Jatropha harvest. The Jatropha produces a seed oil which can be used as diesel oil substitution for power plants or diesel engines.

Photo: Kambou Sia/aFP/ScanPix
Our Vision:
African People
Shaping Their Own Future

Our Goals:
Research of High Quality
Equality in Determining the Research Agenda
An Impact on Policy

The Nordic Africa Institute (Nordiska Afrikainstitutet) is a center for research, documentation and information on modern Africa in the Nordic region. Based in Uppsala, Sweden, the Institute is dedicated to providing timely, critical and alternative research and analysis of Africa in the Nordic countries and to cooperation between African and Nordic researchers. As a hub and a meeting place in the Nordic region for a growing field of research and analysis the Institute strives to put knowledge of African issues within reach for scholars, policy makers, politicians, media, students and the general public. The Institute is financed jointly by the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden).
Africa in Uncertain Times

In November 2009 I had lunch with a friend in Pretoria. I was there for the concluding workshop on the Nordic Documentation Project on the Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa. We had not met for some time, so we had a lot of things to catch up on. We discussed how things had developed in South Africa after the recent election. We discussed the importance of history. We discussed a biography my friend is about to get involved in and the art of fundraising.

* Our meeting continued to resonate in my head as we said goodbye. The Nordic Documentation Project has come to an end but it was evident from the “think pieces” presented at the workshop – and the conversation with my friend – that we need history to understand our present. Several interesting suggestions were made during the workshop both regarding archives and the actual documentation of data, and regarding how data can be used. Why, I asked myself, does it seem to be so difficult to obtain resources for research on contemporary history, research that can provide new knowledge to inform us on our present political development.

This may be particularly true in the present time of uncertainty. One year after the outbreak of the financial crisis and the dramatic collapse of the banking system hitherto undisputed economic theories are being reassessed. Old knowledge which informed us in similar historical situations has been resurfac ing and comparisons have been made.

* GDP growth on the African continent is expected to be around 2.8 percent in 2009. This is significantly lower than the in the last five years, when economic growth stayed above 5.5 percent each year. When African political and economic leaders gathered in Cape Town for the World Economic Forum on Africa key leaders however took a relatively positive view. They said the continent’s resources – both human and physical – leave it well positioned to return to a rapid path of growth, as long as governments move aggressively to deliver on their commitments to market reforms, political accountability and investment in infrastructure and education.

A worrying factor is that many countries, not least in Africa, are also under countervailing threats of climate change, rapid urbanization and increasing inequality within and between countries. This can increase the risk of conflicts, forced migration and raise instability generally in the region.

Again, on the positive side, there is an increased awareness among African governments and in the African Union of the necessity to address these challenges. The Copenhagen climate change conference in December was portrayed as a failure, but from an African perspective it is promising to observe the foundation of a new broadbased group including Brazil, China, India and South Africa. This so called Basic group held its first meeting in New Delhi at the end of January 2010. The question is if this new group will be able to find common ground on the vital issue of climate change. Since the first UN environment conference in Stockholm in 1972 there have been two important parallel tracks in international negotiations on the environment; environment and development. In Rio in 1992 those tracks were brought together in one word: sustainable development. Africa needs both.

Carin Norberg
Director of the Nordic Africa Institute
Africa in Uncertain Times / Carin Norberg
Africa is well positioned to return to a rapid path of growth, but a worrying factor is that many African countries are also under countervailing threats of climate change, rapid urbanization and increasing inequality within and between countries.

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PHOTO: JON HICKS/FORBES
InDeeD, over the past few years, Africa’s relationship with the emerging powers of Asia has expanded as evident from the frequent summits, beginning with the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (November 2006), the India-Africa Summit (April 2008), the 4th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (June 2008) and the first Korea-Africa Summit (November 2009). The increasing attention that the African continent has received from the emerging powers has not gone unnoticed by its traditional Western trading partners as they attempt to reengage a skeptical Africa with promises of aid and preferential trade agreements.

The BRICs have attracted increased attention due to the rapid economic growth they have registered in recent years. It is projected that the combined economies of the BRICs could eclipse the combined economies of the current richest countries in the world by 2050. Based on current projections, China will overtake the US as the largest economy in the world by 2040, with India in third position and Brazil and Russia at 5th and 6th respectively. The BRICs also now dominate in the growth of sovereign investment funds as well as in the value of foreign exchange reserves.

In this short article, I will make a brief overview of the scope and nature of BRIC-Africa engagement, and assess Africa’s preparedness to engage these new powerful actors.

**Russia**

While much attention has been given in recent years to resurgent China and India in Africa, Russia is also actively courting energy producing African countries, such as Nigeria and Angola after decades of turning its back on the continent. While the majority of Russian investment in Africa has been in the resources sector, Russian state and private sector firms are investing in Africa’s financial services and telecommunications sectors.

Although Russia’ trade with Africa is still relatively small in comparison to China and India (about USD 3 billion in 2006), Moscow intends to increase this amount as it scrambles to catch up to its competitors in securing lucrative deals in the energy and other sectors.

**India**

There has been a perceptible rise in the importance of Africa for New Delhi due to India’s growing energy needs and the decision to diversify such access away from the volatile Middle East. The April 2008 India-Africa Forum Summit is an indication of the coming of age of India’s relations with African countries. India is strengthening its ties with Africa through lines of credit, foreign direct investment, and technical assistance. Currently, around 24 percent of India’s crude oil imports are sourced from Africa. Indian national oil companies like the Oil and Natural Gas Corpora-
China’s president Hu Jintao and Mali’s president Amadou Toumani posing with Chinese doctors working in Mali during the inauguration of a hospital in the capital Bamako. PHOTO: AFP/SCANPIX
rational Videsh Limited (OVL) have invested equity assets in Sudan, Ivory Coast, Libya, Egypt, Nigeria, Angola and Gabon. Unlike China, India’s entry into Africa is spearheaded by private companies, covering such sectors as telecommunications, hotels, mining, and pharmaceuticals. State owned enterprises are also very active in many sectors.

**Brazil**

Under the presidency Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Brazil’s economic and political relationship with the African continent has undergone dramatic transformations. Though Brasilia is far less active than Beijing and New Delhi, the Lula administration has openly courted African countries in order to access Africa’s large market and secure energy and other crucial resources vital for Brazil’s fast growing economy. President Lula has visited Africa seven times, visiting 19 countries and opening 12 new Brazilian embassies on the continent, bringing the total to 25. Led predominantly by state-owned corporations, Brazil’s push into Africa is largely strategic, indicating its awareness of Africa’s massive potential. Brazil has in particular been promoting the ‘Biofuels Revolution’ in Africa and Brazilian biofuel companies have been leading the initiative.

**China**

China’s expansive engagement in Africa is probably one of the most important political developments in the continent since the end of colonialism, transforming African economies in a significant way. China’s voracious appetite for African resources has led to a commodity boom, which in turn has improved the fiscal position of many African countries. At present, there are more than 800 Chinese corporations, mostly state-owned enterprises, operating throughout Africa. The significance that China attaches to Africa can be seen in the frequency of Chinese diplomatic and trade missions to the continent. President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao have each visited no less than 17 African countries in 2006 and 2007, and the 4th China-Africa Forum was held in Sharm-el-Sheik, Egypt in November 2009.

China has pursued ‘resource for infrastructure’ deals with many African countries, and as a result, the massive investments in roads, hydropower and other essential infrastructure has led to productivity improvement in many sectors of African economies. China now lends more to Africa than the World Bank does. For example, China lent USD 8 billion to Angola, Nigeria and Mozambique in 2005 compared to the USD 2.3 billion lent by the World Bank to the whole continent.

given these dramatic changes in Africa’s international relations, the Nordic Africa Institute has initiated a research project on ‘BRIC-Africa Dialogue’, building on the institute’s current research on China’s and India’s role in Africa. The central focus of the research project are the following:

(a) how can African countries, individually or collectively go about harnessing the new relationship with emerging powers to construct a paradigm of globalization favorable to the continent?

(b) What are the challenges, opportunities and critical interventions that African governments must put in place in order to take advantage of the growing economic engagement of the continent with China and India?

At present, there is uncritical expectation in Africa that the BRIC nations can do no harm to Africa, and that they will use their economic might to transform the current global governance architecture in a manner that will be beneficial to Africa. This conclusion is premature and wishful thinking at best. If anything, the BRICs will continue to engage in high level global diplomacy, not necessarily to enhance policy space for African countries; but rather to maximize their own autonomy vis-à-vis the dominant western powers with whom they have stronger economic, political and strategic relationship. The BRIC states are unlikely to act in a manner that would advance the interests of African countries, unless pressed by Africa as a united front.

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The next meeting of the BRIC heads of states will take place in Brazil in mid-2010 and it is up to the African states, and the African Union, to articulate clear positions on how African countries might want to engage the BRIC countries in the coming years. Africa still lacks a policy on the BRIC countries. Africa now needs national, regional and continental strategies to engage the BRICs from a stronger platform and better informed position.
Now is the era of breakthrough for freedom of expression and interactive communication. NAI is devoted to making use of the potential of the new, web-based social media. Besides Twitter, and other social media, NAI in 2009 decided to enter the blogosphere by setting up an online Forum on Nordic Policies for African Development.

One reason for this initiative is that web-based social media are of rapidly increasing importance in the policy debate in the Nordic countries and in many other parts of the world. A NAI online forum can be an effective tool for contributing to an enhanced policy debate in at least four ways:

- catalyzing public debate,
- connecting researchers and civil society experts with practitioners and policy makers,
- convening targeted policy dialogues, and
- disseminating research findings to a wider audience.

Another reason behind the decision to set up a web-based Forum is that NAI has been mandated to facilitate a bridging between research and policies affecting African development. The Swedish Government’s Budget Bill for 2010 states that the research and policy-related activities of NAI are to be more relevant as a basis for the formulation and implementation of Nordic policies towards Africa.

Thus, NAI’s research and policy-related activities are to put more emphasis on development policy, especially on development cooperation and aid, which is the main area of interaction between Africa and the Nordic countries. Policies relating to global development continue to be under lively debate in the Nordic countries. However, the media debate often tends to be characterized as a positioning of interests, rather than as well-informed contributions from researchers and practitioners. A common Nordic platform for development policy debate could, through cross-border interaction, add value over and above that of the ongoing development policy debates within all of the Nordic countries.

Among topics suggested for debate in the Forum are: *Millennium Development Goals beyond 2015, corruption and aid, changing perspectives and priorities in Nordic development policies, how effective is aid and how effective can it be?, Nordic social policies – an area of comparative advantage for development cooperation with Africa?*. To create a lively debate it might be useful also to include topics that are narrower and more timely, e.g. reviews of important books or recent high-level reports such as the World (and the new European) Development Report or major new development policy declarations from the Nordic countries.
I initially approached the issue in the title from the angle of a former aid practitioner. Could delivering cash directly to people living in poverty bypass some of the shortcomings of other aid methods? I soon found myself in a room crowded with people struggling with the same question, but who had arrived there through separate doors.

Depending on one’s perspective the doors had labels such as “social protection”, “safety nets”, “social policy”, “cash transfer” or “welfare state”.

Some had entered the room with an emergency relief perspective; people who had seen that delivering cash might be smarter than delivering food and that a predictable cash flow may work as disaster prevention. Others had entered the room from the perspective of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and chronic poverty perspective, looking for the most efficient instrument to reduce poverty by 2015. In the room I also found advocates for various vulnerable groups – elderly, children, AIDS orphans, the sick and unemployed – who were eager to take a step away from charity to rights. Some were late arrivals after the global financial crisis, pushed into the room by the 2009 G20 meeting’s call for protecting the poor in insecure times.

Another group had been in the room for decades and were somewhat uneasy with all newcomers and their poverty discourse; they were the ones doing comparative research on welfare states and their historic roots. To them social policy had broader functions, being a key instrument to build inclusive welfare regimes. In a less visible corner of this room I also found a handful of African governments who already were delivering cash on scale to their populations on a regular basis, as old age pensions or child grants. Not much attention was paid to them by the donors who were busy running pilot cash transfer schemes elsewhere on the continent, or talking about it.

Finally, outside the room, further down the corridor, one could hear voices shouting: “low-income countries cannot afford this”, “poor people misuse the money, drink it up and become lazy”, “investment and growth is what’s needed”, “hand-outs make people dependent”, “this is all donor driven, neo-patrimonial African governments lack political will to do this properly”.

Entering the social protection debate – without being too concerned with borderlines between academic disciplines or between activists, policy-makers and researchers – is a bit like stepping into a room like this. Key issues in this debate are concerns about impact, affordability, targeting mechanisms, institutional capacity and political economy. Conclusions and policy recommendations on these topics tend to reflect the participants’ entrance point. Is it about designing “safety nets” to be used in exceptional times for exceptional people? Or is it rather about identifying the first steps in a long journey towards building an inclusive welfare state? Or something else?

“It has been established that people living in poverty spend their money reasonably well, consume as well as invest, benefitting the surrounding local economy.”

As a policy instrument cash transfer schemes have the advantage that they lend themselves to randomized impact evaluation. One group of people receives cash and a control group does not; innumerable studies have used this methodology to establish impact on nutrition, schooling, health etc. And in general results are quite encouraging. In the case of the South African child grant one study has even established impact in terms of height of children (children benefitting from child grants were projected to be three centimetres taller as adults). It has also been established that people living in poverty spend their money reasonably well, consume as well as invest, benefitting the surrounding local economy.

In very crude terms you may identify three models in Sub-Saharan Africa when it comes to public transfers. First, there is the insurance model, based on individual contri-
Most countries have such schemes, with legal origins dating back to the years after independence. They typically cover a small fraction of the population, i.e. state employees and some segments of the formal private sector, leaving the rural and informal sectors unprotected.

Secondly, there are a growing number of targeted cash transfer schemes for specific vulnerable groups or locations. Such schemes are now found all over the continent, but suffer from serious limitations as they are neither legalized nor institutionalized, with low coverage and a high degree of aid dependency.

Finally, you have a select group of Sub-Saharan countries, most of them middle-income, who have institutionalized social protection policies that are national in scope. Seven countries operate universal or near-universal old-age pensions (South Africa, Namibia, Mauritius, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Seychelles). A few countries also have institutionalized some form of child grants. The historic roots to these systems are quite diverse. However, the common trait is their high-coverage character – they do not try to target only the poorest of the poor – and that national institutions run them based on legalized entitlements.

Another common trait is that donors are absent; when Lesotho introduced universal old age pensions in 2004 it came as a big surprise to the donor community. The fact that these schemes are home-grown and politically sustained seem to contradict the sometimes expressed view that social protection is a donor driven fad unfit for African political economies.

THE MOST CRUCIAL FACTOR for a further expansion of social protection schemes in Africa, beyond the better off middle-income countries, has to do with affordability. From cost simulations the price tag is more or less known: A typical low-income country in Africa can implement a minimum universal old age pension for approximately 1–1.5 percent of GDP (assuming a pension worth 30 percent of GDP/capita and 65 as age limit). A universal child grant for all children below 14 would cost about the double. Less generous age requirements and a more targeted approach would obviously reduce the cost.

Could donors step in? Aid amounts to maybe 10 percent of GDP in a typical African low-income country, and donors have announced a doubling of aid to Africa (a commitment surrounded by doubts). But few ministers of finance would like to institutionalize long-term pension and child grant schemes that would depend on unpredictable donor flows. And few donors are ready to make financial commitments of the long-term nature that would be required. That is one of the unresolved equations in the room where social protection in Africa is debated.

Göran Holmqvist is an economist and Senior Policy Analyst at the Nordic Africa Institute.
Africa is as disunited as ever. Indeed, in the present decade Africa is even more fragmented than in the 1970’s. How does one explain this? Does the relationship between Europe and Africa have anything to do with it?

The main responsibility for the failure of African integration lies, first and foremost, with African political and intellectual leadership. However, over the last 500 years of Euro-African relations, a general pattern—a kind of cycle—is broadly discernible. It starts with resistance (against slavery, colonialism, racism, etc.); then it moves to active connivance on the part of a section of society (who then become agents of the exploiting/oppressor nations), and adaptation to a new reality by the bulk of the population. Over time, when exploitation and oppression reach their limits, the cycle moves to resistance leading to the emergence of a new dispensation.

We are presently living through a post-colonial reality. It is passing through the connivance/adaptation phase. It has yet to transform into active resistance, and genuine liberation of the people of Africa from European (and allied) domination and exploitation. There are some positive signs on the horizon, even (perhaps) among Africa’s present political and intellectual leadership, but the main challenge lies with the African posterity.

I have these questions for our Nordic friends:

1. What are the effects of “globalization” in the Nordic societies? The “Nordic humanist culture” appears no longer what it used to be 20 or 30 years ago. Could it be that the Anglo-Saxon virus of “greed” (with a corporate and banking executive class demanding big salaries and bonuses, for example) has infected the body politic of the traditionally frugal, modest and non-aggressive Nordic people?

2. What are the effects on those Nordic countries that have joined the European Union? Have the “Brussels priorities” and the “Brussels culture” diminished or in any way changed the basic fundamentals of the traditional Nordic way of doing things?

3. The Fourth Pan-European African project (the EPAs) has been very divisive of Africa; it has been a major factor in Africa’s present fragmentation. Sweden held the chair of the European Union for six months in 2009. What did Sweden accomplish to try and mitigate the damage done to Africa by the overbearing hand of the European Commission?

4. Has the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture of “individualism” eroded some of the elements of the famous Nordic model of welfare state?

5. Is Nordic democracy in retreat? Democracy is never a “completed project”; it is always, even in the West (despite illusions), a “work in progress”. Democracy can even move backwards and in the name of “war on terror”, among other forms of xenophobia, trample on the ordinary rights of the citizens. Is the Nordic model of democracy really safe from such a virus?

6. Europe benefited from 400 years of slave trade. Africa is today largely impoverished and de-industrialized as a result of policies imposed on it through SAPs and aid conditionalities during the last 25–30 years of “Project Globalisation”. Why, then, is the present European leadership so harsh in their treatment of immigrants from Africa?

7. The Nordic peoples have settled down to peaceful and friendly relations with Africa. Is this achievement of the last 50-100 years now under threat? Has the dominant Anglo-Saxon “imperial ethos” corrupted the essentially “anti-imperialist” or “non-imperialist” recent culture of the Nordic people? Has Sweden become an imperial state?

8. The Pirate Party is a political party in Sweden, founded in 2006. Among its objectives it has reportedly taken the position that patents, especially as they relate to access to music, are obsolete and should be gradually done away with. This sounds like music to the ears of Pan-Africanists who too have been fighting against the monopolization of scientific knowledge in the control of multinationals under the present intellectual property (or IP) patent system. Is there a germ of possible alliance here between the youthful Swedish Piratpartiet and the Pan-Africanist anti-patent movement? Is there still some hope for Africa among the Nordic youth?
Questions for the African Power Elite

By “power elite” I mean not simply those in state power, but also the business elite, the intellectual elite, and, depending on the context, the “NGO elite”.

1. The most shocking aspect of Africa today is the exodus of its people. People (both skilled and unskilled) are leaving the continent in their thousands. Is there a parallel between this contemporary form of massive exodus and the thousands of slaves who were shipped out of Africa every year to the Americas 500 years ago?

2. The other shocking aspect of contemporary Africa is hunger and famine. Africa has known droughts in pre-colonial times, but instances of famine were rare. But today hunger and famine stalk the continent. Do the power and intellectual elite feel any sense of responsibility towards the emergence of such a situation? Do they think there may be any connection between hunger and famine in Africa with the neo-liberal policies they have been pursuing for the last 25-30 years?

3. People in Africa are dying of preventable or curable diseases. Malaria is still rampant, as well as AIDS/HIV and other illnesses. Do the African power elite and civil societies feel any sense of responsibility towards remedying this situation? Are they going to do something about it, or do they think that this is the responsibility of donors outside of Africa?

4. African leadership goes cap in hand begging for “aid” from the West, and now also from countries such as China. Meanwhile, millions of dollars (probably four or five times of all the “aid” put together), leave the continent by questionable but officially “legal” ways and through not so legal or legitimate routes. Do the power elite feel any sense of embarrassment about it? Have national pride and national dignity also become “commodities” in the global market place?

5. Africa’s friends in Europe are not the corporate and state power elite, but the small group of left-liberal-progressive people in civil society, academia and the arts/culture. Many of them try hard to get their governments to “give” us aid, at least 0.07 per cent of their GNP, more if possible. They, unfortunately, are mistaken about the role of aid in our countries. How do we restructure our relations with this well-meaning progressive bloc in Europe away from reinforcing our “aid dependence syndrome”?

6. In 2008 the leaders of the three regional blocs – the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) – took the initiative to create a free trade zone by integrating these three regional efforts. If this can be achieved it would create a free trade zone of 26 countries with a GDP of an estimated US $624 billion. Why, then, are the leaders negotiating and signing the EPAs that are clearly undermining this extremely important initiate at regional integration?

7. Capitalism will survive the present financial crisis in new forms. But neoliberalism as the ideology of the present phase of capitalism is now discredited, and the Western Empire is slowly dying. It should be dead in another 50 or 100 years. What vision do we provide to our younger generation today, to the coming posterity, so that they are prepared for the impending collapse of the Empire?

These, and many more questions, need to be asked of our leaders in Africa.
Professor Yash Tandon, holder of the Claude Ake Visiting Chair in 2009, is a Ugandan researcher, policymaker, political activist and writer, with a remarkable career stretching back to the early 1960’s.

Professor Yash Tandon, who is of Indo-African heritage, began his academic career as a student at London School of Economics, where he eventually completed his Ph.D. in international relations in 1969. He was a lecturer with Makerere University in Kampala from 1964 to 1972, a period that he still remembers as “a very inspiring time, although full of illusions”.

With the military coup of Idi Amin in 1972 the situation in Uganda became untenable for anyone, who like Yash Tandon, was known for resisting the new regime. Through a friend he received a warning that he was due to be arrested the following week and left the country within 24 hours.

Tandon, like many other Ugandans in the opposition to the Amin regime, took refuge in Tanzania, where he became professor of political economy at the University of Dar-es-Salaam. When the Uganda National Liberation Front was founded in Tanzania, Yash Tandon was one of the founding members. With the fall of Amin in 1978 he was again able to return to Uganda, where he was a government minister for a short period.

In the 1980’s and 1990’s Yash Tandon worked as a rural development worker in Southern Africa, and also with trade unions in the region. He also founded the Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiations Institute (SEATINI) with offices in Zimbabwe, Uganda, Kenya and South Africa. He remains its current Chairman. In the last five years before his retirement he was executive director of the South Centre, a leading international policy institute based in Geneva, where he remains a senior adviser.

The failure of African integration was the focus of Yash Tandon’s 2009 Claude Ake Memorial Lecture, with the title Europe and the Challenge of African Integration.
A policeman in Nairobi fires tear gas at supporters of opposition candidate Raila Odinga during the post-election violence that gripped Kenya after the elections in 2008.

PHOTO: CHRISTOPHE CALAIL/CORBIS
Struggle for Democracy in Africa’s “Barrel and Trigger”

West Africa; whether you consider the region the “armpit” or the “barrel and trigger” of Africa, a continent shaped like a pistol, it has for long been a site of struggle for democracy. Perhaps most critical is the way the region symbolises the close link between development and democracy.

Once regarded as Africa’s “belt of conflict”, West Africa, has in the past decade entered into a fragile post-conflict phase, of which democracy and its consolidation has remained a key issue. The efforts towards the consolidation of democracy and peace have been underpinned by the sophisticated peace and security architecture of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

However, the 2008 military coup in Guinea, the assassination of the President of Guinea-Bissau by renegade soldiers in March 2009, and the constitutional coup by Niger’s President, who sacked the constitutional court and the National Assembly, before “winning” a referendum for tenure prolongation in May 2009, only to be overthrown in a military coup in February 2010, are indications that the democratic project in the region has recently suffered some serious setbacks.

The view about a “slippage” from democratic to non-democratic forms of governance in the region is further reinforced by the Freedom in the World 2009 Report, which identifies only four of West Africa’s fifteen countries as being democratically free: Ghana, Benin, Mali and Cape Verde. It raises concerns that the democratic regression in the region may have wider implications should the situation in the other “partly free” or “declining” countries continue to degenerate with wider security, strategic and developmental implications. This feeds into a renewed debate about the nature and depth of political changes in the region and the prospects for a developmental democracy that brings together freedom and socio-economic justice within the reach of the majority.

The research and interviews done so far suggest mixed results regarding electoral democracy in West Africa. On one hand, electoral success stories in Benin, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Liberia, indicate a deepening of the democratic ethos, while flawed elections in Nigeria in 2007, reports of an attempted coup in Togo in 2009, the breach of constitutional norms in Niger, and Guinea where troops opened fire on people attending a political rally organized by the opposition to demand for a return to democratic rule, indicate that the struggle for democracy across the region is far from being over.

With regard to the success stories, Professor Amos Sawyer, a former Liberian President, who led the ECOWAS Election Monitoring team to the 2008 Ghanaian elections describes the country as a pacesetter for electoral democracy in West Africa. Specifically, he identifies the “personal integrity and institutional integrity” of the Electoral Commission of Ghana and “the resolve of the Ghanaian people to have peaceful elections”, in spite of the high stakes involved, as critical success factors. Another scholar, Charles Ukeje, an International Relations Professor at the Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigeria, also an observer of the Ghanaian elections, agrees with Sawyer about the important role of the Electoral Commission, particularly its “fairness and neutrality”, and also refers to the “maturity of the electorate” and the political actors who strongly

A Muslim schoolgirl walks past a soldier guarding the entrance to an army camp where members of Niger’s ruling military junta were meeting in Niamey, Niger, following the military coup in February 2010. Photo: Rebecca Blackwell/AP/Scanpix
felt that with “all eyes on them”, Ghana could not “afford to let the international community down”. This resonates with the response of the Director of the Legon Centre for International Affairs (LECIA), University of Ghana, Professor Kwame Boafo-Arthur, who, while asserting that “there is nothing unique about Ghana’s democracy”, nonetheless attributes the “good electoral practices” in Ghana to “a committed and transparent electoral commission, acceptance of political stakeholders that the democratic contest is not a matter of life or death, active role of the civil society in complementing the role of the electoral commission, and the institution of effective election monitoring mechanisms”, free from any interference or intimidation. Another important success story is that of Benin Republic. In spite of the high levels of poverty in the country, the 2006 elections which were won by an independent candidate, Boni Yayi, marked the consolidation of the small country’s hard-won electoral democracy in 1991. An important lesson from all cases is that electoral institutions, political stakeholders and the people play strategic roles in advancing democracy. Elections will only lead to democratic outcomes when they reflect the will of the people, otherwise they enthrone dictators wearing masks of democracy.

THE OCCURRENCE OF THE DEMOCRATIC INFRACTIONS mentioned earlier in spite of ECOWAS’ zero-tolerance for unconstitutional changes and its suspension of Guinea and Niger from the organization is worth more attention. ECOWAS should be commended for its actions in imposing sanctions on erring member states and working with the international community to put pressure on such recalcitrant regimes. However, it should be noted that the organization’s pro-democracy rhetoric is hardly leveraged beyond moral persuasion. As Boafo-Arthur argues, “without enforcement power”, the impact of ECOWAS sanctions is somewhat circumscribed. This is, in some cases complicated by the role of some member-states which support erring neighbours, or what Ukeje, aptly describes as the “double-speak” by some hegemonic players within the international community, keen to place economic and strategic interests, before democracy-promotion.

2010 PROMISES TO BE A CHALLENGING YEAR for electoral democracy in several countries, not least those that have experienced some form of democratic regression. Of note is the case of Nigeria whose last elections in 2007 were considered controversial. While a Nigerian journalist, Joel Nwokeoma posits that elections have so far “not reflected the wishes of the electorate”, others like Ukeje demand that we look for the “sparks of hope” across the region, represented in success stories, and fairly effective institutions such as the Nigerian judiciary and media, and the Sierra Leone’s Anti Corruption Commission. It is perhaps between effective and neutral electoral commissions, credible judiciaries, responsible political stakeholders, vigilant media, pro-democracy civil society and mobilized citizens that the critical link between democracy and development in West Africa can be reinforced in favour of the people.

“The democratic project in this region has recently suffered some serious setbacks.”

Dr. Cyril Obi is a Senior Researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute where he heads the cluster on “Conflict, Displacement and Transformation.”
Supporters of opposition candidate Raila Odinga tear down a poster of President Kibaki in central Nairobi during the post-election crisis in Kenya in 2008.

Photo: Christophe Calais/CORBIS
Choice Matters:

Elections and Violence in Kenya

Are elections democratising Africa? Analysts have argued that the democratisation process in Africa is constituted either by “choicelessness”, “tyranny of choice(s)”, or by people who “vote without choosing”. Elections are described as a fading shadow of democracy.

Many others note the tension between the mere fact of holding an election and the promise to translate them into “meaningful participation of the people at all levels of decision-making.” Writing in the 2007 NAI Annual Report, Cyril Obi urges the need for popular empowerment and participation which, together with periodic elections, will entrench a system in which the popular will is respected and the people’s control over their leaders realised. This would contrast with the current system which is not just disempowering but also feeds into a wider pattern of apathy and disaffection that accounts for electoral violence.

In Africa, the centrality of choice to elections has received limited attention. Analysts who celebrated the opening of the political space did not sufficiently inspect the content of that competition. Competition makes sense when meaningful choice is exercised. Meaningful choice differentiates a political culture that accepts and embraces competition and the popular will and one where democracy is simply a buzzword for a ruling class that is self-indulgent in their pursuit of raw power.

In exercising choice through the ballot box, the maturity of the political class and of the democratic system is tested and demonstrated. Meaningful electoral choice is a sure way of avoiding electoral violence. Yet, the ballot box is only legitimate when it guarantees fairness. In the absence of fairness, the ballot box and street protests become tactics of equal weight in determining continuity or change of a regime. As Jeff Fischer writes, “when conflict or violence occurs, it is not a result of an electoral process; it is the breakdown of an electoral process.” Post-election violence in Africa has often been the consequence of an abused electoral process.

When the ballot box is abused and its place in ensuring free and fair elections is doubted by the general mass of voters, it either results in a timid relapse into voter apathy or to a violent attempt to force the people’s will through alternative avenues. In the multi-party experience in Africa, “streets” have become legitimate sites of contest. Street action helped keep the popular will in Ukraine. In the 2005 Ethiopian and 2007 Nigerian elections, massive flaws in the electoral process was widely decried but the incumbent/candidate preferred by the incumbent was declared winner. Force was deployed to silence the people and install the alleged winners.

“In the multi-party experience in Africa, ‘streets’ have become legitimate sites of contest.”

In the 2008 bungled Zimbabwean elections, violence engulfed the whole process. The contest combined state-backed intransigence and a tactless opposition to undermine genuine choice. This was possible because both ZANU-PF and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) got trapped in a stultifying debate pitting the “democratic” versus the “national” question. MDC’s cosy relationship with foreign actors allowed the government to invoke the excuse of sovereignty to interfere with campaigns, voting, and to postpone announcement of the results when they sensed defeat. In Zimbabwe, as in Kenya, elections and violence were intimately paired to defeat the purpose of electoral competition, dilute meaningful choice and negotiate a power-sharing arrangement that threatens to become a choice-option for incumbents unwilling to vacate state power.

The democracy and national question are intimately connected questions where real choice is exercised in an electoral contest. Electoral choice is about renewing the governance mandate, a mandate that should ideally be predicated on patriotism. It involves choosing a leadership and political party with a vision for the country and the widest national appeal. Even though the contending parties in

Conflict / Godwin R. Murunga
the 2007 Kenyan electoral contest articulated differing visions on how to achieve equity and national-building, abuse of the electoral field stemmed largely from political elite focus on raw state power. Precisely because of this focus, the visions simply became pawns in a consuming struggle for power that turned deadly due to the zero-sum nature of local politics where the winner wins everything.

OPINION IS DIVIDED on the post-election violence. What is clear though is that the final trigger for violence and the almost total collapse of the country was the abuse of the vote-tallying process. In Kenya, balloting and announcement of results in respective constituencies was smooth. Problems started with the transmission of results to the central tallying centre in Nairobi where anomalies were reported.

The anomalies had serious implications since details played out live on television in the final days of 2007. Matters were worsened in Kenya by several other factors. By 2007, Kenyans were getting accustomed to using the ballot box to voice their preference. They had, on two previous occasions, used this medium in 2002 to defeat years of KANU misrule and in 2005 to hand President Mwai Kibaki his first defeat at the national Referendum on the draft constitution. If there was anything Kenyans did not expect, it was the open abuse of the ballot in a situation where many stayed vigilant in an election they thought was unriggable.

"One can endlessly debate the morality of violence, but there is a relationship between abuse of elections and post-election violence."

THE CONSEQUENT POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE indicates, among other things that meaningful choice is important to the people and for democratic consolidation. The resort to violence is therefore not an irrational tribal instinct among people the world considers as unsuited for democracy but is an option exercised when the ballot box is abused and delegitimized and where apathy and disaffection is firmly rooted. One can endlessly debate the morality of violence, but there is a relationship between abuse of elections and post-election violence.

Dr. Godwin R. Murunga is a lecturer at the Department of History of Kenyatta University, Nairobi, Kenya. In 2009 he was a Guest Researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute.
When you see him walking around the Kibera slum, greeting every corner shop owner and generously distributing his big, frank smile, you might mistake Tole for a politician. But if you have the slightest knowledge of Kenyan politics, you will almost immediately realize that Tole is far too young, accessible and laid-back to be connected to politics.

During the Post-election Violence (PEV) of early 2008, Tole was behind the microphone of Pamoja FM, a community radio station located in what was then one of the worst hit areas of Nairobi, the Kibera slum. On air in times of chaos and crisis, Tole decided to preach peace despite the government-imposed live media ban and the public disapproval of those who believe that journalistic objectivity should be sacrosanct.

"It goes further than any ethical code of conduct; it is a question of conscience. You see killings, you need to go through blockades to reach the station, you see the food delivery not reaching the ones who need it and you don't feel, inside you, the responsibility to tell people to stop messing around? Come on!" clarified the young journalist.

Where the North has a predilection for television, Sub-Saharan Africa prefers a more accessible and less cost-prohibitive medium: radio. And when radio talks, people listen. The infamous Radio télévision libre des milles collines (RTLM) in Rwanda has made the world conscious of the power of the airwaves.

Community radio, a nascent category in Kenya, is generally defined as having three core aspects: non-profit, community ownership and control and community participation. Too often considered by officials as a second-class category, confusion remains around what is often described as a genuine participatory bottom-up project.

My study set out to explore how post-election violence had affected the community radio practitioners’ perceptions of their own roles and responsibilities. During my five months of fieldwork, Pamoja FM, Ghetto FM, Koch FM and their crowd of hip youngsters, opened their modest studios and shared their reflections on media ethics with me.

Many, like Tole, consider that preaching peace was the right thing to do, to prevent a highly responsive audience to plunge into anarchy:

"Unlike the big media houses in their downtown build-
Migrating Zimbabweans Adapting to ‘Disorder’ in Mozambique

Despite Zimbabwe’s decade of severe crisis, Zimbabweans who have crossed the border to find work in Mozambique are initially dismayed at the apparent ‘disorder’ or of physical, economic and social life in the new country.

It’s May 2009. Three young men sit at a nearby table in what would pass for a trendy café in Chimoio, the provincial capital of Manica Province in central-western Mozambique, where I have been conducting fieldwork on the effects of Zimbabwean displacement and migration on and off for three years. As I unashamedly eavesdrop, I recognise the familiar banter of Zimbabwe’s younger, educated generation: switching fluidly between Shona and English, between ambitious business talk and affectionate bravado.

After a while, we lean across to greet one another, recognising our shared status as Zimbabweans and outsiders in this town, and get talking. All three are now based in Chimoio, working in marketing and sales for various companies that are backed at least in part by Zimbabwean and South African finance. At the same time they are trying to see what they can establish for themselves independently ‘on the side’, the by-now-familiar risk diversification strategy that Zimbabweans have had to become skilled at.

I ask how they find things in Mozambique, and each one tells of how he has had to learn “to do things differently” here. I push a bit further:

“Differently how?” I ask, and am told that basically things here “are a bit crooked”.

“You can’t simply rely on a professional relationship in this place”, says one. “Normally, you have something to sell in the market, and anyone interested can come and buy. But here, everything depends on clicks”.

‘Clicks’, in translation, means connections, contacts.

“So, even if I’m more expensive than the next guy” he continues, “you’ll come and buy from me because we have clicks in another area, politically and in other ways.”

“It’s getting to be like Zimbabwe here”, chips in his friend. “The company I work for is owned 50 percent by Frelimo. And I’ve been told clearly that around election time, when I drive around I have to have a party flag flying on my car. If you don’t do that, they’ll simply cut you out, kill your business. Everyone will be instructed not to buy from you.”

Clearly, all three have been well educated, and they comment overtly on the low levels of education both in Mozambique and in South Africa. At the same time, one amongst them talks of how he started working and trying to establish his own business in Zimbabwe just as things started to get bad there (in the early 2000s).

“I must admit, I felt really hurt about the way I was prevented from moving forward there”, he said. “Okay, even if one has to try and understand these Zanu PF guys [in Zimbabwe], they took away my opportunities. So we come here and see what we can do. But it’s a different way of doing things...”

What strikes me repeatedly in my encounters with a range of Zimbabweans who have crossed the border to Mozambique in the years of Zimbabwe’s deepening crisis since 2000, is their assertion that ‘things are so different in Mozambique’ from how they are – or perhaps once were – in Zimbabwe.

Much differentiates the various groups of Zimbabweans in Manica. Besides those like the young men mentioned above, there are the more impoverished Zimbabweans who, especially vulnerable in the face of the steep economic decline, have sought poorly paid piecework on small Mozambican run farms or, increasingly, engage in the widespread artisanal gold panning boom, mostly at the lower and more dangerous end of the enterprise, as labourers. There are returning Mozambican ex-farm workers and their now Zimbabwean offspring, many of whom have settled on land on the Mozambican side of the border and begun quite successful farming in what has been referred to as “an indigenous green revolution” (a term used by Alex Bolding, Wageningen University, Netherlands). And there are the evicted white commercial farmers who began moving into Manica Province from the early 2000s with the vision of undertaking farming and/or establis-
hing related enterprises much as they had been doing in Zimbabwe prior to losing their farms.

DESPITE THEIR MANY DIFFERENCES, one emerging commonality between them seems to be an initial dismay at the apparent “disorder” or haphazardness of physical, economic, administrative and social life they encounter when they arrive in Mozambique: the “unplanned way of doing things”. Young job seekers arriving in Chimoio, for example, express surprise at there being ‘no classifieds’ in local newspapers, advertising jobs. White farmers talk of having had to adapt substantially to the messiness or even “crookedness” of doing business in Mozambique.

Broadly, they seem to experience either directly or indirectly the absence of what might be called “an organised life”. Paradoxically, this is despite a decade of severe crisis in Zimbabwe, in which a wide range of both official structures and informal everyday practices have been dramatically up-turned, and any consistent or predictable pattern of order or certainty barely prevails. It is also in spite of their own personal experiences, in many instances, of dramatic disruption and displacement.

In fact, much of what Zimbabweans remark upon in Mozambique, or register as disturbing, has become common practice in many aspects of life in Zimbabwe: the informalisation of the economy; the politicisation and/or corruption of bureaucratic procedure; the individualisation of social practices. The reasons for these and other such seeming similarities between the two countries – and their respective consequences – is complex, and cannot be outlined here. What can be noted, however, is the temporal mismatch amongst most Zimbabweans between what is, and what is remembered: almost a form of nostalgic amnesia, that refuses to acknowledge the profound loss of “order” back at home by underscoring the level of “disorder” in Mozambique.

Yet even if these distinctions remain important to those who have moved, as with forced exiles everywhere, out of necessity and over time most find ways to adapt to their new environments. Amongst Zimbabweans in Manica Province, there is an increasing willingness – and capacity – to “become Mozambicanised” so as to stay and make things work there.

“You can’t simply rely on a professional relationship in this place”, says one. “Normally, you have something to sell in the market, and anyone interested can come and buy. But here, everything depends on clicks”.

Dr. Amanda Hammar was a researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute until March 2010. She coordinated the research programme “Political Economies of Displacement in Southern Africa”.

The Machipanda border post between Zimbabwe and Mozambique. PHOTO: TANIA BERGER
The small boy soldier in dark blue boots and light angel wings walking around in the film is exceptionally disturbing – is the child/youth soldier an angel in disguise, or a devil? *Johnny Mad Dog* refocuses our attention on the souls of suffering children and youth in African warzones. However hard to bear these images ought never to be forgotten – that is a first step – yet different and certainly closer attention is in the future needed to come to terms with the tragic destinies of child/youth soldiers.
“A harrowing masterpiece – but are you brave enough to watch?”, asked one British film reviewer in his overall positive response to the film Johnny Mad Dog, a film about child/youth soldiers in the Liberian Civil War, based on Emmanuel Dongola’s novel by the same name. In this article Mats Utas asks the question if most viewers know enough to watch films like this one.

Watch This Film?

DIRECTOR JEAN-STÉPHANE SAVAIRE spent a year with the young boys (and two young girls) who act in Johnny Mad Dog. They are ex-child/youth soldiers who fought in the war for different factions. But despite the genuine, authentic setup with true child/youth soldiers and a real Monrovian landscape the film is saying very little about the Liberian Civil War; what were reasons behind, how was it fought and how did it end. And maybe more seriously it does not say very much about child/youth soldiers; why they fought and what they did achieve. Certainly what it does well is that it transmits sentiments of confusion and despair to the audience, but also a sense that we cannot understand this war. This is shared with a majority of films on African conflicts: it shows African wars as doomsdays carnivals.

Sauvaire is very good with details, and like anyone who is looking for attention he is putting the exotic and eye-catching ones forward. I am not proposing that he is getting things wrong, but by focusing on the exotic he is preventing us from seeing the familiar (except the ordinary love story). I want to highlight some of these stereotypes which Western media describe African conflicts and the African Other with.

AS AN OPENING SCENE of the film, Johnny and his crew are seen entering a house; looking for loot. They capture a boy in a pink shirt – this is his school uniform and signaling both his young age and him being another “type” of kid than the child/youth soldiers. The boy is then forced to kill his own father. This is one of the most forthcoming stereotypes of child/youth soldier recruitment in Liberia and other African wars. The idea is that children would never be recruited into armies were it not for forceful adults in the guise of ruthless commanders – or structures put in place by the same.

Rebel commanders are ruthless, no question about that, but my own research in both Liberia and Sierra Leone has showed a quite different picture. At the beginning of my work in Liberia, all child/youth soldiers I talked to stated that they had been directly forced to join a rebel army. The forceful killing of a family member was a common story that was narrated to me, another was the army coming with trucks and just picking up children and young men at gun point. However after a few months staying with the same group of young people, I was intrigued by the fact that their stories changed. In the end none of the guys maintained that they were actually forcefully recruited. When trust was established they simply changed their stories.

“In the end none of the guys maintained that they were actually forcefully recruited. When trust was established they simply changed their stories.”

I AM NOT IMPLYING that there is no forced recruitment in African wars, but I can say for certain that it is a lot less common than what popular ideas proposes. It should however come as no surprise that children and young adults are less prone to admit that they went with the rebel army.
due to lack of other possibilities, possible prosperity, or were sent off by parents.

In the same opening scene the camera also revisits a young male soldier who in contrasting solitude is putting on a wedding dress. Young boys habits of cross dressing were striking images circulating the world during the early years of the Liberia war. These images came with no explanation and it was simply left to the viewer to conclude that this was the doomsday carnival, logic aloof. Indeed the hypermasculinity of war and transvestitism at first appear to be an odd couple.

ANTHROPOLOGIST MARY MORAN has explained this from a cultural perspective. In Liberia formal initiations into adulthood is common for both girls and boys (equal to the Christian confirmation). In parts of Liberia boyhood initiation includes a limited period where masculinity is in limbo. At this point, and as a ritual, boys dress in women's clothes in order to highlight their liminality before entering into adulthood. Part of being in this liminal period is to become a warrior – a male occupation. To show civilians that they can be soldiers and should be taken seriously, child/youth soldiers, too young and far from being socially sanctioned, took on symbols such as wigs, wedding gowns and other female robes to prove that their transformation to men actually took place. As such it was a symbol of taking power.

DRUGS ARE AWASH IN THE FILM. This is indeed the case in most wars. In Ismael Beah's bestseller, A long way gone: memoirs of a boy soldier, soldiers snort cocaine through their noses – an indication that Beah maybe never was the Sierra Leonean child/youth soldier he has written about. The kind of cocaine available in West African warzones is of such bad quality that if snorted the nose will fall off.

“At this point, and as a ritual, boys dress in women’s clothes in order to highlight their liminality before entering into adulthood.”
Johnny Mad Dog and friends at least takes cocaine the way it was taken in the bush, through cuts on the body, or even better, in fresh pimples. One thing that should be noted however was that many drugs were not taken before a battle, as the fighter would lose focus, but rather afterwards as a recreational drug, simply to be able to cope with the hard life and stay away from traumatic memories.

Key concepts, forced recruitment, ritual transvestitism, initiation, juju magic, drugs and ethnicity so visual in the film are real but hardly the most central issues of the Liberian war. The exotic is thus shifting our focus away from the essential issues of the conflict.

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Dr. Mats Utas is a Senior Researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute and Associate Professor in Cultural Anthropology.

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Key concepts, forced recruitment, ritual transvestitism, initiation, juju magic, drugs and ethnicity so visual in the film are real but hardly the most central issues of the Liberian war. The exotic is thus shifting our focus away from the essential issues of the conflict. It is in fact obstructing us from understanding African conflicts. In Africa as elsewhere reasons for wars are social, political and economic and just as complex as are the reasons behind “our” wars. We ought not to lose sight of that.

The film is certainly transmitting the eerie feeling of the Liberian battlefield; what anyone in the shoes of Johnny Mad Dog would feel. It is important to attend to the fact that child/youth soldiers are suffering from the most gruesome circumstances in warzones all over the world. Yet it is equally important to get an accurate framework around these stories. In order to successfully aid and make a difference we must enhance our understanding of the socioeconomic environments that makes the use of child/youth soldiers possible and advantageous. And if we include issues of poverty and social injustice in Liberia as key components leading to the civil war we cannot just blame evil leaders in Liberia, but must equally see these wars and in the extended case the use of child/youth soldiers as an outcome of our own production of wealth.
The Diaspora – a Resource of Development

ON 16 MARCH 2009 a number of leading Swedish and international researchers met at the Swedish government conference centre Rosenbad in Stockholm for a scientific workshop on Migration, Diaspora and Development: A Transatlantic Perspective. The workshop, organized jointly by NAI and George Washington University in Washington D.C., discussed how the diaspora can be utilized as a resource in development cooperation.

Earlier research has focused on diaspora remittances. Globally these capital flows are far higher than the sum of all bilateral development aid and an important resource for many developing countries. But the diaspora can also contribute with “social remittances” such as know-how, competence and technology from host country to native country, as well as with cultural and civic competence. Used constructively and creatively the diaspora can make a valuable contribution to the development of their native countries.

Towards Greater African Integration: Assessing EU support

AFTER ALMOST FOUR DECADES of largely symbolic cooperation under the Organization of African Unity, African governments inaugurated a revamped African Union in 2002. The goal was to build a more robust supranational entity that would spearhead joint action by Africa’s 53 states to address common development and security problems.

Against this background NAI and the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) in Maastricht, The Netherlands, organised an informal high level seminar on the theme Building the African Union institutional architecture: Progress achieved, new perspectives and possible support by the European Union in Uppsala on 21 October 2009, just ahead of the European Development Days held in Stockholm. The seminar was organised with active support of the Swedish European Union Presidency and in close coordination with the African Union Commission (AUC). It was attended by high-level representatives from the various institutions of the African Union, including Erastus Mwencha, Deputy Chairperson of the AUC. The EU was represented by several officials from EU Member States, including Joakim Stymne, Swedish State Secretary to the Minister for International Development.

The seminar considered three key issues at the heart of African integration: progress in the Pan-African integration agenda; the continuing development of the AU institutional architecture; and the status of key reforms and future challenges.

A full report from the seminar is available on the NAI web site.

NAI-FOI Lecture Series on African Security

IN 2009 THE THEMATIC lecture series on African Security, initiated in 2008 as part of a cooperation agreement between NAI and the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), continued in its second year.

The main objective of the lecture series is the strengthening of FOI Studies in African Security Team’s knowledge on relevant conditions and factors for security studies in an African context. In addition to this prime target group other Swedish policy-relevant institutions such as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the Swedish Armed Forces, the National Defence College, the Swedish Rescue Services Agency and the International Division of the National Swedish Crime Prevention Police are invited for participation. The lectures are organized as half day seminars in order to provide adequate space for discussions and networking between lecture participants and with invited lecturers. Before each lecture preparatory reading material is provided on a website created for participants.

In 2009 a total of six lectures were organized in Uppsala and Stockholm. Sixteen highly qualified experts on African security issues were invited as lecturers for the series, which included presentations on the following themes:


The NAI-FOI cooperation on the lecture series on African Security continues in 2010 with eight new lectures to be held in Stockholm.

Governance Reform from Below – Lecture with John Githongo

THE KENYAN CIVIL SOCIETY luminary John Githongo, best known for his role in investigating and exposing the Anglo-Leasing corruption scandal in Kenya visited NAI in November 2009 to give a lecture on the theme Governance Reform From Below. During an intensive day in Sweden he also had talks with government representatives, diplomats and parliamentarians.

John Githongo’s presentation at NAI reflected on the essentials of transforming institutions and the role local level ideas and participation can play. He illustrated this using the Zinduko and Twaweza initiatives that he currently co-ordinates.

The struggle against corruption in Africa has come to rest partly on the initiatives of individuals of great convictions. However, the struggle for a fair, just and equitable humanity risks losing direction if it relies primarily on individual initiative at the expense of collective action and on modernizing institutions at the expense of transforming their internal work cultures for better state-society relations.
Mount Kilimanjaro.

PHOTO: SVEN-ERIK SJÖBERG/SCANPIX

RURAL

URBAN
In October 2008, a group of Chagga-speaking men left their homes in Rombo District on the eastern slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro for a rare undertaking. Leaving long before dawn, the men led a bull-calf into the plains below the mountain. Walking for hours, the men crossed the international border with Kenya after sunrise. There, they met a group of elderly Kamba men who brought with them a large female goat.

The men from Rombo are descendants of their area’s last colonial ‘chief’, mangi. They claim as their ancestor Horombo, a mythologised man who allegedly ruled there in the 17th century and later lent his name to the present administrative district of the United Republic of Tanzania. Together, the men from both sides of the border walked to a secluded clearing, which they claim is where Horombo was killed in internecine fighting with pastoralist Maasai. His body is said to have been left behind there, while his head was brought back to be buried at his homestead on the mountainside.

Gathered in the shade of a sprawling acacia tree, the men poured local beer on the ground while addressing Horombo in their vernacular languages. They lamented the heat and the drought, complaining that their plants, livestock, and children were dying, and asked Horombo to bring them rain, fodder, and food. Invocations were then uttered over the two animals before they were slaughtered, roasted, and eaten by the roughly 40 men who had gathered by the early afternoon. After eating, the men made further offerings of beer, meat, milk, and blood on the ground before they left for their homes. In the early evening, the men from Rombo returned to their home area, where they were met with songs and ululations from men and women, who had brought them beer to show their gratitude for what the men had done on their behalf.

According to the local people, the purpose of these events was to end the drought they had suffered from for the past years. The arrival of rain would safeguard their stall-fed livestock and secure their food supply. The last time they performed these acts was in 2000 and they were now overdue. The difference this time was that the lack of rain was attributed to a novel cause: mabadiliko ya hali ya hewa, or changes in the climate.

In November 2009, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences published an American study showing that the glaciers on Mount Kilimanjaro are both shrinking and thinning ever-faster. Since 1912, 85 percent of the ice-cover has disappeared and the melting has been most rapid since 2000, removing 26 percent of the ice that was then present. According to the scientists, the development is unique in an 11,700-year perspective, and at the current rate the glaciers are likely to disappear in less than two decades. These research results were widely reported in newspapers in Europe, including the Nordic countries. The reports attribute the melting of the ice to climate change caused by global warming, most likely due to greenhouse gas emissions.
sions. They focus on the loss of an iconic image immor­talised by Ernest Hemingway in his short-story *The Snows of Kilimanjaro*, and many also emphasise the devastating re­sult it may have for the Tanzanian tourism sector. While these are no trifling concerns, none of the newspapers con­sider the impact the lack of water may have on the liveli­hoods of the more than one million people who live on the slopes of the mountain and the hundreds of thousands on the surrounding plains who depend on rivers and streams that originate from springs on the mountain.

The relative abundance of rain and water in the area around Kilimanjaro has enabled a highly diversified and in­tensive form of agriculture. In pre-colonial times, the peo­ple of the area supplied provisions for the slave and ivory caravans that passed through this region on their way be­tween the coast and the interior. A tremendous population growth, and the colonial introduction of coffee cash cropping, furthermore made land increasingly scarce and ne­cessitated more intensive modes of cultivation to ensure people’s livelihoods.

Historical sources and longitudinal fieldwork indicate certain trends in the agricultural developments of the peo­ple of Rombo. First, their large livestock holdings gave way as grazing land was converted to fields and homesteads. Then, their diminishing banana gardens on the mountain­side made them reliant on seasonal maize cultivation in the plains. These fields were later converted to permanent homesteads, which are now often unable to feed their mem­bers due to erratic, insufficient, or even absent rainfall. As a result, the maize has migrated up the mountain: record le­vels of maize fields could be observed on the mountain slo­pes in 2008, thus diminishing the significance of banana cul­tivation and further reducing the area available for growing fodder. Such deforestation and environmental trans­formations into agricultural land are furthermore frequently mentioned as local contributors to warming the climate.

To a large extent, the people of Rombo have gone from agro-pastoralism over diversified agriculture to become increasingly reliant on a single crop. In this scenario, the presence or absence of water is the difference between food security and hunger. In contrast to Hemingway’s sto­ry, it is not the snow of Kilimanjaro, but rather its disap­pearance, that may spell death for the people who live on the mountain and in its immediate surroundings. Given the uncertain times that the people on and around Kili­manjaro undergo due to rapid climate change, it is no sur­prise that they take matters into their own hands. After all, it is perhaps better to slaughter some of your animals in the hope that this will bring rain, rather than waiting for all of them to die from lack of fodder and water.

Dr. Knut Christian Myhre is a Researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute. He heads the research project “Persons and Property in Kilimanjaro: Claims, Development and Legal Anthropology”.
The process of outsourcing African land for large scale production of food and energy to foreign investors and countries has accelerated over recent years. This is taking place in a situation where rural Africa remains poor and food insecure after decades of declining support by governments, international financial institutions and donors.

Most African land is owned or managed through customary ownership systems. Will the current surge by external investors, further endanger African food insecurity and undermine smallholders’ land rights, as sceptics argue, or will it increase rural wage employment, modernise agriculture, increase export incomes and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, as proponents of the outsourcing process claim?

The international media has painted a picture of massive land grabbing in Africa connected with the quest by external companies and governments to enhance their own food and energy securities. Some of the land deals reported are spectacular, however, information on the broader process and details about actors, terms of contract and implications of the land deals for host and investing countries are still unclear. Some evidence has, however, been forthcoming.

The driving forces of the process are; (1) the rapid increase worldwide in food prices in 2007 and 2008. Estimates indicate that the increasing demand from biofuels between 2000 and 2007 contributed 30 per cent to the increase in cereal prices. This development raised concern about food insecurity not only in poor but as well in a number of developed and transition countries, (2) rising oil prices and growing concern for the climate change has led to increasing interest in switching to non-fossil fuels, including ethanol and bio-diesel. The breakdown of the Copenhagen meeting in December 2009, is unlikely to halt this development in any substantial way, (3) African governments see an increasing potential for agriculture in their region due to higher land and commodity prices and major export potentials where land endowments are substantial, and (4) foreign as well as domestic investors are seeing possibilities to increase profits.

A key assumption for the rising interest and investments in acquisition and leasing of African land is the existence of large reservoirs of unused or underutilised land in Africa. Eighty percent of the global agricultural land reserve is located in Africa and South-America. This number is, however, highly contested, since, at least for Africa, much of the non- or underutilised land may still be part of agricultural systems or is being used for grazing, firewood collection or for other purposes. Since African governments are eager to attract foreign investors they have shown readiness to offer land to foreign investors even when customary land rights of rural smallholders and communities are undermined.

Secure access to African land through leasing by foreign investors is difficult to establish, and in particular, where states have the ultimate ownership to land which is managed through various communal and customary or other legal arrangements. Such are the situations in Mozambique, Tanzania and Ethiopia where land in principle cannot be purchased by external investors, but has to be leased. In Tanzania such leases may last from 33 to 99 years.

Another challenge facing external investors is the problem of purchasing land since nearly 90 percent of African land is managed under customary or community land ownership and only about 2-10 percent are under private or individualised ownership systems.

Following the customary rules, laws and legal regulations
regarding leases and acquisitions of African land thus requires a participatory and cumbersome process that includes all stakeholders. The environmental and agricultural challenges of a transformation to large scale, often water consuming, agricultural production, require additional awareness in the governance of the process. In many countries, it has been shown, however, that rapid conversion to, or planning of, large scale production has or is taking place without proper regulations, policies or even guidelines being in place. Environmental and Social Impact Assessments and/or investment studies have at times not been able to rectify weaknesses in the governance process in a situation of unclear policies, directives and legal aspects.

The concern about the process of outsourcing of African land for energy and food production has been growing and in fact, international research institutes and the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food have all provided recommendations to guide the land acquisition and lease process. The recommendations show consensus regarding the following aspects;

- that there shall be transparency in the negotiations,
- that the rights of local communities, including customary land rights, should be protected,
- that there shall be a sharing of benefits between local communities and investors,
- that environmental sustainability shall be ensured and
- that food security in the African countries and communities shall not be compromised.

Systematic reports on the spread of outsourcing of African land for energy and food show that land outsourced for energy exceeded that for food production for export or domestic use by 50 percent. The corresponding land investments were, however, higher in food production.

Overall, a few more systematic and preliminary findings indicate that there is a long way to go before the five recommendations mentioned above are attained. It is, in my opinion, highly unlikely that voluntary guidelines related to biofuel production can instil in external investors and interests, often in cooperation with powerful domestic partners, a genuine willingness to take proper concern for environmental, ecological and agricultural aspects as well as the land rights and livelihood concerns of African smallholders and pastoralists.
“WE’VE MADE GREAT PROGRESS against all odds”, says Moustapha Sidatt, leader of a cooperative in the Tagant area in the Sahel in central Mauritania.

On a high plateau, 90 square kilometers large, in the middle of the desert, dams, wells and new cultivation techniques, together with concerted efforts and good organization have helped Mauritanian peasants to raise their yields considerably over the last decades.

“The heat and the drought make many believe that life isn’t possible here. But for us, there is nothing better than the desert”, says Sidatt.

In the early 1980’s a great drought led to starvation in many areas of the Sahel. In the Tagant large numbers of both people and cattle died, trapped on top of the completely dry plateau. However, survivors started a cooperative movement. Mainly with manual labour, they have built roads down from the plateau, dams on top of it, and made great progress in their agriculture, leading to sharply increased yields.

This is one very favourable example. But can it be repeated elsewhere, and for Sub-Saharan Africa more generally? This is a question that has provoked a major discussion in international policy and research communities over the last few years. The steep rise in food prices in 2007 and 2008 – “the food price crisis” – added to the severity of the issue.

Poverty is still widespread in rural areas of Africa, where large majorities are dependent on agriculture. Can small scale agriculture lead the way out of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa? Can agricultural productivity increase enough to spur economic growth?

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Many African countries are net importers of food, despite having a majority of their population directly dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods. Agricultural productivity is generally much lower in Sub-Saharan Africa than anywhere else in the world. A pessimistic interpretation of this is that peasants and small scale farmers in the long run will be unable to support themselves on their small plots of land. An optimistic interpretation is that agricultural productivity could increase a lot from very low levels.

THEORETICALLY, for agricultural productivity to increase, the same amount of resources that are used for cultivation – labour, land, energy and machines – should result in a larger production than they do today. It is obvious that many different factors would influence this. Generally, peasants should have the possibility and the will to invest in their lands, to buy farming inputs and to use their labour effectively. What prevents them from doing this? Let’s start with a few observations:

• Recent case studies from several Sub-Saharan countries indicate that an increasing number of people in rural areas might be vulnerable to poverty. It is neither clear exactly what drives this vulnerability, nor if it is a general pattern;
• Recent studies indicate that peasants and small scale farmers experiencing high levels of risk invest in informal security systems. This makes them forego economic growth to much larger extents than earlier thought.
“A pessimistic interpretation of this is that peasants and small scale farmers in the long run will be unable to support themselves on their small plots of land. An optimistic interpretation is that agricultural productivity could increase a lot from very low levels.”

If these studies are correct, then risk, vulnerability and uncertainty would influence agricultural productivity in a negative way. But from where do such risks and vulnerability come? What risk factors are the most important for peasants and small scale farmers? There would of course be different sources of risk and vulnerability in each country, in each village and for each farmer. But there might also be risks that affect whole societies, nations and possibly sub-regions. What would these common risks, also called “covariate risks”, be and to what extent would they affect agricultural productivity negatively?

There is increasing talk about “fragile states”, and a majority of the countries in this (rather imprecise) category are found in Sub-Saharan Africa. But this is a fairly recent concept and it is difficult to tell if things are becoming any worse. Instead one might study “governance”, where available measures show low or very low quality of governance in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, there are very few cases where fragility is increasing or quality of governance decreasing. Bad as it is, this is an underlying risk factor, which has not increased.

If Sub-Saharan Africa is affected heavily, but in a stable way, by armed conflicts and bad governance, almost the opposite may be said about disasters. Africa is least affected by natural disasters of all continents. But when it is affected, the fact that countries are poor makes the consequences so much worse, as it did in the Sahel in the 1980s. The death tolls from natural disasters are higher in Africa.
than elsewhere. Furthermore, windstorms, floods and hydro­
meteorological disasters are on the increase as a result of
climate change.

The effect will be unevenly spread across the continent,
and within countries. Some of the poorest countries will
be worst hit, and in particular those farmers that depend
on rain-fed cultivation. The most severe effects will prob­
ably come from extreme climate events, such as droughts,
heavy rains and windstorms, just as happened in the
Tagant in the early 1980s. But the rise in temperature will
as well in itself have negative effects on yields, since grains
will be fewer and smaller. Yields for the major food crops
will start decreasing at a 1.5°C temperature increase. In­
creases above 3°C degrees will be damaging for most crops.

In parallel, weeds, pests and insects will be more prevalent.
Larger tracts of land will be no longer suitable for agricul­
ture and water scarcity will increase.

THE FOOD PRICE CRISIS and the increasing demand for land
(“land grabbing”) are, together with the economic down­
turn immediate risks. Increased prices are good news for
food producers who can earn more and invest to increase
productivity. However, higher prices have come with increa­
sed changes back and forth in prices (“volatility”), which
makes planning much more difficult. Thus, the food crisis
holds both good and bad news for small scale farmers.

The same could be said about the increased demand for
land. There are risks for evictions and land-lessness, but
also chances for improved techniques and higher wages.

WHEN WEIGHING THESE FACTORS together, it is clear that
peasants face enormous risks and uncertainties. Armed
conflicts and bad governance provide a very problematic
basis for agricultural development. However, they have re­
mained fairly stable for some time. More severe threats to
agricultural productivity will come from climate change,
in combination with demographic changes. Immediate
threats come from volatile food prices and from increased
demand for land. But, the latter also carries opportunities.

The example provided by the cooperative movement in
the Tagant region of Mauritania is something to learn from.

“We don’t know any better place to live than the desert,
and that has made us committed to survive and prosper here”, says Moustapha Sidatt.

Dr. Mats Hårsmar is a
Senior Research Associate
at the Nordic Africa Institute
with his research programme
“Productivity Potentials
and Poverty in Relation to
Sub-Saharan Agriculture”. 
NAI Research Consolidated in New Cluster Organisation

During 2009 research at the institute has been consolidated into four research clusters: Agrarian Change, Property and Resources (cluster leader: Kjell Havnevik); Conflict, Displacement and Transformation (cluster leader: Cyril I. Obi); Urban Dynamics (cluster leader: Ilda Lindell); and Globalization, Trade and Regional Integration (cluster leader: Fantu Cheru). The framework has now been laid for the recruitment of additional researchers and cooperation with external partners.

NAI Cooperation

In 2009 the institute signed a new three year agreement (2009–2011) with Sida departing from a focus on poverty, inequality and social exclusion and with the aim of enhancing and informing public debate of positive development and government alternatives.

Since 2008 the institute is the host of the Swedish Research Network on Livelihoods and Natural Resources. The institute has also an ongoing cooperation with the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). The three-party agreement between ACCORD (the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, in Durban, South Africa), the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and the institute has come into force during 2009. During 2009 NAI also signed an agreement on research cooperation with the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana. The research project, titled The African Union and the Challenge of Peace and Security in Africa, aims at generating research-based analysis and knowledge to inform critical policymaking institutions within the African Union and Nordic institutions engaging with the AU. Results of the project will be disseminated through policy dialogues and joint publications.

Discussions continued with CODESRIA (Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, in Dakar, Senegal) regarding our cooperation. The institute was also party to the formation of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) research network on Africa, initiated at a conference in Moscow in June 2009.

Commitment to Open Access

Publications from the Nordic Africa Institute are now available for free download from the Swedish Academic Archive Online, or “DiVA”. Almost 400 titles have been transferred to the DiVA archive during the autumn of 2009. DiVA is a publishing system for research publications and student theses and a digital archive for long-term safe preservation of publications.

NAI has taken a decision in principle to make all its scientific publications available as open access. The series Policy Dialogue, Policy Note, Current African Issues and Discussion Paper, published directly by the institute, can either be bought as print-on-demand at a cost price, or be downloaded for free from the DiVA archive.

The goal is to make books published in cooperation with external publishers available in the DiVA archive some time after publication.

First Six NAI Associates Installed

The Nordic Africa Institute launched an Associates Programme in 2009, in order to link leading researchers and Africa experts to the Institute. The long-term goal is to broaden the knowledge and experience base of the Institute as well as its network. The first six “NAI Associates”, who have been contracted with the Institute for three years, met in Uppsala for the first time on 4 November. NAI Associates will be recruited both from the Nordic region and from Africa.

“The objective of the Associates Programme is to connect individuals with deep experience and interest in our activities to the Institute,” says NAI Director Carin Norberg, who initiated the programme.

NAI Associates must have an independent position in their native countries and in their professional or academic community. They should add to the strengthening of NAI as a center of research and documentation on Africa in the Nordic Region. The first six NAI Associates are all from Sweden and Nigeria. The immediate goal now is to widen the circle of NAI Associates in the Nordic region.

The first six NAI Associates are:
- Göran Hydén, Professor Emeritus of political science at University of Florida in Gainsville, Fl.
- Bo Göransson, former director-general of Sida and former Swedish ambassador to Kenya.
- Bertil Odén, writer, lecturer and consultant, with focus on Africa and development cooperation.
- Eva Evers Rosander, Associate Professor of social anthropology.
- Dag Ehrenpreis, former Chief Economist of SIDA.
- Jimi Adesina, Professor of Sociology at Rhodes University in South Africa.

First Six NAI Associates Installed

Göran Hydén
Bo Göransson
Bertil Odén
Eva Evers Rosander
Dag Ehrenpreis
Jimi Adesina
A woman selling foodstuffs on the sidewalk, a day worker at the port, a tailor sewing dresses in the backyard – these are examples of how most people today earn a living in cities in Africa and beyond, in the ‘informal economy’. Many of them lack sufficient incomes, basic rights and experience hostility from their governments. Since long, they have struggled individually and silently. But ‘informal workers’ in many places are scaling up their resistance by creating organizations that voice their interests. To what extent are such organizations able to exercise influence? Who are their targets and what are their agendas? Who do they speak for? Who are their allies? And why are they joining transnational movements?

Informal economy associations in Sub-Saharan Africa have usually been regarded as being ‘inward-looking’, concerned mainly with welfare or with facilitating business, and built around idioms of kinship, of religious and ethnic affinities. While these collective forms are important, there is today a growing number of associations through which informal workers articulate claims and make themselves visible as political actors.

This new generation of associations openly challenge unfavourable regulations and policies, and publicly contests repressive actions such as harassment and evictions. At times, they use the media to make their concerns heard and appeal to the courts to defend constitutional rights. These associations are also contesting government discourses that portray informal workers as marginal and illegal. In contrast, they claim to be central to local and national economies, they stress the legitimacy of their livelihoods and demand legal recognition. While some of these...
new organizations speak for the ‘working poor’, others represent better-off constituencies. Indeed, we witness a diversification of collective initiatives, reflecting the great diversity of interests in contemporary informal economies.

The extent to which such associations achieve recognition and influence varies greatly, among associations and between different societal contexts. In some cases, associations are too weak to be able to develop political voice or fall prey to political cooptation. Other associations have sometimes managed to open up political spaces for advocacy and dialogue with governing powers, as is the case of the Kenya National Alliance of Street Vendors and Informal Traders, and the Cross-Border Traders Association in Zambia. Such associations often engage with dominant actors in complex and varying ways, using formal and informal channels, even combining opposition and patronage.

“While some of these new organizations speak for the ‘working poor’, others represent better-off constituencies.”

Whatever their tactics, their political role is not to be underestimated. In the context of heightened political competition in the multiparty era, politicians are well aware of the growing crowds in the informal economy. And indeed, the vast numbers of urban informal workers potentially make them and their organizations politically relevant. As one association leader in Maputo once explained: “We are a world! The political parties struggle to control this association”.

Paradoxically however, many such associations struggle
with lack of recognition from their authorities, even when fully registered and legal. This makes it critical for informal economy associations to find allies on which to lean on. They may seek alliances with a range of other organized actors, and engage in both ephemeral and lengthier collaborations. One such ‘alliance’ that is emerging in a number of countries is one between these associations and trade unions – although it’s specific configuration varies considerably. For example in Ghana, Mozambique and Zambia, labour federations have opened up for membership by informal economy associations. In Uganda and Malawi, they have created their own branches to organize informal and casual workers.

“Can trade unions claim to represent the concerns of informal workers? Can the interests of formal and informal workers be reconciled?”

IN SOME CASES, trade union involvement seems to have provided a platform for voicing the interests of casual and informal workers to government and private firms. But there are also difficulties and challenges involved in these relationships. Can trade unions claim to represent the concerns of informal workers? Can the interests of formal and informal workers be reconciled? While there are opposing stances on these issues, the answers to these questions can only be found on empirical investigation of how such ‘alliances’ are being constructed in practice.

A number of informal workers’ associations are also increasing their positions on this issue. An association of cross-border traders with members in several countries across Southern and Eastern Africa facilitates the mobility of traders between countries and lobbies the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa for greater liberalization of trade in the sub-region.

A number of informal workers’ associations also engage in international movements and activist networks. One such network is StreetNet International, with member organizations from across the Global South but with greatest representation from Africa. Through the network, local associations get to share experiences with sister associations abroad and also draw on their solidarity when they are repressed by their governments. This international experience and support has proved beneficial in the local struggles fought by member associations in countries such as Kenya, Mozambique and Malawi. In the account of a Malawian association leader, ‘When we have problems, the government knows that we have friends out there’.

INFORMAL WORKERS are thus moving out of isolation and invisibility. Through their associations, they are increasingly able to negotiate with dominant actors, to ally with other organised actors and become part of transnational networks.

Photo: MÅS Pål BG
SOME PEOPLE BELIEVE I have been with NAI since the institute was founded. This is wrong. True, I did come in the last millennium. But in 1962 I did not even know what the Nordic Africa Institute was. Certainly, one could say that I was busy constructing my predestination for NAI, by taking part in the U.S. anti-racist civil rights movement, and rejoicing the birth of a number of black nations in Africa.

I REMEMBER MY FATIGUE at the thought of writing about petty Finnish politics when, on my return from the US in 1964, I started to study Political Science at the Åbo Academy University. Instead I chose to write about Africa and so I needed NAI. In 1967 I spent a summer at NAI, which I had visited the year before, on a study tour that we organised within the Student Club for International Understanding at our university. At NAI we enjoyed an enthusiastic two hour speech by the acting director, Sven Hamrell.

I REMEMBER RIDING every day on rickety motorbike to NAI, then at Svartbäcksgatan. I remember the disturbing bang-ing sound of driving piles for the nearby future S:t Per mall. It was a lonely summer. But I remember my excitement over all the books, periodicals and documents. To this day I believe the NAI library with its competent and friendly staff is the one asset that cannot be substituted for anything else. If anybody touches it I will organise a volunteer army of library users for its defence.

I REMEMBER WELL why I came back to NAI in 1969. Both for those books and all, and to seek refuge from the student revolt, which I was an active part of. I felt that I needed to get more peace, less confrontation, and more studying done. I would be at NAI maybe one semester. Things turned out different.

I didn’t leave Uppsala. Africa didn’t leave me. I was not a lonely researcher for long. When Lars Rudebeck gathered some doctoral students in political science for an ongoing
I remember the new and elated feeling of getting my first travel grant in 1974 from NAI to do research in Zambia, on the political role of the workers in political development. But I did not get a Zambian research permit; to date my 1975 application has not been answered. It is in the pipeline, the Zambian embassy said. How long is the pipeline, I asked. While waiting, NAI allotted me a desk in the scholarship students’ room. There was not much difference between me and the staff, except that I was not paid. The whole staff (and me) could sit at a big round table to argue about who should make coffee, and perhaps also about Africa and institute plans.

I remember receiving a travel grant in 1977 from NAI to do research in Senegal, on the political role of the workers in political development. But I did not get a Senegalese research permit; to date my 1976 application has not been answered. It is in the pipeline, the Senegalese embassy said. How long is the pipeline, I asked. While waiting, NAI allotted me a desk in the scholarship students’ room. There was not much difference between me and the staff, except that I was not paid. The whole staff (and me) could sit at a big round table to argue about who should make coffee, and perhaps also about Africa and institute plans.

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April 6
The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation hosted a reception to welcome me. It was small, rich, heartwarming. It felt like a party in a friend’s living room.

I was given a book of photos: The Mountain World of Dag Hammarskjöld. I’ve always been drawn to mountains. My name, Shailja, is Sanskrit for “daughter of the mountain.”

Some feedback on my performance:
Moving and powerful, a scream in a whisper.
The muscles of language and body, of mind and passion, combine.
Ink addition to the power of the words you speak, is the power of speaking them at all.

April 10
I have a perennial fear when I write – that I don’t know enough to do the subject justice.

A passage I just read, in the book on mountains, illuminates the block for me:
A trip like this is always unfinished. It cries out for continuation. We attempt to nail down experiences in words that crumble under pressure. What I recount can scarcely reach – or be understood by – anyone who has not lived its like. But it is for them – and for myself – that I write. (Max Ström)

Christopher Okigbo, killed in 1967 in the Biafran War, reminds me why I must keep trying, and falling short:
We carry in our worlds that flourish
Our worlds that have failed....

Christopher Okigbo, Silences

April 12
Uppsala Cathedral was dark when we entered at 11pm, for the Easter Service.

I am not a fan of organized Christianity, with its historical legacies of patriarchy, colonialism. But I appreciate the power of Easter myth and ritual. Especially here, where the sun dies for six months, then returns to life.

The darkness flowered into the voices of the choir, which rose to the carved vaulted ceilings.

he lives again
he lives again!
Alleluia
Then, the careful lighting of candles, one huge chandelier at a time.
A tiny flame passed hand to hand along the rows of people, until everyone’s hands glowed with a lit candle.
The Swedish Lutheran service was led by a woman, Finnish-born, she emigrated to Sweden decades ago, as a young radical socialist, because the Finnish church did not allow women priests. She has just been appointed the fourth female bishop of the church. In the procession of celebrants, there were as many women as men. That deep healing peace of equality opened me fully to the beauty of the male baritones and basses in the choir.
When we came to the climax,
Christ is risen!
We raised our candles high. Jubilation tingled the nerves of my lofted arm, raised the hairs on my body.
The most beautiful sound of all was when we exited. Hundreds of candles seemed to sing, a capella, along with the choir, as the cathedral bells sent wild midnight carolling out over square and city.

May 7
On my desk today, a little vase spills over with delicate white Vitsippa – the wildflower that heralds the Swedish spring. Hand-gathered by a NAI colleague this morning – for your poetry.

May 15
Historian David Anderson, Director of the African Studies Centre at Oxford, was here to give a talk titled, provocatively:
Violence and Politics in Kenya’s Uncivil Society
I disagreed strongly with two of his major arguments: that political participation in Kenya is driven by what he terms “competitive authoritarianism”, and that the Kenya crisis was generated by an election that was “too close to call.”
In my response, I addressed some of his major omissions: the underlying economic drivers of the political crisis, and the long-term issues that fuelled the violent conflict in December 2007 and January 2008.

May 18
For every living creature that is male nine are sacrificed... the bodies are hung in a grove near the temple in Uppsala.
— Adam of Bremen, German Church historian, 1070
I want to make a dragon’s head, an angel, a devil. All experimentation implies great risk.
— Ingmar Bergman, legend of modern cinema, born and raised in Uppsala
The most telling – and compelling – line of a man’s body is that where his neck meets his shoulder.
— Shailja Patel, Bwagamoyo: The Father

What does the tortured masculinity of Ingmar Bergman have to do with Kenya’s post election-violence?
How do Nordic myths of male sacrifice gyrate the hips of small brown boys in colonial Zanzibar?
Find out on June 3rd, at the historic Slottsbiofagen, Uppsala, Ingmar Bergman’s first cinema.
I will deconstruct nine chokeholds of masculinity, with flashing blades of poetry.
Ritually hang them. Then resurrect them with a song of redemption.
It’s the world script premiere of Bwagamoyo: The Father, the second movement of my four-part work, Migritude.

May 20
My first Finland interview was in the tropical greenhouse of Helsinki’s Botanic Gardens. I revelled in orchids, scents of bloom and decay in the steamy air around us.
I’m staying at Hanaholmen, the Swedish-Finnish Cultural Center, on the tiny island of Hanasaari. Down at the shoreline, clear gray-green ripples lap the pebbles with a tenderness, a liquid musicality, that is inexpressibly lovely.

May 22
Over a hundred people sat or stood in the cold rain to watch me perform at Helsinki’s World Village Festival yesterday. Bravo, Finns.

June
Countdown to the moment of truth, the world script premiere of Bwagamoyo, on the stage of the Slotts Biofagen. The culmination of my residency.
I’m still re-working the script. Halfway through draft 27, as I keep seeing more to fix, I stumble on this, in an essay on Fanny and Alexander, Bergman’s quadruple-Oscar-winner, set and shot in Uppsala:
True, there are many things that do not make sense in this film — both in the internal narrative and the external aspects of the tale — but this is not necessarily a bad thing.
— Dan Schneider, Alternative Film Guide
I look at Draft 26 on my desk, heavily marked up, laden with post-it notes. I say to it with kindly condescension:
True, there are many things that do not make sense in you. But this is not necessarily a bad thing. It may lead to four Oscars.
All my tension and tiredness melt into laughter.
I’d choose to meet my world in jacaranda time, its shifting dappled light across my face that tessellates the blossoms into rhyme.

Rain churns Nairobi roadsides into slime littered with purple flowers like torn lace.

Five-week countdown to election time.

As if this villanelle were the sublime re-weaving of our fractured, looted space, I trudge gluey mud, I grope for rhymes.

Kalonzo, Raila, Kibaki tena – pantomime of sumo wrestlers threatens to efface thirty-eight million silenced. When’s their time?

And maybe this is love: hope wrapped in grime. Relinquish all the might-have-beens. Embrace each tiny possible, each less-than-perfect rhyme.

So I will choose this lilac song. Now I’m unfurled to small epiphanies of grace in bloody struggle. Joy, in jacaranda time, her lips curved, gentle, round the missing rhyme.

(1) Kalonzo, Raila, Kibaki - candidates vying for the Kenyan presidency
(2) Approximate population of Kenya, 2007

First published in The Literary Review
Open Access, the free online download of published research reports, articles, dissertations and other books, is a hot topic for universities and research institutions, in the North as well as in the South. The Open Access movement is a cornerstone in the attempt to create a fair and balanced flow of information.

The Nordic Africa Institute has successfully joined DIVA, The Swedish Academic Archive Online. Open Access is a hot topic for institutions in the North as well as for organizations in the South. From Africa’s point of view Open Access is not only a key for access to information, but also the key to dissemination of research produced in Africa.

The Nordic Africa Institute library has since its work with a strategic framework for the institute’s future followed the development of the Open Access movement in Africa. Looking back, there has been an emphasis on accessibility to sources published in the North rather than on dissemination of research published in Africa. Several initiatives are however underway to pave the way for Open Access in Africa.

During the last six years the debate among library professionals concerning Open Access and Africa has been focused on advantages and barriers. Several themes are consistent with the development in the North but some themes are reserved for the point of view of the South.

The advantages of moving towards Open Access are also all prevalent in the Northern debate.

Access to information, dissemination, and visibility are mentioned, but also the importance of lobbying for Open Access. Not only researchers have to be convinced, institutions have to be informed and convinced at the same time as competence and funding is lacking.

What singles out the debate in the South are themes concerning barriers as well as ethical perspectives on Open Access.

INASP (International Network for the Availability of Scientific Publications) and eIFL (Electronic Information for libraries) have programmes for building up or supporting Open Access. They also have several initiatives for access to licensed sources for developing countries.

INASP have also initiated a platform for online journals in Africa, AJOL (Africa Journals online). Under AJOL’s business model, African researchers can access the African journals free-of-charge, but researchers elsewhere must pay to access them.

This model is, however, not in line with the principles of Open Access. Anders Wändahl and Martha Garrett at INFORM (International Network for Online Resources and Materials) point out that there are risks with a pay-for-information model when it comes to dissemination of Africa produced research.

“Part of the research produced in developing countries mirrors the inequality in access to resources. Research produced locally does not always meet the standards set internationally. Why should libraries and researchers pay to read reports of possibly sub-standard research when there is so much high-quality research published via Open access? For researchers based in developing countries, there are even initiatives providing their institutions with free access to licensed sources published in the North. If one of the goals of AJOL is to draw attention to research in Africa, a much better approach would be to make the journals publishing African research available free via Open access.”

The ethical angle of Open Access in Africa puts new light on an old ghost. Researchers have to be persuaded of the advantages with publishing Open Access everywhere, still researchers head for high impact journals to publish in, in order to chase funding. The hesitance towards publishing Open Access is prevalent among African researchers as well as among their northern peers. Added to the hesitance are questions like: “Why should African researchers publish Open Access?”, “Are we second rate researchers?”, “What if our results are hijacked by researchers in the North?”.

In 2009 the Nordic Africa Institute library reviewed the library component of the institute. Part of the review concerned the relevance of its collection for research on Africa. Although the review was too small to draw any scientific conclusions some thoughts were confirmed in the interviews with stakeholders. Most researchers base their research on publications published in the North, especially when making citations. African researchers were cited from their northern publications. Literature published in the South was merely used for reading up on issues, to follow debate in the South.

Out of many researchers focused on the digital dive J.J. Britz and Peter J. Lor already in 2003 pointed out moral reflections concerning the information flow South-North. In short the authors argue that the South can make valuable contribution to the world’s body of knowledge and that there is a moral obligation for all of us to create a fair and balanced flow of information. For information specialists and professionals the Open Access movement is one cornerstone for this.
Communicating Research in a Changing Media Landscape

The Nordic Africa Institute is only in the beginning of an exploration of the possibilities of social media. The next step might be to stimulate our researchers to use social media channels when they participate in debates on African issues.

Do researchers involvement in Web 2.0 contribute to the quality of research or not? This is a burning issue for researchers as well as for civil servants like me who work with communications. From a dissemination point of view I believe we have to adjust to the new media landscape in order to improve our communications with our target groups. I also strongly believe that the new technological tools for creating dialogue are valuable and preferable to a more traditional one-way approach. I understand Web 2.0 as web-based tools and services aimed at facilitating collaboration and sharing of work between users.

In one sense the Nordic Africa Institute has already adjusted to the new opportunities for sharing of knowledge by adopting an Open Access policy. We believe that publicly funded research should be available on-line for free. Not, of course, by compromising the researchers’ legitimate need to publish in ways that give them necessary credits. Our ambition is rather to support Open Access publishing whenever it is possible. We recognize that the opportunities are growing and by adopting an approach to copyright that advocates “some rights reserved” rather than “all rights reserved” we aim to contribute to this process.

In another sense NAI is only in the beginning of an exploration of the possibilities in social media. We already have a lively Twitter page and aim at increasing our presence through tools such as Facebook and YouTube. This can be done without taking precious time from our researchers. The next step might be to stimulate our researchers to use social media channels when they participate in debates on African issues as well as to provide support for new ways of “harnessing collective intelligence” or “crowd sourcing” that are available. Several arguments are often spelled out, however, as inhibiting or preventing researchers from making use of the full possibilities of electronic communications: a) quality achieved through the review systems in cyberspace (crowd sourcing) is not as good as the traditional academic peer review system; b) time spent on social media draw energy and resources from traditional academic publishing; c) sharing work in progress and pre-publishing of results might be a threat to intellectual property rights and to an ambition to publish results before anyone else; d) bibliometrics as a measure of academic success and credibility do not include participation in social media.

On the first issue I would argue that a well working web based social network actually could offer a more efficient and broader response to work in progress than a more traditional peer review system since the option of mobilizing a critical mass of peers in cyberspace sometimes may be easier and less costly in both time and money. On the second issue of the time investment needed for involvement in web based fora, this depends on how we choose to use them. With search engines and applications like RSS we may not need to browse everything that is published but can be specific and selective in what we spend our time on. With a clear purpose I would argue that Web 2.0 could save us time. Thirdly, sharing work in progress and pre-publishing of results could naturally lead to violations of intellectual property right, but on the other hand it could also be seen as a way of tagging one’s name to a specific idea or finding.

Additionally, social media tools are not only useful for pre-publishing but could also be used for “post-publishing”, for dissemination and review purposes. The last issue, bibliometrics, is the most tricky one. As long as researchers do not get “cred” for airing their work in cyberspace there is a need for other incentives or motives for making use of “Social academia”. I hope I have pointed out some of them above.

Comments are welcome.
HENRIETTE GUNKEL

The Cultural Politics of Female Sexuality in South Africa
2009, 181 pp, 978-0-415-87269-0
Co-published with Routledge

Sexual identity has emerged into the national discourse of post-apartheid South Africa, bringing the subject of rights and the question of gender relations and cultural authenticity into the focus of the nation state’s politics. This book is a fascinating reflection on the effects of these discourses on non-normative modes of sexuality and intimacy and on the country more generally. While in 1996, South Africa became the first country in the world that explicitly incorporated lesbian and gay rights within a Bill of Rights, much of the country has continued to see homosexuality as un-African.

LIV HARAM AND C. BAWA YAMBA (eds)

Dealing with Uncertainty in Contemporary African Lives
2009, 226 pp, 978-91-7106-649-7

The articles in ‘Dealing with Uncertainty in Contemporary African Lives’ are based largely on work in Tanzania which has been spared much of the turmoil that elsewhere has uprooted populations and destroyed communities. Nevertheless they illuminate phenomena common throughout sub-Saharan Africa as modernity in its many guises undercuts old certainties, outmodes established knowledge of how to order life and deal with crises, introduces new hazards, and frustrates ambition and expectations. The case studies demonstrate both the increasing uncertainty and insecurity of life in contemporary Africa and the ways that people respond, including warding off and reaching out.

GAIM KIBREAB

Eritrea: A Dream Deferred
2009, 420 pp, 978-1-84701-008-7
Co-published with James Currey

Eritrean independence under the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (now the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice) became an international cause celebre during the 1980s. Eritrea was the first African nation to gain independence in the post-colonial period and appeared to be opening a new and progressive path in African politics. But the promise of the revolution was soon betrayed by the outbreak of war with Ethiopia, the PFDJ’s increasingly repressive domestic policies, its mismanagement of the country’s economy, and its hostile relations with its neighbours. In this well-researched first account of post-independence Eritrea, Gaim Kibreab gives a detailed and critical analysis of how things went woefully wrong and how the former ‘liberators’ turned into oppressors with no respect for the rule of law, human rights and religious freedom.

KJERSTI LARSEN (ed.)

Knowledge, Renewal and Religion – Repositioning and changing ideological and material circumstances among the Swahili on the East African Coast
2009, 310 pp, 978-91-7106-635-0

In the past decades religion has entered the political debate and is evoked in relation to a variety of events taking place around the world. Religion and religious differences, not political, economic or
social, are claimed to be the cause rather than an expression of – or even a reaction to – ongoing problems. Among the Swahili on the East-African Coast, this trend provokes questions related to whether we should approach what appears to be expressions of religious positioning in terms of renewal of previous understandings and relationships, or as a rephrasing of complex and conflictual matters that were always part of Swahili society. The papers in this book reveal that the Swahili are experiencing worsening economic, political and social conditions. Within these circumstances, Islam is invoked as a source of knowledge that not only explains the current state of life and living, but also gives directions on how to cope with and to change the situation for the better.

OKEY NDIBE & CHENJERAI HOVE (eds)

Writers, Writing on Conflicts and Wars in Africa
2009, 190 pp, 978-1-90670-452-0(HB); 978-1-90670-453-7(PB)
Co-published with Adonis & Abbey Publishers

Writers, Writing Conflicts and Wars in Africa is a collection of testimonies by various writers and scholars who have experienced, or explored, the continent’s conflicts and woes, including how the disruptions shape artistic and literary production. The book is divided into two broad categories: in one, several writers speak directly, and with rich anecdotal details about the impact wars and conflicts have had in the formation of their experience and work; in the second, a number of scholars articulate how particular writers have assimilated the horrors of wars and conflicts in their literary creations. The result is an invaluable harvest of reflections and perspectives that open the window into an essential, but until now sadly unexplored, facet of the cultural and political experience of African writers.

ROGER SOUTHELL & HENNING MELBER (eds)

A New Scramble for Africa? Imperialism, Investment and Development
2009, 440 pp, 978-1-86914-172-4

Published by the UKZN Press with support from the Nordic Africa Institute.

Dramatically escalating prices of raw materials, driven by rapid industrialisation in China and other countries of the global South as well as by looming world shortages, had for the few years preceding the financial meltdown and global recession of 2009 promoted a new scramble for Africa’s natural resources. In this important volume, the new scramble for Africa is placed in the historical context of imperialism and the contributors show important continuities with the original nineteenth-century scramble. However, while the previous scramble was between major European powers, today the continent provides a battleground for competition between the US, the European Union, China and other emerging players such as India and South Africa.

POLICY DIALOGUES

MATS UTAS

Sexual Abuse Survivors and the Complex of Traditional Healing.
(G)local Prospects in the Aftermath of an African War
2009, 56 pp, 978-91-7106-648-0

CURRENT AFRICAN ISSUES

DAN KUWALI

Persuasive Prevention: Towards a Principle for Implementing Article 4(h) and R2P by the African Union
2009, 70 pp, 978-91-7106-650-3

DANIEL VOLMAN

China, India, Russia and the United States. The Scramble for African Oil and the Militarization of the Continent

DISCUSSION PAPER

RON SANDBEY AND HANNAH EDINGER

Examining the South Africa-China Agricultural Trading Relationship
NAI Publications
PUBLISHED BY THE INSTITUTE IN 2009

POLICY NOTES

1. Causes and Cures of Oil-related Niger Delta Conflicts
   Ukoha Ukiwo

2. Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeeping Operations in Contemporary Africa
   Fanny Rudén & Mats Utas

3. Les migrations de travail: une question qui concerne aussi les enfants et les jeunes
   Dorte Thorsen

4. The African Union and the Challenges of Implementing the “Responsibility to Protect”
   Dan Kuwali

   Mattias Engdahl

   Ukoha Ukiwo

7. The Impact of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Reform on Africa-EU Trade in Food and Agricultural Products
   Paul Goodison

8. Impact de la réforme de la Politique agricole commune (PAC) sur le commerce des produits agricoles entre l’Afrique et l’UE
   Paul Goodison

9. Situating the EPA Negotiations – Issues and Unresolved Debates in Africa-EU Trade Relations
   Paul Goodison

10. EPAs and the post-Lisbon Implementation Status
    Nkululeko Khumalo and Fantu Mulleta

11. Africa-China-EU Co-operation in Africa – prospects and pitfalls
    Chris Alden and Elizabeth Sidirooulos

12. Participation of the Diaspora in the Joint Africa-EU Strategic Partnership
    Awil Mohamoud

SELECTED DOWNLOAD STATISTICS

NAI publishing is increasingly in the form of electronic documents that are freely downloadable, earlier from the NAI web site and now from DIVA, the Swedish Academic Archive Online. These are download statistics for a selection of publications (total number of downloads since publication).


Activities

LECTURES AND PUBLIC SEMINARS

South Africa’s Difficult Choice

Africa in the New World – How global and domestic developments will impact by 2025

Promoting development in fragile states: What have we learned?
13 March in Uppsala, Sweden. Derick Brinkerhoff (George Washington University’s Trachtenberg School of Public Policy and Public Administration).

Power – the missing link in development policy analysis

How the Financial Crisis Influences Africa

Violence and Politics in Kenya’s Uncivil Society

Transformation of an African town, Shesemene, Etiopien
19 May in Uppsala, Sweden. Gunilla Bjerén (Stockholm University), Atakilte Beyene (Stockholm Environment Institute). Co-arranged with the Swedish Research Network on Livelihoods and Natural Resources.

Moving Out of Poverty – Success from the Bottom Up

Financing Social Policy: Mobilizing Resources for Social Development

Governance challenges related to outsourcing of African land for energy and food – implications for smallholders, human rights and the environment

Democratisation and Parliamentary Opposition in Contemporary South Africa

Book launch: A New Scramble for Africa? Imperialism, Investment and Development
29 September in Uppsala, Sweden. Henning Melber (Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation), Cyril Obi (NAI).

Changing Social Policy: The Child Support Grant in South Africa

Next Government Official? Southern African NGOs and Power
8 October in Uppsala, Sweden. Kumi Naidoo (Civicus, South Africa), Maxi Schoeman (University of Pretoria, South Africa). Co-arranged with the Centre for Sustainable Development, Uppsala University.

The United States and Africa – Reconciling the Challenges of Security Cooperation

Social Protection for the Poor and Poorest: Concepts, Policies and Politics

Governance Reform from Below

Currency and Dependency in the Central African Sub-region: The Case of Cameroon in the Franc Zone

The Maghreb Today: Challenges in the Context of the Global Financial Crisis and Mediterranean Integration

Social Policy in a Development Context

Claude Ake Memorial Lecture:
Europe and the Challenge of African Integration
16 December in Uppsala, Sweden. Yash Tandon (South Centre, Switzerland). Co-arranged with the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.
Activities

CONFERENCES AND WORKSHOPS

Social protection – Cash Transfers and Social Benefits in Africa.
2 February in Stockholm, Sweden. Convener: Göran Holmqvist. Co-organised with the Institute for Futures Studies, Swedish Save the Children and SIDA.

The Nordic Documentation Project on the Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa: The Icelandic People’s involvement and Lessons Learnt.

African Research – How Can Uppsala University Be a Strong Partner?

Migration, Diasporas and Development: Trans-Atlantic Perspectives.

Nordic/Baltic Meeting on Africa.

What’s Culture Got to Do with it.

Darfurians on Peace – Drawing on Civil Society Concerns for Sustainable Reconciliation.

Africa in Search of Alternatives; The Nordic Africa Days.
1–3 October in Trondheim, Norway. Conveners: Africa Network Norway and NAI.

Land, Poverty, Norms and Agrarian Change in Ethiopia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

Building the African Union institutional architecture Progress achieved, new perspectives and possible support by the EU.

The Documentation Initiatives on the Liberation Struggles in South Africa.

THE INSTITUTE IN THE MEDIA

A selection of interviews, op-eds and articles with NAI researchers and staff during 2009.

"Nordisk Afrika-institut chef: Lighed og social velfærd skaber vækst" 14 December on the website U-Landsnyt.dk (Denmark). Column by Director Carin Norberg.

"Chinese company in talks over major Nigerian oil contracts" 29 September in Radio France International. Cyril Obi on Nigeria-China oil relations

"Afrika tema för nästa mässa. Carin Norberg på Nordiska Afrikainstitutet försvarar beslutet" 29 September in Upsala Nya Tidning (Sweden). Interview with Director Carin Norberg.

"Bokmässans tema upprör. Om valet av ‘Afrika’ som tema för 2010 års Bok & Biblioteksmässa" 28 September in Svenska Dagbladet (Sweden). Interview with Director Carin Norberg.

"Det är jag som är det biståndsin­dustriella komplexet" 28 August on the Newsmill web site (Sweden). Comment by Göran Holmqvist.


"Har barnsoldater någon framtid?" 9 July in Swedish TV4, “Nyhetsmorgon”. Interview with Mats Utas on child soldiers.

"Inbäddade antropologer" 1 July in Swedish Public Service Radio ‘Vetandets värld’. Interview with Mats Utas.

"Manligheten under lupp. Världspremiär för Shailja Patels företällning The Father" 3 June in Upsala Nya Tidning (Sweden). Interview with Shailja Patel.


"No peace in Kenya without justice" 20 May in YLE/Radio Vega (Finland) and 22 May at website Kepa. Interviews with guest writer Shailja Patel.

"Europas dystra historia tynger. De postkoloniala relationerna och biståndspolitiken hämmar EU:s möjligheter i Afrika" 3 April at website Fokus (Sweden). Comment by Fantu Cheru.

"The Weakest Link. Commodity-rich Africa profited when the world was growing. Now that it’s not, it will be the hardest hit" 16 March in Newsweek (US). Interview with Göran Holmqvist.

"Studenter virkar i barättunni gegen adskinadarstefnunni" 26 February in Morgunblaðið (Iceland). Interview with Proscovia Svärd.

"Statsminister med dårlige odds" 11 February in Vårt Land (Norway). Interview with Amanda Hammer.

"Tvsgvalir svar eden – åntílegen" 11 February in Hufvudstadsbladet (Finland). Interview with Amanda Hammar.

Activities

PUBLICATIONS BY STAFF

BOOKS
(single authored or edited)

Ngangjoh-Hodu, Y. and F. Matambalya (eds), Trade Relations Between the EU and Africa: Development, Challenges and Options Beyond the Cotonou Agreement, London: Routledge.

REFEREED ARTICLES IN JOURNALS


REFEREED BOOK CHAPTERS


Activities

PUBLICATIONS BY STAFF


BOOK REVIEWS


OTHER PUBLICATIONS


Palmberg, M.: Revision and updating of texts for Nationalencyklopedin www.ne.se

– Zimbabwe – Statsskikk och politik
– Zimbabwe – Historia
– Zimbabwe – Sociala förhållanden
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Mia Horn af Rantzén, University Library.

**SWEDEN**
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Inger Österdahl, Professor of International Law, Uppsala University.
Ulf Göranson, Director, Uppsala University Library.
Mia Horn af Rantzén, Deputy Director General, Sida (substitute member).

**STAFF REPRESENTATIVES**
Susanne Linderos, Information Manager

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<td>Mats Utas,</td>
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**RESEARCH**

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<tr>
<td>Karolina Winbo</td>
<td>Project Coordinator/ Research Administrator (on leave)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ADMINISTRATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peter Engemar</td>
<td>IT-Technician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent Eriksson</td>
<td>Office Caretaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack Hagström Academic</td>
<td>Receptionist (until June)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susanne Hagström</td>
<td>HR Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulfira Kolsmyr</td>
<td>Accounts Assistant (until March)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narek Krehla</td>
<td>IT-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louise Simann</td>
<td>Accounts Manager (until March)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GUEST RESEARCHERS 2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr Babatunde Ahonsi</td>
<td>Women’s Health and Action Research Centre, Benin City, Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Katarina Bajziková</td>
<td>University Matej Bel, Banska Bystrica, Slovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Martin Sango Ndeh</td>
<td>University of Buea, Buea, Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Kirsten Holst Petersen</td>
<td>Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Maxi Schoeman</td>
<td>University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Ole Steinit</td>
<td>Oslo, Norway</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GUEST WRITER 2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ms Shailja Patel</td>
<td>Nairobi, Kenya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### PHD SCHOLARSHIPS

**Ranne, Katriina**  
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)  
Project: "The Image of water in constructing the idea of life in the poetry of Euphrase Kezilahabi"

**Sonnichsen, André**  
Copenhagen University  
Project: "Unmaking ‘the people’: Collective identity and social differentiation in post-apartheid South Africa"

**PhD sCholArshiPs**  
Ranne, Katriina  
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)  
Project: "The Image of water in constructing the idea of life in the poetry of Euphrase Kezilahabi"

**Niklas Hållén, Umeå University, Sweden**  
Project: "The object of the other: Material objects in late 19th century British travel literature about Africa"

**Egill Þór Nielsson, University of Iceland, Iceland**  
Project: "Black on white: Occidental colonialism and slavery in the Nordic countries"

**Mari Johanna Kervinen, University of Joensuu, Finland**  
Project: "History of understanding HIV/AIDS: Knowledge, change and comprehension in a Namibian village community"

**Tendai Chella, Norwegian University of Life sciences (UMB), Norway**  
Project: "Why is Zimbabwe’s stock market displaying bullish behaviour? Speculative determinants for the high performance of the Zimbabwe stock exchange in a hyper inflationary environment"

**Egill Þór Nielsson, University of Iceland, Iceland**  
Project: "Black on white: Occidental colonialism and slavery in the Nordic countries"

**Ingibjörg Dórnisoldur, University of Iceland, Iceland**  
Project: "Ignorant or instinctive? The image of African mothers in a historical context"

**Mariama Zaami, University of Bergen, Norway**  
Project: "Gendered strategies among migrants from northern Ghana in Accra"

### STUDY SCHOLARSHIPS

**Jaakko Allio, University of Tampere, Finland**  
Project: "Politics of the globalization of HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa"

**Anna Backman, Åbo University, Finland**  
Project: "Stephen Biko and the black consciousness movement"

**Priscilla Akua Boakye, University of Tromsø, Norway**  
Project: "DIPØ–Puberty rites among the Krobo of Eastern region, Ghana"

**Sanni Ojanen, Tampere University, Finland**  
Project: "Somalis in Finnish research"

**Nuno Martins, University of Jyväskylä, Finland**  
Project: "China’s soft power in Angola: What lies beneath and what lies ahead"

**Olowo Eria Onyango, University of Bergen, Norway**  
Project: "Pastoralism and conflict in African drylands: Confronting persistence violence in an armed society: The case of the Karimojong in North-eastern Uganda"

**Teke Jacob Ngomba, University of Aarhus, Denmark**  
Project: "Political communication in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Cameroonian experience in a global perspective"

**Ingibjörg Jóhannsdóttir, University of Iceland, Iceland**  
Project: "Ignorant or instinctive? The image of African mothers in a historical context"

**Narve Nub Kveseth Rotwitt, University of Oslo, Norway**  
Project: "Somalia and ‘The Union of Islamic Courts’: New dimensions of political control in a stateless society"

**Mari Paus, Institut for kunst of kulturvidenskab, Denmark**  
Project: "Reconciliation and musical hybrids: Interculturalism in South African popular music"

**Martina Savio, University of Tromsø, Norway**  
Project: "Child labour, coltan mining and state failure: Cases from the Democratic Republic of Congo"

**Carrie Turunen, University of Jyväskylä, Finland**  
Project: "Promotion of women as physical education teachers in Tanzania"

**Johanna Turunen, University of Joensuu, Finland**  
Project: "United Nations’ Security Council in defining ethnic violence in contemporary Sudan and Democratic Republic of the Congo"

**Crystal Simeoni, Dalarna University, Sweden**  
Project: "The challenge of hope: dairy cooperatives in Kenya – Addressing issues of governance and value addition"

**Neema Seguya, University of Tromsø, Norway**  
Project: "Challenges in conflict resolution: Case of the Juba peace process in Uganda (2006 - 2008)"

**Constance Nombeko Pali, Oslo University College, Norway**  
Project: "Challenges to HIV and AIDS programs in selected Free State High Schools"

**Constance Nombeko Pali, Oslo University College, Norway**  
Project: "Challenges to HIV and AIDS programs in selected Free State High Schools"

**Maya Yullstiani Minwary, Norwegian University of Life sciences (UMB), Norway**  
Project: "I want a bite too: Revenue sharing and power relation in Enduiment Wildlife Management Area, Longido District, Tanzania"

**Masip Farid Ikken, Stockholm University, and Poppius Journalistskola, Sweden**  
Project: "Press freedom and the media in Africa today"

**Maya Yullstiani Minwary, Norwegian University of Life sciences (UMB), Norway**  
Project: "I want a bite too: Revenue sharing and power relation in Enduiment Wildlife Management Area, Longido District, Tanzania"

**Carrie Turunen, University of Jyväskylä, Finland**  
Project: "Promotion of women as physical education teachers in Tanzania"

**Johanna Turunen, University of Joensuu, Finland**  
Project: "United Nations’ Security Council in defining ethnic violence in contemporary Sudan and Democratic Republic of the Congo"

**Mariana Zaami, University of Bergen, Norway**  
Project: "Gendered strategies among migrants from northern Ghana in Accra"
# FINANCIAL STATEMENT 2009

## EXPENDITURES
(Swedish kronor, even thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>RESEARCH</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>12 606</td>
<td>12 981</td>
<td>11 015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scholarships and grants</td>
<td>2 079</td>
<td>2 215</td>
<td>1 871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmes (including housing for researchers and scholarship holders)</td>
<td>7 816</td>
<td>4742</td>
<td>3915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Research</strong></td>
<td>22 501</td>
<td>19 938</td>
<td>16 801</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LIBRARY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>4 144</td>
<td>4 114</td>
<td>4 375</td>
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<tr>
<td>Programmes</td>
<td>1 572</td>
<td>1 259</td>
<td>1 014</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Library</strong></td>
<td>5 718</td>
<td>5 375</td>
<td>5 389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMUNICATIONS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>4 376</td>
<td>4 343</td>
<td>4 290</td>
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<tr>
<td>Programmes</td>
<td>2 152</td>
<td>2 077</td>
<td>1 621</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Communications</strong></td>
<td>6 528</td>
<td>6 420</td>
<td>5 913</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ADMINISTRATION</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>6 186</td>
<td>6 247</td>
<td>4 683</td>
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<tr>
<td>Premises</td>
<td>6 760</td>
<td>6 870</td>
<td>6 945</td>
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<tr>
<td>Programmes</td>
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<td>4 627</td>
<td>4 467</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capital change per year</td>
<td>-836</td>
<td>-691</td>
<td>-372</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Administration</strong></td>
<td>17 473</td>
<td>17 053</td>
<td>15 723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL ALL NAI</strong></td>
<td>52 220</td>
<td>48 786</td>
<td>43 826</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is a summary of the expenditures report from the NAI Annual Audit Report to the Swedish government. The full Audit Report (in Swedish only) is a public document and can be downloaded from the NAI web site (under “About Us” -> “Organisation” -> “Reports”).
## FINANCIAL STATEMENT 2009

### PAID CONTRIBUTIONS
from the Nordic Governments and SIDA
(Swedish kronor, even thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>27 836</td>
<td>27 498</td>
<td>27 682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4 856</td>
<td>3 255</td>
<td>1 157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>3 654</td>
<td>3 711</td>
<td>4 048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>3 854</td>
<td>4 716</td>
<td>4 950</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uppsala University Library</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>1 076</td>
<td>1 096</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>5 341</td>
<td>6 055</td>
<td>6 153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1 659</td>
<td>4 295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>47 444</strong></td>
<td><strong>48 220</strong></td>
<td><strong>49 641</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difference between expenditures and contributions is a result of differing periodisation of payments over the working year. Source: The Swedish Government Legal, Financial and Administrative Services Agency (Kammarkollegiet).
### How we are changing:

#### THE NAI EXPENDITURE BUDGET 2009–2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>15,050,000</td>
<td>15,270,000</td>
<td>15,100,000</td>
<td>15,070,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>of which</td>
<td>6,200,000</td>
<td>5,140,000</td>
<td>5,200,000</td>
<td>4,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>premises</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>16,800,000</td>
<td>19,325,000</td>
<td>20,590,000</td>
<td>18,030,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Africa 2010/ECAS</td>
<td>670,000</td>
<td>3,430,000</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>5,910,000</td>
<td>5,110,000</td>
<td>5,210,000</td>
<td>5,510,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>5,400,000</td>
<td>5,490,000</td>
<td>5,220,000</td>
<td>5,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>43,830,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>48,625,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>48,620,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>48,810,000</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(Swedish kronor)

- Premises down 27.5 percent in three years
- Research up 7.5 percent in three years
- Library down 4 percent in three years
Apply for Scholarships from the Nordic Africa Institute

Study Scholarships

The primary purpose of the Study Scholarships is to facilitate use of the Nordic Africa Institute’s large library collections on contemporary Africa (books, periodicals, newspapers, government publications) and usage of its databases. The scholarship recipient is therefore offered his/her own working place at the Institute and free accommodation in a shared student apartment for the duration of one month. The Scholarships also cover travelling expenses (equivalent to the least expensive return fare from the place of residence in a Nordic country) and daily allowances during the stay in Uppsala.

Eligibility criteria:
The Study Scholarships are intended for students, who have completed basic academic education (Bachelor’s degree), pursuing Africa-oriented studies at universities and colleges in the Nordic countries, and for Africa-oriented journalists and textbook writers.

Application forms and directions are obtained through the Internet: www.nai.uu.se/scholarships/

Application deadline:
Please note that the scholarships are now awarded only once a year and applications must be in by
- 1 October for the period January–June and mid-August – mid-December

Inquiries: Inga-Britt.Faris@nai.uu.se

PhD Scholarships

The primary purpose of the PhD Scholarships is to facilitate use of the Nordic Africa Institute’s large library collections on contemporary Africa and usage of its databases. The scholarship recipient is therefore offered his/her own working place at the Institute and free accommodation in a shared student apartment for the duration of one or two months. The Scholarships also cover travelling expenses (equivalent to the least expensive return fare from the place of residence in a Nordic country) and daily allowances during the stay in Uppsala.

Eligibility criteria:
The PhD Scholarships are intended for students pursuing Africa-oriented studies for a PhD degree at universities and colleges in the Nordic countries. The applicants’ PhD studies should relate to current research at the Institute. For information about the Nordic Africa Institute’s thematic research clusters, see: www.nai.uu.se/research/

Application forms and directions are obtained through the Internet: www.nai.uu.se/scholarships/

Deadline:
Applications must be in by
- 1 October for the scholarship periods January – June and August – December

Inquiries: Inga-Britt.Faris@nai.uu.se

Travel Scholarships

The primary purpose of the Travel Scholarships is to facilitate research or preparation of research projects in Africa by sponsoring research trips to Africa.

Eligibility criteria:
The Travel Scholarships are intended for researchers in the Nordic countries pursuing research on Africa within the discipline of Social Sciences or closely related disciplines such as, anthropology, history, economics, and human geography. The scholarships are mainly intended for young researchers, but applications from established researchers will also be considered. Applicants should have completed basic academic education (Bachelor’s degree).

The Scholarships cover travel expenses in connection with fieldwork in Africa. They cannot be used for salaries, or for study visits, excursions, language studies, participation in conferences, or volunteer work.

Application forms and directions are obtained from the Internet: www.nai.uu.se/scholarships/

Deadline:
- Applications must be in by 31 January

Inquiries: Ingrid.Andersson@nai.uu.se
Jatropha harvest. The Jatropha produces a seed oil which can be used as diesel oil substitution for power plants or diesel engines.

Photo: Jonasson/SCANPIX