

**NAI-FOI
lecture series
on
African Security**

ANNUAL REPORT 2010

ISBN 978-91-7106-704-3

Nordiska Afrikainstitutet
The Nordic Africa Institute



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Foreword

In 2008, the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI) and the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) initiated a pilot collaboration on African security. Among the main elements in the collaboration were a joint lecture series on African security, mutual support in quality reviews, information exchanges and pooling of contacts and competencies from the respective organisation's networks. The collaboration agreement between the two institutions during 2009-10 had the main objective of establishing a solid base for cooperation and capacity-building in Africa-related research on peace and security issues. In line with this objective, cooperation on Africa-related research on these issues has continued, as has the lecture series, which remains one of the key expressions of this cooperation.

The Annual Report 2010 includes the papers presented during the 2010 lectures. The report has been edited by Dr Cyril Obi, leader of the conflict cluster at NAI from 2009 to 2011.

Carin Norberg
Director
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About NAI

The Nordic Africa Institute (NAI, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet) is a centre in the Nordic region for research, documentation and information on modern Africa. Based in Uppsala, Sweden, the institute is dedicated to providing timely, critical and alternative research on and analysis of Africa in the Nordic countries and to strengthening cooperation between African and Nordic researchers.

As a hub and meeting place in the Nordic region for a growing field of research and analysis, the institute strives to put knowledge of African issues within reach of scholars, policy-makers, politicians, media, students and the general public. The institute is financed jointly by the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden).

About FOI

FOI (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, Swedish Defence Research Agency) is an assignment-based agency under the auspices of the Swedish Ministry of Defence. Its core activities are research, development of methodology and technology as well as studies in defence and security.

The organisation employs around 950 people, of whom about 700 are researchers (2009). This makes FOI the largest research institute in Sweden.

FOI provides its clients with leading expertise in many fields, such as security policy studies and defence and security analyses; assessment of different threats; systems for the control and management of crises; protection against and management of hazardous substances; IT-security and the potential of new sensors.

Acknowledgements

This report, the second of its kind, is the product of the efforts of a dedicated team to document the memorable features and highlights of the collaborative NAI-FOI African Security lecture series.

I have had the wonderful experience of working with my colleague Tania Berger, who efficiently and professionally administered the practical aspects of the programme and in many ways facilitated the compilation of the report. Thanks also go to all our colleagues at FOI, particularly Markus Derblom and Camilla Elowson, with whom we worked directly; to NAI Director Carin Norberg; and to all the guest lecturers, discussants and participants for their contributions to the success of the lecture series.

Cyril Obi

Senior Researcher and Leader of the NAI Conflict Cluster, 2009-11

NAI-FOI LECTURE SERIES ON AFRICAN SECURITY OVERVIEW FOR 2010

Cyril Obi

The 2010 lectures built on those in 2009. In this regard, more emphasis was placed on the practical workings of peace and security mechanisms and processes on the continent. The lectures, therefore, aimed at analysing and explaining the trends in preventing, managing and resolving conflicts and building peace in a sustainable manner in Africa. A theme that runs through the lectures is the nexus between peace, security and development within the framework of peacebuilding on the continent. Leading scholars and practitioners in the field of African security from Sweden, Africa and across the world and well-versed discussants acted as resource persons, giving lectures and providing deep insights into the varied aspects of Africa's peace, security and development.

In the preceding year, the NAI-FOI African Security lecture series focused on the theoretical, political, socioeconomic, military and policy challenges confronting African security at the sub-state, state, regional and transnational levels. The lectures provided participants, who are Swedish security and defence analysts and senior policy-makers, with the tools to interpret the complex dimensions of, and emerging issues in Africa's security and development, and respond in constructive and systematic ways to them. In 2010, the lectures were designed to build the capacity of participants to facilitate the conceptual, analytical and policy-oriented basis for engaging with peacebuilding challenges and conflict issues in Africa by exposing them to leading international experts with strong multidisciplinary expertise.

The 2010 lectures focus on several broad issues. These include the implications of unconstitutional changes of power for democracy and peace; the nature and impact of identity politics, whether ethnic, religious or regional on Africa; and the challenges of peacebuilding, drawing on the following case studies: West and Central Africa and Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi. Other issues are more specific aspects of peacebuilding, including Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR), Security Sector Reform (SSR) and post-conflict democratisation in various African settings. Some attention is also paid to the role of regional organisations in promoting peace and security in West and Central Africa. Also addressed was the challenge to energy and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG), particularly the regional and global risks arising from the insurgency in Nigeria's oil-rich but impoverished Niger Delta. Related to this was a critical analysis of the nexus between the Global War on Terror, the US-Africa Command and stability and security in the Sahel region and the rest of the continent as a basis for cautioning against the possible militarisation of African politics and development.

Apart from providing deep insights into the challenges facing peacebuilding and development in Africa, most of the lectures draw attention to the ways these can be addressed, particularly to the need to prioritise

the security and welfare of African people, the democratic reconstruction of developmental states in Africa and the relevance of Africa perspectives and knowledge to peacebuilding on the continent.

The 2010 lectures series continued to demonstrate the benefits of the collaboration between NAI as a centre of excellence for research on Africa and the FOI as a valued partner in the quest to produce informed knowledge on Africa and engage with the issues confronting that continent.

Unconstitutional Changes of Power: *Understanding the Implications For Democracy and Security in West Africa*

Cyril Obi



CYRIL OBI holds a PhD in political science from the University of Lagos. He was a post-doctoral visiting Fellow at St Antony's College, Oxford. Prior to joining the Nordic Africa Institute in 2005, he was associate research professor at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and was the 2004 Claude Ake visiting professor at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University. Between 2009 and 2011, Dr Obi was leader of the research cluster on Conflict, Displacement and Transformation at NAI. He is widely published

internationally and serves on the editorial boards of several journals. His recent publications include Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi (eds) (2010), *The Rise of China and India in Africa: Challenges, Opportunities and Critical Interventions*, London: Zed Books; and Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad (eds) (2011), *Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petro-Violence*, London: Zed Books.

Summary

In a report on the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) released on 6 January 2010, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon aptly noted that the 'resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government and undemocratic practices in West Africa constitutes a potential threat to sub regional peace and security'. Central to his note of alarm was the deterioration in the political situation in Guinea, which could undermine the fragile peace in the Mano River region, including in Côte D'Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone, which barely a decade ago emerged from bloody civil wars that threatened regional security in West Africa.

This lecture explores the implications for regional democratisation and security of recent unconstitutional acts, including coups d'états and constitutional crises in some West African countries. Coups in Mauritania (August 2008) and Guinea (December 2008); reports of the assassination of the president of Guinea-Bissau by armed soldiers (March 2009); a reported coup attempt in Togo (April 2009); and a constitutional crisis in Niger (since May 2009) following the sacking of the constitutional court and the National Assembly by the president and the

holding of a referendum and elections in the face of ECOWAS resolutions against these unconstitutional acts, do point to reversals in the democratic project in West Africa.

Of particular note is the situation in Guinea, which deteriorated rapidly after the coup of December 2008 and culminated on 28 September 2009 in the shooting by Guinean soldiers of unarmed persons protesting against the incumbent military head of state's plan to contest national elections planned for January 2010. Some 150 protestors were left dead and scores more were wounded. The head of state, Captain Dadis Camara was later shot by one of his own troops in December 2009 and had to be flown abroad for treatment. In Nigeria, the political crisis linked to an ongoing insurgency in the oil-rich Niger Delta has been worsened by a constitutional vacuum created by the absence of the president since November 2009. The president made no move to inform the National Assembly of the need to transfer power to the vice-president until he returns, a circumstance that is causing protests in the country as well as international concerns about the possible eruption of a political crisis in West Africa's power-

house and leading oil exporter, with wider ramifications for regional stability and security.

In light of such reports, some commentators are already drawing attention to a 'slippage' or 'regression' from democracy to dictatorship in West Africa, pointing to the limitations confronting ECOWAS in implementing its 2001 ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Governance, which underpins its policy of zero-tolerance for unconstitutional changes of government. Such views are predicated on a sense that a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule had taken place in the region and that West Africa faces the real risk that the 'democratic gains' made in the past decade are being rolled back. Given the implications of this situation and in the face of the open challenge to ECOWAS's sophisticated

peace and security architecture posed by the constitutional crises in some of its member states, the following questions are relevant: What factors explain the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of power in the region; what are the likely outcomes of the recent trends; and what are the prospects for democracy in West Africa? Does the current situation suggest that ECOWAS's mechanisms for promoting democracy and security are proving to be ineffective? What role can the international community play in enabling ECOWAS and its member states to end democratic regression and political instability, with their attendant risks for security in West Africa? It is to these and other related questions that this lecture addressed itself.

Identity Politics in Africa: *The Complexities of Ethnicity, Religion and Regionalism*

Abdul Raufu Mustapha



Dr ABDUL RAUFU MUSTAPHA is a university lecturer in African politics at the Department of International Development and Kirk-Greene Fellow at St Antony's College, University of Oxford. He studied political science at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria, and St. Peter's College, Oxford. He has previously taught at Bayero University, Kano and Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. His current research interests include the impact of democratisation on rural societies in the north of Nigeria, the management of ethnic diversity by the Nigerian state

and the nature of the state in Africa. He is a deputy editor of *Oxford Development Studies*, a contributing editor of the *Review of African Political Economy* and a member of the scientific committee of the Council for the Development of the Social Sciences in Africa (CODESRIA). His recent publications include Adekeye Adebajo and Abdul Raufu Mustapha (eds) (2008) *Gulliver's Troubles: Nigeria's Foreign Policy after the Cold War*, Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press; Abdul Raufu Mustapha and Lyndsay Whitfield (eds) (2009), *Turning Points in African Democracy*, London: James Currey; and 'Peace and State Building in Africa: Regime Types, Political Institutions, Leadership Styles, and Civic Engagement' (2010), Research Report for the African Development Bank, Tunis).

Summary

African identities are often misunderstood as being largely built on race and 'tribe'. There are at least eight dominant identities operational in contemporary Africa. This lecture examines how links between identities and politics can be understood: (1) through the lens of culture wars; (2) by examining 'root' causes; and (3) through understanding ideological patterns of ethnic mobilisation. The concrete forms of identity politics and how they play out comparatively in different scenarios on the continent are explored, focusing on three identities: ethnicity, religion and regionalism. These comparisons remind us that we must be careful in making sweeping generalisations about the politics of identity in Africa.

Africa usually evokes notions of two identities: race and 'tribe', and the continent is closely identified with the Black race. This lecture argues that the identification of Africa with race and 'tribe' is misleading. African identities are more complex than that. Thus, the way these categories of race and 'tribe' are often understood and used is itself misleading. To properly understand the nature of iden-

tiety politics in Africa, we must properly understand the nature of identities in Africa.

The operational identities in Africa include race, ethnicity (not 'tribe'), religion, gender, generation, nation, regionalism and class. With regard to race, the popular view is that Africa-ness is synonymous with being Black. Although all Blacks may be Africans, not all Africans are Blacks. Apart from the obvious case of the Maghreb with its Arab and Berber populations, there is also the reality of the presence of indigenous Shuwa Arabs in northeastern Nigeria. The same holds true for South Africa, where the descendants of European Dutch settlers in the Cape referred to themselves as Afrikaners, using Africa as the reference point of their emerging identity, but initially dealing with the local indigenous population not as fellow Africans united by place, but as *tribes* and *natives*. As recently as 2007, the Chinese Association of South Africa, representing 100,000 long-established Chinese of South African citizenship, went to the high court and secured a ruling to the effect that the 'South African Chinese people

fall within the ambit of the definition of “black people” under the affirmative action laws. The conflation of Africa and Black in the popular imagination is therefore too narrow and potentially misleading.

The same mis-application can be observed with regard to ethnicity, which is often thought of as being marked by cultural, linguistic and territorial distinctions. As most academics now acknowledge, the concept ‘tribe’ does not correctly describe Africa’s identity groups. In their current form, ethnic groups emerged in the context of the encounter between African cultural materials and the forces of colonial modernity. Thus, Africa has a number of identities that are best understood in terms of their complexity and historicity. As noted above these are race, ethnicity, religion, gender, generation, nation, regionalism and class, which in varying degree have a bearing on African politics.

While some perspectives on identity politics emphasise cultural incompatibility as the basis for friction and political mobilisation, others explore the ‘root’ structural causes of ethnic grievance and the impact of group or horizontal inequalities on the generation of grievance and on political mobilisation. The phenomenon of ethnic conflict can be understood by examining the ‘root causes’ that fuel the grievance and political mobilisation. This perspective directs our attention to horizontal inequalities – inequalities between groups, rather than the economists’ usual concern with inequalities between individuals – vertical inequalities. In many respects, both vertical and horizontal inequalities are intertwined, but they are also sufficiently distinct to warrant separate attention. Yet another approach to identity politics focuses on the quest for recognition by groups who feel that they suffer mis-recognition, erasure and marginalisation.

Religion is sometimes seen as an aspect of ethnic identity. But we must bear in mind that religions are also fragmented along belief systems and ritual practices, leading to considerable intra-religious differences and variable political consequences. This point can be illustrated by examining intra-Islamic cleavages in northern Nigeria from an historical perspective.

The politics of regionalism – demands for federalism, autonomy or merger with another territorial or extraterritorial unit – often arise in the context of these multifaceted disadvantages and fears of southern domination. These tensions often find expression in the patterns of political activity and electoral politics, and can be considerably worsened where regionalism overlaps with other cleavages, such as ethnicity and religion.

Every African country has its own unique politics of ethnicity, driven by patterns of horizontal inequalities, mis-recognition, ethnic structure and the historical dynamics of economic accumulation, processes of class and state formation and contingent factors. What is important is that the form ethnic and other types of identity politics assume in any particular country is peculiar to structural, historical, ideological and contingent factors, including the configuration of the country. It is important therefore to avoid sweeping generalisations, without paying attention to the nuances inherent in these complex and dynamic identities.

Identities matter in Africa, as elsewhere, but they are often misunderstood. A number of identity categories, operating alone or in combination, can influence the identity politics of countries and regions. Explaining what these identities are, and why and how they have political effects has been the objective of this lecture. We cannot understand the dynamics of identity politics through recourse to cultural stereotypes or simple causalities. The same identity can have very different political implications, depending on the wider context and there are often complex factors underlying specific forms of identity politics. Understanding these processes and taking the necessary remedial measures – inclusive governance and economic structures, cultural sensitivity, creating and nurturing avenues for informal inter-communal interactions and building an impartial and developmentalist state – remain tasks for local communities, national states in the region and the international community.

The Challenge of Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict Africa: *Perspectives from Burundi*

Patricia Daley



Dr PATRICIA DALEY is a university lecturer in human geography and an official Fellow and geography tutor at Jesus College, Oxford University. Her previous academic appointments were at Dartmouth College in New Hampshire, Loughborough University and Pembroke College, Oxford. She has taught a range of human geography topics as well as specialist courses on African societies and environments. On the basis of her research on the state and violence in Central Africa, she was invited as a keynote speaker to the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) Governance Institute, held in Dakar, Senegal in 2002.

She has also given lectures to British military personnel on the crisis in Central Africa at peacekeeping training courses held at the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford. She is a member of the interdisciplinary advisory board of the international relations journal, *St Antony's International Review*. She acted as a consultant for an internationally screened documentary on the genocide in Rwanda (*Rwanda: the Forgotten Tribe*). Dr Daley is a peer reviewer for *Political Geography*, *Third World Quarterly*, *CODESRIA Journals*, *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography*, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, *Ethics, Place and Environment* and the *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*. She has also peer-reviewed grants for the UK Economic and Social Research Council and UK Department for International Development

Summary

In 2010, the Central African country of Burundi holds its second democratic elections since the signing of the Arusha peace and reconciliation agreement in 2000, which led to three years of a power-sharing transitional government (involving the minority Tutsi and majority Hutu) and five years of an elected majority government led by the CNDD-FDD political party. For decades, Burundi's society was racked by political conflict that manifested itself in genocidal violence and civil warfare between its minority Tutsi and majority Hutu population. The post-conflict period in Burundi has been far from smooth, with episodic outbreaks of violence, human rights abuse and the continued presence, though in a democratic form, of coercive state security machinery.

This lecture identifies six challenges to sustainable peace in Burundi. These include: post-genocide ethnic grievances which divide the society; the per-

sistent militarised and violent character of the state, despite the transformation of rebel groups into political parties; and the persistence of a culture of impunity, despite a move towards establishing a truth and reconciliation committee. Economic crisis and limited economic opportunities controlled by the political elite have narrowed the prospects for post-conflict recovery and stability, while the return and reintegration of refugees and displaced peoples has been constrained by the absence of livelihood opportunities. Another factor affecting Burundi is the regional context – particularly the situation in neighbouring eastern DRC and Rwanda and the effectiveness of regional economic organisations.

To many commentators, ethnicity, whether primordial or socially constructed during the colonial period, was a primary cause of the violence in Burundi. However, the underlying cause was not age-

old enmities but the near exclusive capture of the state by the minority Tutsi group and the institutional marginalisation of the majority Hutus. The assassination of the democratically elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, in October 1993, six months after the elections which gave victory to a majority Hutu political party, and the military coup of 1996 led by Tutsi military officers, sparked a wave of violence and civil warfare. Peace negotiations lasting four years led to the signing of the peace agreement in October 2000. It was an agreement between political parties, as rebel groups were excluded from the talks. It took another two years before ceasefire agreements were signed with most of the factions of the splintering rebel groups, and almost five years of an interim power-sharing government before multi-party elections were held in June and July 2005. The former rebel group CNDD-FDD won the communal and presidential elections and formed the dominant group in the power-sharing agreement, as stipulated by the peace agreement. It was not until 2009 that the last rebel group, Agathon Rwasa's faction of the FNL, finally agreed to go into cantonments, formed a political party and joined the government.

Ethnicity is not the root cause of political violence. Differences of status, class and region remain central to the political rivalry, especially among the Tutsis. While intra-Tutsi conflict was prominent during the period of one-party military rule (1965-93), intra-Hutu conflict has emerged as a more significant factor post-1993 and even more so since the signing of the peace agreement. The Hutus, who were not a homogenous group (also regionally differentiated), were united against Tutsi oppression. Once political power became accessible, they started to factionalise.

Rather unfortunately, the introduction of a democratically elected government with elements of power-sharing has not halted Burundi's pervasive culture of impunity. State institutions, such as the security services – *service national de renseignement* – and the police force have been largely indifferent to, or are believed to be involved in, torture, extrajudicial killing and imprisonment of political opponents. An example of arbitrary imprisonment is the case of Alexis Sinduhije, journalist (founder of *Radio Publique Africaine*) and president of the new political party, Movement for Solidarity and Democracy. In April 2009, Ernest Maniruvma, vice-president of a civil society group, Anti-cor-

ruption and Economic Malpractice Observatory (Olucome), was murdered after his organisation accused the government of corruption.

The persistence of political violence has resulted in a militarised environment that facilitates pervasive violence throughout the society. Elite indifference to the lives of those hundreds of people who have died or been raped and mutilated in recent wars indicates a considerable de-alorisation of the lives of the poor and rural dwellers. The dependence of the elite on state resources is also a critical factor in the internecine character of the violence. The limited private sector, controlled largely by foreign investors, has left the state as the main avenue of accumulation. Historically, the *baganwa* (aristocracy) and Tutsi elite, especially the chiefs, were given land by the colonial state and amassed enormous wealth. Consequently, militarism has continued to play a vital role in the processes of extraction, both for the Burundi elite and those in neighbouring countries.

Burundi's Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (DDR) programme was devised in consultation with, and supervised by, the World Bank under its Central African Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme. However, DDR and demilitarisation has been far from successful, as the former rebel groups have retained caches of arms, and many weapons, grenades, Kalashnikovs are still in the hands of ex-combatants. The return and reintegration of different cohorts of refugees and internally displaced populations remain a formidable challenge to peace. The state has yet to fully dismantle the *regroupement* camps that were established during the war for internally displaced peoples. Five years after the elections, over 100,000 still remain in these camps, and many of those repatriated have been unable to repossess their land without going through lengthy, costly and sometimes haphazard legal procedures that may not result in success.

The foregoing situation has been compounded by the dire economic conditions. Ranked 167 out of 177 on the Human Development Index, Burundi has experienced long-term decline in general standard of living and has been highly dependent on external aid. Over 67 per cent of its population is defined as poor. Life expectancy, an indicator of human well-being, has fallen and morbidity is high, due to an HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of over 13 per

cent in the population and adult malnutrition, augmented by years of warfare, frequent drought and food shortfalls. Unfortunately, the implementation of neoliberal reforms has done little to transform the dependency of the elite on state resources.

Developments in the regional context have had a direct bearing on the resolution of Burundi's problems. Of note is the instability in the eastern DRC and the festering political problems in neighbouring Rwanda. During the 13 years of war, Burundi's Hutu rebels fought in the DRC on the side of Laurent Kabila and funded their rebellion with resources gained illegally from the DRC, while the Burundi economy relies heavily on the processing and export of minerals from the DRC.

The continued presence of Hutu rebels (FDLR) in the DRC and the uprising by the Tutsi rebels (CNDP) in the country serves to strengthen the resolve of those elements in Burundi society and in the diaspora who continue to see the solution to the regional political crisis in ethnic terms. Burundi under Nkurunziza's government, seeking to maintain friendly relations with Rwanda, has forcibly repat-

riated Hutu refugees to Rwanda, buying into the Rwanda government position that there is no need for Rwandans to claim asylum in Burundi as Rwanda is now stable, and anyone who is afraid to return to Rwanda is a *génocidaire*.

Peace and security in Burundi are still fragile. Burundi's post-conflict political elite in the country and in the diaspora still plays divisive politics and the state persists in its intolerance of political diversity. Burundi's democratic maturity is tied closely to not just ensuring equity (ethnic and gender), but to improvements in the conditions of life for all so that sustainable livelihoods can become the norm for the majority. Improving social welfare may reduce the politicians' capacity to mobilise young people for acts of violence. For the elites, access to the state is still critical for accumulation. In this context, power-sharing, which is largely unworkable, may be the only political option, but it has to be accompanied by inclusive democratic and economic policies that promote national and social development in ways that reduce elite dependence on the state.

The Challenge of Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict Africa: *Perspectives from Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau*

'Funmi Olonisakin



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Summary

The lecture is organised in five parts. The first discusses the principles underpinning peacebuilding as conceptualised by the international community and based on Africa's own experience, followed by a discussion of the challenges of applying this global approach to Africa's current security environment. The third examines the experiences of UN peacebuilding in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, while the fourth part examines ECOWAS's emerging approach to peacebuilding. The fifth and last part draws key conclusions and messages for international actors working to support peacebuilding efforts in Africa.

Concerns about the recurrence of armed conflict, particularly in settings where a heavy price has been paid for peace, were an important consideration in the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). The UN Secretary-General supported the establishment of the PBC on the basis that the UN institutional structure was unable to engage effectively in peacebuilding-support activities in post-conflict contexts. Subsequently, the UN's PBC was operationalised in 2006.

The PBC is an improvement on previous global attempts at peacebuilding, as it allows for an in-depth context-specific approach to peace and for partnerships with regional organisations. African

contexts require a transformation in the conditions that sustain violent conflict and keep security and stability far removed from the lived realities of ordinary Africans. However, fragile and conflict-affected situations in Africa call for a much more fundamental shift in global and local conditions than the PBC can offer. A number of challenges prevent the PBC from responding effectively to Africa's security challenges. These include PBC's failure to define what peacebuilding should mean for transformation. The exclusion of pre-conflict peacebuilding work from the mandate and focus of the PBC is a major limitation, leading some to question PBC's credibility and relevance, especially to Africa's conflict environment. Failure to respond to pre-violent conflict conditions is one reason PBC was not present in Guinea-Bissau before its situation escalated into larger crisis.

It is likely that future conflict in Africa will primarily be low-intensity intra-state conflicts. These are unlikely to pose major threats to international peace and security, but will remain a challenge for efforts to promote sustainable national development and human security. In relation to Africa's strategic environment, the scope of the PBC is driven by a faulty logic. The focus on cases where conflict has escalated into large-scale conflict has little relevance

to current and potential armed conflict situations on the continent. Currently, there are fewer active wars in Africa with the potential to produce dire consequences for the region. Interestingly, what has emerged is not peace and stability throughout Africa's regions, but rather 'no war, no peace', in which security and development remain volatile and unpredictable.

Other challenges on the continent are low intensity conflict and widespread structural instability, which predate many of the civil wars that exploded in the last two decades. Some of these structural factors include:

- weak democratic structures and practices; inaccessible elites;
- systemic gaps in the administration of justice and provision of security for citizens;
- spatial inequalities
- two parallel systems, one responding largely to the needs of the ruling elite and their networks, and a second informal system catering to the needs of ordinary people;
- a demographic shift in favour of young people, but without clear national planning to take advantage of the potential offered by this population, the result of which is widespread vulnerability and exclusion of young people; and
- a disadvantageous position in the global economy.

The reduction in large-scale armed conflict has created space to address the structural underpinnings of armed conflict while responding to the challenge of low-intensity conflicts. The ECOWAS region, for example, has begun to change its approach through its articulation of an ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) and its development of a subsequent implementation plan to actualise the objectives of the ECPF.

Thus, PBC must also adapt itself to the needs of the continent. The African security environment is dynamic and will continue to undergo mutations for the foreseeable future, albeit with (sub-) regional variations. As such, conflict management and peacebuilding frameworks, not least PBC, must retain the flexibility to respond to 'moving targets'. Africa requires an effective transformation of its current structural environment towards greater stability and security, which can in turn ensure sustainable and equitable development.

Guinea-Bissau had been grappling with varying internal crises since independence in 1974. Crisis escalated in 1998 and prompted an intervention by the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group, ECOMOG. A UN political office was subsequently deployed in the country, in principle to assist with reconciliation and peacebuilding. This did not achieve any fundamental shift in Bissau, and we witnessed further degeneration into crisis as a result of the death of the army commander and the president in 2009. Additionally, international drug rings have a stranglehold on Guinea-Bissau, which needs a major recovery effort to get back on track. The inclusion of the country on the PBC in 2009 is in part designed to achieve this objective.

On the engagement of PBC in Sierra Leone, local actors have highlighted the need for it to take a longer-term and more strategic approach to peacebuilding on the political as well as financial fronts, particularly with regard to deep-seated issues such as youth employment priorities. The commission's work in the country privileges the role of national actors, and the role of non-state actors has been marginal. There have been criticisms of PBC's engagement with civil society in Sierra Leone, perhaps the most serious being the claim that state authorities selected the civil society actors that participate in proceedings. There is clearly resentment at this 'hand picking' by government of certain organisations, which were not deemed to be well qualified to put forward a grassroots position. So far, the process for engaging civil society appears to be hampered by less-than-concrete guidelines, which lead to questions about the 'local ownership' of the peacebuilding processes pursued by PBC.

With regard to peacebuilding in West Africa, the 2008 ECPF provides a sound basis for a comprehensive agenda for the sub-region. The ECPF is also consistent with the African Union's new policy on post-conflict reconstruction and development. For the first time, ECOWAS has a framework that encompasses all the principles outlined in several normative instruments and systematically ties together the goals of conflict management, consolidation of peace and the structural prevention of conflict to curb the outbreak of violence as well as relapse into armed conflict in societies emerging from war. For greater certainty, the ECPF adopts a human security approach, thus moving far beyond peacekeeping and stabilisation to addressing many of the fundamental

threats to the security of peoples and individuals. As ECOWAS proceeds to develop an implementation plan for ECPF, it is important to take note of the AU's policy on post-conflict reconstruction and development and reinforce some of its core principles, not least 'local ownership'.

In conclusion, the following are the key observations and recommendations from this lecture:

- Africa's security situation requires a more flexible approach to peacebuilding. An approach that rigidly focuses on post-conflict situations risks condemning African peoples to longstanding suffering and catastrophic consequences before a rescue is mounted. Additionally, it risks irrelevance, because African conflict situations may never escalate to a level that warrants conflict and post-conflict attention.
- Even in the few cases where appropriate post-conflict response is sought, communities become hostage to the politics of intervening actors and institutions.
- Overall, the answer to peacebuilding lies in the region and in the very locales where the conflicts are happening. The blueprint for effective peacebuilding will ultimately come from here.
- A partnership between the global, regional and local is ultimately desirable for effective peacebuilding – the local provides the knowledge, the regional provides the blueprint and the global provides the robust capacity. This might be the right answer to peacebuilding in Africa in the future.

A Comprehensive Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Liberia and Sierra Leone

Olawale Ismail



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Order in Downtown Lagos', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 40, no. 5 (2008). He has also published articles in the journal *Conflict, Security and Development* and contributed to several books on peace, conflict and security issues.

Summary

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes have become a recurring denominator in peace processes as a precondition to substantive peacebuilding initiatives. At the global policy level, DDR has been noted as a key pillar of peacebuilding and sustainable development. The UN Agenda for Peace and its supplement(s) emphasised this much, placing DDR at the interface of peacebuilding, sustainable development and human security. Over the past decade, several initiatives focused on DDR have emerged. They reflect the need for better technical planning and coordination, funding, practical guidelines and national ownership. In the context of this lecture, a working definition of DDR is relevant.

- Disarmament refers to the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants, and often also of the civilian population.
- Demobilisation deals with the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from the armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilisation may extend from the processing of individual combatants in tempo-

rary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose.

- Reintegration refers to the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open timeframe, taking place in communities at the local level, but is a national responsibility that usually requires long-term external assistance.

DDR in post-conflict Liberia

The Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that was signed in August 2003 by the Liberian government, LURD, MODEL militias, paramilitary forces and representatives of Liberian civil society groups, ECOWAS and the UN, set up the framework for DDR in post-conflict Liberia. Article II of the CPA mandated ECOWAS to institute a multinational intervention force for establishing the necessary conditions for introducing a DDR programme in Liberia. While Article IV of the CPA provided for the deployment of an international stabilisation force to oversee the quartering of forces and provide security in DDR zones and safeguard collected weap-

ons, Article VI provided for the implementation of a DDRR (by including a Rehabilitation) programme. Following the CPA, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1509 in September 2003 authorising the deployment of a UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Part of UNMIL's mandate was the development and implementation of a DDRR strategy and programme.

DDR in Sierra Leone

In June 1999, warring factions signed the Lomé Peace Agreement (LPA) as a power-sharing arrangement between the Sierra Leone government and the Revolutionary United Front. The agreement was brokered and guaranteed by ECOWAS and the UN. Article 1 of the LPA provided for an immediate ceasefire as a precursor to DDR and was to be overseen by a joint monitoring committee chaired by the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). Article VI, among others, provided for a national commission for DDR (NCDDR) and the national commission for resettlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction, and a truth and reconciliation commission. Articles XV, XVII, XVIII provided for a neutral intervention force (UNOMSIL and ECOMOG) to undertake DDR of all warring factions – to commence within six weeks of signing the agreement – and mandated the government to seek international support for DDR, including paying particular attention to child combatants. The Security Council under Resolution 1270 of October 1999 established UNAMSIL to replace UNOMSIL – as a fully fledged peace-support operation with a military peacekeeping component. UNAMSIL's mandate included providing assistance with the DDR processes, deploying peacekeepers across the country and providing security at DDR sites, while promoting confidence-building among the parties.

A comparison of the DDR in both countries shows that a multi-agency structure, involving UN missions (UNMIL and UNAMSIL), ECOWAS, national commissions for DDR, UNDP and other UN agencies, was put in charge of planning and coordinating the process. Other observations are:

- In Liberia, the joint implementation unit was put in charge of operational planning and coordination with tasks divided among UNMIL (DD), OCHA (information and awareness), UNDP (monitoring and assessment), UNDP (rehabilitation and reintegration). In reality, the

joint implementation unit subcontracted many of the technical aspects to the Monrovia offices of some international bodies. The NCDDR was in charge of managing the political aspects of DDRR.

- In Sierra Leone, three technical bodies were created: the first, comprising NCDDR, UNAMSIL and UNICEF, was for DD; the second, for awareness and information; and the third for reintegration. The bodies, including the NCDDR, were dissolved in March 2004.

The DDR in the two countries set out to collect, register and destroy all conventional weapons and munitions; undertake multiple DDR for a set number of combatants from specified armed groups; and to provide support for former combatants in their socioeconomic reintegration after leaving demobilisation camps. In Sierra Leone, the DDR placed more emphasis on children and less on women. On the other hand, in Liberia there was more emphasis on women and children during DDR.

There were marked differences in the criteria for qualifying for DDR in both countries. In Liberia, there was a low-end, minimal criterion of either a firearm or 150 rounds of ammunition. In Sierra Leone, a mixture of group disarmament and strict presentation of a firearm was used for eligibility. Despite the different criteria, both DDR programmes produced different yet related outcomes.

- In Liberia, the initial estimate of combatants expected to undergo DDR was 38,000. However, subsequent events showed this was a gross underestimate (actual number was 103,019). Commanders and others exploited the loose minimal criterion alike to seek DDR benefits (the transitional sustenance allowance of US\$ 300).
- In Sierra Leone, the initial estimate of potential combatants to undergo DDR was 45,000. Again, this was a wrong estimate, as the actual number was far higher (71,043). Commanders exploited this and refused to present child soldiers as part of their fighters (attracted no cash rewards), and instead hired adults (non-combatants) to stand in. Women too were prevented from accessing DDR. Most child soldiers and female members of fighting groups did not go through DDR.

The funding for the DDR programme in both countries came from external actors, mainly the UN and

countries and organisations in the global North. The funds were managed through a multi-agency framework. The funding for the DD came from or through UNMIL and UNAMSIL.

In both countries, the transition from DD to R phase involved encampment at D2 sites for a few days and then transportation to community or areas of choice (for resettlement or living) with payments of a Transition Sustainment Allowance (TSA) and one month of food rations.

- In Liberia, ex-combatants were given 2 installments of US \$150 over a two-month period as TSA, as well as information about educational, vocational skills training and employment opportunities. The reintegration process was in two parts, reinsertion and socioeconomic reintegration, and it was managed by NCDDR. There was a separate arrangement for children, with the emphasis on family tracing and reunion. The reintegration process, after several months' delay (due to funding shortfalls), lasted from June 2004 to December 2006. In data collected, 54 per cent of ex-combatants opted for professional training, 41 per cent for education and 4 per cent for agriculture. Some 15 reintegration projects centred on public works (construction) and a few agricultural projects.

- In Sierra Leone, ex-combatants got US\$ 150 TSA after quartering and were given the choice of educational or vocational/professional training, public works (infrastructure rebuilding in communities) and agriculture, with support lasting between six and 24 months. An estimated 55,000 combatants are said to have benefited from this reintegration package.

The DDR process in both countries faced several challenges and problems. These included riots, demonstrations and violent disruptions during DDR and immediately afterwards, pointing to gaps in the process and the inability of the programme to fully reintegrate ex-combatants into civilian life. The following were some of the problems facing the implementation of DDR in both countries:

- a. Huge coordination gaps and lags between DD and R phases.
- b. Inappropriate DDR criteria.
- c. Poor information management and crises of expectation.
- d. Profiteering from DDR by commanders!
- e. Poor funding or concentration of funding for DD and minimal funding for R phase.
- f. Poor integration of DDR into overall peace-building.

Post-Conflict Challenges in Africa: *A Case Study of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo -- The End of the Road?*

Henri Boshoff



HENRI BOSHOFF was born in Pretoria on 12 April 1957. He attended school in Pretoria, after which he completed a four-year diploma in education at the University of Pretoria in 1979. After military service, he taught in Pretoria until 1986. In 1986 he joined the South African National Defence Force and was involved with the planning of internal and external operations. He also obtained an honours degree in African politics in 1995. He left the SANDF at the end of 2001 to join the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) as a military analyst for the Africa Security Analysis Programme. His area of expertise is terrorism, peacekeeping, support to the police and African politics. Since 1 April, he has been the head of the Peace Missions Programme at the ISS. Henri Boshoff has presented numerous papers at conferences and seminars and is a regular commentator on local and international radio and television. He regularly lectures on security issues and has published, edited and contributed to a large number of journals, books and other publications. He is currently focusing on conflict and the military in Africa, specifically in the Great Lakes area.

Summary

This lecture analyses the Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) process in the DRC, factors impacting on the process, the new army reform plan, the role of the Congolese *Programme de Stabilisation et de Reconstruction des Zones sortant des conflits Armes* (STAREC) and the United Nations Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (UNSSSS) plans and the way forward. In January 2009, the DRC government announced that the second phase of the DDR process would be discontinued at the end of the year. This announcement came with a caveat that those combatants not demobilised by the end 2009 would fall under the purview of the UNSSSS for the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and STAREC. The first phase of the DDR programme had started in November 2004 and ended in December 2006. The process came to an end without being finalised because of renewed violence in the eastern DRC.

The first phase of the DDR process in the DRC was coordinated by the Commission Nationale pour la Démobilisation et la Réinsertion (CO-

NADER), guided by the Programme National pour la Désarmement, la Démobilisation et la Réinsertion (PNDDR), and financed entirely by the World Bank and the UNDP. During the first phase, 186,000 combatants went through the process, of which 102,104 were demobilised and 83,896 were integrated into the FARDC.

Because of the ongoing conflict, phase 2 of the DDR process only started in June 2009 and ended in December 2009. The budget for this phase was US\$ 75 million. The funds were provided by the World Bank and managed by the UNDP and the PNDDR. At the end of October 2009, only 18 per cent of the funds had been used and it was foreseen that not more than 30 per cent would be expended. During this phase, only 12,820 combatants went through the process, of which 4,782 were demobilised and 8,038 were integrated into the FARDC. The money was then allocated to the STAREC programme to continue with the DDR process. During 2010, within the STAREC programme and with the support of MONUC, a further 2,000 combat-

ants have been put through the DDR process. Those former combatants who choose reintegration into the FARDC become the responsibility of the Structure Militaire d'Intégration/Integrated Military Structure (SMI), which along with the FARDC (and with logistical support from MONUC, the UN mission in the DRC) transported the former combatants to the centres de brassage. The main function of the brassage process was to break the chains of command of the different warring groups. However, armed groups and militias such as the CNDP and the Mayi-Mayi had demanded that former combatants who are integrated into the national army remain in the region where they operate (hence the introduction of the mixage process). Following the 2004 conflict in Bukavu, the FARDC made a difficult compromise with Nkunda's CNDP by 'mixing' brigades loyal to Nkunda with FARDC brigades, a practice that was not supported by the international community and MONUC.

From the available statistics, at least some 80,000 combatants must still go through the process of DDR, of which the bulk come from the non-integrated FARDC brigades. The process will have to be completed as part of the UNSSSS for the eastern DRC and the Congolese STAREC.

The completion of the DDR process and of Security Sector Reform (SSR) goes hand in hand. It is clear that if DDR is not completed, SSR will not move forward, as we have seen in the last six years. The feeling is that the entry point for SSR is the training of FARDC. This could only happen if FARDC sends the soldiers to the training centres. If that happens, it is accepted that an estimated 15 battalions will be trained every year, nearly 12,000 soldiers. This alone will not be the solution, because it will almost be impossible to put 130,000 combatants in a relative short time through selection, vetting and training.

Due to the presence of foreign armed groups and militias in the eastern DRC, the DDR process operated parallel to the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reintegration or Resettlement (DDRRR) process for foreign armed groups, coordinated mainly by MONUC, guided by the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) and supported by the World Bank and UNDP. With regard to DDRRR, as of February 2010 MONUC had repatriated more than 16,100 soldiers (and dependants) from foreign

armed groups (mainly from Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi) since 2003. However, one of the most notorious foreign armed groups, the FDLR, had not been reined in by the DDRRR programme and is now the target of sustained cooperative efforts between the Congolese and Rwandan army with the support of MONUC.

The UNSSSS is addressing DDR as part of a bigger holistic plan to bring stability to DRC. Within the framework of the security component of STAREC, the UN and other international partners plan to support the government of DRC's efforts in three primary areas of intervention:

- Emergency strengthening of FARDC capacities
- Support for disengagement of armed groups
- Enhanced protection of civilians in conflict areas and disengagement zones

A number of national structures have been established to provide strategic direction, technical and programmatic guidance and operational coordination and monitoring of efforts within the STAREC framework. The key guiding structure is the STAREC oversight committee (*Comite de suivi*). The committee provides overall strategic orientation for the implementation of the DRC government's plan, ensures overall coherence of efforts and undertakes periodic reviews of progress at provincial level. The oversight committee is chaired by the prime minister, and comprises the vice-prime ministers, ministers of interior, defence, planning, international and regional cooperation, justice, finance, budget, social and humanitarian affairs, mines, public works and infrastructure, gender and family. It also includes representatives of the presidency, the prime minister's office, civil society, the STAREC national coordinator, the UN and lead donors. The minister of planning provides the technical secretariat for the oversight committee. The implementation of the plan will depend on the level of stability that can be achieved in the short to medium term.

Since the re-election of Joseph Kabila as DRC president in December 2006, a number of major security crises have amply illustrated the lack of DDR and structural progress in SSR and the risks this entails for the stability of the country as well as the consolidation of democracy. The lack of any real impact of ongoing DDR and SSR programmes on human security in the DRC is a reflection of a wider problem in donor-led peacebuilding efforts. Peace-

building and DDR, as well as SSR, are all too often considered as technical processes, and although there is a growing understanding that this approach fails to address the root of the problem, it is a failing not easily remedied. SSR is a particularly sensitive field of action as it deals with central elements of national sovereignty.

The case of the DRC also demonstrates that successful DDR and SSR processes depend on the full engagement of political authorities, who in DRC have been somewhat passive in the adoption of policies and strategies to implement effective reform of

the security forces. Although the impact of the lack of progress in SSR is felt throughout the country, the Kivu provinces are the hardest hit. Lack of progress in SSR will continue to foster an environment in which local political and economic entrepreneurs will have no difficulty in recruiting militias and in capitalising on the resentment against the governmental security forces as well as the lack of security and effective structures of governance. Such a situation, if left unaddressed, could easily lead to a resumption of more general conflict.

Nigeria: *Dilemmas and Dimensions of Violence and Conflict*

Darren Kew



Professor DARREN KEW is with the McCormack Graduate School of Policy Studies, University of Massachusetts, Boston. Much of his research explores the relationship between transformative conflict-resolution methods and democratic development, particularly in terms of democratic institution-building in Africa and the growth of political cultures that support democracy. He also focuses on the role of civil society groups in this development. Professor Kew has worked with the Council on Foreign Relations's Center for Preventive Action to provide analysis and blueprints for preventing conflicts in numerous areas around the world,

including Nigeria, Central Africa and Kosovo. He has also been a consultant to the UN, USAID, the US State Department and to a number of NGOs, including the Carter Centre in a 1999 effort by former President Carter to mediate the Niger Delta conflicts. Professor Kew is recognised for his deep, firsthand knowledge of Nigerian politics and society. His work on how conflict-resolution methods promote democratisation of national political cultures is among the first of its kind in linking these important fields.

Summary

This lecture examines the various dimensions of politics, electoral democracy and the crisis of development in Nigeria, including trends in violent identity politics since the country returned to democratic rule in 1999. It provides a background for understanding the complex politics of Africa's demographic giant – with an estimated population of 135.7 million people, and characterised by multi-ethnic and religious diversity. The picture is further compounded by the 'paradox of plenty' in which Nigeria, Africa's largest oil producer and the sixth largest oil exporter to the United States, has 70 per cent of its population living below the poverty line of a dollar a day, while also being ranked the fourth most corrupt country in the world.

The foregoing, in addition to the poor social indicators for Nigeria, underpin the high stakes involved in gaining access to political power and resources in Nigeria, which also fuels violence as various groups struggle for access to power, or protest their exclusion from the distribution of resources. This brings us to the examination of political violence and conflict that has bedevilled Nigeria's democracy and

undermined efforts at consolidating political stability and development. According to some estimates, since 1999 about 15,000 deaths and the destruction of property worth millions of dollars have resulted from communal, sectarian, political and identity-related conflicts and unrest in different parts of the country. Some of these conflicts have a long history, while others are linked to electoral politics and the struggle for access to power and resources.

The various conflict drivers are part of the legacy of colonial rule, which sowed the seeds of regional rivalry between the north and south, indigene versus settler conflicts in central Nigeria and the nature of the Nigerian state. The unequal distribution of the oil wealth, blocked social mobility of some ethnic groups and the lack of higher political institutions to accommodate all group interests has also been a contested issue. In this regard, various groups have resorted to ethnic or religious mobilisation to maximise group power in the protection of group interests and in accessing power or protesting exclusion. Such considerations have often fuelled a zero-sum thinking and contests for power among political

elites, as well as ethnic conflict and political instability.

Another important factor is the political culture of corruption, in which a political oligarchy has monopolised power and used it to serve its own narrow interests. For this oligarchy, politics has largely served personal interests and enabled its members to nurture and reproduce their neo-patrimonial networks and keep themselves in power. The result is that elections have been subjected to manipulation by powerful interests, and personal interests and rivalries have also weakened public institutions and fuelled instability.

It is important to note the various responses to the conflicts and instability that have plagued the Nigerian political system. These range from the adoption of federalism, the principle of federal character or ethnic balancing in the distribution of public offices/appointments and development projects and the politics of multi-ethnic national alliance-building, which is often greased through corruption and neo-patrimonialism. The effects of these policies since the return to democracy have been rather complex and difficult to measure. Political power at the federal level has been largely dominated by the ruling People's Democratic Party, while the opposition has largely been weak. The media and civil society have been particularly vocal, but have achieved limited results in ensuring accountability from the rulers. In the meantime, the adoption of Sharia Islamic law in most of the northern states and the emergence of some radical Islamic movements have led to episodic outbursts of violence, including sectarian conflict, and have in central Nigeria combined with indigene versus settler politics to assume the dimensions of low intensity conflict, marked by many deaths and destruction of property.

In southern Nigeria, the insurgency in the oil-rich ethnic minority Niger Delta, which resulted in huge losses to the oil industry and the Nigerian economy, is gradually being addressed by the amnesty declared by President Yar'Adua in 2009. This appears to be a positive development in what some Nigeria's con-

sider the rather 'slow' approach of Yar'Adua to governance. The fact that his deputy is from the Niger Delta, and is likely to aspire to the presidency in the 2011 elections, is bound to raise questions about the ethnic power rotation principle and whether it is time for someone of ethnic minority origin to aspire to the highest political office in the land. This may also touch on the issue of electoral reform and the need to ensure that Nigeria in the future organises credible elections against the background of the widely condemned 2007 elections.

Although the political challenges and dilemmas facing Nigeria appear to be formidable, it is important to reflect upon where the likely solutions can come from. At the heart of most of the political conflicts lies the issue of unequal distribution of power and resources. Therefore it is important to address this problem by ensuring more equal distribution of both among Nigeria's many groups and address the roots of ethnic grievances. This should be done in a way that promotes ethnic security, where government acts deliberately to protect broad group interests and adopts policies that reduce the influence of personal and neo-patrimonial interests. Another major issue is that of consolidating Nigeria's rather fragile democracy. This is because democracy is the only organising political framework and principle that can de-emphasise the zero-sum approach to politics, and promote conflict resolution and development in the diverse Nigerian context.

The challenges of democratising Nigeria further would require the decentralisation of executive powers, promotion of multi-ethnic political parties, building a credible electoral system and an anti-corruption agency and carefully managing the balance of power within Nigeria's political elites. A lot of work will need to be done to also strengthen and democratise civil society to address the issue of accountability and the balance of power between the government and society, and in the process consolidate the rebirth of democracy and development in Nigeria.

Niger Delta Crisis and Security in the Gulf of Guinea

Charles Ukeje



Dr CHARLES UKEJE is an associate professor of international relations at the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria. He holds a PhD in international relations from the same university. He has received several academic fellowship awards, including from the Fulbright Exchange Programme, Rockefeller Foundation, Ford Foundation, Institute for International Education, the Nordic Africa Institute and the Social Science Research Council of New York. Other academic awards include those from the CODESRIA Governance Institute, Bucerius

Summer School on Global Governance and the Salzburg Seminar. In September 2004, he presented the Royal African Society's Mary Kingsley Zochonis Lecture and spent a short sabbatical as Leventis Cooperation Visiting Research Scholar at the School of Oriental and African Studies London. He has published extensively in leading international journals, including *Issue – A Journal of Opinion*; *Africa Development*; *Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives and Area Studies*; *Scientia Militaria*; *Politics, Culture and Society*; *Globalizations*; *Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence*; *Oxford Development Studies* and *African Journal of International Affairs*. He has published several books, and his chapter on 'Changing the Paradigm of Pacification? Oil and Militarization in Nigeria's Delta Region' is appearing in Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad (eds) (2011), *Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petroviolence*. London: Zed Books.

Summary

There are growing concerns that the protracted, low-intensity armed insurgency and outright criminality in Nigeria's richly endowed Niger Delta oil region could have far-reaching and potentially dangerous implications for the country's immediate and distant neighbours. The countries that belong to the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) (Nigeria, Cameroon, São Tomé and Príncipe, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Congo Brazzaville and Angola) are mostly oil-producing nations, and share similar governance pathologies with Nigeria.

Two perspectives are dominant in the literature on the Niger Delta conflict. The first argues that the current disorder in the delta region poses a fundamental challenge to peace and stability within Nigeria, while the other shows how the crisis is threatening global energy security and the

core geostrategic interests of major oil importing countries such as the United States and its Western European allies, and also emerging powers like China, India and Brazil. While these perspectives are important, they tend to ignore the far-reaching implications of the Niger Delta conflict for regional security in the GoG. This lecture outlines how the security threats from the Niger Delta have wider ramifications for the GoG region.

Scholars and commentators on the Niger Delta conflict agree that what is happening in that region is a culmination of many years of neglect and underdevelopment, despite the region's fabled oil wealth. Indeed, after almost five decades of oil exploration and production, the region remains one of the poorest within Nigeria. Given the pockets of insurgency, kidnappings, arson and attacks on

oil personnel and infrastructure in recent times, the delta region has been a site of unrest and insecurity.

The GoG countries overlap three sub-regions: West Africa (Nigeria), Central Africa (Cameroon, Gabon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe) and Southern Africa (Angola). Besides Chad, whose oilfields are connected to Cameroon's coastline by the 1,000-kilometre-long Doba-Kribi pipelines, GoG oil is mostly located offshore in the Atlantic Ocean. Except for Cameroon, the other GoG countries are dependent on foreign exchange earnings from oil. According to the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Angola has a proven oil reserves estimated at 9.04 billion barrels and natural gas reserves standing at 270 billion cubic metres, while Nigeria's estimated oil reserves are about 36.22 billion barrels and 5,215 billion cubic metres of natural gas. It is estimated that the GoG countries now surpass the Persian Gulf as oil suppliers to the US.

The activities of the insurgent Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), particularly their ability to strike at offshore oil installations, has raised concerns about a possible contagion of ethnic militancy in neighbouring oil-producing countries. In Cameroon, for instance, a nascent separatist movement is emerging in the predominantly Anglophone southwestern region, which borders on the (potentially oil-rich) Bakassi peninsula.

Despite token democratic openings, some of Africa's most ruthless and sit-tight dictators continue to preside over the affairs of GoG countries with impunity: El Hadj Omar Bongo, who came to power in 1967, Sassou Nguesso (1979), Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasongo (1979), dos Santos (1979) and Paul Biya (1982) in Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Angola and Cameroon respectively. This situation, coupled with high levels of corruption, suggests that historical grievances and political conflict in some of these countries could assume the form of ethnic or insurgent violence, with dire consequences for oil production and regional stability.

Several conclusions might be drawn from the socioeconomic and political challenges facing GoG oil states. These portend grave dangers for governance and security in each of the countries. Oil wealth has brought each of them enough leverage and external support, because the external policy environment is supportive of petro-states that provide unimpeded

access to oil investments. This partly explains why oil has become a strong impediment to democratisation in virtually all the GoG countries.

There is also widespread concern about a possible 'export' of 'Niger Delta militancy', with its disruptive and destructive consequences for hitherto peaceful GoG countries. Such concerns increased after June 2008 when MEND attacked the Bonga deep-water oilfield platform almost 120 nautical miles out into the Atlantic Ocean, demonstrating that militants could operate both on land and sea. Also, reports of the involvement of mercenaries from the Niger Delta in attacks on the presidential palace in Equatorial Guinea in 2005 and 2009, and recent allegations that Niger Delta militants were in Ghana to 'train' activists in the country's oil-producing region, have lent credibility to the fears of a possible destabilisation of GoG countries such as Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Gabon and the twin islands of São Tomé and Príncipe as a result of the 'spread' of the 'Niger Delta brand' of oil-fuelled insurgency.

Given the limitations (capacity and legitimacy) of the GoG petro-states, maritime security has become a daunting problem. The World Defence Review reported that between 2000 and 2007 more maritime attacks occurred in the GoG than the rest of Africa, while the International Maritime Organisation ranked the West African sea lanes as the next most dangerous after the Strait of Malacca. With the upsurge in insurgent activities and the porosity of the common land and maritime boundaries, the opportunities for various kinds of criminality (arms and illicit drug smuggling, human trafficking, coastal piracy and petty armed banditry, etc.) can keep on expanding.

Due to the vastness and permeability of the maritime boundaries shared by GoG countries, effective policing and interdiction is difficult, if not impossible. Apart from Nigeria, with its navy, no other GoG and West African country has a sizeable and deployable naval or coastguard capability to meet the growing demands for sea patrols, interdiction and counter-insurgency. This is partly the reason many GoG countries have become net recipients of military largesse from outside.

Since 2002, when President George W. Bush declared African oil to be of strategic importance to the US, making it unequivocally clear that Washington would be willing to go to war to protect its source(s), there has been a considerable scaling-up

of that country's military presence in the GoG. It is not accidental that the largest chunk of US foreign direct investment and military assistance to African countries is going to oil states like Angola and Nigeria. Apart from oil, there is a growing concern in the US and among its key allies in the global coalition against terrorism that political instability and deepening economic problems are radicalising the populations of many African countries, including about 300 million Muslims domiciled in the Sahel region of West Africa.

It is inconceivable that any regional approach to security in the GoG would succeed without Nigeria's support. The country has played a leading role within the Economic Community of West African States and the African Union in their respective efforts to bring peace and stability to the sub-region and the continent. For instance, given the strategic and frontal role that ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) played in restoring peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone, what is now required is for the framework to be modified and expanded to meet the security challenges arising from the nexus between oil-induced conflicts in the Niger Delta and regional security concerns in the GoG.

A regional oil and maritime security framework for GoG would have to address the complex and cumbersome policies and practices of three over-

lapping sub-regional groupings: ECOWAS, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the South African Development Community (SADC). It is proposed that this regionally focused security assistance should include improving base and port facilities; increasing support for regional defence attaché offices; enhancing crisis-response capabilities of national and regional armies; coastal patrols, border security and brown water naval capabilities; upgrading military to military (including pilot) training as well as transferring selected military hardware, etc. However, such collaboration must also necessarily support economic growth, governance and development in the GoG.

To conclude, GoG countries have entered into partnerships with the US and several EU countries aimed at ensuring security in the 'new oil gulf'. These have ranged from capacity-building, military training, joint patrols and the supply of military equipment and arms. However, most of these measures are short-term and tend to reflect the priorities of the donor countries. In the long term, only genuine and participatory democracy, economic empowerment and the capacity of governments in the GoG to meet the most basic needs of their peoples can serve as the best guarantee of viable and sustainable peace and security in the GoG.

The Challenges of Democracy, Peace and Security in the Sudan

Gunnar Sørbø



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Development, the International Livestock Centre for Africa, the Research Council of Norway (Division of Environment and Development) and the Rafto Foundation for Human Rights. From 1993 to 1995, Gunnar Sørbø was a member of the North-South/Aid Commission appointed by the Norwegian government.

Summary

When the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in January 2005 between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, many Sudanese and external observers hoped that it would also positively affect the situation in Darfur and elsewhere in the country. Yet the efforts of the international community to help build peace in the Sudan have been a continuing uphill struggle.

For a long time, the conflict between north and south was very much portrayed as a clash of identities and a conflict between different religions. Then there is the centre-periphery dimension, which sometimes is also portrayed as being dominant; then came the oil; and in Darfur, some people, particularly in the US, seem to believe that this is also about Muslims against Christians, even though all Darfurians are Muslim. So there are these images and stereotypes: conflict over scarce resources, competition between elites, and so on. All these factors are true in a sense, and as Alex de Waal has observed, 'the Sudanese crisis is already over-determined', because there are many factors involved and they continue to create more conflict.

It can be argued that Sudan suffers from the combined effects of two kinds of crisis: the crisis of governance and a livelihood crisis. As a result of these crises, there are many conflicts in Sudan: local, regional and national conflicts that are becoming increasingly interrelated. They are also increasingly connected to a wider conflict system that extends beyond Sudan to neighbouring Chad, Central African Republic and Uganda. It is important to note, however, that most violence in Sudan has been in the rural areas, with only a few exceptions: Khartoum experienced major disturbances following the death of John Garang and the attack by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Darfur in 2008. However, in urban areas like Khartoum and Omdurman there is a large presence of street children, poor households and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Many of the IDPs come from areas affected by drought in the 1970s and 1980s: Darfur, western Sudan and the Red Sea hills. Some come from the transition zone between north and south, which has been subjected to modernised and mechanised agriculture, with people being forced off the land by the state as a result.

From colonial times, the Sudanese state has owned and controlled a large part of the national economy. Those who control the state have tended to concentrate development in the north-central parts of the country. Power has also effectively remained with groups from the area around Khartoum and the north of the country, with most government ministers recruited from three ethnic groups: two Arab groups, the Shaiqiyah and the Ja'Alin, and one Nubian group, the Danagla. The state has therefore served the interests of certain groups, including those big landowners who acquired government-appropriated land. Thus, the shift to mechanised agriculture, which has spread to eastern and western Sudan, led to considerable dispossession and destruction of livelihoods, particularly of nomadic and semi-nomadic people, and to competition over shrinking lands between nomads and farmers.

The term 'spaciocide' coined by Palestinian researcher Sari Hanafi to refer to dispossessing people of their land and marginalising them is very much part of the history of Sudan. Apart from land dispossession linked to large-scale agriculture, there were also forced evictions of local people for the development of oilfields. Land degradation as a result of unsustainable land-use practices by mechanised schemes and forced evictions led to massive population flows into Khartoum and other urban centres. This partly explains the extreme poverty and inequalities within Sudanese society. It also explains the disparity in development between the area around Khartoum and other parts of the country, particularly the south.

The coming to power of the Islamic fundamentalist regime in 1989 accentuated some of the differences in Sudanese society and enthroned a form of totalitarianism, which found expression at the local level through administrative re-divisions that played local forces against each other. This was one of the factors that led to conflict in Darfur in 2003, where a number of administrative sub-divisions gave more power to the government's clients, who were Arabs, mostly at the expense of non-Arab groups. The totalitarianism of the regime promoted the fragmentation that now threatens the whole country. The regime, in my view, went too far, and at the same time was not able to control the entire country, but rather sowed the seeds of more fragmentation and poverty in many regions. The problem was also compounded by the nature of the dominant elite

(five elite groups in Khartoum), which was not consolidated or united.

The fact of the existence of different power centres in Khartoum means that decisions made can be contested and changed by a system that Alex de Waal describes as 'retail politics' based on patron-client relations, implying that the system of political bargaining and balancing ensures that no agreements are ever final. Thus, from the perspective of the Khartoum government, the CPA may not be a final agreement, but actually the starting point of negotiations. The combination of the centre-periphery problems, the dominating but unconsolidated elite, perpetual turbulence in Khartoum and the effects of the oil economy accompanied by government crisis, on the one hand, and a livelihood crisis, on the other, underpin the governance crisis in Sudan. The picture is compounded by the complexities that characterise local conflicts, which are interwoven with national conflicts, and connect with the role of neighbouring countries such as Libya, which is arming Arab militias in Darfur and meddling in Chad.

Regarding the role of the international community in Sudan, one notes the lack of a joint diplomatic and developmental approach. There has been a division between politics and aid, which partly derives from the traditional separation of the two areas within different ministry structures. The embassies in Khartoum appear to be focused mainly on the politics of peacebuilding, while aid agencies tend to focus on reconstruction, development and poverty reduction, but without building linkages between their activities.

Although much aid has gone to southern Sudan, there has been a failure to engage with certain fundamental issues, particularly local politics, and conflict assessment. Also relevant is the absence of an overall strategic plan for recovery and development. Although many assessments have been made, it is difficult to get a sense of the priority areas, particularly as they tie in with peacebuilding. There is also the challenge of how to relate to the government in Khartoum, over which the international community has little leverage.

There is a limit to peacebuilding from the perspective of external actors, particularly when the government does not share the same perspective on 'liberal' peacebuilding. What we have seen since 2005 in Sudan is a kind of simulated peace proc-

ess, where conflict actors use the process to promote their own ends and objectives, including warlike strategies. We are dealing with a weak government in some respects, but one that certainly has a firm grip on very important aspects of the state, not only through the army, but particularly through the various security agencies it controls. Another aspect of the limited leverage of the international community in a multipolar world is that we are seeing an increased Chinese, Indian and Malaysian presence in the Sudanese oil industry, with China also being able to limit the imposition of strong sanctions on Sudan by the UN Security Council, illustrating once more that there is a limit to the extent that liberal peacebuilding can be pursued.

Sudan since 2005 can therefore be characterised as a situation of no war, no peace, low-intensity turbulence, particularly on the peripheries, and muddling through. In the south, there is local violence, featuring traditional feuds between different ethnic groups, cattle rustling, etc. In my view, the international community is not geared to addressing local

violence, preferring to work around it as a kind of inconvenience: in short, local politics is such that international efforts have to live with the realities as they unfold. This is clear from the response to the elections won by a president who had been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC). The president had been able to mobilise support locally partly on the basis of the ICC arrest warrant and his use of state power. After he won elections, he was recognised by the international community.

One of the serious challenges facing Sudan is the question of citizenship. This is compounded by the tremendous economic interest in the continuation of the situation of the no war, no peace. It appears that the elite in Khartoum have prospered through war in the peripheries, which also tends to feed into fragmentation in those places: there is always a risk of fragmentation alongside the power games being played by factions of the dominant elite, which will likely continue, posing further challenges at the local, national and regional levels, but also creating a situation from which these elites can profit.

Peacebuilding and Security in Africa: *The Case of the Economic Community of Central African States*

Angela Meyer



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regional focus is on Africa, Central Africa and the South Pacific. She has conducted field research in Cameroon and in the Central African Republic and taken up temporary employment with the UNESCO secretariat, Paris (Sector for External Relations and Cooperation) in 2002. Her field projects and research have been conducted in Kenya and Cambodia and the IDC projects that she coordinated have been on SustainenergyNet and Cambiodiversity

Summary

This lecture provides a critical appraisal of the efforts of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in responding to the region's conflict and security challenges. Over the last 10 years, peace and security have become a new and ever more important element in regional cooperation in Central Africa. Whereas the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) and ECCAS were initially created to pursue purely economic objectives, the consolidation of peace and security has been included in the regional agenda since the late 1990s. Since July 2008, ECCAS has assumed authority for MICOPAX (*Mission de consolidation de la paix en Centrafrique*), the regional peace consolidation mission in the Central African Republic (CAR). ECCAS is thereby increasing and widening its activities and commitment in relation to conflict-prevention and management in Central Africa.

ECCAS was created in 1983 to strengthen economic cooperation among its members and to prepare at the regional level for the continental eco-

nomical integration of Africa and the establishment of an African common market. It originally comprised Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe as member states, with Angola as an observer. In 1999, Angola became a full member, while Rwanda quit ECCAS in 2007.

ECCAS's new focus on regional peace and security can be related to two interlinked developments. The series of crises that ravaged the region during the 1990s paralysed ECCAS's activities and made it clear that the success of economic cooperation and integration would depend on regional peace and security. This coincided with the reluctance of the international community to send peacekeepers to African conflict zones. Instead, they preferred to invest in the development and building of African security capacities at the regional level. Thus, ECCAS responded to regional challenges and the retreat of the international community from African peacekeeping operations by undertaking com-

prehensive institutional reform and agenda revision from 1998 onwards. This new approach prioritised peace and security cooperation based on the creation of new mechanisms, and the implementation of joint programmes and policies.

The regional body for peace and security in EC-CAS is the Council of Peace and Security of Central Africa (COPAX). COPAX has three key technical organs. The first is the Commission for Defence and Security (CDS), made up of the chiefs of staff of the member states' national armies as well as the chiefs of police and gendarmerie forces. Meeting twice a year, CDS advises ECCAS's main decision-making organs – the conference of heads of state and the council of ministers – on security and defence issues as well as on the organisation. The Central African Early Warning Mechanism (MARAC) collects and analyses data for the early detection and prevention of conflict, while the Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC) is a non-permanent peace-support operation force. It is drawn from ECCAS member states to carry out regional peace, security and humanitarian assistance missions. Steps have been taken to institutionalise FOMAC and facilitate its integration as one of five regional brigades into the AU's African Standby Force.

In July 2008, ECCAS took over command of the multinational peace mission in the CAR. The mission started in 2002 under the name of FOMUC (Force multinationale en Centrafrique) and was initially operated by the other Central African regional community, CEMAC. Following increased political instability and insecurity in the CAR, FOMUC was deployed to support the national security forces in restoring peace and security and the transition and reconciliation process launched by the CAR's President François Bozizé. With the strengthening of ECCAS's peace and security architecture, the mission was transformed into MICOPAX.

With a mandate lasting until 2013, MICOPAX's role is much wider than FOMUC's. Its mission includes the consolidation of peace and stability in the CAR, with particular emphasis on security sector reform and implementing a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme for ex-combatants. In addition, the mission is to support the national reconciliation process between the CAR government and major rebel movements, monitor the human rights situation and coordinate humani-

tarian aid activities. With a total strength of 725 persons, MICOPAX comprises 527 troops, mainly from Cameroon, Gabon, Chad and the DRC, as well as 146 policemen from the Republic of the Congo and Cameroon, 31 military observers and 21 others, mainly civil personnel.

In Central Africa, the consolidation of peace and security is challenged on several different fronts. These include the fact that while Central Africa is among the most richly endowed regions in Africa, it at the same time includes some of the poorest countries on the continent. This 'paradox of plenty' is further compounded by problems of mismanagement of public funds, poor governance, widespread poverty and institutional weaknesses. The population's frustration over the states' incapacity to satisfactorily respond to basic social and economic needs, improve well-being and ensure security is an essential element in the loss of confidence in the public sector and hence an additional generator of crises and tensions.

Another major challenge is the conflict-proneness of the region. Among the 10 ECCAS member states, few have not witnessed violent conflict over the last two decades. The porosity of national borders, the uncontrolled crossing of combatants and armed groups and the proliferation of illegal arms and weapons increase the risk of the spill-over of conflicts among neighbouring states. In the CAR, the populations in the border regions are constantly exposed to attacks by former combatants and rebel movements from Chad, Sudan, the DRC or even from Uganda. These groups are a major source of insecurity, as they attack local people and villages, burn down houses and kidnap children for ransom, poach wildlife and rustle cattle. The high level of violence has caused the displacement of almost 200,000 people within CAR and 150,000 to neighbouring countries, especially Chad.

A fundamental challenge for ECCAS in responding to the challenge of collective peace and security in Central Africa is its ability to build the capacity of MICOPAX and its peace and security mechanisms; to ensure the progressive transfer of powers and competences from member states to emerging common institutions and legal frameworks; and to develop a more participatory, multi-level approach. Currently, the involvement of non-state actors, notably from civil society, in regional policy processes remains

marginal and more needs to be done to strengthen their role. Also, the ECCAS secretariat needs to enhance its capacities to respond to the challenges facing the sub-region. In addition, effective regional cooperation requires serious commitment by ECCAS member states. This includes regular payment

of agreed financial contributions, implementation of regional decisions by national and local bodies and the involvement of civil society in decisions affecting the well-being of the citizens of ECCAS member states.

Peacebuilding and Security in Africa: *The Case of the Economic Community of West African States*

Thomas Jaye



Dr THOMAS JAYE holds a PhD degree in international politics from the University of Wales, Aberystwyth and a Master's degree in history from the Moscow State University. He is the head of the Liberia office of the International Centre for Transitional Justice. Before this, he was a senior research fellow at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre. He was also a research fellow in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham, UK. He has served as director of the African Research and Information Bureau and editor of the *African World Review*. Dr Jaye serves as the chair of the board of trustees of the Foundation for Security and Development in Africa. He is widely published internationally and his research interests include postwar reconstruction, African peace and security, democracy, conflicts and regional organisations. In 2003, he authored *Issues of Sovereignty, Strategy and Security in the Economic Community of West African States: Intervention in the Liberian Civil War*, Lewiston NY: Edwin Mellon Press.

Summary

This lecture discusses the role of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in peacebuilding and regional security in West Africa. It explains the peacebuilding initiatives and capabilities of ECOWAS within the context of its responses to regional security challenges and conflicts over the years.

In my view, peacebuilding is a politically sensitive and convoluted process that involves diverse actors and is driven by different agendas and factors. If it is not properly conceived, designed and implemented, it can lead to a recurrence of conflict. Peacebuilding also addresses the underlying causes of conflict. It can also be about state-building or state-rebuilding. It also requires reaching a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict through peace agreements and other mechanisms. Further, it requires consensus-building to meet the broader security needs of the vast majority of the people.

Some of the critical elements of peacebuilding in post-conflict situations are: elections and political pluralism; good governance; reconciliation; institutional reforms; demobilisation, disarmament and re-integration; security sector reform; transitional justice, law reform, economic recovery or renewal and

humanitarian support. To reiterate, it is an inclusive process that promotes inclusive politics aimed at reducing the risk of recurrence of violence and releasing countries emerging from conflict from the trap of violent conflicts.

Peacebuilding and security are inextricably linked. ECOWAS has moved away from the narrow notion of regime security, which has dominated West African politics since independence, and adopted a human security perspective. In the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), ECOWAS defined human security as the 'creation of conditions to eliminate pervasive threats to people's and individual rights, livelihoods, safety and life; the protection of human and democratic rights and the promotion of human development to ensure freedom from fear and freedom from want'. Thus, peacebuilding is seen as an integral element of the organisation's conflict-prevention framework.

The end of the Cold War produced mixed results in the West African sub-region. Some countries set out on the path of electoral democratisation, while others have gone down the path of self-destruction through internecine intra-state conflicts. Examples of the former include Ghana, Benin, Nigeria and

Senegal, and of the latter Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau. Thus, during the last two decades, parts of West Africa have been engulfed by violent intra-state conflicts, resulting in refugee and internal displacement crises, state and societal collapse, destruction of local economies and basic infrastructure, armed banditry and a humanitarian crisis.

The sources of violent conflict in the region can be traced to bad governance, identity crises, poor natural resource management and other factors. As noted in the ECPF, these conflicts 'took on a regionalized character, fuelled by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, as well as private armies of warlords, mercenaries, dispossessed youths and bandits who fed off the illegal exploitation of natural resources'. Therefore, resolving these conflicts through peacebuilding and the promotion of human security has been a preoccupation of ECOWAS. The processes and challenges of ECOWAS in peacebuilding and security are examined below

In response to cases of political instability caused by constant regime change and other (in)security factors in the sub-region, ECOWAS adopted the following security regimes: non-aggression (1978) and in 1981 the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD). Both regimes were the embryo of the thinking that development and sub-regional integration would be impossible without security, and provided the normative framework for ECOWAS's role in peacebuilding through conflict management. Subsequently, such thinking has been integrated into the revised ECOWAS treaty of 1993.

This revision was partly in recognition of the link between security and development. More explicitly, Article 2 (a) of the protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security (1999) spells out that 'economic and social development and the security of the peoples and States are inextricably linked'. Unfortunately, as much as ECOWAS has shown a degree of willingness to respond to the emerging peace and security challenges in the sub-region, the organisation still needs to work towards a shared security culture and appropriate mechanisms for conflict-prevention and peacebuilding. The actions taken against member states in which unconstitutional changes in power took place, such as Togo, Niger and Guinea, and the efforts to establish the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) clearly

illustrate that the organisation is moving in the right direction but has more to do.

For example, ECOWAS has intervened in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire with mixed results, and there are considerable lessons to be learned from these interventions on three key issues: sovereignty, strategy and security outcomes.

Sovereignty refers to the legality and legitimacy of ECOWAS's intervention in intra-state conflicts. Using Liberia as a case study, ECOWAS intervened without prior UN Security Council, thereby legally breaching UN Charter principles, but the Liberian case could not be solely assessed on a legal basis, as it was a highly political issue as well. In fact, even though the UN did not give prior authorisation, it did not condemn the intervention. On the contrary, the UN belatedly commended ECOWAS for interceding in the conflict and saving lives. In this light, ECOWAS intervention set a precedent for a sub-regional organisation's intervention in an intra-state conflict without prior Security Council approval.

Regarding security outcomes, while ECOWAS stopped the fighting in Liberia and Sierra Leone through ceasefire agreements between the armed factions and provided a safe haven for alleviation of immediate human suffering, such short-term security outcomes did not necessarily feed into long-term ones, namely addressing the underlying causes of human suffering through conflict resolution, postwar reconstruction and viable national politics. These lessons will be useful for future ECOWAS interventions in intra-state conflicts. As already noted, over the years ECOWAS has taken action against member states for violating certain of its principles with regard to unconstitutional power changes. Such was the case in Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Togo and Niger. As laudable as these ECOWAS actions to reinstate constitutional order were, critics would argue that if unconstitutional change occurred in one of the regional powers, for example Nigeria, ECOWAS would find it difficult to act. Thus, there are still limitations on ECOWAS's ability to deal with similar situations in the future. As in the past, implementation constitutes the major challenge because of lack of political will and not so much lack of resources.

Although ECOWAS may have had qualified success in meeting the original objectives for which it was established in 1975, such limitations need to

be seen in the context of existing global realities. Resolving protracted conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia has not been easy, and the current situation in Côte d'Ivoire and the uncertain situation in Guinea are a major headache for the sub-region. Even more worrying is the latent conflicts in every part of the sub-region. The secessionist efforts in the Casamance region in Senegal remain a problem and the low intensity conflicts in northern Ghana and the

Niger Delta also require peacebuilding efforts by way of conflict management.

Finally, it is important to point to the regional awareness that has emerged in West Africa. To become an effective body, ECOWAS should work seriously towards restoring peace and security in the sub-region through effective conflict management and resolution as part of the process of regional economic integration.

Africa Unsecured?

The Role of the Global War on Terror in Securing US Imperial Interests in Africa

Jeremy Keenan



Dr JEREMY KEENAN is a professorial research associate in the Department of Anthropology and Sociology at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London University. His current research is directed towards the anthropology of globalisation, terrorism and counter-terrorism (focusing on the post September 11 'War on Terror' in Africa) and the ethnicity and identity of marginalised and repressed people. Jeremy Keenan has previously conducted research on Africa, specifically the Sahara (1964-72, 1998-2008) and apartheid South Africa (1974-86). He has co-produced five films and authored five books. Two of his most recent books are *The Dark Sahara: America's War on Terror in Africa*, London: Pluto Press (2009) and *The Dying Sahara: US Imperialism and Terror in Africa*, London: Pluto Press (forthcoming). He has also frequently contributed articles to the *Review of African Political Economy*.

Summary

This lecture starts with two posers:

'To Americans, democracy is synonymous with virtue'. So why, Robert Grenier asks, has the US failed to champion democratic reform in the Muslim world? (Al Jazeera).

The 'propaganda' from the US about AFRICOM, since its inception, has been about all the benefits it will bring to Africa. So, why, with the possible exception of Liberia, has every country on the continent made it very clear that it does not want to host it?

Following this, the following arguments are made:

- The main purpose of AFRICOM is to secure US imperialist interests – mostly oil
- Its origins are based on 'deception' – the fabrication of terrorism
- As was the creation of AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) in 2006 (Al Qaeda in the West, for the West)
- The implications of AFRICOM for Africa will be almost entirely negative

- The immediate future will be marked by the EU's intervention in the 'crisis' of the Sahel

Does the US military, through its Africa Command, have any prospect of bringing peace, security and development to Africa? AFRICOM's operations will militarise US relations with Africa, and militarise numerous African countries, which, in turn, will be more likely to use force in obtaining their own objectives.

This development not only enhances the 'military definition of reality', but also encourages military in preference to diplomatic intervention. Indeed, with 'the current ratio in US funding for defence versus diplomatic/development operations abroad [at] 17 to 1, there are grave concerns about the power of the Pentagon to orient US policy in Africa toward military rather than civilian functions'. This increased militarisation of aid and development programmes in African countries further marginalises civil society, its organisation and development on the continent.

Glossary

AFRICOM	(United States) Africa Command
CNDD-FDD	National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy
CNDP	National Congress for the Defence of the People
DDRR	Demobilisation, Disarmament, Reintegration and Rehabilitation
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
FNL	Forces Nationales de Liberation (Burundi)
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MODE	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
OCHA	Office for Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs
UNAMSIL	UN Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme