task in the following way:

"I find out how many children there are who ought to go to school. Then I try to convince the parents."

"How many school children do you have at present?"

"Twenty-four, among them seven girls."

In answer to a direct question, the president says that none of the members of the committee knows how to read and write, neither "the Koran" (i.e. Arabic) nor Portuguese. But thanks to the Party, he says, many children know how to read and write now, and there are many among the older people who know the Koran. During the war, the president says, he has not yet found time to learn himself.

"How are you able, then, to study the party guidelines in order to interpret them to the people?"

"The children read to me—the children who have been taught how to read and write by the Party."

One aspect worth noting about this rather spontaneous interview is the close agreement between the concrete and practical way in which the members of the committee define their various tasks and the general organizational division of functions established by the PAIGC. Wherever the author came during his marches, he was introduced to local office holders of the party, and everywhere he could make similar observations. The impression of organizational efficiency was striking, although the number of observations was naturally limited in relation to the total number of Village Committees organized in liberated Guinea-Bissau. But it does not appear reasonable to assume that the organizational pattern now described is restricted to the places visited by the author. On the contrary, as pointed out above, available evidence in the form of party documents, statistics, reports, testimony by others, and the demonstrated inability of the Portuguese to control the country, all supports the conclusion that the number of effectively functioning Village Committees is considerable.

The military organizations

The struggle for national liberation made a military organization necessary. Those active within the armed forces of the PAIGC, however, like to say that they are not "military people" but "armed militants".³²

It is quite clear that this is not a mere pun, but a good way of characterizing a national liberation movement where (1) conscious application of the principle of rotation between military and civilian posts, (2) a great deal of decentralized responsibility for concrete action, and (3) an egalitarian spirit—e.g. small material differences, and no military grades—all demonstrate an ambi-

³² For instance in *Guinée et Cap-Vert*, p. 139, it is stressed that the fighting members of the party are "pas de militaires mais des militants armés".

tion to counteract tendencies in the direction of militarism, hierarchy, and bureaucratization. Whether this willingness will suffice in the future is of course a different question. But the fact is that it exists, both in theory and practice, under present conditions in the interior of Guinea-Bissau.

Nevertheless, for very obvious practical reasons, it has proved advantageous to introduce a distinction between the military and civilian organization at the level below that of the unified center. Whereas the *regular army* needs to be mobile and able to operate efficiently all over the country, the *representative* and *administrative organs* naturally must be locally based. Also the *local defense forces* are quite closely tied to the civilian side of the organizational structure, under the local direction of the Sector Committees and of the vice presidents of the villages, as already noted. But the distinction military/civilian is always difficult to maintain in Guinea-Bissau, where the military and the socio-economic-political-cultural efforts are consistently regarded as merely different aspect of the same struggle, in good agreement with the official ideology of the PAIGC.

The people of liberated Guinea-Bissau are a people in arms. The case of the village of Manhau, mentioned above, where 40 men in a population of about 240 people were reported to be armed with guns in 1972 is no exception. In villages located closer to fortified Portuguese camps, it was said that almost everybody was armed. In the schools it has been judged necessary to train children over fourteen for the use of arms. And all this is still only in addition to the regular army and the organized forces of local defense.

It is important, nevertheless, to emphasize the primacy of politics in the struggle carried on by the PAIGC. The military organization is strong and it is getting stronger. For without a military organization there would probably have been very little advance in the struggle against the Portuguese colonial system. Nor can it be denied that the military struggle has in some ways functioned as a developmental catalyst, that it has served to accelerate the change from old to new ways of thinking and experiencing reality—amulets afford poor protection against modern NATO arms. But fundamentally the PAIGC military organization is a political instrument. It is a means used to achieve political ends.

As all people's armies, the PAIGC army, the Armed Revolutionary Forces of the People, *Forças Armadas Revolucionárias do Povo* (FARP), would be lost in the forest without the people's active support. But with that support, it has stood strong against the colonial army's overwhelming superiority in numbers, air force, and, at least earlier, in striking capacity on the ground. The PAIGC's disadvantage in numbers, for instance, is about 1:8 (about perhaps 5,000 PAIGC regular army soldiers to about 40,000 Portuguese), but this is more than made up for by the massive differences in political

strength. If the local defense forces are included, the numerical relation of course turns out less to the advantage of the Portuguese, but even so, their number is much greater.

Writing in 1968, Basil Davidson spoke of "four phases mark(ing) the military unfolding of this long war".³³

First, there was an initial guerilla phase in 1962, during which a small group of people of "petty-bourgeois" origin, led by Cabral, started the armed struggle.

But on the basis of the careful political preparations carried out in the countryside, peasant participation in the war developed rapidly from 1963 and onwards. The significance of this second phase is summed up by Davidson in the following words: "A few men who want revolution may launch one: only many men who want a revolution can make one."³⁴

But as early as in 1964, the beginnings of a third phase may be distinguished, with the guerilla army of a few thousand men gradually becoming transformed into something more like a regular army. The tendency was "from localized guerilla warfare to co-ordinated mobile warfare".³⁵ This continued until about 1968 and also involved the development of local guerilla militias as distinct from the regular army.

The fourth phase, as viewed by Davidson, would come when the FARP was ready to launch direct assaults "on enemy-held towns coupled with insurrection in Bissau and elsewhere, together with parallel operations in the Cape Verde and Bissagos Islands, which (would) culminate in the final eviction of Portuguese power."³⁶

Davidson himself emphasizes that the fourth phase had not yet begun when he was writing in 1968. In fact, events did not quite evolve the way he foresaw. True, direct assaults upon enemy-held towns, including Bissau, occurred. But for the rest, the PAIGC remained careful during the early nineteen-seventies, strengthening the liberated areas inside Guinea-Bissau, doing very little in Cape Verde, and hoping, realistically, to evict the Portuguese from Guinea without having to wage a bloody battle over the capital city.

In 1970, the organizational structure of the regular army was still very simple. It was organized into three fronts—the eastern, northern, and southern fronts—each under the leadership of a commander, who in turn is directly responsible to the *Conselho de Guerra*, the top military organ of the PAIGC, consisting of the three members of the Permanent Commission and four others from the Executive Committee. The basic unit of the army was—and is still—the *bigrupo*, or "double group" of 32–40 men, operating with a great

³³ Davidson, *The Liberation of Guiné*, p. 91.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

deal of autonomy under the dual leadership of one military and one political leader—*chefe militar* and *comissário político*.

In 1972, however, a new and more elaborately structured type of organization was coming into operation (cf. the diagram on p. 108). As the struggle had developed and become more diversified, the organization was also becoming more complicated. The three original fronts had dissolved into a number of smaller fronts—in the North in 1972 for instance, four *Frentes de Luta* (fronts of struggle) were considered to exist. But the most important new development was the organization of the army into *Corpos de Exército*, army corps, each with its own commander. In the North in 1972, there were five such army corps, which could be shifted around between the fronts in accordance with the shifting requirements of the struggle. The exact number of army corps in the other parts of the country is not known to the author, but probably there were also about five in the South and somewhat fewer in the East. In combination with more efficient artillery and possibly also armoured vehicles, the new organization — at the same time both more flexible and more concentrated than the previous organization — posed a strong threat to the positions of the Portuguese in the entire country.

The army corps of the FARP are under the command of the War Council, but they naturally also work in close coordination with the national Committees of the North and the South. As mentioned on p. 117 above, these two committees even have one member each specifically charged with the maintenance of liaison between the party and the armed forces. But below the level of the National Committees, there are no formal organizational links between the two branches of the national liberation movement, the FARP and the “party as a state”. In daily practice, however, contacts are naturally both numerous and close.

The organization of the army into army corps did not affect the basic unit, which remains the *bigrupo* of 32–40 men with the dual political and military leadership characteristic also of earlier years. Within the artillery, the basic unit is sometimes called “artillery group” or “battery”.

Thus the two fundamental units of the armed forces of the PAIGC, below the War Council, are, at the moment of writing, the *bigrupo* and the *army corps*.

In principle, all recruits to the army are supposed to receive a course of training at the PAIGC's own boarding school, the *Centro de Instrução Político Militar* (CIPM, center for political and military education). This school is described in some detail in a different context (pp. 222 ff.). Its program of studies is also referred to in the chapter on the ideology of the PAIGC (pp. 84). Let it just be noted here that considering the capacity of the CIPM and the rather limited numbers of the FARP—approximately 5,000 soldiers, as

mentioned earlier—there is good reason to believe that the comprehensive training program exists not only on paper but also works in practice.

An important development after 1970 has been the gradual transformation of the local village militia into regionally and sectorially based local defense forces, the *Forças Armadas Locais* (FAL). In one of his important talks at the meeting of the *Conselho Superior* in August 1971, Cabral stressed the great importance attached by the party leadership to the FAL.³⁷ In order for the FAL to be able to live up to these high expectations, it was necessary, Cabral said, that the very best cadres be assigned to the posts as commanders at the levels of the sector and the region. It had therefore been decided by the party leaders, Cabral announced, that the member in charge of security within the two National Committees of the North and the South would also be the highest chief and coordinator of the FAL in his part of the country. This double assignment would also serve the function of demonstrating the close connection between the political and the military aspects of the FAL, Cabral emphasized. On the regional level, as we have already seen (cf. p. 119) and as was also announced by Cabral on this occasion, a fourth member with the specific task of being the regional commander of the FAL would be added to the Regional Committee. As far as the sector level³⁸ was concerned, Cabral had the following to say:

At the level of the zone, there is to be a commander of the FAL and the political commissar shall take over security affairs. This must be so because of the military form that the FAL ought to have, at the same time as we maintain its profoundly political character which ties it to the security of the liberated areas, to all the work of the liberated areas.³⁹

According to the observations made by the author in the North in 1972, this particular decision had not yet been exactly applied in the manner prescribed by Cabral. Instead the division of functions within the Sector Committee, described on p. 121, remained the same as that found in the South in 1970. With regard to function there is no contradiction, however, between the existing organization and that prescribed by Cabral, as the existing organization also has one member with specific responsibility for local defense. But this slight discrepancy between abstract and concrete organization may perhaps be regarded as an illustration of the fact that the communication of organizational details is not always easy under the conditions of a war of national liberation. One of the most striking and even amazing characteristics of the PAIGC organization is, indeed, that the number of such discrepancies is so extremely limited.

³⁷ Cabral, *Sobre alguns problemas práticos da nossa vida e da nossa luta*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), 1971, pp. 20 ff. (translated by the author). Text made from tape-recording.

³⁸ Cabral said "zone"—cf. p. 120 above.

³⁹ Cabral, *Sobre alguns problemas práticos* . . . , p. 22 (translated by the author).

The number of soldiers engaged in the FAL is not known to the author. But the principle is to have quite young men join the FAL, which thus naturally comes to function as the most important source of recruitment for the FARP.

In summary we may say that the fourth phase of "the military unfolding of this long war" has been marked by an increasing capacity—as foreseen by Davidson—to strike against the towns and the larger fortified camps of the Portuguese, but also by a more prudent use of this capacity than Davidson seems to have been expecting when writing his book before 1969. Instead we may note two other characteristics of the fourth phase: (1) the organization of the FAL into structured units under regional command, and (2) the introduction of army corps into the FARP, which makes possible a more sophisticated combination of flexibility and concentrated strength than before.

A new judicial system

When the construction of a new society was begun in the liberated areas, there was not much the PAIGC was prepared to take over from the legal system of the Portuguese—a system that discriminated systematically against approximately 99 percent of the population (cf. pp. 21 ff.). It was considered necessary to start from scratch. After a period of pragmatic improvisation, a radical and systematic experiment was initiated in 1968.⁴⁰

Originally the guerilla leaders had had the authority to settle both military and civilian disputes in their parts of the liberated areas. It soon became clear, however, that such a concentration of local power was not desirable, and during 1965–66 the authority to settle civilian disputes was transferred to the political commissars of the Sector Committees.

In 1966 the important step was taken of promulgating the *Lei da Justiça Militar* (law of military justice)—the first and, at least until 1973, also the only legal text adopted and published by the PAIGC in its role of "party as a state".⁴¹ This deals with the constitution of the courts and the formal legal processes. In spite of its name, it concerns not only military but also civilian justice. Various types of crimes and penalties are specified; the sentence of death is generally reserved for those found guilty of such crimes as espionage

⁴⁰ The following account is based upon oral information, primarily from the man in charge of working out the new judicial system, Fidelis C. Almada, himself a jurist and acting as the party's Secretary of Justice. Complementary information was received from one of Almada's associates in Conakry, also a university trained jurist, as well as from members of several courts, and from a number of people not specifically concerned with the judicial system.

⁴¹ *Lei da Justiça Militar de 19 de Setembro de 1966. Com as modificações introduzidas pelo Bureau Político do Partido, na reunião de 20 a 23 de Dezembro de 1966*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), 1966. This is published in Portuguese, the official language of the PAIGC and of the independent Republic of Guinea-Bissau.

and the rape of minors, but it may also be applied to murderers. The *Lei da Justiça Militar* defines only the principles by which the most serious crimes are to be judged. It functions also, however, as a frame of reference for those charged with the task of judging minor offenses according to traditional customary law. In order to make it possible for the new written law to function in this way, a great effort has been made through the party to explain and discuss the text in the sectors and villages of the country.

In 1972, the *Lei da Justiça Militar* of 1966 was about to be revised. A proposal had been worked out but not yet submitted to discussion, possible revision, and ultimate approval by the Conselho Superior.⁴² The law text about to be proposed was considerably more detailed than the law of 1966. It contained an introduction, a preamble, and ten chapters under three main headings. The author of the text was anxious to emphasize that it did not contain any important new principles, but should be regarded more as an elaboration and development of the old text rather than as an innovation. The most important new elements were the introduction of (1) conditional release ahead of time of prisoners sentenced to over three years in jail, (2) the possibility of suspended sentence, (3) rules against drunkenness, (4) rules on crimes against discipline, and (5) more elaborate rules concerning the civil register.

The interest of the PAIGC leadership in providing the new Guinean society with an efficiently functioning and at the same time popularly based system of order and justice is also demonstrated by the evolution of the system of courts.

In 1968, two years after the authority to settle civilian disputes had been taken away from the guerilla leaders and given to the political commissars of the sectors, the time was again considered ripe for a major change. At this time, the construction was begun of a new, revolutionary judicial system, the foundation of which—in accordance with the party rules—is a series of popularly elected courts. Originally these *Tribunais do Povo*, People's Courts, with three elected members, were established at the level of the village, the village teacher acting as clerk, registering the decisions of the court. Special forms have even been printed for the purpose of registration and are eventually filed in the party headquarters in Conakry.

During the visit of the author in the South, in 1970, People's Courts appeared to exist in all villages where Village Committees had been set up. But in 1972, the system of courts at this basic level was in the process of being reorganized. It had been found to be a waste of competent people to assign three militants per village to judicial tasks, especially as the introduction of the People's Courts was said to have caused a drastic decline in the rate of crimes

⁴² *Projecto da Revisão de Lei da Justiça Militar* (typewritten), studied by the author in Conakry, May 1972.

because of the shame involved in being judged by one's peers. Whether this was the only reason or not, the decision had in any case been taken to move the court of first instance to the level of the *section*, the level between the village and the sector (cf. pp. 124 f.). In the spring of 1972, this had been put into effect in three northern sectors. The results were said to have been satisfactory, and the reform would be extended to the entire North. As far as the South was concerned, plans were being made, and the division of the sectors into sections had been finished on paper.⁴³

Under the system introduced in 1972, we thus find one People's Court for between four and eleven villages—a kind of centralization in other words. It is important to point out though, that the judges will still be elected in the same way, and remain in office according to the same principle, as described above for the five members of the Village Committee.

The registration of the sentences by a school teacher acting as clerk of the court will also continue. This is important with regard to the explicit intention of the PAIGC to arrive gradually at a codified synthesis of traditional customary law and modern principles of justice. It will take time, however, to arrive at such a synthesis, and so far—it is said with some exaggeration, perhaps—there are almost as many systems of justice as there are People's Courts, although they all have to fit within the general framework established by the *Lei da Justiça Militar* and by party policy. In case of conflict between the customary law of the ethnic group to which the person who has committed an offense belongs, and the law of the territory where the offense has been committed, the territorial principle prevails. According to Balante law, for instance, a person who steals one cow must return two cows, whereas according to Mandinga law, one cow will suffice. In this example, then, a Mandinga thief must yield to the more severe Balante law, if he is careless enough to supply himself with a cow from Balante land and get caught.

The jurisdiction of the elected People's Court is limited to offenses that cannot be punished by jail (corporal punishment is strictly prohibited), which means that they deal with thefts of, for example, cattle and rice, disputes between families, minor violence, and trouble-making. In cases of dispute, efforts are made to arrive at a voluntary reconciliation. The punishments that can be meted out by the People's Courts are limited to fines (usually rice) and repayments in kind, as in the example above with the cow. The party also makes systematic efforts to imbue the judges with a "revolutionary spirit", which means that they are encouraged to be conscious of their political and educational responsibilities when admonishing the culprits.

Naturally it is not always easy to arrive at the desired synthesis between traditional and modern ideas. Conflicts arise, for instance, over the customs

and rules regulating marriage and family life. To give a typical example, a new rule being enforced by the PAIGC states that no girl or woman can marry until she has notified the party that she does so voluntarily (cf. App. VI). The formal act of marriage is carried out by a party official, and both the husband and the wife can obtain divorce by presenting their reasons for such a step to the People's Court. Things like these are radical innovations in the traditional peasant society of Guinea-Bissau, particularly in the areas most influenced by Moslem religion and culture.

At the levels above the People's Court, the judicial system remains the same as that gradually introduced between 1968 and 1970.

At the level of the sector, this means that we find a Zone Court with five members—a kind of combined regional and sectorial body, partially changing its membership in accordance with where it is called to sit. This is designed to function both as a court of appeal for people dissatisfied with village decisions (it appears, however, that such appeals are rare) and as a court with autonomous jurisdiction with regard to certain kinds of more serious cases.

The Zone Court is presided over by either the official in charge of politics and production at the *regional* level, or the official in charge of *regional* security. In the former case, the second member is the official in charge of security in the *sector* where the court meets; but the political commissar of the sector joins the court, if it is presided over by the regional security chief. The third member is a representative of the party's Secretary of Justice, and the remaining two members represent the population of the sector.

The jurisdiction of the Zone Court covers crimes too severe to be judged in the villages, but punishable by less than four years in jail. This means mostly crimes of property and violence of medium gravity. The author's impression—and it is only an impression—is that the Zone Courts have very few cases to judge, but that the People's Courts fulfill important social and political functions by resolving conflict and by introducing, gradually, modern democratic authority into the villages. It is probable, too, that the elected judges often resolve conflicts between villagers without bringing the case as far as to a formal meeting of the court.

The Supreme Court of the liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau is the *Tribunal de Guerra*—the War Tribunal, instituted by the *Lei da Justiça Militar*. This court has five members: the commander of an army corps, the official in charge of either security or political leadership in one of the two National Committees, the official in charge of either security or political leadership in the region where the crime to be judged has been committed, the party's Secretary of Justice, and one representative of the population.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ This is a slight change in comparison with what the author was told in 1970. The War Tribunal was then to have two representatives of the population as members, and no special

As with the Zone Courts, the composition of the Supreme Court also varies with the place where the crime has been committed. If this is in the North, the commander of one of the northern army corps and a representative of the National Committee of the North act as judges; whereas a commander of one of the southern army corps and a representative of the National Committee of the South join the court, if the crime has been committed in the South. The *Lei da Justiça Militar* also states that the court, if need be, may be presided over by the Secretary-General of the party.⁴⁵

As far as the jurisdiction of the *Tribunal de Guerra* is concerned, it functions (1) as a general court for offenses committed by members of the armed forces and by party cadres, (2) as a court of appeal from the Zone Courts, and (3) as a court with autonomous jurisdiction for civilian crimes punishable by four years imprisonment or more.

This new system has been gradually introduced in the liberated areas since 1968 by the PAIGC in a systematic effort to create order in the emerging nation state, without violating either the principle of popular consent or the chances for dynamic social change. The problems involved in this effort bring out in sharp relief the two components of what might be called the dialectics of mobilization: steering and control versus voluntary popular participation. It should not be necessary to emphasize the difficulties of this political and developmental task, but the revolutionary judicial experiment attempted in Guinea-Bissau indicates that it need not perhaps be altogether impossible.

In the same way as done above for the sectors and the villages, a few concrete glimpses of the activities of individuals involved in the judicial system will now be given:

In November 1970, the author visited the village of Djati, sector of Balana, and was introduced to the members of the People's Court and of the Village Committee. The three judges were not very talkative, but one of them mentioned that their court had been established in 1968. As an illustration of the low rate of crimes in the village, it was interesting to note that the latest case dealt with by the court had come up as long ago as five months before the author's visit. It had concerned a conflict over the distribution of land to some people newly arrived from territory controlled by the Portuguese. It was also mentioned that, during the time the court had existed, the need to appeal to a higher court had never arisen.

In November 1970, the author was introduced to the three judges of the People's Court of the village of Timbo, sector of Tombali, and, on the same occasion, also to one of the two people's representatives of the Zone Court of Tombali. The member of the Zone Court answered most questions, while the three village judges nodded in agreement:

representative of the Regional Committee of the region where the crime had been committed. In 1970, it was also said that one of the two people's representatives was to be a soldier, if the defendant was a soldier. As there were no army corps in 1970, we may note also that the present place of the army corps commander was then taken by the commander of one of the three fronts existing at that time. Cf. pp. 135 f. above.

⁴⁵ *Lei da Justiça Militar*, Chapter II, Article 7, p. 4.

Both the Zone Court and the People's Courts in the villages had been established in 1968. Within the sector no problems of conflicting legal systems had arisen, it was said. A free discussion was carried on until agreement was reached about the correct solution. The accused would listen to the discussion, and would then be given a chance to explain himself. Finally the three judges of the People's Court would discuss among themselves and analyze the case in order to reach a just conclusion. "We have public trials, justice in liberty."

In answer to a question as to whether strong men may be able to influence the courts: "No, that would be impossible. Our courts are freely elected, incorruptible. Our justice is based upon truth."

But in the old system, it was emphasized, freedom could be bought. The Portuguese had different court for "civilized" people and for "native". They did what they could to divide the people and prevent a unified system from arising. The "native courts" were arbitrary and corrupt.

Had the need arisen, since 1968, to force an elected judge to resign from his post? "No, so far this problem has not come up."

Not a single case, so far, had been brought to the level of the Zone Court. In all the People's Courts of the entire sector, no more than 12 cases had been dealt with since the introduction in 1968 of the new system. Why so few crimes? "Because people do not like to be humiliated in public. We live in truth, among our people there is neither high nor low."

Sentences were meted out in accordance with the assumed degree of maturity of the culprit, rather than his age. "Children cannot be dealt with as adults."

It was very rare for women to appear at court. Why? Not because women are in inferior positions, but because the offenses brought to court are not "suitable" for women: war crimes, thefts of cattle. But it was emphasized that women may very well be imagined to appear at court—for example if a marital dispute comes up, or if somebody is accused of rape.

Finally the judge of the Zone Court wanted to put a question to his questioners: "How is it possible that the Portuguese can regard our land as Portuguese land? Every man has a right to be free..."

In November 1970, a member of the *People's Court of the village of Kuduko, sector of Tombali*, told the author that no case had been dealt with in Kuduko since the court was established in 1969.

In April 1972, a member of a *People's Court in the sector of Candjambary* described his work to the author in the following words:

"From the moment the trial begins, I no longer have any family. my only goal is to find out truth... I myself can neither read nor write, but the teacher writes. I question the fellow who is suspected, and the teacher writes down everything. And if the fellow tells a different story the following day, we have it all in writing what he had said the day before... As far as I am concerned, I don't like to sentence people to payments of rice and such things. We have a lot of rice around here. I prefer to sentence them to transport service, to walk to the border in order to carry munitions and other things back into the country..."

Coupled with other evidence (documents and interviews with leading officials), these and other similar interviews and conversations seem, to the author, to indicate that the PAIGC has had some success in establishing its judicial system in the villages and sectors of Guinea-Bissau. It is notable also that the crime rate appears to be very low under present circumstances, and that the PAIGC officials both at the central and local levels explain this with reference to the prophylactic effects of the new system. Probably the low crime rate can also be seen as a unifying effect of the common struggle

against a common enemy. To the extent that this is true, the crime rate can be expected to rise, once the war is over.

Registration and census

To register and count the people of a country is a typical "state" function. It has to be performed by those who hold central positions in all political systems, democratic or not, where the conscious will to influence and steer the evolution of society is present. In liberated Guinea-Bissau, the PAIGC performs the function of registering and counting by keeping up a civil register in the villages and by carrying out a census which was begun in 1969 in the South and was still going on in the North in 1972. These two operations are of course closely connected.

The civil register has already been mentioned in connection with the village committees, one member of which has specific responsibility for keeping the register up to date. Here births, marriages, divorces, and deaths are registered on special forms, which are later filed and systematically coordinated with information from other villages by the central information services of the party. The documents include, for instance, a form for the registration of marriages, but also a separate form used by women and men to notify the party of their free intention to marry. This contains the following words in Portuguese: "Marriage in the form and with the effects established by the Party, during its exercise of the sovereignty of the People of Guiné and Cabo Verde, of whom it is the legitimate representative." These documents, some of which are shown in Appendix, are remarkable evidence of the "state-building" going on in the liberated areas.

The census of the population is naturally a difficult operation to carry out under the conditions of war of national liberation. The greatest difficulties are caused by movements of people back and forth between different liberated areas, between Portuguese and PAIGC controlled parts of Guinea-Bissau, and between Guinea-Bissau and the two neighbouring countries of Senegal and the Republic of Guinea. No complete results of the census have been shown as yet, but the data are accumulating.

The census is carried out from census bureaus (small and highly mobile open-air "offices") established at the level of the sector and operating in close contact with the civil register officials of the village committees. A printed form has been distributed, which is filled in sector-wise. One copy is sent to the central information services of the party, and one is kept in the sector. The form is very thorough, and appears to aim specifically at gathering systematic information about the people's professional skills. As an interesting by-

product from a sociological point of view, it contains a list of the various occupations most frequently found among the people of the villages (cf. p. 178)

Until the census has been finished and its results made public, it is of course very difficult to say anything certain about the number of people permanently living in the liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau. The very approximate estimate of "about half" of about 800,000 people has usually been given by journalists and other writers sympathetic toward the PAIGC (cf. p. 9). In the opinion of this author, the true figure has probably been lower, at least until the summer of 1974, but also quite fluid, particularly because of the movements of people back and forth between Guinea-Bissau and neighbouring countries. On two different occasions, two high leaders of the party, independently of each other, mentioned to the author the figure of about 300,000 people living in the liberated areas. But because of the situation, not even this figure can be regarded as more than a well-informed guess. During the election campaign of 1972, 83,000 ballots were distributed. Of these, 77,517 were reported to have been used by the voters inside the country.⁴⁶ As all citizens aged 18 or more were allowed to vote, this would seem to indicate that, in 1972, perhaps about 160–180–200,000 people, or more, including all children and a number of abstainers (particularly women?), inhabited the areas where conditions were safe enough to carry through the election campaign. In any case, such static calculations have very little to say about the dynamic situation in which the people of Guinea-Bissau live at present.

The most recent official estimate of the population of Guinea-Bissau was made in early 1974. It gives us the following figures:⁴⁷

population of the liberated regions	350,000
population of the zones still occupied by the Portuguese colonialists	<u>300,000</u>
population living inside Guinea-Bissau	650,000
refugees in Senegal, Republic of Guinea, and Gambia	<u>150,000</u>
total population	800,000

Political mobilization and democratic centralism

As we saw earlier in this book (pp. 100 ff.), the party guidelines, formulated by Cabral and widely disseminated among the cadres since 1965, introduce four norms as fundamental to the organization of the PAIGC: (1) criticism and self-criticism, (2) collective leadership, (3) democratic centralism, and (4) revolutionary democracy. Although Cabral places them all at the same level,

⁴⁶ *Sur la création de l'Assemblée Nationale Populaire en Guinée (Bissau). Résultats et bases des élections générales réalisées dans les régions libérées en 1972 (communiqué)*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), January 1973, p. 3.

⁴⁷ *La République de Guinée-Bissau en chiffres*, February 1974, p. 1.

as four parallel and related principles, it seems more natural to regard *democratic centralism* as the key concept, and the other three as indissoluble but analytically distinguishable subspects of this central concept. In any case, this approach to the subject will be used here.

The concept of political mobilization, as we shall attempt to define it in the concluding chapter of this book, contains the same contradiction or double implication as the concept of "democratic centralism": at one end, control, efficiency, conscious planning, guidance—at the other end, participation, spontaneity, democracy in the most elementary and literal sense of the word. The "party as a state" must perform both of these functions, or both of these dialectically related sides of the same function: it is supposed to lead the people, at the same time as it places itself under the people's leadership. It is a classical task of political science to analyze this problem theoretically and to investigate various attempts to solve it in political practice. It would not have been particularly far-fetched therefore, although somewhat conventional, to begin this book, like so many others, with a reference to Aristotle.

The aim of the election campaign and of the elections held in Guinea-Bissau in 1972 was to lay the foundations of a gradually emerging division of labour between the party and the state. This new development will be analyzed in the following chapter—as far as is possible at the moment of writing. In the present chapter, however, we have been dealing with the "party as a state", as it had established itself in Guinea-Bissau up to 1973. In spite of the new assemblies elected in 1972, this will very likely continue to constitute the institutional core of the emerging social order for several years to come yet.

Looking at the structures and institutions described in the preceding sections of this chapter, and trying to evaluate them from the point of view of political mobilization and democratic centralism, the extent to which they reflect the basic contradiction referred to above is striking. On the one hand, we have the undeniable tendencies toward personal leadership and concentration of power at the top developed under Cabral—tendencies necessarily involving partial denial, in practice, at least of collective leadership but probably also of the other related principles. On the other hand, we have the equally undeniable existence of critical and self-critical discussion within the party, as well as powerful elements of revolutionary democracy at all levels inside the country. It is an open theoretical and empirical question, whether a durable synthesis is possible between such tendencies, or whether they will have to remain in contradiction until one of them absorbs the other.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Cf. on this problem an incisive study by Thomas G. Hart, *The Dynamics of Revolution. A cybernetic theory of the dynamics of modern social revolution with a study of ideological change and organizational dynamics in the Chinese revolution*, Stockholm Studies in Politics 1, Stockholm, Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm, 1971.

In the opinion of the present author, the problem, as far as Guinea-Bissau is concerned, will not become truly acute until the war is over and peace established under an independent state. It is even possible to argue that the conditions of the war of national liberation temporarily *impose* a precarious synthesis between the two poles contained in the concepts of political mobilization and democratic centralism. The argument would be based upon the following considerations:

The principles of the PAIGC political and institutional structure are in a sense quite simple. At each level of the organization, members and officials are held responsible for specific tasks, which they are expected to carry out on their own responsibility, and without much supervision. At the same time, the population as a whole is expected —by discussion and consultation—to help formulate the policy decisions later made by the top-level leaders, decisions that in their turn define the limits within which the various tasks of the lower levels are expected to be performed. A simple feed-back model could easily be designed to illustrate the principle.

It is of course easy to express doubt as to the effectiveness of the influence exercised by the people in this kind of political structure. “Democratic centralism” is a term which has so often been abused for narrow and dictatorial purposes that it can now only be used very carefully, unless within quotation marks. The fact is, however, that policy execution and application in a rural country with a simple economy and difficult communications, such as Guinea-Bissau at present, necessarily will have to be quite decentralized. Another fact is that no people’s war of liberation can be carried on without the people.

For these two reasons, the leading policy- and decision-makers of the PAIGC depend very much upon the free consent of the people and especially the local cadres for the *application* of their policies. The theoretical argument for the existence of a temporary synthesis between control and participation in the political system of liberated Guinea-Bissau can thus be formulated as follows: as long as each of the two poles contained in the concepts of political mobilization and democratic centralism depends, for its own material existence, upon the existence of the other, such a synthesis is possible. The empirical argument is quite simply that evidence indicating the existence of such a synthesis exists. But the evidence also indicates that the synthesis might be fragile. Nor is it, of course, possible to formulate any theoretical guarantees for the future—when the concrete tasks of the direct struggle for national liberation will have to give place to the less harsh, but in some respects more subtle and complicated, tasks of peaceful economic and social development.

The answer to the problem lies in “the institutionalization of structures which tie the people and the leaders together in such ways that the people’s

participation and control of their leaders are facilitated in all possible ways".⁴⁹ Amílcar Cabral was better aware than most political leaders, anywhere, of the necessity for such an answer to be continually worked out, over and over again, both in theory and in practice. It is tragically ironic that his murder might have been prevented, if he had managed to translate this insight into political practice at the center of the party he led, more vigilantly than he probably did during his last years.

⁴⁹ In Cabral's own words to the author, Conakry, May 1972.

V. The Emerging Social Order (2): The Election Campaign and the Elections of 1972, the National Assembly, the Establishment of a State Separate from the Party

We have the honour to announce, before this Commission, that we have just carried out general elections, universal and secret, in all the liberated regions, in order to create Regional Councils and our first National Assembly. The National Assembly will be composed of 120 representatives, of whom 80 are elected among the masses of the people and 40 among the cadres of the party. Our people and our party are firmly determined to draw all conclusions implied in the creation of these new organs of sovereignty. Our National Assembly will be called upon to proclaim the existence of our state and to endow it with executive organs functioning inside our country.¹

With these words to the Fourth Commission of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Amílcar Cabral announced to the nations of the world, on October 16, 1972, that they would soon be asked to give *de jure* recognition to the *de facto* existence of an independent and functioning state in liberated Guinea-Bissau.

On September 24, 1973, the first National Assembly of the People of Guinea, which had been convened in the region of Boé in the East of the country, solemnly proclaimed the *de jure* existence of the state of Guinea-Bissau, a "sovereign, republican, democratic, anti-colonialist, and anti-imperialist state" within the same borders as "Portuguese" Guinea.² The republic of Guinea-

¹ Amílcar Cabral, *O povo da Guiné e Cabo Verde perante a ONU*, speech made by Cabral before the fourth commission of the General Assembly of the United Nations at its XXVIIth session, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), October 1972, p. 19 (translated by the author).

² *Proclamação do Estado da Guiné-Bissau*, adopted by the National Assembly of the People meeting in the region of Boé, September 24, 1973, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), 1973. This and subsequent translations from this document used in the text have been made by the author.)

Bissau had come into formal existence, and the forty-third independent state of modern Africa had been born.³

In this chapter we shall attempt to trace the most important ideas and events leading up to this decisively new stage in the history of Guinea-Bissau. The analysis of the new stage of independent statehood itself, however, falls outside the scope of the present work. Thus we may regard the 24th of September, 1973, as marking the temporary end-point in time of our task of analysis.

The idea of a state separate from the party

As mentioned at the beginning of Chapter IV, the key to the PAIGC system of government both in theory and in practice has been the idea of the party as a state, at least up to 1973. The opposite idea, of a state separate from the party, is not encountered in any of the important party documents or statements produced before 1971, except of course in the original party program and a few other early statements.⁴

Chapter V of the party program, in its first point, does in fact proclaim the goal of a "republican, democratic, lay, anti-colonialist, and anti-imperialist" regime, whereas point 5 of the same chapter specifies that "general elections" shall be held in order to elect a "legislative power" based upon "universal, direct, and secret suffrage" and that this legislative power shall in its turn designate an "executive power".⁵ But between the formulations of the party program of the early nineteen-sixties and Cabral's announcement at the United Nations in 1972 lay a decade of hard political and military struggle, during which the structure of the party as a state, described in the preceding chapter of this book, had been forged in daily practice. With victory within

³ If Rhodesia is counted, Guinea-Bissau is the forty-fourth independent state of modern Africa.

⁴ See for instance *Memorandum enviado ao governo português pelo Partido Africano da Independência*, Conakry, December 1, 1960. This document was written by Amílcar Cabral and others. It is found, translated into English, in Ronald H. Chilcote, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa. Documents*, Stanford, California, Hoover Institution Press, 1972, pp. 367 ff.

⁵ The passages quoted have been translated by the author from *Programa do Partido*, a Portuguese language edition of the program, printed by the PAIGC press in Conakry, not earlier than 1969 (the edition carries no date, but an addition dated April, 1969, is included at the end). Chilcote, *op.cit.*, pp. 360 ff., has a translated version of *Statuts et programme*, Conakry, no date, pp. 19-27, where point V:5 of the major program appears in much briefer form, containing only the following words: "General, free elections of organs of power based on universal, direct, and secret suffrage." The most notable difference between the two versions is that the one quoted by Chilcote does not make the distinction between legislative and executive organs of power.

sight, however, it became necessary to give renewed attention to the general goals proclaimed in Chapter V of the party program, with a view toward applying them in political and administrative practice. The emerging state was beginning to outgrow the party which had created and nurtured it.

We may assume that the idea of actually carrying through general elections and of creating a National Assembly had been discussed among the top leaders of the party for some time, before it was presented to the *Conselho Superior da Luta* meeting on August 9–16, 1971. But, as mentioned above, these discussions have not left any traces in the published party documents. Nor had the elections yet become a current topic of discussion among party members in November, 1970, at the time of the author's first visit in Guinea-Bissau.

The first official mention of the general elections to be held, encountered by the author, is found in a twenty-four page mimeographed document called "Brief report on the situation of the struggle, January-August 1971" which was published in September 1971. In the second part of this report, we find the following passage:

In August, at the meeting of the *Conselho Superior de Luta* which considered very seriously the principal problems of our life and our struggle, important decisions were made in order to strengthen and improve our political work, to consolidate the structures of our developing state, and to intensify and expand the activities of our armed forces. Among these decisions, it is important to stress the decision to create the first National Assembly of the People of Guinea (*Assemblée Nationale Populaire de la Guinée*). The assembly will be elected as soon as possible, and it will give our people still another essential organ of sovereignty, thus opening new perspectives for our political action both inside and outside our country.⁶

A few months later, on December 3, 1971, what might be called an electoral law, "Basic principles for the creation of the National Assembly of the People of Guinea", was issued on behalf of the *Conselho Superior da Luta* and signed by the party's Secretary General and by its Secretary of Justice acting together.⁷ Promulgated in accordance with the idea of the party as a state, this text was given "the force of law".⁸ In the following text it will be referred to as the electoral law. It is a carefully worked out seven-page document, in which the entire electoral procedure is spelled out in great detail:

⁶ Cabral, *Rapport bref sur la situation de la lutte (Janvier-Août 1971) par le Secrétaire Général du PAIGC*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), p. 17 (translated by the author).

⁷ *Bases pour la création de l'Assemblée Nationale Populaire en Guinée*. This was first published as an appendix to the official report on the elections *Sur la création de l'Assemblée Nationale Populaire en Guinée (Communiqué). Résultats et bases des élections générales réalisées dans les régions libérées en 1972*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), January 1973. Before this French language version of the *Bases* . . . was published, the original Portuguese version had been circulated in a limited, numbered edition in the liberated regions, for use by the party cadres in charge of preparing and carrying through the nomination and election campaigns in 1972. (All subsequent translations from these two documents have been made by the author.)

⁸ *Bases* . . . , Article 10.

from the nomination of candidates and the formation of electoral commissions all the way to the election of Regional Councils and finally the election of the National Assembly by the members of the Regional Councils. We shall have occasion to return to these rules and procedures later in this chapter. Let us only note here how the powers and functions of the National Assembly are characterized in the first article of the text upon which the election of 1972 were based:

In accordance with the decisions made by the *Conselho Superior da Luta* at its meeting on August 9–17, 1971,⁹ upon proposal duly put forth by the Secretary General of the party and after a full debate, we must immediately take all measures necessary in order to create, as soon as possible, the first National Assembly of the People of Guinea.

The National Assembly of the People of Guinea (ANP) is created on the principle that the power emanates from the people and that it should serve the people. The ANP is the highest organ of the national state that our people have forged in the struggle and are now daily developing and consolidating more and more. It is the supreme organ of sovereignty of our people in Guinea. This sovereignty has been conquered through an heroic struggle filled with sacrifices, and it is already held by our people on the largest part of our national territory.

The ANP holds the legislative power within the framework of the sovereignty of our people. Because it is the supreme organ of the state in Guinea, it also controls the application of the political, judicial, economic, social, and cultural policies defined, discussed, and approved for Guinea by our party.

At a suitable time the ANP will define its functions and rules as well as other norms pertaining to its activities within the framework of the structures and the evolution of the state.¹⁰

A close reading of the paragraphs quoted yields considerable information about the division of labor between the party and the state organs envisaged for the emerging independent state of Guinea-Bissau.

The “party as a state” will hand over to the new National Assembly (1) the legislative power, (2) the power to control policy application, and (3) the symbolic function of representing the sovereignty of the people. But the powers to define, discuss, and approve political, judicial, economic, social, and cultural policies will remain in the hands of the party.

From a practical and political point of view it was clear thus that the party was thought of as remaining the leading organ — the avant-garde of the new state, as it were — however “supreme” the National Assembly would become from a constitutional and symbolic point of view.

The same emphasis is found, perhaps even more strongly, in the constitution proposed to the National Assembly on the solemn occasion, on September 24, 1973, when the new state was proclaimed into formal existence. Article 4 of the proposed constitution of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau is very explicit with regard to the leading role of the party:

⁹ Other documents from the meeting of the *Conselho Superior da Luta* referred to here give the dates August 9–16, 1971. Cf. note 4, p. 110.

¹⁰ *Bases* . . . , Article 1.

Power in Guinea is exercised by the toiling masses in close association with the *Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde* (PAIGC), which is the leading political force of society ("*a força política dirigente da sociedade*").¹¹

In Article 5, it is stated that the goals set up for the new state cannot be reached, unless the people are "completely mobilized" and unless they "participate broadly in the elaboration of the policies of the state". An important task of the party will be to contribute to such mobilization and participation by "stimulating the creation and development of democratic mass organizations".¹²

Article 6 is an attempt to summarize in concise form the role of the party in state and society. It is, if possible, even more explicit than Article 4:

The PAIGC is the leading force of society. It is the supreme expression of the sovereign will of the people. It decides the political orientation of the policies of the state and ensures their realization by appropriate means.¹³

The PAIGC is thus "the supreme expression of the sovereign will of the people". But the National Assembly is also said to be supreme, although no longer "the supreme organ of sovereignty of our people", as in the passage from the electoral law quoted earlier in this chapter. In the part of the proposed constitution that deals with "the organization of political power", we find instead the following formulations about the role of the National Assembly:

The National Assembly of the People is the supreme organ of power of the state. It votes laws and resolutions.¹⁴

And the following article:

The National Assembly of the People deliberates over fundamental questions of internal and external politics of the state, and it controls the application of the political, economic, social, and cultural line defined by the party.¹⁵

The reader of the constitution is called upon therefore to appreciate the very subtle distinction between "the supreme expression of the sovereign will of the people" and "the supreme organ of the power of the state", a state which is in turn considered to be subject to the will of the people. But as the party is said to be the supreme expression of that will, the conclusion that the party represents a higher political authority than the National Assembly cannot be avoided. In this sense, then, the constitution is very logical. Let it be

¹¹ *Constituição da República da Guiné-Bissau (Projecto)*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), 1973, Article 4. (This and subsequent translations from this document have been made by the author.)

¹² *Ibid.*, Article 5.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Article 6.

¹⁴ *Constituição . . .*, Article 28.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Article 29.

noted too, in this context, that the National Assembly may remove a member of the assembly from his office "on proposal by the party".¹⁶

The political doctrine discernible in the constitution of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau is not the doctrine of western liberal democracy. This is a fair conclusion to draw from our preceding analysis. It is rather a variant of marxist-leninist revolutionary doctrine, according to which the party of the people is seen as the leading force of the necessary transformation of society toward democratic and socialist goals. This is the kind of political doctrine that the reality of struggle against underdevelopment, colonialism, and imperialism has imposed upon the founders of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau.

It is very clear, from all this, that the idea of a state separate from the party in Guinea-Bissau does not constitute a radical break with the previously prevalent idea of the party as a state. We are, on the contrary, justified in concluding that the new idea seems to have materialized in an evolutionary way and as a practical adaptation of the party-as-a-state idea to the *de facto* existence of a functioning state in the liberated areas.

The idea of a state separate from the party in Guinea-Bissau does not, in its 1973 version, in any way question the supremacy of the party. All it does is to provide for some division of functions between (1) the formulation and making of policies, which is done by the party, (2) the establishment of a general legislative framework, which will be done by the National Assembly guided by the party, and (3) the control of policy application, a power which will be exercised by the National Assembly.

This is of course in good agreement with the abstract principle of democratic centralism embraced by the PAIGC, as shown in Chapter III of this book: the party defines policies and approves them, after broad discussion, while the elected assembly, guided by the party, legislates a broad framework of general rules within which the policies must be kept, and then finally also watches over the application of the policies.

Still it would be neither reasonable nor fair to classify the formulations of the electoral law and of the proposed constitution as mere attempts at ideological and juridical rationalization of the supreme role of the party, before the new institutions have even started to function on a permanent basis. For the two ideas of popular representation and control of the leaders by the people which are central in these texts, are also closely connected with the principle of revolutionary democracy, encountered in the party guidelines together with the principle of democratic centralism. The creation of the National Assembly and the Regional Councils may thus be seen also as a serious attempt to carry over the abstract principle of revolutionary

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Article 32.

democracy into concrete institution-building, a serious attempt to give institutionalized democratic contents to the revolutionary doctrine of democracy mentioned above.

This interpretation is supported by the explicit rule of the electoral law that two-thirds of the membership of the assemblies, both at the national and at the regional levels, be representatives of "the masses of the people", meaning that they cannot be active party cadres. The remaining third, on the other hand, are elected explicitly among the party cadres.¹⁷ In this way, the PAIGC electoral law consciously tries to safeguard against the risk that the individuals elected by the people to watch over the party would merely be watching over themselves.

As far as the nominations in the North are concerned, the author was even told in April, 1972, that the rule that two-thirds of the candidates be non-cadres was applied so strictly that presidents or other members of Village Committees who were nominated as the people's candidates had to resign from their posts, before they were allowed to accept the nomination. The concept of "cadre" in the PAIGC thus includes all persons active in the party hierarchy, even those villagers elected by their own neighbours to manage the affairs of their own village.

Inside Guinea-Bissau, the information and nomination campaign preceding the elections went on for eight months, from January to August 1972.

While visiting the North of liberated Guinea-Bissau in April of that year, the author was thus able to discuss the subtle problem of division of functions between party and state with the cadres charged with the delicate task of explaining this to the people who had, during ten years of struggle, become used to viewing the PAIGC and its various organs as their only state structure. The formula used, the author was told, was to explain that the party would remain the "driving" or "moving force" (*force motrice*) of the society, but that the new assembly to be elected would represent the whole people directly. In a more concrete way, it was explained that the party would continue to make decisions, but that the assembly would watch over their application. The people were told also that as long as they did not have any formally elected organ of their own, representing the whole people, foreigners might think that they were Portuguese — and this, of course, was an intolerable state of affairs.

Both these arguments are emphasized in the official report published by the PAIGC, after the elections had been successfully carried through. In this document, the last major official text written and signed by Amílcar Cabral, it is argued that the contradiction between the fact of effective PAIGC administration and control over large parts of Guinean territory and the lack of

¹⁷ *Bases* . . . , Article 4.

a "juridical personality at the international level" constituted an obstacle to "the progress of the struggle and the full blossoming of our African nation which has been forged in struggle".¹⁸ This is the argument of international recognition and representation, which is likely to have been politically decisive for the leaders of the PAIGC when they first decided to take the important step of translating the *de facto* existence of their state into *de jure* existence. The other argument concerns internal politics and the need for fuller and more direct representation of the people in public affairs than was provided for by the structures existing until September 1973. This argument was developed by Cabral in the following words:

... the functioning of such institutions (political, administrative, judicial, military, social, and cultural) in the framework of the new life developing in the liberated regions requires that the people participate more fully, through their representatives, not only in the studying and solving of the problems of the country and of the struggle, but also in the effective control of the party that directs them.¹⁹

The emphasis is clearly, in this text as well, upon the new assembly's role in involving the people more directly in the *control* of their leaders, while the function of *directing* the political life of the people and the country remains with the party.

At the moment of writing — only a short time after the first meeting of the National Assembly and before the Regional Councils have even begun to fulfill other functions than that of electing the members of the National Assembly — it is obviously impossible to say anything at all about the real role of the new assemblies in the internal politics of Guinea-Bissau. Will they be able to exert effective popular control over the party, or will they merely register the policies "defined, discussed, and approved for Guinea by the party"? That they will have the latter function is clear. The question is how much and what they will do beyond that.

The election campaign of 1972

During the first eight months of 1972, from January through August, intensive preparations for the first national elections to be held in liberated Guinea-Bissau were carried on in all parts of the country controlled by the PAIGC. The elections themselves began at the end of August and were concluded on October 14, according to the official report.²⁰

¹⁸ *Sur la création de l'Assemblée Nationale...*, p. 2.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

The nominations of candidates for the Regional Councils

The election of the National Assembly was a two-step procedure, in which the electorate as a whole, the people, were involved only in the first step: i.e. the election of 273 regional councillors for eleven Regional Councils.²¹ Each sector functioned as an electoral district, a constituency. The second step was the election of the members of the National Assembly by and among the regional councillors themselves. We shall return to the elections later on. Here we shall first be concerned with the nominations of candidates for the Regional Councils, an operation in which the people of the liberated areas were directly involved.

When the author visited the North in April, 1972, the nomination campaign was in full swing. The electoral law had been distributed in a limited number of copies to the officials in charge of the campaign. A "special commission in charge of preparing, organizing, and carrying out the elections" had been formed, and electoral commissions for each sector had been formed or were in the process of being formed under the supervision of the special commission.²² In the sector of Candjambary, the nominations had in fact already been completed under the guidance of the political commissar of the North. The following account of the nomination procedure in the North is based upon oral information given to the author in a number of interviews and conversations with the officials in charge of the operation, supplemented with and checked against official information published after the election.

The nominations in the sector of Candjambary can be regarded as a kind of pilot experience, an experiment, as they were the first to be carried out, at least in the North. This is a good reason for studying them in some detail.

Twelve regional councillors were going to be elected in Candjambary. According to the procedure prescribed this meant that twelve candidates were going to be nominated, in order to be presented later to the voters on a single list for the sector.²³ Two thirds of these candidates were going to be selected among "the masses" and one third among "the militant cadres" of the PAIGC.²⁴ The numerical relationship in Candjambary was thus 8:4.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 4, and Bases . . . , Articles 4–8.

²² According to *Bases . . .*, Article 10, the special commissions formed in the North, the South, and the East, respectively, were made up of the three members of the Permanent Commissions of the National Committees of each of these three main divisions (the autonomous Regional Committee of Boé in the case of the East) plus, in each special commission, one representative of the highest party leadership and one assistant. Each special electoral commission thus had five members. In the liberated regions, the electoral commissions for each sector were made up of the members of the Sector Committee in charge of security and education, one teacher designated by the Permanent Commission of the National Committee, and two representatives of the people, i.e. five members in all. On the fronts where armed struggle was still going on, the electoral commissions were made up of "three soldiers able to read and write fluently, regardless of position and branch of the army in which they serve." All this is stated in *Bases . . .*, Article 10.

²³ *Ibid.*, Articles 6 and 7:7.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Article 4.

The nomination procedure prescribed in the electoral law is quite elaborate.²⁵ Meetings are to be held "with the people and the soldiers" all over the sector in order to explain the significance of the elections. At these meetings, the participants are to be invited to propose candidates. Any person born in Guinea or having later become a citizen of Guinea can be a candidate, regardless of ethnic origin, sex, social condition, or religious belief, provided he or she meets the following six conditions:

- being over eighteen years of age;
- being a producer or having a well-defined profession (women are regarded as producers);
- not being a collaborator with the Portuguese colonialists, nor having collaborated with them since the beginning of the struggle;
- not having been convicted of any crime;
- being known for good moral and civic conduct;
- being held in prestige, respect, esteem, and confidence by the masses of the working people.²⁶

After this initial round of meetings in the sector, the special commission is supposed to meet with the electoral commission of the sector in order to make up a list of candidates. The list will then be presented to the people of the sector in a second round of meeting. It is stated in the electoral law that this is to be done either by way of the village committees or at public meetings. It is also said, in a somewhat ambiguous formulation, that the list will be regarded as definite "after approval by the majority of the (village) committees and, at public meetings, by the majority of those present."²⁷

According to the information received by the author, what really happened in the sector of Candjambary differed somewhat, although not very much, from the prescribed procedure.

The first step seems to have been a series of meetings between the party cadres in charge of the election and the members of the village committees of which there were, in April of 1972, a little over thirty in Candjambary. These meetings were held section-wise. Candjambary is divided into six sections, as noted in Chapter IV. At this stage, the people still did not participate directly, as the meetings were restricted to active members of the party. The political commissar emphasized to the author that it had been necessary to proceed in this manner, as this was the first election ever for the people of rural Guinea, and there had to be guarantees that the people nominated "really deserved it". It was impossible for the people, he said, to initiate this procedure for themselves. The guidance and advice of the party were necessary. In addition to being political, the election was also seen as an educative process.

The result of these meetings with the village committees of each section was a party-sponsored list of twelve candidates for the sector of Candjambary.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Article 7.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Article 2.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Article 7:6.

The candidates were approved by "the party", meaning in this case the special electoral commission of the North. The difference between the procedure prescribed in the electoral law and the one actually applied had thus been that the initial proposals emerged through a process directly involving only party cadres and not the people at large.

Once the list had been established, however, the actual procedure followed in Candjambary seems to have approached the procedure foreseen by the authors of the electoral law. What happened was that a public meeting was called in each of the six sections. According to one authoritative source, the attendance at the meetings of this second round averaged something like fifty to one hundred people. In each section the entire group of twelve candidates, and not only the candidates nominated within the particular section in question, were submitted to debate. Most of the candidates were present themselves. The discussions were said to have been frank and thorough, but in the end the list proposed by the party was approved unanimously and without any changes. Criticism had been raised, though, against the nomination of three persons who were almost neighbours, at the expense of some other parts of the sector where the people had in consequence felt poorly represented. This was presented to the author as an example of valuable criticism from the people. The lesson had been learnt, it was said, and such mistakes would be avoided in the future. But this time it had not been felt necessary to make any changes.

Among the eight people's candidates finally nominated for the sector of Candjambary, one was a woman, while the four party candidates were all men. The woman was, by profession, a dyer of cloth. "Most of the other candidates" were peasants, the author was told. One (probably a party candidate) was, however, in charge of a People's Store. This candidate knew how to read and write. Of the remaining candidates, one was literate in Arabic, while the others did not know how to read and write.

After the nominations all were completed in Candjambary and the names of the candidates had been fixed, it was agreed by discussion among a group of high leaders in the North—a discussion at which the author was present as participant observer—that it had been a mistake to nominate the four cadre candidates without consulting the higher levels of the party. The cadres were the candidates of the party, it was said, and the party was a national organization. The candidates of the party should therefore be nominated not by the people of one small sector only, but by the party itself as a whole, according to the principles of democratic centralism. In Sara, therefore, the people would be asked to approve only the two-thirds of the candidates representing the sector itself. Another mistake committed was that a soldier had been nominated as a cadre, while he should properly have been regarded as an ordinary man of the masses. Within the armed forces, chiefs of double groups

and upwards were "cadres", as opposed to ordinary soldiers.

We may assume that nomination campaigns, more or less like the campaign in Candjambary, were carried on in all of the nineteen or twenty "civilian" sectors of the South and of the North, in the autonomous region of Boé, and as far as possible also in the sectors still under military administration or partly under Portuguese control (the "fronts of struggle"). Naturally the conditions under which the campaign was carried out differed somewhat from sector to sector, as did the details of the procedures followed. The example given above from Candjambary and Sara, of how experiences gained in one sector influenced the practice followed in another sector, is very characteristic of the manner in which a new state emerges bit by bit, every day, in Guinea-Bissau.

The end result of all this was that 273 candidates were nominated for the same number of seats on eleven Regional Councils. In the electoral law it is also stated that Regional Councils are to be elected for Bissau, Bolama, Bafata, and the Bissagos islands. These cities (towns) and regions were, however, still under "enemy occupation" in 1972, and for this reason neither nominations nor elections could be organized there. Instead, as we shall see later, their representatives in the National Assembly were designated for them by the party, rather than elected by Regional Councils.

The number of seats on the fifteen Regional Councils were divided between the regions as follows:²⁸

Liberated regions and fronts of the South

Balana-Quitafine	15
Catió	39
Cubisseco	24
Quinara	30
Xitole	15

Liberated regions and fronts of the North

Bula-Cantchungo	27
Oio	39
Sara-Candjambary	27
S. Domingos-Sambuia	15

Liberated regions and fronts of the East

Bafata	9 (not elected)
Boé	21
Gabu	21

Others

Bissagos islands	12 (not elected)
Bissau and surrounding countryside	27 (not elected)
Bolama and surrounding countryside	15 (not elected)
Total	336
not elected	63
elected	273

²⁸ The present table is based upon information found in *Bases . . .*, Article 6. The manner of

Eleven Regional Councils were thus elected, out of the fifteen foreseen in the electoral law. Nine of these represented the nine regions shown in the diagram on p. 108, one represented Xitole, which was separated from the region of Quinara in this context and considered to be partly a military front, and one represented the front at Gabu in the East.

Within the eleven regions and fronts where elections were actually carried out, there were altogether twenty-two electoral districts. Most of these were sectors within regions, but the autonomous region of Boé and some fronts of struggle, such as Xitole, Nhacra (within the region of Oio), Gabu, were also their own electoral districts. In each of the electoral districts, a single list with the following number of candidates was presented:²⁹

Balana-Quitafine		Bula-Cantchungo	
Balana	9	Bula	12
Quitafine	6	Cantchungo	15
Catió		Oio	
Como	6	Maqué	9
Cubucaré	15	Morés	18
Tombali	18	Nhacra	12
Cubisseco		Sara-Canjambary	
Cubisseco-de-Baixo	15	Candjambary	12
Cubisseco-de-Cima	9	Sara	15
Quinara		S. Domingos-Sambuia	
Fulacunda	15	Sambuia	6
N'Djassane	9	S. Domingos	9
S. João	6	Boé	21
Xitole	15	Gabu	21
			<u>273</u>

The election of the Regional Councils

In reality, nominations and elections were so closely connected that it would probably be most correct to describe them as different phases of one single and coherent process. This is even recognized implicitly in the electoral law, where the act of electing is dealt with in the same article as nominations are dealt with, as merely the logical consequence of nominations:

Then elections of the members of the Regional Councils will take place in each sector, by direct, universal, and secret voting, on the day or the days communicated to the people in advance.³⁰

In Candjambary, the author was told, the only reason why the elections themselves were not arranged in immediate connection with the final approval

presenting the figures has been slightly modified, however, in order to suit our purposes. We have also reversed the figures for Bafata and Boé, as all other available information makes it clear that they have been reversed by mistake in the article of the *Bases*... quoted.

²⁹ *Ibid.* The comments made in the preceding note are also applicable here.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Article 7:7.

of the lists by the nomination meetings was that the arrival of the ballots (voting papers) from Conakry had been delayed. Everything else had been prepared, only the ballots were missing.

Under the conditions of the war of national liberation, the voting naturally could not be arranged to take place simultaneously on one single day all over the country. It was on the contrary, as mentioned above, a process lasting for well over two months, from August into October, carefully presided and watched over by the electoral commissions of the sectors and by other party cadres travelling from section to section within each sector.

The great majority of the voters were people who had never seen a ballot paper before. Thus detailed explanations were necessary, and it is even possible to argue that the most important aspect of this first national election to be held in liberated Guinea-Bissau was its probable educational impact upon the minds of the people.

One important thing to be explained to the voters was, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the very subtle distinction between the party's role as "driving force" of the society and the National Assembly's role as the supreme representative organ of the state. But there were more concrete matters to be explained too, as for instance the meaning of the different colors of the ballots, white for "yes" and grey for "no".³¹ as well as the reason why two boxes, one for "yes" and one for "no", had been placed on the table behind the vertical straw mat giving needed secrecy to the voter at the moment of depositing his or her ballot.

After it had been made clear to everyone why there were two kinds of ballots and two boxes, each voter was given one white and one grey ballot and then asked to move behind the screen and deposit the ballot of his or her choice in the right box.

About 100,000 ballots of each kind had been printed. According to the official documentation on the elections made public by the PAIGC, 83,000 of each kind were eventually distributed. This was the number of voters who had been registered inside the country during the spring and summer of 1972. Of the ballots distributed, 77,515 were actually used.

It is interesting to compare the figure of 77,515 voters with the number of people reported to have voted in the elections arranged by the Portuguese in "their" part of the country at the end of March, 1973. As mentioned in Chapter II, the official figures were 7,824 registered voters, out of whom 89.40 percent actually voted. If this information is correct, and we have no

³¹ In *ibid.*, it is said that the colors of the ballots were to be green for "yes" and white for "no". But the ballots shown to the author were white for "yes" and grey for "no", as said in the text above. This is also what Basil Davidson observed, according to what he writes in *West Africa*, "An Independent Guinea-Bissau. 2, Political Foundations", January 29, 1973, p. 131. See Appendix VII.

reason to doubt it, the Portuguese were thus able to get 6,995 persons in Guinea-Bissau to go to the polls.³²

The votes in the liberated areas were distributed as follows between "yes" and "no" for the single lists:³³

	absolute numbers	%
yes	75,163	96.96
no	2,352	3.03
total	77,515	99.99

In this way, then, were elected the 273 members of the eleven elected Regional Councils. As the only choice open to the voters on election day was to either accept or reject one single list, it would have been necessary for more than half of the voters of an entire sector to vote against their list in order to prevent the nominees from being elected. It is very clear from the distribution of the votes that this did not happen anywhere. Consequently, the 273 persons elected were identical with the 273 candidates nominated. As in most single party systems, the voting itself was more of a manifestation than an exercise in choice between alternatives. In practice, the process of selecting individuals was over when the nominations were finished.

Still, interesting variations were noted in the official report of the election results. The 77,515 people who actually voted comprised 93.39 percent of those registered. This was thus the national average. But in the North we find 95.30 percent of those registered participating, while in the East the percentage was as low as 87.93. The percentage actually voting for the single list, of those who voted, was also at its lowest in the East, where 94.49 percent of the voters used the white ballot paper. The highest average on this count was registered in the South, where 97.85 percent voted for the nominated candidates. The party document also notes that there were six villages in the entire country where the majority of the voters rejected the list. In one northern village, the list is even reported to have been rejected by 100 percent of the voters, for the reason that one of the candidates was unacceptable to them.³⁴

The regional differences and variations made public by the PAIGC do not justify any far-reaching hypotheses. It is probable, though, that the lower percentages registered in the East have something to do with the difficulties encountered by the PAIGC among the Fula people³⁵ and with the fact that the war had forced many people to move away from the region of Boé, thus

³² *Marchés tropicaux* (French), April 6, 1973 (*Facts and Reports*, cutting no. 509, Vol. 3, no. 9, April 28, 1973).

³³ *Sur la création de l'Assemblée Nationale...*, p. 3.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³⁵ Cf. pp. 10 and p. 126.

upsetting the normal life of the region. Furthermore, important parts of the East were still considered fronts of struggle and not liberated areas under civilian administration in 1972. As far as the differences noted between villages are concerned, it seems quite clear that they should be explained by local factors. The particular factors at play in the particular villages mentioned in the official report on the elections are, however, quite unknown to the author.

The Regional Councils

Article 49 of the proposed constitution of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau states that "the Regional Council is the representative organ of state power made up of the elected representatives of the sectors of the region."³⁶ The following article enumerates the powers and functions of the Regional Council:³⁷

1. To raise the civic and political consciousness of the citizens.
2. To ensure the respect of public order.
3. To defend the rights of the citizens.
4. To constantly improve the conditions of life and the work of the citizens.
5. To promote, develop, and control the political, economic, social, and cultural activities of the citizens and their community groups.
6. To act in order to strengthen the defense capacity and the security of the country.
7. To make use of local resources for the economic development of the region and for the constant improvement of the people's welfare.
8. To create, direct, and develop educational, cultural, sanitary, and athletic institutions as well as other public services.
9. To appoint the organs necessary for the administration of the region.

The Regional Council of each region shall also elect a Regional State Committee and sectoral committees, the composition, functions, and powers of which are all to be specified in future legislation.³⁸

But everything now said about the Regional Councils belongs to the future. At the moment of writing, the only practical function of the Regional Councils is specified in Article 26 of the constitution, in the part dealing with the "organization of political power".³⁹ In this article, the procedure whereby the first National Assembly was elected is also elevated into provisional constitutional law:

Until that part of the territory of the state which is still occupied by the foreign aggressors has been liberated, the election of the National Assembly of the People may be done by indirect suffrage, by way of the representatives elected to sit on the Regional Councils, within terms established by law.⁴⁰

³⁶ *Constituição* . . . , Article 49.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, Article 50.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, Article 52.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, Articles 23–27.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Article 26.

The details of the election of the National Assembly by the members of the Regional Councils are explained in the electoral law. This text was, it will be remembered, given the force of law when jointly promulgated by the late Secretary General and by the Secretary of Justice of the PAIGC.

The election of the National Assembly

It can also be understood from the electoral law that the election of the National Assembly in two steps is regarded as a procedure temporarily adopted, forced upon the people of Guinea-Bissau by the circumstances of the war "in the present phase of our struggle",⁴¹ but not regarded as an ideal solution. Nevertheless, in 1972 and 1973, the system appears to have functioned well.

All members of the Regional Councils elected in 1972 were *ipso facto* candidates for membership of the National Assembly. At the same time they were also electors. In this capacity they were to elect one third among themselves to be members of the National Assembly.

This meant in other words that the 273 persons elected to the Regional Councils were to elect 91 among themselves to become members of the National Assembly as well.

In addition to the 91 elected by the Regional Councils, five members were elected by the members of the trade union organization UNTG,⁴² and three by "the youth and the students".⁴³ Another 21 members were designated to represent Bissau, Bolama, Bafata, and the Bissagos islands, where no elections had been organized because of the presence of the Portuguese colonial power. The sum total thus added up to 120 members distributed as follows:⁴⁴

Liberated regions and fronts of the South

Balana-Quitafine	5
Catió	13
Cubisseco	8
Quinara	10
Xitole	5

⁴¹ *Bases* . . . , Article 5.

⁴² The *União Nacional dos Trabalhadores da Guiné* (UNTG) was formed in the early years of the existence of the PAIGC as a special labor organization closely affiliated with the party. During the years of armed struggle in rural Guinea, the role of the UNTG has been very limited. In reality, it does not seem to have had any existence independently of the PAIGC. Formally the UNTG continues to exist, however, and it is possible that it will become more important in the future. Its statutes were published in 1961, *Estatutos*, UNTG, Conakry(?), 1961.

⁴³ "The youth and the students" refers to the many Guineans studying abroad as scholarship holders in various countries, mainly in Eastern Europe. These students are organized in sections of the party. Cf. pp. 212 ff.

⁴⁴ *Bases* . . . , Article 3. The figures for Bafata and Boé have been reversed. Cf. note 29 above.

Liberated regions and fronts of the North

Bula-Cantchungo	9
Oio	13
Sara-Candjambary	9
S. Domingos-Sambuia	5

Liberated regions and fronts of the East

Bafata	3 (designated)
Boé	7
Gabu	7

Others

Bissagos islands	4 (designated)
Bissau	9 (designated)
Bolama	5 (designated)

UNTG	5
Youth and students	3
Total	<u>120</u>

The author has no conclusive information about how the 21 representatives of the areas still under Portuguese control were selected. It may be assumed that they were simply designated by "the party", in this case probably the *Comité Executivo da Luta* or its leading members. The representatives of the UNTG — a fairly dormant organization during the period under consideration — may be assumed to have been similarly designated, while the students abroad had their own elections.

As explained above, the remaining 91 members of the National Assembly were elected by the 273 regional councillors among themselves. The procedure is outlined in the electoral law and was also explained to the author orally by the officials in charge of the election in the North.

The basic idea was to hold a meeting with each Regional Council separately at which the members of the council elected one-third of their own number to be members of the National Assembly. The meeting of the Regional Council was to be convoked by one of the three special commissions in charge of the election (in the North, the South, and the East), and one member of the special commission was required to be present during the session.

The first task of the Regional council thus convened was to agree upon a list of candidates for the National Assembly. According to the electoral law this list was then to be "subjected to a broad debate among the members of the Regional Council."⁴⁵ Afterwards a vote was to be taken openly, each member in favour of the list simply raising his or her hand. The list would be accepted, if at least two-thirds of the members of the council voted for it.⁴⁶ Apparently this majority was easily attained in all of the eleven elected Regional Councils.

⁴⁵ *Bases* . . . , Article 8.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

Although nothing is said in the electoral law about it, the author was told by authoritative sources in the North that the sectors of each region would be fairly represented on the list of candidates eventually put to the vote of the Regional Council. In accordance with Article 4 of the electoral law, the relation 2:1 between representatives of the people and representatives of the party was approximately maintained also on the lists for the National Assembly. For mathematical reasons minor adjustments were necessary here though, as the number of names on each list (one-third of the membership of the Regional Council) was not always exactly divisible by three.

According to the president of the special commission in charge of the election in the North, the representatives of each sector among the members of the Regional Council would moreover be required to meet separately, before the meeting of the Regional Council, in order to agree among themselves on their candidates for the National Assembly. Afterwards the whole Regional Council would meet together, and there would be a frank "confrontation" of opinions.

Those responsible for the election in the North emphasized to the author that the representatives of each sector would, through the procedure now described, be forced finally to vote for some of the candidates proposed by the representatives of the other sectors as well, and not only for the candidates of their own sector. This was said to be one example among many of ways in which the PAIGC tried consciously to broaden the views of the people by requiring them to also take into consideration interests other than their own narrowest and most local ones.

The Republic of Guinea-Bissau

Before he was murdered on January 20, 1973, Amílcar Cabral announced several times to the international public the intention of the PAIGC to proclaim the *de jure* existence of the state of Guinea-Bissau within a near future.⁴⁷ On January 8, 1973, only twelve days before his sudden death, Cabral wrote in the official PAIGC statement on the elections:

In 1973, in our country, after all preparations have been finished, the National Assembly of our people will hold its first session. It will then accomplish its first historical mission: to proclaim our national state, to promulgate the constitution, and to create the corresponding executive organs.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Cf. pp. 53 f. and 149. Of these announcements, probably the one quoted at the beginning of the present chapter reached the widest international audience.

⁴⁸ *Sur la création de l'Assemblée Nationale...*, p. 5.

After the murder, many enemies of the PAIGC, and possibly some friends as well, were expecting confusion and dissolution in the ranks of the party, with a consequent weakening of the struggle against the Portuguese colonial power to follow. But after the initial shock to the movement, normal political activities were resumed very quickly, and the military operations inside Guinea-Bissau do not even appear to have been much affected by the dramatic loss of the leader.

Only a few days after the murder, an official message was issued by the *Comité Executivo da Luta*. In this document, the PAIGC makes eight pledges for the future. One of them reads as follows:

The deputies, having been elected democratically for the first time in the history of our people, in all the liberated regions, are called upon to be prepared to hold the first meeting of the National Assembly of the People.⁴⁹

And on January 31, 1973, a member of the *Comité Executivo da Luta* affirmed with confidence at a memorial symposium in Conakry:

Precisely because he (Amílcar Cabral) has succeeded in turning the party into a living organism, his work will survive him. Our comrade Amílcar Cabral has left his heritage to us. . . We shall realize in practice the great dream of his life: a free and independent nation. . .⁵⁰

Earlier in the same speech, the speaker mentioned the creation of the National Assembly and the proclamation *de jure* of the state, while armed struggle was still going on, as an original aspect of the struggle of Guinea-Bissau for national liberation.⁵¹

The attitude demonstrated by the PAIGC leadership immediately after the murder of Cabral was thus an attitude of firm determination to carry on toward the same goals as before, and with the same methods. There was no question whatsoever of shrinking away from the declared goal of proclaiming the existence of the state during the course of 1973, although some delay could naturally be expected.

This was again confirmed in April, at the international conference on Portuguese colonialism organized by the Scandinavian governments in Oslo on behalf of the United Nations,⁵² as well as on several other occasions during the spring and summer of 1973. The most important reaffirmation of the intention of the PAIGC to carry through with the meeting of the National Assembly and the proclamation of the state was made by the second party

⁴⁹ *Message du Comité Exécutif de la Lutte du PAIGC*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), January 1973, p. 8 (translated by the author).

⁵⁰ *Intervention du camarade Vasco Cabral, membre du Comité Exécutif de la Lutte de PAIGC, au symposium en mémoire d'Amílcar Cabral*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), January 1973, p. 7 (translated by the author).

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁵² *Le Monde*, April 13, 1973.

Congress which met in the eastern part of the country on July 18–22, 1973. The congress made a formal decision to this effect.⁵³

The only question still remaining open in July was the exact date, which for obvious reasons of military security could not be revealed in advance. One rumour had it that the proclamation would be coordinated with the summit meeting of the chiefs of state of the non-aligned nations in Algiers on September 5–9, 1973.⁵⁴ This did not materialize, however.

But very soon afterwards, on September 24, 1973, it was announced to the world that the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, a sovereign state within the same borders as “Portuguese” Guinea, had come into existence. The important step of adding *de jure* sovereignty to *de facto* sovereignty had been taken.

The islands of Cape Verde and the state of Guinea-Bissau

The state of Guinea-Bissau explicitly does not encompass the islands of Cape Verde. But the following passage is found in the official proclamation of the new state:

The state of Guinea-Bissau takes upon itself the sacred duty of acting both in order to hasten by all means the expulsion of the aggressive forces of Portuguese colonialism from territory still occupied in Guinea-Bissau, and in order to intensify the struggle on the islands of Cape Verde that are an integral and inalienable part of the national territory of the people of Guinea and Cape Verde. When the right moment comes, a National Assembly of the People of Cape Verde will be created, within a perspective including the formation of the supreme organ of total sovereignty of our people and of their unified state: the Supreme Assembly of the People of Guinea and Cape Verde.⁵⁵

Nothing more specific is said about Cape Verde in the proclamation of the state. Nor does the proposed constitution enlighten us much on this point. Articles 1 and 3 reiterate the intention of the state of Guinea-Bissau to liberate the islands. Article 3 speaks also of the “unification into one state” of the two territories, and in Article 20 it is declared that all natives of the islands of Cape Verde will enjoy the same rights and be subject to the same obligations as the citizens of the state of Guinea-Bissau, being regarded for all legal purposes as such citizens. Article 22, finally, declares that anyone who works against the interests of, among other things, the unity of the people of Guinea and Cape Verde will be deprived of his political rights and fundamental liberties as a citizen.⁵⁶

We thus see that the undeniable fact of Portuguese control of the islands of Cape Verde, as late as in 1973, is recognized both in the proclamation of the

⁵³ *Communiqué spécial*, issued by the *Comité Executivo da Luta* on July 24, 1973, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), 1973, p. 2.

⁵⁴ *Jeune Afrique*, Paris, no. 660, September 1, 1973, p. 17.

⁵⁵ *Proclamação do Estado da Guiné-Bissau*, pp. 2 f.

⁵⁶ *Constituição* ..., Article 22.

state and in the new constitution. This does not keep the PAIGC from affirming, as strongly as ever, its intention to also liberate the islands, in order to form a unified state of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. The two fundamental documents of 1973 do not, however, give us any clear picture of the exact forms and institutions foreseen for the future unified state.

It is worth noting that the party program of the PAIGC does not even speak of a unified state, but only of a union within a "strong and progressive African fatherland." "The form of union between the two peoples," the program goes on to say, "will be established by their legitimate, freely elected representatives."⁵⁷ The quoted formulations of the party program do not seem to exclude the possibility of a federation with fairly loose formal ties between the two territories, while the more recent formulations of 1973 implicitly seem to point in the direction of a fairly close union. But formally the question remains open, and even the declaration of statehood asserts that the specific features ("modalities") of the union will be established "in accordance with the popular will, after the liberation of the two territories."⁵⁸

After the *coup* in Portugal on April 25, 1974, events moved very fast with regard to relations between the islands of Cape Verde and the state of Guinea-Bissau. As the final version of the manuscript of this book was being prepared for the printer during the summer of 1974, the strong formulations of the declaration of statehood and the 1973 constitution about the "unification into one state"—even a "unified state"—hardly appeared realistic for the immediate future. The Portuguese government stood for self-determination by means of a constitutional referendum.⁵⁹ In such a referendum, the Portuguese government appeared to wish to offer the people of the islands the choice between autonomy within a union with Portugal, some kind of union or federation with Guinea-Bissau, and, possibly, complete independence. The PAIGC, while having agreed to carry on "separate discussions" on the future of the two territories, had not given up the demand that the "unity" of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde be admitted by Portugal.⁶⁰ The fact that the PAIGC had had a weaker political organization on the islands than on the mainland throughout the years preceding the *coup* in Portugal, did, however, weaken this position. The only thing that was clear by the end of July was that Guinea-Bissau would become independent before the islands of Cape Verde, but that these would follow later in one form or other.⁶¹

⁵⁷ *Programa do Partido*, points III:1 and 2.

⁵⁸ *Proclamação do Estado da Guiné-Bissau*, p. 2.

⁵⁹ *Le Monde*, July 26, 1974, reports a declaration by the permanent representative of Portugal at the United Nations, made on July 23, to the effect, *inter alia*, that Portugal intended to organize a referendum on self-determination for the inhabitants of the islands of Cape Verde. See also pp. 69 f.

⁶⁰ Cf. *Le Monde*, June 2–3, 16–17, and 22, 1974.

⁶¹ During the spring of 1974, Onésimo Silveira, former representative of the PAIGC in the Scandinavian countries, published two newspaper articles in which he argued, *inter alia*, that

The executive organs of the new state

The highest executive functions of the new state are, according to the proposed constitution, exercised by a fifteen-member *Conselho de Estado* (State Council) elected by the members of the national Assembly among themselves.⁶² The president of the State Council...

... represents the state in its international relations. He is the supreme commander of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People (FARP).⁶³

But nothing is said in the constitution about the president of the State Council being regarded as a head of state or individual chief executive in the formal sense. It would seem correct to interpret the intention of the proposed constitution as being to endow the state of Guinea-Bissau with a fifteen-member collective head of state, with the president of the State Council as its foremost representative.

According to the communiqué issued by the PAIGC after the first meeting of the National Assembly on September 23–24, 1973, the assembly elected the State Council as prescribed by the constitution, although the constitution itself was only proposed to the assembly on this occasion, final adoption being postponed in order to give time for deliberation. Elected as President of the State Council, and thus of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, was Luis Cabral, vice secretary general of the PAIGC. Luis Cabral is also a member of the four-man secretariat of the *Comité Executivo da Luta* established by the second party congress, as well as of the War Council (*Conselho de Guerra*) of the party.⁶⁴

In addition to the State Council, a *Conselho dos Comissários de Estado* (Council of the Commissars of the State) was also appointed, in accordance with the rules of the constitution.⁶⁵ This is what might properly be called the "cabinet" or the "government" of the country. The constitution does not specify the number of commissars, but eight were appointed by the National Assembly in Boé.⁶⁶ Francisco (Chico) Mendes, like Luis Cabral one of the four members of the secretariat of the *Comité Executivo da Luta* and of the *Conselho de Guerra*, was appointed head commissar (*comissario principal*),

the people of Cape Verde could not be expected to favour union with Guinea-Bissau at the time of writing. See *Arbeiderbladet*, Oslo, April 6, 1974, and *Dagens Nyheter*, Stockholm, May 26, 1974. He developed the same arguments in "Le particularisme des îles du Cap Vert et la question nationale", *Le Monde Diplomatique*, June 1974, p. 3.

⁶² *Constituição* ..., Articles 36–43.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, Article 39.

⁶⁴ *Communiqué spécial* and *Biographies sommaires des membres du Secrétariat Permanent du Comité Exécutif de la Lutte*, signed and issued on July 24, 1973, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), 1973.

⁶⁵ *Constituição* ..., Articles 44–48.

⁶⁶ *Communiqué*, issued after the National Assembly in Boé, signed on October 2, 1973, by Aristides Pereira, Secretary General of the PAIGC, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), p. 3.

more or less the equivalent of a "prime minister".⁶⁷ According to the constitution, however, there is no special "prime minister", the Council of the Commissars of the State being a "collective organ",⁶⁸ responsible to the National Assembly and, between the sessions of the assembly, to the State Council.⁶⁹

We may note again the considerable overlap between the *de facto* leading organ of the party, the Permanent Secretariat, and the leading organs of the new state: both the President of the Republic and the "prime minister" as well as the "minister" for the armed forces, are members of the party secretariat. Only one of its four members, Aristides Pereira, Secretary General of the party, remains outside the top organs of the state.

International recognition of the new state

Earlier in this chapter it was assumed that the argument of international recognition and representation had been politically decisive for the PAIGC leaders when they decided to push ahead with the *de jure* proclamation of their state. Our assumption is supported by the importance of the place occupied by this question in the text of the formal declaration of statehood. The concluding words of the declaration, in fact, read as follows:

The state of Guinea-Bissau launches an appeal to all independent states of the world for recognition *de jure* as a sovereign state, in accordance with international law and practice. It expresses its decision to participate in international life, particularly within the Organization of African Unity and within the United Nations, where our people will be able to give their contribution to the solution of the problems of our time, in Africa and in the world.⁷⁰

Within three weeks after the new state had been declared to exist *de jure*, about sixty states had offered their official recognition. These included the great majority of African states, a number of socialist states, including the Soviet Union and China, a number of Arab states, the provisional revolutionary government of South Vietnam and the royal national union government of Cambodia, and a few others, notably India and Bangladesh.

By the spring of 1974, the total number of governments having recognized the Republic of Guinea-Bissau was over eighty. But not a single government of any of the industrialized capitalist countries of the West — including countries such as Sweden which had maintained close relations of cooperation with the PAIGC ever since 1969 — had yet taken this step, when recognition by Portugal herself of her former colony as an independent state was declared to be imminent in July 1974.⁷¹ Recognition by the largest Portuguese-speaking

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Constituição* . . . , Article 45.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, Article 44.

⁷⁰ *Proclamação* . . . , p. 5.

⁷¹ Cf. p. 70. Swedish recognition followed on August 9, 1974.

country in the world, Brazil, on July 18 portended this dramatic event in the history of Portugal and Guinea-Bissau.⁷²

The elections as an exercise in political mobilization

We have touched, earlier in this chapter, upon the twofold purpose of the 1972 elections in Guinea-Bissau: (1) to create the institutional prerequisites for international juridical recognition of the fact that most of Guinea-Bissau, after eleven years of politico-military struggle, was now effectively governed by the Guinean people themselves through the PAIGC, but also (2) to improve the system of government by initiating a separation of functions between the party and the state, and by involving the people more directly than before in the governmental process. From the latter point of view, the nomination and election campaigns may be interpreted as a practical exercise in political mobilization and participation.

This interpretation was explicitly put forth by Amílcar Cabral. In his report on the elections, he wrote for instance:

The realization of general elections in Guinea-Bissau and the creation of the first National Assembly of our people are political facts that carry historical implications for the new life we are building and for the future development of our people's heroic struggle for independence. These initiatives have been met by the most enthusiastic support from the masses of the people of the liberated regions and they have been very favourably received by the inhabitants of the zones still under occupation by the Portuguese colonial troops. These initiatives open new perspectives for our liberating fight.⁷³

Cabral's comment is general. The same idea has been expressed in more specific form by Basil Davidson in two articles written for the journal *West Africa* after a 27-day visit with the PAIGC during November and December of 1972, i.e. after the elections were over. Davidson begins his second article by pointing out that the ten years between 1963 and 1973 had been filled not only with military struggle against the Portuguese troops...

... but also and even more, as one discovers in every aspect of the country's internal life, by the steady and persistent building of an independent political system (our italics).⁷⁴

Later in the same article, Davidson makes the following remark:

The electoral process, in short, has been a practical exercise in the liberation of minds, and in the encouragement of a new self-confidence.⁷⁵

⁷² *Le Monde*, July 20, 1974.

⁷³ *Sur la création de l'Assemblée Nationale...*, p. 4.

⁷⁴ Davidson, "An Independent Guinea-Bissau. 2, Political Foundations", *West Africa*, January 29, 1973, p. 131.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

In making these observations, Davidson touches directly upon the main theme of our own work: the political mobilization of the people of Guinea-Bissau *against* the illegitimate social order of the colonial system and *for* an alternative order which they hope will better satisfy their social, economic, cultural, and political aspirations.

By themselves choosing, for the first time, people to represent them above the local level, the inhabitants of liberated Guinea-Bissau have been made to link, in their own minds, their own concrete interests to questions of more than local significance. Especially the manner in which the nominations were carried through indicates how important this mobilizational and pedagogic aspect of the election was considered to be by the PAIGC leadership. If we add to this the fact of fairly broad participation in the actual voting, we are justified in assuming that the elections in Guinea-Bissau in 1972 had that very quality of dynamic interaction between, on the one hand, organization, guidance, and direction from the leaders, and, on the other hand, voluntary and spontaneous participation of the people, which according to our conception characterizes the process of political mobilization.

Naturally only the future can tell how lasting the effects of this important political experience will prove to be. What we are able to state here is that a piece of solid foundation for future political mobilization and institution-building in Guinea-Bissau was laid in 1972 and 1973.

VI. The Emerging Social Order (3): Economic, Social, and Cultural Organization

National liberation, the struggle against colonialism, working for peace and progress, independence—all these will be empty words without significance for the people, unless they are translated into real improvements of the conditions of life. It is useless to liberate a region if the people of the region are then left without the elementary necessities of life.¹

Political mobilization, as we shall see in Chapter VII, can be defined as conscious work carried out with the explicit purpose of releasing, accelerating or directing the more general process of social mobilization. This means that political mobilization has to build upon and start from the concrete interests of those who are being mobilized in defending or improving their own conditions of life. In the context of underdevelopment and development, the most natural purpose will obviously be improvement rather than defense, although there is no absolute contradiction between the two.

Through successful political mobilization, people will themselves become aware of what must be done in order to improve their own lives, and they will also start to act in consequence. When the established social order is as profoundly illegitimate as the social order of colonial Guinea-Bissau in the early nineteen-sixties, such necessary action will involve the removal of strong political and institutional obstacles, and the creation of more popularly based structures and institutions in their place. But the necessary action will also have to involve the organization of the economic, social, and cultural life of the people in ways that bring tangible improvements and hopes for the future. In the present chapter we shall deal with these latter aspects of our subject matter. Although perhaps not “political” in the very narrowest sense of the term, they are still indissolubly linked to the concept and reality of political mobilization and thus to the main theme of this book. Furthermore, education is also clearly an instrument of direct political mobilization, in addition to being an important example of social improvement.

¹ Cabral, *Palavras de ordem gerais*, p. 23.

Economy and production

It was pointed out in Chapter IV that, since 1970, responsibility for general political leadership and responsibility for production have been combined and assigned to the same office-holder in all organs of the PAIGC organization at all levels below the central level. It was also noted that this demonstrates the political importance attached by the PAIGC leadership to economic output and material improvement. The same emphasis is found in the party guidelines and in several other party documents and declarations by Cabral. What we are concerned with here, however, is how this theoretical conviction was translated into practical action during the years of armed struggle.

A peasant economy

We saw in Chapter III that the party guidelines emphasize the necessity for diversifying agricultural production in the liberated areas in order to meet the people's need for food. It is impossible to provide any exact information on the extent to which this has actually taken place. Experimental fields with various vegetables can be observed here and there, although not too frequently, in PAIGC-controlled Guinea-Bissau. A limited number of agronomists and agricultural technicians have — as we shall see in the section of this chapter dealing with education — received advanced training abroad, mainly in Eastern Europe, and then returned to their country to work in the liberated areas. In daily practice some of their knowledge is also transmitted to other people who have not had the chance to go abroad. The children of the PAIGC-schools often have small cooperative fields of their own. In these and other related ways, new ideas and practices are gradually penetrating into the productive life of Guinea-Bissau. Sometimes, also, knowledge existing already is put to more efficient use than during colonial times. This is true particularly in the South, where rice production has been intensified and fairly large surpluses have been created. Peanuts, on the other hand, are becoming much less important than before, as they were demanded mainly by the Portuguese and are of limited value for the cultivators' own consumption.

But both party documents and observations inside Guinea-Bissau convey the impression that production and social relations of production at the local level so far have not changed much during the struggle for national liberation. In spite of a few attempts to run properties abandoned by the Portuguese through committees of the people, the institutional framework of production at the local level is still the traditional village. Nor do crops and crop practices seem to have been transformed as much as desired by the party leadership. Speaking on "production" at the 1971 meeting of the *Conselho Superior*, for instance, Cabral emphasized the need for agricultural diversification:

... instead of growing only rice, we can cultivate as much rice as possible, but also beans, peanuts with husks, potatoes, manioc, vegetables. We have done a little of this, but we are not doing enough. This has to do with politics...²

Cabral also spoke with a sense of urgency and great seriousness about the need to organize collective fields in the villages. Not only the products, but also the manner of organizing production ought to change under the impact of the struggle. But there were still hardly any collective fields—except in the traditional sense of communal ownership—in spite of a promising start years ago:

Regardless of their specific responsibilities, comrades everywhere in our organization should help our people to organize collective fields. This is a great experiment for our future, comrades. Those who do not yet understand this have not understood anything of our struggle, however much they have fought and however heroic they may have been.³

The main differences between economic life under the colonial system and under the PAIGC concern the ways in which the surpluses are used and commercialized. Under colonialism, an oppressive tax system pushed the people to produce for cash, often to the neglect of their own daily consumption needs. Under the PAIGC, all institutional obstacles against production for self-consumption have been removed, and surpluses are channelled by the PAIGC either through the village committees or through the system of *People's Stores*, which is by far the most important outlet. The stores have been introduced by the PAIGC in an attempt to provide a substitute for the Portuguese commercial circuits and to break the dependence of the people upon the Portuguese for the satisfaction of such consumption needs that cannot be met by the villages' own production. The system of People's Stores is the main innovation introduced by the PAIGC into the economy of Guinea-Bissau, and because of its importance both materially and as an illustration of PAIGC principles it will be described in some detail in this chapter.

Before turning to the People's Stores, a few more words will be said about the type of economy operating in the liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau. This is a peasant economy, organized in and around small villages with varying kinds of social structures—ranging, as we saw in Chapter II, from quite hierarchical to very egalitarian. Agricultural production and cattle raising are thus the main occupations of the Guineans. These occupations take different institutional forms and they aim at slightly different kinds of products depending upon local conditions, but they are usually, in all of Guinea-Bissau,

² Cabral, *Sobre alguns problemas práticos da nossa vida e da nossa luta*, mimeographed transcription of tape-recording from the meeting of the *Conselho Superior da Luta*, August 9–16, 1971, Conakry, PAIGC, 1971, p. 14. This and all subsequent quotations from the same document have been translated by the author from the Portuguese original.

³ *Ibid.*

carried on with the village community as the basic proprietor of land and the family as the basic producing unit. This is true both in hierarchical Fula and in egalitarian Balante villages, although Fula chiefs have been able to appropriate village land for private purposes.

The fact that the people of Guinea are peasants does not mean that other occupations do not exist — even independently of such modern tasks as have been introduced to some extent by the Portuguese during colonialism and to a much greater extent by the PAIGC in connection with the struggle for national liberation. The special census form mentioned in Chapter IV contains, for instance, the following list of existing skills and occupations, as an aid to officials charged with the task of classifying the citizens of liberated Guinea-Bissau according to their specific skills:

blacksmith, shoemaker, weaver, quarrier, carpenter, mechanic, iron-caster, goldsmith, tailor, maker of canoes and wooden implements, statuette-maker, sailor, hunter, wrestler, pottery-maker, rope-maker, maker of mats of grass and bamboo, tapper of palm-trees for palm-wine, musician and singer, maker of musical instruments, practitioner of traditional medicine, Moslem learned/holy man (*marabout*), etc., etc.⁴

This list of skills and occupations gives a concrete image, as good as any, of the variety and richness of the traditional economy the colonial system had forced into stagnation and which it was unable to develop. Instead, it is now the task of the new society under construction to develop the economy in order to justify itself in the eyes of its members, and contribute thereby to ensuring the continued mobilization of popular energy.

The People's Stores

The system of *Armazéns do Povo*, People's Stores, consists of sixteen stores or depots fairly well spread throughout liberated Guinea-Bissau: there were in 1972 six in the North, seven in the South (eight, if one store located right on the border with the republic of Guinea is included), and two in the East.⁵ The first People's Store was established in 1964, and the system was built up until 1968, when there were fifteen.⁶ The sixteenth store was organized between 1968 and 1970 in the sector of N'Djassane, in the southern region of Quinara.

These sixteen central stores function both as places of commerce and as storage houses. In order to facilitate the exchange of local produce for the consumer goods that the party is able to furnish, several of the People's

⁴ *Recenseamento da População (a), Regiões Libertadas da Guiné*, mod. 35. PAIGC (translated by the author).

⁵ According to *La République de Guinée-Bissau en chiffres*, February 1974, p. 12, there were, in early 1974, five People's Stores in the North, eight in the South, and four in the East—i.e. eighteen in total.

⁶ Davidson, *The Liberation of Guiné*, p. 124.

Stores have also established subsidiary branches within their sectors, sometimes mobile and sometimes fixed.

The main function of the People's Stores is to provide the inhabitants of liberated Guinea-Bissau with an outlet for their surplus production and at the same time an opportunity to supply themselves with the most necessary consumer goods independently of the Portuguese. This is of course a highly political function—if it is not performed to the people's satisfaction, the entire credibility of the PAIGC in the people's eyes will suffer.

From the point of view of the PAIGC, an equally important function of the system of stores is to feed the armed forces. Most of the rice received by the People's Stores is in fact consumed by the soldiers of the FARP, although some quantities are also exported to the Republic of Guinea.

It is an important principle of the People's Stores not to accept Portuguese money.⁷ In fact, no money at all was used until the fall of 1973, as the monetary system had been temporarily abolished in order to break all economic relations between the people of the liberated areas and the Portuguese. Instead a system of direct exchange was established, through which so many kilograms of, for instance, rice—the principal "currency"—were exchanged against so many metres of cloth. The exchange values were established centrally upon the recommendation of the local cadres who knew the local opinion of what a fair price ought to be.

After the declaration of a sovereign state on September 24, 1973, the Republic of Guinea-Bissau introduced its own currency, the *peso*, the official exchange value of which is 0.042 U.S. dollars, i.e. the same as the Portuguese escudo. This was defined by Luis Cabral as an "accounting unit, to be used for the exchange of goods, until we print our own bank-notes."⁸ The value theory applied in order to establish the exchange values of the People's Store might be said to be derived from a kind of philosophy of natural rights. Its basic principle is political. Its purpose is to satisfy elementary material needs in a society with extremely scarce resources, and in such a way that the people are encouraged to produce more.

The aim of the People's Stores is to keep their prices below the price level of the Portuguese — this can also be regarded as implied in the effort to adjust exchange values to the Guinean producers' own notions of what is just and equitable. But Portuguese dumping in combination with a greater variety of goods offered for sale by the Portuguese have, at times, made the competition

⁷ At the 1971 *Conselho Superior*, Cabral spoke very firmly against some officials who had allowed the people to use Portuguese money in the stores. Cabral, *Sobre alguns problemas práticos...*, pp. 17 ff.

⁸ Interview with Luis Cabral in *Le Monde*, January 19, 1974.

tough for the PAIGC in areas where the people had some possibility of choosing between the two systems.⁹

It should be emphasized that the abolition of the monetary system always was intended to be temporary — necessary because of the Portuguese, and possible because of the simplicity of the economy of the liberated areas. The PAIGC leaders are not utopians in the sense of having ever believed that they would be able, in the long run, to manage exchanges inside their country without money. In fact, the beginnings of a PAIGC monetary system were already appearing before 1973 in the form of receipts or vouchers given to people who brought their produce to a People's Store without finding anything they wanted to buy at the moment. These receipts were transferable, and they could also be kept for as long as the owner wished to keep them. They functioned thus as a kind of paper money. The concept of money, of course, appeared also in the accounts, bills, and invoices of the People's Stores. All calculations for such purposes were made in terms of Portuguese escudos, until the introduction of the Guinean peso.

In view of the fact that almost all transportation inside liberated Guinea-Bissau, at least until the new situation of 1974, was done by people walking long distances through muddy swamps and dense forests with heavy burdens on their heads and backs, it is easy to understand that the "logistic" problem of supplying the People's Stores was a difficult one, even when the PAIGC managed to receive or buy the needed goods and bring them as far as to the border. Transportation, during the war, was probably a greater problem than getting the peasants to produce. According to the official in charge of the central accounts of the People's Stores in 1972, the potential of the liberated areas with regard to rice production is considerably greater than the actual production. This is also the explanation given for the annual fluctuations of the quantities of rice brought to the People's Stores: when the party has desirable goods to offer, rice is always available. According to this official, then, the quantity of rice received by the People's Stores can be seen as a direct function of the party's ability to supply the stores with goods desired by the people.

⁹ In 1970 the author visited a store in the South where 25 sheets of writing-paper were given in exchange for 1 kilo of rice. Three metres of cloth, suitable for a woman's dress, "costs" 10 kilos of rice. A sewing-machine was available at the store for those who wanted to make their clothes immediately. At this store, producers who lived far away and thus had to carry their produce over long distance were compensated with lower prices than those paid by the peasants who lived nearby.—In 1972 the author visited a store in the North where a piece of good cloth, 2.08 metres by 90 centimetres, "cost" 12 kilos of unpolished rice. Twelve kilos of unpolished rice was said to be the equivalent of 6 kilos of polished rice. In nearby Senegal, polished rice at the time cost 40–50 francs CFA a kilo. The piece of cloth mentioned was thus given to the peasants in exchange for a quantity of rice worth 240–300 francs CFA (a little over 1 U.S. dollar) in Senegal.

The transportation problem has also an opposite side, as Guinea-Bissau has a need to export several products — mainly rice surpluses, but also such products as coconuts, peanuts, kolanuts, rubber, crocodile-hides, bees-wax, etc. — received by the People's Stores and not usable within the country. All these products have to be carried to the border and then marketed abroad. Until the present time the Republic of Guinea has received most of the exports of liberated Guinea-Bissau, but it does not seem possible to resolve this problem on a larger scale until the war is definitely over and transportation by modern means can be carried on safely, without the constant threat of attacks from the Portuguese air force.

Other problems the PAIGC has had to face in its attempt to construct an alternative system of economic exchanges in Guinea-Bissau include such seemingly minor problems as finding cloth to the taste of the people. Sometimes, for instance, the PAIGC has been given cloth by friendly governments and organizations, but which has then been rejected by the people who bring their produce to the stores, not because of poor quality but simply because colors and patterns were not to their liking. At other times, the PAIGC wholesale buyers have hesitated to buy the desired patterns because of prices on the international market. This has also been a political problem, related to Portuguese attempts to compete with the PAIGC in the field of opportunities for material consumption.

In view of all these difficulties — others could easily be added to the list — it is remarkable that the system of People's Stores has indeed functioned as well as it has. Through this system, the PAIGC has been able to supply the armed forces of the liberation movement with food; the people of liberated Guinea-Bissau have found an outlet for at least part of their productive potential; and considerable though not sufficient quantities of necessary consumer foods have been brought into the country and fairly distributed. Originally, much of this was bought by the PAIGC or given unsystematically by various donors, but in recent years cooperation between the PAIGC and the government of Sweden (cf.p. 56) has contributed to stabilizing the supply. This kind of material support is obviously of considerable political importance to the PAIGC.

Most of the statistics we shall now study were made available to the author by the central information services of the party in May 1972. They are based upon reports from the directors of each of the sixteen People's Stores inside Guinea-Bissau and very carefully kept.¹⁰ After compiling the tables and finishing most of the text of the present chapter, however, the author received

¹⁰ In May 1972, the author studied these statistics in detail at the PAIGC secretariat in Conakry. The official in charge of them was Armando Ramos.

the first statistical publication of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau: *La République de Guinée-Bissau en chiffres*, February 1974. In addition to the material studied in 1972, this contains information for the year 1972, as well. Whenever the tables of this chapter contain information for the year 1972, it will thus be based upon *La République de Guinée-Bissau en chiffres* where relative indices including 1972 are given. It should be mentioned, too, that there is no inconsistency whatsoever between the official figures on the People's Stores and on education published in 1974 and the figures of the raw tables made available to the author in 1972.

Table 18 shows the quantities received of the main products brought to the People's Stores during the period 1968–71.

Table 18. *Purchases of principal products by the People's Stores*
(in kilograms)

Product	1968	1969	1970	1971
Polished rice	279,882	249,814	414,274	367,688
Unpolished rice	161,939	119,574	491,570	300,823
Maize	—	4,066	84,582	50,473
Kola-nuts	28,809	30,677	40,032	54,319
Peanuts with husks	—	5,639	5,471	1,684
Bee-wax	—	667	1,415	6,582
Honey	—	8,000	3,110	17,797
Palm-oil	10,480	8,117	8,669	21,218
Crocodile-hides (centimeters)	3,440	3,285	5,598	4,326

As we can see from table 18, rice dominates heavily in quantitative terms. In fact, as already noted in Chapter II, the amounts bought or received by the PAIGC in 1970 and 1971 have not been surpassed by the exports from the Portuguese side since 1959.

The statistics published in 1974 only give relative indices of the quantities of products handled by the People's Stores. With 1968 as the base year (index 100), the index of the volume of total purchases in 1971 is 158.9, and in 1972 it is 343.7—i.e. more than a one hundred percent increase between 1971 and 1972. Polished rice increased by about 80 percent, and unpolished by 200 percent. A considerable increase was also registered for palm-oil in 1972 (72 percent), while kola-nuts decreased by close to 50 percent.¹¹

The dominance of rice is not quite as marked with regard to values as with regard to quantity. In terms of market value—or at least in terms of the prices offered by the Republic of Guinea—the value of the 54.3 tons of kola-nuts purchased by the People's Stores in 1971 was even greater than the value of the

¹¹ *La République de Guinée-Bissau en chiffres*, February 1974, pp. 15 and 19 ff.

300.8 tons of unpolished rice. But if polished and unpolished rice are combined, rice regains the lead, as does polished rice alone, too. This can be deduced with the help of table 19, which shows the quantity and value of the various products exported by the PAIGC in 1971. The table shows also that there were a few additional products bringing significant income to the PAIGC.

Table 19. *Sales abroad (i.e. in the Republic of Guinea) during 1971*

Product	Quantity, kg (until June)	Value in Guinean francs ^a (until June)	Value in Guinean franc (entire year)
Unpolished rice	2,955	145,000	145,000
Coconuts	10,927	1,170,525	1,170,525
Rubber	1,927	529,925	529,925
Bee-wax	844	401,975	2,152,850
Crocodile-hides	3,163 (cm)	1,336,100	1,185,775 ^b
Bitter kola-nuts	49,511	21,909,025	29,120,675
Various	—	97,700	97,700
Total		25,590,250	34,402,450

^a In 1972 the currency of the Republic of Guinea was renamed *sily*. In 1971 it was still called the Guinean franc and worth about 0.0046 U.S. dollars, according to the official rate of exchange.

^b No explanation is available as to why the value was lower for the entire year than for the half-year, but the reason is probably a simple copying error in the original document.

In table 20, the annual export incomes during the period 1968–72 are compared with each other. 1971 is shown to have been the best year so far.

Table 20. *Value of sales abroad*
(in Guinean francs)

Year	Value
1968	15,444,600
1969	12,065,411
1970	18,547,720
1971	34,402,450
1972	20,242,559

Table 21 gives the quantities of the two main products, sugar and cloth, sold (exchanged) to the people by the People's Stores during the four-year period for which these statistics were shown to the author. But in addition to sugar and cloth, many other goods are also available in the People's Stores, depending upon supplies, such as soap, sandals, sewing-needles, sewing-thread, buttons, matches, salt, writing-paper, fish-nets, etc. Table 22 includes these goods too, as it gives the total value, in terms of Portuguese escudos, of

the exchanges performed through the People's Stores during the period under consideration.¹²

The tables indicate that the activities of the stores have expanded considerably since 1968. The 1971 turnover of slightly over 6 million escudos may be compared with, for instance, the sum of 255 million at which the total Portuguese budget for the province of Guinea was supposed to balance in 1971.¹³ Export values may also be compared: total exports from the Portuguese side were reported to amount to 89.8 million escudos in 1970,¹⁴ compared with PAIGC figures of about 2.3 million escudos (18.5 million Guinean francs) in the same year and about 4.3 million escudos (34.4 million Guinean francs) in 1971. For very natural reasons, the PAIGC figures are modest in comparison with the figures of the Portuguese. But considering the socio-economic, political, and military conditions under which they have been achieved, they remain considerable.

Table 21. *Sales of principal products by the People's Stores, inside Guinea-Bissau*

Product	1968	1969	1970	1971 ^a	1972
Various kinds of cloth (meters)	291,500	91,099	257,117	356,277	694,911
Cloth for mosquito nets (meters)	—	20,193	70,920	—	37,326
Sugar (kilograms)	12,094	43,071	57,860	38,500	36,106

^a until June (a comparison with the relative figures given by *La République de la Guinée-Bissau en chiffres*, pp. 16 and 18, shows that the figures for the first half of 1971 studied by the author in 1972 are also very close to the totals for 1971).

Table 22. *Total turnover of People's Stores (in escudos)*

Year	Value of turnover
1968	3,641,523
1969	2,404,175
1970	5,798,772
1971	6,022,959
1972	8,989,491

¹² The raw tables studied by the author contain this information for each of the sixteen stores separately. But the totals are sufficient for our present purposes.

¹³ *Sítese monográfica da Guiné*, p. 95.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

The system of People's Stores has impressed foreign observers, and within the PAIGC ranks, as well, it is looked upon with pride as an example of relative success in attacking an almost overwhelmingly difficult economic and political task. It is quite probable therefore that Cabral surprised his audience — and perhaps even shocked a few — when he began his comments on the People's Stores at the 1971 *Conselho Superior* with the following words:

As far as the People's Stores are concerned, everybody speaks about their great importance. It is my sincere opinion that our People's Stores do not function well.¹⁵

The Secretary-General's criticism concerned several important points. Not enough work was done, and what was done was not good enough, he said. It was difficult to compete with the Portuguese colonialists, who were sometimes able to offer exactly the kind of cloth or tobacco the people liked, whereas this was not always possible for the PAIGC. But it was necessary to explain the reasons well to the people, to educate. It was also necessary, Cabral went on to tell his audience of party cadres, to make the system of People's Stores more efficient, and to keep it functioning permanently, without interruptions. To this end Cabral proposed decentralization of the system in the sense of abolishing the existing top post as official in charge of the entire system and creating instead one separate post for each of the three liberated parts of the country: the South, the North, and the East. Central responsibility would henceforth rest with the Secretary-General himself, and the three new office-holders would have to work inside the country and not outside.¹⁶

In the same speech Cabral pointed out that the decision to decentralize responsibility for the People's Stores might also contribute to improving the party's work on security inside the liberated areas. This was to be expected, because the new arrangement would make possible close coordination between the Permanent Commission of the National Committees (of the North and of the South) and the official in charge of the stores.¹⁷ The concluding words of Cabral's long speech on "the practical problems of our life and our struggle" were devoted to the People's Stores:

In order to resolve the problem of the People's Stores and to make further progress, the fundamental thing is to have comrades in Conakry whose only task is to supply the stores rapidly. These comrades are not in charge of the People's Stores. Their task is simply to supply them with goods. Secondly, there is going to be closer supervision of the People's Stores by the party leadership. Thirdly, on each front of the struggle¹⁸ (because after all the People's Stores are an instrument of the armed struggle, as they supply our soldiers with food), there ought to be one official permanently in charge of the People's Stores in each of the main liberated areas.

¹⁵ Cabral, *Sobre alguns problemas práticos* . . . , p. 15.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 15 ff.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁸ Cabral uses here the old terminology of the party, according to which there were three "fronts" one in the North, one in the South, and one in the East. Cf. p. 135.

This official should work in close connection with the Permanent Commission of the National Committee, and he should also be subject to the control of this same Permanent Commission. And the Permanent Commission should inform us, through its political commissar, about the People's Stores. This should obviously be done in collaboration with the official in charge of the stores.

It seems to me that if we do this and do it seriously, keeping the People's Stores properly supplied, we should be able to improve our work a great deal in this field. To say anything more would be to complicate things unnecessarily. This is my opinion.¹⁹

Judging from his speech at the meeting of the *Conselho Superior*, Cabral was clearly worried in 1971 about the performance of the People's Stores. Nor is it likely that he was much relieved when he was handed the results for 1971. For as we see from tables 18–21, quantitatively less rice, maize, and peanuts were received (bought) by the stores in 1971 than in 1970, in spite of the fact that the total exchange value, as calculated in escudos, went up. The PAIGC, in other words, received less of these important products from the people in 1971, in spite of distributing more goods. This fact contradicts the idea, mentioned above, of a simple direct relationship between the quantities distributed by the PAIGC and those delivered by the people. On the other hand, it may also be interpreted as an ordinary price reduction for the consumers living in the liberated areas. Note also that the amount of palm-oil bought by the People's Stores increased greatly in 1971. In 1972, furthermore, considerably more rice was bought, as noted earlier in this chapter, than in both 1970 and 1971. The same was true of peanuts.

On the basis of available data, it is impossible to push the analysis of the People's Stores much further. It is a fact that considerable quantities of goods are produced, exchanged, and distributed in liberated Guinea-Bissau through a network of sixteen central stores with a number of subsidiary branches. It is also a fact that this system involves complications, difficulties, and imperfectly resolved problems, the most important of which probably is that there is a lack of continuity in supplying the stores with goods for the people. It may be left up to the reader to judge, which one of these two facts is most remarkable: that the system functions in spite of all obstacles or that it faces certain difficulties.

Health and medical care

I work with health care too. If anybody gets sick, I talk to the president, so the sick person can be brought to the sanitary post. When the health brigade comes to our village, I am always present and watch that the people listen to the advice offered by the brigade. I also see to it

¹⁹ Cabral, *Sobre alguns problemas práticos . . .*, pp. 23 f.

that the members of the brigade are received as well as possible when they come to our village.

In these words Tale Na Sum — the woman in charge of social affairs in Cã Village Committee in the sector of Cubisseco-de-Cima in November 1970 — described to the author her responsibilities in the field of health care (cf. p. 130 for Tale Na Sum's description of her other tasks). Her brief words bring out three important points about the health organization set up by the PAIGC in the liberated areas: (1) within each Village Committee there is, as we have already seen, one member with specific responsibility for health matters; (2) there are sanitary posts, at the level of the sector, where people can receive medical treatment; (3) there are mobile "health brigades" which visit the villages more or less regularly. Through the village health officials, the sanitary posts, and the mobile health brigades, the inhabitants of liberated Guinea-Bissau are thus reached by the party's efforts to apply Cabral's words in the party rules that "our health is our greatest richness and the most important strength of our soldiers and militants".²⁰

As we saw in Chapter II, health conditions were very poor in colonial Guinea-Bissau at the time when the struggle for national liberation began. Since then, they have improved on both sides, as the Portuguese have tried to compete with the PAIGC by offering certain material improvements to the people. There are no data available about the actual effects on the health condition of the people of these efforts, neither of those undertaken by the PAIGC nor those undertaken by the Portuguese. What we shall offer here is a descriptive analysis of the PAIGC's system of health organization and a brief comparison with some statistical data about the Portuguese system.

It is only natural that health and medical care should be an important part of the political work carried on by the PAIGC. The general goal of the movement is liberation from oppression, misery, and underdevelopment. But people must see concrete results of their efforts in order to continue to offer their political support. Improved health is one of the most immediately pressing human and social needs in Guinea-Bissau and therefore also one of the most obvious developmental and political goals of the PAIGC.

We saw in Chapter IV that responsibility for health matters is designated as a specific responsibility at all levels of the political and administrative organization of the PAIGC: separated from all other tasks in the Village and Sector Committees, and combined with education into "national reconstruction" at the levels above the sector. But how are the actual health and medical services organized in order to achieve the political and humanitarian goal of reaching a maximum number of people with the minimum of material resources available?

²⁰ *Palavras de ordem gerais* . . . , p. 26 (translated by the author).

The three points at which the organization reaches the people most directly have already been mentioned. The country hospitals and the member of the Sector Committee in charge of health should also be added to this group of basic institutions and functionaries. The following five, then, provide the corner-stones of an organization which has gradually been built up since 1964, until it covers all parts of the territory where functioning PAIGC Village Committees exist: country hospital, Sector Committee, sanitary post, health brigade, Village Committee.

Country hospitals

Ideally, according to the organizational plan, there should be one country hospital per sector, and a number of sanitary posts. Because of a serious lack of physicians, the plan, on the eve of the declaration of statehood, was far from having been realized yet with regard to the number of hospitals. In early 1972, there were nine hospitals — five in the South, two in the North, and two in the East — eight of which were directed by a properly trained physician.²¹ A number of the doctors were still Cuban in 1972, but efforts were being made to replace them with Guineans and Cape Verdeans. By 1971, eight medical doctors from Guinea and Cape Verde had been educated for the PAIGC in Eastern Europe, and together with one Angolan doctor who joined the struggle of the PAIGC after having received his training in Portugal and France, plus a few others, they were so far the only PAIGC physicians, although the number will increase in the near future.²² As not all of the PAIGC doctors in 1972 were in charge of country hospitals—some were mobile and some worked at the PAIGC hospitals in the Republic of Guinea—it is easy to see that the contribution of the Cubans was still essential even in order to maintain the nine hospitals that actually existed inside the country.

The country hospitals are primarily military hospitals, although they often receive civilian patients, and although they also function as a kind of central hospital for the surrounding sanitary posts. The function of central hospital, however, is performed by having the doctor and other medical personnel visit the sanitary posts rather than by bringing the patients to the hospitals. This is avoided for security reasons, unless absolutely necessary. It has happened, for instance, that infiltrators from the Portuguese side have guided Portuguese bombers to a PAIGC hospital after having been treated there.

²¹ Information from Dr. Manuel Boal, chief coordinator of the medical services of the PAIGC.

²² Until 1971, eight of the 27 persons who had completed higher studies abroad under PAIGC auspices were physicians. In 1972 there were 31 persons pursuing higher studies abroad. It can be assumed that the proportion of medical students in this group was at least as high as in the group who had completed their studies. Cf. tables 29 and 31, pp. 213–14. For the source of this information, see note 30, p. 192.

A PAIGC hospital, under the conditions of armed struggle, does not have any impressive external structure, visible to the eye, but it is functional and intelligently adapted to optimal use of existing possibilities. It consists of a number of small huts, well hidden in the forest. The operating room is only a roof covered with straw or palm-leaves, usually constructed without walls in order to facilitate ventilation. The wards of the patients consist of rows of simple beds, each surrounded by a mosquito net, underneath a roof. Walls have often been considered unnecessary here as well. Electricity does not exist, instruments are sterilized over coal fires, in order to avoid smoke from burning wood that attracts the Portuguese airplanes.

On April 21, 1972, the author observed the performance of a complicated abdominal operation at *the country hospital in the sector of Sara*.

The patient was a male civilian, aged about fifty. He was being operated because of "extreme urgency". The doctor, a Cuban, said his life could not have been saved in any other way. The disease necessitating the operation had been caused by gonococci in the ureter of the patient. The operation involved opening the entire abdomen through a 15 centimeter cut, from the navel downwards, cutting and reconnecting the ureter, placing a thin tube, and then closing the wound with a great number of stitches.

During the entire operation, the intestines of the patient were hanging outside his stomach. Anesthesia was given by local injections, but the patient had also received a little morphine. As the hospital lacked both refrigeration and laboratory facilities for the determination of blood groups, no fresh blood could be given. A blood plasma substitute was given through intravenous infusion.

The doctor was assisted by another Cuban doctor (passing by on his way to another hospital where he was to assume duties), by the two Cuban assistants of the two doctors, and by a number of PAIGC nurses and attendants. Instruments were sterilized in a bowl made of stainless steel, heated over a coal fire. The operating table was a simple construction of branches, underneath a roof covered with palm leaves.

On the following day the doctor announced that the post-operational phase had been successful, and that the patient would recover, barring unexpected complications. The risk of further infection, he said, was minimal, as Guineans in general responded extremely well to treatment with antibiotics, because of previous lack of exposure.

In the opinion of the author, this operation demonstrates that sophistication and "development" have much more to do with the intelligent application of relevant knowledge to existing means, than with the existence, as such, of sophisticated and developed means.

The constant threat of helicopter attacks or bombing with napalm and other kinds of explosives caused serious strain on the medical organization, at least until 1974, and was also the main reason why no permanent building constructions had been erected. Usually the hospitals moved to new sites several times a year — in 1971, the author was told, the hospital in Sara had had to move *seventeen* times. This was exceptional, though, and hospitals visited by the author in the South normally moved two to three times a year. For this reason great efforts are made in order to keep the number of patients who were unable to walk by themselves at a minimum. As soon as the condition of the patient permitted, he or she would be carried to the border and then

transported by car, either to the PAIGC hospitals at Koundara and Boké in the Republic of Guinea or to the PAIGC medical center at Ziguinchor in Senegal. Many patients were also carried directly from the sanitary posts to the border, thus bypassing the militarily vulnerable country hospitals.

Medical personnel

In addition to the doctor, there are a number of nurses and attendants at each hospital, both male and female. Usually they are as many as around twenty. This is because their tasks, at least during the years of armed struggle and possibly also afterwards, are not only strictly medical, but involve everything that has to be done in order to keep the hospital going: cleaning, cooking, maintenance, and, during the war, construction of new buildings after each move undertaken in order to safeguard against attacks from the air, evacuation of patients at the slightest threat of attack, etc.

The medical training of this personnel is of uneven quality. Some have taken medical courses of varying length in different countries of Eastern Europe, but others have only been trained on the spot by their more experienced comrades. People active within the PAIGC—for instance the member of the Sector Committee of Tomabli quoted on p. 123—therefore do not hide the fact that the professional level of many of the nurses and their assistants is far from satisfactory. On the other hand, it would have caused numerous and even more serious problems of both political, psychological, and practical nature, if foreign personnel had been allowed to work in great numbers inside Guinea-Bissau during the war—provided of course that such personnel could be found at all.²³ The principle was therefore, and is still, to send as many Guineans and Cape Verdeans as possible abroad to be trained, and to use them systematically both as practitioners and instructors upon their return.

Besides the fully trained doctors, the situation in 1971 was reported to be as follows with regard to personnel: according to the statistics kept in Conakry, nine advanced medical assistants had been trained abroad under PAIGC auspices by that year, and two other persons had received specialized training in orthopedics and anesthesia respectively. Ninety persons had been trained as sanitary assistants. About the same number of students were abroad receiving similar training in 1972. In addition to these people with fairly advanced train-

²³ The Portuguese information services claim over and over again that most of the qualified personnel of the PAIGC, both military and civilian, are foreign "mercenaries". As far as the author has been able to judge, this is pure invention, with some such limited exceptions as the small number of Cuban doctors mentioned above, who certainly are not "mercenaries" in any case. If the Portuguese authorities really believe that the struggle of the PAIGC is carried on by foreign "mercenaries", this only demonstrates their incomprehension of the political nature of the struggle.

ing, there were several hundred nurses and auxiliary nurses, both male and female, most of whom had been trained in Guinea-Bissau or at the PAIGC hospitals in the Republic of Guinea or in Senegal. Their number, in 1972, was reported to be 410—not counting the male nurses included in each *bigrupo* of the army. Still, this figure probably refers only to people classified as having received some kind of training, either through supervised practice on the spot or through participation in some kind of course. The total number of people assisting at hospitals and sanitary posts is therefore likely to be greater.

The figures now cited were given to the author in 1972. They are somewhat difficult to compare with the information on health and medical care contained in *La République de Guinée-Bissau en chiffres*, as the various categories of personnel are not classified in quite the same manner by this more recent source. But even so, it is clear that the figures have been revised upwards in the official publication, which tells us that there were, in 1971–72, twenty-three foreign doctors, eighteen PAIGC doctors, twenty medical assistants, eleven PAIGC medical technicians, and ten foreign medical technicians.²⁴ According to these statistics, there also were 335 nurses, all categories, in 1972.²⁵ These figures cannot be analyzed any further for the time being; they are merely noted here. Table 25, p. 199, gives some further details.

Mention should also be made of the fact that a number of traditional doctors are still working in Guinea-Bissau. These doctors make use of natural medicines that experience has taught them how to use. According to the professionally trained PAIGC physicians, there are both good and bad traditional doctors. The knowledge and experiences of the good ones are welcomed by the PAIGC, whereas the people are discouraged from consulting those practitioners who are regarded as mere superstitious magicians. This is in agreement with the party guidelines which encourage the use of natural medicaments in cases where they are known to have beneficial effects.

Among all the other problems brought up by Cabral at the 1971 meeting of the *Conselho Superior*, we also find the problems of the medical personnel. With regard to doctors and other advanced specialists, the main counsel advanced by the Secretary-General was realism: "We have to be realistic enough to understand that the Party cannot perform miracles."²⁶ But with regard to the nurses, it ought to be possible to do both more and better. In particular, Cabral stressed, a solution would have to be found to the problem of female nurses leaving their jobs after having had their first child. From the point of view of the party, it was pointless to recruit and train a nurse who then would not work:

²⁴ *La République de Guinée-Bissau en chiffres*, February 1974, table 4, p. 8.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, table 2, p. 7.

²⁶ Cabral, *Sobre alguns problemas práticos* . . . , p. 11.

This cannot be. Either we find a way of obliging our nurses to continue working after having children, or otherwise we will have to stop recruiting female nurses for our struggle.²⁷

Cabral mentioned that this problem was by no means peculiar to Guinea-Bissau, but on the contrary a fairly universal problem, existing in all countries, even in the Soviet Union where a large proportion of doctors were women. But the fact that this problem existed elsewhere could not keep the PAIGC from trying to resolve it:

We have to be capable of understanding this reality, but also capable of struggling in order to improve it. And the best way of improving the work of our women is to demand of them that they hold themselves in due consideration and respect.²⁸

Sanitary posts

The sanitary posts (*postos sanitários*) function at the level of the sector. They are smaller and more modestly equipped than the hospitals, in particular with regard to personnel. Otherwise they are similar to the hospitals: the same kinds — for the same wartime reasons — of easily mobile constructions, simple operation table, coal fire for sterilization of instruments constantly ready for use, patients' beds underneath mosquito-nets, small houses for the personnel, everything well hidden in the forest.

A PAIGC sanitary post may be staffed by a varying number of nurses (attendants) — one well-equipped post in the South seen by the author, not very far from an hospital and regularly visited by the doctor, had four attendants with three years of training behind them, but others were smaller and had fewer and perhaps less well trained attendants.

According to the statistics for 1971 prepared by the doctor in charge of coordinating all PAIGC medical services, there were, by the end of 1971, 117 civilian sanitary posts inside liberated Guinea-Bissau: 44 in the South, 65 in the North, and 8 in the East. This was a considerable increase compared with the situation in 1968, when only 28 posts were reported.²⁹ and it probably includes several small dispensaries with only one or two nurses, and no wards where patients can remain for treatment. More recent statistics from the central services tell us for instance that (probably in 1970) there were altogether 165 beds for patients available at sanitary posts, which indicates that not all posts had such beds.³⁰ But even so, the figure of 117 sanitary posts in 1971 is a noteworthy indication of progress. It should also be noted that in addition to

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

²⁹ *Guinée et Cap-Vert*, p. 83. The figure of 117 sanitary posts is also given by *La République de Guinée-Bissau en chiffres*, February 1974, p. 9.

³⁰ Statistics carefully kept by the official at the central secretariat in charge of "national reconstruction", Domingos Brito. These statistics were made available to the author at the secretariat in Conakry in May 1972.

these civilian posts, there were a number of military sanitary posts. How many is a fact unknown to this author, but judging from a few southern sectors, where the author was told the number of military posts, their total should have been considerably below 117. Nor was the distinction between military and civilian sanitary posts usually kept very strictly.

The civilian sanitary post functions as a small medical center or dispensary to which people can themselves come for treatments. Mothers with small children are frequent guests at these centers. The larger posts, at least, function also as small hospitals where some operations may be performed, and where it is decided if transportation to the border is necessary, if the patient shall remain for treatment, or possibly return to his or her village at once. But perhaps the most important function of the larger sanitary post, from a politico-medical point of view, is to be in charge of an health brigade which pays regular visits to the surrounding villages.

Health brigades

The health brigade is an important medical, social, and political innovation introduced by the PAIGC into Guinea-Bissau around 1970. Outward appearances are modest, as usually, but the conception as well as the practice constitutes a radical break with old ways in the country.

The brigade is simply a small group of male and female nurses, with a sanitary post or an hospital as their headquarters, who circulate regularly among the villages in their part of the sector according to a schedule made up in cooperation with the member of the Sector Committee in charge of health. Each brigade may have approximately between four and perhaps in some cases as many as ten villages on its schedule. Sometimes it is accompanied by the health officer of the Sector Committee during its visits.

From a social and medical point of view, the health brigade is the instrument through which the PAIGC tries to bring rudimentary knowledge of modern hygienic principles and prophylactic health service to the villages. A most important and difficult task of the brigade is, for instance, to convince people, who have lived through the ages in their small villages without latrines, of the causal connection between the lack of latrines and many of the diseases plaguing them in their daily lives. Another important task is to inform the mothers of how to take good care of their babies. This is done by the female members of the brigade. Powdered milk and medicines are also distributed. Pregnant women are given special attention. The general health situation of the village is examined. If necessary, transportation to the sanitary post is arranged.

From a political point of view, the health brigade is an instrument through which the PAIGC proves to the people that the struggle is worthwhile, that it brings concrete improvement to their daily lives. But the brigade is also an in-

strument of education. The kind of knowledge brought to the village by the members of the brigade is rational and scientific knowledge, aiding the people to master their lives in modern ways, necessary in order to conquer modern underdevelopment. The brigade thus has the important mobilizational function, mentioned in Chapter I, of demonstrating practical alternatives to firmly established but no longer functional ways of perceiving reality and acting upon it.

The health brigades are a fairly recent addition to the political arsenal of the PAIGC. In 1970, they had just been established in the sectors of the South visited by the author, and in 1972, they were still in the process of being established in the North. In April, the organizational work was said to have been completed in the sector of Sara and still going on in the others. In the South, the author was told that there was one brigade per sanitary post. In the North, he was told that there was one per sector, but that its composition varied depending upon what part of the sector was being visited. Nurses well familiar with the particular villages on the visiting schedule of the brigade were always to be included. This seems to indicate that the underlying principle is the same everywhere, but that the organizational form of the brigade varies somewhat between the different part of the country. In fact, we may conclude, the system of health brigades was still at an experimental stage in the early nineteen-seventies.

Cabral was well aware of the great importance of the health brigades, not only under the circumstances of the war of national liberation, but also for the future. This is how he spoke to cadres in 1971, emphasizing the importance of his words, and concluding on a critical tone indicating that much remained to be done:

We have to be realistic with regard to the amount of health assistance we can offer the people, but the health brigades are in fact extremely important. And everything we may be able to do in order to develop the work of the health brigades aids us at the same time to lay the foundations of an efficient health organization for tomorrow. For we cannot pretend to be able, tomorrow, under the conditions existing in our country, to build hospitals in all urban centers, let alone in the forest. This will not be possible. We shall have to create an ambulant system of health assistance. Even if we have a few stationary posts, we shall have to have an ambulant system including facilities for operations. This experiment with health brigades, then, is of great importance, above all with regard to respect for health and hygiene. But the comrades have not given it the attention it deserves.³¹

PAIGC hospitals outside Guinea-Bissau

One important supplementary reason why the health and medical organization of the PAIGC functioned as well as it did during the war was that it had branches in the neighbouring countries, shielded from Portuguese attacks.

³¹ Cabral, *Sobre alguns problemas práticos...*, p. 13.

Although this book is about the society under construction inside liberated Guinea-Bissau, it is necessary therefore to say a few words about the external part of the organization as well.

The most important of the outside branches is the Solidarity Hospital in Boké, in the north of the Republic of Guinea. This is a modern and fairly well-equipped hospital — thanks mainly to aid given by the central trade union organization of Yugoslavia. It has modern operation facilities and specialists in surgery, general medicine, orthopedia, and pharmacy. The number of beds was reported to be 123 in 1971,³² divided between three pavilions. The patients treated are victims of the war from inside Guinea-Bissau, both military and civilians, as well as some persons with “civilian” diseases and wounds.

The hospital in Boké has subsidiary branches in Koundara, in the Republic of Guinea close to the north-eastern tip of Guinea-Bissau, and in Ziguinchor in southern Senegal. At Koundara there were reported to be 50 beds in 1972, and for the establishment in Ziguinchor—which for reasons of internal Senegalese politics was, in 1972, called “center” (*foyer*) rather than “hospital”—the official figure is also 50 beds.³³

The importance of these three hospitals is obvious. They have made it possible to operate under safe conditions, with access to electricity and refrigeration, and to take care of patients during long periods of convalescence. They have also offered facilities for the planning and preparation of large-scale health campaigns, as for instance a cholera vaccination campaign carried out in 1970. The main difficulty is equally obvious: transportation. Patients have had to be carried to the border, the marches lasting for days, through swamps and dense forest. The hard choice to make, therefore, has often been between insufficient treatment on the spot and a dangerous, perhaps mortally dangerous, march to the border.

Evaluation and comparison with the Portuguese side

The health and medical organization of the PAIGC has been set up in such a way as to reach a maximum number of people under severe qualitative and quantitative restrictions. The restrictions have made themselves felt more with regard to personnel and difficulties of transportation than with regard to medicines and equipment, as these latter kinds of needs have been met in a reasonably satisfactory way through international assistance from friendly governments and organizations.

In most non-socialist countries of the third world, resources available for health and medical care are concentrated to a few urban centers where they

³² See note 30.

³³ *Ibid.* There were 40 patients in April 1972.

can only be reached by a small and relatively privileged minority. The strategy of the PAIGC works very definitely in the opposite direction. Geographically, its resources are spread all over liberated Guinea-Bissau, but functionally they are concentrated to those kinds of activities that contribute most to the struggle for national liberation and development. Under the circumstances of the present war, this came to mean acute medical care for the members of the armed forces, and as far as the civilian population was concerned, an emphasis upon child and maternal care, general prophylaxis, hygiene, and sanitation. This does not mean that adult civilian patients were not operated or in other ways treated for acute diseases—as we shall soon see from available statistics, civilians even constitute the majority of the patients treated—but it does mean that priority in planning and equipping the country hospitals of the interior was given to the needs of the armed forces. The emphasis on prophylaxis and hygiene for civilians, on the other hand, is not only a short-term decision taken for military reasons, but also a conscious long-term political and developmental choice made with the future of independent Guinea-Bissau in mind. As such it accords very well with the ideology of the PAIGC.

In the long-term political and developmental perspective, the most important achievement of the PAIGC health and medical workers is the creation of an organizational network that reaches far out into the smallest villages, where nothing had been heard about modern hygiene and sanitation until the beginning of the struggle for national liberation. This means that new social institutions and relationships have been established and new knowledge demonstrated. In a more concrete sense it means that whatever material resources are available can be channelled to those who need them most and used intelligently for purposes of social improvement. Thus, the health and medical organization of the PAIGC can be assumed to make a twofold contribution to accelerating the process of development in Guinea-Bissau: by creating immediate social improvement, it simultaneously reinforces the political conditions of further development.

In 1970, the statistics shown in table 23 were published on the activities of the country hospital in the southern sector of Balana during the five-month period of July-November 1966. Although the figures are old, they give an illuminating and informative indication of what kinds of activities are emphasized by the PAIGC within the general field of health and medical care.³⁴

³⁴ *Guinée et Cap-Vert*, p. 84.

Table 23. *Five months' activities at a country hospital in 1966*

Patients hospitalized:	
civilians	83
members of the armed forces	<u>157</u>
	240
Reasons for hospitalization:	
wounds	98
diseases	<u>142</u>
	240
Surgical operations:	
major surgery	63
minor surgery	37
orthopedia	14
deliveries of babies	<u>5</u>
	119
Assistance outside the hospital:	
civilians	1,629
members of the armed forces	<u>741</u>
	2,370

According to these figures, the number of civilians attended to by the hospital was greater than the number of soldiers, and the reasons for hospitalization appear to have been connected with the war only in a minority of cases. But the majority of those who had been hospitalized were soldiers, and it is also possible that the majority of the surgical operations had been caused by the war, although the statistics do not enlighten us on this latter point.

It might be of interest to compare this information from 1966 with a few observations made by the author four and six years later.

At a visit in November 1970 to the same hospital for which statistics were given above, the doctor did not present any systematized statistics, but he gave the following information:

Over 50 percent of the population have malaria, and over 80 percent are plagued by various kinds of intestinal parasites. Lack of vitamin B-1, causing beri-beri, and lack of iron are also common. Many soldiers have to go on fighting in spite of diseases that in other countries would have caused them to be hospitalized at once. Umbilical hernia, due to primitive methods of delivering babies, is common. Most soldiers are operated for this. War neuroses and similar troubles do not seem to exist, however, thanks to the political consciousness of the soldiers. The most common military wounds are burns from napalm and wounds caused by splinter grenades. Three days before the visit of the author, three small children had been sent to Boké: two with napalm burns and one with wounds from grenades.

At another hospital, the author was given the following information by the doctor in charge in November 1970:

During the ten months the doctor had been at this hospital, he had performed 115 operations, about 70 percent on civilian patients. Of the 115 patients, 36 had been wounded because of the war, but only one had been a soldier, all the others civilians. Thus, 79 operations had been performed for reasons not connected with the war at all, and 35 had been performed on civilian victims of the war. Operations for umbilical hernia are common. For reasons of military security, all operations upon civilian patients are performed at the sanitary posts, away from the hospital itself. As examples of problems encountered in his work, the doctor mentioned the difficulty of making correct diagnoses without laboratory facilities, and the unavoidable risks involved in transporting patients with acute diseases, for instance gastritis, to the border, because possible complications could not be dealt with inside the country. Nor could tuberculosis be well treated, for dietary reasons.

In April 1972, when visiting the country hospital of the northern sector of Sara, the author counted 19 patients, most of whom were civilians. Only two had been wounded through the war, one by a bullet and the other by splinters from a grenade.

These observations support the impression, given by the 1966 statistics from the hospital in Balana, that civilian medical care dominated also at the hospitals inside the country, in spite of the primarily military character they were supposed to have, as long as the war continued. One reason for this is that the kind of war going on between the PAIGC and the Portuguese army caused few casualties among the military on the PAIGC side. The civilians, on the contrary, were often severely hit by Portuguese military terror against villages, schools, and hospitals. Another reason for the small number of military injuries treated in the interior was that everything was done to carry seriously injured soldiers to the border for further transportation to Boké, Koundara, or Ziguinchor. A third reason for the tendency to emphasize civilian care beyond the original intentions is of course political. Because of its developmental goals and ideology, the PAIGC is forced to do all it can in order to meet popular demands for social service and material improvements.³⁵

It is also possible that the increasing pressure for civilian medical care may in some ways have been related to the attempts of the Portuguese to compete with the PAIGC. For it is a fact that Portuguese efforts in the field of health and medical care were stepped up somewhat after the initial successes of the PAIGC, although considerably less so than in the field of education (cf. pp. 64 f.). The increases came mainly on the side of finances and number of doctors and nurses, whereas the material infrastructure and other personnel do not seem to have changed much between 1960 and 1970. The only noticeable difference in infrastructure reported by the Portuguese themselves, in com-

³⁵ Cabral, *Sobre alguns problemas práticos* . . . , p. 13, criticizes "comrades who forget" that "if an hospital is military, everything has to be military" about it.

parison with the figures given in table 26 of this book, is an increase of the number of sanitary posts from 51 to 57.³⁶ With regard to finances, it has already been noted on p. 65 that spending went up from about 17 to about 29 million escudos between 1960 and 1970. In relative terms this meant an increase from 10.8 to 14 percent of the budget.³⁷

With regard to medical personnel, the figures given in table 24 have been published by the overseas authorities in Lisbon.³⁸

Table 24. *Portuguese medical personnel in Guinea-Bissau*

	1961	1971
Medical doctors	26	46
Nurses	150	285
Pharmaceutists	3	3
Auxiliary personnel	14	14
Administrative personnel	6	11
Other personnel	119	115

Granting that there are differences in background and training that make the comparison difficult, it is still interesting to compare the figures of the Portuguese with the information given in table 25 about the medical personnel of the PAIGC around 1971.³⁹

Table 25. *PAIGC medical personnel during the first years of the 1970's*

	1969-70	1971-72
PAIGC doctors	11	18
Foreign doctors	20	23
Medical assistants	13	20
PAIGC medical technicians (medium level)	2	11
Foreign medical technicians	10	10
Fully trained nurses	4 ^a	25 ^b
Sanitary assistants	119 ^a	95 ^b
Auxiliary nurses	142 ^a	215 ^b
Military nurses		150 (?) ^c

^a The figure refers only to 1969

^b The figure refers only to 1972

^c The author's rough estimate

³⁶ *Síntese monográfica da Guiné*, p. 53.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *La République de Guinée-Bissau en chiffres*, February 1974, table 4, p. 8, and table 2, p. 7.

Excluding the administrative and other personnel, the comparison, for whatever it is worth, between tables 24 and 25 shows that a greater number of people were involved in the health and medical work of the PAIGC than in that of the Portuguese in Guinea-Bissau of the early nineteen-seventies. The reported number of fully trained doctors is higher on the Portuguese side, on the other hand, whereas the number of people working in the countryside and thus able to bring assistance to the people of the villages is higher on the PAIGC side. A qualitative comparison of the personnel of the two sides is beyond the knowledge and ability of the author. With regard to the fully trained doctors, equal competence may perhaps be assumed for the two sides. But with regard to the other categories, very little may in fact be assumed, except that many of the nurses on the Portuguese side are likely to lack the intimate contact with the population which is the most important asset of the PAIGC personnel.

A comparison with regard to the *number of establishments* comes out to the advantage of the PAIGC, as we may see from table 26, whereas the *number of beds* available for patients is greater on the Portuguese side, according to the statistics of the early nineteen-seventies.⁴⁰ The table indicates that the PAIGC system is more evenly distributed over its territory than the Portuguese system, because of the greater number of sanitary posts and hospitals. The health brigades must also be remembered in this context.

Table 26. *Number of medical establishments and beds for patients on the PAIGC and Portuguese sides*

PAIGC 1971		Portuguese 1970	
"Center" in Senegal	1	Central hospital	1
Hospitals in rep. of Guinea	2	Rural hospitals	3
Country hospitals	9	Health centers	6
Sanitary posts	117	Sanitary posts	57
		Maternity centers	2
Beds for patients:		Dispensary	1
Boké	123	Beds for patients	1,027
Koundara	50		
Ziguinchor	50		
Country hosp.	100		
San. posts	165		
	488		488

⁴⁰ The source for the Portuguese side of the table is *Síntese Monográfica da Guiné*, pp. 53 f. For the PAIGC sources, see note 18 and 25 above. The figures given by *La République de Guinée-Bissau en chiffres*, table 5, p. 9, refer to 1972, and are thus less comparable with the Portuguese figures for 1970 than those used here. The differences between the two sources: according to the official source, there were, in 1972, six hospitals at the level of the region and seven at that of the sector (to be compared with the nine country hospitals of table 26). These

Naturally, it is extremely difficult to go much beyond a purely quantitative comparison. Quality, as usual, is difficult to compare. It is possible that the Portuguese had more modern equipment, but it also appears safe to conclude that the organization of the PAIGC was more geared toward the needs of the average man, woman, and child of Guinea-Bissau.

Regardless of the problems involved in making detailed comparisons on the basis of the figures presented, it is worth emphasizing that the PAIGC, since 1964, has built up a more elaborate and comprehensive organization for health and medical care in Guinea-Bissau than the Portuguese have managed to organize during all their years of colonial presence in the country. Although this is not directly mirrored in the statistical material, there is also good reason to believe that the PAIGC organization is qualitatively superior in the sense of being better adapted to the developmental needs of the country, in spite of the possibility that some Portuguese personnel and equipment might be superior in some strictly professional and technical aspects. The Portuguese claimed to have a greater number of fully trained doctors in 1970, but the PAIGC reached out to the villages where the great majority of the people of Guinea-Bissau are found.

Education

To gain the battle for the education of cadres, to guarantee that we have the qualified people necessary for the development of our country, is one of the most important tasks included in the work of our party and defined by its program:

Our political and military victories will have no future, if we do not have cadres from our own people for the reconstruction and development of our country.

To educate ourselves, to educate others, the population in general, in order to struggle against fear and ignorance, in order to eliminate, little by little, submissiveness in front of the natural forces that our economy has not yet been able to master . . .

... We shall win, because man is the most powerful force of nature.⁴¹

hospitals had altogether 245 beds, which is a considerable increase in comparison with the 100 reported to the author in early 1972. The three hospitals outside Guinea-Bissau were also reported to have 245 beds in 1972, which is not very far from the figure of 223 given in table 26. These comparisons indicate the fluidity of the situation—easy to understand against the background of the war of national liberation. Hospitals would move and then suddenly reappear at an entirely different spot. The number of beds was rapidly adjusted to the needs of the situation.

⁴¹ Quotation from Cabral on the first page of the teacher's manual, *Programa do ensino para as escolas das regiões libertadas*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), no year (translated by the author).

Previously we were under the Portuguese. But now we have left them in order to take care of ourselves, and so they cannot force us to build roads and such things for them any longer. That is why they are mad at us and throw bombs at us.⁴²

The decisions of the 1964 Party Congress stressed the importance of education as a motor (driving force) of development. We also saw in Chapter II that the party guide-lines of 1965 give detailed directions about the concrete planning of educational work and about the behaviour of the teachers.

Stressing the importance of education for development is of course not very original. It would be hard to find a single national development plan in the third world that does not do this. But what is unusual about the PAIGC approach to education is the consistency with which it follows from the general ideology of the movement, as well as the consistency with which it is translated into practical action.

Ideologically and theoretically, education — and culture in general — is seen by the PAIGC as an effective weapon of struggle against anachronistic values and beliefs, the prevalence of which is interpreted as one basic aspect of colonial cultural degradation. Another basic aspect is the general ignorance of modern instrumental knowledge. This ignorance, as well, can of course be fought against through education. Education is seen therefore both as an important part of the emancipatory struggle against imperialism and underdevelopment, and as an instrument to be used in the more immediate struggle for concrete material improvement of the people's situation. The two go hand in hand and support each other in practice, and it is only analytically that they can be held apart. The ideological—strategic—perspective gives strength and consistency to the daily work carried on in the many schools of the villages. And by mobilizing the people into supporting it in practice, this daily practical work in a sense also verifies the broader perspective from which it emanates.

Education in liberated Guinea-Bissau can thus be assumed to mobilize important portions of the population for the anti-colonial struggle of national liberation, at the same time as it brings immediate concrete improvement in the form of instrumental knowledge and renewed self-respect. This political effect — intentional, of course — cannot be regarded mainly as a result of indoctrination. It results naturally from the social and political context in which the PAIGC for the first time brings modern education into the small villages of rural Guinea. Because of this context, education in liberated Guinea-Bissau

⁴² Answer given in a southern school by a fourteen-year old boy in the second grade, when asked to give his opinion on why the Portuguese try to bomb and burn the schools of the PAIGC. The boy's own school had been damaged by bombs during an attack eight months earlier and then rebuilt at a greater distance from the village. During the attack the children had hidden in the forest without being hurt, but one of the teachers received a stomach wound from a grenade splinter.

can be assumed to function both as an accelerator of general social mobilization and as a powerful instrument of political mobilization.

Even in the areas controlled by the Portuguese, modern education may certainly be assumed to accelerate social mobilization. Its general effectiveness as an instrument of long-range political mobilization (for the Portuguese) may be doubted, however, because of the objective theoretical and practical contradictions existing between the colonial system and the satisfaction of elementary developmental needs in Guinea-Bissau.

Neither of these two assumptions — about PAIGC and Portuguese education, respectively — can be tested in a very strict empirical sense, at least not on the basis of data available to the author, nor indeed on the basis of data that could reasonably be collected in Guinea-Bissau under the present circumstances. What can be done, however — and this is what we shall attempt in this part of the present chapter — is to present available facts as objectively as possible against the background of our two assumptions. These in turn can be seen as specified subassumptions of our more general assumption that PAIGC success in establishing effective political and military control over a considerable part of Guinea-Bissau is in itself evidence of mobilization of the people by the PAIGC. On theoretical grounds we assume that education plays a most important part in that kind of mobilization. This assumption is the point of departure for the descriptive analysis of the PAIGC educational system to be offered here. If the observations and documentary facts presented appear to support our initial assumption and its two subassumptions, this is of course positive from the author's point of view, but as far as the logic of strict empirical verification is concerned, such evidence can do no more than *support* the assumptions they are intended to elucidate. To expect more would imply tautological reasoning.

Concerning the Portuguese side, the only kind of data available is completely bare statistics, the reliability of which the author has not been in a position to check. These statistics are in themselves unrelated to mobilization and thus neither support nor do not support any assumptions about possible mobilizing effects of Portuguese education in Guinea-Bissau. But if the proposition that education and social mobilization are related to each other is accepted *on other grounds*, then statistical information about the amount of education offered by the Portuguese takes on some interest also in the context of mobilization.

Village schools, students, and teachers

Lai goes to school
He brings a book
He also brings a pencil

Lai likes to study

(First reading exercise with coherent sentences in the first-year reader of the PAIGC.)⁴³

To talk and speak

Nobody can live alone. Nobody can live without communicating with others, without saying what he thinks, what he wants, and what he feels.

Parents talk to their children; a brother talks to his sister; a boy talks to his girl-friend. Men talk to each other.

Nobody can live without thinking, without feeling, without wanting.

To speak is to think aloud; to speak is to make others hear what we think ourselves.

(First reading exercise in the fourth-year reader of the PAIGC.)⁴⁴

The backbone of the PAIGC educational system is constituted by a series of village schools fairly evenly distributed over the liberated areas. The school buildings are simple and functional constructions, easy to move and to rebuild, well adapted to the climate: usually only a roof covered with straw or palm leaves over rows of benches made from branches or rough boards. A blackboard behind the teacher's desk is attached to one of the poles holding the roof. As far as outward appearances are concerned, this is usually all there is to be seen. For fear of air attacks, the schools have been well hidden in the forest, at some distance from the village agglomerations of huts and houses.

According to the latest comprehensive and detailed statistics studied by the author, there were 157 such village schools in the liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau during the school year 1970-71 and 164 in 1971-72.⁴⁵ In the spring of 1972, the member of the National Committee of the North in charge of national reconstruction had noted 128 schools in the North alone for the school year 1971-72.⁴⁶ This, he said, reflected a greater density of schools in the North than in the other liberated areas.

Comparing the number of schools with the number of villages, we realize that each school usually serves more than one village, as the author was also able to observe during his visits.

The statistics further tell us that there were 6,419 boys and 2,155 girls enrolled in the 157 schools functioning in 1970-71. They were taught by altogether 251 teachers. The average number of students per school was thus 55, the average share of girls about one-fourth, and the average number of teachers per school between one and two (cf. table 27, p. 206). After the sudden increase of students to 10,898 boys and 3,633 girls in 1971-72, the

⁴³ *O Nosso Livro, 1a classe*, Uppsala, Sweden, PAIGC, 1970, p. 59 (translated by the author).

⁴⁴ *O Nosso Livro, 4a classe*, Uppsala, Sweden, PAIGC, 1972, p. 4 (translated by the author).

⁴⁵ See note 25 for the 1970-71 figure. The 1971-72 figure is given in *La République de Guinée-Bissau en chiffres*, February 1974, p. 5.

⁴⁶ Based upon detailed reports from the teachers, from the sector officials, and from the regional officials in charge of education in the North.

average number of students per school rose to 89, while the other two averages remained about the same as before.

The averages for 1970–71 are in good agreement with the author's own observations in the South in 1970. The equivalent averages for the North, according to the statistics for 1971–72 shown to the author in 1972, were 47 students per school, one-third girls, and 140 teachers for 128 schools. It would seem that the number of schools was somewhat overestimated by these statistics, but the slightly higher proportion of girls, as compared with the country as a whole, appears quite credible in the light of the author's own observations.

In principle the village schools are to offer education from the first through the fourth grade. In practice, according to the impression of the author, it appears that first- and second-graders dominate heavily among the students of the village schools, although third- and fourth-graders are also found. Many of these, however, are concentrated to the boarding-schools of the party (see below). No statistics are available about the distribution of students between the four grades of the village schools, but there is a tendency for the village schools to have mostly first- and second-grade education, while the boarding schools concentrate their efforts on the higher grades. Still there is no rigidly fixed division of labour, as all four grades are represented in many village schools, while some second-grade education is offered also in the boarding-schools, especially to girls who might have been taken away from school by their parents had they remained in their villages.

Because it is sometimes necessary to walk many kilometers in order to reach the school from the surrounding villages, and also because of the grim necessity of training the children to react rapidly and rationally in order to protect themselves against attacks by the Portuguese, either by bombs or by helicopter-borne troops, the general norm has been not to let the children begin first grade until the age of ten.⁴⁷ Numerous exceptions have been made, however, especially in the case of schools located close to the camps of the PAIGC armed forces, where younger children were often seen among the pupils of the schools. In one school in the southern sector of Tombali, for instance, the author was shown the teacher's list of students, where the name and age of each student was carefully noted: in this particular school there were 68 students from five or six villages, their ages ranging from seven to 16 years of age with a clear concentration at ages 11–13. It may also be noted that the form to be filled in by the census officers defines "school age" as 7–12.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ In 1971, for instance, fifteen children were killed in the North alone, as a result of Portuguese raids against the schools. The figure justifies the prudent practice of beginning late.

⁴⁸ See note 4, p. 178.

The teacher — and his co-teacher or assistant, as the case may be — has to work with large groups of students belonging to different grades. In order to solve this problem, he often uses one of the older and more advanced students as his assistant. There are no noticeable problems of discipline in the schools of the PAIGC. The students avidly follow the instruction given, seemingly never getting enough. Nor do they, of course, have any objective reason to be *blasé* yet. A serious problem, on the other hand, is the lack of school materials—even such simple things as notebooks and pencils are rare and valuable items in the *maquis* of Guinea-Bissau. But since around 1970, comprehensive books of work and instruction for each of the grades 1, 2, 3, and 4, in addition to some more specialized textbooks and manuals, have been worked out by teachers' seminars and then printed abroad.⁴⁹ All these materials — books, writing-paper, pencils, etc. — have had to be carried from the border by the older children, marching for many days back and forth in order to supply their schools with the most elementary things.

The school year 1964–65 was the first year of systematically organized PAIGC education in the liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau. As early as that year, there were reported to be 50 schools with a total of 4,000 students.⁵⁰ This figure is probably approximate, but for the following five school years detailed statistics, based upon the reports sent in by the persons in charge of education on the various organizational levels, have been made available to the author. These statistics are summarized in table 27.⁵¹

Table 27. *Number of students, teachers, and village schools in liberated Guinea-Bissau, 1965–66 – 1970–71*

	1965–66	1966–67	1967–68	1968–69	1969–70	1970–71	1971–72
Students	13,361	14,386	9,384	8,130	8,559	8,574	14,531
male	9,821	10,865	6,737	5,907	6,232	6,419	10,898
female	3,540	3,521	2,647	2,223	2,327	2,155	3,633
Teachers	191	220	284	243	248	251	258
Schools	127	159	158	134	149	157	164
% female students	26	24	28	27	27	25	25
students/school	105	90	59	61	57	55	89
students/teacher	70	61	33	33	35	34	56

The most striking aspect of the educational statistics of the PAIGC is the early quantitative top with as many as 14,386 students enrolled in 1966–67 followed by a stabilization at the much lower level of about 8,500 students

⁴⁹ The textbooks for each grade have been printed in 25,000 copies so far, as well as a book of geography. Cf. notes 43 and 44. In addition to the books printed in Sweden, a great deal of educational material has been produced in Conakry as well.

⁵⁰ According to the preamble of the internal statutes of the PAIGC schools. *Regulamento das escolas do partido*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo). September 19, 1966.

⁵¹ See note 30, p. 192.

from 1968 to 1971. Then there was a sudden return, in 1971–72, to the level of the first years.

The author has no special information about the reasons for the sudden increase reported in the most recent official statistics of the PAIGC. But the question of the decrease beginning in 1967–68 was raised with several leading members of the party with high responsibilities in the field of education. The answers received emphasized such factors as a wave of initial enthusiasm followed later by greater reticence on the part of the population, in particular among the Moslems; hesitation to expose the children to the bombs and napalm of the Portuguese; lack of teachers. One reason for the lack of teachers was that many were sent abroad to continue their studies.

The first explanation for the decline in the number of students offered suggests that the mobilizing function of education is not always performed so smoothly as the assumptions above on p. 202 would seem to indicate. Hesitation at sending productive members of the family away to school, and hesitation among Moslem father to expose their daughters to modern education, are examples of the kinds of obstacles that have to be conquered little by little, through concrete demonstration to the people of the benefits possible to draw from modern education. Cabral devoted much attention to these problems at the 1971 *Conselho Superior*, and the following passage deals precisely with the contradictions involved in political mobilization through education:

Another aspect of great interest is the attitude of the people toward the schools. In all countries of the world, comrades, and above all in countries where peasants are a majority, there is great resistance to education.

We must not be discouraged because there are people in our country who do not like education. We must regret this, but we must not be discouraged. In Portugal for instance, in Beira, Minho, Alentejo, above all in the north of Portugal, the people rose and burnt the schools, when schools were built in the villages. But this happened also in France and in other countries of the world. The peasants burnt the schools because the schools took their children away from home, and this harmed the work, for the children were taking care of the house, the pigs, the sheep, the cattle, etc . . . This is normal, and we must not be discouraged because of it. We have to be able to understand it as well as possible, and find an acceptable solution, without aggravating the conflict between the schools (and thus the Party) and the population.⁵²

Cabral's advice was to schedule the work of the schools so as to interfere as little as possible with the work of the villages, and in general to give great attention to the problem of how to approach the attitudes of the people. "Our work is fundamentally political, comrades."⁵³

Another part of the explanation why there had been a decrease in the number of students attending school in the liberated areas was given by Cabral, on the same occasion, in a very straight-forward manner:

⁵² Cabral, *Sobre alguns problemas práticos* . . . , pp. 4 f.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

As far as the number and the quality of the schools are concerned, we have to be realistic. comrades, in the same way as with the hospitals and the sanitary posts . . . It is more important for us to have few schools and many young people without schools, than to have many schools that we cannot support, with fourth-grade teachers who have only finished second grade themselves, and similar things. This means that we cannot lose our sense of realism. We have to act in the field of national reconstruction, schools, hospitals, etc., in accordance with the realities of our country, and we have to prepare ourselves to advance more and more every day . . .

Clearly there was great enthusiasm for the schools. To begin with, we did not yet have any clear line for our schools, but we told ourselves that there were to be schools. We made schools everywhere, and students came from everywhere. But little by little we were forced to take things in hand. The force of circumstances made us a little more realistic, for it is impossible that we should want to do what we cannot do, comrades. Anybody present here can carry a bag of 20, 30 or 40 kilograms, but if he is given a bag of 200 kilograms he cannot carry it. But if two or three men join together, they will manage.

Clearly there is another subject involved here too, and this is the truth that a teacher has multiple functions. A teacher is not only a teacher, he is an educator, and as an educator he is a political man. This is more important than increasing the number of schools. If the few teachers we have in the few schools we have perform their educational and political functions properly, our struggle will advance much more than if we have 300, 500 schools, where the teachers are a bunch of cheating liars, without any connection with the political work of our Party.⁵⁴

We see thus that the decrease in the number of students attending the village schools of the PAIGC has been caused both by the spontaneous attitudes and reactions of the people and by conscious party policy. The two types of causes are closely related to each other, as the policy of the party was changed precisely in order to approach the problem of the attitudes of the people in a more prudent and realistic manner. The problem was to improve the performance of the politically mobilizing function of the schools, and the solution was seen in a combination of careful moderation and greater emphasis upon political education in a broad sense.

When the number of students rose drastically for the school year 1971–72, this should also be interpreted as the result of a combination of rising popular demand for education and conscious party policy. The proportions may vary, however. In view of what was said above, it appears more probable that the party yielded to pressure from the people rather than actively encouraged the youth of the country to almost double the average number of students per school and teacher from one school year to another.

The number of schools, students, and teachers in liberated Guinea-Bissau is comparatively easy to document. The statistics exist, and knowing the process through which they have been collected and put together, the author is also prepared to go quite far in vouching for their relative reliability. But the

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 2 f.

vagueness of our information about the number of people living in the liberated areas during the period studied in this book, makes it very difficult to use the educational statistics in order to estimate such parameters as "percentage enrolled of population in school age" or other similar measures. Let us attempt two very rough calculations, though:

Assume that about 300,000 people lived in the liberated areas during the early nineteen-seventies. Assume further that half of them, i.e. 150,000, were below 20 years of age. This is probably an underestimation, but the general roughness of the calculation makes the simplification permissible. Our third assumption is probably even bolder: it states that all one-year age groups below the age of 20 are equally large, meaning that each of them encompasses 7,500 individuals. School age is for four years in liberated Guinea-Bissau. Thus "population in school age" would encompass 30,000 individuals.

If all the steps of this calculation are accepted — and the reader is only asked to accept them as hypothetical — it follows that about one-third of the population of school age went to school in the school year 1970–71 and just over half in 1971–72. This figure is intentionally approximate and includes not only students of the village schools, but also those of the party's other schools (cf. below).

If we calculate in the same way as for table 10, Chapter II, using the entire population as our basis of comparison, the percentages come out at 3.3 and 5.3 respectively.

In the context of table 10, this means that liberated Guinea-Bissau of 1971–72 had a primary school enrollment higher than the enrollment around 1960 of nine, and lower than that of three, among the twelve West African countries included in the table. Note that the PAIGC figure is higher than that of "Portuguese" Guinea at the time.

If we use the 1970–71 figure of liberated Guinea-Bissau, the comparison naturally does not come out quite as advantageously for the PAIGC. But even then Guinea-Bissau has a better figure than four other countries, although we have to use the Portuguese figure of 2.2 percent, rather than the U.N. figure used in table 10, if (cf. p. 35) liberated Guinea-Bissau of 1970–71 is to come out better than "Portuguese" Guinea of 1960. The PAIGC system, on the other hand, had started from zero in 1964 and been constructed under the difficult conditions of guerilla warfare, whereas the Portuguese system had had all the background of the long history of colonialism.

The main function of such calculations as those now attempted may be to discourage others from analogous attempts, as the validity of the results is so obviously uncertain. They do demonstrate, however, that in spite of great and exacting efforts under conditions of extreme difficulty, the PAIGC in 1970–72 was still far from having achieved the goal of universal education for the children of liberated Guinea-Bissau. The number of students had even been kept quite low during a number of years in an effort to stress educational and political quality as opposed to mere quantity, in a situation where harsh realities made it difficult to give full stress to both simultaneously. "We must not want to do what we cannot do, comrades."⁵⁵

It is important to remember, however, that the educational activities of the PAIGC are not confined to the schools but are carried on in many other con-

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

texts too, particularly within the armed forces. The percentages arrived at in our calculation above would have been higher, had it been possible to include all such "extramural" educational activities.

Education of the teachers

Originally the teachers of the PAIGC village schools were recruited among those members of the party who had managed to receive some education under the colonial system. Gradually, the proportion of PAIGC-trained teachers increased, and in 1972 about 50 percent of the teachers were said to have a purely PAIGC educational background.

In heavy competition between education and other important tasks of the liberation movement, teachers are selected among the best fourth-graders of the schools — sometimes directly upon leaving school, but sometimes also after having proved their political consciousness and devotion, for instance through serving as soldiers. Women are very rarely selected for this particular task, partly because there are fewer qualified girls, but possibly also in order to make the schools more acceptable to traditional and hesitant minds.

Until 1970, the only further training for the teachers of the village schools was a two-month summer school, *Centro do Aperfeiçoamento de Professores*, at the *Escola Piloto* (see p. 212) in Conakry during the three summers of 1966, 1967, and 1968. The summer school could be repeated several times by the same teacher, but even so it became evident that more systematic and comprehensive training was needed. To meet this need, the summer school was abolished and a new type of course introduced, called the *Centro Permanente de Professores*. Under the new system a limited number of well-qualified teachers were given the chance to spend an entire school year at the *Escola Piloto* studying to improve themselves as teachers. While about 200 teachers per year had attended the summer school, the new full-year course of studies only received 16 teachers in 1970–71 and 21 in 1971–72.⁵⁶ It should be added, though, that two summer seminars held in 1969 and 1971 in order to work out textbooks for the schools have in a sense functioned as substitutes for the summer schools.

This recent change in the methods of teacher preparation is consistent with the shift of emphasis from quantity to quality noted above. It reflects a serious dilemma which has to be consciously approached in the present, although it can only be resolved in the future.

Boarding-schools, education beyond the primary level, and adult education

Although the village schools form the backbone of the educational system of

⁵⁶ See note 30.

the PAIGC, there are also other important components of the system, both inside and outside Guinea-Bissau.

Besides the political and military school created for the specific purposes of the party and the army (see below pp. 222 ff.), the most important of these other educational institutions are the boarding-schools, *internatos*, of the party. The *Escola Piloto*, to be described below, is also an *internato*, although located outside Guinea-Bissau.

The first article of the statutes for the *internatos* emphasizes that the purpose of these schools is to receive "the children of the martyrs and the fighting men of Guinea and Cape Verde".⁵⁷ But only a month before the publication of the quoted edition of the statutes, Cabral had stressed that the function of the *internatos* was "to raise the level of work of our people, not to lower it, and not to transform the *internato* into an asylum" for all children left without parents because of the war.⁵⁸ This is the same dilemma we have already encountered: humanitarianism and quantity versus political effectiveness and quality. Even if a synthesis is possible in the long run, the immediate contradiction has to be faced through conscious choice, in a situation of great need and extreme scarcity.

The *internatos* are boarding-schools where carefully selected boys and girls receive their primary schooling under considerably more advantageous conditions than is possible in the village schools, both with regard to the professional competence of the teachers and with regard to the general educational atmosphere. There are four such schools: one in the South, two in the North, and one in the East. The school in the East was closed in 1971 because of "confusion, disorientation, and lack of support from the population";⁵⁹ but in 1972 it was said to be functioning again. At each *internato* there are about 70 students, both boys and girls, most of them in the third and fourth grades. But in 1972, when the author visited the northern *internato* in the sector of Sara, even second-grade education was offered. This was to be continued for the girls the following year as well—the reason being that the recruitment of girls to the *internato* would otherwise become difficult, as so many girls are taken out of the village schools by their parents as early as after the first year.

Life at a PAIGC *internato* involves not only formal studies, but also active participation, through an elected student committee, in the direction of the school, as well as student responsibility for sharing maintenance and agricultural work and for assisting in the kitchen. Tasks of this kind are seen as equally important from the point of view of citizenship education as formal

⁵⁷ *Regulamento interno dos internatos das regiões libertadas*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), September 1971, article 1, p. 1 (translated by the author).

⁵⁸ Cabral, *Sobre alguns problemas práticos...*, p. 6.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 6 f.

class work.⁶⁰ Considerable emphasis is also given to theatrical and musical activities, with a view to acquainting the students with each other's cultural heritages, across all ethnical lines of division, thus contributing to laying the foundations of a truly national culture of Guinea-Bissau.

At least until the summer of 1974, the *internatos* worked under difficult conditions, permanently on guard against Portuguese attacks from the air and constantly prepared to move the entire school, buildings and all. But because of the stimulating and total educational *milieu* they establish for their students, the politico-educational impact of the *internatos* will probably prove to be far out of proportion to the limited number of students they have been able to receive so far.

A small portion of the best students graduating from the *internatos* and from the fourth grade of the village schools are sent on to the fifth grade at the *Escola Piloto* in Conakry. This "pilot school" opened as early as in 1964, and from 1965-66 and onwards there have been about 100 students per year, mainly in the third, fourth, and fifth grades. There is also the special class, mentioned above, of teachers from the interior of the liberated areas. The *Escola Piloto* is a pedagogically advanced experimental school with seven university-trained teachers in 1972 and consistent application of the same principles of student participation in school government, construction work, maintenance, cooking, cleaning, etc., as in the *internatos* of the interior. No one works at the school except the teachers and the students, and all the necessary tasks of daily life and maintenance of the school are rotated between groups of students composed of both boys and girls.

From an administrative and juridical point of view the *Escola Piloto* is run by an organism separate from the party called the Friendship Institute, *Instituto Amizade*, which is also responsible for the *internatos* of the interior. Through this device it has become easier to solicit international humanitarian support for these educational institutions. The *Instituto Amizade* also runs a nursery for about 60 small children, mainly the sons and daughters of people working at the central services of the party or of people who have been killed in the struggle, leaving their children without parents.⁶¹

Beyond the fifth grade of the *Escola Piloto*, the PAIGC has so far had to rely upon outside help for formal education. Such help has come mainly from the countries of Eastern Europe, who over the years have offered a great number of different kinds of training opportunities to members of the PAIGC. A major reason why PAIGC students go to Eastern rather than to Western Europe is that they have to go where they are given scholarships. With very

⁶⁰ This orientation of the *internatos* is clearly reflected both in their formal statutes (see note 57) and in their concrete educational activities.

⁶¹ *Statuts de l'Institut Amitié*, official translation into French, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), 1969.

few exceptions such offers have not been forthcoming from the capitalist countries.

Figures have already been given for the medical training received by the PAIGC, but many other kinds of educational activities have also been involved in the educational programmes made available. Detailed figures on this are given in tables 28–32, because they reflect in an interesting manner the educational priorities of the PAIGC, as well as the types of education that PAIGC members have actually gone through.⁶²

Table 28. *Number of PAIGC members educated abroad 1959–71 and 1959–73*

Type of education	1959–71	1959–73
Higher studies	27	36
Medium-level technical studies	31	46
Vocational training	107	
Organizational training	171	
Sanitary assistance	90	

Table 29. *Number of PAIGC members being educated abroad in 1972 and 1973*

Type of education	1972	1973
Higher studies	31	36
Medium-level technical studies ^a	259	386

^a this probably includes also "sanitary assistance".

Table 30. *Number of students from PAIGC schools continuing their formal education abroad*

1964–65	12
1965–66	17
1966–67	20
1967–68	12
1968–69	22
1969–70	48
1970–71	45
1971–72	97

⁶² The sources for the first columns of tables 28–32 are those mentioned in note 30. The source for the second columns is *La République de Guinée-Bissau en chiffres*, February 1974, pp. 4 f.

Table 31. *Number of PAIGC members having received higher education abroad 1959-71 and 1959-73*

Field of study	1959-71	1959-73
Agronomy	5	6
Physics	1	
Medicine	8	10
Economics	3	4
Law	3	
International law	1	7
Political science	1	
Public administration	1	
Construction engineering	1	7
Machine engineering	2	
Electrotechnology	1	
Humanities		2
total	27	36

Table 32. *Number of PAIGC members having received medium-level technical education abroad 1959-71 and 1959-73*

Field of study	1959-71	1959-73
Social sciences, economics		2
Agronomy	6	13
Veterinary training	4	
Medical assistance	10	11
Geology	1	
Commerce	1	
Pedagogics	1	
Construction	1	20
Construction of roads and ports	1	
Electrotechnology	1	
Technology	1	
Petro-chemistry	3	
Car mechanics	1	
total	31	36

Naturally the opportunities of continuing their education offered to the fourth-grade graduates of the schools in the interior are very far from sufficient. Some of them have found an occupation within the liberation movement as nurse's assistants or soldiers within the local defense forces, for instance, but many have simply returned to village life. In order to provide an additional outlet for the competence of these young people, plans were being made in 1972 to start two technical schools inside the liberated areas: one for agriculture and one for medical training. But during the spring of 1972, this was still no more than a project and not a material achievement.

PAIGC's general cultural ambition to bring the people of Guinea-Bissau into the mainstream of universal human culture without breaking their ties with their own cultural and historical origin. Note that the children are taught how to read and write in Portuguese, in order to link them to the universal culture of mankind without any colonial inferiority complexes. Instead the more specifically Guinean, West-African, and African aspects of the educational program are more clearly seen in such subjects as artistic education, which tries to develop local traditions and themes connected with the struggle for national liberation, and geography, which starts at home and gradually widens the horizon of the children. The textbooks also contain a few songs in Creole.

Explicit political education appears in two forms in this program of instruction: (1) under the headings "militant formation" and "political formation", and (2) in the form of student participation in the direction of the school, mainly at the *internatos* and the *Escola Piloto* where special students' committees are elected. The latter is an exercise in democracy, and can be seen as such as political mobilization in the sense of demonstrating in practice an alternative to the authoritarian institutions of the colonial system. The former is the PAIGC's attempt to go beyond the more or less automatic politically mobilizing effects to be expected from general education in a revolutionary context and to influence the minds of the students through direct political education. Note that the headings under which this kind of education is found only occupy a fairly small part of the program. But because of their special interest to the theme of this book, we shall now single them out for more detailed study.

"*Militant formation*" in the first grade is limited to the following:

Themes concerning our struggle and our life. Love of the Fatherland, of the Party, and of our leaders. The anthem of the Party.⁶⁵

For the second grade, the themes are at the same time both wider and more specified:

Themes concerning our struggle, our life, and our possibilities. Tales of moral and patriotic content. Comradeship, discipline, moral courage. Love of the Fatherland, of the Party, and of our leaders. Important dates to be remembered by the students: the foundation of the Party; the massacre at Pidjiguiti; the day of women; the day of children. Portuguese-speaking Africa. The movements of liberation (PAIGC, MPLA, FRELIMO, CONCP). *Guinea and Cape Verde*: the unity of the peoples of Guinea and Cape Verde within our Party. *Sing*: the anthem of the Party — the International.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ *Programa do ensino para as escolas das regiões libertadas*, p. 3. This and subsequent translations from the manual have been made by the author.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

In the third grade, the heading is changed into “*political formation*”, and more emphasis is given to the organizational aspects of the PAIGC. The educational system is also explained to the children. The party program is presented for the first time:

The statutes of the Pioneers of the Party: the creation of the organization of pioneers, its structures and objectives. Conditions for becoming a pioneer. The Group: its formation and activities. Fundamental notions about our Party: its constitution, its objectives. The achievements of the Party: *Instituto Amizade (Escola Piloto, nursery, internatos)*. The schools of our liberated areas. Centers for further teachers’ training. Seminars . . . First study of the program of the Party.⁶⁷

In the fourth grade, the emphasis shifts from Guinea to Africa, and important elements of African history are now taught to the children in the context of “*political formation*”. This naturally includes the history of Guinea-Bissau as well, both past and present:

Africa before the arrival of the colonizers: the great African empires. The origin of colonization: Portuguese presence in Africa and in Guinea and Cape Verde; the slave trade. The struggle to resist. Portuguese military occupation: reasons why the colonial economy became possible. Racism. The origins of the present struggle for national liberation: the Socialist Revolution of October 1917; the anti-colonial movement in Portugal and in the colonies; the Great War and the trade-union struggle in Africa; the first independencies. The founding of our Party. Study of a few fundamental points of the program of the Party. Principles of the Party. Its history: the period from 1956 to 1959; from 59 to 61; from 61 to 63; from 63 to the Congress of Cassaga; from 1964 to the present time. Our struggle for the Unity of our People in Guinea and Cape Verde. Our struggle and the struggle of the other Portuguese colonies — MPLA, FRELIMO, CLST, and CONCP.⁶⁸ Our struggle and Africa — the United Nations and the Portuguese colonies. Our struggle and the working classes of the world. The achievements of our Party from political, economic, social, and cultural points of view.⁶⁹

In the fifth grade, the study of history continues, but now with the addition of some elementary sociological notions. At this stage of “*political formation*”, the idea is also introduced that the struggle of the PAIGC can be seen as a contribution to world peace:

The history of the people of Guinea and Cape Verde. Notions of the social structure of the Fulas, the Mandingas, and the Balantes. Study of the colonial society of Guinea and Cape Verde. The history of our people and our struggle. Study of various types of resistance. Detailed study of the program of the party. The UNTG;⁷⁰ its formation and objectives. The realities of the Party and the objectives of our struggle for national and cultural liberation. Our struggle as an expression of the culture of our people. Our culture as a contribution to the development of African culture. Our Party in Africa and in the world. Our struggle as a con-

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁶⁸ *Comité de Libération de São Tomé et Príncipe, CLST, and Conférence des Organisations Nationalistes des Colonies Portugaises, CONCP*, cf. p. 45.

⁶⁹ *Programa do ensino . . .*, pp. 10 f.

⁷⁰ *União Nacional dos Trabalhadores da Guiné*, cf. p. 165.

tribution to world peace. International conferences. The Rome Conference.⁷¹ Support to the peoples of the Portuguese colonies.⁷²

Clearly, the subject matter taught under the headings of "militant" and "political formation" is presented in a political perspective and transmitted to the students with the purpose of creating and reinforcing attitudes in support of the PAIGC and its goals. There is no necessary contradiction whatsoever between trying to do this and imparting true and instrumentally valid knowledge, particularly as the goals of the PAIGC are quite obviously in line with what might be called the objective developmental needs of Guinea-Bissau. This is probably the main reason why even these most politicized parts of the teacher's manual give such a factual impression.

In the short run, the explicit political education is likely to add to the politically mobilizing effects of the educational program as a whole, by providing it with an emotional appeal inspiring both collective and individual self-respect as well as Guinean and African nationalist pride. Whether the explicit political education imparted by the PAIGC will, in the long run, contribute or not to political mobilization in support of the PAIGC will, however, depend upon the future ability of the movement to continue to verify its claims to legitimacy through concrete developmental and emancipatory action.

Additional documentary evidence of the character of the education offered by the PAIGC is found in the textbooks of the party, collectively produced by teachers of the village schools and based upon their concrete experiences of teaching. These books are impressive from the point of view of pedagogy — attractively printed and systematically conceived in order to widen, step by step, the child's knowledge of the surrounding world, providing him or her at the same time with gradually more sophisticated means of grasping reality. The explicit political content of the textbooks is minimal; it is limited to a few texts about heroes of the party, women emancipating themselves through the struggle, an anthem of the party, a picture of Amílcar Cabral in the second year book, the program of the party in the fourth year book, pictures of people in uniform, etc. But on the whole, these books are, on the surface, surprisingly non-political. Their authors seem to have had confidence in the mechanisms, discussed above, of political mobilization through verification in practice of the legitimacy of the PAIGC.⁷³

Among the many fundamental problems discussed by Cabral at the 1971 *Conselho Superior* was the question of the relationship between instrumental

⁷¹ A conference with representatives of 64 countries meeting in Rome on June 27–29, 1970, in order to demonstrate their solidarity with the movements of national liberation in the Portuguese colonies of Africa. After this conference, the Pope received the leaders of the FRELIMO, the MPLA, and the PAIGC in special audience (cf. p. 56).

⁷² *Programa do ensino ...*, p. 14.

⁷³ See note 49.

knowledge, apparently neutral from a political point of view, and political mobilization. Cabral emphasized strongly the need for what we have here called explicit political education — perhaps more strongly than might have been expected from a mere study of the manuals and textbooks of the PAIGC. His argument was that the type of education that might be offered was conditioned by each particular phase of the struggle, and that political education had to be given priority during the present phase:

Another subject of great interest is the type of education to be given, a subject our comrades have not had much to say about. We have to educate our people. Nobody wishes more than the leaders of the Party, and among them myself, that our people, our children, learn to read and write well in order to have a foundation. Our objective is that within some years everybody shall study through the seventh grade in our country. Our first minimum goal is second grade, a few years afterwards the minimum will be fifth grade, and another few years afterwards the minimum will be seventh grade. In the future we shall not regard anybody who has not completed the seventh grade as a full member of our society. It will have to be like that, both in the towns and in the bush. This will take time, but I have hope that people will appear in our country who will be able, to-morrow, to do this. This is the goal of our Party.

But this is for to-morrow, today it cannot possibly be done. Today our primary education is political, we cannot forget this. From the moment they are very small, we have to prepare our people to understand the struggle, the PAIGC. We have to teach about the foundations of the struggle, about the basis of the strength of our Party, about the interests of our Party, about the value of our Party, about the idea that our party is their guide, their light, and all for them. It has to be like that, comrades. At the same time we have to teach our children to read, to write, to count, etc., and to move forward step by step. Our type of education has to be conditioned, in each phase of the struggle, by the life and the history we experience at the given moment.⁷⁴

The most probable interpretation of Cabral's words is that he, personally, at this time wanted the educational practice of the PAIGC to be more politicized than he thought it was, and that some of the other leaders perhaps had slightly more faith than Cabral himself in the indirect political effects of a general improvement of the educational level of the people. But this is no more than an hypothetical interpretation of the fact that certain nuances of opinion could be discerned within the PAIGC in 1971 with regard to *how* the politically mobilizing function of education was best performed. The author's own observations and interviews in 1972 do not indicate that Cabral's words in 1971 had actually led to any noticeable increase of politicization in the educational practice of the PAIGC.

The internal statutes for the functioning of the schools also give some indications about educational intentions and practices. Both the statutes of the *internatos* and the *Escola Piloto* and those of the village schools are factual and practical in tone: hardly anything is said about political education, except

⁷⁴ Cabral, *Sobre alguns problemas práticos . . .*, p. 7.

In addition to the schools and institutionalized courses now mentioned, there are many other educational activities going on in liberated Guinea-Bissau. Efforts are being made to teach all soldiers of the FARP and of the FAL how to read and write, and special schools exist for soldiers learning how to handle such equipment as anti-aircraft artillery, for instance. Nurses and patients studying together at the hospitals and sanitary posts can also be seen. It is naturally impossible to present any reliable quantitative estimate of the number of people engaged in these kinds of studies. The number is certain to be considerable, however, and should be kept in mind when regarding the various statistics presented above. And if education is defined in a somewhat broader way than as merely that which goes on inside the formal school system, the entire PAIGC may well be regarded as an educational organization for the average Guinean.

But adult education in systematically organized forms has not yet come to Guinea-Bissau, however burning the need is recognized to be. The village schools are intended mainly for the youth, which does not mean that adults are not received as students now and then, particularly during periods when there is not much work to be done in the fields. At the 1971 *Conselho Superior*, however, Cabral was anxious to explain to the cadres that it was impossible to start a large-scale adult alphabetization campaign in Guinea-Bissau, such as the Cuban campaign of the early nineteen-sixties, as long as the war had not yet been brought to a successful end. His concrete proposal for the meantime was to apply the recommendation of the party guidelines:

We can start alphabetization on a large scale only when we have complete control of our country. Then we shall all go out teaching, including myself. But in the meantime we must not be passive. All those who know more, have to teach those who know less. If we do this, comrades, we can advance a great deal.⁶³

Curriculum contents

According to our general assumptions about modern education in situations of modern underdevelopment, such education can be expected to have generally mobilizing effects, at least in the long run, regardless of whether it is initiated by conservative/reactionary or radical/progressive governments. But more specifically *political* mobilization, as we shall try to establish the distinction in Chapter VII, will be more difficult to achieve through education, if the social class positions and interests of the educator and the pupils are clearly contradictory.

If the social interests of the educator and the pupils are in harmony, on the other hand, then education becomes a powerful instrument of political mobilization for common goals.

⁶³ Cabral, *Sobre alguns problemas práticos...* p. 9.

It would not be inconsistent with our argument to expect the curriculum of the PAIGC schools to emphasize conventional skills, adapted of course to the specific historical, economic, and social situation of the country, but to give relatively little emphasis to outright political education — or indoctrination. According to this view of the politically mobilizing role of education, the transmission of instrumental knowledge and scientifically inspired thinking in the context of a conscious collective effort to transform society is in itself an essential part of the process of political mobilization. It teaches the people to see *for themselves* the connections between various means — such as sanitation, allowing girls to go to school, accepting the strenuous work of carrying heavy burdens from the border into the country, changing agricultural practices, distrusting amulets as well as the promises of the Portuguese, etc. . . . — and the ends of liberation and development. Political indoctrination may appear as a tempting short-cut, but it does not create firm foundations for development.

The view now indicated of the politically mobilizing role of education is not only consistent with the theoretical points of departure for this book, but it is also consistent with the ideology of the PAIGC as outlined in Chapter III. It is no surprise, therefore, to find it also clearly reflected in the manual used by the teachers of the PAIGC and in the textbooks of the students, as well as in the observable practice of the schools inside liberated Guinea-Bissau.

The manual—"program of instruction for the schools of the liberated areas"—outlines, subject by subject, what is to be taught to the students of the five grades contained in the PAIGC educational system.⁶⁴

Five subjects are taught to the children of the first grade: the Portuguese language, mathematics, "militant formation" (*formação militante*), artistic education, gymnastics. These five then reappear on the schedules of the four following grades, as well.

In the second grade, no new subject is added. In the third grade, "*political formation*" is substituted for "militant formation", "gymnastics and sport" is substituted for merely "gymnastics", and geography, self-government, self-discipline, cooking, and "parallel activities" appear as new subjects.

In the fourth grade, the only new subject is "empirical sciences" (*ciências de observação*), while sewing is added to cooking.

In the fifth grade, finally, geography, physics, and chemistry appear as autonomous subjects, while "theater, singing, dance, recitation" is sorted out as a subject of its own besides "artistic education", which now emphasizes drawing and painting.

This is, very briefly, the concretization into an educational program of the

⁶⁴ *Programa do ensino para as escolas das regiões libertadas.*

by implication, but practical and organizational matters are dealt with in considerable detail.⁷⁵ No far-reaching conclusions can be drawn from this, except that the daily and harsh requirements of the struggle for national liberation under conditions of war and scarcity seem to impose a practical attitude even to such a potentially highly ideological issue as how to run the schools where the children of the revolution are to be educated.

Perhaps we may say that Cabral's words, quoted above, and the statutes of the schools deal with two different but closely related necessities: the necessity to convince the people, and the necessity to keep going in daily practice.

The Pioneers of the Party

The mission of the organization of the Pioneers of the Party (PP) is to contribute to the education of the children of our land. Acting under the political leadership of the Party, our organization of Pioneers aims at reinforcing our children's love of our people, their devotion to the struggle, their respect for the family and for the school, their fondness of Justice, Work, Progress, and Freedom.⁷⁶

The pioneers must be between 10 and 15 years of age. Their motto is "Study—Work—Struggle", and their formal salute is "For the PAIGC: force, light, and guide of our People!" Their organization is meant to be the most explicitly political branch of the liberation movement at the schools, but, at least until 1972, its functions of political education had to be performed in other ways at most village schools, because of the limited number of formally organized groups of pioneers. This does not mean that these functions were ignored — the regular schedule, as we have seen, also provides for political education.

The intention of the statutes is to have a group of pioneers at each school in the liberated areas.⁷⁷ This goal was far from having been achieved in 1972, however. In fact, the pioneers' organization was limited mainly to the *internatos*, the *Escola Piloto* and a few other schools. The estimate of the teacher appointed to be the monitor of the pioneers at the *Escola Piloto* in 1972 was that there were, at this time, no more than altogether about 350 children included in formally constituted groups of pioneers. The reason was said to be the war, which made it difficult to keep the children together as much as deemed necessary for effective work within the pioneers' organization. But the attitudes of the parents were also mentioned as a reason: the children of the village schools had not been "given entirely to the school".

Because of the restricted scope, at least until 1972, of the organization of pioneers, it does not seem probable that it has functioned as a very important

⁷⁵ See notes 46 and 53.

⁷⁶ *Estatutos dos Pioneiros do Partido*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), no date, article 1, first paragraph (translated by the author).

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, article 4.

instrument of political mobilization inside the liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau. Its symbolic value, and its value as a means of contact with the youth of other countries may be considerable, however, although difficult to estimate. Until the end of 1971, for instance, a total of 78 pioneers had spent part of their vacations as invited guests at youth camps in Eastern Europe.⁷⁸ Another important activity of the pioneers' organization is the publication of the periodical called *Blufa* (cf. note 58 p. 100). This mimeographed journal is widely disseminated in the schools of the liberated areas. Its editors try to transmit the message of the party to their youthful readers in easily understandable form and with many concrete facts illustrating the abstract ideas of national liberation and development.

The Center for Political and Military Instruction

In this chapter we have presented the program of instruction for the "ordinary" schools of the PAIGC as an application of the general ideology of the movement to the concrete problem of how to educate and mobilize the population of Guinea-Bissau. The program of instruction for the *Centro de Instrução Político Militar* (CIPM), on the other hand, was introduced in Chapter III, where we deal specifically with the general ideology of the movement. This difference in treatment may appear arbitrary to the reader, but it is not unintentional, although of course open to question. For the program of instruction of the CIPM is the ideology of the PAIGC, in the form in which it is transmitted to those most directly involved in carrying out the struggle of national liberation, i.e. the soldiers of the FARP and the political cadres of the liberated areas.

In Amílcar Cabral's own words to the author in May 1972, "the fundamental task of the CIPM is to give political and military training to the fighting men of the PAIGC". At the time of the author's visit to the school in November 1970, the primary purpose was defined by the director⁷⁹ as twofold: (1) to give political and military training, particularly to the *bigrupos* of the army, and (2) to give courses of introduction and readaptation to the realities of the present situation in Guinea-Bissau to persons returning from abroad to join the struggle. To this may be added the necessary task of arranging ordinary primary education for students who were illiterate when arriving at the CIPM.

The internal statutes of the school contain the following formulation of purpose:

The CIPM is above all a political school (our italics). Its fundamental purpose is to train conscious party militants and fighting members, determined to struggle until the victory of our

⁷⁸ See note 30.

⁷⁹ A former officer of the Portuguese army by the name of Silvino Manuel da Luz.

just cause of independence and progress of our people has been reached. The activities of our Center may be summarized in three main points: (1) Political preparation. (2) Military preparation. (3) Alphabetization.⁸⁰

After a reorganization, completed during the first half of 1970, the CIPM has been able to receive up to 300 students, although the actual number in 1972 did not exceed 200. Age, background, and experience of the students vary — from young village boys to adults with international experience, and from illiterates to persons with university training. The students are organized in groups of 25, with autonomous responsibility for carrying out various practical tasks under the direction of a leader selected among themselves. The maximum number of teachers, in 1970, was said to be about 30. The length of a period spent at the school varies with the background of the individual concerned, but the normal period of training appears to be a few months, and in any case always less than a year.

The general program of studies covers a wide field of knowledge, ranging from the historical and present facts of colonial domination in Guinea and Cape Verde to the moral code of behavior that should guide the party militant. Important points in this systematically elaborated syllabus include: the party organization and program; the problems of regionalism, tribalism, general ignorance, and technical backwardness; the aims, strategy, and tactics of the enemy; the relations between the party and the people; the role in Africa of the national liberation movement in Guinea and Cape Verde; the historical process of decolonization; the present international situation, and the role of the imperialists, the socialist countries, and the third world.⁸¹

The full implications of the kind of training attempted at the CIPM have not yet made themselves felt. But the mere existence of such a highly organized institution, deep in the bush, is a remarkable fact in itself. It must be emphasized that it is of strategic importance for a mobilization-oriented movement, such as the PAIGC, to be able to fill exactly the kind of lacuna which the graduates of the CIPM are expected to fill. A *sine qua non* of enduring political mobilization is the existence of capable and competent cadres, able to identify with the people and thus to evoke their confidence, and at the same time aware of the broader perspectives defining the conditions of their own work.

This judgement appeared to be shared by a young soldier attending a CIPM class in November 1970, who answered in the following words when asked by the author to define what he had found to be most important in his program of training:

⁸⁰ *Regulamento de disciplina interna. Quembra, 21 de Maio de 1970, Quembra, PAIGC (typewritten), 1970 (translated by the author).*

⁸¹ *Programa do ensino do CIPM, Quembra, PAIGC (typewritten), 1970.*

Politics. This is necessary in order to carry on the struggle in a correct way. The military struggle and all the rest come after politics . . . Political work is the most important of all, it is our revolution . . .

Brief comparison with the Portuguese side

Because of the author's limited knowledge of the reality behind the Portuguese educational statistics for Guinea-Bissau, not much more can be done here in the way of comparison than to put the bare figures of the Portuguese beside those of the PAIGC, and then to recommend utter caution as far as interpretations are concerned.

As noted in Chapter II there has also been educational expansion on the Portuguese-controlled side of Guinea-Bissau during the nineteen-sixties (cf. pp. 27 and 64 f.). The official statistics on this are given in table 33.⁸² They are presented here in spite of the fact that the author has not made the least attempt to check their reliability. This may appear irresponsible. But the choice was between presenting the statistics in this way and not presenting them at all.

Table 33. *Education in Portuguese-controlled Guinea-Bissau since the beginning of the open struggle of the PAIGC*

Type of education	Number of students		
	1963-64	1969-70	1970-71
Primary education	11,999	26,172	31,952
Secondary education	580	2,028	2,693
Vocational education	19	24	45
Agricultural education	—	—	7
"Outside the official plan"	728	8,390	9,425
Scholarships in Portugal			54

Comparing these figures with those presented for the PAIGC side on the preceding pages, we may conclude — if the Portuguese figures are at all related to facts — that a greater number of individuals are involved in formal schooling on the Portuguese side than on the side of the PAIGC. To this rather empty conclusion we may add the brief comment that the variety of technical and professional training abroad offered to the people of Guinea-Bissau through the channels of the PAIGC is greater in both quantitative and qualitative terms than what the Portuguese have been prepared to offer so far.

As far as mobilization is concerned, we can only repeat our assumption that Portuguese education in Guinea-Bissau is likely to have led to considerable social mobilization in general, but hardly to any *political* mobilization in favor of the Portuguese colonial regime. Paradoxically, it is even quite possi-

⁸² *Síntese monográfica da Guiné*, pp. 47 ff.

ble that Portuguese education in Guinea-Bissau resulted in political mobilization in favor of the PAIGC — both for the general reason that education, even under a colonial regime, may be expected to raise the level of consciousness of the students, and for the more specific reason that Portuguese educational expansion in Guinea-Bissau can easily be interpreted by the public as an indirect result of PAIGC successes in the liberated areas.

Culture as the flower of history

Education is naturally and by far the most important aspect of the efforts exerted by the PAIGC in the field of culture. But a few additional comments may still be justified.

In the final analysis Cabral seems to have viewed the anti-imperialist struggle very much as a culture struggle — as a people's struggle to reconquer its right to a place in history. This aspect of the ideology of the PAIGC was presented in Chapter III, pp. 85 ff. Culture, as Cabral saw it, is the expression of the history of a people in the same sense as a flower is the expression of a plant. Thus if national liberation and a people's reconquest of its own history are synonymous concepts, Cabral's conclusion that national liberation is "an act of culture" follows logically. Culture is viewed as the flower of history.

It is difficult to estimate the specific impact, outside the educational system, of this total view of national liberation as a cultural struggle. The efforts to revitalize national artistic and musical traditions, for instance, are carried on mainly through the schools.

The most important specific example of cultural struggle possible to discern within the total struggle and distinguishable from the school system is probably the systematic emphasis given by the PAIGC to the problem of female emancipation. This does not mean that the struggle for female emancipation is not integrated with the total struggle, nor does it mean that it is not an important part of the general educational task of the schools. It only means that this problem has been considered important enough in its own right to be singled out for specific attention in the concrete political practice of the PAIGC. A people can never be emancipated, if its female half is excluded or only half-heartedly included in the struggle.

The position of women in liberated Guinea-Bissau

We have noted earlier such facts as the consistent application by the PAIGC of the rule that at least two women be members of the Village Committees. We have also mentioned the emphasis upon maternal protection and child

care in the work of the health brigades, and the efforts made to protect girls and women from certain arbitrary rules of customary law with regard to marriage and divorce. Another notable fact is the fairly high percentage of girls attending the village schools, although much remains to be done in this field, especially with regard to the tendency for girls to leave school much earlier than the boys. This usually means that they return to their traditional role in the village. As mentioned earlier, second-grade education for girls is offered in some of the *internatos* with the specific purpose of counteracting this tendency. But the task is difficult, and the author can well remember a woman in charge of education in a northern Mandinga village, who reluctantly admitted to a high PAIGC leader that there was not a single girl among the 25 children attending the school of her village.

As might be expected, the percentage of women in the political and administrative organs above the Village Committees is very low, with the exception of the "brigades for political action" mentioned in Chapter IV, p. 118. It is perhaps more surprising that women are so few among the teachers of the village schools as well, although numerous among the medical personnel.

In 1972, the political commissar of the northern region of Sara-Candjambary was a woman, as well as the political commissar of the sector of Sara within the same region. In the South at this time, there was probably only one woman filling such a high post — whether on the regional or sectoral level is not clear to the author. In Chapter V we saw that there was only one woman among the 12 candidates for the Regional Council proposed to the voters of the sector of Candjambary in the 1972 election. At the secretariat of the party, on the other hand, there are a number of women working with information, broadcasting, and related activities. There are also several women working as teachers at the *Escola Piloto* and the nursery. In 1972, the director of the *Escola Piloto* was a woman from Cape Verde with a Portuguese university background.

In the top organs of the new sovereign state we find three women: one is second vice president of the National Assembly and member of the State Council, while two others are members of the State Council.⁸³

But the two fundamental aspects of female emancipation in liberated Guinea-Bissau are the guaranteed participation of women in the Village Committees and the constant pressure exerted by the party to get the girls of the villages to attend school. It is worth noting, too, in this context that the member of the Village Committee in charge of education is usually a woman.

⁸³ *Communiqué*, October 2, 1973, p. 3.

VII. Some Theoretical and Concluding Remarks

Underlying assumptions and premises

Underlying the work and thinking that has gone into this book are a number of general theoretical assumptions and premises more or less clearly related to marxist or marxist-inspired thinking on underdevelopment and development. These assumptions and premises may not be marxist in any very strict sense. Whether they are or are not is somewhat beside the point.¹ But through simple trial and error, the author's own theoretical and practical experiences in political research have led him to conclude that marxist-inspired theoretical thought is indispensable to the systematic organization of factual knowledge about underdevelopment and development. Very often such factual knowledge simply makes more sense — to put the matter naively but correctly — within marxist-inspired theoretical frameworks than it does within the various frameworks provided by various brands of functionalist sociology or other kinds of explicitly non-marxist social science.

This is a limited conclusion. As already indicated, it is based less upon purely theoretical considerations than upon the author's own experiences in trying to apply different theoretical concepts to the facts of underdevelopment and development. In the present context we may therefore allow ourselves to concretize the implications of this limited conclusion in the limited form of a

¹ In October 1971, at a meeting in London, the question of the relevance of marxism to the struggle for national liberation in Guinea-Bissau was put to Amílcar Cabral. His answer is interesting in the context of the problem indicated in our text. Cabral said, among other things: "Is Marxism a religion? I am a freedom fighter in my country. You must judge from what I do in practice. If you decide that it's Marxism, tell everyone that it is Marxism. If you decide it's not Marxism, tell them it's not Marxism. But the labels are your affair; we don't like those kinds of labels. People here are very preoccupied with the questions: are you Marxist or not Marxist? Are you Marxist-Leninist? Just ask me, please, whether we are doing well in the field. Are we really liberating our people, the human beings in our country, from all forms of oppression? Ask me simply this, and draw your own conclusions." Quoted from Cabral, *Our People are our Mountains*, London, Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola, and Guiné, 1971, p. 21 f. Cf. also Chapter III of this book.

list of general assumptions, premises, and points of departure, rather than in the form of an analytical comparison of the theoretical foundations of alternative approaches to the study of underdevelopment and development:

1. A good general reason for carrying on with work in social science is that knowledge of how societies function and change is a necessary, although clearly not sufficient, condition of social and human emancipation through history. It may be objected that knowledge and clarity are also necessary for successful oppression. This is undoubtedly true. But the social scientist may perhaps still find some justification for carrying on by trying to tell him- or herself that knowledge and clarity, however double-edged they may be, are even more necessary for liberation and emancipation than they are for oppression. This is in any case an underlying assumption of the present work.²

2. The division of Western social science into several separate sub-disciplines is possible to understand historically. It is, however, highly arbitrary and harmful as it affects attempts to come to grips with the past and present reality of underdevelopment and development. This reality can be adequately understood only if conceptualized as an economic, social, political, and cultural totality. The harmful division into separate sub-disciplines is best counteracted, on the other hand, not by having every social scientist try to be a specialist of everything, but by having every social scientist try consciously and constantly to relate his own field of knowledge, for instance politics, to all other relevant aspects of the societal totality.

3. Man's efforts to produce and reproduce, and thus to change and improve his own condition, in mutual interaction with other men and with the material conditions imposed by nature, are basic to all social life and hence to history. As has often been pointed out, there is no necessary connection whatsoever between this assumption and any simple determinism, economic or other.

4. The dynamics of history — and thus development — are provided through the clashing and resolution of opposing interests, which can usually be traced, directly or indirectly, to different positions in the social and economic structure of society.

5. Underdevelopment is a modern historical phenomenon, to be carefully distinguished from primitive un-development. It is best understood as the historical result of the clash between the dynamic expansionism of Western European (and later also North American) societies and the initial inability of South American, African, and Asian societies to resist that expansionism. Through this historical process of colonialism, capitalism, and imperialism, the center of world power was established in the West, and the peoples and countries of the present so-called third world were deprived of the power to use their own resources to meet their own needs. Out of this grew the modern phenomenon of underdevelopment, which can be characterized as an acute structural contradiction, both internationally and within separate countries, between human and social needs on the one hand, and on the other hand the existence of un-utilized, under-utilized, or wrongly utilized human and material resources which, potentially, could be used to meet those needs.

6. If the argument under the preceding point is accepted, it follows that the structural contradiction of underdevelopment cannot be overcome in any decisive way until a considerable amount of the *power* to control themselves and their resources is again exercised by the coun-

² This was also Cabral's attitude toward the research reported upon in this book. In May, 1972, in Conakry, he told the author that he wanted a detached analysis ("*une analyse froide*") of the realities of the PAIGC, as the author had been able to observe them. Cabral did not fear truth, for he was convinced it would prove to be on the same side as the PAIGC in the long run. He was anxious to have the PAIGC and its political work analyzed as objectively as possible, because he thought the results of such analysis would be useful to the struggle.

tries and the peoples of the present third world themselves. This does not mean that underdevelopment is a "political" rather than an "economic" problem. But it does mean that the main immediate obstacles to development in all underdeveloped countries, except those few that have gone through a socialist revolution, have to do with the fact that the above-mentioned re-transfer of political and economic power so far has been very incomplete, although begun. For it is well known and fairly widely recognized by now that merely formal political decolonization, while probably being a necessary step along the road, does not mean that the transfer of power occurs automatically, without continued struggle. On the contrary, the economic, political, and cultural mechanisms of neo-colonialism often tie the ruling strata of the formally independent country more closely to alien imperialist interests than to the interests of their own people in overcoming underdevelopment. As long as this is so, the structural condition of underdevelopment remains, and any attacks, however well-intentioned, upon the symptoms of misery — often taken to be the essence of underdevelopment — will remain half-hearted and ambiguous because not forced upon the power-holders by those upon whom they depend for maintaining their power.

7. While it is true, of course, that the various statistical indices of poverty and misery are closely correlated with the structural condition of underdevelopment in the countries of the third world, it is equally true that the existence of the symptoms of misery is not identical with the structural condition of underdevelopment. Equivalent types of contradictions also exist in industrialized societies without mass poverty and misery, for instance in the forms of unemployment or ecological problems; and in the world as a whole, between global potential and global needs, as well as between global potential and specific needs of either industrialized or undeveloped societies.

8. Western capitalistic development can be looked upon as the combined result of the internal dynamism of class conflict and great opportunities for economic, political, and military expansion outwards. This development was in a sense spontaneous; it was, on the whole, not willed and foreseen in advance. Nor did it start from a position of consciously experienced underdevelopment in the modern sense. The historical, capitalistic "model of development" to which it gave rise has come into existence only *post factum*. Nothing of the kind can be expected in the underdeveloped countries today. Their underdevelopment will have to be overcome through consciously directed political action, if it is to be overcome at all. For this to become possible, dynamic political interaction must be established between the developmental needs and aspirations of the masses, and a consciously applied strategy of challenge to the social, political, and economic *status quo* of underdevelopment. The conditions under which such mobilization and its mechanisms may be established and sustained are also the conditions under which political leadership may become more closely tied to the interests of the people in overcoming underdevelopment than to alien imperialist interests. It is surely an important task of political science to examine those conditions. They may be regarded as minimal conditions of development out of the structural contradiction(s) of modern underdevelopment characterizing third-world countries integrated into the predominantly capitalist international system.

9. Sufficient conditions of such development — if projected further into the future — include not only the establishment of popularly based political regimes with radical socialist strategies of development in the third world, but also regionally and eventually globally coordinated struggle against all powerful social forces acting to maintain global underdevelopment. Although beyond the specific topic of the present work, this problem is certainly not beyond its theoretical perspective and context.

Within such a general framework of thought as the one now presented, it is possible, obviously, to locate a great number of specific problems and tasks

for social science research. The possible range is all the way from general macro-considerations on imperialism to very specific investigations of the processes and mechanisms of liberation from imperialism and underdevelopment. Our own investigation in this book has been of the latter kind.

We have been studying the political problem of how to base political power upon the postulated interest of the masses in overcoming underdevelopment. In this formulation, the problem studied is a general problem for all countries under imperialist, colonial, or neo-colonial domination. Without being a sufficient condition, the solution of this fundamental political problem is most probably a necessary condition of development away from underdevelopment in all those countries — i.e. in all third-world countries included in the global system of international capitalism. As long as power remains vested in those classes, groups, and alien powers and forces whose immediate interests are served by continued underdevelopment in the dependent countries of the third world, development is obviously very unlikely to occur.

But in the present book we have chosen to approach this general problem of underdevelopment and development, not by trying to grasp it in its entirety, but by seeing it through the concrete experiences of one particular people in struggle against one particular manifestation of imperialism and colonialism. Clearly this approach imposes limitations upon the kinds of conclusions which may be drawn. But concreteness and realism are gained in return, and it may still be possible to make a few observations of a more general character, as well, based upon our investigation.

Let us begin by an attempt to discuss and specify possible meanings of the term and concept of mobilization, frequently used in this study, and move on then to a few concluding remarks on what may be learnt from the case of Guinea-Bissau and the PAIGC about the more general principles and mechanisms involved in the emancipation of oppressed societies.

The term and concept of mobilization

Let there be no mystery about “mobilization”. As is obvious from the preceding chapters, we have been using this word as an appropriate *term* for the crucial political process and mechanism through which political leaders organize support for revolutionary efforts by appealing to the people’s self-experienced and concrete interests in a better life. In the particular situation of Guinea-Bissau this has meant convincing a peasant population, often suspicious and reluctant, of the necessity to fight a war of national liberation in order to meet their most elementary needs for material satisfaction and a life in peace and human dignity. By this very fact, the organizers of rebellion

and revolution in Guinea-Bissau have also been forced to sustain popular support by daily demonstration in practice of the credibility of the PAIGC alternative to the colonial system. Had they failed in this demonstration, support would no longer have been forthcoming, and a successful people's war would have become impossible. This is the simple and basic logic of the kind of mobilization we have been dealing with in this book. It is also the reason why development, in the sense of improved conditions of life through the utilization of existing possibilities to meet existing needs, is both a necessary prerequisite for and an essential means of achieving such political mobilization.

It ought to be clear to the readers that the kind of political process and mechanism now indicated is crucially important to the transformation of society not only in Guinea-Bissau, but also in all other countries of the third world, and indeed in all countries and societies of the world where fundamental contradictions within the structure of society continue to exist. The particular context differs from country to country, however, and whether successful political mobilization, based upon the people's interest in improving their lives by using their own possibilities and resources for their own purposes, will involve a war of national liberation or not depends precisely upon the concrete character of this particular context. In Guinea-Bissau, as we know, it did involve a war of national liberation. But it also involved a series of political, socio-economic, and cultural innovations, all closely interwoven with each other and with the war. These innovations are what we have been studying in the present book.

In doing so, one intention has been to give a measure of theoretical meaning and content to a *concept* of mobilization. This is a difficult task, and our success may well be doubted. Our work would be good enough in this respect, however, if we contribute even a little to the clarification of what may be meant by mobilization in a context of social science. Mobilization is such a broad and vague term that it has often been used to denote concepts very different from the one we are interested in here. Yet, it is hard to think of a better term for what we are interested in.

The views of four different social scientists

Mobilization is not even found among the entries in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1967). Yet, as pointed out by the sociologist Amitai Etzioni in a penetrating analytical discussion of "societal mobilization and societal change", the term has been used "by a variety of writers in a variety of ways which are not wholly consistent with each other."³

³ Amitai Etzioni, *The Active Society, A theory of societal and political processes*, New York and London, The Free Press and Collier-Macmillan Ltd, 1968 and 1971, p. 388, footnote. The references in our text are all to chapter 15, "Societal Mobilization and Societal change", pp. 387-427 in the 1971 paperback edition.

The political scientist *Karl Deutsch* was perhaps the first among modern Western social scientists interested in underdevelopment and development to attempt a definition and operationalization of the concept of mobilization. To Deutsch . . .

social mobilization . . . is something that happens to large numbers of people in areas which undergo modernization, i.e., where advanced, non-traditional practices in culture, technology and economic life are introduced and accepted on a considerable scale. It is not identical, therefore, with this process of modernization as a whole, but it deals with one of its major aspects, or better, with a recurrent cluster among its consequences.⁴

As Deutsch continues, however, it becomes clear that in spite of the words now quoted, the kind of mobilization he is talking about is indeed very nearly identical with "modernization", as this latter concept is normally used in conventional Western social science of development. On the next page Deutsch refers to earlier intuitive notions of "social mobilization", that "suggest a breaking away from old commitments to traditional ways of living, and a moving into new situations, where new patterns of behaviour are relevant and needed, and where new commitments have to be made."⁵ In a specific reference to Karl Mannheim, Deutsch also included the two opposites of "traditionalism" and "modern life".⁶ His own definition of social mobilization, however, opposes only "old" and "new":

Social mobilization can be defined, therefore, as the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior.⁷

In spite of the fact that "old" and "new" are broader concepts than "traditional" and "modern", it is clear from the context that mobilization to Deutsch is a crucial aspect of the process whereby people move from "traditional" to "modern" ways of life, within the well-known paradigm of functionalist sociology. His own argument tends to blur the distinction, made in the first of our two quotations, between mobilization and modernization. This becomes even more obvious, as Deutsch goes on to propose an operational definition of his concept.

Deutsch suggests that the process of social mobilization can be operationalized into various percentages of the population of a country (presumably measured repeatedly at different points in time, as Deutsch sees mobilization as a process): percentage exposed to "significant aspects of modern life", percentage exposed to mass media, percentage having changed

⁴ Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 55, no. 2, September 1961, pp. 493–513. The reference here is to p. 493.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 494.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

their locality of residence, percentage in towns, percentage in non-agricultural occupations among gainfully occupied, percentage of literates, and finally either net national product or gross national product measured in dollars per capita.⁸

It appears that Deutsch's way of reasoning in the quoted article is misleading in at least two ways: (1) It presupposes that the process of mobilization, although possibly not identical with the process of modernization, always involves movement in one and the same direction, i.e. movement away from "traditionalism" toward "modernity" in functionalist language. In this way an unverified hypothesis is built into the definition. (2) It confuses degree or level of mobilization with level of modernization as focus of measurement, thus ignoring, it seems, the common sense notion that mobilization has to do with commitment to common goals and capacity for common action regardless of the level of modernization in the specific sense of functionalist sociology.

While change of cultural and attitudinal patterns (although not necessarily in the direction postulated by Deutsch and most other Western social scientists) naturally can be very significant parts of mobilization, and while it certainly is important to search for measurable expressions of mobilization, it should still be clear to the reader by now that the kind of mobilization conceptualized by Deutsch in his often-quoted article from 1961 is not the kind of mobilization we are primarily interested in in this book. To us it is even completely absurd to define the concept in such a way that a society with high levels of modern consumption and technology becomes, by definition, more mobilized than, for instance, a peasant society actively engaged in national liberation.

Another point of reference for a discussion of the mobilization concept is to be found in the works of *David Apter*, also a well known political scientist who has studied the problems of what he calls the politics of modernization.⁹ Apter defines a mobilization system as a "government" which is "hierarchical in its authority and consummatory in its values" and which by coming to power "creates a powerful synthesis of consummatory meanings in instrumental acts."¹⁰ According to Apter, the limited but important role of this type of system lies in that it reaches "optimum effectiveness in the transition from high modernization to early industrialization."¹¹

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 495.

⁹ David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization*, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1965 and 1967; and "Political Systems and Developmental Change", in Apter, *Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1968, pp. 329-350.

¹⁰ Apter, "Political Systems and Developmental Change," *op.cit.*, p. 339.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

It is clear to the present author that acceptance, for the purposes of this book, of Apter's basic typology — which distinguishes between *mobilization*, *theocratic*, *bureaucratic*, and *reconciliation* types of political systems — would have locked our analysis into the straight-jacket of one particular version of structural-functionalist sociology, without helping us to understand more than certain isolated aspects of the conditions and mechanisms of mobilization in Guinea-Bissau.¹²

Our basic objection to Apter's conceptual approach concerns the limits set to his analysis by the way he postulates those functional and structural "requisites of governments" with the help of which he then distinguishes the four types of political systems mentioned above. Apter attempts to capture the essence of political development of modernization in terms of (1) *information* and *coercion*, defined as the two basic "functional requisites of governments",¹³ and (2) *decision-making* and *accountability*, defined as the two basic "structural requisites".¹⁴ What makes the mobilization system helpful in taking a society "over the hump" from late modernization into early industrialization is, according to Apter, precisely that it combines high coercion (low information) with effectiveness in decision-making (low accountability). But once early industrialization is reached, "the need for information will grow and coercion will become increasingly dysfunctional to the system."¹⁵ This latter hypothesis may well be worth investigating — the point we are trying to make by no means excludes such a possibility — but the heavy emphasis of Apter's approach upon information and coercion diverts, by definition, the analysis from many other real political issues at stake in concrete situations.

Coercion by whom, against whom, for what purposes, and information about what, concealed from whom?

These important questions are shunned by Apter's approach, which would have us believe that the essence of politics can be usefully defined as more or less information/coercion and decision-making/accountability rather than as, for instance more or less power and influence, exercised in the interests of this or that group of class, over the social interactions involved in producing the livelihood of the people and setting of goals for a given society.

In this subtle sense, then, does Apter's approach to the analysis of political

¹² Cf. Lars Rudebeck, "Political Development: towards a coherent and relevant theoretical formulation of the concept", *Scandinavian Political Studies*, vol. 5, Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1970, pp. 35–44, and the more elaborate analyses in *Utveckling och politik. En samhällsvetenskaplig teoristudie med anknytning till konkret politisk verklighet* (Development and Politics. A theoretical social science study, related to concrete political reality), Stockholm, Wahlström & Widstrand, 1970, pp. 59–80.

¹³ Apter, *The Politics of Modernization*, 1965, pp. 237 ff.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 243 ff.

¹⁵ Apter, "Political Systems and Developmental Change," *op.cit.*, p. 349.

change in the third world have a conservative bias. It tends to denature political conflict by depicting it as an abstract game, and tends also to disregard its ideological content and material bases. It would, to put the problem concretely, be impossible to make the distinction between "left" and "right" in politics by using Apter's terminology. In his conceptual terms, both Peron's Argentina (1946–1955) and Castro's Cuba are for instance classified as mobilization systems, whereas the obvious differences between these two regimes would have to be accounted for outside Apter's conceptual language.¹⁶

Amitai Etzioni, sociologist, is our third example of well known Western social scientists who have written about mobilization. His abstract and general definition of mobilization, in the chapter of *The Active Society* mentioned above, avoids the theoretical and political pitfalls of Deutsch's argument and Apter's typology. Etzioni writes:

We refer to the process by which a unit gains significantly in the control of assets it previously did not control as *mobilization*.¹⁷

And further on in the text:

Depending on the kinds of assets involved, mobilization is coercive (as when feudal lords turn their armies over to the control of the king), utilitarian (as when a state raises the level of taxation), or normative (as when loyalties to the nation are increased, while those to local communities decline).¹⁸

Logically, it is quite possible to refer to the social processes and mechanisms to be described and analyzed in this book as processes and mechanisms of mobilization in Etzioni's abstract sense. This will be shown through some quotes and references further on in the text. The question is what is gained. The answer is that while we do not get beyond the formal and abstract level of analysis, we do gain some conceptual stringency, useful for description and operationalization, and a point of reference. This is stringent enough. But the entire work of finding out what kind of mobilization, for what purposes, in whose interests, etc., still remains to be done.

Eqbal Ahmad is a Pakistani social scientist working in the United States. He differs from the three we have just been discussing in that he does not make systematic use of the term mobilization itself. But he has written with insight about the same kinds of social processes and mechanisms as those dealt with in our own book.

Ahmad is interested in that particular kind of mobilization which becomes possible when an established system of power begins to lose its legitimacy, or

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 338, and Apter, *The Politics of Modernization*, 1965, p. 253.

¹⁷ Etzioni, *op.cit.*, p. 388.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 389.

rather, he is interested in the conditions of such mobilization. In fact, his theoretical formulations are partly parallel to the official theoretical and ideological views on the subject held by the PAIGC, as studied in Chapter III of this book.

When can a people, Ahmad asks, summon up the determination to end injustice and humiliation, the patience with prolonged suffering, the grim resolution to resist their rulers at almost any cost, that in modern times have been demonstrated by for instance the peoples of Algeria and of Indochina? "A people can summon up that resolution only if they feel morally alienated from their rulers, when the latter's very title to authority is actively rejected by the masses,"¹⁹ Ahmad answers. The reverse of the moral alienation of the people is of course the moral isolation of the rulers. Ahmad underlines this point by quoting one of the historic chiefs of the Algerian revolution as having told him that "the success of a revolutionary war is predicated upon the continual and increasing moral isolation of the enemy,"²⁰ adding on the same page:

In the language of contemporary social science, "moral isolation" may be translated as loss of "legitimacy" — a crucial though badly defined and vastly misused term.²¹

According to Ahmad, it is therefore necessary to have some understanding of the problems involved in the "recreation" of legitimacy in order to understand revolutionary warfare. These thoughts and ideas come very close to the heart of the subject matter of this book: the attempt of the PAIGC to create a new social order in Guinea, an order based upon legitimate authority instead of the eroded and illegitimate authority of the colonial rulers.

An important part of Ahmad's argument is contained in the following paragraph:

Legitimacy comes to governments and other institutions of power when their constituents recognize their claim to authority in some principle or source outside them, or when citizens actively and meaningfully participate in the processes of governments, i.e., when there is a maximum of self-government. Above all legitimacy is assured to the extent that the relationships and processes promoted by the system of power are responsive to the needs created by the system of production. In order to be legitimate, power must find an operative ideological justification — in the divine right of kings, the mandate of heaven, sanctity of priests, and superiority of lords; in constitutions stressing the principle of democratic consent or the dictatorship of the proletariat. But its functional validity comes from the concurrence of economic and social forces and needs with political institutions and relationships. The title to authority comes into question when changes in the system of production (including technology) alter the basic configurations of economic and social relationships.²²

¹⁹ Eqbal Ahmad, "Revolutionary Warfare and Counterinsurgency", in Norman Miller and Roderick Aya, eds., *National Liberation. Revolution in the Third World*, New York and London, The Free Press and Collier-Macmillan Ltd, 1971, pp. 137–213. The reference here is to p. 150.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 152 f.

In the case of colonial systems, we may safely assume that they have never enjoyed much legitimacy, except in the eyes of some limited social strata. The crisis of legitimacy thus usually begins at the very moment a colonial system is imposed by force upon a dominated people. But because of the military and economic strength of the colonial power, the strangers maintain themselves in control for some time in spite of the system's illegitimacy. With this qualification, Ahmad's argument about the conditions of illegitimacy also applies to the conditions of social mobilization against an apparently strong social order, such as for instance an established colonial system.

Although the conditions leading to revolutions are not produced by conspiracy, as Ahmad also emphasizes, it is still important to note that the processes of change and revolution usually are not released automatically. Active political work on the part of the politically conscious among the radical forces seems to be an almost necessary condition. A regime unwilling and unable to satisfy popular aspirations loses legitimacy, it has to rely more and more upon coercion in order to maintain itself in power. Its resistance to necessary fundamental reforms provokes new political forces into existence. The revolutionary forces deliberately activate the process by which the rulers lose their legitimacy (or become more and more clearly illegitimate):

By forcing the issues which augment the contradictions within the system and the divisions within the ruling class, they weaken the latter's efficacy and cohesion. By promoting activities which bring into sharp relief the parochial interests of the regime, they widen the perceptible gap between those in authority and the expectations of the collective. By setting examples of defying and challenging established authority, they break the inhibitions of habitual or reflexive obedience and help transform private doubts into public actions; examples of overt resistance establish new standards of defiance and produce new alternatives and skills.²³

Another very important point concerns the practical demonstration of an alternative to the existing order. The revolutionary movement must "demonstrate, in practice, that there are alternative structures and arrangements which approximate the popular yearning for a just, communal, and participatory system."²⁴

Note on marxism and mobilization

Political mobilization, as the term has been used throughout this book and as it will soon be conceptualized a little more strictly, is an essential ingredient of a possible strategy of development out of the situations of underdevelopment and dependency into which colonialism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism have locked the countries of the third world. It is based upon the possibility of appealing politically to the self-interest which the deprived and oppressed

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

masses of these countries have in their own development. Obviously this kind of thinking is inspired by marxist thinking on the same subject. It is even trivial to note that progressive societal change, in all marxist and marxist-inspired thinking, always involves some kind of mobilization of the masses.

Our first question here, however, is only if the term mobilization is used in a more specific and well-defined way — as Etzioni uses it — in modern marxist research and theorizing about underdevelopment and development. We saw that Ahmad, for instance, although writing in a broad way about some of the very same social processes and mechanisms as those dealt with in this book, did not use the term mobilization to denote any of his key concepts. We may state, in answer to our question, that the same is true also of most more explicitly marxist authors, regardless of their origin in the advanced capitalist countries, in the third world, or in the more or less socialist countries of Eastern Europe. The term mobilization is not systematically used to denote any of the key theoretical concepts found in modern marxist thinking about underdevelopment and development, although it is unavoidably used quite often as a noun among others with a fairly obvious meaning in this context.²⁵

The aspects of social reality that we try to grasp with the term mobilization are on the other hand, as already indicated, of great importance in marxist political theory. In our usage, mobilization in a broad sense, or *social* mobilization, is more or less equivalent to the growth of social and political (class) consciousness. *Political* mobilization focuses on the political, organizational, and ideological work necessary in order to convert that consciousness into political strength and force. These matters have naturally been dealt with at length by politically active leading marxists, notably by Lenin and Mao Tse-tung.

In the writings of modern marxist professional social scientists, however, we find less systematic and specific interest in the processes and mechanisms of mobilization. This may partly be due to the fact that social scientists trained in marxist thinking usually direct their attention less toward the con-

²⁵ This statement is based mainly upon the following books and other texts: Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil*, New York and London, Monthly Review Press, 1967; Samir Amin, *L'accumulation à l'échelle mondiale. Critique de la théorie du sous-développement*, second edition, Paris, Editions Anthropos, 1971; Samir Amin, *Le développement inégal. Essai sur les formations sociales du capitalisme périphérique*, Paris, Les Editions de Minuit, 1973; Tamás Szentes, *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment*, Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1971; Y. Zhukov, L. Delyusin, A. Iskenderov, and L. Stepanov, *The Third World. Problems and Prospects*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1970; V.I. Pavlov, I.B. Redko, and P.A. Ulyanovsky (editors), *Asia and Africa: Fundamental Changes*, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1972; R. Ulyanovsky and V. Pavlov, *Asian Dilemma: A Soviet View and Myrdal's Concept*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1973; *World Marxist Review* (Prague and Toronto), recent volumes; Maj Palmberg, "Icke-kapitalistisk utveckling?" (Non-capitalist development?), *Häften för kritiska studier* (Stockholm), no. 1, 1973, pp. 3–28 (an article summarizing a number of mostly English-language Soviet and Eastern European texts dealing with the theory of "non-capitalist development").

ventional field of political science than toward either economics and sociology or general theory. Such Western marxist theoreticians of underdevelopment and development, for instance, as Andre Gunder Frank and Samir Amin concentrate their attention upon the mechanisms of dependency and dialectically related development/underdevelopment they find characteristic of the global relationship metropolis/satellite of center/periphery. Their focus thus tends to de-emphasize the importance of studying in detail the conditions and mechanisms of internal mobilization against this relationship. Frank provides us with an extreme example of this in his well known study of "Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America", where all he has to say on the subject of internal strategy and tactics is that the peasants (of Latin America) and their allies must "destroy and replace capitalism"²⁶ and that "the crisis and underdevelopment of Brazilian agriculture, Brazil and Latin America" can be solved only by "the destruction of the capitalist structure itself and the liberation of Brazil from the world imperialist-capitalist system as a whole."²⁷ Even Samir Amin's most recent work, which deals explicitly with "the social formations of peripheric capitalism," devotes no more than a few concluding pages to the problems of transition from underdevelopment (peripheric capitalism) to (socialist) development within the countries of the third world themselves.²⁸

Soviet and Eastern European social scientists devote more detailed interests than do Frank and Amin, and most other Western marxists, to the internal problems of transition from underdevelopment to development in the direction of socialism. But much of what they write on the specific topic of political mobilization is still very general, as for instance in the following characteristic quote from a recent Soviet book on the subject:

History teaches us that social progress requires a democratisation of the political and social system of government and the participation of the masses in the business of the government. Social progress is in the interests of the people. Accordingly there can be no social progress without the people's participation, behind their back.²⁹

The following is one of many other variations upon the same theme:

A state is strong when the broad masses participate in policy-making. In a national democracy the state, by rejecting dictatorial and despotic methods of government, offers an opportunity for such participation.³⁰

The last quote introduces the term "national democracy". This — or "the national-democratic state" — is the term used in current Soviet and Eastern

²⁶ Frank, *op.cit.*, p. 270.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 277.

²⁸ Amin, *Le développement inégal...*, p. 325–339, particularly pp. 333–339.

²⁹ Zhukov, Delyusin, Iskenderov, and Stepanov, *op.cit.*, p. 55.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

European theorizing about "the road of non-capitalist development" in order to denote the political and institutional structure assumed to be required for such development. A whole body of marxist theory about this concept of non-capitalist development in the third world has been developed by Soviet and Eastern European social scientists.³¹ The concept refers to the possibility that progressive nationalist regimes might gradually lead their countries in the direction of socialist development, although as yet able neither to abolish capitalism completely nor to break with the capitalistic world market.

Obviously, political mobilization of the kind we have been trying to define in this chapter will be essential to any possible successes of such difficult "non-capitalist" development strategies. Consequently, it is also in some of the texts on this subject that we find a few more detailed marxist discussions of mobilization, although the term itself is used only intermittently and unsystematically. The basic political idea involved is that the development of the resources of third world countries for the benefit of the masses of the people requires the people's own participation. It requires "democracy". But this democracy cannot necessarily be equated with "parliamentarism and political freedoms for the individual". In societies "living through the turbulent period of national and political formation, it is the social aspects of democracy that are the most important."³² These social aspects of democracy have to do with the active participation of ordinary people in forming the conditions of their own lives:

All true patriots, whether politicians or revolutionary military leaders, realize that compulsion and administrative methods alone cannot solve the economic, political and cultural problems of national reconstruction. For this the leaders must have strong links with the masses, conduct political education among the masses, and constantly correct mistakes in the work of the organs of power. The masses must take part in the solution of major problems of national development. Some headway in this direction has already been made in a number of countries.³³

The sociological conditions of the continuation of such a process are analyzed as follows:

The further the revolutionary process develops, the less able is the national bourgeoisie to remain in power without the support of imperialism and of the landlord class, which is usually closely connected with imperialism. The positions held by different classes in the Third World countries can be described as follows. Under the combined pressure of all the national forces, imperialism and its feudal-comprador agents have been compelled to relinquish power and retreat. Owing to the weakness of the bourgeoisie and the falling into disrepute of the landlord class which usually collaborates with imperialism, on the one hand, and the relative weakness of the class-conscious proletariat and its party, on the other, there has advanced to the

³¹ Cf. Palmberg, *op.cit.*

³² Pavlov, Redko, and Ulyanovsky (editors), *op.cit.*, p. 223.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 230 f.

foreground the most numerous section of the population — the middle strata and the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie.³⁴

The middle strata and the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie certainly do not constitute “the most numerous section of the population” in the majority of third-world countries. But regardless of what the authors may have meant by appearing to be of that opinion, they are certainly right in reminding us that the coming to power of these strata by no means guarantees continued non-capitalist development. Therefore, “much depends on the revolutionary initiative of the masses, on their active participation in building a new life.”³⁵

Clearly, what the authors of this text have in mind is something quite similar to what we have here called political mobilization. They also develop their argument into some fairly detailed considerations on the kinds of concrete political, organizational, and economic work necessary in order to bring the people into the process of development.³⁶ But their empirical references are limited to a few general statements about Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Tanzania, and Burma. Even if these statements are based — as they probably are — upon detailed studies of the countries concerned, and even if the theory of non-capitalist development contains much of interest to the study of political mobilization for development in the third world, we may still safely assume that much remains to be done with regard to specific research about the political aspects of underdevelopment.

Our own use of the term and view of the concept

In this book we have been concerned with revolutionary mobilization against colonialism — a clear case, in other words, of mobilization synonymous with the process through which people begin to see clearly the contradictions between their own aspirations and the existing structural and institutional arrangements of the society they live in. If nobody is consciously aware of these contradictions — aware enough to articulate his insights — then obviously very little is going to change. But if the contradictions are deep enough, and the general awareness acute enough, people may become available (mobilizable) for far-reaching political action — and in the extreme case for revolution. In Etzioni's analytical language, the deprived “units” (such as groups, strata, classes, and their organizations) will gain significantly in the control of “assets” (such as loyalty, solidarity, commitment to common goals, articulated knowledge, discipline, readiness to act, material resources) they previously did not control.

We do not deny, of course, that mobilization may occur also for other

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 231 f.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 233.

³⁶ See for instance *ibid.*, pp. 220 f.

reasons than the illegitimacy of the established order of society, for instance because of external threat against a legitimate regime. Nor do we deny that mobilization in the abstract sense, unqualified by the facts of a concrete historical situation, may be hard to distinguish from manipulation for all kinds of possible purposes. This is precisely why we have carried our analysis of mobilization out of the world of conceptual abstractions into, in our case, the concrete world of colonialism and underdevelopment and the struggle of the PAIGC and the people of Guinea-Bissau against these plagues.

Let us try now to tie together what we have learnt from studying Guinea-Bissau with the references and observations made in this chapter, into a coherent argument of our own.

Mobilization, without any qualifying attribute, is our broadest term. It includes both *social* and *political* mobilization.

But *social mobilization*, although more specific than merely mobilization, is also a fairly broad term. It refers to the process whereby people's awareness of the structural conditions and contradictions of the society they live in is influenced by these conditions and contradictions themselves. Social mobilization is bound, therefore, to be going on to some extent all the time in all societies. But under certain conditions the intensity of this permanently on-going process is heightened, and we may witness an increase in people's readiness to accept change and transformation, including collective action for such goals. This is when the social, economic, and political situation of a society may be described as being ripe for change — most importantly when the historically established structural and institutional arrangements of society no longer fit its changing social and economic base and when the general awareness of this is spreading.

Political mobilization, however, which is what we have been trying to focus upon in this book, is something more specific. By that term we would like to denote conscious work, carried out with the explicit purpose of intensifying, accelerating, and directing the more general process of social mobilization. Such political work may be organizational and educational, it may also consist of attempts to demonstrate various institutional and economic alternatives in practice. It may be initiated either locally, by the masses themselves, or, as is more frequently the case, by highly conscious minorities enjoying the confidence of the people. By channelling into organized forms the potential and actual social energy brought into existence through social mobilization, political mobilization increases the participation in the directing of their own affairs by people who previously participated only slightly or not at all.

In our terminology, then, *social mobilization* must be considered a necessary attribute of all human societies. But it is the kind of intensification, mentioned above, of the process of social mobilization that we are primarily interested in. This kind of intensification may occur rather spontaneously, but

it can also be brought about through *political mobilization*.

The intensification of social mobilization can be brought about through political mobilization both directly and indirectly. In the latter case political mobilization is a means toward the establishment of more effective political organization and participation, which may, in its turn, increase social mobilization, thus facilitating further political mobilization . . . It is admittedly difficult to apply these distinctions in an entirely consistent manner — it is sometimes tempting, for instance, to use the broader term mobilization when one of the more specific terms social or political mobilization may be more appropriate. But even granting some such fluidity in usage, we nevertheless hope that the terminological distinction now proposed may contribute somewhat to conceptual clarification.

We may note in passing that Etzioni in his discussion of the concept of mobilization is aware of the distinction between what we have now called social mobilization and what we have called political mobilization, although he does not emphasize it very explicitly. Etzioni writes as follows, for instance:

Mobilization, like decision-making, social planning, and other related concepts, implies a collective actor who is capable of controlling societal processes, at least to some degree, and is not merely subject to them. Thus mobilization is viewed as a drive which is, *at least in part* (our italics) deliberately initiated, directed, and terminated, and not as a by-product or an out-growth of the "interaction" among macro-units or as a compilation of the decisions of myriad micro-units.³⁷

In a different context, Etzioni describes in concrete terms what political mobilization — in the terminology we shall try to use here — is about:

The capacity of a societal unit to act and its historical impact depend considerably on the outcome of the internal struggle between the mobilizers and the unmobilized members of a unit, a struggle which is evident in practically all major mobilization processes. The Cecil B. De Mille version of history has the slaves (or occupied nations, or colonized peoples) "rise". Actually, if and when such an uprising occurs, it usually follows many years of mobilization efforts, during which an internal leadership is slowly built up and expanded and the mobilizing sub-units gain in members and sympathizers; even at the end of such a process, the attention, loyalties, and utilitarian assets of the members are unevenly tapped. Mobilization is, thus, a process which slowly penetrates from one societal layer to another but rarely encompasses all of them or progresses very rapidly precisely because of this internal struggle.³⁸

As we have seen in the preceding chapters, this theoretical observation of Etzioni's could very well have been an empirical generalization of crucial aspects of the PAIGC experience in Guinea.

It is important to emphasize that basically both social and political mobilization are *processes*, although the terms are sometimes also applied to

³⁷ Etzioni, *op.cit.*, p. 393.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 406.

situations arising from these processes, as when “mobilization” is “measured” by the percentage of a population performing certain acts or displaying certain characteristics. This tendency toward terminological confusion of process with end state (or with level attained at a given point in time) is an understandable consequence of the desire of social scientists to operationalize their concepts. But we should not allow it to result also in conceptual confusion.

Hopefully, the following attempt to systematize various meanings of mobilization may contribute to further clarification of our argument. The intention is to make clear (1) that mobilization is a process, (2) that it may be conceptualized as being of at least two kinds: social and political, and (3) that these two kinds of mobilization are both distinct from and closely related to each other:

Mobilization

I. Social mobilization

1. Ever on-going process whereby people's awareness of the structural conditions and contradictions of society is influenced by these conditions and contradictions themselves. This process may be intensified, thus leading to sharpened awareness

- (a) spontaneously, as a result of objective conditions
- (b) as a result of political mobilization
- (c) through a combination of the two.

II. Political mobilization

1. Process involving the political organization and participation of the people

- (a) spontaneously, arising from the “grass-roots”
- (b) as a result of organizational, ideological, and socio-economic work initiated by conscious minorities for purposes of increased social mobilization
- (c) through a combination of the two.

Mobilization, as we have tried to employ the term in this book, is thus a complicated process that combines both social and political mobilization into an intricate and interlocking pattern. Social mobilization may be said to be the *intransitive* aspect of mobilization. Political mobilization, on the other hand, is its active, *transitive*, aspect.

People may be mobilized *against* an established but totally or partially illegitimate social order, such as for instance a colonial or a neocolonial system. They may also be mobilized *for* an alternative order, which they hope will better satisfy their social, economic, cultural, and political aspirations. Against and for are dialectically related to each other. Furthermore, the means necessary to reach the goals of any specific process of mobilization

are, in analogous manner, dialectically related to the situation against which mobilization occurs.

This means that mobilization for development against, for instance, a colonial system will look different from mobilization for similar goals against, for instance, a neo-colonial system. In the former case, an immediate goal will necessarily be to substitute a national regime for the colonial regime, and the mobilizing organization will appear as the nucleus of that alternative regime. In the latter case, we may conceive of a nationalist and anti-imperialist regime itself acting as the mobilizing leadership against internationally imposed neo-colonialism and against the internal groups supporting neo-colonialism, by appealing to the people's aspirations for social, economic, cultural, and political development. In both cases, concrete achievements with regard to development — improvement of the conditions of life — will sooner or later stand out as a necessary condition of continued mobilization in favour of the original mobilizing leadership. If this condition is not met, demagogic mystification, manipulation, and oppression are likely to take the place of mobilization as means of maintaining the leadership in power. *Fictitious mobilization* will be substituted for political or social mobilization. The door will then have been opened for the re-creation of illegitimacy.

Let us note finally that the concept of *political mobilization* — more central to us in this book than social mobilization — contains a fundamental dialectical tension or double implication of which it is important to be aware.

This doubleness in the concept is best brought out if we think of political mobilization as a dynamic process kept going through mutually supporting interaction and continual resolution of conflict between two poles. At one of these poles, we find control (by leaders), organization, guidance, direction, and large-scale planning. At the other pole, we find spontaneity, voluntary participation, control of leaders, collective self-control, and democracy in the most elementary and literal sense of the word. At different points between the poles, these two forces combine in varying ways and proportions.

If either of the two poles is weak or missing in a concrete situation, political mobilization as defined here will be either weak or non-existent in that situation. If both poles are strong and mutually reinforce each other, political mobilization will also be strong.

The more the process of interaction between the people and their leaders is characterized by authoritarian control and planning from above at the expense of democratic discussion and participation in and control of decision-making by those concerned by the decisions, the more will we be justified in using the term *fictitious mobilization*, or even manipulation and oppression, instead of political mobilization. If, on the other hand, a concrete situation is more or less exclusively characterized by spontaneous activity and actions at

the expense of coordination and any kind of control (self- or other), then we may speak of social mobilization and of opportunities for political mobilization, but we may not speak of political mobilization in the more specific sense in which the term has been used here.

The kind of combination of opposed forces emanating from the two poles is thus the variable we may think of as characterizing any particular and concrete process of mobilization. The range of the variable is from purely social mobilization all the way to purely fictitious mobilization, with different types of political mobilization in between.

The problem of operationalization and measurement

The problem of conceptual operationalization and measurement cannot be avoided in social science. But on the other hand, we should not allow it to become our predominant concern. Try to measure that which is worth measuring, yes, but investigate only that which is easily measurable and controllable, no.

We saw that Karl Deutsch operationalized his concept of social mobilization in such a way that levels of mobilization could be approximately measured by certain statistical percentages. But we also rejected Deutsch's definition as inappropriate for our present purposes. But as any reader of this book can verify, this does not mean that we are against the use of quantitative measures. On the contrary, whenever possible we have tried to present exact and even quantified information that can be related in a meaningful way to the degree of mobilization in Guinea-Bissau. But it is important to remember that such quantified expressions of social realities, however exact and reliable they may be, do not provide us with any easy short-cut to valid knowledge which may be compared between countries and societies.

School-enrollment, for instance, is something that is fairly easy to measure with reasonable accuracy and reliability in most countries. It is also something we can safely assume to be related in some way or other to politics and even to mobilization. But can we assume the nature of the relationship to be the same in different countries and societies? Obviously not. Suppose the percentage of the population enrolled in primary schools had been the same in liberated Guinea-Bissau as in those parts of the country still held by the Portuguese. Would we then have been justified in assuming the relationship between this piece of information and the level of mobilization to be the same in the two different parts of the country? Such an assumption would clearly have been senseless. The relationship might possibly have been the same, but it might also have been entirely different.

The same argument can be applied, in appropriate parts and with appropriate strength, to most of the quantified information contained in various international statistical handbooks, even those elaborated specifically for

social scientists interested in international comparison and in the accumulation of comparable information.³⁹ While these handbooks can certainly be highly useful for some purposes, and while it is important that social scientists present their findings in ways that add to already existing knowledge in a cumulative manner, reliable measurement and numerical exactness still do not solve the more fundamental problem of meaning or validity. The problem of measurement and reliability is a practical problem, while that of meaning or validity is a theoretical problem. The manner of approaching each of them must be adapted accordingly.

Etzioni's definition of mobilization does not lend itself to measurement quite as easily as Deutsch's. But the difficulties are more of a practical than of a logical nature. In principle, "assets" controlled by "units" could of course be counted and measured exactly. In addition to percentage of GNP used by the governments, Etzioni proposes such measures as "the percentage of the manpower employed or drafted by the governments, and the intensity of the identification with the nation or with national bodies (such as the Party) as against identification with sub-units (such as tribes, local leaders, and regions)."⁴⁰ These and similar measures are not unreasonable and might all be useful, provided we have reliable data and methods of measuring. But the serious problem of validity suggested above would still remain. What do we in fact measure, and how does it relate to the aspect of reality we are really looking for? No series of statistical indices in the world, however sophisticated, can help us get around this fundamental problem. It has to be faced separately for each investigation.

It is worth noting that Ahmad, whose views on the processes and mechanisms of mobilization are similar to our own, is sceptical of all superficial attempts to measure legitimacy, which is the key concept relating his problem to ours. Lack of legitimacy — arising from the contradiction between people's needs and aspirations and the existing structural and institutional arrangements of the society they live in — cannot be operationalized merely in terms of attitudes and beliefs. Legitimacy, Ahmad writes, "can be produced or snatched away neither by conspiracy, political conditioning, nor bargaining; neither by feats of organization nor symbol manipulation. It refers to that crucial and ubiquitous factor in politics that invests power with authority."⁴¹

Stressing the "ubiquity" of the crucial factor related to legitimacy or illegitimacy and hence to a society's potential for mobilization is just a vague

³⁹ Cf. D.V. McGranahan, C. Richard-Proust, N.V. Sovani, and M. Subramanian, *Contents and Measurement of Socioeconomic Development. A Staff Study of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development*, New York, Washington, and London. Praeger Publishers, 1972; and, Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1972.

⁴⁰ Etzioni, *op.cit.*, p. 411.

⁴¹ Ahmad, *op.cit.*, p. 152.

way of stressing that what we are primarily interested in here is a structural condition of society and not its various more or less measurable manifestations. These, of course, we are also interested in, but only in so far as we can know what they are symptoms of.

Presenting the problem of operationalization and measurement in the way we have now done, does not make it an easy problem. Does it make it an entirely impossible problem? We do not think so. In this book it has been approached in three different but related ways.

To begin with, the documented fact that the PAIGC has managed to establish effective political and military control over a considerable part of Guinea-Bissau against the determined resistance of the Portuguese was in itself regarded as evidence that political mobilization of the people by the PAIGC had in fact occurred. We assumed, both on theoretical and empirical grounds, that the establishment of PAIGC political and military power against the physical power of the colonial system simply could not have happened without the kind of social and political mobilization discussed and defined in this chapter having taken place. This assumption is also corroborated by available evidence about the evolution of the activities of the PAIGC since the movement was founded in 1956.

Secondly, we sketched, in Chapter II, the general historical, social, economic, and political background of national liberation in Guinea-Bissau and more briefly on the island of Cape Verde. In this way, it was hoped, the structural conditions of the illegitimacy of the colonial system would become evident to the reader. This illegitimacy, it was assumed, had provided fertile soil for the social and political mobilization of the people against the colonial system.

Thirdly, and most importantly, we studied in detail the ideological principles and organizational methods, the political, institutional and organizational structures, and the socio-economic and cultural innovations introduced by the PAIGC in order to make possible the political mobilization of the people of Guinea for the aims and goals of national liberation. Through this very concrete analysis of the revolutionary practice of the PAIGC, we hope to have strengthened our initial assumption that the political and military control established by the PAIGC in liberated Guinea-Bissau does in fact, to a considerable extent, rest upon social and political mobilization of the kind discussed and conceptualized in this chapter.

Concluding remarks

Our conceptual discussion in this chapter has dealt with a concept of mobilization broader than mere revolutionary mobilization for war of national

liberation against colonialism. This is because we presume the general applicability of the proposition that legitimate political power can, in the long run, be based only upon the satisfaction of the concrete interests of those groups and classes in whose name power is exercised. And by the term political mobilization, we refer precisely, although in a general way, to this possible way of building legitimate political power. Fictitious mobilization, on the other hand, is based upon demagogic mystification, manipulation, and violent oppression, and is therefore the best way of building illegitimate power. These two statements about political and fictitious mobilization are analytical. They follow from our view of legitimacy and from our definitions of different kinds of mobilization, and should therefore not be interpreted as merely subjective assertions.

Our study of the mobilization led by the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau has not proved the absolute truth of any general propositions. But it has given us some detailed insights into the conditions and mechanisms of mobilization in one concrete case. What conclusions, if any, are we entitled to formulate beyond what has already been said in the text of the preceding chapters?

The conditions of mobilization were set out in Chapter II, and the mechanisms were analyzed in Chapters IV–VI.

The conditions are those of an illegitimate and oppressive colonial social order, denying — with extreme violence — progress and emancipation to the vast majority of the people of Guinea-Bissau during the very historical period when almost all other countries of Africa are granted formal political independence and the right to set up their own national states.

Other important conditions are the small size of Guinea-Bissau; the lack of any ethnic group heavily dominating the others; remarkably skilful political leadership; the smaller economic importance to Portugal and to the international capitalist system in general of Guinea-Bissau as compared with Angola and Mozambique; the very small size of the white settler population; the general oppressiveness of the Portuguese colonial system; and the loyal support, first of all from the Republic of Guinea, but also, most of the time, from Senegal.

All the conditions now mentioned are specific conditions that we may assume to have facilitated political mobilization for national liberation in Guinea-Bissau. But of course there were also conditions, both general and specific, that worked in the opposite direction, making mobilization more difficult than it would have been, had those conditions been absent. Among more specific such conditions we may include the authoritarian and hierarchical social structure, favoring conservatism, of some of the peoples of Guinea, as well as the low educational level of the people in general. The most important general condition making mobilization difficult is simply what might be called

a certain social inertia, arising from unawareness of alternatives. This can only be overcome through active political work of education and propaganda, i.e. through conscious political mobilization, which is also what happened in Guinea-Bissau.

It seems clear to the present author that the conditions favoring political mobilization for national liberation were stronger than those working in the opposite direction in the total situation of Guinea-Bissau toward the end of the nineteen-fifties and the beginning of the sixties. The high degree of mobilization actually achieved by the PAIGC can be compared with the situation in most other African countries from 1960 and onwards, countries that have not been forced to fight for their political independence, that are still economically controlled from their former colonial metropolises, and that are often also split by ethnic and other internal divisions. It seems reasonable to connect the fact of very little political mobilization in most of these countries with existing differences between them and Guinea-Bissau with regard to such specific conditions favoring mobilization as those mentioned above.

Colonial resistance to national liberation by determined, large-scale warfare is certainly a factor of overriding importance. It is a well-founded hypothesis that any colonial power which obstinately resists formal political decolonization, once the claim has been seriously raised, actually only accelerates the process of political change by provoking a higher degree of political mobilization than would otherwise have been needed in order to achieve political independence. The less political organization, mass consciousness, and commitment to social transformation needed in order to achieve independence, the more there remains of the political struggle against underdevelopment afterwards, and *vice versa*. This is one perspective in which events in Guinea-Bissau since the end of the nineteen-fifties take on a significance that far surpasses the boundaries of this small country first reached by Portuguese sailors more than five hundred years ago.

Our study of the processes and mechanisms of political mobilization themselves, within Guinea-Bissau, indicates that political mobilization in the sense of strong leadership in continuous interaction with active participation, local democracy, and collective self-control was strong inside Guinea-Bissau during the period under consideration in this book. This was studied in Chapter IV. In the terminology of the PAIGC itself, both democratic centralism and revolutionary democracy seem to have functioned at the organizational levels inside the country.

As also indicated by our analyses in Chapter IV, however, centralism may well have been excessively dominant at the center of the movement.

In the analytical language proposed earlier in this chapter, there seems to have been a tendency at work toward fictitious mobilization at the center of

the movement. We recall that the term fictitious mobilization denotes the control pole in the permanent tug-of-war going on along a control/participation dimension assumed to be crucial to the analysis of mobilization. It is impossible, though, to say anything very exact or definite about the strength of this tendency toward fictitious mobilization.

On the basis of the facts and analyses presented in Chapter IV, both cautious optimism and cautious reserve with regard to the future of political mobilization in Guinea-Bissau are justified.

On the side of optimism we may list the fundamental fact of a functioning political organization and an emerging state, firmly anchored in the developmental needs of the people, existing and working inside liberated Guinea-Bissau.

On the opposite side we may list not only the difficulties already noted in maintaining revolutionary democracy all through the movement, from the base to the summit — such difficulties are, after all, not insurmountable — but also the likelihood that revolutionary democracy will be more difficult to maintain in the future, when independent Guinea-Bissau faces her future in peace. There are no guarantees that the present high degree of political mobilization, social egalitarianism, and absence of bureaucracy will be maintained, when the concrete tasks of the direct struggle for national liberation give place to the less harsh, but in some respects perhaps more subtle and complicated, tasks of peaceful economic and social development. On the other hand, there are no guarantees in the opposite direction either. Continued political mobilization in favor of independent socialist development thus remains a distinct possibility, although by no means a certainty. It will have to be consciously struggled for in the future as well.

It is worth noting in this context that the small size of Guinea-Bissau, while being a factor favoring mobilization as long as the war goes on, may well turn out to be a factor working in the opposite direction in the future. For small size, while facilitating coordination and communication in guerilla warfare, in times of peace means vulnerability to economic pressures from the global system of international capitalism, something decidedly not favourable to continued political mobilization in the socialist direction indicated both by the reality of Guinea-Bissau and by the ideology of the PAIGC.

The recent political and institutional developments described in Chapter V certainly do not foreclose the possibility of independent socialist development in the republic of Guinea-Bissau. If anything, they strengthen the chances for such development. But it is worth repeating that it is too soon to tell, at the moment of writing, how lasting the effects of the important political experiment of national elections and the creation of sovereign state organs will prove to be. As emphasized in Chapter V, all we can say with relative certain-

ty is that a piece of solid foundation for future political mobilization and institution-building was laid in Guinea-Bissau in 1972 and 1973. This, in itself, is significant enough.

In Chapter VI, finally, we investigated the concrete efforts and results of the PAIGC with regard to economic, social, and cultural development in the liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau. We also attempted some comparisons with the Portuguese side. In Chapters IV and V we had first investigated the political mechanisms through which interaction is established between the people and their leaders, thus making possible the mobilization of the people for the economic, social, and cultural development defined through the ideology of the PAIGC. It is fundamental to the theoretical conception of this book that the political and the socio-economic-cultural aspects of the revolutionary struggle for national liberation and development are merely different sides of one and the same process of mobilization. These sides mutually support each other, and one would not be possible without the others.

While Chapter II describes the structural conditions of illegitimacy against which political mobilization in Guinea-Bissau has taken place, Chapter III presents the ideology that guided those who consciously and successfully released and still direct the process. But it is in the combined presentation of political, economic, social, and cultural development, given in Chapters IV, V, and VI, that we arrive at the core of the theme of the book. Together these three chapters are intended to portray as accurately as possible the process of beginning regeneration, through politics, of a society and its culture—the difficult growth leading to the blossoming of a plant of history.

Appendix I

The following translation of the party program of the PAIGC is found in Ronald H. Chilcote, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa. Documents*, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1972, pp. 360–366. It is a translation from *Statuts et programme*, Conakry, PAIGC (no date), pp. 19–27.

The Party Program of the PAIGC

The PAIGC Minor Program

1. Structural union of all nationalist and patriotic forces of “Portuguese” Guiné and the Cape Verde Islands in order to liquidate Portuguese imperialist domination in these two African nations.
2. Structural union of nationalist and patriotic forces of Guiné and Cabo Verde at home and abroad in the fight for the liquidation of Portuguese colonialism.
3. Effective alliance with nationalist and patriotic organizations in other Portuguese colonies for mutual support and coordination of the fight for liquidation of Portuguese colonialism. Collaboration with African, Asian, and Latin American peoples who are fighting against colonialism and imperialism.
4. Effective training based on mobilization and organization of the popular masses to fight against Portuguese colonialism and imperialism.
5. Struggle — and only if necessary, armed conflict — for the rapid and total destruction of the Portuguese colonial forces in “Portuguese” Guiné and in the Cape Verde Islands and for the conquest of complete national independence for the peoples of Guiné and Cabo Verde. Fight against imperialism.
6. Structural union of all political, union, and mass organizations in “Portuguese” Guiné and in the Cape Verde Islands, to build a life of peace, well-being, and progress for the peoples of Guiné and Cabo Verde. In this union will be the permanent defense of the interests of the peasants and urban workers who make up almost the entire population.
7. During the fight for liberation and after the conquest of national independence, collaboration with all the progressive anti-colonial and anti-imperialist forces of the world for the construction of a life of peace and progress for all peoples.

The PAIGC Major Program

1. Immediate, total independence

1. Immediate conquest, using any necessary means, of national, total, and unconditional independence for the people of “Portuguese” Guiné and the Cape Verde Islands.
2. Conquest of power, in “Portuguese” Guiné, by the people of “Portuguese” Guiné and in the Cape Verde Islands, by the people of Cabo Verde.

3. Termination of all colonialistic or imperialistic relationships; and end to all the Portuguese and foreign prerogatives over the popular masses; revision or revocation of all agreements, treaties, alliances, concessions, made by the Portuguese colonialists involving "Portuguese" Guiné and the Cape Verde Island.

4. National and international sovereignty of "Portuguese" Guiné and the Cape Verde Islands. Economic, political, diplomatic, military, and cultural independence.

5. Permanent vigilance, based on the will of the people, to prevent or destroy any attempts by imperialists and colonialists to re-establish themselves, in new forms, in "Portuguese" Guiné and in the Cape Verde Islands.

II. National unity in "Portuguese" Guiné and in the Cape Verde Islands

1. Equal rights and duties, solid union and fraternal collaboration among the citizens, whether considered individually, by social class, or by ethnic groups. Prohibition and extermination of all attempts to divide the people.

2. Economic, political, social, and cultural unity.

In "Portuguese" Guiné this unity will take into consideration the social and cultural characteristics of the diverse ethnic groups, whatever their population. In the Cape Verde Islands, each island or group of similar islands in close proximity will be able to enjoy a certain administrative autonomy, always within the framework of unity and national solidarity.

3. The return to "Portuguese" Guiné of all emigrants who wish to return to their country. The return to the Cape Verde Islands of exiled emigrants or workers who wish to return to their country. Free circulation of citizens throughout the national territory.

III. Unity between the peoples of "Portuguese" Guiné and the Cape Verde Islands

1. After the conquest of national independence in "Portuguese" Guiné and in the Cape Verde Islands, union of the peoples of these countries for the construction of a strong and progressive African fatherland based on opportunely consulted popular will.

2. The form of union between the two peoples will be established by their legitimate, freely elected representatives.

3. Equal rights and duties, solid union, and fraternal collaboration between the peoples of Guiné and Cabo Verde. Prohibition and extermination of all attempts to divide the two peoples.

IV. African unity

1. After the conquest of national independence and if desired by freely manifested popular will, to fight for the unity of African peoples, considered as a whole or by continental regions, always governed by respect for liberty, dignity, and these peoples' right to political, economic, social, and cultural progress.

2. To combat any attempt by any nation whatsoever to annex or put pressure on the people of "Portuguese" Guiné or the Cape Verde Islands.

3. Defense of the rights and the political, economic, social, and cultural gains of the popular masses in "Portuguese" Guiné and in the Cape Verde Islands is the fundamental condition for the realization of unity with other African peoples.

V. Democratic, anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist regime

1. A republican, democratic, lay, anti-colonialist, and anti-imperialist regime.

2. Establishment of fundamental liberties, respect for the rights of man, and guarantees of the exercise of these liberties and rights.

3. Equality of citizens before the law, with no distinction as to nationality or ethnic group, sex, social origin, cultural level, profession, wealth, religious beliefs, or philosophical convictions.

Men and women will enjoy equality with regard to the family, work, and public activities.

4. All individuals or individual groups who, by their actions or conduct, favor colonialism, imperialism, or the destruction of the people's unity will be deprived of their fundamental liberties, by whatever means necessary.

5. General, free elections of organs of power based on universal, direct, and secret suffrage.

6. Total elimination of the colonial administrative structure and establishment of a national, democratic structure by the internal administration of the country.

7. Protection of the persons of all foreigners living and working in "Portuguese" Guiné and in the Cape Verde Islands who operate with respect for the current laws.

VI. Economic independence, a structured economy, and the development of production

1. Termination of all colonialistic or imperialistic relationships. Conquest of economic independence for "Portuguese" Guiné and the Cape Verde Islands.

2. Harmonious planning and development of the economy. Economic activity will be directed according to the principles of democratic centralism.

3. Four types of ownership: state, cooperative, private, and personal. The natural resources; the principal means of production and of communications; social security; the radio and the other means of broadcasting, of imparting information, and of spreading culture will be considered as belonging to the nation of "Portuguese" Guiné and of the Cape Verde Islands and will be employed in accordance with the needs of rapid economic development.

Voluntary cooperative exploitation of the land and agricultural production, of the production of consumer goods, and of handicrafts.

Private exploitation can be developed as needed to promote progress, on the condition that it be useful to the rapid economic development of "Portuguese" Guiné and of the Cape Verde Islands.

Personal property — especially individual consumer goods, houses, and savings earned through work will be inviolable.

4. Development and modernization of agriculture. Transformation of the present system in order to end the one-crop agricultural economy and to erase the obligatory character of earthnut cultivation in "Portuguese" Guiné and maize cultivation in the Cape Verde Islands. Struggle against agricultural crises, drought, floods, and famine.

5. Agrarian reform in the Cape Verde Islands, with private rural property to be limited in extent so that all peasants may have enough land to work. In "Portuguese" Guiné, to profit from the traditional agricultural structures and to create new ones that will permit the land to be used in a manner that will most benefit the people's progress.

6. Both in "Portuguese" Guiné and in the Cape Verde Islands, confiscation of lands and other possessions of proven enemies of the people's liberty and of national independence.

7. Development of modern industry and commerce. Progressive establishment of state commercial and industrial enterprises. Development of an African artisan class. State control of foreign trade and coordination of domestic commerce. Price adjustment and stabilization. Elimination of speculation and unjust profits. Harmony between urban and rural economic activities.

8. Budgetary equilibrium. Creation of a new fiscal system. Creation of national currency, stabilized and free from inflation.

VII. Justice and progress for all

A. At the social level

1. Progressive elimination of man's exploitation of man, of all forms of subservience of the human person for the profit of individuals, groups, or classes. Elimination of misery, ignorance, fear, prostitution, and alcoholism.

2. Protection of the rights of workers and guarantee of work for all who can work. Abolition of forced labor in "Portuguese" Guiné and of exportation of forced laborers or laborers taken "under contract" to the Cape Verde Islands.

3. Just salaries and fees based on the principle of equal pay for equal work. Positive competition in work. Limitation of the length of the work day consistent with the progress that must be made, but also with the interests of the workers. Progressive elimination of the differences between [working conditions for] urban and agricultural workers.

4. Freedoms for union and guarantees for their effective exercise. Participation and creative initiative on the part of the popular masses effective in all levels of national leadership. Instigation and support of both urban and rural mass organizations, principally those of women, youth, and students.

5. Social assistance for all unemployed, invalid, or ill citizens involuntarily in need. All institutions of public health and hygiene will be directed or controlled by the state.

6. Establishment of social services to be tied to the productive activity. Protection for pregnant women and infants. Protection for the aged. Rest, recreation, and culture for manual, intellectual, and agricultural workers.

B. At the educational and cultural level:

1. Educational centers and technical institutes will be considered as possessions of the nation and, as such, will be directed or controlled by the State. Educational reform, development of secondary and technical education, creation of universities and of scientific and technical institutes.

2. Rapid elimination of illiteracy. Compulsory, free primary education. Formation and urgently needed improvement of technical and professional staffs.

3. Total elimination of the complexes created by colonialism, of the consequences of colonialistic culture and exploitation.

4. In "Portuguese" Guiné, stimulation of the use of native languages and of the creole dialect; creation of a script for these languages. In Cabo Verde, stimulation of and a script for the creole dialect. Development of the cultures of the various ethnic groups and of the people of Cabo Verde. Protection and development of literature and the national arts.

5. Utilization of all the gains and discoveries of value made by human culture for the progress of the peoples of Guiné and of Cabo Verde. Contribution of these peoples' culture to humanity in general.

6. Support and development of physical education and sports for all citizens of "Portuguese" Guiné and of the Cabo Verde Islands. Creation of physical education and sports institutes.

7. Religious freedom; freedom to have or not have a religion. Protection of churches and mosques, of places and objects of worship, of legal religious institutions. Independence for religious personnel.

VIII. Effective national defense based on the people themselves

1. Creation of the groups necessary for an effective national defense: army, navy, and air force, tied to the people and led by national citizens. The fighters for the conquest of independence will form the central core of national defense.

2. Democratic system within the armed forces. Discipline. Close collaboration between the armed forces and the political powers.
3. All the people must participate in the vigilance and the defense against colonialism, imperialism, and the enemies of the people's unity and progress.
4. Absolute prohibition of foreign military bases in the national territory.

IX. International policy to be developed in the interest of the nation, of Africa, of peace, and of the progress of humanity

1. Peaceful collaboration with all the peoples of the world, with respect for the principles of mutual respect, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, nonaggression and noninterference in domestic affairs, equality and reciprocity, and peaceful coexistence.

Development of economic and cultural agreements with all peoples whose governments accept and respect these principles.

2. Respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.
3. Nonalignment with military blocs.
4. Protection for natives of Guiné and Cabo Verde residing abroad.

Comment

The version used by Chilcote differs in a number of details from *Programa do Partido*. Conakry, PAIGC (no date, but printed not earlier than 1969, since an added message is dated April, 1969). The following differences may be noted, among others:

1. *Programa do Partido* speaks only of Guinea, not of "Portuguese" Guinea.
2. Point I:5 of *Programa* ... reads (this and subsequent translations have been made by the author of this book):

Permanent vigilance, based upon the will of the people, in order to avoid or destroy all attempts by imperialism or colonialism to return in new form to Guinea and Cape Verde.

3. Point II:1 of *Programa* ... speaks of social *strata* (as opposed to classes).
4. Point V:5 of *Programa* ... reads:
Legislative and executive powers. Free and general elections, based upon universal, direct, and secret suffrage, in order to elect a legislative power, which shall, in turn, designate an executive power.
5. Point V:6 of *Programa* ... reads:
The autonomous regions of Guinea and the islands, or groups of islands, of Cape Verde will have the possibility to adopt regional measures, but always within the framework of national unity.
6. Point VI:3 of *Programa* ... includes *means of transportation* among the resources to be exploited or run by the *state* (as opposed to the nation).
7. Point VI:5 of *Programa* ... begins:
Agrarian reform on Cape Verde, in order to do away with large-scale private agricultural property and the system of tenancy, and in order to limit private rural property so that all peasants may have enough land.
8. Points VI:6 and VI:7 in *Programa* ... are numbered VI:7 and VI:8 respectively in Chilcote's version, as Chilcote's point VI:6 is the final paragraph of VI:5 of *Programa* ...

Appendix II

Program of Study of the Center for Political and Military Instruction (CIPM)

(translated by the author from typescripts available in Quembra, November 1970)

One Version

I. Colonial domination in Guinea

1. Its characteristics
2. Its consequences
Stress in particular:
 - a) the misery and ignorance
 - b) the injustices and abuses
 - c) racism and economic discrimination

II. Colonial domination on Cape Verde

1. Its characteristics
2. Its consequences

III. The PAIGC:

1. Mobilization and organization
2. Beginning of the armed struggle
3. Development of the armed struggle
Stress in particular:
 - a) difficulties met with
 - b) mistakes committed
4. The present situation:
 - a) with regard to politics and administration
 - b) with regard to the armed struggle
 - c) with regard to national reconstruction

IV. The Program of the Party (summary)

Some principles of the Party:

1. Criticism and self-criticism
2. Democratic centralism
3. Collective leadership
4. Revolutionary democracy

V. Training of the fighting men

1. What a fighting man of the Party is

2. For whom it is necessary to fight
3. Discipline and organization
4. Relations between the fighting men: comradeship and discipline
5. Relations between the fighting men and the people
6. Relations between the fighting men and people with posts of responsibility: confidence
7. The value of example
8. Secrecy, vigilance, security, and truthfulness
9. Necessary ever to improve military preparations
10. Criticism and self-criticism
11. Words and action
12. Work

VI. National unity and the struggle for national liberation

1. Tribalism
2. Regionalism

VII. Relations between the fighting men and the people

1. The support by the people as fundamental factor in the struggle for national liberation
2. The people: source of supplies, soldiers, and information.

VIII. Some of our weaknesses

1. Weak national consciousness
2. Economic and social backwardness — misery and ignorance
3. Lack of political experience
4. Lack of military experience
5. Improvisation.

IX. Our enemy

1. Who our enemy is
2. His economic, political, and military objectives
3. His strong and weak points
4. His internal, African, and international allies
5. Psychological warfare and politics.

X. Africa and our struggle — our allies, our enemies

XI. Contemporary struggle for national liberation. Decolonization

1. In the Portuguese colonies
2. In South Africa
3. In South Vietnam, Laos
4. In Latin America.

XII. The international situation

1. The imperialist camp and imperialist domination
2. The socialist camp
3. The third world, imperialist domination, and struggle for national liberation
4. General evaluation. Conclusions.

XIII. The present epoch

1. Great technical and scientific victories
2. Our exclusion from technique and science by Portuguese colonialism
3. The necessity for rapid development:
What we have to do in order to overcome rapidly our situation of underdevelopment:
 - a) put an end to economic exploitation
 - b) put an end to ignorance — attitudes toward study
 - c) attitudes toward work
 - d) economic spirit
 - e) struggle against parasitism
 - f) habits of organization, methods of work and planning.

Another Version

1. Moral training of the fighting men

- a) What is a fighting man of the Party? His duties.
- b) Relations between the fighting men — comradeship and mutual aid
- c) Relations between the fighting men and the people
- d) Revolutionary discipline (of the conscience)
- e) Differences between soldiers of the Party and soldiers of the Portuguese colonialists
- f) Secrecy, vigilance, and security
- g) Truthfulness, discretion, and modesty
- h) Words and action
- i) Necessary ever to improve military knowledge
- j) Criticism and self-criticism
- k) The value of example
- l) Relations between the fighting men and people with posts of responsibility

2. Brief history of Guinea and Cape Verde

Portuguese colonialism

3. Brief history of our Party

Creation of the Party. Mobilization and organization. Beginning of the armed struggle. Development of the armed struggle — difficulties met with. Present situation. Perspectives.

4. Program of the Party

Some of the Party's principles of work

5. Religion. God. Iran. Djambocosos

6. Tribalism

Its limitations and its evils. Racism. Its causes.

7. Differentiation within the people by (ethnic groups and) various social strata:

- favorable
- hesitant

- indifferent
- hostile

The political line of the Party with regard to each of these strata:

- a) Relations between the fighting men and the people. Limit relations between the people and the FARP. Respect the customs and the religion of each ethnic group. Respect the property of the population.
- b) The people: source of supplies, soldiers, and information
- c) Support by the people — fundamental factor in the struggle for national liberation.
- d) Tribalism and regionalism.
- e) Community of interests between our people and our fighting men (there is no contradiction of interests between our revolutionary armed forces and our people).
- f) Our weaknesses: constant struggle against our weaknesses.

8. *Our enemy*

- a) Who is our enemy?
- b) His objective (military, political, and economic)
- c) His strong points. His weak points. His allies (internal, African, and international).
- d) His tactics of psychological and political warfare
- e) Ourselves and the Portuguese people

9. *Our struggle and Africa*

Its significance for Black Africa. Our allies in Africa. Our enemies in Africa.

10. *Our struggle and the struggle of the Portuguese colonies.*

11. *Our struggle at the international level.*

Other struggles of national liberation (Vietnam)

The imperialist camp and NATO

The socialist camp and the USSR

Progressive forces in the capitalist countries

12. *The oath of the fighting man of the FARP*

Appendix III

The proclamation of statehood is included here as an appendix because of its historical importance for Guinea-Bissau and because it marks the end-point in time of our main task of analysis in this book. Other basic documents — such as the law of military justice of 1966, the electoral law of 1972, the constitution of 1973, and others — have not been included, however, as this would have entailed too many difficult decisions about where to draw the unavoidable line between materials to be included and materials to be excluded from the section of appendices. But all the basic documents are extensively analyzed and quoted in the various chapters of this book.

The translation of the proclamation of statehood used below has been borrowed from a booklet by Basil Davidson, *Growing from Grass Roots. The State of Guinea-Bissau*, London, Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola, and Guiné (no date), pp. 13 ff. It has been checked against the original (see the bibliography of this book). Davidson's booklet also contains a translation of the constitution of the new republic. It has not been included here, however, for the reasons mentioned above.

Proclamation of the State of Guinea-Bissau by the National Assembly of the People

The current era of man's history is characterised by the struggle of peoples for their full emancipation from colonialism, imperialism, racism and all other forms of domination and oppression hampering human development and dignity, peace and progress.

In the liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau, our people, guided by the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) under the enlightened leadership of its founder and No. 1 militant, Amílcar Cabral, has, in the course of 17 years of political and armed struggle, constructed a new life and now possesses a constantly-evolving administrative organisation, social and cultural services, a judicial system, a steadily developing economy and national armed forces.

The visit of a United Nations Special mission to the liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau from 2nd to 8th April 1972 served to confirm to the international community what has been attested to by dozens of impartial, honest observers from every continent: the self-determination of our people and the *de facto* existence of an efficiently functioning State Structure.

In flagrant violation of modern international law, the Portuguese colonialists are still encroaching upon some portions of our national territory. The United Nations has repeatedly recognised the illegality of the Portuguese presence, the inalienable right of our people to freedom and sovereignty, and the legitimacy of its struggle against Portuguese colonialism.

On the basis of the historic resolution 1514 (XV) of 14th December 1960 concerning the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council have reaffirmed the inalienable right of our people to self-determination and independence, particularly in General Assembly resolution 2918 (XXVII) of 14th November 1972 and Security Council resolution 322 (1972) of 22nd November 1972. Furthermore, on the proposal of the Special Committee on Decolonisation, the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session recognised PAIGC, the liberation movement of Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde islands, as the only and authentic representative of the people of the Territory.

The People's National Assembly, which is the result of PAIGC's successes in the fight against Portuguese colonialism, was constituted on the basis of the principle that power derives from the people and should serve the people. The Assembly is composed of representatives elected by universal and direct suffrage by secret ballot, being the expression of the sovereign will of the people of Guinea-Bissau.

At its meeting of 24th September 1973 in the Boé region, the People's National Assembly, expressing the sovereign will of the people:

SOLEMNLY PROCLAIMS THE STATE OF GUINEA-BISSAU

The State of Guinea-Bissau is a sovereign, republican, democratic, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist State whose primary objectives are the complete liberation of the people of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde and the forging of a union between those two territories for the purpose of building a strong African homeland dedicated to progress. The arrangements for this union will be determined, after these two territories are liberated, in accordance with the will of the people.

The State of Guinea-Bissau assumes the sacred duty of taking action to expedite, by every means, the expulsion of the forces of aggression of Portuguese colonialism from that part of the territory of Guinea-Bissau which they still occupy and to intensify the struggle in the Cape Verde Islands, which form an integral and inalienable part of the national territory of the people of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.

In due course, the People's Assembly of Cape Verde will be established in the Cape Verde Islands, with a view to the creation of the supreme body having full sovereignty over the people of Guinea and Cape Verde: the People's National Assembly of Guinea and Cape Verde.

The State of Guinea-Bissau regards the strengthening of the links of solidarity and soldierly brotherhood between our people and all peoples of the Portuguese colonies as one of the fundamental principles of its foreign policy; it stands in solidarity with the peoples struggling for their freedom and independence in Africa, Asia and Latin America and with all Arab peoples fighting against zionism.

The State of Guinea-Bissau is an integral part of Africa and strives for the unity of the African peoples, respecting the freedom of those peoples, their dignity and their right to political, economic, social and cultural progress.

As regards international relations, the State of Guinea-Bissau wishes to maintain and develop ties of friendship, co-operation and solidarity with its neighbours — the Republic of Guinea and the Republic of Senegal — with all independent African States and with all States throughout the world which recognise its sovereignty and support the national liberation struggle of our people. These relations shall be based on the principles of peaceful co-existence, mutual respect for national sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual advantage.

The State of Guinea-Bissau assumes responsibility for promoting the economic advancement of the country, thereby creating the material basis for the development of culture, science and technology, with a view to the continuing improvement of the social and economic living

standards of our population and with the ultimate aim of achieving a life of peace, well-being and progress for all our country's children.

Having as a foundation our heroic People's National Liberation Army, the State of Guinea-Bissau will provide our national armed forces with all necessary means to accomplish the task of bringing about the complete liberation of our country, and defending the achievements of our people and the integrity of our national territory.

From the historic moment of the proclamation of the State of Guinea-Bissau, authorities and organs of the Portuguese colonial State which exercise any political, military or administrative authority in our territory are illegal, and their acts are null and void. Consequently, from that moment on, the Portuguese State has no right to assume any obligations or commitments in relation to our country. All treaties, conventions, agreements, alliances and concessions involving our country which were entered into in the past by the Portuguese colonialists will be submitted to the People's National Assembly, the supreme embodiment of State power, which will proceed to review them in accordance with the interests of our peoples.

The State of Guinea-Bissau affirms the principle that it is fighting against Portuguese colonialism and not against the Portuguese people, with which our people wishes to maintain a friendly and co-operative relationship.

The State of Guinea-Bissau adheres to the principles of non-alignment. It supports the settlement of international disputes by negotiation and, to that effect and in accordance with the resolutions of the highest international organs, it declares its willingness to negotiate a solution which will put an end to the aggression of the Portuguese colonial Government that is illegally occupying part of our national territory and committing acts of genocide against our populations.

The frontiers of the State of Guinea-Bissau delimit the territory situated between latitudes 12° 20' and 10° 59' north and between longitudes 16° 43' and 13° 90' west, that is to say bounded by the Republic of Senegal to the north, the Republic of Guinea to the south and east and the Atlantic ocean to the west. The territory consists of a mainland part, a string of coastal islands and all the islands comprising the Bijagos archipelago and covers a land area of 26,125 square kilometres plus the respective territorial waters and corresponds to the area of the region formerly designated as the colony of Portuguese Guinea.

The State of Guinea-Bissau appeals to all the independent States of the world to accord it *de jure* recognition as a sovereign State in accordance with international law and practice. It expresses its determination to participate in international life, particularly the United Nations, where our people will be able to make its contribution to solving the fundamental problems of our times both in Africa and in the world.

PEOPLE'S NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Boé region, 24th September 1973

Appendix IV

Front page of leaflet distributed by the PAIGC among the soldiers of the Portuguese army in Guinea-Bissau

— SOLDADO PORTUGUÊS —

Como muitos outros já o fizeram, os ex-fuzileiros ANTONIO JOSÉ VIEIRA PINTO, N.º 1227-7, JOSÉ ARMINDO SENTIEIRO, N.º 1225-7 E ILBERTO COSTA ALFAIATE, N.º. 790-8 abandonaram a tropa colonial no dia 18 de Fevereiro.

NA EUROPA, PARA ONDE SEGUIRÃO DENTRO DE BREVES DIAS, OS TEUS COMPATRIOTAS CONTARÃO COMO FORAM RECEBIDOS PELO NOSSO PARTIDO.

E, com os outros que já fizeram o mesmo e estão agora em França ou em qualquer outro país, eles lembrar-se-ão de ti soldado português.

De ti que continuas no exército colonial:

A participar em crimes contra o nosso povo;

A contribuir para ruína do teu país;

A sofrer a tirania dos oficiais;

A correr o risco de seres mutilado ou morto, como muitos milhares de jovens já o foram,

SOMENTE PARA O GOZO DOS RICAÇOS DA TUA TERRA

PROVA QUE ÉS UM HOMEM QUE SE RECUSA A COMETER CRIMES E A MORRER INUTILMENTE NUMA GUERRA JÁ PERDIDA.

**ABANDONA A TROPA COLONIAL
QUE SERAS BEM RECEBIDO**

NÓS NÃO LUTAMOS CONTRA O POVO PORTUGUÊS, CONTRA INDIVÍDUOS PORTUGUESES OU FAMILIAS PORTUGUESAS.

PEGAMOS EM ARMAS PARA LIQUIDAR NA NOSSA TERRA, A DOMINAÇÃO COLONIAL PORTUGUESA, QUE NUNCA CONFUNDIMOS COM O POVO DE PORTUGAL!

P. A. I. G. C.

— PORTUGUESE SOLDIER —

As many others have already done, the ex-infantry-men ANTÓNIO JOSÉ VIEIRA PINTO, No. 1227-7, JOSÉ ARMINDO SENTIEIRO, No. 1225-7, and ILBERTO COSTA ALFAIATE, No. 790-8, abandoned the colonial troops on February 18.

IN EUROPE, WHERE THEY WILL ARRIVE WITHIN A FEW DAYS, YOUR COMPATRIOTS WILL TELL HOW THEY WERE RECEIVED BY OUR PARTY

And, as the others who have already done the same thing and who are now in France or any other country, they will remember you, Portuguese soldier.

You, who continue in the colonial army:

to take part in crimes against our people;

to contribute to ruining your country;

to suffer the tyranny of your officers;

to run the risk of being mutilated or killed, as many thousands of young people have already been

ONLY FOR THE PLEASURE OF THE MONEY-GRABBERS OF YOUR COUNTRY

GIVE THE PROOF THAT YOU ARE A MAN WHO REFUSES TO COMMIT CRIMES AND TO DIE A USELESS DEATH IN A WAR THAT HAS ALREADY BEEN LOST

ABANDON THE COLONIAL ARMY

YOU WILL BE WELL RECEIVED

WE DO NOT FIGHT AGAINST THE PORTUGUESE PEOPLE, AGAINST PORTUGUESE INDIVIDUALS, OR AGAINST PORTUGUESE FAMILIES.

WE TOOK ARMS IN ORDER TO LIQUIDATE, IN OUR COUNTRY, PORTUGUESE COLONIAL DOMINATION, WHICH WE NEVER CONFUSE WITH THE PEOPLE OF PORTUGAL!

PAIGC

(translated by the author)

Appendix V

Form used for the registration of proceedings of People's Courts of liberated Guinea-Bissau

<small>REGIÃO LITORAL DA GUINÉ</small> SERVIÇOS DA POPULAÇÃO E JUSTIÇA TRIBUNAL POPULAR DE _____ TERMO DE AUDIÊNCIA	
<p> Ano _____ dias do mês de _____ de 19____, nesta habitação da sala das audiências do Tribunal Popular de _____ onde se achava o Presidente, camarada _____, cougo nascer, se findo declarado, ali se _____ houve: presença de juizes _____ do aberto a sessão da audiência de instrução e julgamento. Submetido a julgamento o acusado, _____ na causa nº _____/19____, ao qual respondeu como-torcedor na lei dos costumes desta região eo no nº _____ da Lei de Justiça Militar, à chamada compareceu o mesmo. Inicialmente o camarada _____ fez a apresentação do caso: Em seguida foi lido o questiono, o réu e as testemunhas que, em return, fizeram o seguinte: </p> <p> Questiona: _____ </p> <p> O réu: _____ </p>	<p> 1ª Testemunha: _____ </p> <p> 2ª Testemunha: _____ </p> <p> 3ª Testemunha: _____ </p> <p> Finalmente o camarada _____ fez a conclusão para a sentença. Suspensa a sessão, os juizes retiraram-se para a elaboração da sentença que, uma vez redigida e assinada, foi lida em voz alta ouvindo o réu de pé. Nada mais havendo a tratar-se foi encerrada a sessão da audiência. E para constar lavrei este termo que lido e conferido vai ser assinado. De _____ o escrevi e sub-assinei. </p> <p style="text-align: right;"> _____ O Juiz Presidente </p>

Modelo 23 - Tip. de P. A. S. G. C. - 1 Maio 54.

POPULATION AND JUDICIARY SERVICES

People's Court of . . .

Text of proceedings

On the . . . days of the month of . . . , 19 . . . in this village, in the court room of the People's Court of . . . , where the President, comrade . . . , at . . . o'clock, was present together with myself, the clerk, under-signed, and the judges . . . , the session of instruction and judgment opened. The accused . . . was submitted to judgment in the case no. . . /19 . . . , in which a penalty may be incurred according to the customary law of this region or no. . . of the Law of Military Justice. The accused appeared in court. First, comrade . . . presented the case. Then, the plaintiff, the accused and the witnesses were questioned. In summary, they stated as follows:

The plaintiff:

The accused:

First witness:

Second witness:

Third witness:

Finally, comrade . . . concluded for the sentence. The session was suspended and the judges withdrew in order to formulate the sentence. After the session had re-opened, the sentence was read aloud. The accused was standing up.

As there was no more business to perform, the session was closed. In order to establish this fact, I prepared this text, which will be signed after having been read and verified. I, . . . , wrote and signed.

. 19

The clerk

.....

(translated by the author)

Appendix VI

Form used for the registration of marriages

REGIÃOES LIBERTADAS DA GUINÉ

SERVIÇOS DA POPULAÇÃO E JUSTIÇA

REGISTO CIVIL

DECLARAÇÃO PARA CASAMENTO Nº _____

No dia _____ de _____ de 19 _____ compareceram perante mim _____
_____, de _____ anos de idade natural de _____, sector de _____
_____, e _____ de _____ anos de idade, natural de _____
_____, sector de _____, os quais declararam que pretendem contrair matrimónio pela forma e com os efeitos estabelecidos pelo nosso Partido no exercício da soberania do Povo da Guiné e Cabo Verde de quem é o legítimo representante.

E para constar lavrei este auto que lido e conferido vai por eles assinado e por mim _____
_____ encarregado dos serviços do registo civil nesta Inter-região.

Assinaturas

NOTA Por não saber ler nem escrever, o noivo, a noiva (ou ambos) deixa (m) as suas impressões digitais.

Noivo

Noiva

(Encarregado do R. C.)

Mod. 47 — Tip. do P. A. I. G. C. — 1.000 Ex.

On the .. day of ..., 19 .., .. years of age, from the sector of ... and ..., .. years of age, from the sector of ..., appeared before me. They declared that they wished to marry, in the form and with the effects established by our Party during its exercise of the sovereignty of our people of Guinea and Cape Verde, of which it is the legitimate representative.

In order to establish this fact, I prepared this document, which will be signed by them and by myself, in my capacity as responsible for the civil register in this inter-region (South or North), after having been read and verified.

Signatures

Bridegroom

Official in charge
of the civil register

Bride

Note: if they do not know how to read and write, the bridegroom, the bride (or both) may use their fingerprints.

.....

Appendix VII

Ballots of the kind used in the 1972 elections in liberated Guinea-Bissau

(translated by the author)

Sources, References, and Literature

I. Unpublished source materials

Included in this book are a great number of different materials, such as statistical and other information compiled by party officials inside the liberated areas and shown to the author, the raw tables of the PAIGC statistics kept at the party headquarters in Conakry in 1972, and various private notes and letters shown to the author. The character of these materials is specified, whenever referred to in the text. The following unpublished, internal, documents were made available to the author:

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Regulamento de disciplina interna. Quembra, 21 de Maio de 1970, CIPM, Quembra, PAIGC (typewritten), 1970.

Cabral, Amílcar: *Sobre a situação da luta* and *Sobre alguns problemas práticos da nossa vida e da nossa luta*, mimeographed transcripts from tape-recordings of Cabral's two major speeches at meeting of the *Conselho Superior da Luta*, August 9–16, 1971.

Regulamento interno dos internatos das regiões libertadas, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), September 1971.

Projecto da Revisão de Lei da Justiça Militar, Conakry, PAIGC (typewritten), 1972.

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I. Laws, decrees, and other fundamental documents of the "party as a state" and of the sovereign state proclaimed in 1973

Lei da Justiça Militar de 19 de Setembro de 1966. Com as modificações introduzidas pelo Bureau Político do Partido, na reunião de 20 a 23 de Dezembro de 1966, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), 1966.

Sur la création de l'Assemblée Nationale Populaire en Guinée (Bissau). Résultats et bases des élections générales réalisées dans les régions libérées en 1972 (communiqué), Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), January 1973.

Proclamação do Estado da Guiné-Bissau, adopted by the National Assembly of the People meeting in the region of Boé, September 24, 1973, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), 1973.

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Estatutos dos Pioneiros do Partido, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), no date.

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Statuts de l'Institut Amitié (official translation into French), Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), 1969.

Decisão, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), August 30, 1970, document through which certain decisions made by the Permanent Commission of the party were circulated.

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Résolution adoptée par le Comité spécial à sa 854ème séance, le 13 avril 1972, à Conakry (Guinée), AF/109/63, provisional, April 13, 1972 (mimeo).

Message du Comité Exécutif de la Lutte du PAIGC, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), January 1973.

Biographies sommaires des membres du Secrétariat Permanent du Comité Exécutif de la Lutte, issued on July 24, 1973, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), 1973.

4. Statistics

La République de Guinée-Bissau en chiffres, Commissariat d'Etat à l'Economie et aux Finances (mimeo), February 1974.

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Cabral, Amílcar: *Un crime de colonialisme (Fondements juridiques de notre lutte armée de libération nationale). Extrait du rapport présenté par le camarade Amílcar Cabral, du Comité Spécial de l'O.N.U. pour les territoires administrés par le Portugal*, Conakry, PAIGC (mimeo), 1961.

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VIII. Interviews and participant observation

In addition to the materials listed above, this book is also based upon the author's detailed notes from a great number of both formal and informal interviews, made in 1970 and 1972 in Guinea-Bissau, the Republic of Guinea, and Senegal, with PAIGC cadres and militants at all levels of the organization, as well as upon the author's own observations from a three-week visit inside the liberated areas of the South and the East in November 1970 and a fifteen-day visit inside the liberated areas of the North in April 1972. In addition to the time actually spent inside the liberated areas, the author also spent many weeks, both in 1970 and 1972, in close contact with the PAIGC organization in the Republic of Guinea and in Senegal.