THE CIVIL WAR IN SOMALIA

Its genesis and dynamics

*Maria Bongartz*

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<tr>
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<td>DFLS</td>
<td>Democratic Front of the Liberation of Somalia (founded at the end of the 1970s)</td>
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Maria Bongartz
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Introduction and Background

Since the end of 1990, Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia has been under heavy fighting between Government troops and opposition movements. The war has continued unabated with thousands of casualties and no sign of a ceasefire. Siyad Barre’s Presidency was not so challenged since he assumed power about 21 years ago. However, it is doubtful whether the overthrow of Siyad Barre’s dictatorship would bring about peace and stability to Somalia. It is expected that the war will take another direction, and be transformed into a strife over power between the opposition groups.

This paper attempts to depict and analyse the events which led to the current civil war in Somalia and to reveal why the end of Siyad Barre’s regime is only a signal to the beginning of a different type of struggle between the present opposition groups.

The following brief background is intended to provide some basic information which is sought to be necessary for an understanding of the political conflict in Somalia. Geographically, Somalia is located in the tip of the Horn of Africa. It borders on Djibouti in the North, Ethiopia in the North-west, Kenya in the South-west and faces the Indian Ocean in the South and the Gulf of Aden in the North. The total area of Somalia is about 637,657 square kilometres and it is inhabited by about seven million peoples. It is estimated that about 50 per cent of the population are pastoralists, 25 per cent are farmers and 25 per cent are urban-based. The main urban centres in the country are Mogadishu and Hargeisa in which over eleven per cent of the population live.

Economically, Somalia qualifies, in many respects, for the status of a Least Developed Country (LDC). In 1988 the total GDP was estimated at 970 million US Dollars, with a per capita of 170 US Dollars. According to 1987 estimates, the total external debt was 2.5 billion US Dollars and the total debt service was equivalent to 110 per cent of the total exports. The situation is worsened by the country's dependence on the export of only two primary products: livestock which contributes about 80 per cent of the exports, and bananas. This gloomy economic picture reflects itself in a population growth rate of 2.5 per cent per annum and infant mortality (in the first year) in the rate of 155/1000. Life expectancy for women is 48 years and for men 45, which is amongst the lowest in the African continent. Drought and a series of wars has brought about misery and destitute. In 1988 it was estimated by the World Food Programme that there were 300,000 Somalis as refugees in Ethiopia; Africa Watch (1990) mentions 500,000. By moderate estimates the total number of displaced Somalis due to the present civil war and famine is about one million. It is
believed that this figure fluctuates according to the intensity of the war and the increasing number of people involved in it.

Politically, Somalia became independent in July 1960 and emerged as a result of the unification of the former British Somaliland in the North and the Italian trusteeship territory in the South. Multi-party democracy was experienced from independence until October 1969 when the elected Government was overthrown in a military coup led by Siyad Barre. Somalia became a member of the Arab League, established the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) and developed strong ties with the Soviet Union and other East European countries. Maintaining one of the strongest armies in Sub-saharan Africa, Somalia entered into a war against its neighbour Ethiopia to gain control over Southern parts of Hararghe and Bale provinces, which are mainly inhabited by Somalis. During the Somali–Ethiopian war, when the Soviet Union’s support of Ethiopia decisively increased, Somalia began to seek economic and military support from the USA and Western Europe.

Since the end of the Somali–Ethiopian war in 1978 the country witnessed the beginning of an open opposition against the Siyad Barre Government. This opposition continued to grow and in 1988 culminated in a civil war which since December 1990 is fought inside the capital Mogadishu itself.

With this background in mind, this study analyses the genesis of the current civil war, the various phases of the development of the opposition groups and the contemporary political relevance of clanship in modern Somalia. In view of this analysis it seems that the myth of a homogeneous Somali nation is shattered amid the diversity of the opposition forces which offer their allegiance to clan-based political and other interests.
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Clanship and Conflict

An important factor affecting Somali internal politics is the segmentation of the population into clans which, to some extent, determine the political, societal and economic life of the population. The Somalis claim that their clan families descended from two main sections: the Sab and the Samaale.

The Sab in the South consist of the Digil and Rahanweyn. While the Rahanweyn are agro-pastoralists, the Digil live on the coastal line towards Kenya and subsist mainly on fishing, blacksmithing, shoe making and other kind of craftsmanship.

The Samaale consist of the Dir, Isaq, Hawiye and Darod clans, who are mainly preoccupied with trade, pastoralism and agro-pastoralism and by legend consider themselves the ‘true’ Somalis (see figure 1).

Figure 1. Somali clan structure

Source: Material compiled by author. Simplified graphic of the Somali clan structure, mentioning only those clans which are referred to in the text.

Lewis (1965, 11) refers to lineage, constituent clan and clan families to distinguish between different levels of Somali clan system, from lowest to highest. Patrilineal and matrilineal descent are recognized and individual Somalis can marry outside their lineages or clans. The lineages are, therefore, intersected and cannot be divided into distinct lineage groups.

The constituent clan represents a middle level of clan segmentation in which loyalty is expressed by adherence to mutual support in the economic, social and political fields. In this sense, the constituent clan forms a vital social network which the state cannot provide (Laitin and Samatar, 1987). The clan family is the highest level of political segmentation and operates within the national socio-political context.
In modern Somalia, clans pledge their support to specific political parties. This can be seen in the case of some of the political parties which were founded in the 1960s, as well as in the case the present opposition groups such as the Isaq dominated Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Hawiye dominated United Somali Congress (USC).

An exception is the Darod clan which divides its support among several opposition groups and political orientations. For instance, the Marehan section of the Darod is the patrilineal clan of Siyad Barre and the Ogadeeni is his matrilineal clan but the latter partially supports the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). The Durbahante clan takes side with the Government represented by the President’s son-in-law (Ahmed Suleiman Abdulle), former National Security Service (NSS) and today’s Chairman of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP). The Majertaan clan dominates the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). Map 1 shows the regional distribution of clans in Somalia.

Notwithstanding the above features of the Somali clans, two factors modify their role in modern Somali society:

1. About 25 per cent of the Somali population live in urban centres, mainly in Mogadishu and Hargeisa. Moreover, socio-economic identification (class and status) gained significance within the clan structure as a result of a growing governmental administrative apparatus and the advance of the market economy.


These factors reveal that in modern Somalia the clans are no longer localized or attached to specific territories, but are more and more taking the shape of socio-economic and political organizations based on kinship. However, the Somalis believe that they descended from the same root and therefore belong to one “nation”. Being internally divided the Somali’s sense of self-identification vis-à-vis foreigners, neighbouring countries and the outside world is exhibited in their strong national pride and a shared myth of a common origin.

Since independence the notion of “Greater Somalia” was the driving force for successive governments in their attempt to unite all Somalis in one nation-state. The five-pointed star in the national flag is the symbol of the five so-called Somali regions: the present Somali Republic (former British and Italian Somaliland), Djibouti (former French Somaliland), the former Northern Frontier District of Kenya and the Somali inhabited areas of Southern Ethiopia (mainly Ogaden and Hararge)—see map 2). Common culture, tradition, language, religion (Islam) and a shared territory are seen by the Somalis as sufficient evidence to justify the existence of one Somali nation. Nevertheless, after decades of fighting for the control of the regions outside the present-day Somalia, the Somali
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Map 2. The Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa

- Somali ethnic limits
- Main areas of Somali cultivation
- Frontiers of former British Somaliland Protectorate and Somalia

Government retreated from its political claims and ambitions. In 1977 it respected the independence of Djibouti, in 1982 it agreed on the present Somali–Kenyan border and, finally, in 1988 it announced to except the territorial integrity of Ethiopia.

Two important issues arise. One pertains to the clan nature of the Somali society and the other to the significance of national identity. It is therefore essential to discuss the implications of these two notions for the civil war and any future political development. The question remains whether the above mentioned unifying factors of the Somali society, above all the common ethnic origin, are relevant in the structures governing internal politics and their potential for conflict resolution. Reviewing the experience with parliamentary democracy from 1960 to 1969 when more than 60 clan-based parties existed, it is questionable whether today a common consciousness of a nation-state is shared by the opposition groups and the society of clans that support them.

On the other hand, a traditional system of inter-clan conflict resolution can be found in Somali pastoral democracy (Lewis, 1961). Traditionally, the clan elders meet in the shir conference to discuss peaceful means for the settlement of clan disputes. Although they act as deputies, the clan elders are not elected representatives, but chosen on the basis of age and influence inside the clan in a quasi-democratic manner.

As recently as May 1990, a political initiative aiming at a peaceful settlement of the present conflict in Somalia was based on the shir system. In an open letter to Siyad Barre more than 100 influential Somali elders called for a conference of national reconciliation and salvation. This shows that the Somali still believe that the shir system can be activated and may assist in finding a political settlement to the war (see Appendix 1).

Prelude to Siyad Barre

Somalia inaugurated its independence as a multi-party democracy and opted for a presidential constitution. The president was to be elected for a 6 years’ term and endowed with rights, such as the nomination and dismissal of the Prime Minister and the enactment of the laws passed by the parliament. The National Assembly consisted of 123 deputies. An independent juridical system was created and combined the Islamic Sharia laws with the Italian and the British legal system.

Two main factors which led to the collapse and eventual overthrow of the democratic system should be mentioned in the context of this analysis:

1. The competition and mistrust between the North and the South. (former British- and Italian-Somaliland). Mistrust and suspicion between politicians and administrators from the North and the South were triggered off by inequality in power-sharing.

An evidence of this is the result of the referendum on the new constitution in which more than 50 per cent of the Northern population voted against the constitution while it was overwhelmingly accepted by the Southerners. The reason behind these results was the Northerners' fear of a Government dominated by the South.

The importance of clanship in national politics was obvious from the very beginning. For instance, the President of the first Government after independence, Aden Abdulla Osman, was a Hawiye from the South. Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, a Majertain, became Prime Minister. The Government included 4 Darod, 3 Hawiye, 3 Sab and 2 Isaq.

Southern domination over the North was felt not only in the political arena, but also in the administrative system. Southern Somalis took advantage of the high administrative positions because Mogadishu which was located in the South became the capital of Somalia. The competition between the Southern, Italian-speaking versus the Northern English-speaking employees was, during the early years of independence, won by the South.

Economically the South has many advantages over the North. Mogadishu has been the major port and commercial centre, with transport facilities connecting it with the countryside. Hargeisa remained an administrative and market centre with less economic and job opportunities and no match to Mogadishu.

In terms of resource endowments the North receives less rains and has, by and large, poor soils. In contrast, the South has fertile lands and Juba and Shabelle, the two main rivers in the country. Most of the population, therefore, is found in the South and this is where the most important trade and production centres are located.
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The natural and historical advantages of the South were augmented by the relatively higher Government investment in infrastructure, commerce and manufacturing industry in this part of the country. Uneven development between the North and the South has been one of the reasons behind the struggle between the two regions and their respective populations and politicians.

2. The incorporation of traditional socio-political patterns of identification, such as family, clan and kinship ties into the modern political system of parliamentary representation.

According to Laitin and Samar (1987, 70) “clan balancing became a standard operation procedure in democratic Somalia, as government jobs necessarily meant representation for any clan”. Neither civic loyalty of the members of parliament nor the politicians’ responsibility to their voters could be handed outside the clan context. Corruption and nepotism became more important than education and competence. So far, the whole country’s economic, administrative and political system was based on clanship.

The parliamentary elections of March 1969 signalled the countdown for the democratic system. More than 60 parties existed on the eve of election. The system of voting for lists heightened the competition between candidates who sought to be on top of the list. The multiplicity of parties was thus sought as a means to secure a promising place in the parliament, by muscling the support of their clan members.

After the elections most of the elected candidates rejoined the main political party—the Somali Youth League (SYL)—in search for Government positions. In retrospect, it seems as if Somalia transformed itself into a de facto one-party system and the Government could no longer be controlled by the Parliament (Lewis, 1990). Parliamentary democracy was, therefore, reduced to a social support system benefitting those with contacts within the state apparatus. However, the majority of the Somali population remained onlookers standing outside the political arena. They neither participated in the decision-making process, nor did they share the national wealth or the limited social welfare.

When on the 21 October 1969, a group of military officers overthrew the Government most of the Somali people were very happy. The new military Government under Siyad Barre implemented a popular political programme whereby a socialist policy should eliminate any tribalism and corruption and put an emphasis on general education and welfare. “The regime presented socialism as an alternative to tribalism, claiming that it fits naturally with the tradition of sharing material possessions” (African Contemporary Record, III, 1970/1971, B161).

The country’s leadership confirmed that there was no contradiction between scientific socialism and Islamic religion. Socialism in its classic form was never considered as a future goal for the Somali society. It was meant to be a pragmatic instrument for the realization of a centrally planned, entire modernization of the society. Inherent to this modernization was the perspective to overcome the traditional clan system which has influenced up to now the political and socio-economic make-up of the country.
Contradictions in Socialist Somalia

When Siyad Barre in October 1969 rose to power after a successful coup d'état this brought about several transformations in the Somali society. The new Government monopolized power, imposed media censorship and banned all political parties. As early as 1970, a strong security system, known as the National Security Service (NSS) was established, with branches expanding from the centre to the local level. The NSS controlled public opinion and suppressed freedom of speech.

However, the traditional loyalty to the clan did not disappear, but was transformed into a function of Siyad Barre’s political whim. Since 1976, the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) played an important role in suppressing the opposition and undermining clan loyalty. Mistrust and conspiracies amongst the opposing clans were utilized by the NSS to enhance divisions and curtail any opposition. Anyone who showed defiance to the Government was jailed, regardless of clan origin or support.

Family ties became even more important, as the family became the only safe retreat. Inherent contradictions and failures in the Government’s popular modernization policies and a drift towards clan-based diplomacy became obvious. Four important issues prevail in the analysis of Siyad Barre’s Government policies:
1. The failure of socialist mass participation.
2. The gap between state and private economy and its interplay with clan ties.
3. Contradictions in socio-political changes.

The failure of ‘socialist’ mass participation policies

Ideologically, scientific socialism (Hantiwadaag cilmi ku dhisan—share of wealth based on wisdom) asked for an integration of the whole population into the political process. At the centre, participation operated through socialist oriented mass organizations, such as women and youth associations. Since 1976 membership in the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) was another means of political participation. But, as Markakis mentions, even young radicals who believed in socialist ideology and in a real change after the revolution felt disappointed with the inflexible structure of the party apparatus. “They discerned the regime’s design to use the Socialist Party as political front for military rule
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In the countryside, the alphabetization campaign, which started in 1972 after introducing standardized Somali language, combined the considerable rice of the rate of literacy with teaching socialist ideology. During this campaign a major part of the rural and pastoral population was reached by the state apparatus. Moreover, the Government tried to gain administrative control over the nomadic population through settlement programmes during the drought in 1973/1974, whereby more than 100,000 nomads were settled throughout the country (Osman, 1982). Local policy orientation centres were established to replace the traditional social system of family and clan. Marriages had to be contracted in local administration offices; funerals could be financed by the state. An entire political representation of the population thought to be guaranteed through district and regional councils.

Local party functionaries were not accepted by the common man, at least not by the nomads who felt controlled by the state and deprived of social and religious traditions. The gap between theory and practice concerning political participation became obvious as the people felt exploited by local party functionaries and officials and by the state elite in the capital rather than by traditional leaders (Mohamed Salih, 1990).

Political mass participation in Somalia was ordered from 'above'; the state and the population remained separated and the Government did not succeed in eliminating traditional patterns of the local authority and the traditional value system.

The gap between state and the private economy

While the Government nationalized foreign banks, the electricity company and several other industries and agricultural enterprises, it failed to control the livestock market. The pastoral sector remained in the hands of the nomads. Although weakened by drought, war and diseases, livestock export to the oil-rich Arab countries continued to be one of the most important sources of foreign exchange.

The parasitists, on the other hand, faced stagnation and under-production. Miscalculations in the Government economic planning (Braun, 1991), shortage of skilled management and lack of new investment enhanced the break-down of the state sector.

Remittances from Somali migrant workers in the oil-rich Arab countries, which are sent back to their families in Somalia through Somali merchants, formed the second major income source for Somalia (Jamal, 1991), about two thirds of the urban GDP. This informal exchange of hard currency is known as the franco valuta system. Franco valuta and income from livestock sales formed a steady and stable source of livelihood for the Somali population.

The gap between the state and the private sector in Somali economy involves a clan dimension. Traders in the quite sound formal private commercial sector are mainly from the Hawiye clan in the South or from
the Isaq clan in the North. The Government, on the other hand, gets its support from the urban-based Government employees from the Darod family, the so called MOD-fraction (Marehan, Ogadeeni, Dulbahante). State restrictions on trade and banking were therefore mainly directed against Hawiye and Isaq businessmen. However, the private management sector, although financially powerful, was not united against the Government because of the deeply rooted North–South competition. The Government profited from these clan divergences.

Contradictions in socio-political changes

Administrative and economic transformations were followed by socio-political modernization based on scientific socialism. Two decisions gained prominence: the ‘Somalization’ of education and administration and the declaration of equality between men and women. Both were incorporated into the new constitution of 1979.

In 1972, Somali language standardization, setting up the use of Roman rather than Arabic alphabets, was a matter of concern in religious circles. Several positive factors arising from the ‘Somalization’, such as the alphabetization campaign which brought the rate of literacy to about 60 per cent should be mentioned.

On the other hand, some developments in this context elucidate the inability of the Government to cope with its modernization policies. Scientists, trained in Europe, were treated by Government circles as arrogant pseudo-intellectuals (Laitin and Samatar, 1987). English schoolbooks were banned, even before adequate Somali teaching material was prepared. The foreign press was censured, while Somali newspapers were under state monopoly and used for one-sided political propaganda.

The declaration of equality between men and women by law in 1975 was followed by major protests from traditional clan elders and religious leaders. During the public debate ten sheiks were jailed and publicly executed. The policies were opposed not only by religious circles but also by parts of the rural and nomadic population, who refused to accept this ‘modern’ human right. As I could experience it during my stay in Somalia, men and women felt contradictions between equality on the one hand and Islamic religion and traditional values on the other hand. These events were the beginning of a rift between the traditional elements in the Somali society and the centralized socialist state. Meanwhile, middle-class urbanized women enjoyed more opportunities in education and better access to Government jobs than before. Supported by the constitutional rights, they were often able to enhance their position in society.

Contradictions between anti-tribal ideology and clan-based diplomacy

One of the main goals of Somalia’s socialist revolution was to subdue clan segmentation. Glorification of tribalism and tribal sentiments could lead
the Isaq clan in the North. The Government, on the other hand, gets its support from the urban-based Government employees from the Darod family, the so called MOD-fraction (Marehan, Ogadeni, Dulbahante). State restrictions on trade and banking were therefore mainly directed against Hawiye and Isaq businessmen. However, the private management sector, although financially powerful, was not united against the Government because of the deeply rooted North-South competition. The Government profited from these clan divergences.

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Contradictions between anti-tribal ideology and clan-based diplomacy

One of the main goals of Somalia’s socialist revolution was to subdue clan segmentation. Glorification of tribalism and tribal sentiments could lead
to death sentence. ‘Jaale’ or ‘comrade’ became the new form for formal address to symbolize the death of tribalism (Laitin and Samatar, 1987).

Behind the scenes, the government itself used more and more clan diplomacy to strengthen and secure its power base. The main government positions were given to family members, such as to Siyad Barre’s son Maslah (minister of defence), to the president’s brother Abdurahman Jana Barre (deputy prime minister and finance minister) and to several of his sons-in-law. The 5,000 members of the Red Brigades, the president’s personal bodyguards, are said to have been specially chosen from the Marehan clan. Moreover, most of the army senior officers belonged to the Marehan-Ogadeni-Dulbahante (MOD) fraction (Lewis, 1988). Following a serious car accident of Siyad Barre in 1986, the prime minister Mohamed Ali Samatar acted as the president’s deputy and succeeded in governing the country in a safe and stable way. Thereafter, the close supporters split into two factions: The ‘constitutional fraction’ with Mohamed Ali Samatar, who had clan backing in the non-Marehan group, and the ‘dynasty fraction’, led by the president’s son Maslah and his mother Khadija, Siyad Barre’s first wife.
Civil War and Opposition Groups

The beginning of open opposition

The intensity of the internal political unrest in Somalia increased after the defeat in the war against Ethiopia in 1978. Popular discontent with the political system, its monopoly of power and suppression of public opinion was heightened. The political turmoil and the aftermath of the war brought to the open several contradictions in Government policy. Whereas many clans were excluded from power-sharing, the group supporting Siyad Barre had gained more influence. It must be made clear that the MOD-fraction’s influence could be explained on the ground that several leading fighters from the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) were incorporated into the Somali National Army in 1978. This was encouraged by the Government on the hope that it would strengthen its position by bringing WSLF into its domain of influence.

It was soon discovered that not only the internal but also the external policies pursued by the Somali Government were incompatible with the official state ideology of scientific socialism. The former main enemy, the USA, became the new political ally of Somalia. The USA was granted a military base for the Rapid Deployment Force in Berbera in 1980. Moreover, in the economic field, Somalia’s dependence on Western donors became more and more obvious. Western-sponsored development programs for Somalia and emergency aid for hundreds of thousands of refugees from Ethiopia overwhelmed the country. Agreements on debt reduction and rescheduling in the Paris Club and IMF structural adjustment programs dominated the official economic policy. It can therefore be stated that Somalia had gone back from all its initial socialist policy proclamations. The war had forced the country to reorient its policies on a large scale, which also created internal frictions within the ruling party.

The formation of an open opposition was prompted by the failure of April 1978 military coup d’état. The coup was staged by officers mainly from the Majertain clan and followed by the creation of the first opposition movement against the Somali Government. The Somali Salvation Front (SOSAF) was founded by those officers who fled Somalia after the coup to seek political asylum in Ethiopia. Being dissatisfaction with the socialist rhetoric propagated by the Government, SOSAF directed its criticism mainly against the Somali Government’s close ties with the West.
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SSDF, SNM and the war in the north

In 1981 SOSAF and other pro-Soviet groups founded the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) (African Contemporary Record, XIV, 1981/1982). General Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmad became chairman of the movement. The political programme of SSDF was filled with a strong Marxist rhetoric. Its main political objectives were the overthrow of Siyad Barre, Somali neutrality in international politics, the strengthening of relations with the Arab World and the commencement of peace talks with Ethiopia.

In the beginning of the 1980s border clashes took place between Ethiopian army units and the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). Two Somali villages were captured. SSDF units fought on the Ethiopian side. The WSLF on the other hand, coming originally from Southern Ethiopia, got financial and material support from the Somali Government. It was now obvious that “Ethiopian” Somalis operating from Ethiopia were used by the Somali Government to undermine Ethiopia. Conversely Somali opposition groups were used by the Ethiopian Government. It can be concluded that the idea of the one ‘Somali Nation’, if it ever existed, began to fade away by that time.

In 1986 the SSDF split into two groups. Some members of the movement accepted the amnesty offered by the Somali Government and returned to Somalia where most of them were integrated into the army. The remaining members of the SSDF moved to Kenya and chose a new chairman, Dr. Hassan Ali Mirreh, who advocated a more moderate political course (see SSDF-pamphlet, 1989, appendix 2).

The SSDF appealed for the unity of the opposition and its military units against the Government. It took a stand against any non-violent approach of force. Hence the SSDF called for the creation of a National Liberation Army to guarantee a form of political control over the fighting units. According to the SSDF, the danger of a new military government which would equally deny democratic rights would be too risky while leaving all the political power in the hands of the army. Parliamentary democracy, such as that of 1960–1969, was seen by the SSDF as the ideal political system in the future. The problem of how to secure political participation by all Somalis was not seriously debated; even though the SSDF called for the duty of all Somali citizens to destroy the barbaric structures of the present dictatorship.

The point of view of the SSDF concerning military efforts in the civil war was seen by some other opposition groups as a sign of weakness due to its lack of fighters and ammunition. It seems from the outset that the problem of the continuation of the use of violence during the civil war against the Government and its consequences was not taken seriously by the opposition groups and postponed to the time when Siyad Barre is overthrown.

The second organized opposition group is the Somali National Movement (SNM) which was founded by Somalis meeting in London in April 1981. The members of SNM came mainly from the Isaaq and the
Hawiye clans. It can be noticed that SNM is in opposition not only to the MOD-fraction which supports the Government, but also to the SSDF. In this sense SNM can be seen, to some extent, as an anti-Darod organization (map 1). After its formation Ahmed Muhammed ‘Silanyo’, a former minister, became chairman of the SNM, and Ali Mohamed Ossobleh ‘Wardigley’, a Hawiye, its vice-chairman. SNM developed in a short time into an efficient and strong military movement.

Financially and ‘ideologically’ the SNM was initially supported by Ethiopia and Libya. SNM used its bases in Ethiopia against the Somali Government, including bombardments of military targets and the liberation of political prisoners. Most such activities were concentrated in the Northern parts of the country, mainly in and around Hargeisa and Burao (African Contemporary Record, XIX, 1986/1987). The fact that the SNM is seen as an Isaaq movement led the Government in Mogadishu to react with a series of arrests especially of Isaaq. Restrictions were imposed on livestock trade, freedom of movement in the North was curtailed through the implementation of several military checkpoints on the main road to Hargeisa and discrimination against Isaaq was used in political and economic life (Africa Watch, 1990).

By the end of 1986 differences between the Isaaq and the Hawiye on the question of succession from the South and disagreement about under-representation of Hawiye in the central committee of the organization emerged and led to the break-away of the Hawiye fraction with its leader Ali Mohamed Ossobleh ‘Wardigley’. Since then the SNM operates as an Isaaq opposition organization thus reviving the North–South competition.

Due to the lack of recent SNM documents, any definite statement concerning their current political platform is very difficult. For a long time a fraction within the SNM favoured complete separation of the North (former British-Somaliland territory) from the Somali Republic. Nonetheless, it is difficult to assess how determined this fraction is today in pursuing this goal. A document published by the SNM in West-Germany in 1984 reveals that its political programme did not differ much from that of the SSDF. It advocates a multi-party system and the privatisation of some sectors of the economy. At the same time, again in common with political programs of other opposition groups, there are no details about how to manage the future Somalia.

In April 1990 SNM held a congress in Ethiopia and elected Abdirahman Ahmad Ali ‘Tur’ chairman. However, there are some indications that the SNM was more ready for a compromise concerning a unification of all opposition groups and to get involved in talks with the Government under its former chairman—Ahmed Mohamed ‘Silanyo’.

The SNM position in Ethiopia was weakened and became uncertain when two years of peace talks between Siyad Barre and Mengistu Haile Mariam culminated, in 1988, in an agreement among other things to stop support for any political opposition directed against the neighbouring country. Confronted, therefore, with more and more problems in Ethiopia, the SNM decided in May 1988 to stage a major attack on Burao and Hargeisa, the two largest towns in Northern Somalia. Lewis (1990, 899)
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The Government ground forces were said to have acted in a very brutal and inhumane manner. It is pointed out by Africa Watch (1990) that children were shot at and tortured, women raped, mass killing was committed and looting was rampant. Many analysts observed that the primary target of Somali soldiers was people from the Isaq clan. Khadilja Sugal, a Somali woman from Burao, reported in an interview, conducted by Africa Watch (1990, 131), “as soon as the fighting broke out, the government used loudspeakers to sort the civilians out into Darood and Isak. They would shout, ‘Who is from Gal kaayo? Mogadishu? Las Anod? Garowe?’ [Non-Isak territories]. They appealed to the non-Isaks to leave so that they could burn the towns and all those who remained behind. Most of the people from these towns left; the government provided them with transportation”.

Furthermore, refugees were armed by the Government during the civil war in the North. The Ogadeni-Somali refugees who were in the North since the outbreak of the Somali–Ethiopian war in 1977 were disliked by the Isaq in Harageya and its hinterland. Hence the Isaq blamed the Mogadishu Government for allocating their land to Ogadeni, belonging to the clan of Siyad’s mother (Markakis, 1990). This occurred at a time when the North was neglected by the Somali Government in the central policy planning. The Government fueled the long lasting conflict between the Ogadeni and the Isaq by creating para-military units inside several refugee camps. As reported by Africa Watch (1990), in 1988 fightings between Ogadeni and Isaq took place in three Northern refugee camps, in Sabacca, Bibin Dule and Biyole.

The situation is much more complex when the positions of other clans are reviewed. For example, the Cisse support the SNM. The Gadabursi established their own movement (known as Somali Democratic Alliance led by Mohamed Farah Abdulla) which was said to be supported by the Government. Siyad Barre profited from the old animosities between the Cisse and the Gadabursi, both constituting the Dir clan family. (see map 1). The Cisse are opposed to their Ogadeni neighbours and therefore supported the Isaq which dominate the SNM. Meanwhile the Gadabursi saw a chance to realize their own ambitions and fight against the Cisse.

The outbreak of the civil war in the North signalled the beginning of a collapse of the Mogadishu Government. Although the Government succeeded in gaining the support of several minor clans and/or movements in the North the persistence of the SNM units hindered the Government attempts to regain full control over the North. During 1989
and 1990 only the main cities, such as Hargeisa, Burao and Berbera remained under the Government control.

USC, SPM and the war in the south

The United Somali Congress (USC) was founded in Rome in January 1989 by members of the Hawiye clan. It is important to remember that the USC is an off-shoot of the SNM until 1987. In fact, the Hawiye members were particularly fearful of being dominated by the Isaq who formed the leadership of SNM.

However, the USC popular base is much wider than the Hawiye clan, which constitutes the main clan in Southern Somalia. It is also supported by the Digil and Rahanweyn inhabitants in the South. About 3,000 deserters from a regiment of the Somali National Army in Kismayo founded the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) in 1989. The SPM supporters are mainly from the Ogadeeni clan.

Since summer 1989, both USC and SPM launched successful military attacks in the war against the Government troops around Mogadishu, Bardhere, Baligubadle and Luuq in the South-east region and Beled Weyn and Dhusa Mareb in Central Somalia. Most of their military combat activities were coordinated. As ex-soldiers in the official armed forces, the SPM fighters seem to be well trained and equipped with sophisticated weapons. They therefore represent a major military threat to the Somali National Army.

The SPM political programme envisages that its main objectives are to overthrow the Siyad Barre Government and to end all forms of dictatorship. Owing to the absence of any published document in this regard, the SPM political perspective remains vague. In an interview which I conducted with Dr. Omar Mohallim, the spokesman of the SPM I could notice a far-reaching consent with the political perspectives of other opposition groups. The differences that count were concerned with the issue of “Greater Somalia”. While other opposition groups, such as SSDF and USC, endorse the right of the ‘Ethiopian’ refugees who fled the border regions during the Somali–Ethiopian war to stay and be integrated into the Somali society, the SPM spokesman remained unclear on the issue. The SPM sympathy with the Somalis from Southern Ethiopia can be explained by the fact that it draws its support from mainly Ogadeeni clan- and family-ties (map 1). It might be difficult for the SPM to continue with any advocacy of “Greater Somalia” since most other opposition movements may accept the present status quo concerning the borders with Ethiopia. Nevertheless it is important to keep in mind that some of the former refugees, now integrated into the Somali society, still hang on to the dream of incorporating the Somali-inhabited areas in Southern Ethiopia into “Greater Somalia”.

The USC, on the other hand, published various position papers and held several meetings in Rome and Bonn, among other places, to discuss the future prospects of Somalia. It strives for an extensively decentralized administration and a multi-party system. The USC calls for a strict
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So far the USC is one of the most formidable opposition groups and is destined to play an important role in any future political development in the country. This can be attributed to at least three reasons. Firstly, the proximity of its domain of influence to that of the Central Government. In other words, it has some hidden supporters from within the Government employees and the bulk of its supporters comes from the South where the capital Mogadishu is located. Secondly, its political programme is more debated and far-reaching than those of the other opposition groups. Thirdly, its leadership and supporters are well versed politically and widely respected personalities, such as Aden Abdulle Osman, the first Somali President after independence.

The explosion of the situation and the beginning of an open civil war in the South continued to undermine the Government position. The intensification of the war, mainly by SPM and USC, and its spread all over the country posed a major threat to the very existence of Siyad Barre and the Mogadishu Government. This was even more the case, when, in December 1990, fightings started in the capital Mogadishu itself.
The Civil War during 1990

During 1990 the civil war continued to devastate the whole country and the fighting between the Government troops and the opposition forces intensified. The situation was worsened by the fact that many soldiers deserted the National Army and joined the opposition forces or established para-military troops. Some of the soldiers became bandits and a threat to people's life and property.

There are no data available on the number of troops and weapons of each opposition movement, nor is it easy to estimate the disposition of the Government armed forces. It is said, for example, that the Somali National Army declined from 65,000 to 15,000 men. Nevertheless, it is certain that except some major towns, as Hargeisa, Burao, Kismayo and Mogadishu, the whole country came under the control of one rebel group or another. As a result President Siyad Barre was described as the "mayor of Mogadishu", which means that he was no longer in control of any part of the country except Mogadishu.

Several incidents can be used as indicators to the calamity of the situation since mid July 1989. For example the catholic archbishop was killed in Mogadishu and the Government used this to jail muslim religious leaders in the centre of town. The demonstration which followed this political arrests were confronted with a cruel show of force.

An open letter signed by more than 100 influential politicians from the old regime, businessmen and religious leaders was forwarded to Siyad Barre on May the 15, 1990. The document was called "Manifesto No.1" and was blessed by elders from all the main Somali clans. It represented a unified appeal to the President to convene a national conference for reconciliation and salvation (see appendix 1). The signatories of the document consciously followed the Somali tradition of the shir conference which accepts compromise as a means to solve political, social and other problems between the clans.

The Manifesto describes the breakdown of the country and the impact of the civil war on society, economy and national integrity. It states that the continuation of the war would lead to the collapse not only of the economy but also the mass killing of the Somali population, who already suffered great losses because of the war.

Siyad Barre reacted to the Manifesto by arresting more than 40 of its signatories who were released only after considerable internal and external pressure. Meanwhile the opposition groups reacted positively to the Manifesto which gave them a golden opportunity to reaffirm a common stand against Siyad Barre. In June 1990, the SSDF, SPM and USC signed a joint statement to express their appreciation of the open letter
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The manifesto described the breakdown of the country and the impact of the civil war on society, economy and national integrity. It stated that the continuation of the war would lead to the collapse not only of the economy but also the mass killing of the Somali population, who already suffered great losses because of the war.

Siad Barre reacted to the Manifesto by arresting more than 40 of its signatories who were released only after considerable internal and external pressure. Meanwhile the opposition groups reacted positively to the Manifesto which gave them a golden opportunity to reaffirm a common stand against Siad Barre. In June 1990, the SSDF, SPM and USC signed a joint statement to express their appreciation of the open letter and condemn the President's reaction to its contents and his arrest of its signatories. In the following weeks serious talks between all opposition groups and the initiator of the Manifesto and the spokesman of the Council for National Reconciliation and Salvation (CNRS), Ismail Jimaale Osobleh, took place in Rome. At the same time a second Manifesto was distributed in Mogadishu which showed the growing public support for the opposition against the Government. In the summer of 1990 the opposition groups became aware of the importance of cooperation in order to be able to overthrow the Siyad Barre Government. Since then they began to coordinate their military activities.

Even though the SNM is the only opposition group suspicious of the Manifesto, negotiations with the Government and cooperation with other opposition forces, there are some indications that it has supported the SPM and the USC forces in the South with arms and ammunition. On 2 October 1990 the USC, SPM and SNM stated in a press communiqué that they do not agree to begin any talks with the Government. This means that while the cooperation between the various opposition groups in the military field has improved, the chances for a political solution became remote. One could therefore observe a tendency of moving away from political dialogue towards the use of violence and the continuation of the war.

On the other hand, the Government took a number of measures to reverse the situation in its favour. Firstly, on the 12th of October 1990, it pronounced a new constitution which allows the establishment of political parties and proposed mid-1991 as a date for a general election. Secondly Mohamed Hawadle Madar, an Isaq, was appointed Prime Minister to appease the Isaq-led SNM opposition. Thirdly, Siad Barre resigned his position as party leader and appointed his son-in-law, Ahmed Suleiman Abdulle, former chief of the National Security Service (NIS), to succeed him. The opposition, however, described these measures as 'cosmetic' and a meeting with the Government, scheduled to take place later in the year 1990, was abandoned.

All the festivities of the 21st anniversary of the revolution in 1990 were cancelled. By and large, the year was one in which the people have suffered extreme brutality inflicted upon them by the presidential guards, known as the Red Brigades. At the same time it was a year of uncertainty and widespread anarchy in the capital Mogadishu itself. In late December 1990 the USC forces captured several parts of Mogadishu. The president had to hide in a military office near to the airport. The opposition was about to gain full control over the radio station and Government buildings in the capital. It was reported that more than 1,500 people had died in this fights. This news arrived in the early days of January 1991.

It can be stated that the opposition groups have no common political programme except to overthrow Siad Barre. Once that goal is achieved it is most likely that they will turn their guns against each other. The civil war might continue. Only the enemy will be replaced.
Conclusion

The internal conflict in Somalia is multi-dimensional and cannot easily be grasped without reference to many interrelated factors. These include conflicts between aspirant leaders, the political elites of today and those of the old regime. The opposition leaders rebuke the present 'socialist' one-party system in favour of the multi-party system, deplore the state security system and its abuse of human rights and shun state monopoly and planned economy. It can be argued that the political programs of the various opposition groups, as the official ideology of the Government, are rooted in 'modern' political theory. In that sense the conflict over power, in Somalia, is between 'old' and 'new' systems of political organization. I have two remarks to make:

Firstly, Somali experience during the last 30 years demonstrated that the political elites have failed to integrate the pastoral majority into the so-called modern political process. Since the leadership of the opposition is part of the Somali elites, it is doubtful whether the opposition movements are capable of producing a political programme to secure popular participation.

Secondly, political concepts, such as socialism or multi-party democracy, have only very limited application to the Somali society. The political programs of different interest groups are not usually articulated according to the political values inherent in these concepts. Somali identification with one political group or another is perpetuated by traditional societal patterns and individuals are born into a fixed system of family and clan affiliation. These, often extensively, define the individual stand in private as well as public, economic and political life. Hence, differences of political opinion between Somalis occur to a lesser degree in political ideology and more in their affiliation to a traditional interest group.

In general, a multi-party system in Somalia cannot operate without the support of the clan structure and all the political, economic and social interests which it expresses. However, the multiplicity of clans has made it difficult for the opposition to unite in its common goal of overthrowing Siyad Barre's Government.

On the other hand, shir traditional political institution seems to be a unifying factor in modern political culture in Somalia. The Manifesto gave an impressive example of how a common ground for compromise can be found despite clan differences. It is in this combination of traditionalist and modern sense that the Manifesto can be implemented. The drive towards peace involved, exceptionally, respected individuals, such as political veterans, merchants and religious men who detached themselves,
Conclusion

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The opposition movements represent intellectuals as well as guerilla fighters, who suffered a bitter experience of prosecution, suppression and extermination. Thus, they may not easily reach a compromise either between themselves or with the Government. In common with the Government, the various opposition groups are captured by the culture of violence which is an inherent part of the pastoral Somali society. This aspect of traditional politics was consciously activated by Siyad Barre during the last decade of his Government. Therefore, the use of coercion as a means of conflict resolution contributed to the continuation of the civil war and the destruction of the myth of the “one Somali Nation”.
Bibliography


Bibliography


Journals and bulletins

Africa Confidential (London)
Africa Research Bulletin (London)
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Horn of Africa Bulletin (Uppsala)
Indian Ocean Newsletter (Paris)
Appendix 1

"Manifesto No. 1"
(Copy from the original)

SOMALI MANIFESTO I

To: General Mohamed Siad Barre
President of the Somali Democratic Republic
Mogadishu

Subject: Recommendation Aimed at Bringing About
National Reconciliation and Salvation

We, the undersigned elders, who took part in the national
struggle for independence, sultans and chiefs of the Somali
Communities from the various regions, religious leaders,
businessmen, intellectuals and others, strongly and unani-
mosly feel that we can no longer remain passive spectators
nor ignore the duties and responsibilities that we owe to our
people and our country, both from Somali and Islamic points
of view, given the sufferings, the bloodshed and the incal-
culable loss of life and property that our people have suffered
for so long; as well as all the consequent and unforeseeable
negative repercussion and risks that these may result vis-à-vis
our national integrity and security.

Among other things we are deeply disturbed by:

1. The Civil War

A- The civil war rising between the government forces and
the opposition movements which has caused unlimited
disaster to our motherland, not only militarily but also
politically, economically, socially, morally and materially.
to the point of making us feel ashamed of ourselves as
Somalis as well as being made pessimistic about our future.

B- The killings of tens of thousands of innocent civilians
including: the aged, women and children as well as the
destruction and looting of their properties.

C- The fleeing of hundreds of thousands of people from
their homes because of fear for their lives, compelled
to seek refuge among other countries in Ethiopia and Kenya.
D- The destruction and the looting of major townships, including: Hargeisa, Burao, Shiekh, Erigavo, Buhodle, Galkaio, Galdoçob, Do'ol, Wargalo, Hilmo and its surrounding hamlets, Afmadow, Liboya and Bada'de. To our shock and dismay, most of the wells and water reservoirs on which, because of the arid nature of our land, the very existence and the life of the nomads and their livestock so much depends were deliberately destroyed as punitive measure.

2- Lack of Security and Respect for Law

Lack of security and respect for law in the country has reached such proportions that there is hardly any Somali citizen or a foreigner who sleeps at his house at present without a scare for the safety of his own life, his family and property.

In addition, as a result of the regime's divide and rule policy, wide spread tribal feuds and holiganism have taken and are taking unlimited toll in almost every region throughout the country causing great losses to life and property, and disruption to trade, transport and communication as well as sowing seeds of dis-harmony among brotherly communities, thus endangering the peaceful co-existence of Somali Communities.

3- Violation of Human Rights

In its twenty years rule, the present Regime has succeeded to have monopoly of power in the domains of politics, economy and security. In the process, the people lost all their basic freedoms and their role in the participation of the affairs of their own country. Well known to all is the regimes arbitrary practice of throwing thousands of innocent citizens to prison simply because they happened to comment on certain governmental policies or decision which seemed to them unjust and inefficient; worse still, others
D- The destruction and the Looting of major townships including: Hargeisa, Burao, Shiskha, Erdajo, Hubudde, Galgalo, Galdorob, Do'Oll, Warargal, Nimo and its surrounding hamlets, Afmadow, Lhoyo and Bada'a. To our shock and dismay, most of the wells and water reservoirs on which, because of the arid nature of our land, the very existence and the life of the nomads and their livestock so much depends were deliberately destroyed as punitive measure.

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3- Violation of Human Rights

In its twenty years rule, the present regime has succeeded to have monopoly of power in the domains of politics, economy and security. In the process, the people lost all their basic freedoms and their role in the participation of the affairs of their own country. Well known to all is the regime's arbitrary practice of throwing thousands of innocent citizens to prison simply because they happened to comment on certain governmental policies or decisions which seemed to them unjust and inefficient; worse still, others were jailed for mere suspicion of being members on sympathizers of the opposition. Thousands of citizens have suffered years of imprisonment under cruel living conditions without proper food, water, light, health care, bedding etc., for periods up to 17 years. Many have been tortured and others have died while still in detention without any formal charges or due process of law. We can not help but note, hereby, in a combination of shame and irony that under European colonial rule, the ordinary Somalian enjoyed the right to habeas corpus where as he has been arbitrarily deprived of such rights as a citizen by the regime as early as October, 1969 with Decree Law No. 64. In this case, comparing the record of the present regime to that of the British and Italian colonialism, does not independence mean less freedom to the ordinary Somalian citizen?. We must say, that in view of the kind of treatment the present regime has normally subjected the Somalian people to for the past twenty years, many Somali can not help but sadly feel, 'it was better when it was worse!'

No one can deny the fact that the present regimes' human rights violations, at the expense of the Somali citizen has become so notorious and for so long to have reached such a point whereby, Somalia has been listed as one of the worst four or five countries in the whole world, by Amnesty International, African Watch and other human rights organisations.

4. Governmental Mis-administration

All Somalis everywhere as well as foreigners who take interest in Somali affairs, are fully aware of the fact that, from the point of view of governmental mis-management and public administration, things have long reached at such low and such shameful a point, whereby, the present regime is normally characterized with unconstrained corruption, from top to bottom, tribalism, nepotism, tyranny and injustice and insufficiency to the point where one can not help but ask whether and to
what degree any national sense of responsibility is still left in those who are supposed to govern the Somali people.

The whole public administration, from the center to the regional and district level and all public services that were intended to provide the basic foundations for the life of the people, throughout the land, such as maintenance of law and order, protection of life and property, public health, basic education, water and electricity, transport and communication and, the economic system have practically ceased to function.

Apropos of the economy system, the Somali Commercial and Savings Bank, practically the only bank in the country, as a result of the monopoly introduced by the regime, now refuses or is unable to cash, strangely as this may sound, the very circular cheques and other credit papers that it issued previously to all clients with savings and bank accounts. This adding to the painful misery of the poor citizens who now can not get their own little savings, so badly needed, for the daily survival of their children.

In addition, the far reaching and serious great economical losses and obstacles caused to the Somali traders and business community, with a large deposit, who can not get their capital out of the bank, in order to be able to conduct their business normally, is bound to have, consequently negative ill-effects and uncalculable losses to the whole national economy, which Somalia can ill-afford.

All the doors of the Somali Commercial and Savings Bank had been practically closed to all clients for the past eight weeks as of today, and it is now commonly believed that the bank is totally bank-rupt to the point of being thirty billion shillings in the red. This has come about as a result of political and tribal interference and pressure brought to bear on the managerial banking authority
what degree any national sense of responsibility is still left in those who are supposed to govern the Somali people.

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All the doors of the Somali Commercial and Savings Bank had been practically closed to all clients for the past eight weeks as of today, and it is now commonly believed that the bank is totally bank-rupt to the point of being thirty billion shillings in the red. This has came about as a result of political and tribal interference and pressure brought to bear on the managerial banking authority from the highest governmental circle, that ended up in facilitating easy credit to the tune of hundreds of millions of shillings, to the wives' the sons, the daughters, brothers and other relatives, as well as tribesmen and other political favorites of the governing echelons, most of which later proved irrecoverable, since they were not covered or guaranteed by any assets or equities.

On governmental mis-management, one issue that is of particular concern to us and so deeply distress us is the case of the National Army and, the extent to which it has been reduced to, as an instrument to monopolize power and serve in political and tribal interests as well as an instrument of oppression at the expense of the Somali people.

The high purpose for which the National Army was created by the first freely elected government, was to defend our national sovereignty and serve our national interest, as a professional body, above political, tribal and personal interests. The Somali people had very high hopes in the National Army and, given their limited resources, had paid such a high price for it by giving its creation such a high priority over their so badly needed social and economic developments.

Contrary to Justice, the regime had placed its own political power and tribal interests before that of the whole nation, by corrupting the army and involving it in party politics and tribal interests, and promoting the officer corps on the bases of political and tribal loyalty as opposed to the traditional promotional system based on "professional merits" as it used to be in the past, under the command of the late General Sa'ud Abdulle-Hersi. During the democratic civilian government, prior to October, 1969
The irresponsible, egoistic and power hungry instrumenta-
ization of the National Army in order to maintain
dictatorial power and tribal interest, has reduced the
national Army to the point where it has lost all respect
and credibility in the eyes of the Somali people. It has
now practically disintegrated into tribal factions, sadly
and painfully as this may sound to all sensible Somalis.

5. Economical Disaster

There is no doubt today that hunger and misery have been
felt in every Somali house except in those of the very
few privileged ones and that the entire national economy
is in shambles. As a result, tens of thousands of Somalis
have fled the country to the outside world in search
for survival.

Unfortunately the bulk of those who have migrated are
the educated and the skilled laborers whose potentialities
the country would need when it comes to the remedy of the
present national chaos.

The economical situation, which puts our own national
state at risk and which has reduced the Somali people to
the humiliating condition of being international beggars
is an end-product of the dictatorial regime’s
mis-management and corruption as well as the arbitrary
imposition of Marxist Economic system which is contrary
to our Islamic beliefs and cultural heritage. By the way,
this philosophy, has now been universally acknowledged as
a failing system as demonstrated by the events taking
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reminding here that prior to the military take-over,
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To sum up, the present disastrous and tragic situation in which we find ourselves locked in, is the end-product of twenty years of dictatorial rule and mis-management by the present regime which has arbitrarily deprived the Somali people of their fundamental rights for self determination as well as the participation in the national decision making process, affecting their own lives, their families and their future.

According to our considered opinion, the best way to get us out of the present mess (and the sooner we admit the reality the better) and pave the way for a political settlement and peaceful solution to our most critical issues, what we first of all need, is a radical change of the present regime, to be replaced by a care-taker government which enjoys the respect and the confidence of the Somali people in general. The sooner we recognize the Godly given rights of the Somali people to freely choose their own government at every level, the better.

After all, once European Colonialism has gone out of the way - wala-humdu-Lillah, is there any Somali who has any right to rule, colonize, or worse still, enslave other Somalis by force? We do take note of the fact that lately, the regime has been publicizing its willingness to abandon the present one party rule, and readiness to make changes in its own constitution in order to provide for its replacement with a multiparty democratic system, in time for a new political election in 1990.

However, the grim truth is that the Somali people have for the past twenty years become utterly tired, disillusioned and skeptical of the usual political rhetoric and empty promises that they have been subjected to and can no longer be deceived. If the regime seriously means business, the sooner it takes concrete, clear cut and tangible steps regarding constitutional changes, the introduction of a multiparty
democratic system and free political elections under the
close monitoring of independent observers from the Muslim
World and Western Democracies, the better for us all!!

In order to dissipate all doubts and suspicions, why not
allow the widest possible popular participation, by duly
chosen representatives of the Somali people, in the
realization of the proposed constitutional, political
and electoral goals promised?

It seems to us that because of the present regime has been accused
to total monopoly of political power for more than two
decades, it is, unable to appreciate the vital importance
of popular participation in the political process. On the
other hand, it is as clear as daylight to all concerned, that
the present regime by itself alone no longer commands neither
the power nor the ability to lead us from the present danger,
without the concerted effort and full backing of the Somali
people as a whole.

To give certain credibility to the proposed constitutional
and democratic changes, the first step needed is to abrogate
forthwith all the repressive laws as well as all the institu-
tional "apparatchiki" (NSS, the Haqash or Military Intelligenge,
the Dabarjebinta or Military Counter Intelligence, Koofiyad-
Casta -Red Hats or Military Police, Barista Hisbiga - Party
Investigators, Guulwadayaal - Party militia etc). such as:

1. Law No.01 of 10 January, 1970 - on power of arrest,
2. Law No.03 of 10 January, 1970 - on creation of National
   Security Court.
3. Law No.14 of 15 February, 1970 - on creation of National
   Security Services.
4. Law No.54 of 10 September, 1970 - on National Security
5. Law No.64 of 10 October, 1970 - on the appropation of the
   right to Habeas Corpus.
7. Law No.38 of 5 April, 1972 - on judicial powers to the
   (Military) SupremaRevolutionary Council.

Contemporarily, the old penal laws of the land, code
No.5 of 16 December, 1962 and the penal procedure No.1
of 10 January, 1963- enacted by the former democratically
elected Somali Parliament, should be immediately restored
enforce entirely.
democratic system and free political elections under the close monitoring of independent observers from the Muslim World and Western Democracies, the better for us all!

In order to dissipate all doubts and suspicions, why not allow the widest possible popular participation, by duly chosen representatives of the Somali people, in the realization of the proposed constitutional, political and electoral goals promised?

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To give certain credibility to the proposed constitutional and democratic changes, the first step needed is to appropriate forthwith all the repressive laws as well as all the institutional "apparatchiki" (NSS, the Hangash or Military Intelligence, the Dabarshinta or Military Counter Intelligence, Koofiyad-Casta – Red Hats or Military Police, Barista – Hisiga – Party Investigators, Goolwadaa – Party militia etc.) such as:

1. Law No.01 of 15 January, 1970 on power of arrest
2. Law No.03 of 10 January, 1970 on creation of National Security Court.
4. Law No.54 of 10 September, 1970 on National Security
5. Law No.64 of 10 October, 1970 on the apprehension of the right to habeas corpus.
7. Law No.38 of 3 April, 1972 on judicial powers to the (Military) Supreme Revolutionary Council.

Contemporaneously, the old penal laws of the law code No.5 of 16 December, 1962 and the penal procedure No.1 of 10 January, 1963, enacted by the former democratically elected Somali Parliament, should be immediately restored and enforced entirely.

After having suffered oppressive dictatorialism for more than two decades, the Somali people now feel heartbreakingly thirsty and hungry to re-acquire their fundamental freedoms and national dignity. Therefore, if the regime is honestly serious enough on its declared intentions of restoring democratic pluralism, then the best test case would be the immediate appropriation of all the above mentioned Marxist-inspired oppressive laws, thus restoring forthwith, to the Somali people their sacred rights to basic freedoms such as: freedom of speech; freedom of assembly and association, and freedom to travel. It may well be worth remaining here of various prominent Somalis who after having suffered detention without trial for well over a decade, were subsequently placed under travel restriction still incourse.

Considering the fact that the regime is now all out trying to improve its lost image and credibility inside and outside the country, what better means can there be to achieve its own goals, than the immediate abolition of these repressive laws and the restoration of basic democracy?

6. National Reconciliation and Salvation Conference

With the aim on absolute priority basis of:

1. Putting a stop as quickly as possible to all the blood that has so sadly and so painfully been shed in most parts of Somalia;
2. Restoring law and order, peace and stability throughout the country;
3. Finding a political solution to the widespread civil war being fought;
4. The creation of a true democratic system based on the consent of the Somali people;

We believe that it is indispensable to call:

"Shirweynaha Suluxa Iyo Badbaadinta Ummada" or the Conference of National Reconciliation and Salvation (according to our traditional "Shir" system, consisting of the most popular political, tribal, religious and business leaders, from all regions of Somalia, leaders who enjoy the full respect and confidence of their local and national constituents, should be, as early as possible; convened on a neutral ground, preferably in Djibouti, Saudi Arabia (the Holy Haram of Islam), Egypt or Italy.)
In order to prepare the ground and make sure that such a vital "shif" gets well organized, we propose that a 13 member committee, called the Committee For the Preparation of the National Conference of Reconciliation and Salvation, composed of the following personalities, who in our opinion possess all the necessary qualifications required for such a delicate task of national importance be immediately created.

1. Mr. Adam Abdulle Osman
   First President of the Country

2. Sheikh Mukhtar Mohamed Hussein
   Former President of the National Parliament

3. Dr. Ismail Jumale Osoble
   Lawyer and Ex Minister of Information

4. Haji Muse Boqor
   Ex Minister of Interior

5. Dr. Mohamed Rajis Ahmed
   Lawyer, Former Member of Parliament

6. Mohamed Abshir Muse
   Commandant of Somali Defence Forces 1958-60
   Ex Commandant of Somali Police Forces 1960-69

7. Sultan Dulane Rafle Guled

8. Mohamed Sheikh Ahmed Muse
   Ex President of Supreme Court

9. Garad Abdiqani Garad Jama

10. Haji Jirde Hussein Duale

11. Haji Ali Shidde Abdi
    Ex Vice President - Somali Youth League
    Ex Ambassador

12. Sheikh Sharif Sharafow

13. Sheikh Ibrahim Suley

The duties and the responsibilities of the Preparatory Committee would be as follows:

1. the organization, the preparation of the agenda and the procedural rules of the conference;

2. the selection and invitation of all conference participants and the arrangements of all meetings required making sure that all communities are fairly represented.

3. consultations with any one, or party who may have a useful contribution to make, inside or outside the country

4. conduct and oversee all necessary discussion with the government and the opposition groups, with the principal aim of laying the foundation ground for a peaceful political solution to the present crises.
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4. Haji Muse Bogor
   Ex Ministe of Exterior
5. Dr. Mohamed Rajis Ahmed
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   Commandant of Somali Defence Forces 1958-60
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7. Sultan Dullema Rafie Guled
8. Mohamed Shiekh Ahmed Muse
   Ex President of Suprem Court.
9- Garad Abdiqani Garad Jama
10- Haji Jirde Hussein Digna
11- Haji Ali Shidde Abdi
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1. the organization, the preparation of the agenda and the procedural rules of the conference;
2. the selection and invitation of all conference participants and the arrangements of all meetings required making sure that all communities are fairly represented;
3. consultations with any one, or party who may have a useful contribution to make inside or outside the country;
4. conduct and oversee all necessary discussion with the government and the opposition groups, with the principal aim of laying the foundation ground for a peaceful political solution to the present crises.

Participants in the Conference for Reconciliation and Salvation

1. representatives of the governing party with full authority;
2. representatives of all opposition groups with full authority;
3. leaders, representing all regions in Somalia, who enjoy the full confidence and respect of their people;
4. most prominent religious leaders and intellectuals of national standing:

The principal aims of the conference on National Reconciliation and Salvation:

1. stopping the bloodshed amongst Somali brothers and the restoration of law and order, peace and stability to the country.
2. reaching common agreement on the basic principles governing the new Somali constitution;
3. reaching a political agreement on the timetable and the best electoral procedures for holding free elections, e.g. for the new parliament, new president, new regional and district councils, necessary reforms on public administration, the economy, public services and the armed forces;
4. formation of a caretaker government to be charged with the responsibility of carrying out the final decisions and agreements arrived in the conference.

Finally, we earnestly hope that your excellency will agree with us on the gravity of the present situation and the unprecedented danger facing our nation at present. Hence the absolute need on the part of every sensible citizen everywhere to put national interest first and concentrate all their efforts moral and material resources in safeguarding our motherland.

We therefore, trust that you will give our proposal the maximum attention and most careful consideration as well as the urgency that the present national crises objectively calls for in order to save our national integrity and national honour.

Wa Biliashi Al-tawfiq

The Council for National Reconciliation and Salvation

List of Signatories
Appendix 2

The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) – pamphlet 1989

Introduction. For many years the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) has undergone a transformation brought about by both internal and external developments beyond its control. This change has spawned a widespread speculation on the policies and prospects of the organization. Some critics have even gone so far as to maliciously but prematurely proclaim the early demise of the SSDF.

This short pamphlet seeks to shed some light on the organization, its objectives and strategies through the answers it gives to relevant questions raised by both critics and supporters of SSDF. It is our earnest hope that these candid answers will satisfy the curiosity of the reader about our organization. The questions are answered by a senior official who is a founding member of SSDF.

1. Q. Can you briefly give us the background to the rise of the armed struggle led by the Somali Salvation Democratic Front?
   A. The rise of the armed struggle was a direct response to the repressive policies introduced by the military dictatorship after the seizure of power in October 21, 1969. This date will undoubtedly remain the darkest hour in the annals of Somali political history. Immediately, the military regime has established a reign of terror that included summary executions, detention without trial, torture, brutal violation of human rights and the cruel suppression of all civil liberties.

   The armed struggle was therefore a patriotic undertaking aimed at saving the country from this barbaric oppression imposed upon it by the emergence of a military dictatorship. To put the matter in its proper perspective, SSDF was the first Opposition movement to take up arms against the military regime and continues to meet the enemy in the battlefields and in the more subtle diplomatic and political forums.

2. Q. What are the main objectives of SSDF?
   A. Briefly, the objectives of SSDF are:
      1) To eliminate dictatorial rule and practices from the Somali political scene;
      2) To restore the freedom and democracy which would guarantee fundamental rights and liberties to the Somali citizen; and
      3) To generate genuine economic and social change after liberation.

3. Q. What are the principal elements of an SSDF foreign policy?
   A. The fundamental principles of SSDF foreign policy are as follows:
      1) To adhere to a policy of passive neutrality in the conduct of international relations;
      2) To promote peace and security within the East African region with particular emphasis on the development of stability, cooperation and understanding in the...
3. To establish brotherly, solidarity and cooperation with Arab states;

4. To foster and maintain friendly ties with all states except Israel and South Africa whose aggressive policies are inimical to Arab and African security;

5. To develop close contacts with Islamic states and movements for the realization of Islamic unity;

6. To participate more vigorously in the work of international and regional organizations such as the United Nations, The Organization of African Unity and The Arab League and;

7. To support liberation movements fighting for freedom, justice and equality throughout the world such as SWAPO, P.L.O. and A.N.C.

4. Q. What is SSDF view on the revival of Islam?

A. SSDF is the religion of the Somali people and SSDF is deeply committed to strengthen true Islamic teachings in Somalia. It wholeheartedly welcomes the revival of Islam in its true and tolerant form ungarbed in dogmatic mysticism which has no relationship to the genuine spirit of Islam.

"When information becomes available, ideas flow smoothly, but if the sources dry up, thirst sets in afterwards, the person, for whom silence is prescribed, goes astray, I count not as civilized men who conduct no debate."

A Contemporary Somali Poet

5. Has SSDF been totally crippled by the internal strife of 1985-86?

A. The internal strife of 1985-86 has done great damage to the struggle. It was unnecessary and arose from short-sightedness and lack of political maturity on the part of various strata — leaders, ordinary fighters and supporters — of the organization.

Fortunately, it has not crippled SSDF. On the contrary, after some thorough reflection, the organization is benefiting from the experience and is therefore revitalizing itself through reorganization, changes of strategy and other more effective methods of promoting the struggle.

6. Q. Has the recent Ethiopian-Somali peace agreement affected your military and political activities?

A. To be frank, it has affected the pace and vigour of our struggle but we have adjusted to its impact through the critical revision of our strategy and tactics. We are now concentrating on the political and informational aspects of the struggle more than the military side.

We tend to see the new approach as a deeper phase of organization that could hopefully lead to a higher level of political consciousness among our supporters and the Somali public in general.

7. Q. How do you see the barbaric reactions of the military regime to the popular uprising of Somalia’s northern regions led by the Somali National Movement (S.N.M.)?

A. SSDF sees the offensive launched by the Military Dictatorship against the Northern regions as an act of pure genocide. The air bombardment, artillery shelling and the use of other lethal means of warfare against unarmed civilian populations in such urban centres as Hargeisa, Burao and Erigavo can only be described as a indiscriminate massacre of one particular Somali clan, namely the Issaks.

SSDF happily raises its hat off to the valiant uprising of the North as it unreservedly condemns the cowardly deed of annihilating defenseless citizens whose sole crime is their heroic resistance to tyranny and repression imposed upon them by the savage usurper of the power, the fascist Dictator Mohamed S. Barre.

3. Q. How would you describe the general situation in Somalia today?

A. The present situation is characterized by chaos, misrule, lack of discipline in the army and the total collapse of the administrative machinery of the state. There is really no government in the true meaning of the word. Things are moving simply through inertia for lack of planning or guidance from any central organ of governmental leadership. On the whole, it is a rule based on the whims of a sick, doddering old man!!

Likewise, development policy is conspicuously absent. The economy is in shambles owing to mismanagement and inefficiency. Production in such principal sectors as agriculture and livestock are practically non-existent. Corruption, nepotism and daylight robbery of public funds are pervasive evils on which the decadent political system thrives. Inflation has reached such a high level as to make the price of essential goods prohibitive for the income of the average citizen whose wretched condition of life is beyond human imagination!

These are facts embellished by fantasy or an overactive imagination. They could easily be confirmed by such neutral observers as diplomats and reporters who are familiar with the political and economic situation in Somalia. We challenge skeptical reporters to visit the country and dig deeper into the validity of these observations.

9 Q. Don't you think the people are fed up with the opposition as much as they are with the dictatorial regime?

A. To some extent, yes. But the two are qualitatively different kinds of dissatisfaction. The people expect the Opposition to unite, to mobilise the nation, to show more vigor and efficiency in the execution of the struggle and to speedily overthrow the Military Dictatorship.
Horn of Africa.

3. To establish brotherly solidarity and cooperation without Arab state.
4. To foster and maintain friendly ties with all states except Israel, and South Africa whose aggressive policies are contrary to Arab and African security.
5. To develop close contacts with Islamic states and movements for the realization of Islamic unity.
6. To participate more vigorously in the work of international and regional organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the Arab League.
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6. Has the recent Ethiopia-Somali peace agreement affected your military and political activities?

A. To be frank, it has affected the pace and vigour of our struggle but we have adjusted to its impact through the critical revision of our strategy and tactics. We are now concentrating on the political and informational aspects of the struggle more than the military side. We tend to see the new approach as a deeper phase of organization that could hopefully lead to a higher level of political consciousness among our supporters and the Somali public in general.

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8. How would you describe the general situation in Somalia today?

A. The present situation is characterized by chaos, maraud, lack of discipline in the army and the total collapse of the administrative machinery of the state.

There is really no government in the true meaning of the word. Things are moving simply through inertia, for lack of planning or guidance from any central organ of government leadership. On the whole, it is a rule based on the whim of a sick, demented old man.

9. Do you consider military confrontation as the only realistic way to overthrow the dictatorial rule or do you see any other alternative?

A. Military action is a vital component of the struggle but it is by no means the sole instrument for bringing about change in the country’s style of government. Experience teaches us that the political approach is more appropriate for neutralizing the masses than any reliance on firepower alone.

10. Would you be prepared to enter into dialogue or negotiation with the military regime in Mogadishu?

A. There can be no dialogue with the military regime as long as the dictator’s order remains intact. Genuine democratic changes — the dismantling of military rule, the right to free elections, the establishment of a multi-party system, free elections, free press and an independent judiciary — must take place before any representative of the Opposition movement could honorably sit in a meeting with the officials of the regime. At the moment, Somalia is on the brink of total disintegration and all actions that would prevent a national disaster should be considered.

Any serious dialogue, however, must be national in character. That is to say, the Opposition on one side and the military regime on the other. There must be no secret colloquy or meeting between two particular. Social, political meeting must also be public and should be conducted in the light of publicity. Dialogue undertaken under any other method would merely impair national unity and national reconciliation.

Moreover, when political consciousness is either too low or even non-existent, the military approach could bring more destruction than a satisfactory solution. We therefore put more emphasis on political work than what we did previously in the conviction that a lot more could be achieved in this way under present circumstances.

11. Q. How can the Somali nation be saved from the sure disintegration to which the policies of the military dictatorship are inevitably leading? A. Admittedly, this question is a tough nut to crack. We see no easy solution because the Opposition is as blind to the tragic fate facing our hapless country as the military regime. There is tremendous need for more creative thinking on the part of all patriotic Somalis so as to find an effective remedy for this scourge of dictatorial rule.

Now the less, we would like to launch a modest proposal that would at least have the merit of focusing attention on this problem than it has hitherto received. That is to hold a National Conference of all the representatives of the Opposition movements, politicians, intellectuals and all Somalis abroad.

The Conference will thrash out the problem, discuss critically and chart our course for the next stage of getting rid of the military regime and establishing a genuine democratic system for the future.

12. What role do you think the public can play in the promotion of the sacred cause of liberation? A. The public can be of great help in the struggle. They can reward leaders who are committed to unity of the people and reject those who practice and promote divisive politics. In this way, they are able to play a strategic role in advancing the pace of the struggle.

If the public remains impotent or expects gallant fighters to descend from Mars so as to save them from the intractable situation of a leadership, that is a fantasy that should have died in the crucible of the bitter experience of dictatorial oppression on for nearly twenty years.

15. Q. In your view, what policies should be adopted toward the military regime by those governments friendly to the Somali people?

A. We hope that governments friendly to the Somali people will recognize Dictator Barre’s role for what it really is: a barbarian in its lowest form. Indeed, to call it...
a government is an abuse and a misuse of a respectable
political term.

These governments can bring pressure to bear upon
the Dictator to respect human rights and to restore true
democracy to the country. They should stop giving aid
and support to the military regime until these conditions
are faithfully observed by the dictatorial order. In dic-
tatorial military regimes, foreign aid brings no develop-
ment to the people but merely bulges the coffers and the
foreign accounts of the Dictator and his minions, while
granting them new resources to extend the life span of
the dictatorial rule.

Conclusion. SSDF was the first Opposition Movement
to undertake armed struggle against tyrannical rule. The
Military Dictatorship was then at the height of its power.
Today, as neutral observers can testify, it is a mere
shadow of its former strength and influence. Indeed, the
military regime is hopelessly moving toward its decline
and extinction.

Unfortunately, the Opposition including SSDF is ter-
ribly disorganized by disunity, by lack of cooperation
and by Salami division and prejusdece. They are not
able to meet, discuss and formulate a common strategy
against a common enemy — the dictatorial regime.

Patriotism dictates that national unity should over-
ride and take precedence over regional, clan and private
interests and considerations. As long as the Opposition
fails to put aside these petty and imaginary differences
and to achieve unity of the salvation of our beloved
land, they forfeit any right to condemn Dictator Barre
for the crimes and acts of treason he has committed
against the nation.

One final point worthy of reflection. Are we more
patriotic and more forward-looking than the Dictator
and his sycophants? Can we describe ourselves as more
honestly concerned with the destiny of the Somali Na-
tion than traitor Barre?

If so, let us prove our loyalty by tangible deeds, not by
hollow words and empty pretensions! And let us re-
membe: well that the only effective way to save our
country is through popular unity, popular commitment
and popular support to the sacred cause of liberating our
beloved homeland from tyranny and oppression.

LONG LIVE FREEDOM!
LONG LIVE DEMOCRACY!
DOWN WITH DICTATORSHIP!
A THOUGHT FOR REFLECTION

Unable to fathom the docile submission of his fellow citizens to dictatorial rule, a contemporary Somali poet expresses his puzzlement in these pithy lines:

By God, amazement has died or anything to marvel at. Astonishment has already been put in the grave. And no wonder remains in the world as it now stands. While bewilderment hasn’t survived the first creation.

As a poet of the older generation put it: “Life never ceases to spring surprises on mortal beings.”

Gulaha Midoonade Soomaalida
League of the Somali Congress

THE POLITICAL PROGRAMME

THE UNITED SOMALI CONGRESS

Approved by the 2nd Congress of the
United Somali Congress held between
20th and 28th of March, 1990 in Rome,
Italy.

THE AIM OF THE USC AS AN ORGANISATION

The United Somali Congress is a Political and Nationalist Organisation whose aim is to topple the dictatorship that exists in our country. To reach its political aims the USC will employ every possible and just form of struggle that will enable the achievement of its goals.

INTERNAL POLICY

1) The abolishment of the ailing dictatorial system that has destroyed the political, economic, social and cultural lives as well as created disunity among the people of Somalia.
2) To abolish the so-called political legal and security institutions which are based on corruption and injustice. Like the Security Courts, The Public Prosecution, The National Security Service, The Hangash (Special Troops used to terrorize the civilian population), The Dhabarjabinta (Troops used for attacks on targeted tribes), The Guulwadayaal (soo called victory pioneers), The Militia and The special prisons.

3) The formation of a democratic, provisional (i.e. Coalition) government that prepare the draft of national democratic constitution and pave the way for a just, free and democratically elected government.

4) To establish a multiparty democracy based on true representation and full participation of the people of Somalia.

5) The establishment of a relevant constitutional system that preserves and promotes the legal and practical coexistence of the three fundamental and governing national institutions, that is the legislative, the executive and the judiciary.

6) The reformation and restructuring of the political, economic, social, cultural, educational, administrative, judicial and military institutions, with particular consideration to the qualifications, experience, efficiency, ability, honesty and dedication of the people who will run it.

7) The formulation and implementation of effective national policies, strategies and plans of action aimed at developing and strengthening the national economy, agriculture, fishery, livestock and wildlife, environment, education and culture, health, communications, public works and housing, industry and technology, security and defence.
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7) The formulation and implementation of effective national policies, strategies and plans of action aimed at developing and strengthening the national economy, agriculture, fishery, livestock and wildlife, environment, education and culture, health, communications, public works and housing, industry and technology, security and defence.

8) The USC assures that all properties including expendable and non-expendable as well as private and state - owned illegally seized and misappropriated under the dictatorial regime shall be legally and fully returned to its legitimate owners. Any individual or group of people who committed these offences will be brought to court to face the due process of the Law.

9) Any individual or group of people who have participated in the wanton destruction of political, social, environmental and cultural life of the Somali people by the dictatorial regime shall be brought to justice and fairly tried.

10) The USC shall give due consideration and support to any individual, group of people, village, district or region that has been excessively or exclusively damaged by the despotic rule.

11) The unconditional release of all political prisoners and fair judicial investigation and review of all ordinary cases.

12) The USC shall formulate national policies, strategies and plans of action to effectively establish and consolidate a Federal Central Government and democratically elected parliament that truly represents all the Somali Citizens. As well as establish the principle of Regional self-government. This will help create a systematic decentralization of governmental institutions and support local planning and decision-making, community initiative and participation which will eventually lead to the people self-reliance in all aspects of their political, social and economic lives.
13) The USC invites all genuine Somali opposition groups to come together urgently to a round-table discussion to find collectively common conditions which will lead to a peace full change of the despotic government and establish true democracy in Somalia.

EXTERNAL POLICY

1) To pursue a policy of positive neutrality.

2) The persuasion and practice of the principles of friendly, goodneigh bournly relations, non-interference into each others internal affairs, peaceful coexistence, respect for the territorial integrity of other countries, and mutual cooperative relations with all the people's and states of the world.

3) Respect to and association with the international and regional organizations such as the Unites Nations, the non-alligned movement, the International Islamic Organization, the Organization of African Unity and the Arab league as well as their charters, International Laws and norms ect.

4) Respect to International and bilateral agreements, between the ailing government and other institutions which are mainly on development projects for national interest.
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4) Respect to International and bilateral agreements, between the ruling government and other institutions which are mainly on development projects for national interest.

5) The United Somali Congress shall establish friendly relations and cooperation with all organizations and countries who support the just struggle of the Somali People.

6) To support all genuine liberation movements in the world.

**APPENDIX A**

**NATIONAL APPEALS**

1) The USC appeals to all the Somali people to unify their struggle to abolish the barbaric dictatorship.

2) To be careful and avoid the dictators shameful tactics of creating enmity between clans that would otherwise have lived peacefully together.

3) To be careful and avoid the baseless disinformation spread by elements formenting misunderstanding and enmity between genuine opposition movements whose goal is to change the regime and establish democracy in Somalia.

4) To realize that the success of the struggle against the dictatorship depends both on the Unity of the Somali people and the cooperation of the opposition movements.

5) The USC appeals to all Somali businessmen to ally with and contribute to the liberation struggle; and be part of the wave of change towards the establishment of a democratic and stable Somalia.
APPENDIX B

INTERNATIONAL APPEAL

1) The United Somali Congress call on the International Community to cut off all forms of military, financial, economic and technical assistance to the moribund regime of Siyad Barre as this would prolong the suffering of the Somali people and to exert all possible political pressures on it.

2) The USC specially appeals to the Italian government which still provides aid to this regime to follow suit the decisions of the other major western countries like the United States of America and Britain.

3) The USC expresses its gratitude to Amnesty International, Africa Watch and other human rights organizations for their constant efforts to expose the human rights violations of the brutal regime in Somalia.

4) The United Somali Congress appeals to Arab States which still have good relations with the regime and requests them to cut off all forms of military and economic assistance to a regime whose forces kill and torture the very people that are meant to be the beneficiaries of this assistance.

5) We also appeal to all arab countries, especially to Gulf Cooperatives Council group of countries to provide temporary admission and residence to Somalis fleeing the turmoil and unrest created by the tyrannical rule of the Barre regime.

6) The USC monitors the attitude of the neighbouring countries towards Somali immigrants who seek refugee in their countries, fleeing from the brutal dictatorship in Somalia.