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**Poem**

|               |   | There Walks a Woman |
|               |   | *Noah K. Ndoisi* |

**News from the Nordic Africa Institute**

is published by the Nordic Africa Institute. It covers news about the Institute and also about Africa itself. *News* appears three times a year, in January, May and October, and is free of charge. It is also available on-line, at the Institute’s website: www.nai.uu.se. Statements of fact or opinion appearing in *News* are solely those of the authors and do not imply endorsement by the publisher.
To Our Readers

On 1 September 2002 the Nordic Africa Institute reached the mature age of forty years, which was commemorated with an academic seminar on ‘Knowledge, Freedom and Development’ and a banquet dinner. It was a very successful and interesting occasion that we will return to in more detail in the next issue of *News*.

The Nordic Africa Institute participated actively in a conference on ‘Truth, Justice and Reconciliation’ hosted by the Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson, which took place in Stockholm 23–24 April, 2002. This was the third such conference aiming to discuss and put emphasis on international efforts against intolerance and anti-democratic activities including crimes against humanity. One of the keynote speakers at this year’s conference, Professor Alex Boraine—previously chairperson of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and currently President of the International Centre for Transitional Justice—offers in our first commentary an overview of the “difficult” and many-faceted road to reconciliation. In summary he states that reconciliation is at best “an arduous long term process”. In this issue of *News* you will also find reports from the panels on Rwanda and South Africa at the conference, in which representatives of the Institute were active participants (chairperson in one and rapporteur in the other). It is our sincere belief that the questions dealt with at that conference are of overriding importance and must be tackled in the future.

Our second commentary is by Dr. Francis Nyamnjoh, a Cameroonian sociologist presently at the University of Botswana, and deals with the democratic developments in Cameroon. He relates an account of a state implementing all the rites of democracy such as multiparty elections, but when the situation is looked at closer it reveals a country where every means possible is used to manipulate the democratic process. Again it shows that democracy is a long term uphill battle where multiparty elections are just the very first step in a long chain of events that have to be implemented step by step.

The third commentary is by Dr. Muhammad Mayanja, Director of Planning at Makerere University in Kampala and a researcher on higher education in Africa. It deals with the operation of ‘cost sharing’ in the higher education sector. He describes how Makerere University, after years of crisis and deterioration, has chosen as a survival strategy a specific model of privatisation and cost sharing for parts of its training courses. He points at the rapid improvement in both quantity (2/3 of the students enrolled at present are paying for their studies) and quality—but also to the problems, in particular in the field of science. The strategy of privatisation, according to him, therefore requires to be supplemented with targeted interventions to support priority disciplines and vital units that may not be able to cope with the liberalization drive.

A fourth commentary by Andreas Mehler, Director of the Institute of African Affairs in Hamburg, Germany, discusses the very topical subject of football in Africa, which has come to the fore as a result of the impressive achievements by African teams in the past few years and in particular in the recent World Championship in Japan/South Korea.

Finally we are also proud to present the work and experience of professor Fatema Mernissi—a leading sociologist and feminist from Morocco. She is interviewed by Carin Norberg, former member of the Institute’s Programme and Research Council. It is an interview that reveals a progressive and therefore controversial researcher and writer, dealing with subjects such as the road forward for democracy and human rights in the Islamic world in general and for women in particular.

*Lennart Wohlgemuth*
There is no simple and single road to reconciliation, it is an arduous long-term process. The confusion and difference is illustrated in an article written by a fellow South African. He looked at one small community in South Africa and asked them to define what they meant by reconciliation. One view of reconciliation was that of moral conversion in the sense of coming to appreciate that all people are equal as human beings under God, and that this requires a process of reflection, of humility, of repentance and forgiveness. Yet there was quite a different point of view expressed by another group in the same village. Divisions were caused by difference and thus reconciliation was seeking to promote inter-cultural understanding through better communication. A third view saw reconciliation as building of a common ideology of non-racism while the final group emphasised the importance of reconciliation in reconstructing the relationships that made up the fabric of the community by clearing up past suspicion, fear and resentment regarding past actions and associations. All this is by way of introduction, to show that there is no nice convenient explication of the word or idea of reconciliation.

It is extremely important to try and better understand what we mean when we talk about reconciliation and the urgent need for reconciliation. In the Oxford English dictionary we are given a definition of reconciliation, and I quote from that dictionary: it defines "reconcile" as "to bring a person again into friendly relations after an estrangement; to bring back and to concord; to reunite persons or things in harmony". In the context of political violence, reconciliation has been described as developing a mutual conciliatory accommodation between antagonistic or formerly antagonistic persons or groups. But even when we have looked at the definitions, it is when you look at a country that has been ravaged, sometimes nearly destroyed that you begin to be uncomfortably aware of the limitations of nice definitions. The struggle then becomes to know how to tackle, to narrow, to focus, to appreciate, to understand what action is demanded against the background of fine definitions.

My own approach will be through the lens of transitional justice, which should place reconciliation firmly in that context but should always in my view be seen together with accountability, truth, reparation and institution reform. This implies that reconciliation has to do with individuals but also with communities and structures. This further implies that justice in respect of transitional societies cannot be limited, in my view, to retribution. Reconciliation does not take the place of truth and justice, but it should be an integral part of our responsibility towards countries, which have a history of conflict, serious violations of human rights, ethnic cleansing and/or genocide. Most countries that have experienced this kind of transition—and obviously there are countries that are experiencing this today—carry heavy baggage as a legacy of the past and are often deeply divided. It is my view, therefore, that a more holistic approach, which has a very much deeper, richer interpretation of justice, is sorely needed.

Those who have fought long, hard battles with impunity are understandably cautious and suspicious about the concept of reconciliation. They see it as a soft option, which actually impedes rather than assists justice. We should listen to this critique, but it would be foolish in the extreme if our entire focus were on the perpetrator rather than on the victim. There is eloquent testimony of how by focusing on the perpetrator we actually do injustice to the victim, and many, many times the one person who is forgotten in the whole scheme of things is the one that has suffered most. Let us be very clear here, reconciliation, which calls for mere forgetting, for amnesia, for concealing, must be rejected as false and even dangerous. Recon-
conciliation, which preaches a personal salvation at the expense of social action, is a contradiction in terms. Such an approach deserves to be rejected, is debased and cheap.

Truth and reconciliation commissions
The idea of a truth and reconciliation commission has developed in recent years. There have been at least 22 of those, and there are at least five or six right now that my centre is working with in different parts of the world, and many others. I almost tremble to mention Angola, because of the tragedy that has been part of that experience. But they, too, now have a cease-fire and are beginning to talk about a truth commission. A leader of the opposition in Zimbabwe, prior to that stolen election of President Mugabe, talked about the need for a truth and reconciliation commission in that country. I am working with the exiles of Burma, they talk about something similar. So in Peru, so too in Mexico, so too in Sierra Leone, and indeed in East Timor. There is a wider approach, which seeks to hold together the search for justice, truth and reconciliation. So truth is important for the country, for the victim and for the perpetrator, because transitional justice must always be seen retrospectively as well as prospectively. Truth must be told, not only to redeem the past, but for the sake of the future. I want to quote something that I wrote some while ago, in discussing and describing the South African work on the model: it is not so that the truth exposed necessarily brings reconciliation in its wake. The only claim I am making is that without this truth it would have been less likely that reconciliation would have been accepted and worked for than was the case. The exposure of the truth dealt a body blow to denial and gave deep encouragement to victims and survivors to put the past behind them and to reclaim their lives without the constant uncertainty and victimisation of past offences. Certainly it is difficult to build a future on the basis of half-truths, of lies, and deceit. Reconciliation is not a cover-up, a veil drawn; it is an honest facing-up to and acknowledgement of the past so that we can move on without being paralysed by it.

If we are going to seek reconciliation then there must be some attention given to reparation for the victims. Here the focus falls directly on the victims rather than on the perpetrators, an essential part of reconciliation. Those who have suffered so grievously should not be abandoned, there can be memorials, that is good; peace parks where the names of people whose bodies have never been found can be inscribed; street names changed, schools renamed. All to restore the social and human dignity to a people that has been so badly hurt. But if it stops there, then we are simply playing around with reparation. There must be direct concentrated assistance to those in deepest need, and that can take the form of institutional reform, which is another part of the holistic approach that I referred to. To introduce the rule of law, and to make it effective must also mean recognition that victims need reparation and care.

Acts of reconciliation
Earlier this year, a very prominent and wealthy group of people from the United States visited my own country South Africa. They met many people in powerful places in the Cabinet, in business, in politics, but they also went to many remote corners of South Africa, one such place was a little place called Elliott, it is not a town, it is barely a village. And this group of fairly powerful, wealthy people stood in the village on the grass and listened to very ordinary people, mostly women telling about their own experiences and about their own needs. It was simple and dignified. Right at the very end, when nine or ten of them had spoken, the last speaker came and a friend of mine who was in the group from the United States turned to the man next to him and said “Oh hell, this is going to ruin the whole thing”. Because standing before them was a very large white Afrikaaner, a farmer with his stomach hanging over his belt, almost a caricature of one of those responsible for so much that had taken place in that area. This farmer introduced himself as the leader of the agricultural union of that area, which is a wide district with many rich farms and farm labourers. He began by saying, in his own accent, “What is needed in this country is land reform. What is needed is for my land to be divided and given to those who are without land.” And he went on. A very bluff, ordinary, middle aged farmer with an entirely different approach. He was not subtle in his apology, but his expression of a practical attitude towards
change in the terms of his own land meant of course that there was a chance for reconciliation in that place. So acts of reconciliation actually create an atmosphere where reconciliation can grow.

The importance of economic justice
Reconciliation must go hand in hand with economic justice. Without that strong emphasis one simply confirms people in their victimhood. Thabo Mbeki, the president of my country, once said this publicly, very powerful words which for me sum up what reconciliation is all about: “Because we are one another’s keeper, we must surely be humiliated by the suffering which continues to afflict millions and millions of our people. Our nights cannot be but nights of nightmares where millions of our people live in conditions of degrading poverty. Sleep cannot come easily when children become permanently disabled physically and mentally because of lack of food. No night can be restful when millions have no jobs and some are forced to beg, to rob and murder to ensure that they and their own do not perish from hunger. Our nights and our days will remain forever blemished as long as our people is torn apart into contending factions for reasons of racial and gender inequalities which continue to characterise our society.”

Reconciliation becomes possible in many places when children for the very first time in their lives have a chance to go to school. Reconciliation becomes a genuine possibility when people have access to a clinic in their own community. Reconciliation becomes possible when people enter for the very first time in their lives a house rather than sleeping in the bush or squatting on the side of a road. But you see that act of reconciliation creates a climate for greater reconciliation. None of us can be anything but deeply disturbed by what is taking place in the Middle East. If ever there was a place where reconciliation was needed it is there. But my understanding of that is that there must be reconciliation in the context of justice, or truths, of reparation and of institutional reform. It is only then there can be any possibility of lasting and abiding peace. Many wrote South Africa off as a place which would end in bloodshed and disaster. But somehow former enemies sat around a table, they did not like each other very much, they did not love each other very much, but they became partners. Not in the politics of war, but in the politics and logic of peace.

Literature on Reconciliation

A more comprehensive bibliography can be found at www.stockholmforum.se.


Fein, H., “Genocide and Gender: The Uses of Women and Group Destiny”. In Journal of Genocide Research, 1:1, 1999 (pp. 43–63).


*) this is a shortened version of the introductory speech held by Prof. Boraine at ‘Stockholm International Forum: The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Conference’, which took place in Stockholm, Sweden on 23–24 April 2002.
Cameroon:
Over Twelve Years of Cosmetic Democracy

By: Francis B. Nyamnjoh
Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Botswana, Gaborone

It is election day in Cameroon, Sunday, June 23, 2002. Polling stations nationwide have opened. Cameroonians are queuing up to vote for councillors and parliamentarians, when suddenly on national television and radio President Paul Biya postpones the elections for a week. His reason: inadequate preparations and poor distribution of ballot papers due to the incompetence of the Minister of Territorial Administration (MINAT)—Ferdinand Koungou Edima, whom Biya dismisses along with some of his key collaborators. Some see in this a sign that the president has at last yielded to more than a decade of pressure for a level playing field in Cameroon politics. To others, it is all déjà vu, a ploy to give a semblance of legitimacy to an election process fundamentally flawed from the outset.

Such scepticism is fuelled by the fact that the just postponed elections had already been postponed six months before, to ensure that “thorough preparations were made”. It is also fuelled by memories of the manipulations and manoeuvres that have corrupted and emptied multiparty politics of any meaning for most Cameroonians. Rescheduling the elections to coincide with the FIFA World Cup finals on June 30 was seen by many as a sinister move, for a football loving country like Cameroon. Since 1990, rigging elections has been perfected to the level of the ridiculous, making the theme a standing joke among satirical comedians, critical journalists, opposition politicians and ordinary Cameroonians who have mostly given up on expectations of change under the current regime. Unfortunately, much of this seems lost to the international community, for which Cameroon does not command the same celebrity status as Zimbabwe.

When Cameroonians are asked about the future of democracy, a common reply is: “on ne se tape même plus le corps ici” (“One has given up. Let’s wait and see.”). It does not seem to matter how many people cry foul nationally and internationally, as the rigging ‘caravan’ continues with impunity. No one has captured this better than the popular comedian Tchop Tchop, in ‘le chien aboie, la caravane passe’. “Elections”, the victors in his sketch claim, “are like a football match where one must prepare one’s players physically and psychologically. One can consult the Pygmy witchdoctor, corrupt the referee, or motivate (bribe) one’s opponents…. You organise your elections knowing fully well that you are going to win them. You have yourself to blame for not having known what to do”. (Tchop Tchop, Candidat Unique de l’Opposition, vol. 1 audio sketch, 1997.)

A semblance of multi-party democracy
To most Cameroonians, the excitement at change and democracy that came with Biya’s succession to Ahidjo in 1982 and with clamours for liberalisation in the early 1990s, has given way to disenchantment and cynicism with the callous disregard of the ballot by the ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM). Most would remember how the CPDM has acted as player and umpire since the state reluctantly embraced multi-partyism in December 1990, ending, in principle, the one-party era that began under President Ahmadou Ahidjo in 1966.
There has indeed been little dialogue and fair play in Cameroon’s multiparty democracy, even in comparison with most African countries. While the first multiparty legislative elections took place in 1991 under the one party electoral law, subsequent elections have since been governed by the highly controversial September 1992 electoral law. According to this new law, candidates for presidential elections must be “Cameroonian citizens by birth and show proof of having resided in Cameroon for an uninterrupted period of at least 12 (twelve) months”. In general, one has to prove a continuous stay of at least six months in a given locality to qualify to vote there, and to stand for elections in that locality one must be an indigene or a ‘long-staying resident’. An elaborate set of rules and stipulations determine who is to vote and where, as the ruling CPDM has tended, for its own political survival, to give a semblance of protecting ‘ethnic citizens’ from being outvoted by ‘ethnic strangers’. Other ‘requirements’ not explicitly formulated in the law are invoked to disqualify opposition candidates or their supporters. For instance, it is not uncommon for opposition supporters to be told in the city where they live that they have to vote in their home area (their village of origin, even when they were born in the city), but once in the village they are informed by the local authorities that they have to vote where they live (in the city). In this way many voters never make it to the polling station on election day. At every election, the newspapers are full of stories about opposition lists that have been disqualified by MINAT, either for failure to ‘reflect the sociological components’ of the locality or for including candidates that did not ‘quite belong’ in the area concerned. But being an umpire as well as player, the CPDM never suffers similar rejections.

Calls for independent electoral commission
Prior to the June 2002 elections, the repressive electoral environment had provoked calls for an independent electoral commission, which does not seem to have prompted more than a cosmetic response from President Biya and the CPDM, both intent on recycling themselves through the sterile pursuit of a semblance of multiparty democracy. In October 2000, Cardinal Tumi of the Douala Archdiocese added his voice to such calls, in an interview with Jeune Afrique Economie (no. 317, October 2–15, 2000), in which he was very critical of the government and called for an independent electoral commission. The MINAT, Ferdinand Koungou Edima, riposted in a press release, accusing the Cardinal of: lying, anti-patriotism, wanting to stand for presidential elections, violating the principle of the separation of the state and church, having little respect for those who govern, questioning the organisation of elections in Cameroon, attempting to insidiously turn Cameroonians and the international community away from the huge efforts and sacrifices made by the government to bail out Cameroon from the economic crisis and insecurity, not being humble and, being tribalistic.

The Cardinal retorted in an open letter, claiming that as someone who loved his country, it was incumbent on him to criticise those in power who instead of serving insisted on being served. “I criticise my fellow citizens who steal, exploit and use Cameroon for their selfish interest bitterly and without rancour”. He insisted on the need “to respect and protect the right of Cameroonians to freely choose those who manage” their affairs. It was the duty of the church, he affirmed, to “denounce the dishonesty of some government officials” and to encourage ordinary people “not to obey directives of civil authorities, when these precepts are at variance with the requirements of morality”. He argued that authority must be legitimate in order to be respected. The current authorities in Cameroon lacked such legitimacy, mainly because of the corrupt and crooked manner in which elections had been organised in the country since independence.

In November 2000, the opposition asked for an independent electoral commission. But the CPDM insisted on a National Electoral Observatory (NEO). The opposition boycotted the debate on the bill that modified the electoral law to provide for NEO, but as in the past, such a boycott did not deter the government from carrying on with the business of keeping up appearances. As The Herald newspaper noted, the “fact… that the opposition was not even allowed to have an input in the passage of
the bill… is yet more evidence of the disdain in which the government holds the opposition” (The Herald 29 December 2000). Although NEO was intended "to contribute to the observance of the electoral law in order to ensure regular, impartial, objective, transparent and fair elections", it is difficult to envisage a free and fair election under NEO, given the CPDM’s perennial bad faith, and given the fact that NEO members are appointed by a presidential decree. When President Biya announced the postponement of the June 2002 elections and sacked the minister in charge, it became evident that NEO had never really been in charge. As expected, the confusion, drama, violence and controversy of the elections, yielded a landslide victory of 149 of a total of 180 seats in the parliament for the CPDM, reducing every other party to a dying regional flicker, and imposing the CPDM as the only national party.

**Stalled democratic process**

As long as free and fair multiparty elections imply a risk of losing power, the CPDM and President Biya will continue, as their actions and vacillations indicate, to ignore the wishes of ordinary Cameroonians. To do this effectively, they will have to continue doing what they do best, namely: stating one thing and doing entirely another, disallowing Cameroonians in the diaspora from participating in elections at home, complicating the process of obtaining national identity and electoral cards that qualify one to vote or to be voted for, withholding electoral cards from those least likely to vote for the CPDM, locating polling stations in the homes of people loyal to them, erecting barricades and co-opting chiefs, bureaucrats, intellectuals, journalists, vandals, businessmen and women to facilitate illegitimate victories, promoting pre- and post-election violence and deaths to justify irregularities, and opting for tailor-made and doctored electoral constituencies that favour CPDM strongholds to the detriment of the opposition and of democracy. They have also ensured that the National Elections Observatory is CPDM in everything but name, and that it neither barks nor bites. Within the ranks of the opposition itself, the CPDM has encouraged floor-crossing, dissension, scandals, and various crises in its favour, with tempting offers to key individuals and communities.

It is evident that the democratic process in Cameroon has stalled. Despite multipartyism, most Cameroonians have had little reason to believe that they are anything other than pawns in a game of chess played by the power elite; the latter set their agendas for them, use them to serve their ends, and at the end of the day, abandon them to the misery and ignorance to which they are accustomed. Democracy is yet to mean more than something cosmetic, an empty concept or slogan devoid of concrete meaning, used to justify excesses of various kinds, especially by those determined to celebrate the status quo.

Ambitions of dominance have only resulted in power without responsibility, and in arrogant insensitivity to the predicaments of ordinary Cameroonians by those who claim to lead. With even the critical elite increasingly opting for shortcuts to power, privilege and comfort, ordinary Cameroonians are left at the mercy of poverty and an insensitive state. In the words of Cardinal Tumi, ‘many families can no longer send even a single child to primary school; in many families, children do not eat their fill; people die of hunger in Cameroon; people die due to inability to afford medical care; road infrastructure is deteriorating—take a look at the roads in Douala city! It is a shame; hospitals are without first aid drugs; public buildings are no longer renovated’.

If Tumi’s criticism is dismissed because he does not share the same ethnic origins as President Biya, the same cannot be said of Bikutsi musicians from Biya’s own home area. Onguene Essono (1996) discusses critical Bikutsi songs composed by popular and village musicians, disillusioned by a regime that has promised without fulfilling, and that has capitalised on Beti solidarity for the selfish interests of the elite few in power. The songs reject the god-like status President Biya has assumed, based on false promises, and the torture that the insensitivities of his regime have imposed even on his own supporters from the same ethnic origin.

Yet there is talk of the country having maintained an impressive 4.5 percent economic growth at the same time as these criti-
cisms are voiced. Corruption is thriving, and the elite few are swimming in opulence from embezzlement and kickbacks. And the government does not want to be held accountable for this or to be criticised for not making things better. As they say in French, "le chef a toujours raison, même en caleçon de bain" ("the boss is always right, even when in swimming costume"), and it must beat the ruling party’s imagination why some Cameroonians still cannot understand this and shut up. Nevertheless, its high-handedness, arrogance, and absolute power imply that the government can afford to distance itself from and ignore the desperate cries of the disenfranchised masses. Liberal democracy, even by African standards, is yet to take off in Cameroon.

### Literature on Democracy in Cameroon


The opening up of Makerere University, which is Uganda’s premier public institution to private students, has turned the institution around and restored its academic vibration. Starting from an insignificant percentage of less than 10 percent out of 7,000 students in 1992, the private sponsored students have grown by leaps and bounds to overtake and double the number of Government sponsored students which remained constant until 2001 when total enrolment was 25,000. The expansion however has not been uniform across all faculties and it is the sciences which are lagging behind in terms of student enrolment, income generation, capacity development and staff remuneration. The experience of Makerere University is that while privatisation of higher education is a very effective strategy it needs to be supplemented with targeted intervention to support priority disciplines and vital units that may not cope with the liberalization drive.

Crisis of underfunding

Until 1991, Makerere University, which relied 100 percent on public funding for both tuition and living expenses for all its students, was the most underfunded university in the Eastern and Southern Africa Region. Its gross unit cost in 1984 stood at USD 345 when the average unit cost in the region was USD 2,000. A university professor’s official salary was less than USD 50 per month, and many lecturers had to make ends meet by moonlighting in such jobs as driving taxis, running shops or kiosks, or teaching in secondary school. Many other academics left the country in search of greener pastures. The financial squeeze manifested itself further in deteriorating buildings, constant power failures, and breakdowns in the water supply system. Journal subscription declined drastically, as did the purchase of chemicals, textbooks, and science laboratory equipment. Research publishing nearly dried up.

The Government was not ready to provide the funds needed by the university, nor was it ready to let the university introduce cost sharing, for fear of student protest actions. Students at Makerere University insisted on free tuition, free food, and free accommodation and even pocket money popularly known as ‘boom’. Every time students’ benefits were tampered with, they would put on their academic gowns and march to State House or to Parliament to exact their demands. In 1990, the government abolished the students’ transport allowance and introduced a ‘book bank’ in place of a book allowance; students went on strike, resulting in a confrontation with police during which two students died. The academic staff soon realised that they were absorbing the brunt of the financial squeeze by being passive. They organized themselves into strike action.

The private student scheme

In the meantime, the demand for university places far outstripped supply. For example, in 1990/91 out of 6,000 candidates who met the minimum entry requirements, Makerere University and two other new universities could not absorb more than 2,500 students. This created cut-throat competition for university places and escalated the cut-off points for admission to Makerere University. Some parents resorted to sending their children abroad as the next best alternative.

As students’ activism resisted any form of cost sharing, the university’s response to the stalemate was to privatise some places in normal regular programmes, launching new pri-
Private programmes, offering existing programmes to a second cohort of students in the evening and also to introduce Distance Education Programmes.

The response, although not abrupt was a real breakthrough. The number of private students which started at 300 in 1991/92 when the government sponsored ones were 6,500 grew very quickly to reach 15,000 when the government sponsored students were still 7,500.

**A complete transformation**

The Private Students Scheme at Makerere University not only multiplied student numbers, but brought fundamental changes to the university in such areas as governance, curriculum and mode of delivery and finance and structure of incentive. A semester system to create more flexibility for self-financed students has replaced the traditional term system. New market-driven courses have been introduced while existing ones have undergone major reviews and Evening and Distance Education Programmes have been introduced. Remunerations to staff have improved to the level where for example, a professor who used to get less than USD 50 a month now gets almost USD 1,000. A decentralised system of administration has replaced the previous system where all financial and academic management powers used to be concentrated at the centre. This was also an incentive for those who could work hard and generate private income to have greater control over such funds. The decentralisation however, means that the Vice Chancellor’s powers to transfer funds from units which generate income to those which are starved of it are very much curtailed.

The recovery of Makerere University which is at the apex of the education system has positively impacted on the entire education system right from the tertiary level to the primary. At the tertiary level the number of universities has increased from one to 10 while the introduction of Universal Primary Education more than doubled primary enrolment from 2.5 million to 6.5 million. In Uganda, education has become the most vibrant sector in the socio-economic set-up today.

**Poor response of science disciplines**

Although the university as an Institution recorded considerable progress, science based disciplines could not immediately respond to the higher education liberalisation. Whereas the Faculties of Social Sciences and Law had 2,968 (74 percent) and 1,189 (79 percent) fee paying students, those of Science and Medicine had only 350 (39 percent) and 411 (43 percent).

In terms of income generating, the Faculties of Law and Social Sciences collected a total of Ushs. 1,804 million and Ushs. 1,803 million respectively against Shs. 400 million and 487 million for the Faculties of Sciences and Medicine in 2001/02. Given the meagre incomes available to the Faculties of Sciences and Medicine they could not provide extra pay to staff. On the other hand, on top of the university official salary which is estimated at about USD 500 for a Senior Lecturer, the staff in Social Sciences and Law earn an extra Ushs. 1,000,000 equivalent to USD 550 from teaching in day and evening private programmes. Although it could be argued that staff in science based disciplines could use their extra time during the day and evening to engage in research which could bring additional financial benefit, it is evident that they remain poorly paid compared to their counterparts in humanities.

A detailed review of the implementation of the Makerere University Strategic Plan 1996/97–1998/99 revealed that all the laboratory-based disciplines were generally lagging behind in adjustment. They could not run evening programmes because they still found it difficult to conduct experiments at night and carry out fieldwork. The sciences still lacked equipment, and chemicals. The capacity for science based disciplines to take on private students so as to generate income is inelastic.

**Can sciences charge higher fees?**

There are two ways in which faculties can step up income from student fees. The first one is to recruit more students without reducing fees per student. The foregoing discussion has indicated that this option is constrained by the limited teaching capacity in science disciplines.
The second option is to charge higher fees in science faculties. According to a recent study carried out with NORAD support the unit cost per student in the Faculty of Medicine was found to be Ushs. 9,212,000 whereas the current fee level for private students is Ushs. 1,920,000. Thus private students in the Faculty of Medicine pay 21 percent of what it costs to train a medical student. In the Faculty of Law according to the same study, the realistic unit cost is Ushs. 3,400,000 when the students are currently paying Ushs. 1,200,000 which is 35 percent of what it costs. While the fees charged in sciences are higher in absolute figures, compared to what it costs the science based disciplines are more underpaid for each private student they enrol than the humanities.

Fee adjustment is considered to be a politically sensitive issue in Uganda today due to a number of factors. First, in Uganda the general incomes are very low with GDP per capita of USD 300. Thus, even the current fee levels of about Ushs. 1,200,000 are by our standard quite prohibitive and there are no such alternatives as loan schemes. Secondly, the number of private students who would be affected by the fee revision has become the dominant majority and any upward fee revision is bound to spark off some repercussions. The private students are paying the existing fees grudgingly because their counterparts who are sponsored by Government are fully taken care of by the state. Thus, the possibility of increasing income for sciences, through charging higher fees is riddled with numerous obstacles.

Affirmative action for science education
In view of the fact that the science based disciplines could not cope with the privatisation of higher education, the current Makerere University Strategic Plan 2000/01–2004/05 decided to address this phenomenon through targeted intervention. Attempts to target more Government funds to sciences have not yielded tangible results as most of the existing funds are fully committed. The attention therefore shifted to donor support. A number of donors have come to the aid of the university in accordance with the strategic plan priorities to support science education. These include Sida/SAREC which is supporting ICT, research, library resources and staff development for the Faculties of Medicine, Technology, Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine. Other development partners that have provided support to beef up the teaching of sciences have included NORAD, Pfizer Foundation and Carnegie Corporation of New York. While this support has gone a long way to developing capacity for science education at Makerere University, it has been realised that most development partners, with the exception of NORAD and Pfizer Foundation, have become reluctant to invest in construction of buildings even when it happens to be a major critical constraint.
Football in Africa: Are the ‘Democratic’ Lions about to Take Over?*

By: Andreas Mehler
Director, Institute of African Affairs, Hamburg, Germany

The ‘Lions of Teranga’, the Senegalese national football team, reached the quarter finals of the World Cup 2002, while the ‘Indomitable Lions’, Cameroon’s prestigious squad, did not survive the first round. Is this meaningful at all? Is soccer just sport? The utilisation of football by all political parties in the German election campaign or the impacts of victory and defeat from South Korea to Argentina tells us: no! And particularly in Africa, football can easily be related to politics. There are several dimensions to this linkage:

**Prestige and legitimacy**: The victory of the national team is a victory of the regime. Particularly autocratic regimes short of tangible successes try their best to channel support from sports to politics—Cameroon under Biya or Nigeria under Abacha are good examples. But the democratically elected president of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, is ‘surfing’ on the successes of ‘his’ soccer stars as well.

**Political career**: Sports, and football in particular, can promote political careers. Numerous politicians are involved in football clubs and associations, they invest in football in order to accelerate their political take-off.

**National unity and ethnic diversity**: The national soccer team is a symbol of a national unity that is rarely substantive otherwise. At the same time, the ethnic composition of the team remains a political issue. And the competition between football clubs at the national or local level is frequently taken as a dispute between ethnic groups or clans.

**Correcting the negative public image of Africa**: In football Africa gets the recognition that is commonly withheld because of real and imagined crises, corruption etc. Football is an African success story, that can be brought to market.

At the same time football offers indicators of the structural problems of the continent:

**Corruption and clientelism**: Football clubs and associations are places of clientelist pervasion, and of criminal acts. Scandals about embezzled money are very common in this environment.

**The rare opportunities for upward social mobility, the difficult access to money, prestige and modernity**: In the context of widespread poverty, football offers the underprivileged classes one of the few opportunities to climb the social ladder. Sincere or dubious brokers promise to open the doors to a different, better world.

**Forced labour migration**: The future El Dorado for most African players is located outside their country, and mainly in Europe. The ‘trans-nationality’ of star players, problems of integrating in the host society and resource transfers back home are highly accentuated in the football circus—while comparable to other forms of temporary migration.

**Dependency**: Poverty, inefficiency, and exploitation have made football clubs and associations dependent on massive inflows from FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association)—with Blatter’s heavy money support programme called ‘Goal’ in mind—and private sponsoring. The success of African football internationally stands in blatant contrast to the state of stadiums, leagues, clubs and associations.

The rise of African football
The days are over when African teams at the World Cup were generally held in low esteem. With Cameroon’s victory over Argentina in the opening match of the World Cup in 1990 (1:0) and subsequent place in the quarter finals (ending with an undeserved 2:3 defeat against England) a new era began. Despite its early elimination in 2002 Cameroon remains the top African team on the FIFA/Coca-Cola World Rankings (at place 17 worldwide). After two
African championships in a row (2000 and 2002, as well as 1984 and 1988), the Olympic gold medal (in 2000) and qualification for the World Cup in 1982, 1990, 1994, 1998 and now 2002 Cameroon was the undisputed Number 1 of African soccer before the tournament. Their early elimination (in group E) has put those successes in perspective. This time Senegal got to the quarter finals (losing against Turkey by a 'golden goal' 0:1; now ranking 31 internationally). With El Hadji Ousseynou Diouf Senegal fielded Africa’s player of the year 2001. Participation in the African Cup of Nations final (against Cameroon) has already confirmed the rise of the team to the African top. Qualification for Korea/Japan and the skills displayed by the team in the tournament have just reinforced this trend.

International successes of different African teams did not arrive by chance; they have roots. Individual players entered international football earlier than national teams. Meanwhile, every second European star ensemble has one or more Africans under contract (Oliseh in Borussia Dortmund, Kuffour in Bayern München, Fofé in Olympique Lyon, Diouf was recently transferred from RC Lens to FC Liverpool, Geremi Ndjitap in Real Madrid, Mboma in AC Parma, Kanu and Lauren Etame in Arsenal London). But success stories can end abruptly: Ghana and Zambia once the star teams, have been relegated to the second rank (position 57 and 66 respectively), and even Nigeria have gone a long way from their heyday in the mid-1990s.

**Sports and politics—some prospects**

The short to medium term future belongs to national teams like Senegal and Cameroon, whose players earn their money in Europe, carry out their training under good conditions and evolve in first class competitions in regular leagues. And in the end those African football associations which respect transparent procedures will have most success. This is to the advantage of democracies in contrast to the classic neopatrimonial state—an advantage for Senegal in comparison to Cameroon. In the mid-term we can expect that a regular league competition will be established only in the more or less ‘functioning’ states where financially sane clubs can offer their players a monthly salary and maintain a basic infrastructure. This will be the case in one third of all countries at best. Partnerships between African and European clubs and external financial help, both increasingly at work in Africa, might be necessary in this perspective. However, they will have the intended effect only, if a) corruption and clientelism are tamed and b) the exploitative aspects (via brokerage of contracts for young talents, vote-buying in the FIFA-circus etc.) are not placed higher than the interests of the Africa partners. There are some noteworthy similarities with other asymmetric relations between Africa and Europe—e.g. in trade or development co-operation. Catch words like ‘brain drain’ on the one hand, ‘block votes’ in the UN-General Assembly on the other spring to mind. Africans here and there are not just objects of manipulation in such circumstances, but acting subjects. The responsibility is therefore shared. Politically, an emancipation of sports from small and big time politics would be desirable, the courage to refuse to be abused by politicians. Local media, professional editorial departments of independent newspapers and radio stations focusing on sports would be helpful. Unfortunately, here as well, the conditions are unfavourable in most countries.

The first World Cup in Africa will probably take place in 2010. It will present enormous material, political and security challenges to the host country (or a combination of countries). About 200 deaths are on the balance sheet of African stadiums in the year 2001. There is a lot to be done in this area. When the World Cup comes to Africa, it will redirect the focus of international attention not only to the continent’s soccer, but also to its problems—and to its problem-solving capacities. Without any doubt will there be enormous investments. In this sense the World Cup could be a chance for the continent. And, by the way, to get to know Africa via football is not the worst approach to understanding how this continent works.

*) This is a shortened and translated abstract of the background paper ‘Fußball in Afrika. Gehört die Zukunft den “demokratischen Löwen”? (Afrika im Blickpunkt, 3), Hamburg 2002 (see www.rrz.uni-hamburg.de/LAK/mehler.pdf).
Confusion and Ambiguity: 
A Response to Henrik Secher Marcussen

By: Gunnar M. Sørbo
Director, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway

In News no. 2/2002, Henrik Secher Marcussen pays a critical visit to the report I co-authored with Johan Helland on Danish development research (‘Danida and Danish Development Research: Towards a new partnership’ in Partnerships at the Leading Edge: A Danish vision for knowledge, research and development, Copenhagen, 2001). There has also been a debate on this issue between Marcussen and myself in Forum for Development Studies nos. 2/2001 and 1/2002. I welcome the opportunity to respond to both these articles and further clarify my views.

Let me start by saying that it is correct that Helland and I played a role in the review of Danish development research, particularly that part of Danish development research that is funded by Danida. However, we were explicitly asked by the Commission on Development-Related Research (led by Gudmund Hernes) to refrain from making concrete recommendations, as that would be the task of the Commission. We are, therefore, not responsible for the actual recommendations made to Danida.

Instead, we were asked to present options for future Danida support to development research. We presented two main options and tried to spell out their implications. One important objective was to remove the considerable uncertainties and ambiguities existing in the relationship between Danida and the Danish research community. Within Danida, there was a widespread feeling that large parts of the research community were unwilling to accommodate Danida priorities and policies, and that the value of Danida investments in Danish development research was questionable. Within the research community, there was an equally widespread feeling that Danida was not really interested in making use of the research made available by Danish researchers, or at least that Danida was poorly organised for such utilisation.

There was also the issue of independence: development research, particularly in the social sciences, should be explicitly critical of aid effectiveness and the vested interests institutionalised in development co-operation; that means it needs to retain considerable freedom in formulating research priorities beyond the potentially more narrow and ‘applied’ issues raised by Danida.

In brief, the relationship was not based on any clearly articulated policy of what Danida wanted to achieve, or any strategy guiding Danida towards whatever goals it had set for itself in the field of research, and it was our opinion that the structures in place contributed to this ambiguity. In our report, Helland and I used the Council for Development Research (RUF) and the Centre for Development Research (CDR) as examples of existing ambiguities and uncertainties that many, both Danida staff and researchers, found unproductive, some even untenable.

Contrary to what Marcussen seems to imply, we did not argue that all funds for research should be aligned more closely to the needs of Danida. We did ask the Commission to consider, as one option, transferring the RUF to the Danish Research Council structure—as we felt that the utility of RUF research output should not be judged in terms of its contributions to operational issues in Danida. This is the model pursued in, for example, the Netherlands and Norway. It has many advantages, including the services of a professional research bureaucracy as well as a closer rela-
tionship to the research agenda in the ‘regular’ research councils (synergies, possibly expanded funding for globalisation research, international health, etc.).

An alternative option would imply more active Danida engagement towards the RUF, particularly with regard to marshalling support for strategic research programmes as a larger share of the RUF allocation. Unlike Marcussen, I do not think that strategic research programmes are a bad thing, at least not the way Helland and I defined them and as long as sufficient funds remain for ‘blue skies’ research. Obviously, the balance here is an issue in all Nordic countries, and a holistic view is important (as noted by Marcussen)—but whether or not the balance is acceptable will depend on how strategic research priorities are defined and how well they accommodate existing research communities and their priorities. In Denmark, the RUF itself, consisting entirely of senior researchers, submitted a paper to the Commission, signalling the RUF’s readiness to strengthen research in areas of direct significance to Danida’s Partnership 2000 strategy, and to concentrate resources on Danish research strongholds by using programme or research funding as important instruments.

Helland and I also argued that there were good reasons to see the CDR as primarily an applied or policy-oriented research institute, different from a university; further, that Danida might reasonably expect, in return for its contribution, a policy-oriented focus in CDR research, reflecting the particular niche and focus of Danida research funding but not determined solely by current agency interests. This would not mean that the CDR should stop doing long-term, ‘basic’ research. An alternative would be to maintain the CDR’s more open, academic mandate as a specialised research institute with, at most, weak links to Danida. Again, the point was to remove ambiguities that created unproductive tensions, and to promote a more active, consistent and positive Danida engagement towards research. This would include clarifying the extent of Danida’s obligations to support the national research effort, beyond the operational and other needs of Danida itself.

Marcussen regards it as a paradox that the review argues in favour of bringing Danish development research closer to Danida and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which, as he puts it, ‘in the past have largely failed in exerting their “drawing rights” on research funded’. As Marcussen knows, we were also critical of the ways in which Danida handled research issues—but then our job was to look ahead as well, not just to assume that past mistakes could not be rectified. Again, our argument was that, in a situation where so much of the funding comes from aid budgets and where expectations differ widely as far as drawing rights are concerned (at least in Danida), it is essential to establish structures that are less ambiguous and that can allow Danida to articulate more clearly what it expects from the research community.

I see no contradiction in arguing, on the one hand, that Nordic development research is overly dependent on funds from the aid budgets, and, on the other hand, that it is important to improve the relationships between Danida and the Danish research community. There are several important challenges to research that go beyond the concerns of donor agencies and, indeed, also those of foreign affairs ministries. We are facing problems in funding such research—the cake is simply too small. That is why it is important to strive to get other ministries as well, and particularly the Ministry of Research, to share responsibility for such research, not least because it addresses issues that are equally important for our own societies as for developing countries. So far, this has proved difficult, but at least in Norway, serious efforts are being made to secure research funding from other sources. In my view, such efforts are greatly facilitated by the circumstance that overall responsibility for development research lies with the Research Council of Norway rather than with NORAD. While agreeing with Marcussen that Helland and I may have underestimated the role of Danish universities in funding development-related research (at the time it was impossible to obtain from Danish universities the kind of calculus that Marcussen makes available in his contribution), I assume we can also agree that funds are still scarce in relation to needs.
“I have two lives.”
Interview with Fatema Mernissi

By: Carin Norberg

Fatema Mernissi is Professor of sociology at the Institut de Recherche Scientifique, Mohamed V University in Rabat, Morocco, and at the same time a well-known independent writer. Dreams of Trespass. Tales of a Harem Girlhood (1994) describes her childhood in a Moroccan harem in the 1940s. Her latest publication is Sheherazade Goes West (2001).

It is the beginning of June 2002 in Stockholm. The sun is shining from a blue sky. It is hot and humid. The boardroom of the Swedish Foreign Policy Institute is filled with people. One chair at the end of the table is empty. On the sign in front of the chair it says Professor Fatema Mernissi. The meeting is about to start when suddenly a woman is entering the room. Yes, it is our professor. Later she explains; the hot weather made her feel as if she were at home, in Casablanca. A short siesta became a little longer than expected. North became south. But now she is here.

Sheherazade goes west is the striking title of her latest publication. Her success with this book has given her numerous invitations to visit the West, she tells me late one evening when we are watching the 750 year anniversary celebrations in Stockholm. But, as she also declares on her own website (http://www.mernissi.net), this year she will only make a few trips abroad. “Spending time in the air is not the best position to observe a strategic event transforming the powergame in the Moslem world.”

One of these trips is taking her to Stockholm this hot and humid week in June. Professor Mernissi has accepted an invitation by the Swedish Government to be a member of the Advisory Committee to the Swedish Institute of Alexandria (which was inaugurated in 2000 and has a broad mandate to engage in strengthening the ties between Sweden and the other countries in the European Union and the countries of the Middle East and North Africa). The Committee, presently consisting of twelve members from the Middle East, North Africa and Sweden will contribute with ideas, themes and actors to be engaged by the Institute in pursuing its goals. The Committee will also, in due course, evaluate the outcome and results of the activities.

Professor Mernissi is a sociologist and researcher at the Institut de Recherche Scientifique of the Mohamed-V University in Rabat and a well known feminist in the Moslem world. She was part of the African women’s research network supported by SAREC (today the Department for Research Cooperation of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida) in the eighties. The Gulf War drew a dividing line in her life as it made her switch focus from women to civil society. Working with both men and women has meant working with the most deprived, the ‘silent majority’, consisting of rural youths and women in poor urban centres.

In 1992 she published her book Islam and Democracy—fear of the modern world. A revised edition has recently been published with a new introduction written in the wake of the 11th September terrorist attacks in the USA.
The question if Islam is compatible with democracy is as urgent today as it was then. How can, asks Mernissi, progressive Muslims use the same sacred texts as extremist Muslims to prove different views. Her contribution shines new light on the people behind today’s terrorist acts and raises provocative questions about the possibilities for democracy and human rights in the Islamic world.

“I have two lives” she tells me, “one as an independent writer and one as researcher”. The publishing list is impressive. It is a mixture of research and fiction. A common theme is the emphasis on making the ‘silent majority’ visible. “In contrast to the highly mediatized ‘Extremist Islam’ where frustrated citizens (exclusively males) empower themselves by kidnapping the oppressor’s violence”, says Mernissi, “here citizens of both sexes get power by peacefully consuming information technology products”.

The modern information technology has been embraced wholeheartedly by Mernissi. In our discussions she is an ardent advocate of the new media as a means of democratisation. She tells her colleagues of the Committee the importance of publishing their works in English and to distribute them via the net. She sees the media working in many directions. First, she believes that information technology increases the youths’ self-confidence by strengthening their individual autonomy via self-expression, second, she is confident that the translation and publication of many modern works, presently only available in Arabic, would increase the West’s knowledge and understanding of problems and development in the Arab world.

Mernissi asks herself if there is a link between democratisation of access to information technologies and the sudden passion of Moroccan youth of both sexes for civic initiatives. In 1997 she made a deal with a selection of innovative NGO leaders who started the Synérgie Civique project. Her role, she explains, is to activate writing workshops for them to enhance their communication skills. Her enthusiasm for the many different ongoing projects is obvious. “My problem” she says, “is that while as an independent writer I thrive on working alone, my quality as a researcher depends on an uninterrupted observation of the Synérgie Civique dynamics”. In exchange for her contribution to their projects they let her observe their internal dynamics. Her next essay ‘Cyber-Islam as a Cosmic Mirror and Civic Initiative in Digital Morocco’, due to be published in 2002, will be based on interviews with NGO-leaders in the project.

The Synérgie Civique projects include many different areas of activities. It all started with Les Ait Débrouille: NGO of the High Atlas (published 1997). Ait Iktel is a village in the remote High Atlas Mountains. Until recently the village had no electricity. Widespread drought forced women to spend hours fetching water. One emigrant from the village, Ali Ahman, formed an association in 1992, bringing together members of the tribe who had moved to Casablanca and Rabat. Out of this...
group emerged the Association Ait Iktel de Developpement (AID). The objectives of AID were to provide basic social services and infrastructure and to organise economic activity. Today, electricity runs four hours a day, streets are lit during the evenings. The entire population has access to water. A new school with a schedule that permits children to help their families in daily chores holds classes in Arabic and French and teaches the traditional Berber dialect. In 2001 the project received the Aga Khan Award for Architecture.

Other areas are child abuse and sexual harassment, two projects, which have resulted in written documentation. Future publications include some on women political prisoners, mothers of political prisoners and family violence. Workshops for 2002 include ‘Civic Islam for our uninformed European neighbours’ and ‘Wonders of the Dra Valley. A Book for Intelligent Tourists’.

Caravane Civique is a complementary activity initiated to promote dialogue and networking and to make the publications of Synérgie Civique known to a wider public. Jamila Hassoune who runs a tiny library in Marrakech started it. She decided to bring the books to the villages. In 1999 she surveyed rural youths and their needs. “They dream of a pocket book for 10 dirhams,” she concluded.

When professor Mernissi tells me the stories of these people, her friends, her dark eyes are sparkling with glee. In advising the Swedish Institute she is advocating a perspective which not only takes the regional and national perspectives into consideration, but which also looks at the development and migration between centre and periphery within countries.

The second part of her life is equally interesting, the independent writer. Besides essays and articles she has written fiction and narratives based on her own personal experiences, as researcher and woman in the Arab world. Her first book of fiction, Dreams of Trespass: Tales of a Harem Girlhood (1994) has been translated into 21 different languages. “I was born in a harem in 1940 in Fez, Morocco…” Mernissi begins this narrative of a childhood behind the iron gates of a domestic harem. She interweaves her own memories with the dreams and memories of the women who surrounded her in the courtyard of her youth.

Fatema Mernissi is working on the second part of this family saga. The title of the new book is Chamas fate. The novel opens on Temara beach in 1999, one week after the death of King Hassan II. The main character is a 45 year-old television star, trying to divorce her old-fashioned husband in order to marry Kamal; an ex-political prisoner turned successful human rights campaigner.

In her fiction as well as in her research work professor Mernissi addresses subjects relating to the Muslim societies. By inviting us to share her experiences as a liberated, independent Moroccan woman she opens a door to dialogue on issues of universal importance.

Our interview has come to a close. The Stockholm night is still hot and humid. We are talking about globalisation. Globalisation of the weather? Maybe not. Globalisation of thoughts? Certainly! ■
Three African guest researchers visited the Institute during this past spring: Mr. Amin Kamete from Zimbabwe, Ms. Mumbi Machera from Kenya and Prof. Minette Mans from Namibia. Their respective research projects are presented below, together with the research project of Mr. Katsuya Mochizuki from Japan, who spent the past six months at the Institute as visiting research fellow.

**Shifting Perceptions and Changing Responses: Governing the Poor in Harare, Zimbabwe**  
*By: Amin Y. Kamete, Senior Lecturer, Department of Rural and Urban Planning, University of Zimbabwe*

The research that brought me to the Nordic Africa Institute deals with an issue located at the nexus of urban governance; the relationship between the urban governors in central and local government institutions and a significant portion of the community that is governed, namely the urban poor. In my stay I managed to produce a manuscript that captures the essence of what I sought to achieve, and which have been submitted to the Institute's publication department.

Using evidence from the city the paper presents the official perceptions. Two main categories encompass these perceptions. These are: (1) positive and paternalistic perceptions and (2) negative and derogatory perceptions. The discussion presents a detailed analysis of official responses emanating from such perceptions and how the poor have reacted to such responses. It is from this analysis that the observation is made that the scene of urban governance in Harare is unpredictable, volatile and fluid. The investigation exposes the distortions in the system of governance and argues that the present style of governance has generated a charged atmosphere where both the rulers and the ruled are continually on the defensive. The discussion concludes by calling for the opening up of the system to accommodate the poor as partners.

The main strand running through the discourse is that the relationship between the rulers and the ruled in Harare is directed by perceptions. In most cases there is very little philanthropy in these perceptions. A substantial proportion of them are based on selfish interest, which itself is an outcome of what may be regarded as 'rational' calculation and the resultant decisions by different stakeholders or stakeholder groups within the urban sphere. Though appearing to have the interest of the other at heart, in reality each party seeks to extract as much capital as possible from the relationship. This is true of both the 'governors' and 'the governed'. Understandably, both groups act in a manner that displays a preoccupation with self-interest.

Empirical observations from Harare reveal that the relationship between the rulers and the ruled is extremely fluid. This fluidity confirms the lack of constancy in the perceived usefulness of one party to the other. Sometimes this results in animosity, hostility or open warfare, with the rulers abandoning their protégés or, as is the case in democratic societies, the ruled opting to be governed by others. This is born out by the many changes from leniency to repression and from sensitivity to insensitivity as well as in changes of government at both central and local levels.

This paper is based on the conviction that an analysis of the shifting perceptions in urban governance is a good starting point to a complete understanding of the changing responses by the rulers to the state and activities of the ruled. Since governance is itself a concept that is primarily concerned with the relationship
between the rulers and the ruled, a scrutiny of mutual perceptions is an integral facet of the understanding and interpretation of governance at any level of government.

The discussion first revisits the concepts of governance, poverty and the urban poor. The discourse then examines existing analyses regarding commonly held perceptions of the poor in the urban centres of the developing world. It then proceeds to present an overview of the realities on the ground in Harare in the context of local governance and local government. It is at this stage that the shifting perceptions, changing responses and counter-responses in the governing of the poor in the city of Harare are analysed in detail. The research found out that responses to these perceptions are many and varied but tend to match the perceptional basis in all cases. Positive perceptions that view the poor as assets and resources trigger favourable responses that aim to champion, encourage and promote the 'good' that the poor do or to use the poor for the advancement of some agenda. Paternalistic perceptions that regard the poor as helpless generate responses whose purpose is to lift the poor out of their predicament. Lastly, control, repression and criminalisation are the typical responses that result from the negative and derogatory perceptions that those afflicted by poverty are a nuisance and a liability.

The results of the interplay of perceptions, responses and counter-responses on the governance terrain in the city are summarised as unpredictability, volatility and fluidity. The discussion raises doubts about the commonly held view that the poor are powerless and voiceless. It brings out the fact that the poor in Harare somehow find a voice and exercise power, but in ways that are not always constructive. This is mainly because they are kept out of the system of governance. On the basis of these observations, the paper concludes by calling for a democratisation and widening of the system of governance so that Harare can become a truly inclusive city.

Emergent Actors in African Political Economy

By: Mr. Katuya Mochizuki, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization

Since the late 1980s researchers had been occupied with the debate on structural adjustment programmes. Both the pros and cons were exhausted as they found themselves trapped in a web of globalisation. The once miraculous East Asian economies were stuck in the mire of economic crisis. No African countries could find an alternative framework for their development efforts. On the other hand, the former Eastern European countries transformed themselves into viable economic units.

Similar phenomena and actors could emerge in every country, even if the economy had been stagnating for a long time. Political and economic changes gave birth to many new units of action, and those actors were the driving forces which furthered overall transformation of the economy.

The present project is interested in this very process. It started by asking a set of questions: What kind of actors emerged in the period of structural adjustment? How did they emerge as the main elements in their respective sectors? What were the major organizational challenges they brought to the society concerned?, and so on.

Several actors were selected for consideration. In the political realm, action-oriented groups such as women’s groups and youth movements attracted our interest. Various NGO activities were selected, as well as civil rights organizations which were targeted as a priority sector. These selections reflect the situation of the country (Nigeria) where field studies were implemented. In the economic realm, various types of brand new enterprises filled the economic space which was widened with the reduction of the state’s influence in the business field. Accordingly, so-called expatriate business was selected.
A number of case studies will be combined with an introductory paper written by Adébáyò Olukosíbi, and will be published from the Institute of Developing Economies (IDe) under the title of this project later this year. The case studies are the following: Hussaina Abudullah argues there is keen competition among the Nigerian women’s movements that accompanied the differing and differentiated responses toward the structural adjustment and political reform programmes. Cyril Obi discusses factors that explain the re-emergence of radical youth activism as the main propellant of the social movements agitating for self-determination and change in Nigeria’s oil producing communities of the Niger Delta. Ayodeji Olukoju deals with indigenous, single-issue human rights organizations in Nigeria. He also examines the development, travails, strategies and achievements of the movements for the enforcement of fundamental human rights from a historical perspective. I myself try to look into the expatriate business community in Nigeria. The main focus is on the transition of the Chinese community which shows contrasting performances when compared with others like the Indian and Lebanese.

There are some noteworthy merits in following the performance of individual actors. Firstly, we can avoid the bias caused by an over-generalization. As often pointed out, responses toward structural adjustment were different from sector to sector. Its impact analysis shows that their timing and magnitude varied even among subsectors. Individual case studies contribute to understanding the differences of the adjustment mechanism in each sector. Secondly, we can also understand detailed historical background through descriptive works. Some actors re-emerged and were re-vitalized in the new settings brought by structural adjustment. Without following the unique histories of their emergence, causal analysis would become unreliable.

There are also many things to do in the next phase of our project. Among other things, we have to test out our analysis in a wider perspective. For this purpose, it is indispensable to introduce comparative studies as the next step. With the exception of case studies used in the introductory article, all case studies are on Nigeria. We need to evaluate our findings from comparative perspectives. In addition, conceptualisation has to be done at some point. Both ‘emergence’ and ‘emergent actor’ are vague in their meanings even as descriptive terms. All types of new phenomena and actors could be described in this way. If we elaborate these concepts properly, it will contribute to implementing comparative analysis. The IDe is planning to hold a workshop under the same title as the project early next year. The possibility of further work and the framework for analysis will be discussed based on the findings of the case studies.

Africanists in the Nordic Countries

is an online database of approximately 250 researchers in the Nordic countries with an advanced university degree in the social sciences or humanities engaged in research on Africa or of relevance for Africa. Its purpose is to facilitate networking among Africanists in the Nordic countries and to serve as a basic guide to the Nordic world of research on Africa. More information: www.nai.uu.se
Too often, the arts are seen as peripheral to real life, to the current and always more crucial issues of economic and social development. So it is the lot of arts researchers to reaffirm the importance of understanding societies through their cultural artistic expressions. Through their arts, one perceives aspects of a people's history and identity.

The typical cultural image of Namibia is twofold. There is the image that draws tourists seeking the exotic to 'move back in time' and 'see ancient nomadic tribes' in the areas previously and presently marginalized by government. This surreal image clearly does not offer a true glimpse of Namibia. It promotes a demeaning stereotype utilizing words like 'primitive' and 'undeveloped'. A second image, or rather lack of image, emerges on discovery that the entire Namibian region is almost blank on cultural history maps, almost as though there is no culture, history, pain or innovation—except that related to the very recent past. 'History' begins with the arrival of missionaries, described through their cultural inventions. Indigenous oral narratives were ignored and forgotten. The struggle for independence at last placed Namibia on the map. But despite the increased volume of studies little has been done in the ethnomusicology field.

Many of the texts that tell the stories of people—images that portray their beliefs, achievements, hopes and aspirations are found in song, praise and dance. An incursion into the world of music and dance in Namibia transports one to this plane where creativity, diversity and challenge are experiences that form and are formed by cultural identity. The sung texts and incantations relate the stories of past generations as well as present, which is why young children sing liberation songs created in exile camps along with reggae songs about city girls. (This refers to the hit song 'City Girl' by Ras Sheehama.) Regional dances reflect the values of the past, but also respond to the demands of today's global society.

My work over the past decade has been to investigate and explore 'The living musics and dance of Namibia'. My purpose has not been merely to document and 'preserve'. Rather, as the title of the project indicates, the purpose is to explore and study musical traditions that are alive and practised today—in whatever guise and form they may take. Planned according to the political regions of Namibia, this has so far involved the Kunene, Omusati, Oshana, Ohangwena, Oshikoto, Kavango, Caprivi, and part of the Khomas regions. The east and south have not yet been addressed. I utilize ethnographic methods of field research, spending time with families in different areas, learning about their worlds, cosmologies, personal lives and musical languages. Through analysis, transcription, and ethnological comparison of the data (including audio and video recordings) the images are slowly starting to emerge.

It should be noted that this research is not about identifying and 'binding' ethnic or tribal groups within traditions but rather investigating living musical worlds within different Namibian localities. Where people identify themselves within the framework of a language or ethnic group, it is reported as such, but musical ideations, not ethnicity, remain the focus. Many localities have a 'co-existence of multiple histories' and note is taken of many discourses. The divisive influence of apartheid had many effects on cultural practice, which in any case is an ever-changing, often elusive entity. However, it emerges from provisional data that as expected, the intercultural borrowing, assimilation and conflation of practices amongst different language groups over time have led to many common performance features, even while the diverse expressions of music and dance speak of strong statements of difference amongst cultural identities. It is becoming possible to trace through movement, musical and linguistic correspondences and ideations, many links that will contribute to our understanding of history.

During my period as Guest Researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute, the Nordic collections on Namibian materials have illustrated the views of missionaries, colonial ad-
Gender, Sexuality and Subjection: The social construction of sexuality and the reproduction of sexual violence in Kenya
By: Mumbi Machera, Department of Sociology, University of Nairobi

The study interrogates the interrelationship between gender, sexuality, and sexual coercion using examples from Kenya. The main proposition which guides the study assumes that socially determined perceptions of female and male sexualities subject women to various acts of sexual violence both in the private and public domains. And because sexuality is gendered, sexual violence is in this case perceived as a form of gender-based violence. The study recognises that human beings are born female or male but the forms which the expression of their sexualities take are patterned around norms, beliefs and practices which may differ from one cultural grouping to another.

The following research questions guided the study: How is the female sexuality defined? Who defines it? How does the social construction of sexuality shape gender relations in the society? To what extent does an individual’s sexuality determine the female sexual experience of sexual violence? To answer these questions, information was collected through informal discussions with students at the University of Wrobi, and through focus group discussions with women and men living in Nairobi city.

With evidence from primary data, I contend that much of the sexual violence in the contemporary Kenyan society serves to preserve asymmetrical gender systems of power. For example, aggression as a central component of masculinity serves to legitimate male on female violence including rape, marital rape, sexual harassment and other forms of sexual terrorism. Among other findings my study shows that sexuality is constructed to favour men and puts women on the receiving end of violence. Sexual drive for men is defined with a certain degree of essentialism, which signals men’s inability to control their sexual urges as generally innate. Women on the other hand are at fault should they become the prey of sexual coercion and violence.

On a political level, the study challenges policy makers to recognize the insecurity women encounter given that threats of or actual sexual violence impact negatively on the well-being of women and on their social and economic creativity. The study also challenges the inconsistency in the society where the family is characteristically a time-honoured institution, that is meant to propagate peace and love but at the same time generates negative values which degrade the female sexuality thus perpetuating sexual violence against women.
**Centres for Gender Studies in Africa**

**During the last** 10-20 years—and particularly since the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995—Centres for Gender Studies have been established at many universities in Africa. In most, if not all, cases these centres have been established as a result of persistent and determined struggles by committed teachers and researchers against university bureaucracies and institutional structures. The status of the centres varies quite a lot depending on local conditions: some are regular university departments, running courses at undergraduate and graduate levels; others subsist on their own fundraising from external grants and from doing consultancy work. The list below is not exhaustive, and the status and activities of centres listed also differ quite a lot, with the African Gender Institute (University of Cape Town) and the Department of Women and Gender Studies (Makerere University) among those with the most impressive range of activities. Just check their websites and see for yourselves!

We intend to come back with more addresses as well as with additional information on specific centres in future issues of *News*. We would be grateful to receive information regarding university centres for gender studies not included in the list below, as well as information regarding research NGOs dealing with gender studies and research. Please mail to pia.hidenius@nai.uu.se, or to Pia Hidenius, the Nordic Africa Institute, P.O. Box 1703, SE 75147 Uppsala, Sweden.

**African institutions**

**Ghana**
The Development and Women’s Studies group (DAWS)  
Institute of African Studies  
University of Ghana  
P.O. Box 73  
Legon, Ghana

**Mozambique**
Departamento de Estudos da Mulher e Género (DEMEG)  
Centro de Estudos Africanos  
Universidade Eduardo Mondlane  
Campus Universitário principal  
Caixa Postal 1993  
Maputo, Moçambique  
Tel: +258 1 490828, 491896, 499876  
Fax: +258 1 491896  
E-mail: ceadir@zebra.uem.mz, ceadid@zebra.uem.mz  
www.cea.uem.mz/deg.asp

**Nigeria**
The Centre for Gender and Social Policy Studies  
Obafemi Awolowo University  
Ile-Ife, Nigeria  
Tel/Fax: +234 36 231 415  
E-mail: centgend@oauife.edu.ng

Women’s Research and Documentation Centre (WORDOC)  
Institute of African Studies  
University of Ibadan  
Ibadan, Nigeria  
Tel: +234 2 810 4077  
Fax: +234 2 810 4077  
E-mail: library@udeku.ui.edu.ng

**Uganda**
Department of Women and Gender Studies (IWGS)  
Makerere University  
P.O. Box 7062  
Kampala, Uganda  
Tel: +256 41 531484  
Fax: +256 41 543539  
E-mail: wgs@mak.ac.ug, gendermu@swiftuganda.com  
www.makerere.ac.ug/womenstudies/
South Africa
African Gender Institute (AGI)
University of Cape Town
Private Bag Rondebosch
Cape Town, 7701, South Africa
Tel: +27 21 650 2970
Fax: +27 21 685 2142
E-mail: agi@humanities.uct.ac.za
www.uct.ac.za/org/agi

Centre for Gender Studies
Faculty of Human Sciences
University of Natal, Durban
Private Bag X10
Dalbridge 4041, South Africa.
Tel: +27 31 260 1413
Fax: +27 31 260 1519
E-mail: genders@nu.ac.za
www.unp.ac.za/UNPDepartments/politics/gender/gender.htm

Institute for Women’s and Gender Studies
Human Sciences Building 20-17
University of Pretoria
Lynnwood Road
Pretoria 0002, South Africa
Tel: +27 012 420 3897/8
E-mail: mdewaal@postino.up.ac.za,
        marinda@postino.up.ac.za
www.up.ac.za/gender/index.htm

Institute for Gender Studies
University of South Africa (UNISA)
P.O. Box 392
Pretoria 0003, South Africa
Tel: +27 12 429 6325, +27 12 429 6328
Fax: +27 12 429 3221
E-mail: lemonj@unisa.ac.za (Jennifer Lemon, coordinator),
nidooge@unisa.ac.za (Gloria Nidoo, Senior Administration Officer)
www.unisa.ac.za/dept/gen/

Women’s and Gender Studies Programme
University of the Western Cape
Faculty of Arts
Private Bag X17
ZA-7535 RSA Bellville, South Africa
Tel: +27 21 959 2234
Fax: +27 21 959 1273
E-mail: glewendal@uwc.ac.za (Glenise Levendal, Course Co-ordinator)
www.uwc.ac.za/arts/gender/index.htm

New opening hours in the library
Monday–Wednesday: 12.00–17.00
Thursday: 12.00–19.00
Friday: 12.00–16.00

Please note that persons, who need to use the library collections for their research or major papers, are given the possibility to use the library at other times than above, however only by agreement and when the library staff is on duty.

Reservation of tables
It is now possible to reserve tables in the reading room. Materials used can be kept overnight at our book depot. Always contact the library at library@nai.uu.se
After thirty years of autocratic rule under ‘Life President’ Kamuzu Banda, Malawians experienced a transition to multiparty democracy in 1994. A new constitution and several democratic institutions promised a new dawn in a country ravaged by poverty and injustice. This book presents original research on the economic, social, political and cultural consequences of the new era. A new generation of scholars, most of them from Malawi, cover virtually every issue causing debate in the New Malawi: poverty and hunger, the plight of civil servants, the role of the judiciary, political intolerance and hate speech, popular music as a form of protest, clergy activism, voluntary associations and ethnic revival, responses to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and controversies over women’s rights. Both chameleon-like leaders and the donors of Malawi’s foreign aid come under critical scrutiny for supporting superficial democratization. The book ends with a rare public statement on the New Malawi by Jack Mapanje, Malawi’s internationally acclaimed writer.

The contributors are Gerhard Anders, Department of International Law, University of Rotterdam; Blessing Chinsinga, Department of Political and Administrative Studies at Chancellor College, University of Malawi; Reuben Makayiko Chirambo, University of Minnesota; Harri Englund, Universities of Helsinki and Uppsala, Gregory H. Kamwendo, Deputy Director of the Centre for Language Studies at the University of Malawi; Edrinnie Kayambazinthu, Department of English at Chancellor College, University of Malawi; John Lwanda, Department of General Practice at the University of Glasgow and with the Centre of African Studies at the University of Edinburgh; Jack Mapanje, Hon. Professorial Research Fellow in the School of English at the University of Leeds; Fulata Moyo, Department of Theology and Religious Studies at Chancellor College, University of Malawi; Clement Ng’ong’ola, Department of Law at the University of Botswana; Ulrika Ribohn, who currently works for (Africa Groups of Sweden) in Northern Mozambique; and Peter VonDoepp, who teaches in the Department of Political Science at the University of North Texas.
Mai Palmberg and Annemette Kirkegaard (Eds)

Playing with Identities in Contemporary Music in Africa
ISBN 91-7106-497-4, 182 pp, 220 SEK, 16.95 GBP, 27.95 USD

The musics of Africa play a particularly important role in expressing and forming identities. This book brings together African and Nordic scholars from both musicology and other disciplines in an attempt to analyse various aspects of the complex playing with volatile identities in music in Africa today. Taken together the papers put new light on the assumed or real dichotomies between countryside and city, collective and individual, tradition and modernity, authentic and alien.

The book includes a keynote speech by Christopher Waterman (UCLA), and an introduction by Annemette Kirkegaard, Copenhagen University. Both Southern, West and East Africa are represented in the studies, which cover a great variety of musics. Contributors are: Simon Adetona Akindes, assistant professor of Instructional Technology in the Teacher Education Department at the University of Wisconsin-Parkside; Ndiouga Adrien Benga, Department of History at University Cheikh Anta Diop in Dakar, Senegal; Johannes Brusila, curator of the Sibelius Museum at the Department of Musicology at Åbo Academy University; John Collins, professor at the Music Department of the University of Ghana at Legon; David B. Coplan, professor and chair in social anthropology at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg; Annemette Kirkegaard, associate professor at the Department of Musicology at the University of Copenhagen; Siri Lange, social anthropologist affiliated with the Chr. Michelsen Institute in Bergen, Norway; Sylvia Nannyonga-Tamusuza, lecturer in music at Makerere University in Uganda; Jenkeri Zakari Okwori, senior lecturer with the Department of English and Drama, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria; Mai Palmberg, co-ordinator of the research project ‘Cultural Images in and of Africa’ at the Nordic Africa Institute; Christopher Waterman, professor and chair of the Department of World Arts and Cultures at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA).

Oliver Saasa with Jerker Carlsson

Aid and Poverty Reduction in Zambia
Mission Unaccomplished
ISBN 91-7106-498-3, 141 pp, 220 SEK, 16.95 GBP, 27.95 USD

Zambia, a once prosperous African country, now has 73 percent of its people below the poverty line and by the early 1990s, the country had reached a level where the UN General Assembly included it on the list of the least developed countries. With crippling indebtedness amidst poor economic performance, Zambia is at present one of the world’s most heavily indebted low-income countries. And poverty continues to take its toll with the province housing the capital city registering the highest increase in poverty over the 1996 to 1998 period. This means that, although rural areas have the highest poverty levels, Zambia’s urban centres are fast catching up. With help from donors, poverty reduction is at the centre stage on the Zambia development agenda after almost two decades of externally prescribed experiments with adjustment and stabilisation as a panacea for welfare improvement. But despite significant aid volumes and structural reforms, the country is getting deeper and deeper into poverty. What is the missing link between aid and positive change? Is the problem mainly that the volume of aid is not sufficient and, as is often heard, more of it would make a difference? Is the sluggish social and economic progress in Zambia appropriately diagnosed and correct remedies and strategies prescribed? This book attempts to address these and related questions.

Oliver Saasa is professor of International Economic Relations at the Institute of Economic and Social Research (University of Zambia). The book is dedicated to the memory of Jerker Carlsson, who started the research project on which the book is based and initiated the work on the book.
At the end of February 2002 the German Hanns Seidel Foundation held its annual consultative meeting with African counterparts from projects in nine different countries on the continent. The subject oriented workshop discussed “The New Partnership for African Development” (NEPAD) and its implications from the point of view of the participants. This Discussion Paper publishes some of the presentations to the workshop in an effort to document the current debate just initiated from different positions. It thereby aims to contribute to a process of taking the latest programmatic document from the African heads of state serious in its possible implications for the future development of the continent.

The contributors are Richard Cornwell, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, Rev. Jephthah Gathaka, Chief Executive of the Ecumenical Centre for Justice and Peace in Nairobi, Henning Melber, Research Director, the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala, and Smokin Wanjala, Lecturer for Human Rights at the University of Nairobi.
Yul Derek Davids, Christiaan Keulder, Guy Lamb, Joao Pereira and Dirk Spilker (Compiled by Henning Melber)

**Measuring Democracy and Human Rights in Southern Africa**

**Discussion Paper No. 18**, ISBN 91-7106-497-4, 49 pp, 100 SEK, 7.95 GBP, 12.95 USD

Are there ways and means of measuring democracy and “good governance”? The contributions to this Discussion Paper present attempts to do this by means of surveys on democratic attitudes in Mozambique and Namibia respectively, as well as by exploring the degree of commitment to and violation of human rights in a comparative perspective in Namibia and South Africa.

The contributors are Yul Derek Davids, Manager of the Public Opinion Service of the Institute for Democracy (idasa) in Cape Town, Christiaan Keulder, Director of the Institute for Public Policy Research in Windhoek, Guy Lamb, Co-ordinator for the Project on Peace and Security at the Centre for Conflict Resolution at the University of Cape Town, Joao C. G. Pereira, a Junior Lecturer at the Department of Political Studies of the Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo, and Dirk Spilker, at the Department of Journalism and Communication Studies/University of Music and Drama in Hanover.

Michael Neocosmos, Raymond Suttner and Ian Taylor (Compiled by Henning Melber)

**Political Cultures in Democratic South Africa**

**Discussion Paper No. 19**, ISBN 91-7106-498-2, 52 pp, 100 SEK, 7.95 GBP, 12.95 USD

The contributions to this Discussion Paper reflect upon different but related aspects of South African democracy after Apartheid as represented in a variety of social forces, institutions and individuals. They illustrate that societies in transition have to make sustained efforts to overcome the legacies of the past, and that the present reproduces some of the past structural constraints and patterns of power and control in the new framework. The contributions were originally presented to a workshop organised in Cape Town in December 2001.

The contributors are Michael Neocosmos, Professor in the Department of Sociology/University of Pretoria; Raymond Suttner, former South Africa’s Ambassador to Sweden until August 2001, now a Visiting Research Fellow at the Centre for Policy Studies in Johannesburg; and Ian Taylor, Lecturer in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies/University of Botswana and a Visiting Research Fellow in the Department of Political Science/University of Stellenbosch.

Ezra Chitando

**Singing Culture. A Study of Gospel Music in Zimbabwe**


This study examines the historical development and social, political and economic significance of gospel music in Zimbabwe. It approaches music with Christian theological ideas and popular appeal as a cultural phenomenon with manifold implications. Applying a history of religions approach to the study of a widespread religious phenomenon, the study seeks to link religious studies with popular culture. This study also seeks to bring to the fore the long-standing issue of the relationship between Christianity and African culture along with the neglected theme of music and the construction of religious and other identities.

Ezra Chitando is a senior lecturer in History and Phenomenology of Religion at the University of Zimbabwe.
Conferences and Meetings

Gender Symposium on African Gender Research in the New Millennium: Perspectives, Directions and Challenges
7–10 April 2002, Cairo, Egypt

The CODESRIA (Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa) Gender symposium in Cairo, April 2002, was a follow-up of the first CODESRIA Gender conference in 1991, the one that resulted in the important book: Engendering African Social Sciences, published in 1997. As pointed out by Adebayo Olukoshi, CODESRIA Executive Secretary, three generations of African gender scholars were assembled in Cairo.

Representatives of the first generation—such as the founders of AAWORD/AFARD in 1977 (AAWORD=Association of African Women for Research and Development)—were among others Zenebeworke Tadesse (Ethiopia), Fatou Sow (Senegal and Paris), Molara Ogundipe (Nigeria, now in the US) and Filomena Chioma Steady (also US based).

Representatives of the second generation were the participants in the First CODESRIA Gender Symposium in 1991, such as Charmaine Pereira (Nigeria). Penda Mbow (Senegal), Marema Touré (Senegal), Sylvia Tamale (Uganda) and several other participants also belong to this second generation.

Finally a third generation of young and promising gender scholars was also represented by among others Desiree Lewis (Cape Town) and Bibi Bakere-Yusuf (Nigeria and London).

Some conference participants did not really fit into this pattern of ‘generations’. This was the case of two very prominent feminist theoreticians from the African diaspora in the US: Oyeronke Oyewumi and Nkiru Nzegwu, and this was also the case of most of the male gender researchers participating in the conference. Of a total of 46 paper presenters, chairs and discussants, 30 were women and 16 men.

The papers given at the symposium covered a wide range of gender studies, starting with a session on ‘Concepts, Methodologies and Paradigms’, and ending with one on ‘Literature, Religion and Culture’, with ‘Globalization’, ‘Resources’, ‘Institutions’ and ‘Socio-Political Dynamics’ in between. The debate was keen and intense throughout the three days of the symposium. In spite of the wide range of papers, certain issues kept coming up in the discussions. Some of these recurrent issues were the following:

- critique of the public/private dichotomy
- reproduction: the invisible economy
- critique of NEPAD.

The public/private dichotomy is a construction, it was said, rooted in Western realities, and working to the detriment of women. By means of this dichotomy women are hidden away in the so-called private sphere, shrouded in the ideology of domesticity. Some called for a redefinition of domesticity, others argued that this whole line of thinking must be uprooted and undermined. Who defines ‘the political’ anyway, who says that ‘the political’ is only what happens in the so-called public domain? It was suggested that the notion of ‘citizenship’ should be transformed in such a way as to include the so-called ‘domestic’.

Commenting on the public/private dichotomy Zenebeworke Tadesse said: “We can no longer discuss the reproductive sector as something which is outside research. We have to see what kinds of processes are taking place in this domain. We’ll have to look at the care economy in a much more rigorous sense”.

Rabia Adelkrim-Chick (Algeria, based in Dakar) contributed to this line of thinking with a concept of ‘economy of solidarity’. “Masses of work and lots of production are taking place outside the official economy and outside market exchange,” she pointed out. This part of the economy is invisible from a market point of view, but nevertheless it is indispensable for the continuation of human life. The bulk of this invisible economy is run by women, but since it does not follow a market logic, the women in question are impoverished and marginalized. World Bank terminology makes us focus on the ‘fight against poverty’,
diverting our attention from the very structure of the dominant economy, which reproduces poverty, marginalization and exclusion. Other discussants pointed to the crucial role of production of knowledge: a major outcome of World Bank activities is production of concepts, which determine lines of thinking. Different concepts are needed for production of different knowledge.

The discussions on NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development) were along similar lines, the problem being seen not just in terms of ‘gender aspects missing’, but in terms of the entire way of thinking in the NEPAD document. NEPAD represents a mode of development based on profit and exclusion, discussants said. This ‘new partnership’ will enhance inequalities. Why do we talk of post-colonialism, why not neo-colonialism? Nkiru Nzegwu was particularly sharp in her criticism: “African ministers are nothing but custodians of colonies”, she said. “Decisions are taken in Washington. This is American imperialism; the old one was European. Globalization does have its weak points”, she pointed out, “but they cannot be discovered, if we follow the leads of the World Bank. This is why awareness of concepts becomes so very important.”

Signe Arnfred

The 2002 Annual Conference of the Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK and Commonwealth (ASA)  
8–12 April, 2002, Arusha, Tanzania  
The 2002 Annual Conference of the Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK and Commonwealth (ASA) was held at the training centre of a Danish NGO (MS-TCDC) outside Arusha Town, in Tanzania, 8–12 April.

The conference convenors, Professor Wendy James and Dr David Mills (ably assisted by a local panel), chose the conference theme ‘Perspectives on Time and Society: Experience, Memory, History’ as one that would signal the important convergence of anthropological and historical perspectives in thinking about the relationship of time to history.

Attracting 110 participants from almost twenty countries, the conference had a packed schedule, with two introductory presentations, four keynote speakers and 75 papers in 14 different themed panels. The conference brought together anthropologists, sociologists, archaeologists and historians, opening up a valuable and all-too-rare set of interdisciplinary conversations.

The 14 different panels tackled different aspects of the conference focus on social experiences and historical understanding of time. Whereas the panel on ‘Time and the ancestors: the material culture of memory’, explored the role of the past and the uses of history, material memorabilia and archaeological remains in African societies, the panel on ‘Heritage: imagining the social continuity of the nation’, brought together several papers reflecting on the relationship between material culture, memory and state nationalisms. The panel on ‘Grandparents and grandchildren in contemporary Africa’ explored the changing relationships between grandparents and grandchildren in contemporary African societies—including the increasing number of orphans who are left in the care of grandparents. Whereas the panel on ‘Biographies: connecting past and present’, addressed the role of individual and social biographies in the creation of political identity and agency, the panel on ‘Dance, trance and calendars: forms of time reckoning’, addressed the origins of culture in Africa. ‘Language, literature, philosophy and time’, brought together a number of illuminating linguistic and philosophical perspectives on time in East African societies and sought to address the implications of linguistic concepts of time for the way time is embodied and experienced. The panel on ‘Re-evaluating the legacies of colonialism’, investigated the ways in which memories of colonial rule and anti-colonial struggle are sustained or challenged, both in popular and academic accounts of the past. ‘African modernities’, explored the historical and political dimensions of ‘development’ and economic change in contemporary Africa.
‘Contesting national space: narratives of identity in process’, explored the relationship between spatial dynamics and the creation of national and regional identities. The panel on ‘Body images and practices over space and time’, addressed the role of representation in shaping social action. The contributions varied from an attention to popular representations of gender and sexuality in South Africa to a discussion of art and its relationship to traditional political systems. The panel on ‘Mediations of memory and prophecy’, explored how memory, history and bodily experience are mediated through objects. ‘Person, gender, and age in work and leisure’, addressed the experiential aspects of time—its rhythms and routines, its demands and its crises—across three continents. Several of the papers carefully attended to the gendering and embodiment of time, describing the phenomenological demands made by time on individuals and social groups.

The penultimate panel ‘Ritual trajectories: transformations in ceremonial practice’, addressed the key intellectual concerns of the conference, namely the role of ceremonies and rituals in the shaping of time—including the potential for violence and disorder within ritual events, and the implications of this ‘disruption’ of time.

In supporting social scientific research in Africa, one aim of the conference was to develop links between the ASA and sister anthropological organizations and thus ample time was given for the following associations to present themselves: the East-African Anthropological Association (EAAA), the Pan African Anthropological Association (PAAA), the British Institute in Eastern Africa (BIEA), and the Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA).

Besides visiting one of the many tourist parks in the Arusha Region, many of the participants also used the opportunity to visit the International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda, taking place in Arusha Town, including a visit to a trial in session.

Liv Haram

Africa 2002: People and Development Event
18–21 April 2002, Helsinki, Finland
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland organised an information campaign with the aim of offering fresh information on contemporary Africa. From January to May several organisations and institutions arranged a variety of events on African themes around Finland. The main event of the campaign was on People and Development. It took place in the Cable Factory in Helsinki from 18 to 21 April and was open from morning until evening and attracted over 24,000 visitors.

The People and Development Event offered a great variety of attractions. At the book market publishers, libraries and other organisations displayed and sold publications and the visitors had the opportunity to meet with African writers such as Ama Ata Aidoo, Yvonne Vera and Achmat Dangor. Music, dance and theatre were performed by both artists from Africa and by African artists living in Finland. Films from Africa were shown. Children’s Africa offered activities for the young ones. A great number of seminars, lectures and discussion forums were organised. The African Market presented development cooperation in Africa by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finnish NGOs, companies and international organisations. The themes included economy and trade, human rights and democracy, environment, culture and poverty.

The Nordic Africa Institute participated with a stand at the African Market and attracted a great number of visitors. Several lectures and mini-seminars were organised by the Institute ranging from NEPAD to the democratisation of the media in Africa. A conference on the theme ‘Africa: A Future beyond the Crises and Conflict’ was organised in Helsinki by the Institute coinciding with the People and Development Event. Some of the keynote speakers gave talks at the People and Development Event and several sessions were open to the public.

Susanne Linderos
Africa, A Future Beyond Crises and Conflict
19–20 April 2002, Helsinki, Finland

Many of the societies currently involved in processes of reconciliation and reconstruction after conflict are faced with the challenges of having to deal with issues of demobilisation of ex-combatants, resettling refugees, serious violations of human rights, etc., as well as those of democratisation and economic reform. And this often under pressure both from within, and from the international community. On 19 and 20 April 2002, the Nordic Africa Institute organised a conference under the broad theme ‘Africa, A Future Beyond Crises and Conflict’. It was held in Helsinki, at a time when this city was hosting a major ‘Africa 2002, People and Development’ event, organised by the Finnish government. The conference took place eleven months after a brainstorming workshop which was held in Uppsala to reflect on the research agenda and priorities for the Institute’s research programme on Post-Conflict Transition, the State and Civil Society in Africa. The challenges of building democratic governance systems after conflict constitute some of the priority research themes identified by participants in the brainstorming workshop.

Conflict is quite often the result of authoritarianism, inequalities of access to, or misappropriation and misuse of power and wealth, the total or partial disruption of regulatory mechanisms, and the weakening of other institutions of governance. Consequently, much of the effort that post-conflict transition entails is geared towards addressing such problems. The main aim of the conference was to examine the ways in which societies are trying to build more democratic and more just governance systems in the aftermath of deep crisis and conflict. Governance issues are at the heart of most of the civil wars that have been ravaging Sub-Saharan Africa since the late eighties. For the research programme on Post-Conflict Transition, the conference provided an opportunity to establish and bring together members of a network of scholars working on the challenges of building or consolidating democratic governance systems in post-crisis and post-war societies.

The conference brought together 34 scholars from African countries in a broad range of situations: Eritrea, Rwanda, South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, each of which has some kind of post-conflict or democratic transition going on, and from the Nordic countries. The conference was addressed by four keynote speakers. Professor Adebayo Olukoshi, the current Executive Secretary of CODESRIA and former researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute, delivered the opening address, which he devoted to the very issue of how Africa’s crises may be understood. Some strands of the literature on the African crises are problematic from a simple methodological point of view and, rather than historicizing the crises and conflicts in Africa, they tend to be either upbeat or downbeat about the continent and its future. Others tend to base their analysis on rational choice theories, which sometimes lead to rather cynical theses on how disorder and violence are instrumentalized. Following this presentation, other keynote speakers discussed issues such as the media in post-conflict transition, with particular reference to Sierra Leone (Professor Julius Spencer, former Minister of Information of Sierra Leone); human rights and constitutionalism in Nigeria (Prof. Jibrin Ibrahim, Country Director for Nigeria, of the International Human Rights Law Group); and on the Fault lines in post-apartheid South Africa’s democracy (Professor Fred Hendricks, head of the Sociology Department at Rhodes University in Grahamstown, South Africa, and editor of the *African Sociological Review*).

The other papers of the conference were presented in panel discussions, on themes such as:
1) war, conflict and violence;
2) alternative pathways to peace, truth, justice, reconciliation and democracy; truth commissions and the recourse to communal mechanisms of justice, such as the *gacaca* in Rwanda were among the cases examined;
3) the links between economic reform, poverty reduction, development and democracy;
4) civil society, political parties, the media and the universities in post-conflict transition;
5) the re-integration of ex-combatant youth;
6) the role of the universities, the African intelligentsia and the need to transform political cultures in the post-conflict transitions;
7) regional and international cooperation in post conflict reconstruction and democratization, with a specific focus on the policies of the EU, and the AU in the context of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiative.

The range of cases discussed in the papers were also very broad, and they included Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, South Africa, Rwanda, Liberia, Mozambique and Benin.

Perhaps the main point of consensus among the participants was that it is possible to imagine a democratic future beyond Africa’s current woes. This conference was precisely about the question of how different societies are trying to build such a future, and what the international community is doing or not doing to assist. A number of ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ (i.e. policy prescriptions) were therefore highlighted in the papers, which was an indication of a strong desire for both a better scientific understanding of the issues, and some kind of policy relevance among the participants.

Ebrima Sall

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**Collective Memory and Present Day Politics in South Africa and the Nordic Countries**

22–23 August 2002, Copenhagen, Denmark

The Nordic Africa Institute convened this extended research workshop at the Centre of African Studies, University of Copenhagen. This Danish institute, situated in the old inner city of Copenhagen, functioned as an efficient co-organizer. The workshop provided for an exchange of views between veterans from the international history debate and the anti-apartheid movement, historians from the new South Africa, and concerned Nordic researchers and research students, also involving aid personalities and NGO representatives.

More than fifty researchers and research students attended the workshop. Professor Holger Bernt Hansen, Head of the Centre of African Studies and Lennart Wohlgemuth, Director of the Nordic Africa Institute gave welcoming addresses. Among the keynote speakers were Professor Bernhard Makhosezwe Magubane, Director of the South African Democracy Education Trust, Professor Yonah Seleti, Director of the Killie Campbell Collections at the University of Natal and Chairman for the South African Ministerial History Committee, and Professor Colin Bundy, Director and Principal of the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London.

Other key speakers were Professor Christopher Saunders from the History Department at the University of Cape Town, Merle Lipton, Senior Research Fellow from the School of African and Asian Studies, Sussex University, Dr. Catherine Burns, Senior Lecturer at the Department of History, University of Natal, Professor Saul Dubow, Chair of History at the School of African and Asian Studies, Sussex University, Professor Albert Grundlingh, Head of the Department of History at the University of Stellenbosch and Professor Martin J. Murray from the Department of Sociology, State University of New York.

All in all, twenty substantial papers were presented and discussed. The semi-open arrangement, where researchers, students and South Africa enthusiasts from the Nordic countries were gathered as discussants around a core workshop of veterans from the South African history debate, functioned very smoothly.

The leading thought behind the workshop was to make a contribution to the renewal of the debate between the main concepts of history in the hope that this would help revitalise the once lively exchange of ideas between progressive academics and the surrounding society in South Africa.

The question was brought up, whether the time has come to produce an account of the present state of historical research in South Africa and of the possibilities for a renaissance of the once lively debate between different notions of history.
The topics of the workshop were perhaps a little more widespread than intended, but all the selected papers were relevant in relation to the debate over South African historiography.

Areas under discussion were among others:

- New Nation, New History? Constructing the past in post-apartheid South Africa.
- Revisiting the debate about the role of business under apartheid.
- South Africa and South Africans. Ideas about South Africans and South African societies.
- Healing History. The place of history in the TRC.
- Reframing Remembrance: Politics of Commemoration.
- The use of history education in nationbuilding in post-apartheid South Africa.
- Land restitution and local citizenship: Place, memory and democratisation.
- From apartheid to democracy in South Africa: A reading of dominant discourses of democratic transition.

In addition topics enlightening the history of solidarity of the Nordic countries with Southern Africa were brought up:

- The Danish debate on support to the African liberation movements and the general Danish political debate in this respect.

Abstracts and the full conference programme can be viewed at the website: www.nai.uu.se/sem/conf/south_africa/invitationsve.html. Selected papers will be published in an edited publication from the Nordic Africa Institute.

The conference could also be considered as the conclusion of one of the Institute’s Nordic research projects. The Danish research fellow at the Institute, Hans Erik Stolten, has been working for the last three years with the project: Historical Research and Higher Education in Southern Africa, from which a book can be expected in near future.

Hans Erik Stolten

(Re-)Conceptualising Democracy and Liberation in Southern Africa
11–13 July 2002, Windhoek, Namibia

Following the Consultative Workshop during December 2001 in Cape Town (see report in News no. 2/2002), this Conference was organised by the Nordic Africa Institute’s research project on “Liberation and Democracy in Southern Africa”. The local collaboration with the Legal Assistance Centre and the Namibia Institute for Democracy as civil society agencies from the NGO sector underlined the approach of combining rigorous academic debate by committed scholars with a wider dissemination having an impact on public discourse.

This understanding was also reflected by a diverse by-programme to the Conference. It included two press briefings, which were attended by most of the local media. Conference themes were widely acknowledged in the radio programmes of the Namibia Broadcasting Corporation and all eight local newspapers reported on some of the events. Three public lectures by the Institute’s Research Director (organised jointly with the Namibia Scientific Society on the impact of September 11, 2001, with the local office of the Hanns Seidel Foundation on NEPAD and with the Namibia German Foundation for Cultural Cooperation on socio-economic aspects of reconciliation at their respective venues in town) attracted up to 100 participants. Among the audience were members of the diplomatic corps, high ranking political office bearers and senior officials from various ministries. Two public panel debates during the evenings of the Conference on “Decolonisation, Violence, Memories and Reconciliation” and “Political Perspectives in Southern Africa” received similar attention.

Three book launches presented recent publications of the Nordic Africa Institute (Tor Sellström’s second volume on “Sweden and...
National Liberation in Southern Africa", organised jointly with the Embassy of Sweden, as well as Discussion Papers produced by the research project during the first half of 2002 on "Zimbabwe’s Presidential Elections 2002", "Political Cultures in Democratic South Africa" and "Measuring Democracy and Human Rights in Southern Africa"), a monograph from one of the participants published by the Legal Assistance Centre (Sufian Bukurura, "Essays on Constitutionalism and the Administration of Justice in Namibia 1990–2002") and a monograph published by the Namibia Scientific Society (Henning Melber, "Namibia 1990–2000. Eine analytische Chronologie"). Furthermore, a former SWAPO activist now living in Sweden presented his recently published account (Keshii Nathanael, "A Journey to Exile") during one of the panel debates.

The Conference was attended by 61 registered participants from 13 countries: Angola (1), Botswana (4), Canada (1), Finland (1), Germany (1), Italy (1), Mozambique (1), Namibia (27), South Africa (11), Sweden (3), United Kingdom (1), United States (7) and Zimbabwe (2). Twenty papers by scholars mainly from the Southern African region were presented in five different sessions. They dealt with regional comparative perspectives, gender aspects as well as a variety of case studies focussing on Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Most of the papers will be published in a separate volume on Namibia, a special issue of the Journal of Contemporary African Studies or as topical Nordic Africa Institute Discussion Papers or Research Reports.

With an average conference attendance of 30 participants, the audience peaked to a maximum of over 50 during the Namibia session—a clear indication that the deliberate effort to make the proceedings accessible to interested members of the public (in some cases themselves visitors to Namibia, such as a group of US-American Fulbright-Hays delegates) achieved the intended response. Local participants included students and academic staff from the arts, history, political science and sociology departments of the University of Namibia as well as members from a wide range of civil society agencies. Temporarily present were also the chief whip of SWAPO’s parliamentary faction (the party holds three quarters of the elected seats in the National Assembly) and the Secretary General of the SWAPO Women’s Council. The Conference closed with a sightseeing tour for the more than twenty external participants brought to Windhoek by the Nordic Africa Institute and a social get-together at a grass root self-help project operated by women in the vicinity of the former township of Katutura.

Henning Melber

Presenting their papers (from the left): Lovemore Chipungu from the University of Zimbabwe; Francis Nyamnjoh from the University of Botswana; Eduardo Sitoe from the Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo.
Panel on Rwanda

Mr. Lennart Wohlgemuth, Director of the Nordic Africa Institute, acted as moderator at the panel on Rwanda. The panel was divided into two sessions, the first dealing mainly with the *gacaca* process drawing upon different experiences and reflections, and the second part discussing healing and reconciliation in general.

Lennart Wohlgemuth emphasised in his welcoming remarks the importance of understanding the background of Rwanda and the history that led to the genocide. Gerald Caplan, author of the report from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) ‘Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide’, agreed with this point and started his contribution by critically highlighting the internal processes and national society that resulted in the murder of over 800,000 persons. He also, in short but crystal clear sentences, outlined the neglect of the international community and the direct impact the actions of the UN, US, France and Belgium had on the genocide.

Jean de Dieu, Minister of Justice in Rwanda, outlined the internal history that laid the foundation for the 1994 genocide. After decades of a policy of exclusion, ignorance and intolerance, the persecution culminated in the massacre of the Rwandan people. He expressed his sincere hopes that no one will ever again have to experience what Rwanda did.

Lennart Aspegren, former Judge of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, pointed out that these killings had been meticulously planned. He also gave an informative picture of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the challenges to it, which show the need for an alternative, *gacaca*.

*Gacaca* is a traditional ‘grassroot’ justice system used earlier in the villages of Rwanda that has been modernised in order to meet the new challenges and speed up the trials, an intermediary between classic and traditional justice. It will judge people other than the organisers, planners, authors and authorities of the genocide. The Minister of Justice and Fergus Kerrigan, Danish Centre for Human Rights, gave a very detailed picture of how the *gacaca* is structured and will function. When sentencing, confession will be taken into account which will generously reduce the sentence. Part of the sentence will consist of community service. There is a lack of legal
representation however, which constitutes one
of the problems with gacaca and has been
criticised by the international community.
Kerrigan emphasised this problem but also
pointed at ways to solve it. Another problem
factor discussed is time, something that peo-
ple tend to forget.

Lasse Berg, a journalist and author on
African affairs currently living in Rwanda,
gave us his own personal experience of a gacaca
trial (he had participated in a pilot gacaca
trial). He could feel the presence of the geno-
cide every day as Rwanda’s experience differs
from other similar crises in that it was carried
out by the people, among the people.

Alloise Inyumba, National Commission
on Unity and Reconciliation, proceeded to
present the practical problems and solutions
Rwandans face today in reconciling. She
emphasised the importance of working with the
Rwandans in a participatory way in order for
reconciliation to be achieved. The Commis-
sion was established in 1998 and it started by
undertaking various national exercises of con-
sulting Rwandans by engaging them in
grassroot participatory discussions. Civic edu-
cation, monitoring programmes and commu-
nity reconciliation initiatives are the three
programmes under which they operate. An
enormous undertaking was the repatriation to
Rwanda of all the refugees from 1994 in DRC
and she claimed they have been successfully
integrated.

Psychologist Ervin Staub, University of
Massachusetts at Amherst, drew parallels to
the traumatising of the Jews after the Second
World War. People’s trust has vanished, a
whole country is traumatised, and they need
help to heal and go on with their lives and
rebuild their country. As the Nuremberg trials
after the Second World War helped to give a
sense of justice, so he hopes, will ICTR, and
more importantly for the everyday man, so
will gacaca. He emphasised that reconciliation
is two sided and that the perpetrators need to
be included in the process, and this makes
gacaca vulnerable as it is crucial that it does not
become a tool for vengeance.

The most affected group is children. Over
300,000 children have lost their parents, and
many young girls were severely raped and
injured. Rwanda has a generation of trauma-
tised children that will eventually grow up and
become the builders of the future of Rwanda.

Lisbeth Palme, member of the Rwanda Panel
of OAU, brought to light how approximately 79
percent of the children experienced and wit-
nessed death in their immediate families, how
many of them were forced to take an active
part in the killings. She drew parallels to the
Palestinian situation today, where trauma-
tised children in neglected refugee camps
grow up to become traumatised adults, lead-
ing up to a whole society marked by violence.
Time is needed to heal.

The most powerful testimony of this con-
ference was without doubt that of
Esther Muyawayo-Keiner, a survivor. She
brought the true problem and depth of the
meaning of reconciliation to a head, by asking
us all “With whom do you want me to recon-
cile?”. With the international community who
turned a blind eye? With the church who
betrayed the faith and actively participated in
the massacres? With the operational govern-
ment? With her neighbour who murdered her
whole family? With herself, for being the only
one to survive? She believes earlier wrongdo-
ings led up to 1994 due to the silence in the
society, she emphasised the need to break this.

The ensuing discussion brought up ques-
tions related to the role of women, the democ-
ratisation process and the regional situation.
Here, de Dieu, just like Muyawayo-Keiner,
pointed out that silence needs to be broken.
He also stated that Rwanda is part of a region,
and as such a member of the regional peace-
building efforts.

The conference dealt with many aspects
of genocide and what comes after, in general,
and, for Rwanda, in particular. However it
did little to address another of the more
important issues, that of money, an issue
touched upon by both Caplan and
Muyawayo-Keiner. This year’s conference
wanted to address practical methods, and
while some of the comments were purely
theoretical others provided good examples of
what is being done for the reconciliation
process and what can be done in the future.

Nina Frödin
Panel on South Africa

South Africa confronts its people with the enormous task and challenge of coping with a situation, in which "the past isn't even the past", as one of the presenters reminded the audience with this quote from the 1950 Nobel laureate William Faulkner. The degree of emotional intensity during the session reflected the commitment and empathy of all the presenters in the current efforts to come to terms with this past, which is still so much alive in the present.

Alexander Boraine, previously chairperson of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa and President of the International Centre for Transitional Justice, emphasised the need to be aware of the context of the current South Africa. The negotiated settlement towards a democratic society paved the way and served as a basis for the TRC. It also demarcated the limitations in taking the previous perpetrators to task under the new political system. Both repression and resistance had resulted in a stalemate in the late 1980s: those still in power could not eliminate opposition, those in resistance could not defeat the system. Hence the only viable option out of this dilemma was to achieve a win-win situation through a negotiated compromise. The required give and take had also far reaching implications for the TRC. The final clause adopted at the last moment to pave a way for the transitional constitution as adopted by all parties eight years ago allowed for amnesty in politically motivated cases. This was difficult to accept for the liberation movement. The problem how to justify impunity in certain cases became a burning issue.

Rev. Frank Chikane, Director General in the Office of the President, is a case in point. The target of an assassination attempt in 1989, he knows those who remain unpunished for the deed. As his case has been publicly known, he refused to testify at the TRC. His personal statement summarised "the story behind the story of the TRC". He emphasised that the TRC did not stand for a theoretical concept but emerged as a product out of the struggle. It had a high moral content, to build new bridges in a situation where old ones were burnt. This was an essential aspect given the particular situation of the white South Africans: having no other place to run to, they had to stay and deal with the issues. Interaction under the new system was required as a condition to save their future—even if this interaction did not imply a change of hearts and minds but reflected more the need for adaptation to changing circumstances to survive. The TRC had as its main intention rather to find the truth than to prosecute the perpetrators, to find out about the story to prevent it happening again. Amnesty also served the purpose of encouraging testimony with the aim of establishing the truth. At the same time, such testimony could restore the humanity of the oppressors too. The struggle was not about revenge but about justice.

Charles Villa-Vicencio, Director of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, confirmed that in his view there were no other alternatives in South Africa than learning to live together. He considered the TRC as a good start in seeking to address the past and to evolve a new self-understanding based on compromise to secure a common future. The social contract must enable South Africans to reach the defined goals: reconciliation is about the courage to continue a journey started. In contrast to the pragmatic solution emphasised by the majority of speakers, Andrew Ribeiro gave a moving testimonial as a victim of oppression under Apartheid. As a son of assassinated parents he refused to accept the relevance of the TRC for healing the wounds. Unable to cope ever since the killing of his parents in late 1986 with the traumata inflicted upon them, the four children of the Ribeiro family all showed in different ways an inability to reconcile with the perpetrators, but also with the way the new government addressed the grievances of the victims. The murderers of his parents 'confessed' during the TRC hearings not out of remorse but to obtain amnesty. Since those victims not participating in the TRC hearings were disqualified from government assistance (both in terms of financial compensation as well as counselling and other support services), the four children were ultimately divided over the issue of (non-)compliance with the TRC procedures. The conflict among them added to their grievances. For Ribeiro as a victim,
who is unable to reconcile within the offered framework, the TRC created more pain and an academic discussion, while he and others still cry for justice. It supported through amnesty the collective amnesia among the perpetrators, while it left victims like him with a deep sense of loss and despair.

Hlengiwe Buhle Mkhize, who was herself a member of the TRC, reminded the audience that she like many others is part of a “lost generation” in the sense that they were growing up without the privileges of a protected childhood. Their youth was sacrificed to the needs of the struggle. They were living in constant rebellion and dealing with questions around resistance and liberation, while the privileges of exploring life during childhood were denied to them. Such losses, resulting in irreversible deficits, are difficult to measure and impossible to compensate for. The truth seeking process, as she stated further, was characterised by biases, silence, lies and the psychodynamic factors of distorted personalities with a selective perception. Most of the beneficiaries of the unjust system of the past were in fact not taken to task by the TRC, which displayed a lack of a coherent strategy for restoring the dignity of the survivors. In this sense it had been a missed opportunity. Notwithstanding such limitations, it also served as a beacon of hope, captured public interest and had a calming effect on the people’s minds. The stories told and popularised by media coverage helped to understand the suffering of the people under Apartheid. In that sense the TRC was a democratic example of accountability.

Graeme Simpson, Director of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, warned that one should amidst all change not lose sight of the need to understand how much at the same time has still stayed the same. Features of oppression, as reflected foremost in the banality of everyday violence, have remained. The new political system runs the danger of masking the social and structural conflict and violence, which remains unsolved under the new constitution too. Institutional transformation requires more than formal changes. It poses the real challenge to transition in South Africa, as the social fabric of society ought to change. This requires a debate over the depth of transformation and the TRC is one element only, far from being a decisive instrument. The TRC walked a tightrope, concerning the notion of truth as a contested area. If truth is complicated, so is justice. Both truth and justice have to be subjects of scrutiny. If reconciliation is party bound, issues of race, class and gender are covered and the danger of a “rainbow nationalism” producing new exclusivist tendencies and xenophobic attitudes remains unchallenged. Unless the socio-economic injustice is addressed, the political struggle will be replaced by gang violence instead of offering lasting peace.

Minister of Justice Penuell Maduna took the floor in an impromptu intervention and stressed that as combatants of the armed liberation struggle they were executing aimed and targeted violence, which was never directed against civilian victims. Under the given circumstances in the early 1990s the organised forces of anti-colonial resistance made deliberate choices to reconcile. They knew enough to say “never again”. In the same spirit of reconciliation, reconstruction and nation building the majority of South Africans would agree in their message to the new government: “Don’t rock the boat, steer it in the right direction”.

A lively debate produced differing views especially on how to address issues of reconciliation and redistribution of wealth accumulated by those who were privileged in the past, who display little collective responsibility to actively contribute towards a common future. There was a broad consensus on the achievements under the democratic system in South Africa. These were also reflected in the TRC, which created despite all its shortcomings and limitations a piece of national, public knowledge. The TRC failed, however, to establish sustainable and lasting links to wider civil society. Basic contradictions in the South African society remain unsolved and pose a threat to lasting solutions. Notwithstanding this reservation and concern, the participants agreed that the South Africa of today is far better than the South Africa of earlier times.
Research on Higher Education in Africa

By: Per O. Aamodt
the Norwegian Institute for Studies in Research and Higher Education, Oslo, Norway

Over the last decade there has been a growing understanding of the important and unique role of higher education in modern societies, and therefore also of the important role that higher education could play in the development of African societies. The economic crisis in Africa since the 1980s has seriously affected the universities’ ability to play this role. Therefore there is also a need for better knowledge about the functioning of and identifying the ways out of the crisis for African universities.

This is in brief some of the rationale behind the Study Programme on Higher Education Management in Africa that the Association of African Universities (AAU) started in 1993. The prime objective of the programme has been to help build up a cadre of African researchers capable of generating the knowledge and policy prescriptions necessary to guide the functioning and development of African universities. The programme has been supported by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Agency for Research Co-operation with Developing countries (Sida/SAREC).

During the first two phases of the Study Programme, awards were made under a research grants scheme to selected individuals and teams of researchers to undertake research on a variety of themes: costs and financing, decision-making, equitable access, gender and institutional culture, government–university relations, higher education and work, privatisation, student living and learning conditions and quality. The studies were conducted under the close supervision of African and international higher education specialists who served as members of the scientific committee and as resource persons. Altogether, 93 researchers have been involved in over 60 projects. Supervision and scientific support to the researchers has been carried out through frequent workshops and individual guidance. Up to now, 37 research reports have been completed. Of the 35 essays based on the reports, almost all have been published, or are expected to be published, in the AAU Research Paper Series. Several papers have been published in the journal Higher Education Policy (vol. 8, no. 1, 1995) and four in Higher Education (vol. 36, nos. 1 and 2, 1998), and also in other journals. All in all the output of the study programme has been quite impressive. A database of the researchers and their projects can be found on the AAU website (www.aau.org). A seminar was arranged in Dakar in February 2002 to disseminate the findings so far to African policymakers.

Besides the published output, an important result is the capacity building. Almost all researchers who have been involved in the programme are engaged in higher education work in their countries doing research or policy oriented work. The importance of bringing together researchers from a broad range of African countries to exchange experiences and to form networks should also be mentioned.

The continuation of the programme is not finally decided. Even if it has been successful, certain changes seem necessary. The previous individual and rather fragmented organisation should be changed towards a stronger institutionalisation to secure sustainability. Further competence building and establishment of more permanent research units are among the elements in the future development of the programme.

Aamodt participated as a resource person in the above mentioned Dakar seminar, together with among others the Director of the Institute, Lennart Wohlgemuth.
Nobody will doubt that books play a pivotal role in the development of African societies, which is why a speech made by a leading politician went down well at the time: Books were necessary for the survival of a country, he said, and taxes on books achieved only non-development and stupidity. Strong words, and both true and truly remarkable. They were spoken by Robert Mugabe, the president of Zimbabwe, at the opening of Africa’s major book event, the Zimbabwe International Book Fair, in 1991.

Today, eleven years later, the erstwhile liberation hero Mugabe has transformed himself into one of the most ruthless despots on the African continent and Zimbabwe has become a pariah state. And books are hardly published at all. No prizes for guessing that both the taxes on books and the repression of writers and artists are thriving in today’s Zimbabwe.

This year’s Zimbabwe International Book Fair, which took place in the first week of August, bore all the hallmarks of a doomed event. Where up to 1998 some 400 exhibitors congregated for this most important of book industry events in sub-Saharan Africa under the blue skies of the Sculpture Garden of Harare’s National Gallery, this year’s fair saw grey clouds and only an official number of 140 exhibitors—and even this alarmingly low turnout figure was questioned by most visitors to the event.

Given the weak state of economic affairs in Southern Africa as a whole, the future looks bleak. To put it bluntly: This year’s event may have been the last Zimbabwe International Book Fair of its kind. And most visitors agreed that the mere fact of pulling the event off under the current extreme circumstances borders on the miraculous and demands great respect for the organisers. How did this come about? All the answers to this question tend to point to the political turmoil that has gripped Zimbabwe. The policies adopted by the government are blasted by every impartial commentator as a complete and utter disaster, a recipe for the destruction of a once proud and prosperous nation. Economically, politically and culturally, Mugabe’s politics are creating a wasteland, with despicable poverty in the cities and famine in the rural areas.

With a famine disaster looming, who cares about new books? Who is interested to know that Chenjerai Hove, Zimbabwe’s most respected and important writer, had to flee the country for fear of his life? He is now exiled in France. Who cares that Thomas Mapfumo, the musician who created the sound of the chimurenga, the war against the Rhodesian white racist oppressors, has not returned from a concert tour—preferring exile to harassment and prison? Of course, both the political climate and the economic downturn have affected the book industry in a dramatic way.

The breathtaking slump of the Zimbabwe Dollar has turned books into true luxury items. A paperback novel is sold at some 1,000 Zimbabwe Dollars on average, which equals 20 USD at the official exchange rate and less than 1.50 USD at the parallel rate. With unemployment officially standing at 60 percent of the population, anybody who still holds a job will count himself lucky to earn around 10,000 Zimbabwe Dollars per month—who would be able, who would be willing to spend money on books?
News from the Nordic Africa Institute 3/2002

The juxtaposition of two events in honour of outstanding books which took place under the auspices of the Zimbabwe International Book Fair highlights the precariousness of the situation. For three long years, the organisers of the book fair, along with an international panel of judges, had worked to produce a list of the best 100 African books of the 20th century. But when it came to the finale of the process, with the list drawn up and a big gala event to celebrate the work about to start, these celebrations could not be held in Harare. The organisers had to relocate the event to Cape Town—possibly at the behest of some of the sponsors, but more likely out of fear that Zimbabwe would not be able to play host to such a major event. Which African writer of any moral stature would allow himself to be presented with an award tainted by the presence of either Mr. Mugabe or his ministers?

So, once again, Nelson Mandela, whose autobiography 'Long Walk to Freedom' was named among the 100 Best African Books, became the celebrated star turn of the event—the very embodiment of the Utopia of Africa that most writers strive to achieve.

Putting his book into perspective, Mr. Mandela did not mince words when it came to describing the role of the writer and the politician in African society. He said “If there is any value in that piece of history the message for the future is even louder and more insistent, now that we as the people of the continent look forward to that better future which all of great literature all over the world always speaks about. We can only achieve that better life for ordinary people and citizens of our continent if we take seriously and give priority to simple principles of humanity which literature, good literature, always deals with. We can achieve that as we ensure that literature and the passion of the human spirit are taken seriously and accorded value in our society and our societal pursuits.”

Five days later, the annual ‘Zimbabwe Book Awards’ event took place in Harare—the most important event in the calendar for the small Zimbabwean publishers association, which lists 18 companies. Not a single one of these publishers had offered a literary publication for one of the awards—no novel, no poetry, no short stories. Only one literary publication received an award—a collection of Czech short stories which had been translated into Ndebele on the instigation of the Czech ambassador. This meant that only textbooks were awarded prizes—and 90 percent of these went to either one of the two multinational publishers active in Zimbabwe: College Press, a subsidiary of UK publisher Macmillan, which itself is part of the German Holtzbrinck group, and Longman, which is part of the UK media giant Pearson.

But even these publishers, which can rely on the deep pockets of their international parent companies, are suffering from the current slump in the Zimbabwean economy. Along with their peers, which have to rely on textbook sales as the economic backbone to their operations, they feel the brunt of the country’s government’s scandalous policy of underfunding school libraries.

But where does all this leave the book fair? With its function for the book market, a trade event like this is urgently needed in Southern Africa. If the political situation in Zimbabwe does not change, a rotating book fair including various SADC countries might be a way out. Why not adopt the model pioneered by book fairs in Latin America, which hold their annual Salón Internacional del Libro Latinoamericano Rotativo (SILAR) in conjunction with book fairs in various countries—from Mexico to Chile, from Brazil to Spain, thus strengthening national book fairs with a strong international impact? The successful INDABA conference series, which has been organised by the Zimbabwe International Book Fair for many years, might provide just this international impact, and a basis for such a ‘Southern African Rotating Book Fair’ (SARBF).

Be this as it may—the only ray of hope for the Zimbabwe International Book Fair seems to be the end of Mr. Mugabe’s violent, corrupt and criminal presidency. Nothing more, nothing less.
Book Exhibition in Cape Town

The Nordic Africa Institute was represented at the book exhibition in Cape Town on July 27 and 28. It was organised for the first time as the initial part of this year’s Zimbabwe International Book Fair in connection with the award-giving ceremony for the ZIBF initiated ‘Africa’s 100 Best Books of the 20th Century’ and an Indaba on ‘The Impact of African Writing on World Literature’. The event was poorly managed, hardly announced publicly and left the exhibitors from near and far mainly to themselves. Publishers present were complaining about the lack of publicity, resulting in an appallingly low number of visitors. Pictured is the Institute’s Research Director at the NAI book-stand.

Publications Received

The following publications have been submitted to the Institute for possible review:


There Walks a Woman

There walks a woman,  
an ancient plank of beehive  
above a twisted neck,  
she carries neatly  
rowed bananas  
in collected strength  
to win a shilling  
for a gourd of milk

Though feeble,  
she cocks herself  
in hard determination,  
the message floating  
on her head clearly:  
“Banana! Banana ripe!  
Stranger, see! Cheap!  
Banana buy!”

The sky opens up  
pouring down severe heat  
into the passive earth;  
she spends the whole day  
at one side  
of a main road:  
“Banana! Banana, ripe!  
Stranger, see!  
Banana, buy, cheap!”

Like a valiant fighter  
on a special mission,  
she defends loose bowels  
of her only son  
whose health is dwindling.

From “Echoes of a past world”  
by Noah K. Ndosi

Professor Noah K. Ndosi (born 1945) is a psychiatrist by profession and is working at the Psychiatry Department at Muhimbili University College of Health Sciences, in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.