

**NAI-FOI
lecture series
on
African Security**

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Nordiska Afrikainstitutet
The Nordic Africa Institute



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Introduction

In 2008, the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI) and the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) initiated a pilot collaboration project on African Security. Among the main themes and components of the collaboration was a joint lecture series on African Security, mutual support in quality reviews, information exchanges and coordination of contacts and competencies from the respective organisation's networks. The collaboration agreement between the two institutions for the period 2009-10 had the main objective of establishing a solid basis for cooperation and capacity-building in Africa-related research on peace and security issues. In line with this collaboration objective, cooperation on Africa-related research on peace and security issues has continued and the lecture series remains one of the key expressions of this cooperation.

The Annual Report 2009 includes the papers presented during the 2009 lecture series. The Report has been edited by Dr. Cyril Obi, leader of the conflict cluster at NAI 2009-11.

Carin Norberg
Director
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About NAI

The Nordic Africa Institute (NAI, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet) is a centre in the Nordic region for research, documentation and information on modern Africa. Based in Uppsala, Sweden, the institute is dedicated to providing timely, critical and alternative research on and analysis of Africa in the Nordic countries and to strengthening cooperation between African and Nordic researchers.

As a hub and meeting place in the Nordic region for a growing field of research and analysis, the institute strives to put knowledge of African issues within reach of scholars, policy-makers, politicians, media, students and the general public. The institute is financed jointly by the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden).

About FOI

FOI (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, Swedish Defence Research Agency), is an assignment-based agency under the auspices of the Swedish Ministry of Defence. Its core activities are research, development of methodology and technology as well as studies in defence and security.

The organisation employs around 950 people, of whom about 700 are researchers (2009). This makes FOI the largest research institute in Sweden.

FOI provides its clients with leading expertise in many fields, such as security policy studies and defence and security analyses; assessment of different threats; systems for the control and management of crises; protection against and management of hazardous substances; IT-security and the potential of new sensors.

Acknowledgements

This report, the first of its kind, is the product of the efforts of a dedicated team to document the memorable features and highlights of the collaborative NAI-FOI African Security Lecture Series.

I have had the wonderful experience of working with my colleague Tania Berger, who efficiently and professionally administered the practical aspects of the programme and in many ways facilitated the compilation of the report. Contributions were also made by NAI interns: Martin Andersson and Cecilia Uddenfeldt contributed to the processing of the papers into coherent summaries, and Sofia Widforss, who also worked on the papers, took the photos and conducted the interviews published at the end of this report.

Thanks also go to all our colleagues at FOI, particularly Markus Derblom and Camilla Elowson, with whom we worked directly; to NAI Director Carin Norberg; and to all the guest lecturers, discussants and participants for their contributions to the success of the NAI-FOI African Security Lecture Series.

Cyril Obi

NAI-FOI LECTURE SERIES ON AFRICAN SECURITY OVERVIEW FOR 2009

Cyril Obi

The 2009 lectures were structured around critical issues in African security. These span six issue areas, including an introduction to African Security, Country Case Studies 1: the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia); Country Case Studies 2: Southern Africa (South Africa, Zimbabwe and Angola). The other areas are Arms Proliferation, Transnational Risks and Regional Security in Africa, Foundations of Swedish Foreign Relations and Development Cooperation in Africa and the Challenges of Democracy, Development and Security in Africa. Leading scholars and practitioners in the field of African security from Sweden, Africa and across the world acted as resource persons by giving the lectures and providing deep insights into the varied aspects of Africa's security, and were supported in this by well-versed discussants.

Then in its second year, the NAI-FOI African Security Lectures Series took place against the background of a need for well-informed analysis and understanding of Africa's complex security challenges. The lectures focused on the theoretical, political, socioeconomic, military and policy challenges confronting African security at sub-state, state, regional and transnational levels. Building on the foundation laid in 2008, the series was designed to empower participants, who are Swedish security and defence analysts and senior policy-makers, with the tools to interpret the complex dimensions of and emerging issues in Africa's security and development, and respond in constructive and systematic ways to them. The lectures also brought in resource persons with strong multidisciplinary expertise to facilitate understanding of the conceptual and analytical basis for capacity-building in research on peace and security issues in Africa.

The series was framed within the context of the changes in the conceptual, definitive and analytical frameworks of security in the post-Cold War world. The thrust was to broaden the notion of 'security' and 'threat' beyond the traditional state-centric, regime or realist perspectives to encompass much broader non-military considerations, including economics, politics/governance, environment/energy and the sociocultural, particularly in the African and global contexts. Equally relevant in the 2009 lectures was the focus on other levels of security below or above the state: human beings, communities and indigenous peoples; regions; non-state actors; and cross-border, transnational actors and networks associated with the expansionist logic of globalisation. Thus, emerging threats are perceived to be those posed by 'failed' states but also – and equally – those associated with environmental degradation, climate change, uncontrolled migration, pandemics, transnational criminal networks as well as international terrorists.

The lecture series demonstrates the benefits of collaboration between NAI, a centre of excellence for research on Africa and a meeting place for those with a keen interest in the continent, and FOI, a centre of excellence for applied research on defence and security. The coming together of NAI

and FOI as co-organisers of this series of lectures since 2008 has given rise to a credible platform for promoting informed analysis and competence on African security. In 2009 the pertinent questions were: How can Africa be located in the emerging paradigms of international security? Whose security is really at stake in Africa? How can external actors best engage with Africa's security challenges in a realistic and non-paternalistic manner? What is the connection between development and security in the African context?

In this regard, the lectures underscore the cardinal importance of understanding the historical context and dynamics of African security. In moving from the broad continent-wide dimension to the regional and country case studies, course participants were exposed to insights and informed knowledge on African security by leading international experts. Apart from explaining the sources and nature of these security challenges, equal attention was directed at Africa's responses to its security challenges. In this regard, Africa's emerging security culture, and the role of the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in its Peace and Security Architecture (PSA) received critical attention.

Other lectures explored the transnational risks and security threats posed by trans-border actors, mostly of a criminal or violent nature, and the political and developmental perspectives on security in Africa. Beyond the usual focus on the implications for the rest of the world of transnational threats emerging on the continent, participants were exposed to the efforts of regional organisations and national governments to address these threats, and encouraged to participate in a dialogue on new options for comprehensively addressing these threats based on case studies from West and Southern Africa and the Horn. These discussions dovetailed with discussions on Swedish development cooperation in the context of promoting peace and security in Africa.

This was followed by a critical examination of the linkages between democracy, development and security and the challenges these pose both for Africa and the international community. In turn, this examination provided both a context and framework for wrapping up the critical issues raised in the preceding lectures, and for looking forward to 2010.

Reflections on the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in African Security

Fredrik Söderbaum (and Rodrigo Tavares)



FREDRIK SÖDERBAUM is Associate Professor and Deputy Director of the School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, and Senior Associate Research Fellow at the United Nations University-Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS), Bruges, Belgium. His latest books include *EU and the Global South* (co-edited with Patrik Stålgren, Lynne Rienner, 2009); *Afro-regions: The Dynamics of Cross-Border Micro-regionalism in Africa*

(co-edited with Ian Taylor, Nordic Africa Institute, 2008); *The EU as a Global Player: The Politics of Inter-regionalism* (co-edited with Luk van Langenhove, Routledge, 2006); *The Political Economy of Regionalism: The Case of Southern Africa* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). He has also produced commissioned reports as a consultant for various government agencies in the field of peace and development.

Conflicts are deeply embedded in a regional and cross-border context, even though contemporary conflicts are more often than not defined as ‘domestic’ conflicts. The spill-over of conflict into neighbouring countries has been common in Africa, thereby underscoring the importance of regional coordination, action and intervention by affected neighbouring countries, often through regional organisations.

Tackling ‘African problems through African solutions’ was the main impetus behind the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU). The notion of African Solutions to African Problems (ASAP) has been ‘forcefully’ encouraged by Western powers. The proposal to set up the African Standby Force was put forward by the AU’s Peace and Security Council (AU-PSC), which aims to use this standby force for peace support operations (PSOs) and interventions across the continent.

Some degrees of difference exist in outlook and style among regional organisations in Africa, such as the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). The differences lie in diverse perceptions of threat, historical experiences and cultural backgrounds, hence the

varying strategies to maintain peace and security and the differing relations with the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations involved in peace processes.

The AU is an intergovernmental international organisation formed in 2002 as a successor to the OAU, which since 1963 had been the primary forum for debating African unity and cooperation. The AU has 14 objectives, ranging from the enhancement of economic integration and political cooperation in Africa to the promotion of democratic principles and good governance. A number of fundamental principles, among them the ‘promotion of self-reliance within the Union’s framework, promotion of gender equality and social justice, respect for the sanctity of human life,’ guide the functioning of the organisation. Pan-Africanism and many other AU principles and programmes represent continuity with the OAU, but the AU’s founders assert that the organisation is more than just a continuation of its predecessor. There are three main differences: the institutional structure, the shift to development issues and the new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The AU is modelled on the European Union (EU), while the OAU was said to be based on the United Nations.

The AU’s organs include an African Commission, a Pan-African Parliament, the Council of Min-

isters, the Assembly of Heads of State and a Court of Justice (to rule on human rights abuses). While the OAU was criticised for being an instrument for corrupt and authoritarian ruling elites, the AU has increased emphasis on good governance and democracy and aspects such as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), which aims to promote self-monitoring by African leaders on the basis of transparent principles. The dominant view within the OAU up to the 1990s was that Africa was negatively affected by its dependence on ex-colonial powers. Its policy of 'collective self-reliance' was therefore a strategy for enhancing Africa's economic, sociocultural and political development.

However, the AU's strategy is predicated on the view that closer 'integration' into the global economy is the best way to overcome Africa's marginalisation and underdevelopment. It lays emphasis on adjustments to the world economy, creating trading agendas compatible with the WTO regime and prioritising African access to global markets. Although NEPAD was launched through the OAU in 2001, under the AU it was further developed to accelerate Africa's economic growth and participation in the global economy, while also promoting democracy and good governance in Africa. Through its PSC, the AU aims to develop a more relevant role for itself by abandoning the old principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states and allowing member states to intervene in other AU member states where grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity so require (Protocol, Art. 4-j; Constitutive Act, Art. 4-h). The AU plans to have a stand-by force by 2010, thereby greatly enhancing the AU's capacity to deal with 'new wars' or so-called interstate wars.

The AU's capacity for peace-building and peacemaking is constrained by limited resources, and is thus still dependent on the international community. Consequently, the organisation tends to concentrate on military conflict-management. Examples of this are operations in Burundi, Sudan/Darfur, Somalia and Comoros. Most peacemaking efforts have been ad hoc, based on personal initiatives or involving relatively few highly skilled personnel. Other challenges facing these operations include competing national political interests, the AU's limited capacity and bureaucratic ineffectiveness as well as its inadequate financial resources and its dependence on

external development assistance for its operational activities.

West Africa

ECOWAS was established in 1975. It was the first West African organisation to successfully bridge the Anglophone-Francophone gap. In spite of this, there is a perception in some quarters (especially by some Francophone countries) that it is a Nigerian-dominated organisation. ECOWAS is today best recognised for its security framework, even though its initial agenda focused on economic integration and development. ECOWAS has deployed military missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire. However, some of these interventions have been marked by controversy. The weakness of the missions and the lack of unified command and control are some of the problems that have arisen. Nonetheless, ECOWAS peacekeepers working with the UN and the international community have contributed to peace-support operations in the region.

East Africa and the Horn of Africa

The predecessor of IGAD, namely IGADD (the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development), was created in 1986 by six East African countries, all of which were drought-stricken: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. A seventh country, Eritrea, joined in 1993. IGAD's establishment was encouraged by the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) as a means to manage the effects of natural disasters in the region. In 1996, IGAD, which had been formed a year earlier, identified three priority areas for cooperation: conflict-prevention, -management and cooperation; infrastructure development; and food security and environment.

Southern Africa

SADC, created in 1993, replaced the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC). SADC has officially embraced a more conventional regional economic integration and cooperation framework. The SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security was established in the mid-1990s and operates in seven clusters, including military issues, peacemaking and conflict prevention. In 2003, SADC adopted a Mutual Defence Pact: 'An armed attack against a State Party shall be consid-

ered a threat to regional peace and security and such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action' (Art. 6-1). It thus became an alliance with latitude for action under Art. 51 of the UN Charter. The organisation has a limited record with regard to peace and security.

There are three main perspectives in the literature on regionalism. That perspective mostly associated with liberal institutionalism and lines of thought concentrates on formal interstate frameworks and official trade and investment flows. This line of thought argues that European experience suggests regionalism has a universal potential and that it can be an important instrument in achieving peace, development and security in Africa. The limitations of regionalism in Africa are attributed to the weakness of the African states that make up the regional institutions.

The second school of thought is the 'pan-African,' which holds that African unity can overcome the balkanisation, conflict and economic underdevelopment that plague the continent.

It is noteworthy that both approaches take the European Commission (EC)/EU experience as their inspiration and justification for the development of pan-African regionalism. Both conclude that successful regionalism in Africa is dependent on strong, functional regional organisations and institutions. The liberal line of thought emphasises the role of market and trade integration coupled with functional cooperation, while the pan-African perspective focuses more on the need for development-enhancing measures and political intervention.

A third group of scholars such as Bach, Bøås, Söderbaum, Hentz and Bøås, is more sceptical about whether the restructuring of regional organisations will lead to highly developed institutional and political integration (most often modelled on the EC/EU). The approach of these scholars to regionalism transcends the 'narrow focus' on inter-state regional frameworks and precludes the artificial separation in the African context of state and non-state actors, a separation commonly associated with traditional regional approaches. They argue that many ruling elites in Africa engage in symbolic and discursive activities – such as praising the goals of regionalism and regional organisations and signing cooperation treaties and agreements – while remaining unwilling and/or uncommitted to actual implementation of jointly agreed policies (Bøås, 2003; Clapham, 1996).

This type of 'sovereignty-enhancing' regionalism may be closely related to 'shadow regionalism,' whereby various actors within the state become entrenched in informal market activities in order to promote their private economic interests or political goals. This implies that regional organisations constitute a means for 'resource capture' and international patronage. Foreign involvement by countries is not only about preserving national security and defeating enemies, but also about securing access to resource-rich areas and setting up privatised accumulation networks that can thrive under conditions of war and anarchy (Taylor and Williams, 2001:273).

Title Deeds without Ownership

A Discourse on the Military, Political and Economic Dimensions of African Security

Amadu Sesay



AMADU SESAY is a Sierra Leonean and Professor of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, where he has worked since 1978. He holds BSc and PhD degrees in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science. In 2005, he was the third Claude Ake Visiting Professor at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research in Uppsala. He was also Visiting Professor, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Bordeaux, France, 2006. In 2003, he directed the CODESRIA *Child and Youth* Institute on the theme *The African Child in an era of HIV/AIDS*. He was appointed official ECOWAS historian to write a book on the Commission's ECOMOG operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea and has completed the assignment. He is a recipient of several distinguished academic awards and fellowships, among which are DAAD scholar, 1995; Ford Foundation Fellow, Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1995; Visiting Fellow, Institute of Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, 1999; and Visiting Fellow, Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo, 2000. He has authored/edited several books, monographs, chapters in books as well as articles in learned journals across the world. His latest books are *Small Arms Proliferation and Collection in the Niger Delta of Nigeria*, 2006 and *Post War Regimes and State Reconstruction in Liberia and Sierra Leone*, CODESRIA, 2008. His areas of research interest are Security and Conflict Studies.

There have been varied perceptions of the concept of security in Africa and in the world. In order to fully comprehend the political, economic and military dimensions of African security, one must also consider the historical implications, as well as the current realities. Issues such as poor and ineffective governance, external dependency, technological and economic underdevelopment must be considered as security concerns.

Historically, the concept of security has changed focus, starting with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, through the Cold War and to the post-Cold War world. The Westphalian definition of security concerned the state and its power to defeat other states in the event of external military confrontation. The notion of security has evolved through three periods: the colonial, postcolonial and the post-Cold War and globalisation era. Caroline Thomas has ar-

gued that developing countries refer to security not only in terms of its military dimensions, but as also – and rather – in terms of internal security, nation building, food security, health and economic security. The paradigmatic shifts in security discourses have moved away from military to human security, especially in the Third World. In 1994, a UNDP report on security underscored the focus on human security, suggesting 'freedom of want' and 'freedom from fear' as the new main concerns.

Less studied though is the Kampala Document (KD), scripted as a follow up to a meeting held three years before the UNDP report. In this document, as Dan Henk has highlighted, the 'paradigm shift' in the UNDP report had already been made.

The current understanding seems to be that development and security are intertwined. One cannot talk of development without taking security into

consideration. Referring to this linkage, Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, two decades ago noted that 'without security there would be no development, and without development, there would be no security.' The KD represents the first serious attempt at 'demystifying' the concept of the state, leading to a new debate and marking a significant shift towards non-military components of security.

The security concerns of developing countries and developed countries differ in some respects. Countries also experience security and insecurity in different ways and forms depending on their level of political and economic development. Even the concept of 'disarmament' mentioned in the UNDP report had already been touched upon in KD.

It is therefore important to point out that the document has not received the attention it deserves in the discourse on the changing nature of African security. This is due to several factors, including Africa's poor global reach and low credibility rating. One statistic that bears this out is that while 45 sub-Saharan African states are members of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the overall voting power of this bloc is 4.4%. Hence, decisions made in such institutions may not reflect the numerical strength of these states. Ali Mazrui characterises African states as refugees in the international system, with a marginal position not in keeping with their number.

Security in Africa has never been fully owned by its citizens. Power in most African states is dominated by a minority elite. One reason for the lack of public involvement and influence may be the reality that survival for many citizens, their preoccupation with daily existence, often overshadows broader social and security issues.

According to Dan Henk, the notion of security in Africa stems from the colonial legacy, whereby security is narrowly construed as the establishment and maintenance of state security. Security frameworks put in place during colonial times only marginally benefited colonial peoples. The Cold War era and the security dilemma of the West affected Africa. In the West's attempt to prevent the spread of communism to Africa, it provided support to some of the continent's cruelest dictators. Also, issues of human rights, democracy and development were pushed into the background.

The preoccupation with state-centric security in the West prompted many African rulers to prioritise

state security and maintenance of law and order over economic welfare and basic human rights. Despite proclamations by many African states that they were non-aligned, the Cold War spawned many proxy wars on the continent, which also experienced political instability, economic neglect and marginalisation. Although Africa received some aid, more often than not this had strings attached, and its impact was hardly ever felt by African people, leading to 'growth without development.'

The OAU's approach to security conformed to the Westphalian definition of hard power, at the expense of soft power. However, the AU has responded to the new global security environment. It sought to align itself with mainstream understandings of security and to distance itself from the OAU non-interventionist approach. However, tackling the new security challenges on the continent has not been without its problems. Dependency on external funding poses a challenge for Africa's ability to confront its security and conflict dilemmas. The expensiveness of peacekeeping operations poses a problem for future AU interventions and peace operations, for even if the EU and other donors provide funding assistance to AU peacekeeping, this is still 'aid with strings attached.'

Despite the conflicts in Africa, the continent is making a big effort to take charge of its own security concerns. The way forward is for the international community to allow and support African states and organisations to achieve this end by engaging with them and working to enhance capacities within the AU and the RECs. Such engagement should also complement the continent's efforts towards self-sustainability and self-reliance in the economic, strategic and political spheres.

UN peace operations have brought hope to many afflicted by conflict in Africa. However, there have also been drawbacks. One is that UN peacekeeping paid inadequate attention to the roots of conflict in most cases, thereby casting a long shadow over sustainable post-conflict reconstruction. In some cases, international aid initiatives in post-conflict societies are not long-term enough to make an enduring contribution to reconciliation and societal reconstruction. Consequently, a country may be even worse off in the long run.

It should be noted that democracy offers better prospects for enhanced security, whether political, economic or military. Democracy can put armed

forces under tighter civilian control and spare the continent dictatorial leaders, corruption, inequity and conflict. There is an increasing need for foreign aid organisations to encourage genuine democratisation and refrain from policies that may undermine this.

Globalisation has also had implications for the roles and capacities of states in Africa. To quote

Charles Ukeje: 'at the same time that globalisation is undermining the capacity of the state, the state itself is still expected to play a major role in the stability and security of the continent.' The very inability of many states to play these roles contributes to the nature and dimension of the security challenge in Africa.

Local Political Dynamics and External Interventions in Somalia

Ken Menkhaus



KEN MENKHAUS is Professor of Political Science at Davidson College, Davidson, North Carolina, and a specialist in the Horn of Africa. His fields of interest include state failure, protracted conflict, post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian intervention and political Islam. In 1993-94, he served as special political advisor to the UN operation in Somalia and in 1994-95 was visiting civilian professor at the US Army Peacekeeping Institute. Menkhaus was recipient of a US Institute of Peace grant in 2002 to study protracted conflict in the Horn of Africa. He frequently serves as a consultant to the US government, the UN and non-governmental organisations. His recent publications include: 'Governance without Government in Somalia' in *International Security* (2006/07) and *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

In the last two years some positive news, though measured, has been emerging from Somalia, bringing some reason for cautious optimism about 2009, specifically that it may witness less violence, a reversal of refugee flows and improved access for humanitarian aid work in the country. There are four reasons for this new optimism: the ending of the Ethiopian military occupation in December 2008; the resignation of Abdullah Yusuf as Transnational Federal Government (TFG) president (he was a polarising figure); that the shift of policy in the Horn of Africa will leave more space for dialogue following the election of President Barack Obama in the US; and that the TFG and the opposition Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) have taken steps to craft a more broadly based government and elect a new president. It is the combination of these factors that may facilitate Somalia's move away from the violent trajectory of the country of the past 20 years, a violent trajectory that has left a difficult legacy for the new TFG.

The problems in Somalia persist. Some changes, though, have occurred in the political landscape in Somalia such as a dramatic rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) that was able to effect a certain law enforcement (even if only briefly); the brutal Ethiopian

offensive against the ICU which consequently gave rise to a huge humanitarian crisis; the rise of the Al Shabaab jihadist groups and the epidemic of piracy on the Somali coast. These dramatic changes have continued into 2009, but, overall, events appear to be taking a more positive direction.

Even though positive elements may be emerging, it is important not to overlook certain political trends: the rise of political Islam; politically mobilised clannism (defining political negotiations); governance without a government; patronage politics; a weak economy; and growing criminality and insecurity.

The TFG does represent progress. However, it faces immense challenges. It is seen as a moderate Islamic government aiming to create a broad-based coalition, and has increasing public and international support. Among the challenges it faces is the persistence of the Al Shabaab and jihadist militias that control parts of southern Somalia. Even though their influence has waned, they still have the capacity to create problems for the TFG. The most promising way to neutralise jihadist groups like Al Shabaab would be through negotiations and eventual coalition-building, but this could cause concern in neighboring Ethiopia, with the risk that Ethiopia

would be unwilling to support the operational existence of the TFG. In addition, Eritrea, businessmen and militia leaders may also act as spoilers if the government succeeds in implementing the rule of law. The TFG also faces other hurdles, including establishing a new constitution and establishing credibility with regard to accusations of violations of human rights. Doing nothing about spoilers would risk undermining the credibility of the TFG, while taking steps to remove them would invite the emergence of new armed spoilers.

There are three possible scenarios regarding the future of the TFG. The best-case scenario would see gradual success for the Djibouti process, with the achievement of its key goals: a broad-based transitional government that seeks negotiations to settle disputes and embraces moderate Islamic governance that does not threaten the stability of the region. Improved security will encourage and allow internally displaced people to return home, facilitating the transition to a new democratic constitution and elections. Positive improvements should eliminate the risk of setbacks and political spoilers. Humanitarian challenges will emerge when huge numbers of displaced peoples return to destroyed and damaged livelihoods.

The worst case scenario would be that the TFG would be too weak to build a viable coalition and will be overrun by an Al-Qaeda-backed hardline Islamist group. Such a government would then declare itself to be the sole ruler, implement harsh Shari'a laws and continue its close links with its backers. The UN and other aid agencies will not be admitted or will face harsh difficulties in working in Somalia. This could lead to a hostile response from external actors, particularly Ethiopia and the US, resulting in further interventions or high levels of armed conflict. Refugee flows will increase and worsen the crisis and insecurity in the region.

A *'status quo ante'* scenario implies a situation where neither the TFG nor the armed insurgents are able to consolidate control over the capital, Mogadishu. Consequently, the country will remain in a state of collapsed authority, with chronic instability, conflict and insecurity. Humanitarian agencies will have to negotiate access at the micro-level. It is important that the international community prepare for all possible scenarios, while hoping for the best case.

The role of foreign, external actors cannot be disregarded in analysing the prospects and outcomes of the Somali imbroglio. Their influence may, for better or for worse, affect the outcome of mediation efforts and the success of TFG's policies. How much of Somalia's internal decisions and power politics are actually internally shaped? It thus appears that the distinction between external actors and internal actors is becoming unclear in Somalia. To give an example, about 70 per cent of the current leadership of the TFG holds foreign passports.

There has been extensive criticism of the role of external foreign actors in Somalia, but the positive implications have been underplayed. Some examples of the latter are the provision of emergency relief throughout the 20-year crisis, preventing starvation, supporting civil society sectors, providing safe haven to the 1 million Somalis in the diaspora and facilitating multiple peace conferences and forms of peace-building in the country.

The question of 'who uses whom' in Somalia is intriguing in relation to external involvement. Often, Somali political groups see external actors as tools to enable them win internal power struggles, but at the same time some external actors seek to use local actors to advance their own political or national agendas within Somalia. Outsiders use and have used Somalia and pursue their national interests at the expense of Somali peoples. This much can be seen by the way US/USSR rivalry played out in Somalia during the Cold War, in the recent Ethiopian-Eritrea conflict, and in the use of Somalia as one battleground in the Global War on Terror: West vs. al Qaeda. The result has been much destruction and division among the Somali people, with little prospect for sustainable peace in the foreseeable future.

Ethiopia has strategic and security interests in Somalia and will seek to influence developments in the neighbouring country. The Somali conflict is also part of a broader, regional conflict spanning the Horn of Africa. It is hardly surprising that Eritrea has also become involved in Somalia, a development that is adversely affecting Ethiopia-Eritrea relations. The US counter-terrorism agenda in the Horn will remain a critical factor in Ethiopian and Eritrean policies towards Somalia. The linking of Al Shabaab to increased al-Qaeda influence alongside the threats posed by rampant piracy off the Somali coast means that the US will keep a keen eye on

developments in Somalia and provide support to neighbouring countries sharing common interests in the troubled country.

Rather unfortunately, foreign knowledge about Somalia has in the past been limited. This situation must improve. Sadly, local sources of reliable information have become very limited due to the recent increase in assassinations and intolerance towards a foreign presence. It is crucial to have a good under-

standing of and information on what is happening in Somalia. Only when such information has been garnered based on internal sources combined with outside resources, can we have a sound basis for understanding the crisis. Without this, trust in foreigners and their agendas will remain frail in Somalia and seriously undermine the ability of the international community to engage or forge a constructive partnership with the country.

Conflict and Insecurity in the Horn of Africa

A Regional Approach

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One can consider three types of intertwined conflicts that have afflicted the Horn of Africa: the internal contestations within each country; the interstate discord extensively rooted in capricious colonially imposed boundaries; and the lack of good governance fuelled by competition among elites. All of these three types of conflict are organically interlinked.

Authoritarian regimes in the region are a focal point for their contribution to the conflict environment in the Horn of Africa, with the support of world powers. Deng (1995) is one of the scholars who dispute the ethnic and religious explanations of conflict, pointing out the state's role in fostering dissonance or harmony in the region. This approach underlines the fact that state leaders have the capacity to turn their state institutions into assets or liabilities.

The important role state leaders play should not take away from the decisive role that civil society movements can play in enhancing such leaders' capacity to do ill or good: a weak civil society can strengthen or undo the agendas of political leaders.

In Gandhi's words, 'societies or groups who are most in need of reform do not always assist reformers.' Consequently, it is critical that political leaders involve civil society in governance, for this interplay can contribute to conflict or peace.

Intra-country conflicts mainly fall into two analytical categories: competition for national domination and local struggles over resources. Although some scholars view these conflicts as arising from ethnic or religious contestation, some of the literature focuses on the government's role in turning local conflicts into full-blown civil wars, and in some cases in transforming relatively benign communal distinctions into 'hard' political and social boundaries. Religious and ethnic discrepancies can also become sources of dissent and take on a violent character (Samatar, 1992; Ajulu, 2002; Muigai, 1995).

The authors of the African map, namely the colonial powers, adjusted the boundaries to suit their own interests on the continent. Although boundaries do not in themselves cause conflicts, the borders set by the colonialists have been the basis for

many of the conflicts across the continent, especially when combined with livelihood disputes. In most cases, the national political climate influences the way leaders deal with boundary problems. More than half the countries in the region do have boundary problems. However, boundary-related issues are not the sole ingredient of conflict: other important factors include the lack of democracy and accountability in the region. Indeed, these two features have been the primary sources of conflict in the region.

Although many features of the conflicts are specific to the region, some aspects resemble those in other parts of the continent. However, the ways in which these have been expressed in the Horn of Africa can only be explained by factors specific to the region, factors that have increased the likelihood of internal and interstate conflicts. Factors such as the impact of Cold War policies, arbitrary boundaries, socioeconomic inequality and marginalisation have all underlain violent inter-state and civil wars.

Civil wars lead to displacement and migration and influxes of refugees into neighbouring countries. Support by such neighbouring countries for opposition parties elsewhere also reinforces mistrust in the region. Hence, the prospects for resolving intra-state tension are complicated by the conflict-ridden relations among states in the region: intra-state conflicts cannot be separated from the regional dynamics. The involvement of regimes in other state's conflicts suggests that warring groups are often sustained through external support/backing. Outsider involvement complicates conflict-resolution. It is important to understand how regional and national actors interact. This helps in identifying and understanding the linkages between internal and external dynamics as causal aspects of violent conflict.

Another factor contributing to conflict is the proliferation of weapons in the region among marginalised border communities, which lack security. The rapid spread of small arms and light weapons has changed the nature of domestic and regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

The mistrust among power-holders in the region has further created what Cliffe, referred to as a culture of 'mutual interference'. This is partly the legacy of US and Soviet Union policies in the context of Cold War rivalry, when each backed rival governments or 'friendly' liberation movements in Ethiopia and Somalia. In the same regard, the current US Global War on Terror has created or reinforced new alliances in the region, reducing old hostilities, but with different pretexts.

Conflicts in the region have persisted, and despite international involvement peace remains elusive. The quality of leadership and nature of governance in the region is the key to resolving many local, national and regional conflicts. Furthermore, the only sustainable solution to these conflicts would be the coming to power of effective and democratic governments. Such democratic and accountable governments could take advantage of global opportunities to ensure good governance and minimise the activities of hegemonic external interests that accentuate intra- and interstate conflicts in the region.

Country studies seem to dominate the literature on peace and conflict in the Horn of Africa. Interstate conflicts often accentuate intrastate conflicts and vice versa. Nearly all the states in the region have experienced misrule by governments that have failed to accommodate or tolerate competing political views or protect the integrity of public institutions/resources. Regimes that abuse public resources and repress people sow the seeds of conflict and regional insecurity. It is in these circumstances that antagonistic politics are nurtured and religious and cultural differences are transformed into adversarial relations. This is a point noted by scholars like Deng, Sikainga, Samatar, Baxter, Hassan, and Odhiambo. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that political agency, the role of state authorities and of communities are vital in understanding the nature of and factors behind conflicts in the region.

South Africa: Some reflections on liberation and other historical perspectives

Chris Saunders



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In order to understand South Africa's future and how it is being shaped, one cannot disregard the country's past. There are few writings that focus on how the legacy of the past affects the present. When one speaks of legacy, it is usually understood as a 'continuation' of the past and the significance of the past to the future. There are, of course, other factors that shape the current conjuncture in South Africa, such as its geography, natural resources and attractiveness to tourists, mineral riches and agricultural potential.

Many South Africans have a strong attachment to their ethnicity, derived from their heritage and rooted in the precolonial past. The South African President Jacob Zuma, for example, proclaims his strong sense of Zulu heritage. There has been a move to emphasise and encourage the ties that people have to the distant past before the advent of European settlers, the events of 1994 and the democratisation period. Most of the work done on heritage in the country refers to the precolonial period. Many South Africans are descendants of people who came to what is now South Africa from the north. In spite of this, recent waves of xenophobia have targeted immigrants from those areas.

Back in the 1970s, Steve Biko, one of the leaders Black Consciousness Movement, was a prominent voice in the struggle for the 'restoration of black dignity' and in challenging the racist notion of black inferiority. In spite of the ending of apartheid, inequalities in South African society have yet to be overcome by the post-apartheid government.

In South Africa, the colonial legacy is evident almost everywhere, most visibly in the skewed distribution of land on a racial basis. Three million people were forcefully removed from their homes during the apartheid period alone. Although there has been a redistribution process since 1994, almost 80 per cent of the land is still owned by white South Africans. Land redistribution remains an important piece of unfinished business.

Many people in reacting to the brutalisation experienced during the apartheid years placed liberation before education. The state has been unable to bring down the high unemployment rate, which has been compounded by the high rate of immigration into South Africa from its northern neighbours and has also contributed to high rates of crime.

The levels of poverty seen in South Africa today are largely the legacy of apartheid, which prohibited people from acquiring education and skills and hence the ability to move freely in search of jobs. In its bid to reverse the adverse effects of apartheid, the government has introduced affirmative action plans, leading to some successes, but not enough to reduce widespread poverty and unemployment.

The number of people living in extreme poverty in South Africa has increased. At the same time, a sizeable black middle class has emerged, some members of which have become extremely rich thanks to the government's black economic empowerment policies. Some critics on the left blame the wide income disparities on neoliberal economic policies and the government's emphasis on economic growth.

However, policy-makers are quick to point out that there can be no redistribution without growth. They also note that electricity and water have been supplied to many who wanted for these utilities before, adding that 2 million new homes have been built. Despite these improvements, the vast proportion of the population still lives in slums and unemployment is reported to be over 40 per cent.

Some have argued that the concept of non-racialism has remained largely rhetorical, and that the old ideas of Africanism (that Africa belongs to Africans, usually defined as people of African descent) remain influential. Certainly, they were emphasised during Mbeki's time in power and hence incorporated, with some elements of the Black Consciousness ideology, into the agenda of the African National Congress (ANC). As may be expected of the Sussex University-educated, pipe-smoking Mbeki, his role has been ambiguous, as seen in his speech in relation to the final constitution drafted in 1996.

There remains uncertainty, controversy even about the extent of corruption in post-apartheid South Africa. It seems, at least, that corruption has taken new forms but that under democratic rule untoward acts are easier to uncover. Crucial in this regard is the existence of a vigilant independent press capable of exposing corruption, although some of it is remains hidden.

The dominance of one party, the ANC, in a multiparty system has proven to be a legacy of the 1994 democratic transformation. Since then, no party has been strong enough to challenge the dominance of the liberation party. It remains to be seen if Mbeki's supporters in the Congress of the People will be able to successfully challenge the ANC in future elections.

When one considers the legacies of liberation, it becomes necessary to recall the long history of resistance to colonialism, including the Xhosa resistance in what is now the Eastern Cape to Dutch and British encroachment and the recently commemorated Xhosa resistance to the Dutch in the Western Cape in 1659. However, most scholarly work on South African resistance is overwhelmingly focused on the post-1961 struggle for liberation and concentrated on the resistance led by the underground or exiled leadership.

This mode of leadership gave rise to a lot of suspicion, and was seen by some as the prototype for a

Stalinist or highly centralised leadership style, rather than an open democratic style. The post-1990s deployment of loyal ANC members to key positions could be seen as 'cadre deployment,' and has in some ways blurred the distinction between party and state. The reality that the ANC had no prior experience of governing a country when it took over the government in 1994 contributed in part to the continuity of centralised forms of decision-making within the ruling party and to some extent the government. It can even be argued that since the 1980s the emphasis on democratic procedure has declined. Examples include former President Mbeki's refusal to tackle HIV/AIDS as a crisis and the initial handling of the arms deal scandals.

According to a critic of post-1994 ANC rule, the hope of consolidating South Africa's democracy in the future lies in the history of democratic institutions that existed before 1994. In this view, which sometimes emphasizes the fact that the first Cape Parliament dates back to 1854, the 1994 elections were largely about extending democracy to black Africans, as noted by Frederick de Klerk.

What is missed in such an argument is the interim constitution that came into effect in April that year did much more than merely extend the franchise: it created a constitutional state for the first time and included a justiciable bill of rights where there had been none before. That the new democratic dispensation has fallen short has only become apparent over time: while floor-crossing to other parties has now disappeared, the evils of the party-list proportional list system remain: no voter in South Africa lives in a demarcated constituency and even a President can be removed at the whim of the party, as seen recently in the case of Mbeki. (C. Saunders)

Another legacy worth exploring is the way in which leaders of neighbouring states are treated on the basis of their 'liberation credentials,' on the basis of their having engaged in the same struggles for liberation. Thus Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF are treated with great respect. Given their role as liberation movements turned political parties, these 'freedom' parties then assume they have earned the right to continue to govern the country in the post-liberation era. This thinking perhaps explains why 'like-minded liberation leaders' have refrained from

openly criticising one of their own, such as Mugabe, and hence Thabo Mbeki's preference for silent diplomacy in dealing with the Zimbabwe crisis.

Policy-makers, who tend to be more focused on the present or future, ignore the historical legacies of the struggle against apartheid at their peril. Thabo Mbeki showed an understanding of these legacies in his speech to parliament in 1996, but this attentive-

ness later seemed to slacken and this in turn arguably contributed to his losing out in the ANC power game. Jacob Zuma gave an impressive inauguration speech, but the future will tell if he will be more successful than his predecessors in managing the legacies of South Africa's past and the challenges these pose for the future.

From 'One Man, One Vote' to One Man, No Vote: Whither Zimbabwean Women?

Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi



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a former teacher and researcher at the University of Zimbabwe, Southern Africa remains her research focus. Her involvement with the *Journal of Southern African Studies* offers her invaluable opportunities to continue dialoging on regional research issues and debates. Since her previous book on women and war, *For Better or Worse? Women and ZANLA in Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*, (Harare: Weaver Press, 2001), she has maintained an intense interest in exploring how Southern African women have influenced and interacted with social and political developments in the last century.

The rhetoric of 'one man, one vote!' that heralded the 1980s independence movement seems far from the reality in Zimbabwe today. The slogan could be seen as underscoring the male's voting entitlement. In spite of the nationalist movement's triumph and the introduction of a 'revolutionary ideology' by the independence leaders, the slogan did not translate into women's entitlement or empowerment. Women's right to participate in politics could therefore not be taken for granted or taken to mean unconditional support for them in the context of an open democracy in the newly born nation.

If the slogan is subjected to a more liberal view, it may be taken as gender neutral, indicating that both genders have an equal right to vote, something which for previously excluded women would symbolise progress. Voting could be seen as a new step towards electoral democracy, and distancing politics from the taking up of arms, thereby signifying change. The transition programme seemed to result in genuine demobilising of the armed wings of the liberation movements established in the 1960s and the 1970s. The mobilisation of civil resources, fostering of peace and civic culture in the context of building of a new democratic nation emerged as a

parallel process. However, I argue that in spite of the hopeful note it started on, the government led by Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), especially from 2008 'came to be associated with policies that had the effect of reducing the vote to a formality.'

By 2008 Mugabe and his war-time generals dominated the political scene in Zimbabwe, but they faced a challenge from an effervescent opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The resulting struggle for power between ZANU-PF and the MDC literally found expression in the ballot box, with the ruling party using its control of the coercive apparatus of the state to interfere in the electoral process. Thus, the 2008 election was certainly not a 'one man, one vote' process, but rather a one man election and non-vote procedure. Furthermore, civil society was extensively demobilised and political violence became an instrument in the struggle for power. In the view of President Mugabe: 'We fought for this country and a lot of blood was shed. We are not going to give up our country because of a mere X (on a ballot). How can a pen fight a gun?'

Constant attacks on supporters of the opposition MDC were part of the strategy to intimidate them, prevent them from voting, or force voters to place a cross next to Mugabe's name. It seems to be a contradiction in terms that ZANU-PF as a political party participating in the post-independence politics of democratic Zimbabwe should resort to violence to undermine the power of voters. On the other hand, when looking at the history of liberation movements turned political parties in the region, such intolerance of opposition parties and ambivalence towards democracy is nothing new. As the stakes to retain control power in the country got higher, the military wing of ZANU-PF, namely Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) increased its sway over many aspects of the of the party.

ZANU-PF was held captive by suspicion of rebellious internal plots and its fear of infiltration reminiscent of the fears within the liberation movement during the independence struggle. Then the punishments for those suspected of being spies or traitors were cruel and instantaneous and encouraged vigilante-politics in the camps. After the victory of ZANU-PF in the 1980s, the party saw and treated those supporting opposing political ideas as being akin to traitors to the cause of national liberation and as security threats that needed to be neutralised or eliminated. This thinking also permeated ZANU-PF's Gukurahundi strategy, whereby over 30,000 people were killed predominantly in areas dominated by the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces. ZANU-PF's concern that elections would increase the risk that the power they had won through the liberation struggle could be lost if they lost elections explains their 'defensive' or violent response to any form of political opposition.

Hence, elections are considered to be 'safe' when they are held under conditions considered likely to produce results that endorse the status-quo and ZANU-PF's continued stay in power. This explains the extensive resort to state violence and the militarisation of state organs in Zimbabwe. In 2005, Mugabe himself described his new government as his 'war cabinet.' Following this, he declared that America and Britain were aggressors and enemies of the state. As the opposition MDC started recruiting more supporters, part of Zimbabwe's own population became 'enemies of the state.' The ways in which the government targeted opposition supporters in Zim-

babwe has seriously undermined domestic human security in the country. The economic exclusion of opposition supporters has seriously contributed to the deterioration of human security as well.

Even though more men have been killed and tortured in the wake of the upsurge in political violence, women have also been adversely affected by the waves of state-sponsored violence. The use of rape as a political weapon can be seen in the increase in the number of reported rapes. Sexual violence has become a tool of possession of the victim's body, leaving a scar on the mind for a long time after the event, a memory of humiliation and a fear of the oppressor in the victim's mind. Furthermore, the culture of impunity that allows violators to roam free within sight of their victims encourages perpetrators to act with greater impunity.

As a consequence of the violence and insecurity, many have fled the country. However, most fugitives are men, as women are less likely to leave their communities and tend to remain victims the insecure political climate. As basic providers for the family, women are unlikely to leave. It has not been uncommon for politically threatened men to seek refuge elsewhere and then leave their wives and children in Zimbabwe. So the likelihood of women remaining in dangerous circumstances is high. It is not uncommon for women and their families to be subjected to violent treatment even after their politically threatened men depart or go underground.

The extensive militarisation of politics and the economy has eliminated civilian control of the latter. Those that control the military now own most of the country's resources, and they use the victims of terror as cheap labour. These victims are most commonly children and women, who are at the mercy of this new ruling class of men. As a consequence of sexually based violence, the spread of HIV/AIDS has become a concern for large parts of the population. Rape is an issue that extends to state-controlled institutions, such as prisons, and is sometimes a tool used by police and among prisoners themselves.

As the insecurity in Zimbabwe persists, refugee flows to neighbouring countries (and across the world) have grown. Most refugees find their way into Botswana, Malawi and South Africa. Even there they face the difficulties associated with living in a country without legal residency, making do with menial, informal or underpaid jobs and lacking access to good healthcare, housing and basic serv-

ices. Because most Zimbabwean migrants are economic refugees, they often come into conflict with local people. Since April 2009, when South Africa lifted visa requirements for Zimbabweans, a border-crossing that used to be a nightmare has eased a little. Even so, the negative stigma associated with Zimbabweans in South Africa remains a huge problem. The xenophobic attacks on foreigners and the targeting of Zimbabweans in May 2008 highlighted the challenges refugees face in getting jobs and enjoying secure lives.

Thabo Mbeki, South Africa's former president, was a prominent figure and mediator in Zimbabwe's political crisis. His quiet diplomacy often meant that the ZANU-PF government was protected from condemnation by its regional neighbours, and avoided having harsh sanctions imposed on it. In spite of arguing that the internal conflict in Zimbabwe did

not threaten international security, the South African government has taken steps to stem the flow of migrants from Zimbabwe, and even received support from the UNHCR to repatriate Zimbabwean refugees. It is evident that the government of national unity involving ZANU-PF and opposition parties is facing serious difficulties. The domination of government by ZANU-PF persists and the party rejects any real compromise with the MDC. Despite the threat of international sanctions, the Mugabe regime still holds on to power due to its unrestricted access to the country's natural resources and new external trading partners. The country has gone from the rhetoric of 'one man, one vote' to a reality where voting is undermined and state-led political violence has dimmed the prospects for a democracy based on peaceful, free and fair elections.

South Africa after the 2009 elections: What prospects for continuity or change?

Anders Möllander



ANDERS MÖLLANDER served with the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs from 1973 to 2008, most recently as Ambassador to South Africa. He has on various occasions been stationed in embassies in Tanzania, Zambia, Angola and South Africa, and has spent most of his professional life working on issues related to Southern Africa. Between 1999 and 2000, he was chairman of the Panel of Experts on the Angolan Sanctions Committee. During 2008 and 2009, he carried out research at the Nordic Africa Institute.

Upon returning to Sweden in 2008 after serving as Swedish ambassador to South Africa for three years, I was asked many questions about developments in that country. Jacob Zuma had been elected president of the ANC in competition with the then incumbent, Thabo Mbeki. Questions were asked about Zuma's corruption trial and his general moral attitude after the case in which he was accused of raping a young HIV/AIDS-positive family friend. The most extreme fears were expressed by those who wondered if South Africa would now go 'the Zimbabwe way.'

As someone who has worked with and in South Africa and other Southern African countries for most of my 30 year diplomatic career, it was natural to base my analysis on an account of where the ANC and the country had come from. I reminded those who asked that the ANC was founded in 1912 and that the party had a history of continuity and orderly change. **If** a new leader were to act in a corrupt or immoral way, there would be correctives. Indeed, I noted, the formation of a breakaway party, Congress of the People (COPE), could be seen as just such a corrective attempt.

I recalled the situation in South Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when there was widespread, state-sponsored violence, including high-profile political murders of ANC leaders during the negotiations for a new constitution, arguing that developments since then could only be described as a best case scenario.

I also noted that Zuma himself spoke of continuity. He underlined, even before his election, both within South Africa and abroad that he would not change the successful economic policy driven by his predecessor and his team. He did this in spite of the fact that the labour union movement (COSATU) and the communist party (SACP), which had supported Zuma, stood for the more socialist economic policy originally adopted by the ANC after the first elections in 1994 (The Reconstruction and Development Programme of South Africa, or RDP). Would Zuma be able to withstand pressure from the ANC's coalition partners to revert to this programme? I foresaw Zuma's election as president of the country and the suspension of corruption charges against him. I also speculated about a stronger showing than before by the opposition parties in the elections, although not resulting in an unseating of the ANC.

The election and its result

The elections turned out to be peaceful. As an international election observer, I was able to experience the sincerity of voters, who turned out in great numbers and waited patiently at polling stations across the country. The results could be seen as something of a victory for both the ANC, which maintained its dominance though not its two-thirds majority, and the opposition. The Democratic Alliance (DA) strengthened its position, particularly by taking the

Western Cape province from the ANC. The new party, COPE, got between 7 and 8 per cent of the vote, which, considering its late start, must be considered a good result. Whether COPE will be able to build on the results to increase its share of votes and influence future elections remains to be seen. The losers were the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), with its main base in Kwazulu-Natal, and the smaller parties. All in all, I felt that democracy in South Africa had stood the test of time and perhaps matured.

A new president and a new team

Zuma has since assumed office and announced his cabinet. Only a few ministers remain from Mbeki's cabinet. At the same time, most new ministers are known. Perhaps most significant is the fact that the former, and widely respected, finance minister, Trevor Manuel, will head a new planning department in the presidency, while another respected figure, the former head of revenue services, Pravin Gordhan, will succeed Manuel as finance minister. The economic team is expanded by a ministry of economic development, while the ministry of trade will be headed by its former deputy, Rob Davies.

One analyst, Richard Calland, has noted that the team must be considered to be competent and can be expected to deliver good results, perhaps even better than before, if its members can cooperate with each other. If they do not, the fall-out will, by contrast, be quite negative. Foreign affairs is another portfolio that will be of particular interest to the outside world. The new minister is largely unknown, although she has served as an ambassador to India and Malaysia. The two deputies are seen to represent continuity. Analysts expect that the high priority given to foreign affairs under Mbeki will be toned down in favour of internal agendas.

'Delivery'

On the internal agenda, so-called delivery is regarded as the most important. The ANC inherited a country that at the time had one of the highest Gini coefficients, indicating a wide gap between rich and poor. Although this position persists, I think it is fair and correct to say that the whole scale has moved upwards. ANC governments have delivered free housing to more than 2 million of the poorest households, along with electricity, water and schools and clinics where before there were none. Old age pensions have increased and child grants have been introduced. These transfers to the poor are often not recorded in economic statistics, but are of course noted by those who receive them, which helps to explain the ANC's continued strong showing in elections. It will be difficult for the new government to speed up delivery as the main constraint has been capacity, not funds.

Will Zuma last?

For those who are gravely worried about the prospects of a Zuma-led government – and there are many both in South Africa and abroad – one could say that a new case of perceived bad judgment on his part could lead to his suspension or demise. The most likely successor would then be the one who deputised when Mbeki resigned, Kgalema Motlanthe, who is widely thought to represent continuity in the ANC and who is considered to have done well as caretaker president. Motlanthe is now deputy president. If there is no new misjudgment or bad judgment on Zuma's part, it could mean that Zuma the president is different from Zuma the deputy.

Angola: An emerging regional superpower

Alex Vines



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By September 2009, José Eduardo dos Santos will have held the title of president of Angola for 30 years. The ruling party, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), announced the same year that it would be postponing its sixth congress, further suggesting that the presidential elections probably would only be held in 2010. The president himself mentioned in his new year's speech that the remaining 'obstacles to the normalisation of national political life' were, following the holding of parliamentary elections in September 2008, the approval of the new constitution and the holding of presidential elections. The biggest concern for MPLA would be if the president wins fewer votes through direct election than the party did in the 2008 elections.

President dos Santos also stated in that speech that Angola would be affected by the global economic downturn as a result of the falling price of diamonds. He noted that adjustments would have to be made to the annual budget, but that the government's economic and social strategy and objectives would remain unchanged. In January 2009, annual GDP growth in Angola was expected to be 8.2 per cent, but was later revised downwards by the

government to 3 per cent. Predictions about further downward revisions were made by the World Bank office in Luanda, based on the low international oil prices in 2009 and decreased world demand for oil. Estimates from the Economist Intelligence Unit were 2.3 per cent real GDP growth in 2009, with predictions that these figures would not improve until 2010, when they would rise to an estimated 6 per cent

Angola chaired the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and had briefly surpassed Nigeria as the leading African oil producer in 2008. It had achieved its highest increase in oil production between 2004 and 2007. However, a decline in oil production is a possibility, reaching a rate of 7.5 per cent per year after about 2011: oil is, after all, a finite resource.

The political hegemony the MPLA enjoys lies in its victory in the legislative elections, in which the party won 191 of 220 National Assembly seats. This comfortable majority allows the party to amend Angola's constitution if it wishes to do so. The first multiparty elections in 16 years had a high turnout of 87 per cent, demonstrating considerable popular

enthusiasm. MPLA won 81.6 per cent of the vote, its rival UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) 10.39 per cent and other parties only 7.97 per cent, although the elections were followed by allegations of corruption and intimidation of voters by the presence of security forces at polling stations. The voting pattern in areas previously held by UNITA and in the traditional UNITA heartland of Huambo and Bie indicated a shift in support towards the MPLA, largely due to the government's pumping of resources into the region. Based on the 70 parliamentary seats that UNITA had won in the 1992 elections, the main source of revenue for UNITA had been the US\$ 14 million state grant. With these seats now lost, the financial difficulties within UNITA are likely to increase.

MPLA had extensive financial advantages during the elections, according to reports from Chatham House. The party also began its election campaign before the official commencement of the campaign (8 August 2008). In addition, unequal access by political parties to the news media was a factor in the elections.

A government reshuffle was carried out by President dos Santos in September 2008, the most significant since 1997. In its manifesto, the MPLA promised to put more effort into the second phase of postwar reconstruction. Promises of a new railway, two new cities and a million new houses along the coast by 2012 were made. It remains to be seen how investments in citizens, health and education will unfold in the face of the global recession and low oil prices. Declining prices for traditional exports may lead to the focusing of investments on the development of non-oil sectors.

Once a new constitution has been adopted in the parliament in 2009, the 'Third Republic' of Angola will commence. President dos Santos has been in power since 1979. Under his leadership, Angola has gained in presence and importance in the region, assuming the role of a regional leader. The establishment of a new constitution has been expected since 1991. Changes to the current constitution are limited, despite the majority of seats the MPLA has in the Angolan parliament. These limits were set out in 1991 and codified in the constitutional law of Angola and the law on the amendment of the constitution. Because of the rejection of the first-round election results in 1992 by the UNITA leader, Jonas

Savimbi, the new constitution that was supposed to be introduced after that election languished.

A date has yet to be set for the planned but indefinitely postponed municipal elections in Angola. Some people are sceptical about whether there will be local elections and view the so-called efforts at 'decentralisation' as really being about the deconcentration of services. The accounting for the US\$5 million given to each municipality, even those lacking appropriate mechanisms, remains an issue. The improvements expressed in the 2009 National Plan, such as the promise of 320,000 new jobs, more access to housing and health and increased food security seem to have been shelved because of economic restrictions and declining oil prices. The availability of external credit has changed Angola's previous reliance on costly syndicated oil-backed loans from international banks.

Angola views itself as a regional superpower and has benefited from the commodities boom and high oil prices, particularly after the ending of the civil war in 2002. The Angolan government's role abroad will be assessed by its internal achievements in terms of post-conflict reconstruction and social improvements for its population. South Africa is seen by Angola as its biggest competitor in the region, and Mbeki's involvement in the mediation talks during the Angolan conflict has had implications for relations between the two countries. Mbeki's resignation as president will have a positive effect on bilateral relations. As regards its relations with Congo-Brazzaville and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Luanda sees both as its backyard. Furthermore, the DRC's Kabila government is dependent for security advice on Angola, which reportedly counselled President Kabila to act decisively against a member of the opposition, Jean-Pierre Bemba, a former militia leader.

The emerging picture suggests that Angola is seeking to become a major power in the Gulf of Guinea, a product of the growing confidence of Luanda's ruling elite and the understanding of the constraints on projecting power in Southern Africa, given South Africa's strong presence. Over the past few years, many Angolan embassies have been established in countries in West Africa and along the Gulf of Guinea.

In the Angolan president's 2008 new year speech, he emphasised the new thrust of Angolan

post-conflict foreign policy, namely reinforcing its bilateral and commercial relationships with other countries. This 'diversification' strategy will allow Angola to maintain beneficial relations with whomever it chooses, be it the US or China, allowing such parties access to its oilfields, while not allowing any foreign country to become too influential.

Angola's relationship with China is becoming more businesslike. Short-term offers by China in terms of post-conflict infrastructural development have not been matched by other countries. In 2007, Angola joined OPEC, a move that could be a significant policy shift. Also, Angola supported the 2006 launching of the Gulf of Guinea Commission as a forum for addressing the common interests of member states and for settling regional disputes over oil

exploration and fisheries. In 2010, Angola will host the African Cup of Nations football tournament, while South Africa will host the World Cup.

The Angolan government's future scenario is modelled on the country's education, food production and energy needs in 2025. Luanda's vision and horizons are being transformed, and it is expected that the MPLA will tighten its grip on power, despite the downturn in the economy. The latter, however, will require some of the government's plans to be reappraised, creating openings for bureaucratic reform focused on improvements in programme delivery, improvement of human capital and poverty reduction. These will constitute a critical part of Dos Santos's legacy and represent a major challenge in the post-conflict development of Angola.

Arms proliferation and regional security in Africa: Transnational risks

Kwesi Aning



KWESI ANING currently serves as Head, Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution Department (CPMRD) of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana. Prior to taking up his new position in January 2007, he served as the African Union's first Expert on Counter-terrorism, Defence and Security with responsibility for implementing the continental counter-terrorism strategy and oversight of

the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) in Algiers. Dr Aning holds a doctorate from the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. His primary research interests deal with African security issues, comparative politics, terrorism and conflict. He has taught at several universities in Europe and Africa and has a number of publications to his name. In 2007, he served as a senior consultant to the UN Department of Political Affairs, New York and completed a UN Secretary General's report on the relationship between the UN and regional organisations, particularly the African Union, in maintaining peace and security. He reviews for several scholarly journals and serves on various editorial boards.

Small arms and light weapons (SALW) have a long history in West Africa. Initiatives in reaction to SALW-related violence, local and regional, have taken place in an attempt to introduce control measures. The initiative by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is probably the best known. Based on the Declaration of the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons, this initiative was initially voluntary, but later became a binding convention in June 2006. The insecurity created by the prevalence of SALW has given rise to an extensive rhetoric on arms control. The real challenge is to transform this rhetoric into operational initiatives.

Two important issues in the field are 1) ECOWAS and its concern that SALW proliferation creates insecurity in member-states and affects the human security of the region, and 2) the concerns of the citizens themselves, who regard access to SALW as fundamental to their own identity and security. Ghana will be used as the empirical example in the discussion of SALW below.

Until quite recently in Africa, governments have regarded security in terms of protecting the state (institutions, regime stability and borders). Conse-

quently, human security was overshadowed by concerns about state security. There has recently been a shift in this perception and a realisation that human/civil security and state security are intertwined. Despite the shift in security thinking, there is still a widespread inability or unwillingness by many African states to protect their citizens. This is so even in countries not at war, as states are often more concerned about securing the regime rather than ensuring the safety of the population. This can be explained first by the fact that in most West African countries there has been an increase in firearms-related crimes and second by the fact that the state's ability to protect its citizens is weakened by the former issue. Human security is undermined in many West African states through their government's inability to function optimally. As I have noted elsewhere:

The resultant impact of such multiple processes is that, sub-state actors who are beyond and below the purview of the state begin to encroach on what ought to have been prerogative of the state: namely its ability to be the sole institution with access to and control over the weapons of violence to protect its interest and citizens. Rather, because of this weakness and despite the political

rhetoric about ‘banning’ small arms, the desire by citizens to acquire SALW for divergent reasons is widespread.

Since 1990, the discourse on security challenges in West Africa has taken a new turn, and this is largely due to the increase in international and ECOWAS concern and involvement, especially in SALW issues, particularly as this is an issue with subregion-wide implications. Cyril Obi emphasises the importance of ‘acknowledging the existence of the “non-criminal” transnational threats,’ as most analysis of the security challenges in West Africa seems to be made through the lens of criminality.

Ghana is perceived to be a relatively peaceful country. However, frequent media reports about firearms-related crimes may point to the existence of underlying conflicts and issues. Manhood and strength are sometimes measured by the possession of firearms. The prevalence of firearms has increased in Ghanaian society, largely as a consequence of the establishment of a Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) by the military regime led by then Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings. It was Rawlings who went about arming his so-called People’s Defence Committees (PDCs) and Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) in the 1980s. This was an effort on his part to ‘democratise the tools of violence.’

The extensive spread of weapons was purportedly to protect the new revolutionary regime from supposed neocolonialists and imperialist agents. Later, the PNDC came to understand the real implications of the extensive distribution of SALW in Ghana. This realisation led to an initiative in 1999 whereby the government, media, churches and NGOs collectively launched an information programme about the firearms problem in Ghana. The programme included a two-week general amnesty for the return of unregistered guns without punishment and a weapons buy-back programme. Punitive measures to seize unregistered firearms were also initiated in 2000 alongside a collaborative police-military weapons-retrieval strategy (*etuo mu ye sum*, ‘the gun is dangerous’). According to A.R. Alhassan, the strategy was a failure, largely due its poor execution. After the recent post-election violence, a second weapons buy-back initiative was introduced in 2009, but not one gun was returned.

Firearms proliferation in Ghana has undoubtedly led to an increase in violent crimes such as land

disputes, armed robberies, carjacking, struggles over resources and distribution and chieftaincy disputes in the country and the sub-region. This civil insecurity is particularly noticeable in urban areas, and some areas in larger cities have become ungovernable.

There have been five major authorised gun importers in Ghana since 2001. There is extensive data on their business, but significantly less information about the local production of small arms. The notable increase in imported firearms by 2000 made the government initiate ‘an immediate freeze on sales of existing stocks pending an inventory of all stocks held by private arms dealers and review of procedures for their acquisition and registration.’ I have, however, yet to meet an official who has any knowledge or information of the effects of the freeze.

The social effects of arms proliferation are many. One is the impact it has on women traders, who in their concern about SALW-related crimes, choose to leave for work later, after the sun has risen, and return before the sun has set, avoiding being outside when it is dark. The result is that they sometimes lose four to five hours of work and income every day.

The attempt to control, even ban, firearms and alcohol by the colonial powers did not succeed, and the indigenous manufacture of arms has survived till today in the region. Research shows that gun-making has become a relatively competitive business. There are approximately 2,500 blacksmiths involved in the local production of small arms. In just one region of Ghana, findings indicate that arms proliferation poses serious security threats to the country and the sub-region. The gun-making culture in Ghana is widespread, and many laws have been enacted to tackle the issue, such as the Arms and Ammunition Act of 1962 (Act 118), which regulates arms and ammunition possession, and the Arms and Ammunitions Decree (NRCD 9) of 1972, which regulates the registration process by the establishment of a punishment regime.

Additional regulations have since been put in place. The most recent initiative is the revision of the Arms and Ammunition Act, whose recommendations will, it is hoped, be debated in parliament in 2010. There is, however, some confusion about the regulations on arms imports. Some think that arms imports are banned and others believe that the interior minister can give exceptional authorisation.

While there is a ban on the local manufacture of firearms by blacksmiths, there seem to be no laws regulating the repair of old imported firearms. The government of Ghana, while harbouring a 'quasi-pathological fear' of local craft producers and their products, ironically appears comfortable with the importation of foreign weapons.

The poor performance by and possible corruption within the police force is related to the publicly perceived culture of impunity. The fairly high level of impunity in Ghana makes dealing with firearms-related crimes difficult. The police are in some ways perceived to be contributing to many of these crimes. 'Justice has been on sale in Ghana for a long time,' are the words of a magistrate in Ghana about the criminal justice system's inability to dispense justice fairly. Of all the criminal cases reported in Ghana, about 62 per cent were not dealt with. This is problematic, as it colours public perceptions of and trust in the state's capacity to deal with crime in the country. An official committee was established to look at the serious issue of armed robbery in the country, thereby overlooking other crimes related to

firearms. Nigeria and Ghana have through different measures coordinated their efforts on firearms control and movement, largely because of its cross-border, sub-regional nature. There have also been joint security meetings among security chiefs from Togo, Ghana and Burkina Faso regarding information-sharing procedures on SALW, rebel movements and mercenaries.

The origins of SALW proliferation in Ghana lie in the policy of the Rawlings government in the 1980s to equip civilian militias with firearms. The legislation on firearms manufacturing is relatively strict, but still a large number of skilled blacksmiths produce firearms locally in Ghana. There are about 35,000-40,000 such locally produced guns in the country. Increased firearms-related crime has had an adverse economic effect. The widespread perception that the police are unable or even unwilling to stop firearms-related crimes has led to an upsurge in mob justice groups and militant communities. The private security business has in consequence blossomed, but is neither monitored nor carefully registered.

Foundations of Swedish Foreign Relations and Development Cooperation in Africa

Lennart Wohlgemuth



LENNART WOHLGEMUTH is a Visiting Professor at the Centre for African Studies at the School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg. His degree in business administration was obtained from the Stockholm School of Economics. He has been active in the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida), United Nations Development Agency (UNDP) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). From 1993 to 2005, he was the director of the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI).

He has been engaged in issues related to African development throughout his life, and has lived in various countries on the continent. His research interests and publications include development issues and Africa (aid, civil society, knowledge development, education, human rights and conflicts) and his current emphasis is on Swedish and European aid policies.

The foundations of Sweden's foreign relations and development cooperation in Africa are largely based on the Policy for Global Development (PGD) approved by parliament in 2003. The aim of this policy is to create a coherent public policy arena in which the goals for equitable and sustainable development are thought through and all aspects of policy making are assessed.

There is an emphasis on solidarity, which is worth noting. As early as the 1962 government bill on Swedish development cooperation policy, solidarity was a focal point and has always been a basic value of Swedish development policy.

In the current document, the strong focus on coherence means that Swedish policies are designed to be consistent with the PGD but also with international conventions ratified by Sweden and therefore incorporated into Swedish law. This coherence is important in limiting conflicts between policies

and the documents defining Sweden's foreign policy and the institutions implementing them. Coherence is also important in the sense that many different political issues are becoming more and more inter-related, both within the country's national boundaries and in a regional and global perspective, for instance, the EU and its cooperation with other actors under the rubric of development cooperation. As such, consistency of policies for supporting development in Africa is increasingly important.

It is important to place the implementation of this policy in perspective and examine the basis for the highly innovative and focused policies introduced in 2007 and 2009 respectively. Beyond this, some attention must also be given to analysing the challenges in implementing these policies. This should then serve as a guide in shaping Sweden's policies towards Africa and optimise the impact of development cooperation on the continent.

Democracy and Development in Africa

Fantu Cheru



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an MS in political science from Portland State University (Oregon, USA) and a BA in political science from Colorado College. He is currently involved in research projects on Remittance and Local Economic Development; Globalisation, Cities and the Politics of Water Provisioning; and China and Africa: Strategic Encounters.

Africa has gone through four different political and social experiences since the 1950s. The post-independence bliss and hopeful sentiments have been shattered, giving way to unfulfilled promises and broken societies.

The first phase is 'the independence struggle,' the thriving hopes and prosperities of nationalism. But as Claude Ake said, 'independence in Africa was rarely the heroic achievement it was made out to be ...' Any real interest in transformation was not part of the struggle. Brought together by their shared objection to the colonial powers, the many nationalist leaders and groups were not free of conflict. Class conflict became prominent once independence was achieved, but class analysis was not embraced fully by the independence leaders, whose predominant focus had been on racial inequalities. Extensive attention was given to 'nationalism,' 'indigenisation' and 'Africanisation,' while inequality was rising. Take South Africa, where poverty is high among the black population following the ending of the oppressive apartheid regime. Former President Thabo Mbeki spoke proudly of the improved situation represented by the emergence of a small black African bourgeoisie within the population, as if the growing economic prosperity of the few could be seen as a sign of upward mobility for all South Africans.

The second phase is 'the post-independence experience.' Like the colonial model, post-independ-

ence development also inhibited peasant production and autonomy. The past 50 years in Africa have seen the extensive marginalisation of peasants by both capitalist- and socialist-oriented regimes. Under the banner of nation-building, 'elite bureaucrats' and party loyalists, far removed from the reality of most of the population, have and continue to dictate the production and sales that peasants were and are involved in. These actions have often been justified on the basis of the priority afforded nation-building. The independence euphoria which climaxed in the 1970s gave way to despair, as the military became entrenched in power in many African countries. The problems of one party or military dictatorships were compounded by the adoption of development policies that were even more 'anti-poor and anti-peasant.' Some development projects financed by Western organisations also excluded the poor. Thus, by the second decade of independence the distance between society and state in Africa had considerably widened. As Ake noted: 'It is not that development has failed in Africa. It has never got started ... because of exogeneity and its contradictions, Africa never had a development agenda – but a confusion of agendas.'

Phase three is 'the post-1980 experience with market oriented reform.' African states were forced to apply for loans, as their economies had fallen into crisis by the early 1980s. Crisis-hit African states had

to implement socially harsh structural adjustment programs (SAPs). As IMF programs began to take a bite, through drastic reduction of social expenditures), large numbers of African producers began to drop out of the formal economy to guard against threats to their subsistence. The flip side of the donor-driven SAPs was that the elected multiparty democracies often resorted to authoritarian and repressive tactics to implement the harsh policies required. Peasants, realising the powerless state they were entrenched in, avoided the state altogether, retreating into their community or ethnic shells, rather than engaging in collective action. Based on their bitter experiences of being victims of elite-sponsored development policies/programmes, they increasingly avoided formal agencies.

The marginalisation of the poor and the pauperisation of the middle class radicalised opposition to unpopular economic reform policies and the governments implementing them, creating a tension between state and civil society. This has fed struggles between social movements, which are increasingly highlighting issues of resource distribution, social justice and political rights, and the governing elite, which sees 'liberal forms of democracy' more as a means to capture power and resources rather than as a way to serve the people.

'The post-1990 drive towards democracy' is the fourth phase. Democracy did succeed in the 1990s, but more as an idea. This victory has either faded or been shattered by the reality that democracy has not really delivered on its expected promises to the African people. There seems to be a striking similarity between the mass mobilisation movement for independence in the 1940s and 1950s and the post-1990 movement for democracy. This is particularly evident in the leadership of the middle class, drawing people from different classes and social backgrounds. The changes made through the multiparty elections have been mainly felt in urban areas. Furthermore, the urban bias remains overwhelmingly strong. This tendency is so potent that famines and even deaths among peasants are widely ignored by the government. There are many contradictory tendencies. Even though multiparty states are emerging, the parties are very similar or somehow connected to the old one-party systems. In many countries, the new opposition party leaders are those that had previously served the single party. Thus, most successful new politicians are in reality 'old-breed' politicians

in new robes, tactically breaking with past through a strategic rhetoric about human rights and good governance that is music to the ears of the international community.

What then constitutes the African Crisis?

1. Challenges to nation-building: problems to overcome
2. African state in crisis: analytical category and problematic conditions
3. Terrible tendencies of 'false start'
4. Overcoming problems of state capacity
5. Four dimensions of state capacity

Democracy has not undergone fundamental transformation in Africa since 1989 and still has not seemed to move beyond the holding of multiparty elections. Africa appears stuck and the transition towards democracy cannot be taken for granted, because civil society remains weak and cannot effectively play the important role of obstructing non-democratic tendencies.

Importantly, one cannot separate democracy from the social agenda: the freedom from hunger and political freedom are organically linked. Democracy must also provide an improved standard of living, better education and further enshrine other fundamental rights.

The need to reshape and reinvent democracy in Africa is fundamental. The way out of the current crisis that Africa faces is through the repossession of power by ordinary people and control over human and natural resources. Importantly, by strengthening their own capacities and redefining development to suit their needs and be conducted on their own terms, African people can promote democratic development. Some of the critical actions to achieve this are: encouraging and empowering civil societies to function and grow; creating a new order for peasants; recognising nationalities and not ignoring ethnic nationalism; and acknowledging that elections are not the only way to bring change to a society. It is also important to understand that sometimes change may have to be achieved through armed struggle, such as the overthrow of the Rwandan genocidal regime.

On the research agenda front, new approaches to political economy and state-society relations need to emerge. A fundamental question to be addressed is: who should drive the new national project aimed

at welfare and democracy? Is civil society really the triumphant social forces we seem to assume, or is civil society an arena for struggle, where social forces contest the space for expanding democracy? There also needs to be more research into and a clearer formulation of 'people's democracy' or 'local democracy' as it is expressed or evolves:

The resistance against the forces of globalisation and against social coalitions that continue to perpetuate poverty and oppression in Africa will take many forms and the outcome will depend on the capacity of the forces of civil society to gain sufficient influence to qualify as a genuine counter-hegemonic project.

There are strong grounds for optimism about the future, but it should be noted that no outside force

can teach Africans how to govern themselves. This is something Africans need to figure out. To quote Paulo Freire; 'the oppressors never make change; the oppressed themselves must write their own history by freeing themselves from the hands of the oppressors.'

Furthermore, a society that does not regard its past as being instructive for its present and future cannot be self-reliant and confident. This in turn will lead to a lack of internally generated dynamism and stability. We cannot allow the marginalisation and bitter experiences of the past to continue, or result in withdrawal of the energetic hopes for fundamental change in Africa. To do so will amount to the betrayal of the optimism that once reigned at the dawn of African independence.

Snapshots from 2009 NAI-FOI lectures on African security

(Photo credits and interviews by Sofia Widforss)



"It has been a positive experience, truly beneficial to learn from the expertise of the lecturers ..."

Camilla Elowson, FOI

What are your perceptions of the lectures series? In what ways did you benefit by attending and has the series contributed to your regular work?

– I appreciate the opportunity to get out of my office and away from the computer screen, to have time to reflect on what you regularly must grasp at a rapid pace. I value the expertise of the lecturers – their reflections are indeed worthwhile. The information coming from the news can sometimes be fragmentary, you do not have the time to read as much or as deep as you should and it is thus good to have the time to extend your knowledge and reflect some more. As a researcher, you work alone at times and so it has been valuable to meet people from other agencies. The idea in itself is good, to build bridges between departments and authorities. There have been a few informal discussions during the lunch breaks that have been inspiring; I have had many rewarding conversations. One can learn a lot by listening to others' questions. For instance, for me it was of interest to listen to the questions from SIDA coming from more of a field perspective. It has been a positive experience, truly beneficial to learn from the expertise of the lecturers, to have access to their reflections. This is something that I have appreciated.

Were there particular lectures that you found especially intriguing?

– The ones by Ken Menkhaus and by Alex Vines. They were very educational. Both speakers had experience in the field, from the regions, which they incorporated. This made it easier to grasp, when it is not a completely theoretical lecture. It is important that the lecturer captures the audience in an educational manner, and this is often done by integrating examples and lecturing in a more dynamic way, so I appreciated the lecturers who succeeded in this.

How well do you feel the different aspects and dimensions of the theme were approached?

– The regional approach on Southern Africa was good, as well as that on the Horn of Africa: those regions were well handled and were enlightening. It was good to have both thematic and geographical focus.

Did you sense commitment on the part of the audience during the lectures?

– Sometimes a few questions ... but parts of the audience have been sitting passively and quietly.

'It was a privilege to come and listen to somebody that otherwise speaks at the best universities in the world ...'

Justin MacDermott, FOI



What are your perceptions of the lectures series? In what ways did you benefit by attending and has the series contributed to your regular work?

– The lecture series was, above all, intellectually stimulating. When you work with African security matters it is important to see the different nuances, dimensions of the conflicts, and the dynamics within conflict zones: to engage intellectually with these will benefit your own analytical work. It was a time-out from the regular task-specific analysis work that I do, a moment to step back and place myself in another environment with others and discuss a theme from different perspectives. In this regard, it was a good meeting place for different authorities and agents working with African security matters,

to be in a context where one does not speak for the organisation or the authority, but participates in an intellectual discussion on academic ground.

Were there particular lectures that you found especially intriguing?

– Ken Menkhaus. He is a guru in the field. It was a privilege to come and listen to somebody that otherwise speaks in the best universities in the world, to sit in a small group and discuss matters with him. He made the biggest impression on me, sitting there and discussing with such a leading world expert. Alex Vines was also interesting, and also the closing lecture by Fantu Cheru where the everyday, general view of the problems was questioned.

'In short, it was a very good and valued opportunity to acquire new knowledge, wider horizons on these issues and to make contact with others, with researchers at NAI, the guest lecturers, and with other participants.'

Per Karlsson, SIDA



What are your perceptions of the lectures series? In what ways did you benefit by attending and has the series contributed to your regular work?

– If you are working in SIDA, and perhaps in other bureaucracies, you often have to make an effort to reflect, to do a deeper analysis. You have to make time for skills-acquisition, to learn more about the issue with which you work. The lecture series for me

offered this opportunity, and NAI was a stimulating environment: you could scout the library, meet other researchers, and all the facilities were ideal, for example, the lecture locale. And even though some of the questions did not directly concern my countries of interest, which are Somalia and Sudan, the examples from, for instance, West Africa were satisfying: you could see important differences and often many

similarities. It was very fascinating to learn about the security industry in South Africa, the formal and informal. Another benefit was the networking and contacts. I met others, not least at FOI, who are interested in matters of security in Africa. In short, it was a very good and valued opportunity to acquire new knowledge, wider horizons on these issues and to make contact with others, with researchers at NAI, and the guest lecturers, and with other participants. Some might ask for more interactive structures for the lectures, with small group discussions and so forth, but I have to say that I do not have any particular need for that. On the contrary, I think it is pleasant, it is a part of the reflection, you arrive and it is without demands – if I have a question I pose it and otherwise I sit down to listen and learn and return with the knowledge, without having to write a report. It is an aspect of the lack of conditions on the participants that makes it possible to relax and truly reflect ... and it was fun being back on a school bench.

Were there particular lectures that you found especially intriguing?

– Somalia with the visiting experts Abdi Samatar and Ken Menkhaus was very good. But also those

outside my immediate field of interest but concerned with the security industry and light arms were also very good. In general, I cannot say I have been disappointed in any of the lectures.

How well do you feel the different aspects and dimensions of the theme were approached?

– The regional aspect, the peace architecture of AU is very topical, and as it has come up it is important to support it. Meantime it is important not to be naïve regarding the significance of the AU and the regional organisations in Africa, the interests they are really representing and why one should not be surprised that they have more of a street security perspective than a focus on human security ... There are political economy-related explanations for all of this ... But the regional aspects are important, no doubt about that, and that must be highlighted in at least one theme, I understand that. The themes were well chosen. I would have liked to see some lecture or theme on Sudan ... but we all have 'our' countries, so to speak. It is good to have country case studies, because they give you useful input, a deeper context than with general themes.