REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN AFRICA

Edited by

SVEN HAMRELL
Refugee Problems in Africa
REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN AFRICA

EDITED BY
SVEN HAMRELL

CONTRIBUTORS:
Cato Aall, Jacques Cuénod,
John Eldridge, Margaret Legum,
Z. K. Matthews, T. Peter Omari, George Ivan Smith

The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies
UPPSALA 1967
The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies has served at Uppsala since 1962 as a Scandinavian documentation and research centre on African affairs. The views expressed in its publications are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute.

© Nordiska Afrikainstitutet
All rights reserved

Printed in Sweden by
Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri Aktiebolag
Uppsala 1967
# Contents

1. PREFACE 7

2. THE PROBLEM OF AFRICAN REFUGEES 9

3. REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 26
   Cato Aall

4. THE PROBLEM OF RWANDAN AND SUDANESE REFUGEES 45
   Jacques Cuénod

5. PROBLEMS OF ASYLUM FOR SOUTHERN AFRICAN REFUGEES 54
   Margaret Legum

6. EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF REFUGEES AND THEIR POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPMENT 65
   John Eldridge

7. FROM REFUGEE TO EMIGRÉ: AFRICAN SOLUTIONS TO THE REFUGEE PROBLEM 85
   T. Peter Omari

8. THE ROLE OF VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS IN THE REFUGEE SITUATION IN AFRICA 97
   Z. K. Matthews

9. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 110
   George Ivan Smith

10. CONTRIBUTORS 122
Preface

The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies was established at Uppsala in 1962. Its main purpose is to provide information on developments in Africa to official institutions and private organizations in Scandinavia.

Once a year the Institute arranges an international seminar on contemporary African problems. These seminars are organized in order to provide opportunities for Scandinavian experts and research workers in this special field to listen to and discuss their problems with foreign specialists and to acquire information, new ideas and a widened perspective.

The Institute held its third international seminar in Uppsala on April 26–28, 1966, on the subject of "Refugee Problems in Southern and Central Africa". About 50 representatives of different organizations active in the field of refugee work and of African political movements took part. The seminar was planned in consultation with Mr. Ragnar Dromberg, head of section in the Swedish Foreign Office, and Mr. Thord Palmlund, head of section in the Swedish International Development Authority and secretary of the Swedish Commission on African Refugee Education. Advice was given during the planning stage by the then Director of the International University Exchange Fund, Mr. Øystein Opdahl, who, together with his successor as Director, Mr. Lars-Gunnar Eriksson, provided the seminar with background material for the discussions. Part of the cost of the seminar was covered by a grant from the Swedish International Development Authority.

The papers presented to the seminar (as public lectures at the University of Uppsala) are printed here in the order in which they were delivered. Some of the authors have added new material to include recent developments and the new African geographical names have been used throughout, viz. Bechuana-land has been referred to as Botswana and Basutoland as
Lesotho. The introductory chapter on "The Problem of African Refugees" has, however, been written especially for this volume, and was completed in the spring of 1967. Mr. Neil Tomkinson has assisted in preparing the manuscript for publication.

The Institute is deeply grateful to the distinguished contributors for their generosity in placing their papers at our disposal for publication in this book. Our thanks are due to Mr. Erik Westerlind, Governor of Province, Stockholm, and chairman of the Swedish delegation to the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and Professor Torgny Segerstedt, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Uppsala, for opening the seminar. We also wish to thank Mr. Sverker Aström, Swedish Ambassador to the United Nations, for his closing address.

Seem Hamrell
Acting Director of the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies

Uppsala, April 1967
The Problem of African Refugees

Introduction

It is a well-known fact that in the last 10 years a series of refugee situations and refugee problems has emerged gradually all over the African continent. There are at present some 730,000 refugees in Africa, mostly south of the Sahara.

While nowadays refugee problems are not confined to Africa, it is true to say that, owing to the involved numbers, the economic and social misery, the human tragedy and also the political background and implications, the refugee problem in Africa is one of the most acute problems of that continent and one of the most acute refugee problems in the world. This is abundantly demonstrated by the attention which is being currently devoted to African refugee problems in the meetings of such bodies as the United Nations Organisation and the Organisation of African Unity.

The emergence of refugee problems in Africa is directly connected with the political revolutions which swept over the African continent after the second World War and which resulted in the creation of no less than 38 independent African states. The majority of refugee situations stem from the liberation efforts which continue today, particularly in the southern part of Africa, and which are not like to cease soon. Other refugee problems result from explosive internal, social and political situations, which existed long before the colonial period but which came to a climax only after independence was reached, when the internal forces were no longer controlled by the straight-jacket of colonial domination.

There are, broadly speaking, two categories of refugees in Africa:

(a) Huge groups of rural refugees, who cross the borders of
their country of origin and seek asylum in a neighbouring area, which very often, although not necessarily, is similar to their homeland in respect of climatic and general physical conditions and also from an ethничal and tribal point of view.

(b) Small and scattered urban groups, refugees with some intellectual or professional background, students or would-be students, who already in their country of origin were disconnected from their original rural environment and who tend to congregate in African capital cities, particularly in the politically more important capitals.

The solution to the problem of massive rural refugee groups seems to have been found. It consists of rural settlement in the country of asylum, i.e. in the creation of entirely new rural communities. Considerable efforts have been made in this direction, particularly on the initiative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and with the assistance of the governments of the countries of asylum, other agencies of the "United Nations family" and many nongovernmental organizations. The need has appeared for consolidating and developing these new rural communities; this raises the problem of integrating refugee-settlement schemes with the overall development programmes of the countries concerned and, therefore, with the economic and social development programmes in Africa, whether national, bilateral or multilateral.

The situation and certainly the solution are less clear as far as the urban refugee groups are concerned. Those who have been concerned over the years with refugees in Europe (or in overseas countries of European structure) should have no difficulty in understanding the problem. The intellectual or would-be intellectual refugee has not been easy to integrate in European countries for a variety of reasons of a legal and factual nature, including language problems. Quite apart from legal considerations, which play an increasingly important role also in Africa, it is difficult to provide the African urban refugee with employment in a barely existent "private sector" of industry. It is no less difficult to provide the African refugee with employment in the public sector, which quite naturally,
as in all other countries of the world, is open primarily, if not only, to nationals.

The purpose of the seminar organized by the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies in Uppsala in April 1966, and consequently the purpose of this publication, is not only to acquaint public opinion with the problem of refugees in Africa. It is primarily an opportunity to analyze the problems, to ask questions and to see to what extent appropriate replies to the questions can be given.

The rural settlement of many thousands—hundreds of thousands—of refugees in Africa changes the physical aspect of many African regions. It is in a way a dramatic venture, possibly comparable—for the historians who in a number of years will be describing the birth of modern Africa—to the development of Siberia or North America in the nineteenth century. But meanwhile, how viable are these new settlements? Will alien African groups integrate into new African nations who want to abolish tribalism but who have not yet succeeded in doing so?

Is it possible to provide adequate education facilities for refugees at all levels in a continent where illiteracy is still prevalent and where the new African nations cannot afford to provide free education for all their children? Are there reasonable opportunities of employment for the young African refugee who has completed his secondary or perhaps his university studies and feels legitimately entitled to use his knowledge in the scarcely available higher occupations?

Can the internationally accepted standards of legal protection of refugees, as they are embodied in the Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the status of refugees, be implemented in Africa, while we know that they are not yet fully implemented in Europe and in other parts of the world?

The problems of refugees were recognized as being of international importance only after the first World War, i.e. recently, from a historical point of view. It has taken Europe a few centuries to deal with this problem as a subject of international concern and international law. While Europe should and must make available her experience in this field to the new nations in Africa, she must do so with a touch
of humility, recognizing that she herself has dealt with her own refugee problems in an imperfect manner and has not yet completely solved them.

It is also clear that the problem of African refugees, if it can be solved, should be solved mainly by the Africans themselves. The developed and rich countries of Europe and the other continents can and should give material assistance in a truly humanitarian spirit. They can and also should give advice, but the final answer is the response of African society to an African problem.

The Size of the African Refugee Problem

The size of the African refugee problem is indicated in Tables I and II. The figures do not take into account the number of refugees in Africa before 1964, which was the year when an intensified programme of assistance to the refugees was initiated and when it was possible to get more accurate data as to their number. It should be emphasized that many of these figures are approximations and that it is impossible to obtain exact figures for the refugee groups. It should also be stressed that the tables only take into account large groups of refugees but that there are in almost every country in Africa groups of refugees, such as those from southern Africa.

The tables show that the overall number of refugees in Africa is increasing. The number of new arrivals is, however, partly counter-balanced by substantial reductions through voluntary repatriation, beginning in 1965. To this new trend should be added the impact of the various material-assistance programmes which by the beginning of 1967 had further reduced the number of needy refugees to an estimated 300,000.

The situation in each country of asylum is analysed in the following sections, taking into account the various material-assistance programmes in operation and the ways in which the

---

1 The following survey has been compiled from various sources. Most of the figures have been extracted from reports produced by the U.N. High Commissioner's Office for Refugees.
governments of asylum and international and voluntary organizations are co-operating in dealing with the problems.

**Burundi**

The total number of refugees living in Burundi at the end of 1966 was estimated at 79,000, of whom 54,000 were Rwandese and 25,000 Congolese.

The Rwandese refugees arrived in two major waves. The first wave arrived sometime before and after Rwanda received its independence in July 1962. At the request of the Burundi Government a relief and initial land-settlement programme was carried out jointly by the UNHCR and the League of Red Cross Societies. Under this programme the refugees were transferred from the border area to three settlements (Kayongozi, Kigamba and Muramba) in the eastern part of Burundi.

In 1963, upon completion of this operation, the Burundi Government requested the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Labour Office (ILO) to implement an integration and zonal-development project covering the three refugee settlements and the adjacent area. This project provided for the drainage of marshland, the reclamation of arable land, the construction of workshops and community centres, road-building, improvement of livestock, etc. The Burundi Government made a cash contribution of 4 million Burundi francs to the project, the UNDP provided funds to the ILO and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) for the recruitment of four experts, and the UNHCR provided the balance of the funds required. This project was successfully completed in early 1967.

The second major wave of Rwandese refugees arrived in December 1963 and the beginning of 1964. This was followed by the arrival of several thousand Rwandese refugees, who had initially sought asylum in the Kivu Province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo but as a result of the disturbances had moved into Burundi.

The Burundi Government allocated a new area in the eastern part of the country called Mugera, which is located not far from the other three settlements. With the assistance of the World Food Programme, which provided food supplies,
Table I. Estimated numbers of refugees of the main refugee groups in Africa
(The discrepancies in the totals are due to rounding.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of asylum and refugee group</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Central African Republic</th>
<th>Congo (Dem. Rep. of)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Situation on 1.1.1964</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angolans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>225,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congolese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guineans*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambiquans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwandese</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>54,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudanese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>287,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Situation on 1.1.1965</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angolans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congolese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guineans*</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambiquans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwandese</td>
<td>58,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>28,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudanese</td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>78,000</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>286,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Situation on 1.1.1966</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angolans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>270,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congolese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guineans*</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambiquans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwandese</td>
<td>52,000</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudanese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>20,500</td>
<td>317,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Situation on 1.1.1967</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angolans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congolese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guineans*</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambiquans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwandese</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudanese</td>
<td></td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>79,000</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>357,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Refugees from Portuguese Guinea.
south of the Sahara (by country and group).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
<th>Total by group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>225,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>154,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>59,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>58,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13,300</td>
<td>67,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>166,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>20,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>113,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>535,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>270,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>47,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>155,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>83,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>28,500</td>
<td>137,000</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td></td>
<td>625,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>800</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>303,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>74,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>20,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>68,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>159,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>115,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61,000</td>
<td>33,300</td>
<td>156,000</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td></td>
<td>735,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15
Table II. Situation and movement of main refugee groups in Africa south of
(The discrepancies in the totals are due to rounding.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation as of 1.1.1964</th>
<th>Evolution 1.1.1964 to 1.1.1965</th>
<th>Situation as of 1.1.1965</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angolans</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congolese</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>58,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guineans&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambiquans</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwandese</td>
<td>154,000</td>
<td>12,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudanese</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>7,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>135,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> From Portuguese Guinea.

the UNHCR, who gave a substantial cash contribution, and the technical services provided by an agency specializing in rural development (the International Association for Rural Development Overseas), the Burundi Government implemented a land-settlement programme for 27,000 Rwandese refugees, which was successfully completed in early 1967. Under this project pipelines some 80 km long were installed to distribute drinking water in the refugee villages.

Roads had to be built, as well as a number of new bridges. As the area was infested with tsetse fly, an eradication scheme was launched with successful results. Approximately 1,260 hectares of marshland were drained, and most of this land was under intensive cultivation. A number of construction works were completed, such as warehouses, a dipping tank for cattle, a co-operative shop, a small vocational training centre for carpenters and blacksmiths and a honey-extraction centre.

With the completion of two major land-settlement projects in early 1967, the refugees have reached a minimum subsistence level, without, however, enjoying the same standard of living as the local population. Consequently another project to consolidate the social and economic conditions of the refugees and to improve those of the local population was launched in February 1967, with the participation of the Burundi Govern-
the Sahara, 1 January 1964 to 1 January 1967.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evolution 1.1.1965 to 1.1.1966</th>
<th>Situation as of 1.1.1966</th>
<th>Evolution 1.1.1966 to 1.1.1967</th>
<th>Situation as of 1.1.1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,100</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>270,100</td>
<td>34,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>7,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>155,500</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63,200</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>83,500</td>
<td>32,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>625,000</td>
<td>135,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ment, the United Nations Development Programme, the ILO, the FAO, the UNHCR, the World Food Programme and the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM), a British voluntary agency.

Besides the Rwandese refugees, Burundi had also to face the problem of the refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who started to seek asylum in Burundi during the first part of 1967. Their number fluctuated greatly and it is estimated that, while 27,000 Congolese refugees entered Burundi, mainly in the first half of 1966, some 15,000 returned voluntarily to the Congo during the second half of the year. At the beginning of 1967 it was estimated that there were still 25,000 Congolese refugees in Burundi. No systematic local settlement programme has been undertaken, since voluntary repatriation seems to be the solution which will be ultimately chosen by the refugees.

**Central African Republic**

The first stream of Sudanese and Congolese refugees started in early 1964 in the eastern part of the country. Their number increased during 1965 and 1966 and at the beginning of 1967 was estimated at 27,000 Sudanese and 16,000 Congolese.

At the request of the Central African Government a relief
programme was launched for the Sudanese refugees, to which the UNHCR, the Catholic Relief Services, OXFAM and several other voluntary agencies contributed in cash or in kind. The most urgent needs of the refugees were covered under this programme up to May 1966. At that point an initial land-settlement project was agreed upon by the Central African Government, the League of Red Cross Societies and the UNHCR, to settle some 27,000 refugees between Banbouti and Obo, a township located some 140 km from the Sudanese border. While this programme was being implemented, discussions took place between the Sudanese and the Central African Governments, in order to promote voluntary repatriation and to settle inside the Central African Republic those refugees who would not avail themselves of the opportunity to return to their country of origin.

Early in 1967 the Government of the Central African Republic indicated that it was planning to resettle refugees in the area of Mboki some 280 km west of the Sudanese border. The representatives of the League of Red Cross Societies and the UNHCR started immediately to work out a plan with the assistance of the Central African authorities and the FAO expert.

In addition to the Sudanese refugees, the Central African Government granted asylum to Congolese refugees, whose number was estimated at 16,000 at the beginning of 1967. The most needy refugees amongst this group benefited from a relief operation implemented by the League of Red Cross Societies. It is expected that voluntary repatriation will in due course permit a solution to the Congolese refugee problem.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

There are three main groups of refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Angolan, Rwandese and Sudanese), totalling some 350,000 persons at the beginning of 1967.

At that time, it was estimated that there were 300,000 Angolan refugees in the Congo, a number which increased by 30,000 in the course of 1966. The settlement of these refugees was provided for mainly by voluntary agencies and was facilitated by favourable local conditions. Thanks to contributions
received from the Swedish Government, the UNHCR and some voluntary agencies, a special effort was devoted to the education and vocational training of these Angolan refugees. Thus the facilities of a secondary school were extended and a new vocational training centre for agriculture, carpentry, tailoring and blacksmith's work was built in Kimpese and inaugurated in October 1966.

Practically all of the 24,000 Rwandese refugees are living in the Kivu Province. After a relief and initial land-settlement operation carried out jointly by the League of Red Cross Societies and the UNHCR from 1961 to 1964, the ILO prepared and implemented an integration and zonal-development project to enable the refugees to become self-supporting and to integrate with the local population. The implementation of this project, to which the Congolese Government, the UNDP and the UNHCR contributed, had to be slowed down as a result of the sequestration of property and expulsion decrees issued in August 1964 against Rwandese refugees and other foreigners residing in the Congo. In order to relieve the tension created by the concentration of Rwandese refugees in the Kivu area, the UNHCR organised the resettlement in Tanzania of 3,000 refugees. This unique operation was carried out thanks to the generous policy of asylum adopted by the Tanzanian Government.

In spite of the slow-down imposed on the ILO project, some progress was achieved during the period from August 1964 to December 1966, when both decrees were rescinded. Particular emphasis was placed on the cultivation of tea and the development of co-operative societies. It is expected that the ILO/UNHCR project will be completed by the end of 1967.

Finally, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo granted asylum to Sudanese refugees, whose number was estimated at 24,000 at the beginning of 1967. The UNHCR and OXFAM contributed to a relief operation carried out by voluntary agencies, in order to cover the most vital needs of the refugees, in particular with regard to medical aid and distribution of food. The implementation of this programme
was considerably delayed by events which occurred in the Orientale Province during the summer and autumn of 1966. At the end of the year negotiations started between the Governments of the Congo and the Sudan, aiming at facilitating the voluntary repatriation of refugees and, alternatively, at resettling those refugees who did not wish to repatriate further inland at a reasonable distance from the border. An agreement to this effect was eventually concluded between the two governments early in 1967.

**Senegal**

From 1960 a trickle of refugees began arriving from Portuguese Guinea, but they posed no great problem to Senegal. They were accepted spontaneously by the inhabitants of Casamance, who belonged to the same group of tribes as the refugees. Therefore, the refugees were easily absorbed into the Senegalese community. However, after May 1964 a mass influx of refugees took place and forced the Government to request the assistance of the international community. The Catholic Relief Services made available food, while the League of Red Cross Societies, in co-ordination with the Senegalese Red Cross and with the assistance provided by other national societies, undertook a health programme in Casamance. The UNHCR made cash contributions in 1964, 1965 and 1966. At the end of 1967 the total number of refugees was estimated at 61,000.

Within the framework of the land-settlement programme each family receives arable land, seeds and fertilisers, in addition to food supplies, medical assistance, blankets and used clothing. Responsibility for the programme was vested in a national committee for aid to refugees, presided over by a Senegalese Government official. Funds under the programme were also used for building bridges, in order to gain access to new arable land, for the sinking of water wells, for the installation of veterinary stations, for the purchase of school materials, for primary education, for extending a hospital and for an experimental project for growing rice.

At the end of 1966 it was estimated that at least two-thirds of the refugee population had reached the same standard of
living as the local Senegalese population, while it is expected that most of the remaining 20,000 living in Casamance will be self-supporting by the end of 1967.

The Senegalese authorities had to face another problem—that of the refugees of various origins who found themselves stranded in Dakar. The Senegalese Government decided to set up a counselling service in order to assist these refugees and find solutions to their problems on an individual basis. The UNHCR agreed to contribute to this project. The problem of unemployed refugees moving into large cities is by no means confined to Dakar. It will, therefore, be interesting to follow the results of this counselling service, which may serve as an example to other large cities in Africa which are faced with similar problems.

Tanzania

Tanzania has granted asylum to three main refugee groups from Mozambique, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in addition to a number of refugees of various origins, particularly from southern Africa. The total number of refugees was estimated at 34,000 at the beginning of 1967.

The first main group of refugees who sought asylum in Tanzania were those from Rwanda. Their present number is 13,500. These refugees started to arrive in 1959 and in 1962 land-settlement projects were elaborated for them in two areas located in the north-eastern part of the country. Thanks to a concerted effort by the Tanzanian Government and the international community, represented by the UNHCR, the League of Red Cross Societies and several other voluntary agencies, such as the British Red Cross, OXFAM, the Swedish Churches, the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service and the World Council of Churches, today the 8,800 refugees living in these two settlements are self-supporting and are likely to become productive communities in the near future, to the benefit of their country of adoption.

In 1964 the Tanzanian Government agreed to resettle the 3,000 Rwandese refugees who first sought asylum in the Kivu Province of the Congo but were living in areas greatly affected
by the events. An area was chosen for the resettlement of these 3,000 refugees in the western highlands of Tanzania at a height of 2,000 metres. The refugees travelled about 1,000 km, first by boat from the embarkation point at Bukavu to Goma, then by air from Goma to Tabora, by train from Tabora to Mpanda and finally by lorry to Mwesi. This dramatic scheme, unique in the recent history of African refugees, illustrates the generous asylum policy followed by Tanzania in respect of refugees of rural stock and could serve as an example of African solidarity between countries which are overburdened with refugees and others which are able to absorb a substantial number of immigrants.

The problem of the refugees from Mozambique reached sizeable proportions in late 1964, when 10,000 Mozambiquans sought asylum in southern Tanzania. At the beginning of 1967 their number grew to 19,000. These refugees are distributed among three settlement areas—Rutamba, Muhukuru and Lundu—accommodating 6,000, 2,500 and 4,000 refugees respectively. The settlement at Rutamba is the most advanced and it is expected that after the April 1967 harvest, food rations may be reduced or discontinued. The infrastructure of the settlement was completed during 1966 and includes an all-weather access road, the laying of pipelines for water supply, together with water tanks and pumps, a health centre, a school unit comprising three classrooms and teachers' houses, as well as offices and warehouses. The other two centres at Muhukuru and Lundu are still in the initial phase.

Tanzania also granted asylum to some 5,000 Congolese refugees. In 1966 2,200 of them returned voluntarily to their country of origin. The remaining 800 are being settled in Pangale, together with a small group of refugees from Malawi.

_Uganda_

Uganda is granting asylum to three large groups of refugees whose number was estimated at 156,000 at the beginning of 1967. The first refugees to arrive were those from Rwanda, who sought asylum as from 1961. In early 1965 there were 68,000 Rwandese refugees, of whom 38,000 were living in seven
organized settlements, while the rest were successful in settling among the Uganda community, especially in areas where they had close links with the local population. One characteristic of the settlement of Rwandese refugees in Uganda was the great number of cattle which the refugees brought with them. Special areas were allocated to cattle-owners and had to be cleared of the tsetse fly by a bush-clearing operation covering an area of 22,500 hectares.

While the first group of Rwandese refugees was being settled in the Orachinga and Naki Vali areas, the new wave of refugees which arrived during 1963 and 1964 was moved into the Toro District, together with 10,000 head of cattle.

By the end of 1966 the Rwandese refugees who arrived in Uganda in 1961 and 1962 had reached the minimum level of self-subsistence, while it is expected that those who arrived later and are being settled in the Togo District will reach this level by the end of 1967.

In 1964 some 30,000 Congolese refugees were granted asylum in Uganda, and 1,600 were divided amongst three agricultural settlements. In 1966 discussions took place between the Governments of Uganda and the Congo on the possible voluntary repatriation of the Congolese refugees to their home country. So far very few of the Congolese refugees have availed themselves of this opportunity.

Sudanese refugees started to arrive in large numbers in Uganda as from 1962. At the beginning of 1967 their number was estimated at 55,000. The refugees crossed the border, bringing with them 16,000 head of cattle, as well as hundreds of sheep and goats. As these herds were infected with sleeping sickness, they had to be slaughtered, thus depriving the refugees of their main means of livelihood.

Furthermore the drought which Uganda suffered in 1965 greatly hampered the efforts of the refugees to settle on the land. Finally, in July 1966 the Government decided for security reasons to remove thousands of Sudanese refugees from the border areas further inland. These factors made it necessary for the Government to review the planning of assistance to Sudanese refugees in Uganda.

By the end of 1966, four land settlements were organised,
accommodating a total of 11,000 Sudanese refugees. Although all of them were receiving rations at that time, it is hoped that considerable progress will be achieved during 1967, providing there are no further major influxes of refugees and no adverse influences on the cultivation of crops.

Zambia

In December 1965 the Government of Zambia requested the assistance of the international community in coping with an increasing number of refugees. By the end of 1966 there were 3,800 refugees from Angola, 1,800 refugees from Mozambique and 700 refugees of various origins, mainly from southern Africa. It should be noted that during 1966 the number of refugees fluctuated greatly, as some 5,600 arrived, while 5,000 were voluntarily repatriated to their country of origin.

The refugees from Mozambique are being settled in one rural settlement and it is expected that they will be self-supporting by mid 1968.

The refugees from Angola started to arrive in May 1966 and most of them had to be transported away from the troubled border to three rural-settlement sites.

The other refugee groups are relatively small and scattered. As most of these refugees are not of rural stock, various solutions have to be worked out, often on an individual basis.

Various Countries

It is possible to find small groups of refugees in almost every African country. Often the governments of the countries of asylum do not ask for international assistance, as the problem can be dealt with by local resources. In other instances, voluntary agencies have assisted individuals or small groups of refugees, sometimes with the financial help of the UNHCR, who, of course, extends his legal-protection functions to every refugee falling within his mandate. Individual cases often pose a number of problems, both of a legal and a material nature, which are difficult to solve. Refugees wishing to be resettled in another African country are typical examples and require
numerous démarche, as well as funds, before a solution can be found and implemented.

Among the countries which have accepted limited groups of refugees, mention should be made of Togo, where at one point up to 3,000 Ghanaian refugees sought asylum. In late 1965 Rwanda accepted refugees from Burundi, whose number reached approximately 3,000 in 1966, before decreasing as a result of spontaneous voluntary repatriation. Nigeria granted asylum for several years to a small group of Togolese refugees, who were expected to return to their country of origin during the first part of 1967. A small group of Cameroonian refugees are being resettled in Ghana, with the assistance of the National Red Cross Society. In Ethiopia and Kenya there are groups of refugees of various origins, who are being assisted mainly by voluntary agencies. For a short period in 1966 Dahomey granted asylum to a number of Nigerian refugees, who thereafter returned to their home country.

In Botswana, there are at present some 220 refugees. Approximately 70 are from South Africa, 130 from South West Africa and the remaining 20 from Rhodesia. A feeding programme, covering some 80 needy refugees, was operated in Francistown until the second half of 1966. The refugees in the Kazungula centre were transferred to Francistown in October 1966. Most of the refugees in Lobatsi have managed to find some kind of employment.

Lesotho is totally surrounded by the Republic of South Africa and this creates great problems for the refugees. At present there are less than 100 refugees in Lesotho. Needy refugees are receiving relief assistance through the Refugee Committee in Maseru.

In Swaziland, there are 120 refugees known to the Refugee Committee. Forty are from Mozambique and 80 from South Africa, and it seems as if the number may increase. Some of the refugees have managed to obtain work, although often not in their former field of training or occupation. Maintenance is provided by the Refugee Committee. It appears that the best solution for those refugees not undergoing educational training is resettlement in another country of asylum.
Cato Aall

Refugee Problems in Southern Africa

Introduction

In military surgery, time, for obvious reasons, has always been of great importance. In our time, with the great threat of atomic warfare looming in the background, it has become even more imperative to treat the possible survivors quickly and adequately. It is absolutely imperative that they be treated almost immediately, so that the healing processes are well under way before the effects of radiation become manifest. At a later stage, healing is slow or impossible and the injured are then in danger of suffering a slow, prostrating and agonising death.

Refugees also suffer under radiation—a radiation of another kind—which is experienced as general hostility and constraint. Unless treated quickly, the refugee almost inevitably develops either apathy or a reckless attitude that "the world owes me a living", which later proves almost ineradicable. There is a slow, prostrating and agonising death—of the hopes, the idealism and the feeling of solidarity with which the refugees began. Therefore, here also—and this is nothing new—the time factor becomes imperative.

The refugee problem concerns not only the refugees themselves but also the people of their new environment. The bad effects of the refugees' maladjustment adds to and aggravates among the host population an already existing and natural attitude of reserve towards anyone unknown. This results in a worsening of the relationship between the refugees and the host country, to the disadvantage of both. The problem is not new but it is new to those who experience it for the first time.
The time factor: quick and adequate action

This will by no means solve the problems—they are far too complex to be altered by one factor alone. There are other factors, such as lack of money, lack of qualified administrators, the political situation and not least, the refugees themselves. Most often, however, the various elements will appear in combination, seldom alone. But still, as regards the time factor, quick and adequate action may alleviate the problem, and in this way influence the other factors in a positive manner. Nothing of this is radically new. Things have gone wrong and have gone well for refugees before, and they will do so in future. The same experiences have to be gained again and again. And yet it seems worth while to repeat old remarks in a new context.

We all know that there are great differences between Europe and Africa. Europe is densely populated and industrialised and its administration and system of communications are well established. It has also had recent experience of massive modern war. And yet it was faced with almost insoluble refugee problems; some of them were never solved and the refugees died in the meanwhile. Most parts of Africa, on the other hand, are thinly populated, with large unpopulated areas in between. In many places an administration is in the process of being built up and communications are poor or non-existent.

In addition, there are enormous differences between the relatively well-industrialised South Africa and the large non-industrialised rural areas in most of the rest of Africa, where society is based on village life, and where industry and what goes with it is located in few and relatively small centres. The difference between the life of a man from Johannesburg and that of a villager in Zambia or Tanzania is much greater than any similar contrast that could be found in Europe.

The distance that refugees from Francistown in Botswana have to be moved to Livingstone in Zambia—mostly through roadless bush—is roughly the same as between Frankfurt and Hamburg, or between Stockholm and Oslo, or London and Glasgow. One should try to imagine what it would be like to travel this distance in one stretch by truck; for most of it
there is no road, and during this trip one would pass only two villages with a few hundred people. In between there are only trees and grass and wild animals. The animals are exciting to look at but dangerous to collide with, one elephant being many times as heavy and strong as a lorry. If anything happens here, one may be more than a hundred miles from any human being, on a "road" where it may be more than a week or a fortnight before another car passes.

All this is necessarily reflected in the way refugee assistance has to be administered and the way the refugees and the host— the "locals"—react to the refugee situation. It seems perhaps too self-evident to mention, but it is not. For good or ill, assisting organisations from abroad participate more or less in administering and handling refugee work. There is nothing special about this. Outside means are drawn upon in almost every field of work in Africa, and this is likely to continue for some time. But this again means that many of the organisations and institutions abroad which participate will derive much of their experience and practice from events in Europe. This must be reflected in their way of thinking and planning, but often it cannot be directly transplanted to Africa. This is just another example of the general situation in Africa with regard to outside participation.

Refugee matters can only be tackled successfully within the context of general developments in Africa. This means that the problems have to be attacked at the very base. Little is accomplished by vainglorious prestige projects. What is needed is broad-based projects closely connected with local development and yet established in such a way that refugees may fit in.

But instead of talking in general terms, it may be useful to put forward as illustrations a few examples of how the situation presents itself in Zambia. But it should be kept in mind that these examples could almost as well have been taken from, say, the Congo or Tanzania. Again, to recall the difference between Europe and Africa, it may be useful to mention briefly a relatively recent refugee situation in Europe which demonstrates in how many ways the situations are not comparable.
Some Examples

*Hungarian refugees in 1956*

When the Hungarian crisis arose in 1956, it was relatively easy to get a comparatively accurate picture of what happened. The world was kept informed by hour-to-hour reports of what was going on. When, therefore, the refugees poured into Austria, it did not come as a surprise, and there was an overall good response to appeals for help.

People had fled from a situation which was well defined, understood and known. The refugees belonged to one nation: they were Hungarian-speaking people who fled to another country, Austria, which has a German-speaking population. They crossed a well-defined and well-marked border.

*Moçambiquan refugees in the Eastern Province of Zambia*

The events were very different when in December 1965 Zambia was faced with a situation in which several thousand refugees from neighbouring Moçambique streamed into its Eastern Province. They came quite unexpectedly, and it was very difficult to get a clear picture of what had happened, except that some kind of violence had taken place. According to what the refugees related, the Portuguese had reacted very violently to some attempts at sabotage, by the mass execution of village people who had had nothing to do with the sabotage.

The refugees came into a region in which many areas are almost regularly stricken by famine. Apart from the Luangwa River, there is no well-defined border. The refugees were spread over an area of more than 150 square miles in which many places are inaccessible by road. The refugees were villagers in the true sense of the word. They had little, if any, contact with modern society; few of them had ever been to a hospital or seen a doctor; and hardly any of them knew how to write or read.

When it was decided that the refugees were to be transferred to one place for the sake of proper administration and food distribution, many were unwilling to go. Since they were of the same tribe as the locals, they had intended to stay with their friends and relatives. Many of them therefore went into
the villages to hide, and when the police came to ask them to come to the new camp, they ran into the fields and the bush, returning only when the police had left.

With the refugees spread over such a large area, food distribution became extremely difficult, and it was not made easier when some of the local people also presented themselves as refugees. As has been mentioned, many of the people in this area at times live on the brink of starvation. And since there has always been a great deal of movement and migration within the tribal area—the border between the two countries is a fiction to them—the concept of a refugee is often very difficult to establish.

As has been mentioned, the refugees were scattered all over the area during the first few weeks: some of them collected at various widely separated points, and this made proper food distribution very difficult. Food consisted mainly of mealie-meal (maize). But at a later stage, after the refugees had been collected in one camp and dried fish and other foods containing protein were available, it was still for some time difficult to organise adequate food distribution. The refugees and those dealing directly with them were content as long as they got the mealie-meal they wanted.

When the refugees arrived, a great many of them were suffering from malnutrition, although in most cases only slightly. But during their initial period of stay and until adequate food distribution had been established, there was a remarkable decline in their general state of health. Signs of malnutrition became more evident, particularly among the children. Even after a proper supply of food had been arranged, it took some time to build up the general state of health.

In the meantime, unfortunately, there was an outbreak of measles. Normally a measles epidemic is not much to worry about, but under these circumstances it became a very serious matter, as many of those affected, and particularly the children, were in a poor state of health. General distribution of milk powder had started very early, but it was difficult to get the children to drink the milk—they had never done so before. Thus, having low resistance, many of them got pneumonia and

30
other infections, and began to die. Some of them were brought to the hospital near the camp, but often when they had passed beyond the stage at which treatment was possible. When children died in the hospital, the refugees became alarmed and thought they had died because of the hospital. The result was that the parents began to hide their sick children, and even more died. This was during the rainy season, and the children were hidden outdoors and lay on the wet ground. No specific medical treatment would help in this situation; what was required was a general improvement in the standard of living, and this was provided by food, blankets, clothing, advice and help from social workers. Gradually the crisis was overcome. The number of children who died was regrettably large, although not catastrophic. There were some fifty registered cases over a period of three months out of a refugee population of some 3,500.

But the rumour about the epidemic spread and made those refugees still in villages even more reluctant to go to the camp. Many who were at the camp left. In addition it seemed that the Portuguese had started an effective propaganda campaign among the refugees. They were said to have been warning the refugees that, if they went to the camp, their children would die, and their men would be sent as forced labour to the Kariba Dam. At the same time, those who were willing to return were promised help to make a new start at home. The Zambian Government had made it clear the whole time that anyone wishing to return was free to do so. On the other hand, all those wishing to remain in Zambia could do so, provided they did not take part in politics.

The relationship between the refugees and the local people has been very good throughout, and there have been no signs of jealousy towards the refugees on account of the assistance they received. One important point surely is that the refugees

---

1 The absurdity of this should be explained. For one thing, the Kariba Dam was completed long ago, and secondly, the dam was under strong military guard on both the Zambian and the Rhodesian side in connection with the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by Rhodesia only a few weeks earlier.
are not regarded as aliens, but as unfortunate fellow men. The refugees have also been very friendly and co-operative. From the very beginning the Government has been in charge of the matter and has been very energetic in engaging the refugees to grow crops in communal fields. Shortly after the arrival of the refugees the Government cleared and ploughed land with equipment from the Roads Department. The refugees have built their own huts, and thus established a refugee town at Nyimba. Fortunately the International Refugee Council of Zambia (IRCOZ) had enough United Nations World Food Programme commodities in stock and could therefore immediately begin providing the necessary food. This arrangement will continue until the refugees have become self-supporting and can provide their own food. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been called in and a plan has been worked out for individual and communal farming; education, social and medical services are, as far as possible, to be integrated into the local existing facilities. But in the meantime, the refugees have become used to camp life in their refugee town, and some time will have to elapse before it will be possible to start this resettlement plan. The final number of people in the settlement is believed to be stabilised at about 2,000.

Walk-out from a refugee college

In striking contrast to the above-mentioned villager refugees from Moçambique are the semi-educated or educated refugees who have left their home countries with the intention of furthering their education, which they cannot do at home. A high proportion of them come from South Africa and South West Africa. The number of these refugees is relatively small: whereas the above-mentioned Moçambiquan refugees can be counted in thousands, the latter only appear in tens. Some of them have made their arrangements well in advance and are easy to handle and place. But many have no fixed plans at all. Often it takes quite a long time to make adequate arrangements. After all, where the question of formal education is involved—something which takes many years and much money—it is necessary to consider and plan carefully in ad-
vance, and this too takes time. But the refugees do not always understand this.

It may be of interest to mention some examples to show the kind of mentality some refugees may develop. There is the story of a group of students from South Africa and South West Africa. They had all gone through Botswana and had the experience of waiting and waiting and waiting in uncertainty as to that what their future might be—but all the time hoping for some kind of scholarship.

In the meanwhile they were unable to participate in any positive and constructive activity. Everyone who has been in Francistown in Botswana knows of the frustration and the hostility that surrounds the refugees there.

Some of them had been in conflict with the law after quarrels at various hotel bars, and quarrels about the food at the transit centre. Had they not been sent onwards, they would have had to go to prison. At Kazungula, on the Botswana side of the river forming the border between Zambia and Botswana at the Caprivi Strip, there was another period of waiting before they were cleared for moving on. At the next stop, the Lusaka Transit Centre, there was further waiting until, finally, together with some other refugees, they were admitted to the African-American Institute (AAI) Secondary School in Zambia, the Nkumbi International College, a school for refugees and Zambians.

Some of them had been difficult to deal with all the way through. Nothing was good enough, and everything arranged had, in their eyes, a secret and ill-meaning motive in the background. Some of them thought they were over-qualified to go to the Nkumbi International College and thought they had in fact deserved “better” scholarships. It is not an unusual thing for refugees—like many other people—to greatly over-estimate their own qualifications and abilities. In this case, it looked as if the students felt they had been given a special punishment by having to go to the College. It was, however, hoped that, once they were established at the College and busily engaged in their studies, the problem would disappear by itself.

Regrettably this was not the case. Somehow they continued to take everything the wrong way and began making various
demands. In the beginning the College was willing to consider their complaints, until a stage was reached at which the following demands were made:

1. An improved menu (the menu at the school was in fact very good, far better than at many boarding schools and indeed much better than most Zambians could dream of);
2. The employment of servants to sweep the floors and do the laundry;
3. Transport arrangements on Saturdays for going to dances and the cinema in the nearest town, which is Broken Hill, some 70 miles from the College.

When the College refused to consider these demands, the students staged a walk-out and left the school. They were later found marching along the main road, where they were picked up and brought to Lusaka.

These students have made everybody furious and brought a lot of difficulties upon themselves and those dealing with them, who, after all, are trying to do things in the best way possible. They have set an extremely bad example, which may jeopardise the prospects of future applicants.

Obviously, at the time they left South Africa, they could not have imagined that at a later stage they would be complaining about food or not wanting to wash their shorts—so one must hope! Something must have happened to them. Admittedly they have had an unpleasant time, but indeed it was nothing compared with what others have suffered, many of whom have grown maturer in fighting against the difficulties, instead of developing an attitude that nothing is good enough and "the world owes me a living".

It should be remembered, however, that, even if these cases are in a way typical, by no means all refugees develop this attitude—or at least not to its full extent. There is a tendency to remember the difficult cases, perhaps because of all the extra work, excitement, despair and pain they cause. The easy cases are easier to forget, although they are very often the more deserving and the typical ones. But it seems worth while to go deeper into the question of why some refugees get into such a difficult mental state and what can be done to counteract it.
**Attempted assistance interpreted as obstruction**

Another unfortunate example may be mentioned. This concerns two Angolan refugees who, after having moved about in various countries, finally got to Zambia. They had applied for scholarships in another country in Africa through the International University Exchange Fund (IUEF) and contact had been established to the point at which it seemed that they could both be admitted to a pre-university course with the possibility of continuing at university level if successful in the pre-university course. The IUEF was willing to grant the scholarships, provided their admission was confirmed by the educational institution in question. But no such confirmation was received, in spite of letters and telegrams to various addresses there. Apart from it being irresponsible to send them off before being satisfied that the necessary pre-arrangements had been made, it would in fact have been impossible to get tickets for them and have them admitted to the country of destination without having made these arrangements beforehand. And even if it had been possible to send them out of Zambia, they would most probably have been sent back to Zambia at the expense of their sponsoring body.

After negotiations with the AAI it was arranged that they could stay at the Nkumbi International College while they were waiting; they could learn English there and otherwise spend the time usefully. However, they bluntly refused to go to the College. They were convinced that a plot existed against them with the intention of preventing them from going to the place where they had their scholarships. In spite of lengthy discussions with them, this idea of their scholarships being withheld had become so fixed and they were so convinced of their misinterpretations that it seemed that nothing was going to convince them that they were not being cheated.

**Some Facts to Keep in Mind**

*The importance of the time factor again*

As can be seen from these few examples, it is justified to emphasize repeatedly *the importance of the time factor*, and
the need for quick and adequate action. Once a kind of mental deadlock has been permitted to develop, some of the refugees feel that they have been manoeuvred into a position in which they are not able to take advantage of whatever chances may be offered to them, however sensible they may seem to those who make them. It is therefore essential to act before such a state develops.

The difficulty in giving exact figures
From the foregoing it may also be understood how difficult it is to produce exact figures of the number of refugees. In a fluctuating and unclear situation figures with discrepancies of almost 100% must be regarded as fairly exact. Therefore it is not surprising to find, for instance, that the number of refugees in the Congo, according to different sources, varies from 200,000 to 500,000. How could accurate figures be given, when the exact figure of the local population is not known, when the refugees are often not distinguishable from the local population, when the people in question or part of them are moving, some in this, some in that direction, and at the same time are spread over a large area?

The difficulty in categorising refugees
And what is a refugee in Africa? Who qualifies for being classified as a refugee? And if he does so today, what about tomorrow? Many attempts are being made to distinguish between various categories of refugees on a legal, political or humanitarian basis. Some people make a distinction between genuine refugees and a rather difficult-to-define remainder group, who are regarded as criminals, subversive elements, saboteurs, agitators, spies, informers, Communists, adventurers and others. Clearly, it is difficult to find a common platform on which everyone can agree. It may be useful to mention two major groups who may serve a useful purpose in this context:

(i) A large group of villager refugees—village people who have run across the border to escape violence and shooting, in which they do not participate by virtue of political conviction. The best way of handling these refugees seems to be resettlement, if possible within the same tribe.
(ii) A relatively smaller group of educated refugees who have left their countries with a definite plan to further their education, which they cannot do at home. These refugees are political refugees, although they may or may not belong to a recognized political party. If they do not, they find themselves in additional difficulties and they therefore often claim to belong to one of the recognized political parties.

Somewhat on the periphery are the "freedom fighters", who again form a special category not dealt with in this context. Further, there are the adventurers, the opportunists, the criminals, etc.

It should be kept in mind that the classification of refugees in various categories may be a fiction, as the same individual may move from one category to another, and if he is not careful, he may be so unfortunate as to end up as a displaced person, a P.I. (Prohibited Immigrant), and, as such, not be granted the protection he is entitled to as a refugee. He may thereby technically and administratively not be allowed to live anywhere.

General Problems in Relation to the Southern African Refugee Situation

Although the problems arising from the Southern African refugee situation are seen and expressed differently by the refugees themselves, the refugee-assisting organisations and the African Governments, the actual situation is the product of the joint actions of all three. Some general observations can be made to illustrate the situation.

One predominant factor is the political situation. On the one hand, there is the general policy of independent Africa towards non-independent Africa. On the other hand, there is the national and domestic policy of each country. This has to take into account the question of security, and the local opinions of the refugees. The admission of refugees into educational institutions or into employment is weighed against the available facilities (or lack of them) and the local aspirations for high positions and promotion. The national policy as regards refugees
has also to take into account the general level and trend of development in the country. When all these opposing interests have to be combined in a general policy, it is difficult to avoid its becoming in many ways restrictive.

Some years ago, when many countries on the African continent were about to become independent or had recently become independent, the general opinion and expectations as regarded development in the non-independent areas were far more optimistic than they are now. Today, when the situation in one way seems more stabilised, and in another way more explosive than ever, independent Africa has become more cautious.

This is so partly because of the many problems and difficulties that were dormant before independence, but now present themselves with vigour as development goes on and new activities grow. Even if governments wanted to, their domestic demands and problems are such that an additional burden of problems becomes almost unacceptable. It is a fact one cannot get round: refugees always mean problems—unpleasant and difficult problems.

Secondly, the political developments in Africa during recent years have unavoidably led to a tightening of the refugee policy. There is a growing cautiousness and anxiety about outside forces. There is a growing frustration with regard to UDI and critical voices express their doubts as to whether Britain is serious about Rhodesia. Many fail to understand the aims of British policy, which is purported to be the restoration of the legal administration in Rhodesia. What legality had this administration? It is regarded as having been unjust, now more than ever, and apart from the question of whether there is to be majority rule or not. The revolutions in Nigeria and in Ghana have added to the general feeling of insecurity and recent happenings in other parts of Africa reflect the same tendencies.

Questions are being asked. Are there any signs of change in the near future in South Africa, Angola or Moçambique? If not, what is the sense of people leaving the country? Why don't

---

1 UDI = Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Rhodesia).
they stay at home and carry on the fight there? Why cannot the political parties of these countries unite instead of quarrelling with each other? For how long are the present refugees going to stay? What are they going to do in the meanwhile? What guarantees are there that they—a frustrated but relatively well-educated group—will not try to interfere in domestic politics, and in this way represent a severe threat to security? The independent countries in many ways feel that they simply cannot afford to take the risk of accepting more refugees. How do they know if refugees who apparently come for education or employment do not intend to infiltrate and try to exert political pressure, which may very well not be in the interest of the host country?

And still there are hundreds of thousands of refugees in independent Africa. The majority of them are what has been termed “villager refugees”, and in general they represent the lesser risk from the security point of view. It is the second kind of refugee, the qualified, educated refugee—what the English call the “sophisticated” refugee—who is guarded cautiously. Past events have shown that a group of, say, a hundred well-disciplined and organised men under certain circumstances can do wonders in independent Africa.

The Refugee Situation in Zambia

After having considered the general situation in Africa, of which Zambia is an integral part, and presented some detailed examples from Zambia, the general refugee situation in Zambia may be dealt with briefly.

1. Villager refugees

(i) Mozambiquan refugees in the Eastern Province. Nyimba Camp and planned resettlement scheme, including agricultural, educational, social and medical facilities. The final number will probably be about 2,000.

(ii) Angolan refugees. In the past years there has been a continuous influx of refugees from Angola, who have settled
in Zambia. They number several thousands, but the exact figure is unknown.

2. Educated refugees and others
They are only few in number and most of them are in transit.

(i) Lusaka Transit Centre. The number fluctuates between 50 and 100, and the monthly turnover is 10–30.

(ii) Nkumbi International College (secondary school) was recently opened. The final capacity will be some 300 students, of whom some 25% will be Zambians.

(iii) Mkushi Agricultural Project. A project manager has been appointed and it is hoped that the project will provide for several hundred refugees. To start with, this project will be concentrated in the agricultural field, but it is planned to include mechanical and technical training. Medical treatment is provided for refugees in the area. The participants are both Zambians and refugees.

In addition to the above-mentioned projects, various refugee scholarship programmes are run from Zambia in co-operation with overseas organisations, as well as the UN special programmes. A refugee transportation programme, bringing refugees from Botswana and northwards, is also being operated from Zambia.

As may be seen, the number of refugees in Zambia is relatively low as compared with the Congo or Tanzania, for instance. But in view of its political and geographical situation, there are possibilities of sudden and sharp increases, due to unrest in one or more of the neighbouring countries.

Refugees in Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana

The exact number of refugees in these countries is difficult to indicate. The number of villager refugees is very low and the number of educated refugees is less than a few hundred in each territory. Swaziland, and particularly Lesotho, are likely to
become less and less important from a refugee point of view because of their geographical positions. Once refugees get there, it is almost impossible to travel farther. In Botswana there are on an average 90–120 transit refugees, mainly at Francistown. The monthly turnover varies considerably, depending on the official northbound clearance.

What Can Be Done to Alleviate the Present Southern African Refugee Situation?

It is impossible to predict the number of villager refugees there may be in future. However, when they arrive, it may be anticipated that the governments, the UNHCR and others will step in immediately, when necessary.

However, it is evident that independent Africa at present feels that it cannot absorb large numbers of refugees seeking education and job placement. There are various reasons for this, the most important ones being based on political considerations. This means that in the future there may be only a trickle of refugees of this category—even less than in the past, provided there are no upheavals or outbreaks of violence which might change the present situation completely.

Therefore there is every reason to concentrate more effort than in the past on those refugees who after all arrive and to prepare them as well as possible for their time in independent Africa, as well as for the time when they finally return to their homelands. In order to do this better than in the past, it may be of value to return to the point mentioned in the very beginning of this paper, namely, the time factor and the need for quick and adequate action.

Educated refugees

As it is now, there is a terrific waste of the refugees' time and energy, and of their readiness to do something useful during the transit period. At the same time, the will to rely on their own initiative and effort is almost inevitably undermined during this long transit time, when they easily become demoralised and disillusioned.
It is not my intention to advocate softness and laxity in dealing with the refugees. The idea is to try to activate them during the transit period for positive and constructive undertakings, through work and study.

In order to do this, it is necessary to improve the existing transit centres, where the refugees tend to be held up for some time. This means improved facilities, such as study rooms (which are not a luxury, but an indispensable requisite to planned reading), small workshops, etc. But all experience shows that this only makes sense with an increase of staff—and staff stationed on the spot. If refugees are left to themselves, in the main there is a rapid deterioration into recklessness and carelessness, fighting and disorder. A firm and decisive but at the same time friendly hand is needed to keep up discipline and morale. This is not said in order to throw blame on refugees; it is something that almost inevitably develops out of the very situation refugees are forced into. Once this is recognised, it should be dealt with correspondingly.

As a part of this programme of improvement there would be one important and special task, namely, the undertaking of a thorough and personal case study of each refugee, working out seriously with him or her what to aim at and how to plan for it. This study would have to be guided and supervised by adequate staff, perhaps in the form of a kind of seminar. Some of the matters to be taken up and thoroughly discussed would be:

(1) The possible role of the refugee in independent Africa. He cannot do what he likes, just to satisfy his own intentions or wishes, but will have to think over what will best serve his country and how he can best serve his host country;

(2) In connection with possible tests, considerable time should be given to extensive discussions on the kind of education aimed at, in relation to the needs of Africa today. The refugee should not be forced into a field of training or study, but arrive at a conclusion after having considered the matter. As it is, it is very much on random and irrelevant grounds that a student chooses a particular subject of study. The proportion of 100 lawyers for each technician and agriculturalist obviously does not correspond with the needs of Africa. A
proportion of one lawyer to each 100 agriculturalists or technicians seems more appropriate.

Again, the whole success of this programme will be dependent on adequate staff. Unless the matter is taken up seriously and thoroughly, it will not make sense. The investments the various refugee scholarship and training programmes represent are already large, but the costs involved here would be very modest, considering the increased value the programmes would have.

Villager refugees

The time factor and quick and adequate action are also important for mass resettlement schemes. In future emergencies it will be of the utmost importance that qualified persons with the necessary field training and on-the-spot experience should be set to work immediately, so as to commence the various activities as soon as possible, in order to avoid or reduce the mistakes and delays which are otherwise unavoidable. It is also important to get the refugees engaged and activated in the right way as soon as possible, so as to avoid the development of “refugee-camp mentality”.

A group of trained refugee field-workers should be available to go out at short notice. This could be a group of people sent out via the UNHCR or by special agreement and arrangement with the government(s) in question. Its task would be, in an emergency, to set out immediately to the spot and under government instruction to assist local police, health authorities and local refugee bodies with the necessary immediate measures, until more permanent staff has been arranged. This corps could perhaps under “normal” conditions work on already established refugee projects, and in an emergency be lent out when and where necessary.

Refugee-assistance machinery has now been established to deal with problems arising from southern African refugee situation. Still, there is need to improve and strengthen it, in order to cope better with the present situation, as well as to be able to meet future eventualities. But at least a beginning has been made.
A Final Word

Indeed, the future of southern Africa seems uncertain, and although the refugees for many and understandable reasons have such odds against them, it must be the task of everybody engaged in this field to work for an activation of the refugee and thus bolster up his morale. Every way in which the refugee can make himself more fit for the future of his country must be considered, and at the same time one must keep in mind the needs and the interests of the host country. The refugee’s success in making himself useful must be proved again and again in practical work and effort. This may again lead to the removal of some of the suspicion that follows a refugee —and will help him feel he is a human being.
Jacques Cuènod

The Problem of Rwandese and Sudanese Refugees

At the beginning of 1966 the number of African refugees of concern to the United Nations High Commissioner's Office was estimated at 580,000 persons. Half of them come from independent countries. The two largest groups are the refugees from Rwanda (almost 160,000) and those from the Sudan (some 80,000). Uganda is their most important country of asylum and has accepted 70,000 Rwandese and 40,000 Sudanese refugees, followed by Burundi (50,000 refugees, all of Rwandese origin), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (25,000 Rwandese and 20,000 Sudanese), the Central African Republic (20,000 Sudanese refugees) and Tanzania (15,000 Rwandese refugees).

To the Office of the High Commissioner, a refugee is a person who is outside the country of his nationality because he has well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his race, religion, nationality or political opinion and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the Government of the country of his nationality. This definition, which is contained in the Statute of the Office, suggests that decisions on refugee status should be made on an individual basis for each person who claims to be a refugee within the mandate of the Office. Indeed this has been the practice in Europe since the creation of the Office in 1951, with the exception of the Hungarian refugees who left their country by the thousand after the revolution in October 1956. As regarded this group, it was decided that every Hungarian crossing the Austrian or Yugoslav borders who claimed to be a refugee should be considered prima facie as a refugee within the mandate.

To determine eligibility on an individual basis would not
be practical in Africa, partly because the administrative machinery required for such a procedure is not available, partly because, like the Hungarians, the refugees usually arrive in very large groups. The General Assembly of the United Nations recognized this fact and by its Resolution No. 1673 in December 1961 requested the High Commissioner "to pursue his activities on behalf of the refugees within his mandate or those to whom he extends his good offices".

The High Commissioner's "Good Offices"

This "good offices" procedure, besides obviating the need for individual eligibility decisions, has another advantage. It avoids an investigation into the reasons which motivated the departure of refugees from their country of origin, the result of which might create problems between the authorities of the country of origin and those of the asylum country. Thus, like a fire brigade, the Office tries to help without concerning itself with the underlying causes of the fire.

The High Commissioner's Office makes no distinction between refugees from independent countries and refugees from countries or territories which have not yet achieved independence. The High Commissioner's work is moreover explicitly required by the Statute not only to be humanitarian and social but also entirely non-political. Thus, he is not involved with any persons active as freedom fighters or with the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity, known as the Committee of Nine in Dar-es-Salaam; his contacts with the OAU and its secretariat, which have been both close and cordial, have been based on the work of the OAU Refugee Committee, known as the Committee of Ten in Addis Ababa.

The Office exercises its basic function of international protection in respect of all persons in Africa in need of such protection who have been granted refugee status by the authorities of the asylum countries or who come, prima facie, within his mandate. The basis for legal protection still remains the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Admittedly, it contained a dateline excluding refugees resulting from events which occurred after 1 January 1951, but the Or-
ganisation of African Unity, in a recent resolution, requested member governments to apply the terms of the Convention to all the refugees to whom they have granted asylum. In addition, the OAU requested the expert assistance of the UNHCR in the drafting of an OAU refugee convention which would be a complement to the 1951 Convention, based on the reality of the situation in Africa. Concurrently, the UNHCR is studying ways of removing the dateline included in the 1951 Convention, so as to make it applicable to new refugee groups, on the basis of an independent protocol to the Convention, which is now being considered by the parties to the Convention and the members of the High Commissioner's Executive Committee.

There are several conditions governing the granting of material aid by the UNHCR to refugees. There must first be a request for assistance from the government of asylum. Several African Governments are facing refugee problems, but refrain from asking assistance from the Office, generally to avoid placing the problem on an international level. A second condition is that the problem is of such a magnitude that it cannot be solved by the host government alone. The burden is then shared by the international community, of which the UNHCR is an agent. The third and last main condition for the intervention of the UNHCR is that the solution proposed by the host government to the refugee problem with which it is confronted should be practical and based on humanitarian considerations only, thus removing the problem from its political context.

If these conditions are met, the UNHCR encourages the host government and assists it in the elaboration of an assistance programme for the new refugee community. This programme is submitted to the Executive Committee with a request to authorise the High Commissioner to make a financial contribution towards its total cost. Such a programme usually provides for the distribution of food rations during an initial period, in order to give the refugees time to clear and cultivate the land placed at their disposal by the authorities with the tools and seeds distributed to them. Basic health services are established and, where required, access roads and water supplies are laid on. The rural-settlement programme should give the refu-
gees the possibility of supporting themselves on the same level as the local population.

It usually takes two years to implement a rural-settlement programme. The size of the settlements varies greatly according to the availability of land in the areas where the government of asylum has decided to settle the refugees. One settlement for Sudanese refugees in Uganda contains 600 persons only, while over 25,000 Rwandese refugees are living in one settlement in Burundi. Experience shows that a settlement of approximately 1,000 families, comprising 4,000 to 5,000 persons, is the ideal size. There are at present six organised settlements for Sudanese refugees in Uganda and the Central African Republic with a total population of 36,000 refugees. Almost 100,000 Rwandese refugees are living in 15 organised settlements located in the four countries of asylum, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania and Uganda.

Many Rwandese and Sudanese refugees preferred to settle individually among existing national communities with whom they had some affinities. These refugees have not been assisted under the UNHCR programmes but were helped by the local population. A study made in Uganda by a research fellow from the Makerere University College shows how well and quickly these refugees have integrated into national communities. It is to be regretted that rural communities in Africa are usually so small that they cannot absorb large numbers of newcomers. Moreover, some governments of asylum have issued decrees forbidding refugees to settle individually outside the areas selected for them.

There are also refugees coming from urban areas who prefer to live in towns, where they usually increase the number of unemployed or underemployed. These refugees do not benefit from the UNHCR programmes either and no solution has yet been found to this problem.

The Results of Rural-settlement Programmes
What are the results so far achieved in implementing these rural-settlement programmes? They vary greatly and depend mainly on four factors. The most important one is the willing-
ness of the refugees to settle. This depends on the refugees' belief in a possible change of the political situation in their country of origin, which would make their return possible. During the round-table conference which took place in mid-1965 in the Sudan to discuss possible solutions to the problem of the South, it was noticed that the Sudanese refugees had ceased to make any efforts towards their settlement. When these negotiations broke off and the hope of a quick return vanished, refugees were then again prepared to take advantage of the settlement possibilities which these programmes offered to them. The same reactions were noticed in several settlements for Rwandese refugees, when some of their political leaders tried to compel them to go back by force to their country of origin. Indeed the refugee leaders play a decisive role, especially among the Rwandese, in the success or failure of a rural-settlement programme. The best settlement for Rwandese refugees is in Tanzania, in the West Lake Region, where the leader of the refugees decided as from the first day to refrain from political intrigues and to induce his people to settle peacefully. A similar situation was noticed in another settlement in the North Kivu Province of the Congo. As a consequence of the positive attitude of these leaders, the programmes in these two settlements cost far less than in other settlements.

The second factor is the attitude of the local population towards the refugees. It is a social factor based on affinity between them and the refugees. In some instances, this affinity was so strong that the local population shared everything with the refugees, until such time as relief could be brought and distributed to them. In other instances, the antagonism was such that the refugees had to be moved elsewhere.

The third factor for success in implementing a settlement programme is of an economic nature. It depends on whether land in sufficient quantity and of adequate quality is available and whether the rainfall is sufficient for cultivation. The results are related mainly to the density of the population of the host country. In the Central African Republic and in Tanzania, where large areas of virgin and fertile land still exist, the problem does not arise. In Burundi and in certain parts of Uganda, where the density of the population is amongst the
highest in Africa, the land available was of poor quality and barely sufficient to enable the refugees to settle.

The fourth main factor is of a political nature. I refer to the attitude of the asylum governments and the local authorities. Most of the African governments had adopted a very liberal policy of asylum and within their limited means have facilitated the settlement of the refugees. Difficulties arose with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who in August 1964 issued an expulsion decree directed, *inter alia*, against Rwandese refugees.

The cost of these rural-settlement programmes varies from country to country and even within a country from one settlement to another, depending on the conditions to which I have just referred and on the cost of inland transportation to bring relief and other supplies to the settlement area. The average cost per head can be estimated at about one hundred dollars ($100), of which approximately half is contributed by the UNHCR, the balance representing the participation of the host government and of various organisations willing to join in these ventures. The value of the land placed at the disposal of the refugees is not included in these figures.

The Lessons of Experience

What are the lessons to be learnt after some years' experience in dealing with the problem of Rwandese and Sudanese refugees? The first one is that enough attention has not always been paid to the problem of refugee education. The desire for education among refugees in Africa is very great indeed. The situation is particularly acute in the case of the Rwandese and Sudanese refugees, as the proportion of intellectuals and students among them is greater than among the persons who remained in the respective country of origin. Let us not forget that the first wave of Sudanese refugees in 1962 and 1963 was composed essentially of teachers and pupils, and that in Rwanda the Watusi, who form the majority of the Rwandese refugees, used to be the leaders of the country. Experience shows that it is very difficult for an intellectual, even for one who comes from peasant stock, to start cultivating the land.
Marginal assistance only has been provided in the rural-settlement programmes for the education of refugees. They are in a particularly unfavourable situation as compared with the students of the asylum country, as they have no government to propose them for scholarships made available within the framework of multi- or bilateral aid. The situation was partly remedied last year, thanks to a special contribution received from the Swedish International Development Authority, which was earmarked for the technical, secondary and university education of Rwandese and Sudanese refugees in Africa. The problem of primary education, however, remains unsolved. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees will discuss this problem with his Executive Committee during the forthcoming session to be held in May in Geneva, with a view to including provisions for the establishment of adequate primary schools in each rural-settlement programme designed to assist a new refugee group in Africa, and to find ways of promoting technical, secondary and university education. It is not necessary to emphasize here the essential role which adequate education could play in facilitating the assimilation of a refugee group into a new community. Education not only gives the refugees better chances of employment but also provides the necessary incentive to enable refugee youth to take roots, make friends amongst the nationals of the host country, learn the history of his newly adopted country and its language, if it differs from his own.

The second lesson to be drawn from the experience gained with Rwandese and Sudanese refugees is that the type of rural-settlement programme which the UNHCR is promoting in Africa should be followed by another programme of a zonal-development nature. It is not enough simply to give refugees the possibility of reaching a bare subsistence level. However, it is not the task of the UNHCR to embark on large-scale zonal-development plans which would, inter alia, consolidate the economic and social conditions of the refugees. This would rather seem to be the role of the UN Development Programme, in collaboration with specialised agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation and the International Labour Office. A development plan could not be restricted to refugees, as
otherwise it would place foreign communities in a better situation as compared with national communities, an idea which is, of course, unacceptable. A development plan would have to cover a whole region where refugee settlements have been established. Such a project clearly exceeds the terms of reference of the UNHCR. However, the High Commissioner has taken the initiative in requesting the UN Development Programme and the specialised agencies to study the possibility of implementing, in co-ordination with the governments concerned, zonal-development plans in areas where several refugee settlements exist. Two such plans are being implemented by the ILO with the assistance of the UNHCR, one in the Kivu Province of the Congo and one in Burundi, each covering three settlements for Rwandese with a refugee population of 23,000 persons and a local population of approximately the same size.

I have described the main factors necessary to ensure the successful implementation of a rural-settlement programme and drawn some conclusions from the experience gained so far. I would like now to conclude with two remarks concerning the role which the UNHCR can play, thanks to the generosity of the international community, in dealing with problems of refugees from independent countries in Africa. A large and sudden influx of refugees represents, during an initial period of two to four years, a considerable burden for the country of asylum. However, the settlement of several thousand persons in a sparsely inhabited area can be the beginning of the development of that whole region. To take an example, in the Central African Republic, some 18,000 refugees are to be settled in an area which has only 3,000 inhabitants and which is almost cut off from the rest of the country as a result of extremely unfavourable communications. This region could therefore not benefit from any development project. The rural-settlement programme for the refugees elaborated by the Central African authorities, with the assistance of the UNHCR, provides for the building of access roads, the establishment of basic health services and some primary schools, and the introduction of cash crops—cotton and tobacco—in addition to food crops. Thus, such a programme is paving the way to a develop-
ment plan, by establishing a new and productive community in an area which was particularly undeveloped.

The other positive factor of the UNHCR role which I would like to underline is that, through its action, the political tension which may exist between countries of origin and countries of asylum can often be reduced. The Government of Rwanda realized that, if the Rwandese refugees could be settled under a UNHCR programme, i.e. that their living conditions were at least as good as those they had enjoyed in Rwanda, the risk of seeing these refugees taking arms against their country of origin might decrease and even disappear. And when a climate of peace and confidence is restored, then negotiation on possible voluntary repatriation can start. A procedure has been worked out between the Government of Rwanda and the High Commissioner's Office for Refugees, which enables refugees who wish to do so to return to their country of origin under certain conditions. Several thousands of them have done so. As regards the others, the fact that they know they can apply for repatriation is sufficient to induce them to settle peacefully in the newly adopted country of their choice.

Thus, a human disaster entailing a lot of suffering can, with the help of the international community, be converted into a positive way of contributing to the development and the peace of that part of Africa in which the problem arose.
Problems of Asylum for Southern African Refugees

Refugees from the white supremacy regimes of southern Africa may be divided into two broad groups. First, there are those who leave home on the instructions of the liberation movement to which they belong in order to further its objects abroad. On the whole, they are taken care of by these movements, which make the necessary arrangements for them either in Africa or abroad. By and large, the voluntary agencies or international organisations have not concerned themselves with this group. It is therefore with the second group that this paper is concerned. These are the people who have been forced to leave their home country because conditions there have become intolerable to them—either because of police persecution, or because of lack of employment or educational facilities. They generally leave at short notice, without prior plans for their future, and lacking the means to sustain themselves.

1 Margaret Legum is the Secretary of the Joint Committee, which supports refugees in Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho, and tries to find them asylum elsewhere. Members of the Joint Committee are: World Council of Churches' Inter-Church Aid; OXFAM; War on Want; Christian Action; Africa Bureau; Society of Friends (Quakers); Africa Centre; Amnesty International; I.C.F.T.U.; Ariel Foundation; Civil Liberties; and the British Labour Party. Other organisations who help the Joint Committee or maintain contact with it include the African-American Institute, the Norwegian Crisis Fund for South Africa, the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Swedish International Development Authority and the International University Exchange Fund.
The Principal Refugee Needs

Clearly, the first need is to keep alive, and to secure protection from expulsion, kidnapping or return to country of origin. In the main countries of first asylum these basic needs are met by various organizations: the Joint Committee on the former High Commission Territories, which operates in Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana, and in Zambia and Tanzania by agencies like the Churches.

Beyond this, the main objective of every refugee is to seek constructive outlets for his energies. Many of them see their immediate future in terms of further education to enable them to make a fuller contribution to society, and to earn better rewards, than they have in the past. Almost all of them express an intention to return to their home countries when the existing regimes there have ended and their capacities can be fully used. With few exceptions, refugees want to make any contribution they can, before their return home, in Africa itself, even if they get their education abroad. Some of them are already skilled or qualified in some profession; and generally they wish to use their skills in Africa. It is important to note at this stage, therefore, that if we are judge by the wishes of the refugees themselves, the problem of asylum appears to concern the free States of Africa—since it is there that most refugees wish to spend the period of their exile.

Thus it seems we are dealing with three broad groups of refugees: those capable of taking advantage of further education; those already qualified, without further training, to make a useful contribution in the independent African States; and those who have no alternative, owing to their age and educational background, but to settle somewhere and integrate with the local people. In practice, however, the problems of finding asylum are much the same for all three groups. Essentially it is the problem of finding a State which will allow them to earn a living and make a contribution within its borders. For refugees granted scholarships to study at educational institutions either in Africa or abroad, the problem is merely postponed: since they cannot be expected to become permanent students, sooner or later employment will have to be found for them. Already
a pool of trained and qualified refugees from southern Africa is developing, for whom it is proving difficult to find employment. This is basically a question of asylum, as defined in the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees.

In addition to this general problem, refugees from South Africa, South West Africa and Rhodesia generally present additional special difficulties. First, with few exceptions, they are not related, in terms of tribal groupings, to communities living in contiguous free African states, with whom they might easily settle and integrate. Second, for many of them the former High Commission Territories—Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana—represent the only available first countries of asylum. But these countries are economically too poor, and politically too vulnerable, to offer more than temporary and very unsatisfactory asylum to large numbers of refugees. This means that the refugees must make their way further north into countries which do not have the international obligations of first countries of asylum in respect of these people, and to whom therefore special appeals must be made for admittance.

Third, these refugees are often urbanised, relatively sophisticated people, who can use their resourcefulness to become problematic and unpopular if their capacities to contribute to a modern economic and educational system are frustrated. Indeed, these differences in cultural backgrounds can create difficulties even where opportunities are made available for qualified refugees. Finally, difficulties have been created by the fact that the major liberation movements—A.N.C., P.A.C., SWANU, SWAPO, etc.—have come to be used, quite naturally, by the free African governments as part of their machinery for security screening of refugees. This sometimes presents almost insuperable difficulties for refugees who, for some reason, are not members of these movements, or who are not known or acceptable to their leadership.

Attitudes of African States

As the numbers of southern African refugees have increased, so have the problems they present. The result is an increasing ambivalence towards them on the part of the free African
states. On the one hand, African governments recognise a responsibility to help the victims of white supremacy; and the ordinary people of these countries often continue to convey a warm feeling of personal solidarity with refugees. Governments also recognise the dangers of isolating refugees in confined areas, in which they can become frustrated and a potential danger—even a security risk. They know that the problem is one of using refugee energies constructively; and they have discovered that many of the refugees already possess skills and professional qualifications in short supply in Africa.

On the other hand, there is no independent African government which does not face, as one of its major problems, that of unemployment; they know that political risks would be run by giving scarce jobs to refugees. Even where refugees are able to take jobs for which trained locals are not available, the fear exists that their appointment will block the advancement of locals as they become available. There is a tendency therefore to seek expatriate European staff for such positions, since they can be appointed on limited contracts, and since they represent no long-term responsibility to the State concerned. In most states this fear (of refugees blocking the advancement of locals) is a considerably exaggerated one, since it is widely recognised that skilled personnel from outside the country will be required for many years to come. Nevertheless, it is felt that however irrational this fear is among the ordinary people, it is one which cannot easily be ignored by governments.

Then there is the general problem of security. The African states are becoming as wary as nations elsewhere about giving permanent resident rights to large numbers of refugees, of whose backgrounds they can know very little. This is a principal reason for their reliance on the advice of the recognised leadership of the liberation movements. But even within the bounds of that advice, African governments are tending to become increasingly conscious of the dangers of allowing refugees the freedom of their countries: in particular they strongly oppose independent approaches by refugees to foreign embassies in their capitals. Thus, despite their own preference, governments are tending to confine refugees fairly strictly to certain defined areas.
Finally, a general feeling exists in some African states that opponents of the southern African regimes should remain at home to fight them; or that if they leave they should be in the exclusive service of the liberation movements as "freedom fighters". A view not infrequently expressed is that the African States ought not to support individuals who leave their countries merely to gain higher standards of living or education at the expense of the peoples of free Africa, and that this is the chief motive of most refugees other than those who leave on instructions from their leadership. This view is given wider currency by the admittedly difficult behaviour of some refugees, often psychologically shaken by past experiences, who can be overdemanding, sensitive to criticism, and hard to integrate.

Clearly, the chief problematic characteristic of all refugees is their lack of internationally recognised documents indicating that a particular state is prepared to take the sort of responsibility for them described in the 1951 Convention. From this stems their own insecurity, the difficulty of planning for their future, and the difficulty of finding the most apt outlets for their energies. It is also at the root of the African states' difficulties in dealing with them: each state fears that to provide opportunities for them is to undertake a permanent commitment to them. These latter problems have been increased by the fact that only a few African states have made serious efforts to help southern African refugees, and they have therefore found themselves host to the great majority of refugees. In other words, the problems could be lessened to the extent that agreement can be found to share the burden. This is the crux of the problem. In theory, the problem is capable of solution through the universal application of the 1951 Convention, or its successor. But it is not universally applied. The question is whether it will be made so, on the basis of exhortations to individual states to ratify the Convention.

Asylum Provisions Offered to Date

In the early stages of the southern African refugee flow, it was Ghana which made the first concerted effort to help. Refugees
were issued with "Commonwealth passports", an ingenious device to suggest Commonwealth citizenship, but in practice internationally regarded as a special version of a Ghana passport. They were issued in the name of the Ghana Minister of Foreign Affairs, contained details of the refugee's identity and provided pages for visas. They represented a very valuable travel document, largely because they were internationally regarded as a commitment by the Ghana government to receive their holders back in Ghana at any time—the essential "return clause" without which travel documents are of limited value. They were renewable annually and they did not provide the holders with Ghana citizenship. They were much appreciated, since without them refugees were virtually immobilised.

As the tide of African independence moved south, it was natural that refugees should seek asylum nearer home; and Tanganyika—now Tanzania—became the objective of most southern African refugees. For some years its government offered a very generous open-door policy to refugees, taking almost anyone who could be politically vouched for and not only those for whom Tanzania is the first country of asylum. Tanzania was the first African state which found itself host to relatively large numbers of refugees—not only those who came over the border from Mozambique, and settled near the border with tribally related communities, but also an increasing flow of individuals from South and South West Africa. Provisions made for them have varied. At one time they were supported in camps by the Tanzanian government; at others, concerted attempts were made to settle them agriculturally among the local people. Latterly, as the burden increased, the Tanzanian government has insisted that the liberation movements should make themselves responsible for refugees; and they have been largely confined to two areas some distance from the capital of Dar-es-Salaam. There is no longer a policy of virtual freedom of entry for refugees: they are now limited largely to those for whom the liberation movements are prepared to make themselves responsible. And in the past year or so there has been a series of expulsions of refugees not affiliated to the established nationalist movements. The fact that the immigration departments of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda are linked in this
respect means that a Prohibited Immigrant order issued in one of them applies now in all three.

On the whole the Tanzanians have not provided refugees with travel documents as useful as those originally given by Ghana. With the exception of individuals issued with full Tanzanian passports, refugees have been given what amounts to a simple identity document, with spaces for visas. This certainly has some value, especially for refugees travelling abroad for scholarships. But since they do not provide an automatic "return clause", they cause immigration difficulties in other countries, and give refugees less security than the Ghana documents did. The same general comments apply to documents issued by Kenya and Uganda: these countries have, in fact, been very much less prepared than Tanzania to accept southern Africa refugees or make any kind of provision for them.

Since Zambia left the Central African Federation, its government has recognised that it would be called upon to receive refugees from almost all its neighbours; and even before its independence, it took the unique step of making serious provision for the problem through the establishment of the International Refugee Council of Zambia. Clearly its first formal responsibility is to refugees for whom Zambia is the first country of asylum—mainly Mozambique, Rhodesia, Angola and Congo. Long before her independence Zambia received tens of thousands of refugees from these countries. In the early stage of independence Zambia also took, fairly freely, refugees from South Africa and South West Africa, via Botswana, their first country of asylum. However, as the flow of refugees has increased from all directions, the Zambian government has increased its restrictions upon the latter category. Today its formal policy is to offer only transit rights through Zambia to these people. In practice this means that refugees must be acceptable elsewhere before they are allowed to enter Zambia, and while in Zambia their movements are restricted.

There are exceptions to this general policy. Refugees qualified to make an immediate contribution to the Zambian economy in areas where local personnel are not yet available are still admitted, but much less readily than they were. Refugees
are also being admitted for purposes of study at the new African-American Institute school in Zambia, designed to educate refugees as well as Zambians. The Zambian government also undertakes to relax its restrictions on entry for refugees as other projects for them, such as this school, become operational.

Travel documents issued by Zambia to refugees are similar to those offered by Tanzania, and with a few exceptions amount to an identity paper valid for a short period and offering no "return clause".

This brief outline of the development of asylum policies in the principical host countries shows that, as the problem has increased, the asylum facilities offered have tended to decline in value to the refugee. This is not to decry the extremely valuable work done for refugees both by host countries in Africa and by voluntary and international agencies. There is now little danger that a refugee will find himself alone, destitute and without assistance. But, while the short-term needs of refugees are being met in an increasingly systematic and rational way, their long-term problems are generally harder to solve. Opportunities for the constructive use of their energies and skills, far from increasing, appear to be declining in Africa.

Some Suggestions for the Future

The question is whether a system can be devised to serve two purposes. First, to provide refugees with internationally acceptable documents and opportunities to earn their living. Second, to marry, on the one hand, the need for skilled personnel in Africa with, on the other, the growing availability of skilled refugees to fill that need. Such a system would fill the gaps in all the attempts made up to now by African States to assist refugees.

An ideal scheme to meet these requirements might operate as follows:

1. Each of the world's nations would be asked to issue or "sponsor" a certain quota of refugee documents on the lines of the specimen travel documents given in the Annex to the 1951 Convention. These would be internationally recognised as travel
documents. They would not confer the nationality of the issuing country on the refugee; but would, of course, contain a return clause to the issuing country.

2. Each refugee would be issued with one of these documents. He would then be free to make application to study or seek employment in a place of his choosing, knowing that ultimately he is entitled to enter the country which issued his documents, and that he would there be accorded the rights of refugees laid down in the 1951 convention.

3. National and international organisations concerned with recruiting qualified personnel for service in developing countries—especially in Africa—should be notified of the availability for recruitment of trained refugees carrying such documents. In addition, an organisation like the Economic Commission for Africa might consider establishing something like a career service for qualified southern African refugees available to accept employment in African states on contract terms.

Such a scheme would have many advantages. First, it would promote the sharing among the world’s nations of the responsibility of providing refugees with asylum and employment opportunities during the period of their exile. Second, it would diminish the fear of those African States which require qualified personnel that by employing refugees they commit themselves to giving them permanent citizenship rights. Third, it would provide refugees with the opportunity of contributing their energies and skills to Africa, and with the experience they will need when they return home. Fourth, it would virtually abolish the immigration problems of refugees who are granted scholarships to study in western Europe and North America, countries now wary of admitting refugees without a “return clause” on their travel documents. Fifth, it would assist the recruitment programmes of national and international organisations concerned with recruiting personnel on contract for service in Africa. Sixth, it would help considerably in solving the problem of refugees not attached to the liberation movements represented in African capitals.

Finally, it would diminish the morale-destroying insecurity of refugees, by providing them with the assurance that, if employment could not be found in Africa, they would become
the responsibility of some other country which had issued them travel documents.

There are also, of course, many problems involved in setting up such a system. No doubt it would be considered wise to start with a limited or pilot scheme, with the issue of a limited number of such passports—say 500, or an average of 5 per U.N. member. A number of resistance factors would have to be overcome. For example, most states might be reluctant to sponsor refugees, by giving them what amounts to a passport, unless they had the opportunity to investigate the background and personality of the individuals granted their documents.

In other words, it might be difficult to persuade governments to issue documents to be allocated by an international organisation. From the point of view of the refugees, it is also possible that the scheme might not be immediately welcome, since they may wish to choose their sponsoring country; and some countries might be in greater demand than others.

Finally, there is the problem of which organisation would have the political authority as well as the administrative structure to organise the scheme. In many ways the U.N.—or one of its agencies, such as the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees—would be the appropriate body. But not all the nations of the world belong to the U.N. and not all members have ratified the 1951 Convention. In addition it might be considered over-ambitious to involve all the world's nations from the start. The Organisation of African Unity presents itself as a possible body to launch such a scheme, but it may be felt that at present it lacks the administrative setup to handle it alone. The Economic Commission for Africa is another possible vehicle, combining as it does the authority of the U.N. with that of the O.A.U. and having an experienced and established administrative machine.

None of the ideas presented here have been worked out in detail. They are offered simply as the basis for discussion of solutions to a problem which can no longer be treated piecemeal. Voluntary, as well as international, agencies have been doing their best to place individual refugees in education and employment, but all of them are coming to the conclusion that
the tide of need threatens to overwhelm them; and that some attempt must be made to find a comprehensive solution. The problem is now too large and too urgent to be treated on an individual and ad hoc basis.

Postscript

Since the above article was written, Bechuanaland has become the independent Republic of Botswana, and Basutoland is now the independent Kingdom of Lesotho. The question arises whether these two nations will ratify the 1951 Convention (as amended). In particular, might they be prepared themselves to issue to all refugees for whom they are countries of first asylum documents containing return clauses? It is possible they may become persuaded that such a liberal course would considerably speed the process of finding opportunities elsewhere for refugees in their countries—a process in accordance with their own interests—and would carry only a small "risk" that the refugees might return there. If Botswana and Lesotho were to initiate such a course, they might give a valuable lead to other African countries in the same position. If so, the somewhat complex proposals suggested above might become unnecessary.

Margaret Legum
John Eldridge

Education and Training of Refugees and Their Potential Contribution to Development

An African proverb says: "He who tries to swallow a large stone had better be sure of the size of his throat." I have a strong sense that this applies to me as I prepare to discuss with you the "Education and Training of Refugees and Their Potential Contribution to Development". In my position as Regional Representative of the African-American Institute over the past three years and more, I have been responsible for the administration of educational programs for the benefit of refugees from southern Africa. Obviously, this experience qualifies me to speak on this subject. Less obviously perhaps, it helps to define certain limitations in my grasp of the problem as a whole: surrounded by trees it is not easy for me to get a proper perspective on the life of the forest as a whole. I regret that my colleague, Jefferson Murphy, who preceded me as Representative in Accra and Dar es Salaam, who started our programs for refugees in East Africa, and who has strongly supported them from broader international perspectives for the past three years, could not be here to give you his more experienced views. For my part, I have discovered in trying to write this paper that to ask an operations officer to explain what he is doing, what he has been about for years, is one of the most provocative questions that can be put to him. But this is my "large stone" and I hope that I do not choke on it.

This is not a research paper. I have not had time to do any research. I believe, however, that I can make my most significant contribution to this seminar by presenting the point of view of an officer who is operationally concerned with the daily problems of education for refugees. From this perspec-
tive, then, I propose to make a survey of the existing educational effort for refugees, as I know it, specifying our achievements and failures with equal candor. In the course of this survey I plan to describe in some detail the origin and development of two specific programs launched by the African-American Institute, in order to illustrate the types of problems that may be encountered in this field. Finally, I want to ask you to join me in a hard look at the future of education and training for refugees. The time has come when we can no longer afford the luxury of training for the sake of training, education for the sake of education. We can no longer breathe a sigh of relief and convince ourselves that the problem is solved when another refugee has found a safe place in a school somewhere. We can no longer go along our unco-ordinated ways, each of us in his own path, sometimes unwittingly in competition with one another. The time has come for those of us concerned with this problem to create a Plan, a Refugee Manpower Plan, if you will. The difficulties are truly great, for the unknowns are appalling; as the social scientists would say, the data are insufficient. No state bureaucracy would think of wasting its time in the face of such handicaps. But we have little choice if we are to avoid wasting our time and squandering our resources in projects that create as many problems as they solve, that fruitlessly duplicate the work of others or that do not pay off at all.

The Beginnings of the Problem

Refugees began to appear in Africa in the late 1950's with the winning of independence for some states and the encouragement this gave to the hopes for independence and self-government for the rest of the continent. My colleague, Jefferson Murphy, spoke with South Africans in Accra in 1957; a friend of mine who was in Dar es Salaam at about the same time talked with Mozambiquans who were clandestinely living in Tanganyika even then. Delegates from dependent areas poured into Accra at the First Conference of Independent African States held in 1958, to join their more fortunate brethren. Al-
though these men were primarily political leaders, many were also refugees, and from this early beginning they set one standard for most of those who followed: unlike other refugees in our century of refugees, they were optimistic, they were filled with hope. Africa was astir and they had stirred with it. They were looking for opportunities for themselves but not merely for themselves. They believed that their countries were approaching independence and self-government and they wanted to be a part of it. And many realized that what they or their followers needed, if they were to govern their own countries effectively when they achieved their independence, was more education.

Since those early beginnings, throughout the first half of the present decade, the number of refugees fleeing from southern-African dependent territories has steadily increased. No one knows exactly how many have come out. Estimates range from hundreds of thousands of Angolans in the Congo to tens of thousands from various countries in Uganda and Tanzania and lesser numbers in other countries. Most of these refugees are peasants who can settle as easily on one side of the border as on the other. We have already heard from a representative of the United Nations about the problems encountered by certain large groups of refugees, the Rwandans and the Sudanese. I am primarily concerned here with the statistically small number of refugees from southern Africa who already have some education and who are seeking, or whose political parties are seeking for them, additional education or training. Fortunately for these, as their numbers have increased, so have their opportunities, until today there is a wide range of programs available for them.

Scholarships

Scholarships have been the principal form of educational assistance to refugees from the beginning. These scholarships have been made available to refugees by individual donors, by church organizations, by student groups, by international organizations such as the World University Service and the Inter-
national University Exchange Fund, by the United Nations, and by various governments. Under them, refugee students are attending schools in various African countries, in the Middle East, in Europe, in Asia, and in North America. Refugees are studying at a wide variety of institutions: at universities in both undergraduate and post-graduate courses, at secondary schools, in technical colleges, and in special training projects of one kind or another. No one can say for sure how many scholarships have been awarded or how many students are currently in schools, but certainly their number is in the hundreds.

Academic study
What can we say about this scholarship effort? From my experience, I would suggest four important generalizations. First, these scholarships have been awarded predominantly for academic study. Despite the logical force behind the suggestions made by many and disputed by no one at all, very few scholarships have been awarded for technical study to train badly needed technicians. The reason for this is easily stated: the refugees themselves simply do not want technical training. During one period in 1963–64, the AAI office in Dar es Salaam interviewed and tested at least three hundred refugees, and only one of these candidates was prepared to accept placement at a technical college and that in the comparatively romantic field of electronics. (I am sorry to have to report to you that this student found the course too difficult and was compelled to drop out of school.) I am inclined to be skeptical that we shall have much success with the present type of refugee population in the even more prosaic but extremely useful fields of plumbing, automobile mechanics, carpentry, agriculture, and the like, unless the political parties insist on it or circumstances compel it. I should note, however, that some of my colleagues in the scholarship effort report somewhat greater success in placing students in technical training. Nevertheless I think that they would concede my main point here.

On the academic side itself, we have found that refugees tend to wish to study in those fields that we can loosely describe as the arts rather than the sciences. In the course of
writing this paper, I took a look at our records of some refugee students in American universities. Of one group of 164 students, 44 or about one-quarter of them were studying scientific or technical subjects; 120 were studying in the arts. It will not surprise you to learn that the most popular subjects by far were political science and economics, followed closely by business administration and education. Although a complete survey of all students might reveal this group to be a faction rather than a true fraction and thus be unrepresentative of the whole, I would be inclined to doubt it. It is far more likely that this breakdown is typical of the refugee student.

When we turn to the problems presented by the education of African refugees in the future, these two characteristics of the educated refugee population must give us pause. We know from our other work with students from the independent states of Africa that African manpower needs for development, now and for the next few years, are concentrated in the scientific, technical, and professional fields. In a surprisingly large number of African countries there already exists, or shortly will develop, a surplus of arts graduates in particular fields. To put it bluntly, in those countries it may soon be easier for an electrician to get a job than an economist. To anticipate one of my major conclusions at this point: if we are to hope to find employment for refugee graduates in independent African states prior to independence in their own homelands, we must consider some form of emergency measures to prepare these refugees already in training for job opportunities that may exist for them in Africa.

*Schools outside Africa*

The second major generalization about the scholarship effort that I would like to make is this: too many refugee students have been sent to schools outside Africa. I take it that I do not need to present any arguments to this audience to support the proposition that, broadly speaking, Africans should be educated in Africa. Yet, what do we find when we look at the refugee-scholarship picture? No one is in a position to do a comprehensive study of this situation and it will therefore have to be a guess. My guess would be that three-quarters or more of the
scholarships awarded to refugees for study above primary levels are tenable at educational institutions outside Africa.

There are two principal reasons and two secondary reasons for this state of affairs. First, immigration barriers in the African countries themselves often effectively preclude the admission of the refugee to the country where he may have a place in school waiting for him. We have just heard Margaret Legum's discussion of this problem and I am pleased to endorse her views. I will add that, with all due understanding of the political problems of African countries, I do not believe that African leadership can be satisfied with any condition that compels those of us seeking shelter for African refugees to go outside of Africa to find it. Yet that is the fundamental operational fact of life. A second reason why African refugees leave the continent is the qualifications barrier. All too few refugees are qualified up to the ordinary level; fewer still are qualified at the advanced level required in most African institutions of higher learning. On the continent of Africa, to my knowledge at least, only Haile Selassie I University in Addis Ababa, Cuttington College in Liberia, Louvanium University in Leopoldville and the newly re-opened institution in Stanleyville, plus the new universities in Zambia and Malawi, will accept students at the ordinary level. There are concessional entry schemes at other institutions, but we have found it difficult to get students admitted under them for other reasons. This is not the proper place to argue the question of admission standards, nor even to plead for special consideration for refugees. I merely note that this condition makes it inevitable that it will often be easier to send a student to the United States where, not only will universities admit students at the ordinary level but also immigration barriers to students without travel documents may be more readily overcome. A third reason that may be cited, although it is perhaps somewhat less significant, is the desires of the students themselves. Offer almost any African student, refugee or not, a scholarship in Europe, the United States, or the Soviet Union and then offer him the alternative of an equally good scholarship to an African university and in a very high percentage of the cases you will find that he will elect to leave the continent. Not
even a serious language problem will deter him very much. Since it is probable that refugee students are not often offered a choice—although the United Nations, the International University Exchange Fund, and the African–American Institute do so when options are practicable—this factor contributes less to this objectionable condition. A fourth factor which may contribute to this condition more in the future, as we become more sophisticated in evaluating manpower needs, may be the necessity to send some students outside Africa to obtain training not available in Africa. Whether this will ever become a significant part of the causes of the problem under discussion here is doubtful.

*Lack of co-ordination*

The third major characteristic of our scholarship efforts is glaringly obvious to all of us: the lack of effective co-ordination and over-all planning. I do not mean to suggest by this that anyone has been guilty of deliberate irresponsibility in this regard. On the contrary, we have all been interested in co-ordination, but I am convinced that our efforts have not, to date, carried us far enough. Despite my best intentions, within the past year I have been involved myself in two specific incidents of competition for a particular student: in one case I was able to call off my effort and yield to the other party; in the other case two virtually simultaneous offers of scholarship aid were made to a student for whom I was desperately seeking help, and this I freely confess was my own fault. Now, competition impedes co-ordination, psychologically and operationally. We need more than good intentions: we need machinery, a structure, that will enable us to avoid competition.

Far more important, though, than operational co-ordination is the urgent necessity to consider the refugee and his problems as a whole. My experience in Dar es Salaam at the end of the long pipeline from the south, my work with the International Refugee Council of Zambia since its formation in April 1964, and my association with the Joint Committee on the High Commission Territories convince me that we must cease viewing the refugee as merely a recipient of a scholarship. Be-
fore the refugee can take up a scholarship, he must travel long distances; he must be fed, clothed, and housed along the way. He requires help to overcome legal and other barriers in his pathway. Although considerable progress has been made over the past three years in this matter, really effective machinery that takes into account all of the problems of the refugee has yet to be established. It is my hope that this seminar may make a substantial contribution to the devising of plans for more effective co-ordination and planning.

When studies are completed

The fourth and final generalization that I wish to call to your attention grows out of the third; indeed, it is naturally a part of it, but, because of its crucial importance, I have chosen to isolate it here. In our planning we must remember that the refugee student will not continue on his scholarship forever. He will, eventually, finish his studies. Shall we, then, abandon him, regarding our work as completed? I do not believe that we can and I doubt that anyone really proposes to do so. But what do we do? If I can remember correctly through the haze of years of effort, we originally embarked on these programs in order to assist the southern-African territories to prepare for independence and self-government. But they are not independent yet; these refugees cannot return to their homelands. This year, the African-American Institute office in Dar es Salaam must prepare for the return to Africa of about thirty refugees who have completed their education. From speaking with representatives of the IUEF, I know that a number of refugees will complete their training in Europe this year as well. If we do not wish to see these men returned to the camps, an end to all their hopes, and a wastage of all our efforts, we must see to it that these men find jobs where they can grow in stature, gain experience, and contribute their talents to Africa as a whole, even while they are prevented by political circumstances from fulfilling the original objectives we set down for them.

The problems to overcome here are truly formidable. Although it is true that Africa generally is still deficient in
trained manpower, it would be a serious mistake to make any light assumption that jobs will be readily available for refugee graduates. Independent African states naturally prefer to reserve the few positions at the middle manpower levels for their own citizens. In this interregnum before independence, where shall we direct the refugee graduate? How shall we overcome the probable reluctance to employ him? And who then will ensure that the refugee can cross the immigration barriers to his new job? Yes, here is that problem once again. Unbelievable as it may seem, there have been instances in which immigration departments have frustrated the recruitment of trained refugees by departments within their own government. To carry this one step further, if we are to find jobs for refugees, if we are to overcome the reluctance to hire them, we must make it as easy as possible for the employer to take them. They must be tailored to fit the job description. This—a grim prospect for scholarship donors—implies the need to consider additional training in some cases. Practical training is required in some professions before a full qualification is obtained and we may be forced to underwrite this. Or, again, take all those future arts graduates I mentioned a moment ago. I am sure that most of them will find it very hard to get a job. All of them could be placed as teachers in teacher-hungry Africa if, but I am afraid only if, they hold qualifications as a teacher. Many of our refugees are rapidly approaching the finishing-line; we must give urgent consideration to the problems I have suggested here. I am very much afraid that we are about to pay the price of our lack of planning at the outset.

To sum up on scholarships, we are training through the medium of scholarships a comparatively large group of young men who are about ready to return to Africa and who can make a substantial contribution to its development. Moreover, in simple human terms we have rescued these people from their political fate and given them new opportunities for personal development. I think that we can feel a sense of gratification at these achievements. On the other hand, we have laid up for ourselves a legacy of problems that we must overcome. I am confident that through our deliberations at this seminar we will make some important progress to that end.
The Kurasini Secondary School

I would like to turn now to a different form of educational effort for refugees and describe the secondary school established by the African-American Institute in Kurasini, a suburb of Dar es Salaam. I propose to treat this subject in some detail, for this story will illustrate many of the problems we all have to confront, and I think that its significance in the over-all educational picture merits this treatment.

The Kurasini International Education Center is a successful outgrowth of a program that failed, and it will be useful to describe that program briefly. In 1962 the Institute established its first educational project for refugees, a scholarship program designed to place students in secondary and technical schools in Africa. We came to regard the program as a failure because, after a year of intensive effort, we had succeeded in placing fewer than ten students in African institutions. Our analysis of the causes for this failure led naturally to our ultimate solution of the problem and I think you will be interested in it. We had assumed that the political leadership of independent African states, acting in the name of Pan-Africanism, would find it possible to set aside a certain number of places in their own schools for refugees. This assumption proved to be wrong because of two complementary conditions. First, hard-pressed African governments, newly in power and struggling to raise the level of education within their own countries, could ill afford to set aside precious places for foreigners, and, second, it was here that we first encountered the immigration problem. One African ministry of education was persuaded to give us 20 places in December 1962; we received immigration clearance 18 months later, after we had lost interest. The Tanganyika Government agreed to the placement of 15 students but specified that they must fit into the occasional odd vacancy. Here we ran into yet another set of problems: one cannot fit, to cite an extreme example, a man ready for form one into a vacancy in form three at a girls' school. Moreover, headmasters in the schools simply did not want refugees. Although their fears were exaggerated and largely imaginary, one objection was certainly valid and had to be taken seriously; men in their
twenties do not fit easily into classes full of boys in their teens. (Believe it or not, in the short time we were given before the term began, we were unable to place a single refugee under this offer and there were many candidates.) In the face of these problems we decided to give it up because by this time we had a new idea altogether. The refugees were in Dar es Salaam. If we could not get them into other countries, if we could not fit them into normal schools, then the answer was to bring the school to the refugees, a special school designed for them where these peripheral problems could be ignored.

The school is formed

By the time we reached a firm decision to this effect, we already had the makings of a school. We had, much earlier, rented a house near the refugee camp in Kurasini and converted the three bedrooms into classrooms and the lounge into a library and study hall. We had brought out an English teacher from the United States and we had invited refugees, idling their time away at the camp, to brush up their English while they were waiting for scholarships. We had then quickly made the discovery that the refugees wanted to study more than merely English, and we had been able to find some under-employed volunteers in Dar es Salaam who were prepared to teach them. By the end of the first year, without really planning it, we found ourselves teaching a remarkable range of courses to an astonishing number of refugees. Every day, as many as two hundred refugees crowded into and around that little house, listening to seven or eight teachers and burrowing industriously into the books we had managed to collect together in our small library. As educational institutions go, it was not much of a school, it did not have much structure, its teachers were poorly qualified, its curriculum badly unbalanced, but it had one of the most enthusiastic student bodies ever assembled. It required no stroke of genius to see that the intelligent solution to our problems was to build on this almost spontaneously created foundation and to create a genuine school for refugees.

Progress has been steady ever since. In July 1963 we rented another house near the first one and a new group of volunteer
teachers, especially recruited in the United States by AAI, appeared on the scene. They had better and more varied qualifications. There quickly followed a period of ferment and real creativity. We began a more systematic study of the refugee student, to determine what his capabilities seemed to be and to refine our own objectives and determine the steps needed to reach them. In December 1963 we took the first of these steps by dismissing some students for academic failure and, by means of tests, structuring those who remained into forms roughly by level of attainment. We adopted minimum admission standards and we began to think about preparing our more advanced students to sit as private candidates for internationally recognized school certificates. We had transformed the school by this time into something resembling a tutorial college. Early in 1964 we met the Tanganyika authorities and were able to obtain their agreement to set aside land in Kurasini for the construction of school buildings. About the same time I succeeded in persuading an American technician working for the Tanganyika Government to design our buildings for us in his spare time. He produced a remarkable set of low-cost building plans with some original design features that were easy to build, looked pleasant when completed, and most important, remained cool in the tropical heat. They have to be experienced to be believed. I met the students and asked them to agree to help build the school as a self-help project, working half-time and studying half-time—instruction and construction together—and with remarkable willingness they accepted the proposition. Site clearance began in July and, with the help of an experienced foreman we hired for the job and with the assistance of a few skilled workers, actual construction got under way in August. I can testify from this experience that there is a real magic in these self-help schemes: nothing that we had done before was so successful in welding the student body together and in overcoming national, tribal and party animosities than this kind of co-operative venture. I cannot possibly convey to you the sense of excitement that gripped us all when, in December 1964, the first classes convened in our first classroom building. Everybody had a sense of achievement. Real academic progress had been made throughout the course of the year and
by January 1965 we had enough professional teachers and enough qualified students, and our building program was far enough advanced to enable us to apply for registration by the Ministry of Education as a recognized secondary school.

Today in Kurasini, less than four years after these crude beginnings, you will find a fully operating secondary school. There are about 190 students registered in the school and structured into four forms. Approximately 150 of them are refugees primarily from Mozambique, South West Africa, Rhodesia and Angola with a smattering from other territories; we have also admitted about 40 Tanzanians from Zanzibar and the mainland. (All students attend Kurasini on what amounts to a full scholarship: we feed them, clothe them, and provide them with pocket money, and, except for the Mozambiquans, who live in a hostel maintained by the Mozambique Institute, we house them.) They are taught by a faculty consisting of 17 teachers, eight professionals and five volunteers from the United States, two Canadian volunteers under the auspices of the Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO), and two teachers recruited locally in Tanzania. In addition to the regular academic program designed to prepare students for school certificate examinations, a small class of girls from Rhodesia are being trained as secretaries and will complete their programs this year, and we have equipped ourselves to provide special administrative training to refugees, in order to help them prepare for the civil-service tasks we assume are ahead of them. Any refugee who has completed eight years of primary school, or otherwise can prove himself to be qualified can be admitted at Kurasini up to our planned capacity of 250. The Tanzanian Government itself imposes only one requirement: a student applying for admission must have the endorsement of one of the political parties recognized by the African Liberation Committee. Such sponsorship and a letter of admission to the school is sufficient for the Tanzanian immigration authorities. Such is the Kurasini International Education Center.

Problems at Kurasini

Although much progress has been made, Kurasini is not without its problems. We are concerned to ensure that the image
of the school, its reputation, keeps pace with its progress, and we are not at all sure that it has done so. Springing from such humble origins, it may be difficult for some to realize just how much progress has been made. In time, we know, this is a situation that will be corrected. In the meantime, however, this may contribute to one of the most serious operational problems that we confront. It will be noted that the school has about sixty vacant places and we regard this as deplorable. This is not due so much to the failure of new applicants to appear as to the loss of students already registered in the school primarily to scholarship programs sponsored by others. In the past year approximately sixty students have departed for one reason or another, and our faculty is seriously concerned. One of the elements of a good school is a good and stable student body and stability is a factor that we lack at Kurasini today. It is probably too much to hope for the stability of a normal school in the volatility of the refugee world, but, if we can achieve more effective co-ordination of our programs through this seminar and in our work in the months ahead, we hope this problem will diminish in importance.

Other schools in Africa

In completing this survey of educational opportunities for refugees, it should be noted that Kurasini is not the only school in Africa with a large refugee-student population. In Botswana Patrick Van Rensburg welcomes a limited number of refugees to the Swaneng Hill School. Largely through the efforts of the Scandinavian countries, contributions have been made to selected schools in all the former High Commission Territories—Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho—to enable them to admit a number of refugees. If the South African Government continues to tighten up its measures against emigration, these institutions will assume an even greater burden than they already bear in the total scheme of refugee education. I would not have you think that I fail to recognize the importance of these institutions. The paucity of my remarks about them is due simply to my ignorance of the situation, but I would like to point out that the African-American Institute is building
another school in Zambia—Nkumbi International College—a school somewhat larger than Kurasini. Since it has the same objectives, I shall not devote any time to a description of its program. All of these schools combined can accommodate perhaps as many as five hundred refugees at the secondary level. Together with the scholarship programs, we are thus prepared to further the education of a truly significant number of refugees from southern African countries over the years ahead until independence comes.

*Bridging the educational gap*

The rising standards at Kurasini have forced our attention on a new problem. To give you the background, the schools and school-subsidy programs were conceived in the early period when there existed a yawning gap between the university scholarships being offered and the greater part of the refugees, even the small class of educated refugees. South Africans and Rhodesians could produce some students qualified for the universities immediately, but the South West African or Mozambiquan who was ready for the university scholarship was extremely rare. With the failure of the scholarship program in African secondary schools, there was little choice, if a serious educational effort for refugees was to be mounted. However, our experience in Dar es Salaam makes it clear that the gap has not yet been filled. All too many refugees, especially those from Mozambique and South West Africa, are not even qualified for immediate entry at the secondary level. On behalf of the Mozambiquans, the Mozambique Institute is trying to bridge the gap between the four years of education that even the luckiest few of the African children can hope for—the *ensino primario* program—and the minimum requirements at Kurasini or even lower technical schools. The South West Africans are similarly handicapped in their previous education and they have no one to help them bridge this gap. There has been some discussion recently in Dar es Salaam concerning the need to establish at least a small school in Tanzania at the upper primary levels. I strongly recommend that serious consideration be given to filling this gap by some means such as this.
With this I have completed my survey of educational programs for refugees from southern Africa. I do not pretend that it has been comprehensive, but I think that it has suggested the full range of activities in education and given you some basis on which to make an evaluation of our performance. It is time now to look at the future.

The Future

I turn to this subject with a sense of regret that I am required by the schedule to speak before Dr. Omari presents his paper on "African Solutions to the Refugee Problem". Fundamentally, it is my position that the refugee problem in Africa is a problem for Africans. We can and should help; indeed, we have an obligation to do so, since the problem in its ultimate origins springs from colonialism. Nevertheless, we must never forget that it will only be through effective action by the African countries themselves that the problems of African refugees can be solved. Actions taken without careful and scrupulous consultation with the Africans who are concerned will certainly meet with failure. I look forward to hearing Dr. Omari's views.

We began our efforts in education for refugees in response to a clearly indicated need, a response dictated by a commitment to Africa and African independence and self-government. None of us could foresee how long it would be before all African countries achieved their goal of independence and we still cannot do so, but it is clear today that the road to independence for southern Africa is longer and more difficult than most of us anticipated five years ago. The graduating refugee is not going to be able to emerge directly from his studies and take up a position in his own country. This condition must now be squarely faced. How can we turn this condition, with all of its inherent disadvantages, to our advantage, to Africa's advantage? Stated in these terms, the answer becomes obvious. We must devise a plan to ensure that he contributes to the development of Africa as a whole until conditions make it possible for him to contribute to the development of his own country and at the same time assist him to
develop his own capacities and contribute to his own welfare. This is refugee manpower planning.

It differs significantly from national manpower planning, obviously, for national manpower planning depends on political stability and control, the very opposite of conditions in southern Africa. National manpower planning studies a national operating economy as it exists, with an analysis of its jobs, and projects the future of that economy in direct relationship to education and population change. However refined the planner's techniques may have become today, they are not capable of handling this kind of problem in a setting of revolution and some degree of probable violence. Refugee manpower planning in the African context is a unique problem and we will have to devise our own techniques to cope with it. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to draft a planning program, I would like to suggest some of the characteristics of such a program, and the elements that must be given consideration in it.

Planning refugee manpower

I would suggest these essential characteristics for an African refugee manpower-planning program. First, it must treat the problem of refugees within the context of the whole of Africa. Second, it must plan for refugees from the time a refugee first appears in independent Africa until he is settled into employment at the conclusion of his training. Third, it must co-ordinate effectively the "insiders"—the African governments, the exiled political parties, the African international organisations—and the "outsiders"—the non-African groups who have accepted roles to play. I am tempted to insist that planning requires some kind of centralized machinery for co-ordination or even, perhaps, control, but I am afraid that this is impractical. I cannot suggest who could assume this function.

There are four elements essential to any comprehensive treatment of refugee manpower planning: the refugee student, his educational program, the immediate job market in the independent states of Africa, and the potential job market in his home country after independence.

One of the conundrums involved in refugee manpower
planning is the intake into the educational system. It is, of course, impossible to predict how many refugees will be moving out of their homelands in any one year. Of those who do move, it is possible to predict the number eligible for further training with only imperfect results. Past experience is not a reliable guide at all. For example, our normal expectation with South West Africans at Kurasini is to find that no more than one in five to one in ten will prove to be qualified, but recently, when we tested a group of 25 students, we found to our surprise that 13 could be admitted. We will always have to live with this uncertainty. Once the refugee student is accepted into the educational programs he is, on the whole, as predictable in his behavior patterns as any student. Our uncertainties about the output of the educational system is due more to our lack of complete information concerning the number of participants in the programs. These uncertainties will remain with us because political parties planning a revolution are not likely to reveal key information of this type to help us solve our administrative problems.

We have completed a survey of the “educational system”. There seem to be enough scholarships at the university level to meet the demand; there are enough places at secondary schools to meet present needs. We have noted the gap at upper primary levels for particular nationalities and the surprisingly low demand for technical education. All of these statements could be rendered obsolete by any serious outbreak of violence in southern Africa and a consequent increase in the size of the refugee flow. We have little grounds for complacency.

We have also explored briefly the probability that we will soon be confronted with the special problem of “topping-off” training to fit refugees into specific jobs. This is a gap in the “educational system” that may develop and it is impossible to predict now the dimensions of the need. I suspect that we shall meet this on an ad hoc basis for a time, until we know what is required.

Preparation for administrative work

One specialized field of training has received all too little consideration—administration and preparation for the civil ser-
vice. It is, after all, our assumption that most of the students we are training will eventually become civil servants in their home countries. Every independent African state has reached independence with a shortage, more or less severe, of men trained for government service, and they have found it necessary to rely heavily on expensive, expatriate staff. With this experience it is surprising that there has been little demand for rapid courses in administrative training. The African-American Institute, in an attempt to exercise foresight, added to the Kurasini staff last year an administrative-training specialist, whose assignment it was to provide some measure of specialized training for the students at the school and to offer training to members of the staff of the political parties. This program—our idea—had been discussed with the various party leaders and has received their endorsement. It has proved to be an almost complete failure; students at the school are either inadequately prepared or far too busy with their regular studies to participate and party leaders have not found it convenient to avail themselves of this opportunity. Our training specialist is on his way home in complete frustration. There is no doubt about the basic need—we had the parties' endorsement—and yet there were never any students to teach. I conclude from this experience that the dynamics of revolutionary movements are such that serious consideration of future problems of this kind may meet with unexpected, unexplained resistance.

There is no inherent incompatibility between the two job markets I have mentioned above. Skills needed now in the independent countries will be needed later when the southern African territories reach their independence. The point that was made much earlier about special training to fit the returning refugee graduate to the job immediately available remains valid. This is a task we may have to perform in order to get them jobs—the independent states will have higher standards at this point in their development than a manpower-hungry Mozambique would have—but in the long run this extra training, the additional work experience that the refugee will absorb, will serve him well when he takes up a job at home. Even if he is sidetracked from his ultimate speciality—
an economist forced to take up work as a teacher, for example—it is doubtful that he will suffer any loss in ultimate effectiveness. Recent studies in the United States have emphasized the transferrability of skills even between seemingly unrelated and specialized occupations. We will still have problems in obtaining employment for refugees; we should counsel refugees to select courses of study that will make employment easier. But, for refugee manpower-planning purposes, the existence of two separate job markets creates no insuperable difficulties.

Trained refugee manpower constitutes an important resource for the African states—the independent as well as those still dependent. Ultimately, every expatriate replaced by an African is a net gain for Africa. Any momentary decline in administrative efficiency is more than offset by the gain in understanding, in sympathy, and in satisfaction by the governors and governed alike. The potential contribution that refugees will make to the independent African states, even before they are able to return to their homelands, alone would justify our efforts. We have made a good investment in international understanding and progress.
T. Peter Omari

From Refugee to Emigré:
African Solutions to the Refugee Problem

The refugee problem in Africa is essentially an African problem which needs to be solved with initiative, imagination and sympathy on the part of African governments. Of course, African governments require much overseas assistance in any programme that is adopted. The countries from which the refugees come, as well as all the possible countries of asylum in Africa, are only now developing and have scarce resources of men and material wealth. Countries of asylum have not and will not find it easy to provide adequate social and economic services for great numbers of refugees, without greatly disrupting their own national development plans, as well as their political development. It is here that voluntary, international and inter-governmental co-operation and assistance will be needed. But in the end the solution of the problems that produce refugees, as well as the settlement and adjustment of these refugees, must be tackled by the governments of the continent with the active support and encouragement of the citizens of these countries. In this effort they can count on United Nations support, as they have been able to do in the past.

There are at present two types of refugees in Africa: refugees from non-independent countries, such as those from South Africa, South-West Africa, Rhodesia, etc., and refugees from independent states, such as those from Rwanda, the Congo (Kinshasa), Burundi, Sudan, etc. In terms of absolute numbers,

1 The opinions expressed in this paper are not necessarily shared by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.
the refugees from the first group of countries are relatively few, with the exception of the Portuguese territories in Africa. It has been estimated that during 1964 only between 800 to 900 refugees came through the main centres from South and South-West Africa. Current estimates put the figures of refugees from these two countries at about 60–70 a month. More and more refugees have been coming out of Angola and Mozambique recently. Of the second group, we can speak in terms of hundreds of thousands, and they present a more difficult problem for solution. This problem engaged the attention of both the Council of Ministers and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU in Accra for five out of the twelve days that the two bodies met.

Refugees from Non-Independent Countries

The solutions to the problems of refugees from the non-independent countries of Africa are less complicated than those to the problems of refugees from the independent countries and may be discussed first. Of this group, we can isolate three classes:

1. Those who migrate or leave their country for political reasons.
2. Fugitives from justice.
3. Informers, spies and those engaged in counter-refugee activities.

We are concerned with the rehabilitation of only the first of the three classes, those whom we can call genuine refugees. Among this group we have:

(a) Political activists, including “freedom fighters”, made up of:

(i) Adult activists—the “freedom fighters”—who seek military training.
(ii) Adult activists who are promoters and organizers of the liberation.
(iii) Youthful activists without definite commitment to a particular objective, such as education, occupation or settlement.
(b) Refugees with or without their families in search of jobs and economic and social betterment.

(c) Youthful refugees who are dissatisfied with local conditions and inferior educational opportunities—especially the Bantu education laws of South Africa—and who seek better educational facilities abroad.

Some of the refugees have been forced to flee their countries for fear of persecution, while some have fled as a result of dissatisfaction with home conditions. But many—especially the youthful ones—have left because they imagined, rightly or wrongly, that the rest of independent Africa was anxiously waiting to offer them whatever assistance they required. Strangely enough, oppressed peoples show more hope for the future than free people, and, with the possible exception of Ghana, African countries seem to be more pan-Africanist before they achieve independence than after independence. Just as Ghana’s independence was of much psychological significance and raised the hopes of the rest of non-independent Africa in 1957 in their struggle for political emancipation, so the present state of independence of most of Africa is of great psychological significance for the few non-independent countries of Africa. Unfortunately machinery does not exist to enable the independent African states to give expression, independently or collectively through the OAU, to the liberation hopes of these countries or to offer more concrete assistance to people who expect and require so much assistance in their struggle for freedom and self-development within and outside the borders of their respective countries.

In order to sort out genuine refugees from spurious ones, refugee camps exist to screen persons leaving these countries and also to assist such persons in securing accommodation, employment, education, financial and other assistance. Host countries, such as Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, etc., which border the major troubled countries, admit large numbers of persons who are properly accredited as refugees, and provide them with minimal facilities in their pursuit of their objectives. But it is obvious that these countries alone, even with international assistance, cannot shoulder the burden of the in-
creasing number of refugees. The OAU has taken interest in these refugees and has established a Committee of Ten (together with other bodies) to deal with the refugee problem. At its Cairo, Accra and Nairobi Conferences the OAU has discussed and attempted a draft Convention on Refugees, which is designed to aid in solving some of the problems faced by refugees in general.

The Economic Commission for Africa has also shown interest in the problem but having neither funds nor an active programme for refugees, it has only tried to co-ordinate or assist with the refugee programmes of the various international bodies operating in the region. It hopes that it can play a more active role in a future programme for refugees in cooperation with the OAU, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other international and voluntary refugee agencies. Among some of the organizations with which the ECA has established contact in the past are the UNHCR in Geneva, the World Council of Churches in Geneva, the African–American Institute in Washington, and the Swedish International Development Authority.

To attempt a solution to the refugee problem in the non-independent countries of southern and central Africa, we must first understand the nature of the problem and the difficulties inherent in the objectives of the refugees.

The "freedom fighter" group is generally well taken care of. We shall not be concerned with that group here. Of more immediate concern to us are persons fleeing their respective countries who require financial, educational and other assistance not connected with active politics and military training. This group faces the following problems:

1. Accreditation of status as refugee.
2. A country of asylum.
3. Financial assistance for transportation and settlement.

1. *Accreditation of status as refugee*. At the moment, individuals must first of all be accredited as refugees at the point where they enter a host country. The problems which refugees face after they leave their countries are immense. If they are not kidnapped and returned to their countries of origin (as in
the case of the Higgs kidnapping), they face bewildering alternatives in their efforts to get assistance. Refugees have the problem of not being allowed through Zambia, for example, without sponsorship, unless they fall into certain professional categories, such as teachers or doctors. Since the refugee problem is closely associated with the political struggle for liberation of these countries, refugee status is obtained through the recognized political party or parties of the country of origin now in exile. South African refugees come largely through Botswana and normally must accept sponsorship there by the African National Congress (ANC) or Pan-African Congress (PAC) in Francistown, in order to get farther along the escape route. The political party screens the “refugees” and attempts to sort out the genuine from the spurious or the spy. The political parties obviously perform a useful function. They are presumed to understand the internal political situation and to be able to vouch for individual citizens fleeing their country for political reasons. Nevertheless there arises a situation in which persons or refugees who have no wish for active political participation but who are fleeing for financial and educational reasons are sometimes coerced to support policies to which they do not subscribe, in return for accreditation. To use an example from South Africa, young persons are known to be coerced to support either the PAC or the ANC. Individuals who were originally sponsored by one of these organizations have later been coerced into actions in support of policies they themselves did not approve. For, when some of them later revoked their promises, these organizations withdrew their accreditation and sponsorship and informed the host country of their action, with the result that after much effort in securing jobs or educational enrolment, they have been expelled as persona non grata without anywhere else to go. Non-political organizations dealing with refugees, such as the International Refugee Council of Zambia and the African-American Institute have tried to offer sponsorship to a few refugees. But these organizations have inadequate resources, and in any case are not recognized by African governments as providing valid sponsorship.

2. Country of asylum. Whether these refugees intend to
pursue educational or financial aims, they require to settle down somewhere for some time. African countries themselves must be able to undertake responsibility for settling these refugees, even if they consider that countries like South Africa and Angola can be liberated in less than 10 years. At present, the African countries acting through the OAU are looking for some means of giving concrete expression to this need. At the Accra Conference of Heads of State and Government in 1965 a draft convention was considered and resolutions were passed on the subject. At the more recent Conference of East African Heads of State in Nairobi this year, the question of refugees came up. At both conferences concern was expressed over member countries harbouring refugees and the possible use of these refugees for the purpose of sabotaging the governments of the newly independent countries of the region. The major emphasis, therefore, has been negative so far, with the various governments being concerned only to ensure that "refugees" from their respective countries are not assisted by their neighbours to subvert their own national programmes. At present, the countries of Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and Ethiopia (in that order) are mostly burdened with promoting the welfare and resettlement of refugees of the various categories. It is obvious that the resources of these and the south-eastern African countries are daily being over-taxed. Ghana, of course, has been in the unique position of offering residential facilities to refugees from southern Africa in diverse substantial ways.

Various international agencies, including the UN, have assisted in offering scholarships and educational facilities to many of the refugees coming out of Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and South West Africa.

(a) The African-American Institute is opening a new school to supplement its school in Dar-es-Salaam, which will take students up to matriculation standards, thus enabling them to take university scholarships abroad.

(b) The United Nations have established an educational programme for refugees from southern Africa.

(c) Voluntary associations in Britain have stepped up their efforts in finding more places in educational institutions for refugees in Britain.
(d) A farm in Zambia is being prepared to train refugees and help them settle on the land.

(e) Political organizations, such as the ANC, have received gifts of large numbers of scholarships to educational establishments in both eastern and western countries.

The refugee problem of non-independent countries should be looked at realistically, in terms of these refugees returning to some African country to settle after their period of training abroad is over. For it is unlikely that they can return to their countries of origin until these countries are "liberated". To achieve this requires political decisions on the part of African governments to accept refugees and to give them asylum, as well as to make welfare facilities available to those who have been taken in through governmental and other agencies.

3. Financial assistance for transportation and settlement. Refugees who do not fall within the category of "freedom fighters", even when there is the prospect of asylum somewhere, or educational opportunity in some institution in Africa or abroad, require immediate financial assistance to aid their mobility. As a matter of fact, lack of ordinary transport facilities has hampered much of the work with refugees carried on by both the political organizations and the non-political organizations. It is here that international assistance is most needed and called for. Refugees can then quickly be despatched to their immediate objective of settlement or training.

A solution to the problem

The refugee problem is one involving the reception of refugees at the point where they enter a host country, the possibility of settlement in an alien country, and freedom from arbitrary restriction of movement within the country of domicile. The refugee problem, as it affects the group we have been dealing with, is complicated by the conception of the "refugee mentality", which in all things assumes that the refugee will return to his country of origin in the shortest possible time. He is thus unwilling to consider a permanent or even a semi-permanent acceptance of his refugee status as an emigré or "settler" in the country that offers him asylum.
Without any intention of prejudicing the efforts of liberation movements and committees to seek the speedy liberation of the countries with which they are concerned, it is my belief that the refugee problem cannot be solved unless it is looked at as a long-term problem, at least for the adjustment of the group of refugees outside the category of "freedom fighters". Even if the non-military training of refugees is meant to equip them for the time when they can return to their countries upon liberation, the type of refugees I have been concerned with may be treated as emigrés rather than "refugees" as such. The main reasons for this point of view are:

(a) Liberation will probably not be effected within the next decade, barring some favourable act of God. The OAU and other programmes for the liberation of South Africa, for example, are not going according to schedule. Of the South Africans who return (after receiving military training abroad), and then are passed back into South Africa (there has been one group of over 70), the majority have been picked up by the police. South-African security-service penetration has been very expert. The OAU's Committee of Nine now seems to feel that the use of exiles to spearhead the liberation of countries that are still colonial or racially dominated has not been successful; that support of the exile groups is becoming too expensive, judging by the poor results produced so far; that there is perhaps a greater need for the African countries to consolidate their own independence. In addition to this, even countries such as Tanzania and Zambia, which have hitherto shown much enthusiasm for receiving refugees, have begun to restrict the activities of the various political organizations concerned with the liberation of these countries.

For Angola, Mozambique or Rhodesia a shorter possible time limit may be realistic. Even then, it takes 3–5 years to train a person and after that he must find an occupational outlet and be enabled to earn a living, not to speak of any contribution he can make to national development. From this vantage point it follows that a refugee must look forward to settling somewhere before his country is liberated.

(b) Experience shows that once a refugee has found a "temporary" abode and is fairly comfortable in his current circum-
stances, he seldom looks forward to other moves that alter his economic and social status from purely altruistic motives and is not likely to return to his country of origin unless he is forced to do so or is only paying a visit. African "refugees" from other parts of the continent, who could return following a change in government which they had advocated, have not always been willing to return when they have settled into employment somewhere or are comfortable in other situations.

Any solution of the refugee problem, therefore, will have to take the settlement of refugees, even as a temporary measure, into account.

Once the above premises are accepted in dealing with the problem of refugees, the following solution may be proposed:

(a) There is need for an overall framework under the auspices of the OAU and the High Commissioner for Refugees to establish a bureau which will be concerned with the overall problems of the refugees, as well as the co-ordination of aid and other facilities for all classes of refugees. Such a bureau will then promote the implementation of conventions and resolutions passed or adopted by both the OAU and the international organizations respecting refugees.

(b) A declaration on the part of the African governments is urgently required (as part of an African convention on refugees) offering to take in as immigrants those refugees who desire to settle within their boundaries. The effect of such a declaration would be that at the time a person is accorded refugee status (or at a later date) he could declare the country within which he wishes to settle (however temporary he considers such a settlement to be at the time). Contact with this country could begin at once to effect his admission then or later, after he has been assisted to acquire the training or education he requires. The corollary to this would be that those who do not want to be admitted as immigrants could be admitted as aliens, with the consequences attendant on alien status within that country.

(c) With respect to the screening of refugees, an international organization, such as the Red Cross, should be available at refugee camps, to which non-political refugees could report for accreditation. This would ease the pressures which political
parties often bring to bear on young refugees to support their causes, a situation which has often resulted in future withdrawal of recognition and untold hardship to otherwise conscientious refugees.

(d) Under the sponsorship of the OAU or the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, refugees should be issued with travel documents which are recognized for the purpose. African countries can also individually issue to refugees the type of passports that have been issued to refugees by Ghana in the past, offering to accept under their protection refugees who are refused entry into countries not accepting them. Such documents should be accepted by all countries subscribing to the OAU Convention and be exchanged for national passports upon settlement in African countries as immigrants.

(e) Educational programmes and the training of refugees should be guided so as to complement the manpower needs of the host countries. Such a programme can be operated under the auspices of the ECA, but in active co-operation with the Organization of African Unity. If refugees have indicated in which country they intend to settle and have been accepted, they can be trained in fields which will not result in unnecessary competition with the citizens of that country. This is often a sore point with host countries. It is a little unrealistic to think that refugees from non-independent countries can be trained specifically to take over particular tasks in countries that are yet to be liberated. Even if these refugees later migrated to their own countries, the experience gained in the meantime would be of immense benefit to their ultimate adjustment.

(f) There is a need for a centralized employment exchange or agency to seek work and migratory prospects for refugees. This could be organized through the OAU Refugee Bureau or through the Economic Commission for Africa with assistance from the High Commissioner for Refugees.
Refugees from Independent African States

The problem of refugees from independent African states is complicated by the fear of the independent African states themselves that, by giving recognition to this class of refugees from neighbouring states, they are paving the way for future possible subversion of their own governments. All governments are agreed on the need for something to be done for refugees from non-independent countries. If much has not been achieved so far, it is largely because the question of this other class of refugees has not yet been resolved. Resolution 26 of the Heads of State and Government meeting in Accra in 1965 entitled "The Problem of Refugees in Africa":

1. Reaffirms its desire to give all possible assistance to refugees from any Member State on a humanitarian and fraternal basis;

2. Recalls that Member States have pledged themselves to prevent refugees living on their territories from carrying out by any means whatsoever any acts harmful to the interests of other states Members of the Organization of African Unity;

3. Requests all Member States never to allow the refugee question to become a source of dispute amongst them;

4. Notes with appreciation the assistance provided by the United Nations High Commissioner's Office to African Governments in their programmes of aid to refugees;

5. Requests the African States that are members of the Economic and Social Council to secure an increase in African representation on the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme.

African Governments, through the OAU, should take a more forthright and positive view of the problems presented by this class of refugee, especially since it includes large numbers of people. The situation also has a built-in and potentially explosive political element which can only be ignored to the detriment of the stability which the OAU seeks to promote.

It was decided in Accra that "the OAU Commission on Refugees should provide legal experts at the highest level to re-examine the draft Convention on the refugee problem, having
regard to the views expressed by the various delegates at the Assembly of Heads of State and Government”.

An African Convention on Refugees is certainly desired and must be within the framework of the UN Convention. Everything I have said with respect to refugees from non-independent countries is relevant to such a convention also. It should establish an operational agency not patterned on the UNHCR but one with executive functions concerned with:

(a) Receiving refugees of all categories.
(b) Providing transit camps for refugees going on for educational and other facilities.
(c) Issuing accreditation status to refugees, as well as internationally valid travel documents.
(d) Financing projects for refugees, either from its own resources or as a co-ordinating agency for other organizations and bodies interested in the problem of refugees.

African Governments cannot fight shy of a problem that threatens to affect the stability of newly independent countries and in this respect declarations must be matched by deeds. For in the final analysis the refugee problem is essentially an African problem. A flexible approach can be found within the resources of the various countries acting in concert through the OAU and with the active participation and support of the UN and other international and foreign agencies.
Z. K. Matthews

The Role of Voluntary Organisations in the Refugee Situation in Africa

The role played by voluntary agencies in situations where people are in distress or need is one of which they may be justly proud. Indeed it may well be said that “where there are needs, there are voluntary agencies”. The refugee situation in Africa is no exception in this regard. As soon as it became clear that, owing to various causes, uprooted and homeless people in need of all kinds of help were to be found in different parts of Africa, voluntary agencies of various kinds, both church-related and non-church-related, began to put together their meagre resources, in order to come to the aid of those in need.

An important aspect of the role of voluntary agencies in their ministry of service is their degree of flexibility. As they are inspired primarily by humanitarian considerations, they are free to act in many situations in which governmental agencies, guided, as they are, by specific appropriations and regulations governing them, would find themselves prevented from acting or delayed in their action, however sympathetic they might be. This does not mean that voluntary agencies act without careful consideration of what they are going to do. They do not just rush in where angels fear to tread. They also have their mandates and their constitutions, their procedures and methods of approach to problems of need. But, as a rule, they are less hidebound than governmental organisations and this is a great advantage. As already indicated, voluntary agencies are generally inspired by purely humanitarian considerations. They are concerned first with the needs and sufferings of the people affected and not with the underlying causes which have led to
their distress. Indeed some people are critical of voluntary agencies because of this. They argue that, because of their preoccupation with need or suffering, voluntary agencies help people who ought not to be helped and that voluntary agencies would do well to examine the underlying causes of need and to tackle them, so as to obviate the necessity for continuous assistance. This is very largely a counsel of perfection and it would be cold comfort for a person in distress to tell him that the reason why he is in that situation is because the policy of his country is not based on sound lines and that all will be well with him when the United Nations has put the matter right. I am not suggesting that fundamental solutions should not be sought for the underlying causes which lead to people becoming uprooted and homeless, but I consider that it is right and proper that voluntary agencies should not withhold their aid from people in need while long-term solutions are being sought for their problems.

Another important feature that characterises the work of voluntary agencies is that they can generally stay much longer on the job than governmental or international agencies. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or the Red Cross may provide immediate assistance to people in need in a situation of emergency, but when the immediate emergency is over, they may seek to withdraw. But the need may continue beyond the period of emergency and voluntary agencies may have to carry on where governmental or international agencies have left off.

One of the problems connected with the humanitarian work of voluntary agencies is their number. This may cause overlapping of effort and a certain amount of confusion in the mind of the general public. Fortunately there is an increasing tendency on the part of voluntary agencies working in the same field to co-operate, to co-ordinate their efforts and to exchange information, to the benefit of the people affected.

In this particular seminar we are concerned with the role of voluntary organisations in dealing with the refugee situation in Africa.

Voluntary organisations have played an important part in the measures that have been taken to meet the needs of the
thousands of people who have been uprooted from their homes by the upheavals or disturbances that have occurred in Africa in recent years. In fact, voluntary organisations, although they are not always first on the scene, generally remain and continue to care for refugees long after agencies such as the UNHCR and even the Red Cross have withdrawn from the particular operation.

The voluntary organisations may be church-related agencies, such as the World Council of Churches (WCC), the Church World Service, and the Catholic Relief Services. Others may be described as secular agencies, such as Oxfam and the Joint Committee on the High Commission Territories. The Protestant Church has in many cases confessional programmes, such as the Lutheran World Federation, the Methodist Commission on Overseas Relief and the Presbyterian Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations, or joint programmes, such as Christian Aid of the British Council of Churches or the Church World Service of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA. The member churches of the World Council of Churches carry out their relief services through the Division of Inter-Church Aid, Refugee and World Service. It is not possible for me to give an account of what all the churches have done to meet refugee needs, but as far as Africa is concerned, I am able to say that since 1960, the churches have made the following contributions through the World Council of Churches to meet refugee needs in Africa.

In Algeria, since independence, the churches have contributed $2,500,000 through a specially established agency (the Christian Committee for Service in Algeria, CCSA) to help in the rehabilitation of that war-torn country. This is quite apart from the material relief valued at several million dollars which has gone into this Muslim country—a gesture which has been deeply appreciated by the Muslim authorities of Algeria.

In the Congo, when that country was overtaken by internal disturbances, the churches responded to the appeal for help by the World Council of Churches to the tune of $800,000 and when this was followed by the Angolan emergency, a further $200,000 was contributed for expenditure in the Congo, the country in which the Angolans had in the main taken refuge.
Independence in Rwanda and Burundi in 1962 was also followed by internal disturbances and there the appeal to the churches brought in $150,000.

In 1964 the World Council of Churches called upon the Lutheran World Federation to set up an agency to act on behalf of the churches in connection with refugees in Tanganyika (now Tanzania). To discharge the responsibilities it had assumed in this regard, the Luthern World Federation set up the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS) and since its inception this body has spent rather more than $400,000 on this service.

In 1964, the World Council of Churches authorised the Division of Inter-Church Aid, Refugee and World Service to launch a special appeal to deal with problems in Africa. This is what has come to be known as the Ecumenical Programme for Emergency Action in Africa (EPEAA). The object of the appeal is to raise an amount of $10,000,000 over a period of five years to enable the Division to deal effectively with refugee needs and non-refugee needs regarded as of urgent importance in the development of the new states of Africa. Of this amount, at least 25% is to be spent on refugee needs. So far, from the proceeds of this appeal, over half a million dollars have been spent on refugee needs in Africa. Thus the Churches, through WCC channels alone, have in the last 5 years put over $4,000,000 into this humanitarian work.

In addition to this, a great deal of material aid in the form of seeds, agricultural implements, medical supplies, day-old chicks, food supplies, etc. has gone to different countries in Africa, contributed especially by the Church World Service of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA. To this must be added the salaries of field-workers sponsored by different agencies for service to refugees.

So far I have dealt with the contribution of the World Council of Churches and its related agencies in this field, but other organisations have also played a part in this development. Among these may be mentioned organisations such as Caritas, which has been active in the Congo, Rwanda, the Central African Republic, Uganda and elsewhere, and Oxfam, which, through its representatives in different parts of Africa,
has made available material relief to various types of refugees, as well as equipment of various kinds.

Forms of Assistance

The forms of assistance rendered by voluntary organisations to refugees vary and depend upon the type of refugee with whom they have to deal. In the case of a mass exodus of people from their country of origin to a country of asylum, the primary need is to find land on which such people may be settled. Fortunately in Africa, in most countries, there is no serious scarcity of land and therefore it is usually possible to find an area in which new settlements may be established. As a rule, such a mass exodus consists of peasants, who are able to make use of local materials in building their homes and to engage in agricultural activities, by means of which they can become self-supporting in a short time. Their main need in the initial period is for food and clothing to tide them over the period before they become self-supporting through reaping their own crops, and provision of essential services, such as roads and water supplies. Once such a settlement is set in motion, the demand for other services arises.

A considerable proportion of such settlements consists of children of school-going age, for whom it becomes necessary to provide educational facilities. In some cases there are to be found among the refugees teachers who can play a part in the education of the children, either on a voluntary basis or for a nominal salary.

As far as health is concerned, clinics and health centres have to be provided and the services of nurses and other medical personnel secured.

Another urgent need in such settlements is for church buildings and pastors for the pastoral care of the refugees.

A serious problem connected with refugees is that of the provision of educational facilities for those children who are beyond the primary stage of education. As a rule, it is not possible for secondary-school facilities to be provided in the refugee settlement. This means that places must be found for
such pupils in schools remote from the refugee settlements. This calls for the provision of scholarships for such students. The same applies to forms of vocational training which may be needed by refugee students.

These services, it will be realised, imply that the voluntary organisation which undertakes to render assistance in those forms finds itself burdened with long-term programmes which the government of the country of asylum may not be prepared to take over within a short period of time.

In spite of the limited resources at their disposal, the record of the voluntary agencies in this field is one of which they may be justly proud. But much remains to be done, not only to meet the immediate material needs of refugees but also to engage in programmes of rehabilitation which are in the nature of longer-term measures and to prepare for the extension of these programmes in various parts of Africa. For example, the whole of southern Africa is a region in which we may expect developments which may give rise to thousands of uprooted and homeless people but even in the parts of Africa which have already achieved independence, stability has not yet been achieved and it may be many years before we can talk about winding up the refugee problem in Africa.

The governments concerned, as well as the United Nations, will naturally play their part in tackling these problems to an increasing extent, but there will always be room for the voluntary organisations, which, with their greater flexibility, may be able to render services in places or to persons when governmental agencies may find it difficult, if not impossible, to do so.

Refugees from southern Africa come about as a result of the policies followed by the governments of the area concerned—from South Africa and South-West Africa as a result of the policy of apartheid followed by the government of the Republic of South Africa, which is the authority responsible for both these areas, and in Southern Rhodesia as a result of the policy followed by the government of Southern Rhodesia towards those Africans who are critics of government policy and advocates of a policy of majority rule for that territory.

Some of the victims of these policies are to be found inside and some outside the countries concerned. Strictly speaking,
it is only the latter group that is generally referred to when we speak about refugees from this area. The actual number of these refugees outside the country is small, running into a few hundreds. The problem of the victims of these policies who have not left the countries concerned is much bigger. This group includes

(a) Those who have been arrested, convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment of varying lengths under various apartheid laws, especially the Suppression of Communism Act, the Sabotage Act and the Unlawful Organisations Act.

(b) Those who have been banned or placed under house arrest.

(c) Those who have been detained under the 180-day, ‘no-trial’ law.

(d) The dependents of persons falling under sections (a), (b), and (c).

The forms of assistance that have been rendered to this group include

(a) Costs of legal defence.

(b) Assistance to dependents of persons in all these categories, including feeding, clothing, rent, school fees, etc.

(c) Costs of educational schemes (correspondence courses for those in jail for lengthy periods of time).

The agencies that have been active in this field on behalf of this group include

(a) The Defence and Aid Fund, a welfare organisation which was started at the time of the Treason Trial and has carried on this service of legal assistance until it was banned recently by the Minister of Justice.

(b) The Friends Service Committee, which confined itself to assisting the dependents of the victims of apartheid.

(c) The Christian Council of South Africa, which also concentrated on aid to dependents.

(d) The Institute of Race Relations, which assisted with the educational scheme for prisoners.

(e) The National Union of South-African Students and the international student organisations, such as World University
Service, International Student Conference and International University Exchange Fund, which concerned themselves primarily with the education of prisoners and with scholarships for students.

(f) The World Council of Churches, which through the Christian Council of South Africa made available such funds as had been donated to it for these purposes by member churches and other agencies.

These agencies have endeavoured to raise funds within the country itself, but the causes they espoused were so unpopular within the country that they have not been able to raise sufficient funds and so have depended a great deal on funds from outside.

The Red Cross has investigated conditions in South-African prisons, but, as far as I know, its report has not been made public.

The Former High Commission Territories

In the former High Commission Territories of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, fluctuating numbers of South-African refugees are to be found. In Lesotho a small refugee committee has been established to look after the welfare of the refugees. Similar committees are to be found in the other territories. These committees have largely been dependent upon the Joint Committee, a body with its headquarters in London. This body has undertaken to send a fixed sum of money monthly to the committees concerned for the benefit of the refugees. Recently, when this body found itself in financial difficulties, it turned to the World Council of Churches for support and the WCC was able to make available a sum of $20,000 for the three territories for a limited period (1965–66). This sum has now been exhausted, but the Special Agency for the Ecumenical Programme for Emergency Action in Africa has approved of a similar amount being made available for these territories for the year 1966–67.

Other funds have come from the Church World Service,
New York, which has been specially interested in the Bakhatla Community Centre in Botswana, which is also used for refugees in transit.

The Oxfam representative in southern Africa, who is stationed in Lesotho, has also from time to time rendered assistance to South-African refugees.

Tanzania

A number of South-African refugees are to be found in Tanzania. In fact, Tanzania is the country which has been most generous in granting asylum to refugees from other countries, including South Africa. The number of such refugees fluctuates, because many of them are young people in search of scholarship opportunities and as soon as they are granted scholarships, they move on to other countries.

The main bodies responsible for the welfare of these refugees are the political parties to which they belong. As far as South Africa is concerned, the two main parties are the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress. It is difficult to say where these political parties get their funds from, but one may guess that they are provided with financial resources by friendly governments. However, the funds they have at their disposal are not sufficient to enable them to meet the needs of all the refugees concerned, so they have turned to the Christian Council of Tanganyika for financial aid and the Christian Council has put their needs before the Division of Inter-Church Aid, Refugee and World Service of the World Council of Churches. The WCC has made available resources for feeding, clothing and housing of these refugees to an amount of at least $20,000 to date.

The Tanzanian government itself gave an allowance of 21 shillings per week to refugees registered with the political parties but apparently this has now ceased and indeed the Tanzanian government has called upon the refugees who were concentrated in Dar-es-Salaam to go to other parts of the country, leaving only skeleton staffs in their offices in Dar-es-Salaam.

Refugees from South West Africa are also to be found in
Dar-es-Salaam and they were treated in the same way by the Tanzanian government. The resources which were made available by the World Council of Churches were applied to them as well. They are also divided into two parties, the South West Africa Political Organisation and the South West Africa National Union. What we have said with regard to the private resources of the ANC and the PAC also applies to the parties from South West Africa.

One of the problems of South-African refugees in Tanzania is that, unless they are associated with the parties, the Tanzanian government is not prepared to have them in the country and even members of the parties, if they cease to be such, run the risk of being declared Prohibited Immigrants and ordered to leave the country. A recent example of this has been the case of some 18 members of the PAC who, because of disputes within the party, were expelled from the party and were then declared Prohibited Immigrants by the Tanzanian government at the request of the party. After a great deal of effort by the Christian Council of Tanganyika and the Presbyterian Mission in Ethiopia, permission was obtained for them to enter Ethiopia. Financial support for these refugees has been provided by the WCC. Some of them entered schools and colleges in the country and others have obtained employment within the country. Their position remains uncertain, however, as the Ethiopian Government is not anxious to have the number of such refugees increased.

Zambia

On the whole the Zambian Government is not favourable to the idea of refugees settling in the country. No refugees are allowed to enter the country unless they can show that they have written permission to enter another country and therefore the few South-African refugees who are in Zambia are technically in transit. Nevertheless, some of them spend some time at the refugee reception centre which has been established a few miles outside Lusaka.

Through the Christian Council of Zambia, the WCC has made available resources for South-African refugees in the
refugee reception centre and has also provided funds for the transport of such refugees from Botswana. Sweden has provided an amount of $5,000 for the extension of the premises of the reception centre. A further amount of $5,600 has been pledged by the Swedish section of the Lutheran World Federation for 1966. The Joint Committee on the High Commission Territories has made available the services of Commander Cunningham for work with refugees in Zambia. Oxfam has contributed to the budget of the Joint Committee.

Zambia has established what is called the International Refugee Committee of Zambia (IRCOZ), a body on which the government and the churches, through the Christian Council, are represented and it is this body which co-ordinates all the activities on behalf of refugees in this country.

Rhodesia

In Rhodesia the problem is that of the so-called restrictees and their families. Restrictees are persons who have been detained under the emergency regulations of the country and have been sent to detention camps in remote parts of the country. They are given food in the form of basic rations by the government and receive blankets and a sleeping mat but no pocket-money, no clothes, no toilet soap or toilet articles, and none of the more normal essentials, like furniture, reading and writing materials, recreational facilities, etc. Even the holding of religious services by visiting clergymen has not been allowed in the largest of the camps for the past 10 months. Obviously these restrictees cannot provide for their families and the situation of their children, as far as their education and living costs are concerned, is in some cases desperate.

Within the country itself a committee has been set up to carry out relief work amongst the restrictees. This is the so-called Co-ordinating Committee, which brings together the

1 Since this paper was written this body has been abolished and the Lutheran World Federation has, at the Government's request, taken over this work on the same lines as it has done in Tanzania.
following voluntary organisations in the country: Legal Aid and Welfare, the Christian Action Group, the Salisbury Prison and Restriction Education Committee, the Central Welfare Committee, the Salisbury and Bulawayo Council of Churches, and the Christian Council of Rhodesia.

Representatives of these bodies meet each month to take counsel and to share their thinking and resources. Funds are more and more often being placed in the hands of the Christian Council, partly to achieve co-ordination and partly because of the political situation.

Through the Christian Council of Rhodesia, the WCC has made available funds both for the material relief of the restrictees and their dependents and for the educational programme which the Co-ordinating Committee is sponsoring on behalf of the children of restrictees. The main contributor of this money was the Swedish section of the Lutheran World Federation, which made available approximately $30,000 for the work of the WCC in Rhodesia. Some of the funds donated were devoted to drought relief in Rhodesia.

One of the problems connected with the relief of distress among these restrictees and their dependents is the machinery for locating the people in need and distributing the food, clothing, etc. For this purpose Amnesty International made available a team of four persons from England to work for the Co-ordinating Committee. Unfortunately, their activities are not popular with the local government and a number of them have been ordered to leave the country.

Contributions of small amounts to the needs of restrictees have come from other bodies, such as the refugee students in Rochester University.

Since the Unilateral Declaration of Independence and the uncertainty about currency regulations in the country, it has become increasingly difficult to transfer funds to Rhodesia for this work, but means continue to be found of making funds available.
Conclusion

This brief survey shows that the voluntary agencies, especially the churches, through the World Council of Churches, have endeavoured to meet the needs of those persons who are the victims of the policies of the governments of the countries to which they belong. This is not popular work, because the governments of the countries concerned regard assistance given to such persons as an implied criticism of their policies, but if the churches are to be true to their calling, they have no alternative but to carry out this humanitarian work among those who suffer hardship, including children who are not responsible for the activities of their parents or guardians. It is hoped that those who contribute funds for this purpose will continue to do so on as generous a basis as possible, because, far from these problems disappearing, they seem to be assuming ever-increasing dimensions.
George Ivan Smith

The Role of the United Nations

It is appropriate that in Uppsala of all places, reference should be made to Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld and to his sensitive and prescient understanding of the new Africa with which we are concerned at this seminar.

At the beginning of 1960, the dawn before the unprecedented advance of the African colonies into sovereign independence, the Secretary-General visited many parts of the changing continent and returned to New York deeply affected by the promise and the problems, by the qualities of African leadership and by the immense tasks they were preparing to tackle. The African leaders, he found, were aware not only of the scale of the problems they would face but of the dangers, including the personal dangers inherent in such vast transformations. Although in the first phases of national development the Africans were left to cope with divisions and border difficulties brought about by the European powers in their scramble for Africa, which left frontiers cutting through traditional trade and tribal patterns, it seemed likely that in later phases the tendency would be towards expanding co-operation of a kind that blurs boundaries and combines markets and efforts. The Secretary-General recognised that in such fields, as well as in terms of spirit, there is a great unity in Africa.

Dag Hammarskjöld was not one to minimise the seriousness and even the acute danger attending some problems in Africa. Nevertheless he felt able to offer a perspective that we should be well advised to maintain in our deliberations. In 1959 at Lund, he said: "No matter how overwhelming other world problems may appear to us because of their proximity, it is possible that the future will attach greater importance to the
rebirth of Asia and Africa in the historical evolution of this epoch than to the questions now uppermost in the news."

I begin on this note because the world outside does tend to look on Africa with distorted vision. A rebellion or a diplomatic break makes headlines, but we tend to miss the unfolding events that are significant for Africa, and for ourselves outside. For example, from time to time reports about events in Tanzania are given a negative interpretation. To be sure, there are chronic problems during these convulsions of change, but how much do we read of the manner in which that great statesman Julius Nyerere has built up within his country a political system that provides stability, that cuts through tribal and racial boundaries, that has in each remote village a point of contact between the national leadership and the poorest peasant? The world is less interested in these long-term indicators. It looks for trouble in Zanzibar or evidence that the African leadership on some issue is not on our side, whichever that side happens to be. This is like the gardener, uncertain about the growth of plants, who must pull them up from time to time to examine the roots.

Racial Policies

There is in Africa a vitality, a powerful upsurge of peoples, that is so strong and commanding that as a matter of course it must sweep aside minorities that abuse their power, be they Africans or Europeans, that must by all the signs in the evolutionary process crush the system of apartheid, just as apartheid's cousin, the Nazi system, was crushed, and as a matter of course it will obliterate the memory of people like Ian Smith and his supporters, who claim for one moment in history to dominate a majority because their ancestors are said to have been "the pioneers". Those ancestors moved into the territory only eighty years ago.

It is hardly surprising that the victims of the current vicious race policies in southern Africa wish to take an axe to the roots of the problem now and to confront all of the oppressors. It goes without saying that the U.N. has a sacred trust to perform, in seeing that every step is taken quickly to replace the
separatism of apartheid by a system under which all peoples, irrespective of colour, race, creed or political belief, have equal rights to respect, equality and opportunity.

While emphasising that the political pressure against these evil practices in southern Africa should be directed powerfully and in concentrated forms through those organs of the United Nations created to deal with the political aspects of such questions, I would go on to say that humanitarian and remedial questions concerning refugees, which are the primary concern of this seminar, should be kept to the fullest possible extent outside the ambit of the essential political activities.

I am convinced that the greatness of Africa and of Africans assures the future of that continent. Those of us who are concerned with changing racial patterns by political action, and those of us who are helping refugees or assisting students to find the education they seek, may be reducing the gap in time before acceptable conditions are established. Let us be modest enough to realise that our work is concerned with such a compression in time, but that the real impetus and inevitability of the solution lie in Africa itself. The very conditions that the white minorities have imposed carry with them a demand for redress. Therefore for the most effective and the fastest action, let us see that political questions are directed through political channels and other questions, such as refugees, albeit they have significant political overtones, be dealt with in ways and by means that will bring the quickest response to the desperate human needs.

We may learn from the principle governing one of the most recent discoveries, that of the laser beam. You already know how this beam of light is used as a scalpel. It is powerful enough and accurate enough to be used in eye surgery. It is so far-reaching that it is used by spacemen, as they circle the earth, to flash signals from outer space to the ground. And what is the principle? Combining and arranging the beams of light so that they move in one direction. This concentration, this discipline of direction is called for, not only to project political effort into the line that will be most effective but also in the humanitarian and relief field that is at present our concern.
A Combined Effort

Speakers from the voluntary agencies have rightly called for a combined effort. Field workers know that refugees couldn't care less about our constitutions, our bye-laws or the neat little fences that we erect around ourselves to try to preserve our identity. Victims want help and we are helpers. Although we cannot meet every demand that is made on us, I should like to think that by common effort and intensive liaison we could get as near as humanly possible to the point at which we were consistently advising the victim of all the avenues open to him, no matter which organisations we happen to represent.

Should it be thought that I am referring to lack of liaison between voluntary organisations alone, let me eliminate that impression. In the U.N. family we have a diverse, confusing, and unfortunately sometimes competing range of contacts, all dealing with one or another facet of the problem in southern Africa caused by minorities of European origin depriving African majorities of basic rights.

There are perfectly valid constitutional reasons for each agency or each department of the U.N. continuing to hang on to its pennyworth of responsibility for what the book says belongs to it, but we are not likely to remain in business at all unless we concentrate our efforts and share our resources.

And perhaps it is our responsibility on the international side to provide the example and to describe an appropriate and acceptable framework in which fusion of effort from international organisations and voluntary organisations may be achieved. Inter-governmental and voluntary agencies complement each other in relief and welfare work, and there is a tradition of co-operation for which the U.N. agencies are most grateful. On our side we are able to offer the attention of governments, the functional experience of the specialized agencies in key fields and sometimes the force of international law. But, on the other hand, by their nature, inter-governmental agencies often ponder and pontificate and are obliged to spend precious time seeking compromises that are part of the price for co-operation in a large gathering of varied political societies. Furthermore directives to inter-governmental agencies are sometimes more
exuberant in their political expressions than in their material manifestations. I have in mind some of the scholarship programmes for students from southern Africa, in which there are large numbers of unutilised scholarships, because member states offered education and training facilities at inappropriate levels.

Voluntary Agencies

May I, at this point, pay tribute to the remarkable, courageous, and if you will permit it, the historically important work that your voluntary agencies are doing in the refugee field. To be sure, you are freer from bureaucracy than we can hope to be and subject to fewer political directives. In consequence you have the flexibility and the power to act quickly that are so necessary in this work. Field workers of your organisations, bringing in groups of refugees across hard and dangerous country and caring for them in sometimes impossible conditions, have made a profound impression on those of us who have been privileged to observe their work. When Africa assumes its fullness of life, your workers and your organisations will be well remembered. So will the few in a small number of countries who have taken a lead in helping the thousands of Africans who are in such desperate need in the southern part of the continent. The Scandinavian governments have set an unforgettable example. So have voluntary societies, such as the international student groups, Amnesty International, the African-American Institute, the Joint Committee on the former British High Commission territories and the World Council of Churches, to name but some of them. They have maintained a power to act positively when political difficulties, human tragedies and the lack of resources mount towards frustrations that could have a paralysing effect on action. And certainly, it puts them in the class of those who have understood, as Hammarskjöld did, that the bright future of Africa will shine like a dawn after this long darkness in which we are engaged.

These examples and the experience acquired in the work may prove to be an important contribution in helping to reduce the tension that will arise unless action is taken to narrow the gap between the living standards in the affluent
societies and those in the impoverished ones. World opinion tends to concentrate, in limits of short-term perspectives, on such questions as the cold war and the containment of ideologies, while neglecting immensely dangerous elements associated with imbalance. Not only can imbalance create deep and bitter divisions between developed and underdeveloped countries but it has the capacity to do the same inside a highly prosperous country, as in Britain during the Industrial Revolution and in the United States over the question of negro rights. In the latter case and in Africa one notes with deep concern that wide differences between standards of life for countries or for communities can develop into race conflict, even in cases in which there is no basis for associating them.

In Africa, I believe that we face imminent moves in directions that will widen the gap still further between the developing nations there and the prosperous nations that are largely in the northern hemisphere. While apartheid continues, while the Portuguese maintain territories in colonial status and while Rhodesia remains illegally in the hands of a white minority, there are, of course, obvious and powerful influences to divide African states from European to the disadvantage of all. In addition, there are trends of opinion in countries outside Africa that may serve to inhibit communication between African countries and others.

There is a real danger that the programme of decolonisation heralded with fanfares during the last decade, is becoming a programme of cynical disengagement. “Africa for the Africans” is taking on a new, sharp and shortsighted meaning, a type of political petulance that encourages European opinion to pull the blinds down on Africa, because the difficulties there are so enormous and because the Africans, not surprisingly, do not tackle the problems in the order or the ways that the Europeans expect. So “Europe for the Europeans” now becomes the cry. Let us join common markets, draw back our defences and our aid, get in under the umbrella and pass our lives in quiet prosperity. It may be tried but it will not succeed, any more than it did when the well-to-do and therefore well-educated Europeans tried to keep at arm’s length their so-called “working classes” in the last century, indeed up until the 1920’s.
The point is worth emphasising, because there is a tendency to turn all such questions into race questions, when often they are questions of minorities locked in fear within majorities. The so-called upper class feared the consequences of giving voice or responsibility, education or opportunity to the overwhelming majority in their society. And as social services and education spread to redress the balance in, for example, Britain in the early part of this century, one heard the same kind of limited and limiting remarks made by the minority against the majority as one hears in Africa now in those few places where minorities still rule Canute-like. In Africa it is said that the African is not yet ready to assume responsibility. In Britain it was said that, if one took workers out of the slums, which they were alleged to enjoy, and put them in houses with bathrooms, they only used the baths to store coal in.

Although race issues are, of course, prevalent in southern Africa and in a vicious form in the discriminatory laws of apartheid, it is as well to remember that many of the policies of minorities to which we object stem more from the fear that the African majority will dilute the minorities' privileged way of life than from any dislike of Africans as such. All who have been privileged to work with Africans know that they deserve respect and affection. Their negative aspects are mostly reflections of the lack of opportunity and the inhibiting social problems with which they are faced. If the developed and prosperous nations, those in which the standard of life is generally tolerable, do not look beyond the short-term problems of adjustment to the need for a continued active support of the under-developed areas, we must expect a widening of the gap between them economically, and politically they could drift beyond each other's effective reach.

Less Interest in Aid

The European working classes succeeded in the end but the longer the struggle for recognition goes on, the more chance there is that bitter, unnecessary elements will be injected and prejudice the inevitable adjustment. It happened in Europe. The class differences were emphasized to a pitch that was un-
justified and damaging, through having been concentrated for too long a period without serious attempts to resolve them. The same is true in Africa now. The equivocations and qualifications of the western countries with regard to southern Africa cause Africans to wonder how seriously they should take the proclamations of the western countries about majority rule. In addition, there is evidence that the interest in aid to the underdeveloped nations is waning. For example, I quote this extract from an article in Venture for January 1966: “There are now clear indications that Oxfam, War on Want, the United Nations Association and others are encountering considerable difficulty in maintaining their income, let alone increasing it; the Overseas Development Ministry is falling well short of its professional recruiting targets; even the romantic call of voluntary service does not attract applications on the scale that had been planned; faced with declining enthusiasm, the government has ditched any attempt at leadership in aid policy in its five-year plan.”

The writer went on to state that support for programmes of aid had been invited on a charity basis and through mass media. A high professional standard of public relations was used but aimed at an emotional or sentimental response. Then he concludes: “The pitfalls are obvious. The warm spontaneous reaction to the picture of an emaciated child can only too easily be eroded by the picture of atrocities in Congo or Vietnam or by a sense of frustration at the supposed behaviour patterns of Pakistani immigrants.”

The reference to Vietnam reminds one that the increased difficulties for the U.S.A. are producing a detectable swing in that country, as well as in many European countries, away from increased aid for the under-developed areas. It is not just the cost of the war that is the inhibiting factor. It is also the growing feeling that aid does not produce instant stability, instant gratitude, instant friends. Those of you working with students and refugees from the under-developed territories know that you are engaged in a real challenge to meet a human need and not to buy affection or loyalty. The affection may come as a bonus, if the primary aim to meet the human need is resolutely kept.”

117
The humanitarian work being done by voluntary agencies for refugees and others in need in southern Africa therefore takes on an added dimension. The goodwill and the trust created by such work may prove to be an important link when aid and understanding tend to be reduced and when ill-feeling between the western world and the Afro-Asian world is generated by events in Vietnam, Rhodesia and South Africa. To maintain such links and to develop them is in the common interest, especially if history indicates that the rebirths of Africa and Asia will prove to be the major events of our epoch.

I am convinced that the world will turn to Africa for the regenerating vitalities that we are losing in our urban and industrial complexes. The grace and the sense of responsibility for human beings that characterise the African are qualities that have become diluted in our more complicated and prosperous societies and it is clear that African development will produce examples of benefit to all, in which the human factor is given greater significance than the narrow view of economic growth per se.

The United Nations and Africa

From the beginning, the United Nations has been involved in the continent of Africa. At the first Assembly the question of the treatment in South Africa of peoples of Indo-Pakistani origin came on the agenda and remained until encompassed by the larger issue of protest against apartheid. There is a powerful and determined world opinion against South Africa on this issue, so much so that apartheid must be destroyed if world opinion remains intensified against it.

The southern sector of Africa below the Zambesi River claims an excessive amount of attention from the world community. South Africa's race policies, the continued colonial status for Mozambique and Angola when almost all other colonies have been freed, the illegal seizure of power by a handful of whites in Rhodesia and their brutal treatment of Africans, the dispute over South-West Africa and the exposed
situation of the three former High-Commission Territories, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, as they approach independence while locked into the economy and geography of South Africa are some of the questions that make southern Africa the focal point of attention for the United Nations family. The sector has a great contribution to make to the continent as a whole and the part played by peoples of European origin in agricultural and economic development has been outstanding. The tragedy is that development has neglected the human factor in a broad sense and as a result the area is a place of fear, a market with a short-term prosperity and a threat to peace.

The reign of the minority will end, as it has always had to do. As Emerson put it, “the dice of God are always loaded”. Our concern should be with how we can plan so that the end is achieved with a minimum of conflict and of chaos. Some studies by the specialized agencies, particularly those on education by UNESCO and the regular reports from the ILO on the Bantu Labour Laws, help to keep us informed about desirable aims. However, since this meeting is concerned particularly with refugees, I may refer to some of the relevant programmes of the United Nations.

Programmes were established, at different times and by different UN agencies or national organisations for students from South-West Africa, South Africa and the Portuguese territories. Experience has shown how important it is to have some form of vocational counselling and selection of students at the point of reception. For some of these international programmes, states offered scholarships requiring standards that few, if any, Africans from the southern sector were permitted to acquire. The Bantu Education Act in South Africa, for example, was set out intentionally to contract the horizons and education of the African to a status set for him by the Afrikaaner. The Africans were to be hewers of wood and drawers of water, who were not, as the South African Minister of Education openly said, to be educated for “pastures in which they are not permitted to graze”. Consequently they are educated for a master-servant relationship, common languages are given second place, local dialects and languages are elevated and the result follows the
aim, to reduce communication and to produce an exploitable innocence.

Those who have read the reports on the UN student programmes for southern Africans will know that there are many unutilised scholarships. I submit that it is because we are not paying enough attention to counselling and testing, to discover the individual requirements of students, to provide the particular remedial education needed to put them into the normal student orbit and to place them in appropriate schools and training establishments. In too many cases at the present time the scholarships are offered at college level, when the need is for scholarships at late primary-school, secondary-school and trade-school levels. In my opinion the special problems of southern African students call for funds rather than scholarships as such, funds with which to assess the precise needs of students funds with which to place them at existing centres of study or to create new ones, should that be necessary, and funds with which to assist African states to extend the facilities they offer refugees.

The role of the African state in this problem has been referred to frequently in our discussions here. However, it would be wrong to describe it as an African problem and thus make it an excuse for letting the Africans cope with it alone. To be sure, as much training as possible should be carried out in Africa. Close liaison with the OAU and with the Economic Commission for Africa should help to direct training to the fullest possible extent into fields for which there is a shortage of skilled labour, but there are special problems for host countries in Africa and the outside world should be expected to help to solve them.

For example, all African states after independence expanded their programmes of education, but the backlog was so great that hundreds of thousands of Africans at this stage cannot be offered facilities. Therefore it would be difficult for a government to make available a significant number of school places for refugees until local needs are more nearly satisfied. If international funds were to be used to build schools to provide teachers and services and to extend the local infra-structure it would be possible to include refugees without political embar-
rassment to the governments. It could be demonstrated that they were not reducing the opportunities for local students. Already some African states have made a remarkable contribution. In particular Tanzania has been very generous as a host. The school established there by the African-American Institute is an excellent example of the special training required to meet the actual needs of students deprived of normal education.

However, the world has not yet seen the full flood in the movement of peoples that will inevitably and tragically arise in southern Africa as this human drama draws towards its climax. We noted the first traces of it when refugees came through the forests under the fire of Portuguese soldiers. There are perhaps half a million of them in need in the Congo and Tanzania. As pressures increase on white minorities in the south, events may increase the flow of students and refugees on a scale that cannot be dealt with adequately by the ad hoc and not altogether united efforts that have characterised operations in the past. Let us hope that this seminar, bringing together the representatives of governments, voluntary agencies and the United Nations agencies most concerned, will be the start of the combined operation which is essential. And in conclusion, let us hope that our deliberations may now be taken a step forward into more detailed discussions with African governments, so that we may discover how best to fuse international and voluntary efforts to assist the African governments to meet the large responsibilities to which they have committed themselves in caring for their brothers from the south.
Contributors

Cato Aall studied medicine in Germany and Norway and holds a medical degree from the University of Oslo. He has been active in the Norwegian anti-apartheid movement and was secretary of the Refugee Managing Committee of the now dissolved International Refugee Council of Zambia from 1965 to 1967.

Jacques Cuénod joined the U.N. High Commissioner's Office for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1956 after having served for 7 years in the U.N. Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). From 1963 to 1965 he was the UNHCR regional representative in Africa south of the Sahara.

John Eldridge, the Regional Representative of the African-American Institute in Dar es Salaam from 1963 to 1966, is now Director of Field Operations in New York. Mr. Eldridge has had a career of 14 years in international education.

Margaret Legum was born and educated in South Africa. She studied economics and politics at Rhodes University, South Africa, and at Cambridge University, where she took her M.A. She left South Africa in 1958 and was secretary of the Commonwealth and International Bureau of the Fabian Society until 1963. In 1961, she became honorary secretary of the Joint Committee, which provides material assistance to southern African refugees in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. She is a free-lance journalist and broadcaster.

Z. K. Matthews is now Ambassador of the Republic of Botswana to the United Nations and was previously Secretary for Africa in the Division of Inter-Church Aid of the Refugee and World Service of the World Council of Churches. He was formerly Principal of the University College of Fort Hare,
Professor of Law and Administration, and Head of the Department of African Studies. He has been a leader of the African National Congress of South Africa and a member of many governmental commissions on higher education in Africa.

*T. Peter Omari* was born in Ghana. After studying at the University of Wisconsin, where he took the degree of Ph.D. in sociology, he worked as Mass Education Officer in the Department of Social Welfare in Ghana (1956–8). From 1959 to 1966 he was Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Ghana and from 1961 to 1966 Director of the School of Social Administration in Ghana. Since 1963 he has been Social Affairs Officer in the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa.

*George Ivan Smith* was born in Australia and took his M.A. degree at the University of Sydney. He entered the U.N. Information Service in 1947. From 1949 to 1958 he was head of the U.N. Information Office in London and afterwards held the posts of Director of External Relations in the U.N. and Senior Director of Public Information. He was the U.N. representative in Katanga in 1961–2, before he became the Personal Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General in East and Central Africa. He has since been the original Director of the U.N. Technical Assistance Programmes in Central Africa.