Introduction: A changing world and its consequences

During the recent World EXPO in Shanghai, most African countries were housed under one roof, a huge building bustling with activity. The African dances and the loud drumming attracted many Chinese visitors, who were amazed, thrilled and shocked at the same time. The African market stalls (see book cover) were also popular. EXPO’s title was ‘Better City, Better Life’, and the organisers had tried to convince the African contributors that it would be nice to stick to that general theme. Few did, even after accepting generous Chinese support. Many of the African pavilions showed rural Africa as a paradise for investors and tourists, with scenes of Africa’s exotic nature and people and with a general message that Africa is a continent full of resources to exploit (cf. Dietz 2011: 5). But on whose terms? EXPO’s experience may be seen as symbolic of Africa being quite capable of carving out its own negotiation space. The world’s emerging multipolarity creates obvious tensions but also opportunities for the many different African players on the world’s geopolitical chessboard.

Consider the following one out of many Sino-African encounters currently taking place within Africa:

In Senegal, near Touba, the religious capital of the Murids (a Senegalese Islamic sufi order), a new road was inaugurated. This road had been financed and built by the Chinese, and, for the inauguration, the Senegalese president had come with a large following of officials, as well as the Chinese consul and his entourage. Important representatives of the religious elite from Touba attended the ceremony, too. There were many speeches, and the Chinese consul met with much enthusiasm when he spoke some words in vernacular. The crowd applauded the president, the religious leaders, and the consul. The
Murid leaders thanked the president, and the president self-assuredly took his time to receive their blessings before thanking the consul. In the meantime, in Dakar, traders were preparing a protest against the invasion of the Senegalese capital by Chinese merchants, backed by some important opposition parties.¹

It is clear that today’s world is not the world of the 1990s and – not surprising to Africans or Africanists but perhaps to others – this also holds true when viewed from the African continent. With the end of the Cold War, the world seemed to move from a bipolar system to a unipolar world in which the neoliberal West globally imposes its laws. However, during the last decade it has been acknowledged that other actors, such as China, India and Brazil, have become increasingly influential, creating multipolarity at the global level (DIE 2006; Dollar 2007; Clegg 2009). It is important to understand what this emerging multipolarity means for Africa. Will Africa fall victim to a new scramble over raw materials and political hegemony between superpowers (e.g. Lee 2006)? Or does this new multipolarity offer African countries greater room for negotiation and manoeuvring, eventually leading to stronger democracy, enhanced growth, and increased possibilities to address their own problems (e.g. Alden 2008; Vittorini & Harris 2009)?

From a Western perspective, non-Western actors intervening in Africa are often considered as mere geopolitical players. Transnational Islamic NGOs, for instance, are usually portrayed as part of a hegemonic project of the Arab world (Kaag 2007). The same tendency can be recognised in discussions about Chinese interventions, in which it is often stressed that these interventions are merely led by the demand for raw materials. This may be partly true, but there is more to it. Different layers have to be distinguished, as is illustrated by the Senegalese example above. Apart from the strategies of superpowers, there are also the ideologies and objectives of intervening organisations, the views and actions of the representatives of these organisations in Africa, and the ways in which African actors attract and respond to these external interventions and use them in their own complex strategies (Nolutshungu 1996; see also Kaag 2008). What also matters is that the number of emerging players seems to increase: ever more Asian, Latin American and Middle Eastern governments, businesses and cultural organisations appear on the scene, partly mak-

ing use of existing footholds (e.g. the Indians in Mauritius, Southern and Eastern Africa; the Lebanese in West Africa; Lusophone connections for the Brazilians), partly coming seemingly ‘out of the blue’.

Taking a longer-term perspective on Africa, the interventions of these ‘new’ actors are feeding into ongoing processes of inclusion and exclusion, both in the economic and political sphere. Important questions include how linkages with these non-Western actors are shaping the integration in the world market of African social groups, African countries, and of Africa as a whole. Are current business and governing elites monopolising contacts with these ‘new’ actors? Or are their interventions offering opportunities for other social categories, especially upcoming or counter-elites, to enhance their positions? They may do so by linking to such initiatives but also by publicly resisting them. Especially the rivalry between different Western and non-Western development partners may offer opportunities for actors in African society (ranging from local groups to the African Union) to enhance their position. What does all this mean for the current systems of transnational governmentality (Ferguson 2006; Olsen, this volume) and for the negotiating position of African elites therein? And what are the effects on processes of inclusion and exclusion in wider African society (Large 2008)? These are among the questions that this book seeks to address. How is Africa and how are Africans engaging the emerging multipolar world? Does the new situation offer the opportunity to get rid of the neoliberal system that many Africans feel has been enforced on them (Amoah, this volume)? Or has the neoliberal era set in motion dynamics that have taken an independent course and are difficult to stop, even after the crumbling of the system that has produced them (see, for instance, Büscher in this volume)?

It is clear that Africa is currently undergoing dramatic changes both politically and economically. In northern Africa, in early 2011, a process of change from below challenged and overturned major and long-standing regimes, including those in Egypt and Tunisia. The political implications of these changes for Sub-Saharan Africa are difficult to predict. Some African countries are experiencing rapid economic growth (Dietz 2011: 21-2). However, most of the continent’s dynamic sectors, such as minerals, gold and precious stones, and tourism and biofuel development are to a large extent influenced and controlled by external interests. In addition, many of the elites and bureaucracies of oil- and mineral-rich countries are controlling
the economic rents for their own benefit (Barnes 2005). The economic growth has thus not been inclusive, and, with a few exceptions (Botswana is always mentioned), benefits have not been passed on to the broader population. Poverty hence still remains deep in the region.

In the early post-colonial era, African governments were strongly engaged in promoting strategies of economic modernisation within the frame of the new nation states, with ‘nation’ a notion of substantial confusion. The period from the early 1960s into the 1970s saw African economies enjoy considerable economic growth as well as major improvements in education, health services and water supply. The need for weak African regimes to consolidate the nation states, however, also led to growing authoritarianism coupled with desires to engage with the world on their own terms. However, this was circumscribed by the existence of the Cold War, which presented constraints for the content and direction of the African engagements, but also opportunities for external support. For instance, a country like Tanzania charted its own development strategy in the 1960s and also benefited from playing external donors against each other (see Liu and Monson, this volume). The African post-colonial development model was, however, supported by favourable international economic conjunctures until the oil crisis in 1973 and the subsequent global economic stagnation. African countries were gradually immersed in political, economic and social crises. These crises changed, in important ways, the engagement of Africa with the external world.

The US and its Western allies had already in the early 1980s made the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank impose economic conditionalities for their further support to African states. These neoliberal reforms emphasised state withdrawal and increasing space for the private sector to unfold. The first phase emphasised “getting the prices right” (World Bank 1981) as a general remedy for recovery of economic growth. However, when the expected outcomes did not emerge (Zagah 2005), the focus shifted to creating a broader ‘enabling environment’ for development in Africa, which emphasised institutional aspects (World Bank 1989; Gibbon et al. 1993). African states on their side attempted to chart their own response to the crises through the Lagos Plan of Action in 1983 and economic reform programmes through the Economic Commission for Africa in the late 1980s. However, these initiatives had limited impact (see also Derbe, this volume).
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989, Africa’s engagement with the world changed to the direction of democracy and human rights. The shift was once more externally driven – primarily by the US and her allies, who wished to legitimise the new unipolar world order by emphasising such values. The 1990s hence saw the West imposing both political (Western-style multi-party systems) and economic market reform on Africa. The reform processes spread throughout Africa, whereas the more authoritarian Asian countries, enjoying high economic growth rates since the 1980s, did not experience similar external reform demands. However, Asian countries which had embraced economic liberalisation also experienced a severe financial crisis from 1997 onwards. Countries that had pursued more protectionist economic strategies, such as China, India, Vietnam and Malaysia, were less influenced and continued their economic growth almost unabated.

After the attack on the Twin Towers in New York in September 2001, the weakening of the US became increasingly manifest both politically and economically. The subsequent ‘war on terror’ led to drastic set-backs for global human rights, enormous economic costs for America, and untold human and material suffering in the countries against which the US and her allies waged war (Iraq and Afghanistan). Gradually, Europe was also being weakened economically. The financial and economic crises in late 2008 contributed further to this development.

In the meantime, new global actors (Brazil, Malaysia, Turkey, South Africa) have entered the geopolitical scene, while older players (China, India) have gained a renewed visibility and enlarged their domain of intervention. China is today Africa’s third-largest trading partner after the US and France. The Chinese development aid to Africa is also expanding rapidly, and by 2009 it had spent about 6.3 billion USD in Africa (Ong’ayo, this volume). In addition, India now has a presence in all African states. At the peak of the global financial crisis, the figure for India’s trade with Africa had reached an astonishing 46 billion USD in 2009, up from 36 billion USD of the previous year. Despite still being less than half of all China’s trade in the continent, this represents a 15-fold increase from a mere 3 billion USD in 2002. The buoyancy of this fast-growing economic relation is so great that the trade between India and Africa is expected to reach 70 billion USD in the next few years and even surpass this figure by 2015 (Vittorini & Harris, this volume).
The question of the influence of rising international actors in Africa has been adopted by the scholarly community, reflected in particular in the increasing number of studies on China in Africa (e.g. Mepham & Wild 2006; Alden 2007; Melber & Lee 2007; van Dijk 2009; Cheru & Obi 2010). These studies show the various ways in which China has been involved in Africa (aid, trade, investment) and critically assess the rationale for its presence. We feel, however, that despite the wealth of knowledge these recent studies have yielded, important scholarly challenges remain. First, most studies have focused on one particular international actor and its involvement in Africa and have not taken multipolarity as the central object of research. It is, however, the diversification of available partners that is one of the most important recent changes when viewed from an African perspective. Second, studies have largely focused on the actions and strategies of external actors, thus overlooking African agencies and the ways they may co-shape new global relationships. Third, most studies have taken the state level as the level of analysis. Such a state-centric perspective prevents one from exploring how emerging global players’ involvement in Africa might not only challenge global power constellations, but also reconfigure power constellations at a more local level (Evers et al., this volume) or contribute to new transnational configurations (Nauta, this volume).

Therefore, by taking multipolarity as the central focus and by highlighting the agency of Africa in co-shaping the new global world order, while also adopting a historically sensitive approach, this book serves to document and analyse the new developments described in the foregoing. What are the continuities and what are the changes in Africa’s position in the world? How does African agency play a role and co-shape the emerging multipolar world order? The contributions in this book show that African engagements take numerous forms on different terms and that relations of power and opportunities are constantly negotiated and re-negotiated, at local, national, international and transnational levels. Moreover, in a continent with over one billion people, there will be mutual and conflicting interests and engagements, both with regards to Africa in relation to the multipolar world, as well as within and among African nations, regions, communities and organisations. In addition, the continent has been colonised, exploited and deprived of natural and human resources, a fact which informs the ways in which Africa is currently engaging in the world.
In view of the observation that in the analysis of an emerging multipolar world African agency is still rather marginally considered, we think it important to reflect a little further on this issue before turning to the contributions to the present volume. In the following section, we will explore some of the reasons why it often appears so difficult to take African agency seriously (having their roots in the colonial past) and consider some recent thinking on African agency and engagements.

**African engagements:**

*The importance of taking African agency seriously*

When Napoleon Bonaparte stood among his troops next to the pyramids after he had conquered Egypt in 1798, he proclaimed: “Soldiers, forty centuries of history look down upon you!” Although the history of colonisation in Africa is older, the French conquest began a new era for understanding Africa, African engagements and Africa’s place in world history. To whom does ancient Egyptian history belong? And how can different understandings of the Egyptian past shed light on African engagements? By using the ancient Egyptian civilisation as an example, it is possible to describe two radical and opposite views regarding African agency and engagements (and, of course, there are many views in between these extremes): one which sees Africans as incapable of cultural development and totally dependent upon external influences (from the West, the Near East and Asia), and the other which sees Africans as the major contributors to and developers of civilisations within Africa and beyond. Perhaps with the exception of Australia, no other continent has been so deprived of acknowledgement for having played any role in cultural progress and global development as Africa. However, perceptions of the ‘backward’ continent were challenged by the ancient Egyptian civilisation.

What made Napoleon’s Africa expedition different from other European colonisations was that the army was accompanied by a special *Scientific and Artistic Commission*. This commission was carefully selected and was to provide a cultural and technological background to Napoleon’s further plans to colonise the Nile valley. The commission consisted of 167 scientists and technicians – a truly inter-disciplinary team at the time. In particular, the pyramids fascinated these scholars, and few scientific expeditions have left such a legacy. The result of this expedition was an enormous work: the
twenty-volume *Description de l’Égypte*, published between 1809 and 1828. Although the Egyptian monuments were known before Napoleon’s conquest, the *Description* was a catalyst for Egyptian studies and generated in Europe a wide public interest in Egypt, which also resulted in intensive robbing and looting of Egyptian antiquities (Fagan 2004: 47-56). Importantly, Egypt and the pyramids placed the big questions regarding Africa’s development and Africans’ engagements and agencies in the world in focus.

Historically, since colonial times, a recurring debate on Africa’s development and engagements has focused on whether unique innovations emerged in the continent itself or were the results of a diffusion of cultural and technological innovations from more advanced cultures and civilisations. In the history of Africa, the models which have been used to understand the continent’s people and development have had political implications, since “models of reality have a tendency to convert into models for reality” (van Beek 2007: 311). Archaeology has had a prominent role in the processes of colonialism and nationalism, and as the archaeologist Bruce Trigger says: “Colonialist archaeology ... served to denigrate native societies and peoples by trying to demonstrate that they had been static in prehistoric times and lacked the initiative to develop on their own” (Trigger 1984: 363). Moreover, “(w)hile the colonisers had every reason to glorify their own past, they had no reason to extol the past of the peoples they were subjugating and supplanting. Indeed, they sought by emphasising the primitiveness and lack of accomplishments of these peoples to justify their own poor treatment of them” (Trigger 1984: 360). In the nineteenth century, such a philosophy was brutally expressed by, for instance, the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who proclaimed that Africa “is no historical part of the World; it has no movement or development to exhibit. Historical movements in it – that is in its northern part – belong to the Asiatic or European World” (Hegel 2007 [1899]: 99) and that the Africans are “capable of no development or culture, and as we see them at this day, such have they always been” (ibid. 98). Africans were denied any engagements, agencies and even humanity.

This political agenda of Sub-Saharan or ‘black’ Africa was subsumed in Western notions of Africa. However, the ‘Egyptian problem’ persisted: how could Africa have produced such a remarkable and astonishing civilisation? Europeans solved the problem by not including Egypt in their concept of ‘Africa’: “Egypt will be considered
in reference to the passage of the human mind from its Eastern to its Western phase, but it does not belong to the African Spirit" (Hegel 2007 [1899]: 99). Africa was thus denied the capability of independent and autonomous development and cultural and technological innovations, which were seen as coming from the Near East and Asia.

Colonial archaeology saw Sub-Saharan Africa as a living, although largely static, museum of the past. Technical, cultural and political achievements in the past and present were underestimated, viewed basically as diffusion from the north, and assigned to prehistoric, so-called Hamitic peoples (Trigger 1984: 362). From this perspective it was these so-called Hamites who could explain the marvellous Egyptian civilisation. The myth about the Hamites comes from the Old Testament. Ham was one of Noah’s three sons; the two others were Japheth and Shem – whose successors were the alleged Aryans and Semites respectively. In Genesis 10.6 it is written that the Hamites include the people from Cush, Egypt, Phut and Canaan. The interpretations of the Hamites have undergone several changes, and in the early nineteenth century the Hamites were seen as Caucasians – whites in black skin. They were not like the other Africans, thus linking the Egyptian civilisation to the Bible and the Middle East. The Hamites became the great “civilisers” of Africa (Mamdani 2001: 82-6).

The denial of African engagements and agencies was also a consequence of the theoretical paradigm explaining cultural change. By the end of the nineteenth century, the paradigm explaining change was firmly based on ideas of diffusion and migration. Even the simplest inventions were not believed to have taken place more than once and at least not repeatedly. The distinguished Swedish archaeologist Oscar Montelius became one of the most prominent exponents for the \textit{ex oriente lux} (‘light from the East’) school, where the origin of European civilisation in the Bronze Age could be traced to the civilisations in the Near East, a view which also appealed to many Christians and their biblical view of world history (Trigger 1994: 151, 160-1).

Thus, the understanding of the Western past during the Bronze Age, as diffusion from the Near East, was unproblematic since it was also part of a Christian ideological hegemony, and the ‘real’ origin of the European civilisation was seen as Classical Greece. The role of Africa, nonetheless, remained passive and ‘backward’. By the high point of colonialism during the first third of the twentieth century, the
ancient Egyptians were seen as explorers, missionaries, traders and colonists as well as rulers, who brought enlightenment from ancient Egypt to the rest of the Dark Continent. As Thurstan Shaw says, one may “wonder whether it is no coincidence that this particular theory of diffusionism emerged out of the heydays of the French and British Empires in Africa, when Western Europeans saw themselves as undertaking a mission civilisatrice” (Shaw 1989: 5), or as assuming “the white man’s burden”, as framed by Kipling, spreading enlightenment in the same way they perceived the ancient Egyptians did (ibid.).

The diffusionist explanation that the Egyptian civilisation came from the Near East or Asia was later abandoned on archaeological grounds. Gordon Childe (1934) and Henri Frankfort (1956) conducted comparative studies of the civilisations of ancient Egypt and southern Mesopotamia, and both concluded that the civilisations had developed in distinct ways and were fundamentally different. In fact, all early civilisations have developed substantially independently, including those of ancient Egypt and the Yoruba in West Africa (Trigger 2003). And although Jared Diamond (1997) places a question mark over it in his best-seller, Guns, Germs and Steel, he treats the Sahel, Tropical West Africa and Ethiopia (but not Egypt) as potentially independent sources of early agricultural innovations.

We can now confidently say that the ancient Egyptian civilisation had its independent origin in the African continent. From the perspective of African engagements and agencies, the colonial perceptions expressed by, for instance, Hegel have been turned upside down by proponents such as Cheikh Anta Diop (1974), who argued that the Egyptians were black, and Martin Bernal’s Black Athena (Bernal 1987, 1991), which argued that ancient Greece and European civilisation have their roots in Black Africa and Egypt and that Greek islands were colonised by Africans. Whereas Diop mainly focused on contact between Egypt and Sub-Saharan Africa, Bernal emphasised contact from Egypt towards the north, the west and the east. Both authors work within the paradigm of diffusionism.

Bernal has admitted that part of his Black Athena project was to lessen European cultural arrogance (Bernal 1987: 73), and – as such – part of pure politics. These studies together with others have stimulated Afro-centricism and other African nationalist ideologies aiming to take back African history and civilisation to Africa, a history in
which Africans play an active and central innovative role (e.g. Chami 2002; van Binsbergen, forthcoming).

Hence, one has two opposite and radical views on African engagements on African terms: on the one hand, the extreme colonial and derogatory view of Africans without engagement and cultural and technical capability for innovation and development, and on the other hand, the independent and positive engagements of Africans influencing past and present Europe and the world. These views are at odds owing to history and ideology. The first view was purely racist; and although the latter may also have the potential to be so, it could be seen more as a reaction to a past which deprived Africa and Africans of history, independent development, and even humanity.

The works of Diop, for instance, have been heavily criticised on academic grounds; but they have, however, as Martin Hall pointed out, “been highly effective in demolishing the tenets of colonial histories of Africa” (Hall 1986: 37). Or in other words, such works have been part of creating and enabling an intellectual space where African engagements and agencies have an independent and active role.

The ideas of the colonial past are still remarkably alive today, as can for instance be seen from the speech by French President Sarkozy, in Dakar in 2007, in which he stated among other things that “[t]he tragedy of Africa is that the African has not fully entered into history”, noted by Achille Mbembe as reflecting an attitude “worthy of the 19th century” (Ba 2007). Of course, this example is a glaring one; but still, traces of the colonial heritage continue to pop up in many instances. One can think of the media, in which Africa most often appears only as a continent of crisis and in which Africans are rarely portrayed as citizens but instead mainly figure as anonymous masses and passive victims. Even in serious academic work, we should be aware of echoes of colonial thinking. Why is Africa, for instance, so remarkably absent from the mainstream works on globalisation? Speaking more generally, and as is underlined by Ferguson (2006: 16), Africa is still seen as the “radical other”, the dark continent, where developments are (and should be) copies of Western models. These Western models figure as the first and official version of how things should be done, and doubts always remain whether the African copy is real and ‘real development’ or only a shadow of what it seems to be and should be (think of concepts like ‘façade’ and ‘failed’ states). This is not to argue that we should do away with analytical concepts that may help to understand developments in Africa,
but that we should use them with caution and reflect on the premises underlying them. In addition, and as underlined by De Bruijn, Van Dijk & Gewald (2007), for instance, putting an accent on agency does not mean that structural factors that have an impact on the opportunities and possibilities of African actors should be omitted from the analysis. Olukoshi, Ouédraogo & Sall (2010) show how to build on this premise in their construction of a project for the ‘Africa of tomorrow’.

Returning to archaeology, which was our entry point in this subsection, the African continent as it is understood today, from the cradle of humanity to the dawn of civilisation and on to the present time, shows technological, social, cultural, political and religious innovations, and developments and achievements which have changed Africa and been part of world history. Throughout history, Africa has been engaging in the Near East, Europe, Asia and, later, America on diverse terms. In today’s multipolar world, these engagements take new forms and face new challenges. But they also ask for a new interpretation of history and more emphasis on encounters between Africans and other human populations, encounters that have hitherto been marginalised. For instance, one may expect more (and often controversial) (re)discoveries in the years to come about the relationships between Africa and Southeast Asia (cf. Dick-Read 2005) or the Arab world (Bennafla 2000; Robinson 2004; Soares & Otayek 2007) also feeding political-cultural sentiments of brotherhood and partnership.

_The contributions to this volume: African engagements, trajectories and opportunities in an emerging multipolar world_

This book is organised in three parts that try to throw light on different aspects of the questions asked in the foregoing but also inquire into how these aspects are interlinked. The first part, Chapters 2-7, describes and analyses new trends and tendencies in Africa. Some of these, however, are intensifications of old ones. Of particular interest is whether such trends and tendencies relate to the emergence of a new economic and political space for Africa, and what interests or powers are capturing, or trying to capture, this space. Are these trends externally or internally driven, and do they constitute an alliance between Africa and external interests – and if so, with what consequences for Africa?
The second part, Chapters 8-13, addresses the macro level by inquiring into the framing of multipolarity. What forces or interests, countries and/or continents are framing the new global economic and political multipolarity, what is the content of multipolarity, and what space does it provide for Africa’s engagements on its own terms? Or is Africa only responding to new initiatives generated externally? From an African point of view, it is the diversification of potential partners or alliances created by the move towards multipolarity that is of interest. The book attempts to address these questions through analysing different aspects related to initiatives and interventions by China, India, Europe, and the US, and also the relations between them. Are the Chinese interventions in Africa complementary to the European ones, or are they competing with them? Is India different from China in terms of its interventions? Does Africa play a role for the Obama Administration, or is the US government mainly focussed on internal problems and the waging of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan?

The third part, Chapters 14-16, focuses more specifically on the potential for Africa and Africans to fill the political and economic space that is a result of the emergence of global multipolarity and globalisation. The focus is also on how African values and needs ought to influence the new global context. But, has this space already been circumvented by the new trends and tendencies addressed in the chapters of Part I, or the way multipolarity has been played out, as analysed in Part II? Is Africa entering a new historical period that cannot be fixed in terms such as pre-colonial, colonial or post-colonial?

Part I: New trends and tendencies in Africa

It is argued by Derbe (Chapter 2) that the most important initiative to define the position of Africa and Pan-African politics in the post-Cold War period is the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). It is claimed that NEPAD represents an attempt by a transnational alliance of African political and corporate elites to rule by intellectual and moral persuasion, rather than by coercive power. The shaping of NEPAD was based both on African governments and foreign agency; however, African intellectuals and civil society challenged NEPAD and tried to present an alternative vision for Africa. The critique of NEPAD is related to its elite and top-down-driven inception and the fact that it was submitted to the G8 for approval and funding. And further, it is claimed that its neoliberal character and
reliance on foreign aid lead to a reproduction of the colonial dependency relationships (Adedeji 2002). NEPAD is also seen, in critiques, as the culmination in the conceptual shift in North-South relations from ‘cooperation’ to ‘partnership’. Each successive step in this direction has reduced the autonomy of recipient countries, to the extent that ‘partnership’ as a principle of international interdependence no longer serves Africa.

Derbe also refers to the consensus of CODESRIA and Third World Network Africa about NEPAD that “current African economic problems emanate from the international order and its division of labour”, which act to reinforce “domestic weaknesses deriving from socio-economic and political structures”. The policy measures urgently needed for Africa’s recovery include (i) stabilisation of commodity prices; (ii) reform of the international financial system, the World Bank, and the IMF, and an end to Structural Adjustment Programmes; (iii) fundamental changes to the existing WTO regime, as well as reversal of its attempt to include investments, competition and government procurement in trade negotiations; and (iv) debt cancellation. The subsequent African Civil Society Declaration for Africa (2004) proposes that an alternative vision for Africa should be based on the principles of human rights, self-reliance, and Pan-Africanism, and the construction of a participatory state (Bond 2005).

Basing his analysis on a neo-Gramscian theory, Derbe finds that NEPAD’s function is to legitimise accumulation of surplus by an African capitalist class in alliance with global corporations and donors. NEPAD’s architects are seen as co-actors rather than intermediaries in this transnational capitalist alliance. African regional and national politics are not simply passive actors for passing on of external initiatives and changes. Hence there is, according to Derbe, a need to re-examine or recalibrate concepts such as passive revolution and hegemony as ideal typologies, in order to capture nuances and variations in Africa’s external relations.

NEPAD’s vision for Africa emphasises efficiency and capital accumulation at the expense of social equity and satisfaction of basic human needs. But it still requires support from international donors to provide material concessions in order to offset radical opposition. In a situation of donor fatigue and deep poverty, such concessions will not suffice. Increasing food and energy prices will make the situation even more precarious. Hence, NEPAD’s capacity to co-opt a broad spectrum of social classes in Africa will be severely constrained.
Simultaneously, the space will gradually open for counter-hegemonic resistance to the prevailing social and political order. Recent developments in North Africa and Arab countries, including Tunisia and Egypt, illustrate the real possibility of social movements to initiate changes from below. The African states thus need to make use of other mechanisms to protect their hegemony.

A rather new trend to this effect, according to Schouten (Chapter 3), is the rapid expansion of private security companies. In contrast to others, Schouten argues that private security does not represent a ‘hollowing out’ or retreat of the African state in favour of market forces. Instead, it indicates a reconfiguration of the political ordering of economic interactions. The expansion of private security companies (PSCs) is best understood through a critical questioning of the spatial spread of PSCs around certain spheres of economic activities. Through two case studies in South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Schouten finds that a PSC at the micro level represents “a pivotal agency shaping the interaction between formal and informal exchanges in Sub-Saharan Africa”, where the PSCs reproduce a militarised yet contested front line “between on the one hand a formal, legalistic, and neoliberal Africa compatible with global capital, and on the other an informal, useless Africa”. According to Schouten, too little emphasis has been paid to how the changing territorial organisation of security governance, often involving PSCs, relates to or is integrated in economic organisation.

Schouten’s framework allows the analysis of the politics of private security on the same level and in the same global space as the state. Thus, new insights are offered into the character and role of the state. Schouten argues that PSCs represent the front-line between the formal/neoliberal and the informal sectors and help seal off economic activities from informal straddling and redistribution. This helps promote a more predictable economic environment, which can attract foreign investments in association with African elites. This disconnecting of formal economic activities “from prevalent patterns of contestation over redistribution of gain that pervade the Congolese economy at large” (MacGaffey 1991) offers insights about the formal/informal boundaries and the role of PSCs at the economic level. Schouten argues that the new private security topography is part and parcel of state formation in a decisive way. But does the expansion of private security necessarily lead to a stronger state? Could it not represent a framework for enhanced exploitation and appropriation of
resources and labour? Could it thus lead to a further weakening of the cultural and social ties of the African state? Protected elite accumulation and consumption, through expansion of private security mechanisms, may thus lead to a lowering of material concessions to the broader population. Thus, it could also work to create space for counter-hegemonic forces, as discussed by Derbe in the analysis of NEPAD.

The contribution by Büscher (Chapter 4) on commodification or neoliberalisation of African nature indicates further pressures on African smallholders, livestock groups and rural people. Withdrawal of productive land from African smallholders already began on a large scale under colonial rule. Indications are, however, that this process is intensifying for various reasons. Foreign interests, in alliance with African states, are pushing for enlargement of existing, and establishment of new, game parks and wildlife reserves in order to promote global and ecological tourism. Climate change has, in addition, led to increasing international emphasis on global utilities (‘global common goods’). This has led to an international push for global commons, such as forests, conservation areas, and ecological systems belonging to the world and protected by international agreements. Such conservation initiatives represent a further encroachment on African smallholder land. Smallholders have to pay for the creation of global commons through restrictions on the use of their agricultural or pasture land, in spite of initiatives to create compensation systems. Büscher provides an interesting analysis of the new payment systems emerging for ecosystem- and climate-enhancing services. The idea of such payment or compensation systems is based on the notion that the value of ecosystems can be captured in monetary terms through market dynamics. Conservation and policy responses to reduce carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (carbon trade and REDD) are based on similar perspectives and function basically as instruments for tying conservation measures and mechanisms and capitalism closer together (Brockington et al. 2008).

The process of commodification of African nature is also played out through foreign acquisitions of African land for production of food and energy. In Chapter 5, Evers et al. analyse aspects of this process in Madagascar. The process of global land acquisitions or ‘land grabbing’ turned spectacular when news broke in 2009 that the South Korean company Daewoo was contemplating a 1.3 million hectare agricultural project in Madagascar. At the same time, the then
Ravalomanana government was imposing a policy of foreign land investments and implementing a land reform purportedly to secure local land rights. The Ravalomanana government was forced out in March 2009 by the military and the current government partly due to the turmoil around the Daewoo project. In their contribution, Evers et al. focus on the realities encountered in the local setting when international and local stakeholders vie for the same plot of land. They find that the negotiation context of local communities in land deals is undermined by the asymmetry of power among the negotiating partners. Existing laws do not guarantee respect for local communities’ rights and interests. Local government and local elites seem to be ambivalent since foreign investors promise jobs and local infrastructure in what are economically weak regions.

Intensified land grabbing by foreign companies and states in Africa for food and energy production has led to concern about its social and environmental impacts (Matondi et al. 2011). So far, only proposals for voluntary recommendations for the process have been put forward. The direction of the international discussion – with the World Bank in the lead – is, however, couched in terms of ‘win-win’ and the possibility of ‘responsible land grabbing’ (World Bank 2010). The conditions for win-win situations, however – and as exemplified by Evers et al. – are limited in the context of existing global, national and local power relations. Many African governments, in any case, seem to embrace the process in the belief that large-scale foreign investments may lead to modernisation of agriculture and increase export incomes. The divide between African governments and African smallholders thus stands out sharply and supports the analysis of Derbe (Chapter 2) that African elites are engaging with external interest in new ways and disregarding local interest.

In Chapter 6, Nauta presents a case where a civil society organisation, Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) in South Africa, was able to fundamentally change things through a South-South alliance. By aligning itself with the Brazilian government and Brazilian and international NGOs, TAC was able to break the South African government’s refusal to widely distribute ART (antiretroviral therapy) medication. It was proved that access to life-saving medication was a viable solution even in a resource-poor setting. But a precondition had been that the Brazilian government had already broken the monopoly on high price HIV/AIDS medication of transnational pharmaceutical companies. Nauta reveals the strategies employed by
TAC in the mobilisation of global partners and examines the objectives of involvement from the Brazilian side. In addition, he shows that in the process of mobilising the support of Brazil – which Nauta refers to as the ‘significant other’ – TAC also became a valuable partner for Brazil and other global allies, as it inspired the global campaign for treatment access and demonstrated how being locally rooted could be married with global action. Nauta uses the case of TAC to reflect on the character of global activism and discusses its potentialities in the current era of emerging world powers and increased access to modern communication.

In Chapter 7, Mohamed Salih questions the relevance of the notion of ‘negotiations making use of multipolarity’ for one particular country, Sudan, after a major shift in government during the 1980s. He argues that Sudan presents the case of a country that has gone beyond negotiations with the West, by neglecting the West and building strong ties with Middle-Eastern and Asian parties. This has made Sudan a country with, on the one hand, rapid economic growth, being now one of the emerging ‘African lions’ – and, on the other hand, a country with major and violent conflict, particularly in the Darfur area and, before the peace treaty and the subsequent referendum in the South, also in many parts of Southern Sudan. After the separation of North and South Sudan into two independent states, it would be highly relevant to our theme of African engagements in a multipolar world to see how these countries go separate ways in playing off various global powers and establishing their own agency, even if it goes beyond (even much beyond) what is seen as morally acceptable by the ‘international community’ in terms of human rights violations.

Part II: Framing multipolarity

In 2009 Elisabetta Martini stated that multipolarity has been recognised as “a fact of the existing international order” (van der Lugt, this volume). However, there does not yet seem to be any consensus about the meaning of the term. In this section of the book, Chapters 8-13, different contributions approach the term through different subject areas and approaches. The aspiration is to examine perspectives, actions and initiatives by most of the major global actors – China and India in Asia, Europe/EU, and the US – so that the term multipolarity can be given a more concrete content. A particular focus is on the implications of the framing of multipolarity for Africa and how Africa
and its institutions respond and engage with the emerging multipolar reality.

In Chapter 8, Van der Lugt explores the link between the position of a country in the world order and its perspectives on humanitarian intervention, in the context of a shift in the world system towards multipolarity. She does so with a particular focus on the role of China in the increase of power of African governments to exercise sovereignty.

Since the Cold War, the West has been dominant culturally, economically and militarily, and it could therefore set the dominant discourses and the structure of the international community and international law. However, as Van der Lugt illustrates in her contribution, the position of the West is declining, and it now has to share power with emerging nations. In addition, China’s increasing influence on and cooperation with Africa has led to a change in the attitude of the West towards the continent.

A major point advocated by Van der Lugt is the impossibility in the current context of holding on to the idealistic picture of an “international order based on systemic and rule-based multilateralism”. The European Union (in 2008) proposed that China just needed to comply with international law in order to make multilateralism efficient. But the EU is not in a position to put forward such demands, and the perception by the West that international law can remain constant is considered naive. According to Van der Lugt, the changes in global power relations will result in changing international laws, in which national sovereignty will gain precedence over humanitarian intervention. This development will increase the potential for African governments to engage in international affairs and to exercise sovereignty.

This is exemplified, firstly, by China’s rising influence, which means a renegotiation of the share of voting power in multilateral organisations and the representation of other than European and North American norms and values in international law. China’s support for African countries’ demands for a seat on the Security Council reflects the depth of their cooperation. Secondly, the rise of China and other emerging powers has led to more than two global powers, which means that a good relationship with one of them is no longer sufficient to circumvent interference in one’s own national issues. This means a higher risk of intervention, which will translate into a higher appreciation for sovereignty internationally.
Olsen (Chapter 9) puts forward a different analysis of the relations of Europeans and Chinese with Africa. Olsen argues that if cooperation is to prevail between China, the EU and the African Union, the actors must share a minimum of common norms, values and interests. The chapter sets out to identify the development of such a consensus by looking at three areas: (i) interests with a focus on promotion of regional order in Africa; (ii) presence of common values and norms, through analysing security interventions of the three actors; (iii) development aid intervention aimed at economic and social development.

As for development interventions, Olsen refers to China’s explicit support for NEPAD. Some observers interpret this as Beijing de facto encouraging Africa to accept liberalised capitalism and not an alternative model for the continent (Taylor 2010: 63). The overall conclusion regarding development interventions is that “both China and the EU share the same goals in Africa when it comes to economic and social development”. In addition, there seems to be a ‘securitisation’ of the approach – i.e., an emphasis on security and the appeasing of conflicts. China and the EU share an interest in stability and order, and they also agree upon the norm of demanding official UN backing in cases of deploying armed forces in conflict situations in Africa. But Olsen also refers to possible dissensions between the EU and China over Africa relations.

As to what the above findings imply for African engagement, Olsen refers to the Paris Declaration of 2005, aimed at increased recipient country influence and enhanced aid efficiency. The signing of this declaration by the EU meant that it committed itself to switch from conditionalities as critical policy instruments to giving more weight to the development objectives of the recipient countries. China has also signed the Paris Declaration. However, whereas the EU officially feels bound by the rules of the Paris Declaration, China does not, according to Olsen. In addition, a number of observers maintain that Beijing tries to organise its aid system in ways that are parallel to the norms of the West. So, as Olsen points out, the bottom line is that “the picture is mixed as far as the development interventions are concerned”. So, perhaps China after all is competing with the EU in relation to Africa rather than supplementing it in important areas? This may also give a perspective on the recent lack of interest in fulfilling the terms of the Paris Declaration by European countries, a fact also noted by Olsen.
Brautigam’s (2008) empirical analyses confirm that China operates ‘outside the global aid regime’, in the sense that its assistance would not qualify as aid according to the criteria set by OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). China is stated to prefer bilateral arrangements with a close tie between aid and politics. This means that aid is often tied to deliveries from China and that it is project-based. Moreover, Beijing uses a whole range of financial instruments in combination, so that it is difficult to isolate Chinese development aid from other economic development instruments. The speed with which China’s support and engagements have developed in Africa means that China is conscious about the effectiveness of its aid, and, in addition, China is very proud of a long record of support to useful projects in response to requests by African leaders (Brautigam 2008: 30). This shows that the engagement of China in Africa is not of recent date, although its character and intensity have changed.

The contribution by Liu & Monson (Chapter 10) analyses aspects of one of these old and useful development projects, the TAZARA railway between Tanzania and Zambia. The African leader who requested Chinese support was the then president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere. The US had first been approached to build the railway, but they declined. The construction of TAZARA took place between 1968 and 1975 and resulted in an impressive railway line being opened between Dar es Salaam and New Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia in 1976. For Zambia, a land-locked country, the line was seen as vital to its copper exports, during a time of contested relationships with its southern-African neighbours. The railway is 1,680 km long and was built with financial and technical assistance from China, amounting to more than 400 million USD. The Tanzanian workforce declined from 35,900 to 13,600 between 1972 and 1974 while the Zambian increased from 2,100 to 13,000 during the same period.

But China not only engaged in the construction of the railway. From 1976 until the present, a period of 35 years, China has provided technological and other guidance to TAZARA through so-called Chinese railway expert teams (CRETs) on two-to-three-year contracts based in Tanzania. The number of advisors in such teams has declined gradually from nearly 1,000 during 1976-8 to around 200 during the period 1989-92, to the current level of seven advisors during 2007-12.

The chapter shows the commitment and consistency of Chinese support to TAZARA over time, even in periods when technical assistance to Tanzania from other regions, such as the Nordic countries,
was found to be counterproductive (Forss et al. 1988). CRETs’ cooperative agreement with TAZARA also welcomed experts from Western countries – e.g., to implement the Ten Years’ Development Programme along the railway starting in 1985. Until the late 1990s, Western donors funded 140 million USD in support projects for TAZARA, including the US, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries, and others.

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The CRET protocols signed by the Chinese, Tanzanian and Zambian governments over time have consistently emphasised technological cooperation rather than technology transfer. However, during the early stages of operation, the CRET experts were powerful and could also make final operational decisions. With the Tanzanian crises from the late 1970s onwards, problems also emerged for the TAZARA railway, and in 1983 the Chinese Premier Zhao during a visit to Tanzania called on Chinese experts again “to participate in daily management of the railway, shoulder by shoulder with African friends”.

The pride about TAZARA was not only Chinese. To a large extent the railway, at least from a Tanzanian perspective, was considered a nation-building project. The chapter shows, through study of life histories of TAZARA workers in different capacities, how these workers’ identity and consciousness were formed by the project and how their skills could not be replaced. Dr. Issa Shivji, when defending the first 300 TAZARA workers who were laid off in 1982, successfully used these qualities in his defence and had the workers reinstated. However, at later stages, TAZARA was immersed in the general economic liberalisation and restructuring which led to increasing lays-offs of the workforce.

The chapter provides interesting evidence on the construction and operation of a major Chinese-supported project in Africa. However, it does not provide any evidence of the operational and economic efficiency of the railway over time. The project analysis is not sufficiently broad to reveal financial and trade conditionalities connected to the project, which, as reported by Brautigam (2008), have continued into the current Chinese aid interventions in Africa.

The contribution by Ong’ayo (Chapter 11) aims to analyse the implications of the absence of African civil society engagement in China-Africa relations and dialogue processes. It also attempts to inquire into the strategic engagement between African CSOs, the Chinese government, and Chinese CSOs over the role of China in Africa. The analysis shows that NGOs lack knowledge of the context-
ual realities in both China and Africa. This knowledge gap acts as an obstacle to constructive and effective civil society engagement in China-Africa relations. It also weakens the potential for engagement with governments on fundamental issues related to China’s interventions in Africa.

The contribution, however, also acknowledges a power gap regarding civil society dissent and initiatives both in China and Africa in relation to their respective governments. It is stated that although the Chinese government’s response to dissent was brutal in the past, in particular during the Tiananmen protests and in other regions of China, recent responses to CSOs in China have been less brutal, “even though cases of detention and constant surveillance can still be observed”. In Africa, CSOs have evolved over time, “through stifling conditions underpinned by authoritarianism and dictatorship”. Both African and Chinese CSO organisations have grown rapidly since the 1980s, and their features and alliances have also shown increasing diversity. But the relationship between the state and civil society is characterised by continuous conflicts.

Ong’ayo argues for the importance of data gathering and information sharing in areas where Chinese involvement in Africa is being criticised, including workers’ rights, human rights’ situations in bilateral projects, and inter-governmental policies and agreements. Such contextual knowledge will not only increase the ability of CSOs to raise issues with the respective governments, but also, and possibly more importantly in the future, help collaboration with Chinese CSO counterparts in cross-continental solidarity initiatives. It is argued to be of critical importance that China-Africa relations do not take on the same forms as the relations with the West – i.e., where African opinions and voices were rarely accepted or heard.

Vittorini & Harris (Chapter 12) address the responses of African governments to Indian investments. India has also emerged as a major player in the new multipolar world and particularly in Africa. India’s relations with Africa are, however, not new. Throughout history, Indian populations have settled in different regions of eastern and southern Africa. They have carved out for themselves an important role in trade and commerce owing to access to capital, skills and alliances at local and international levels. In the area of technical economic cooperation, India has long had relations with Africa (since the 1960s), which, however, were limited in comparison with Western aid and technical interventions during the 1960s and 1970s.
Currently India is underlining its exceptionalism in its trade and aid to Africa and the complementary actions of its mostly private-sector investors. India is emphasising this feature not only in relation to China but also to the West. India is a democracy, which strives towards transparency in its international activities. Its relations with Africa are predominantly private enterprise-related and, in addition, India’s African engagement is based on capacity-building and human resource development. Affirmation of mutual interest, rather than altruism, and rejection of conditionality are core elements of its development assistance and relations which India and its authorities wish to underline.

This has led to positive responses to Indian engagement by some African governments, and in a few instances even preferential treatment. But the general trend seems to be that African ministers are reluctant to praise one outside party over another when benefits can emerge across the board. Ideologically, Vittorini & Harris do not see India and China promoting an alternative development model in Africa to that of the Western liberal framework that is on offer. Here they concur with Rye Olsen. However, there is a growing and general popularity amongst African leaders for the non-interference and mutual benefit approach of both India and China. Western countries are thus no longer seen to have their pre-eminent position in trade and aid, with enforced liberalisation through conditionalities. But, in addition, many African ministers and top-level administrators are trained in the West and may know (or want to know) little of options other than the liberal consensus offered by the IMF and the World Bank.

The element that might be the most important for African responses to India is that of strategic considerations. India may provide a crucial third node of economic and political power across the African continent. The presence of India and China to complement the West (and Japan) – and others such as Brazil, South Korea, and Russia, which are also lining up – may provide more space to manoeuvre for African governments. Thus, there might be a possibility this time around that Africa will not be a by-stander in an external struggle over raw materials and political hegemony and fall prey to a new neo-liberal scramble for Africa. But the outcome will depend on African agency, according to Vittorini & Harris, which again is linked to the depth of the changes associated with the enforced economic liberali-
sation and democratisation during the brief era of the unipolar world order.

The contribution by Schraeder (Chapter 13) focuses on US engagements in Africa, using a historical perspective. This is conducted in a context in which the Obama Administration on the one hand is confronted by daunting challenges and on the other by extraordinary expectations. However, Schraeder shows that, historically, US foreign policy towards Africa has “demonstrated remarkable coherence and regularity despite the differences between Republican and Democratic administrations” (quoting Brian Winchester). The current period of US engagement with Africa, starting in 2001, is not unexpectedly called ‘war on terrorism: expansion or contraction?’. Schraeder is of the opinion that Obama will prioritise domestic and other international priorities before Africa. However, recent developments in Tunisia, Egypt and other North African and Arab countries are bound to be given priority by the US administration since they undermine the current US strategy of cooperation with repressive governments for security reasons. The recent development also hits at the foundation of the US’s Middle East peace strategy, where Egypt is and has for a long time been a critically important ally.

Areas for US engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa are also economic, in particular safeguarding supplies of oil and strategic minerals from the continent. Schraeder, however, also reports about several new, and the expansion of old, foreign aid initiatives concerning Africa, including doubling of foreign assistance, continuation of the successful AIDS Relief programme (PEPFAR), and revival of support to international family-planning programmes. Obama entered office in 2009 mindful that the US had not played a sufficiently proactive role in the resolution of African conflicts, including the genocide in Rwanda and the Darfur crisis. Although Obama has underscored his administration’s intention to take a more proactive approach in African conflict resolution, it is doubtful, according to Schraeder, whether this will occur, owing to the foreign policy challenges elsewhere.

The main concern for the US administration in Sub-Saharan Africa, however, seems to be related to the security agenda. This is manifest in the creation of various task forces and counter-terrorism initiatives, which have been buttressed by a continent-wide Africa Command (AFRICOM), expansion of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) and other US military aid programmes, and the Gulf of Guinea Initiative. The primary goal of the latter
initiative is to establish over time an effective regional security programme capable of ensuring safe transport of oil to the United States. The primary target for US foreign policy, however, is not unsurprisingly those countries in which core foreign policy interests intersect, such as Algeria – an important regional oil power considered crucial by the US in combating perceived terrorist threats in North Africa.

*Part III: New space for African engagement?*

According to Amoah (Chapter 14), the near universal and dominant sway of neoliberal ideas in the political and economic spheres over the last three decades has come under intense scrutiny following the global economic crisis of 2007-9. The crisis and the subsequent responses by the global North to the financial meltdown have created a policy window for African polities to reclaim their autonomous policy-space in a multipolar world. One important reason for the meltdown, according to Amoah, was the liberalisation of financial markets during the last few decades, which led to excesses and widespread misuse of such markets for rent-seeking. In his contribution, Amoah analyses policy responses of leading centres of neoliberal thought to the global financial crisis and the implications for public policy formation in Africa. Drawing from his concrete findings of the pervasive influence of neoliberal ideas in Africa, he argues that policymakers and intellectuals in Africa have not paid sufficient heed to Susan Strange’s admonition that “power derived from the knowledge structure is the one that has been most overlooked and underrated” (Strange 1988: 115). Such knowledge is, according to Strange, no less important that the other three sources of structural power: military, production and finance.

Amoah in his analysis finds that the 1970s were marked by political instability, which undermined continuity and creativity in public policy making. The tendencies towards autonomy in Africa had by the 1970s and 1980s “all but atrophied”. The neoliberal public policy thinking had presented government intervention in any shape or form and under whatever conditions in Africa as unacceptable. Amoah further finds that the policy responses of governments in the global North to the financial crisis indicate that neoliberal tenets are not consistently applied and “reflect ideological proclivities and preferences which undermine any universalistic, axiomatic and monothetic pretensions”.
Amoah sees multipolarity not merely as the re-diffusion of political and economic power at the global level but as critically linked to the legitimacy of ideas. Multipolarity is about the contest of ideas. The unfolding of the global financial crisis presents to Amoah a vital policy window for African intellectuals and policy makers “to begin the task of inventive policy formation beyond the hegemony of neo-liberal ideas”. According to Amoah, Africa needs a new mind, meaning a fresh understanding of public policy formation derived from Africa’s worldview. The construction of this mind should begin with three building blocks of critical realisations: (i) public policy formation over the last three decades has been driven by neoliberalism; (ii) the multipolar world provides Africa with the opportunity to craft her own public policy approaches in response to her existential challenges; and (iii) African policymakers and intellectuals need to provide sufficient agency for self-conscious public policy approaches to emerge. Amoah, however, does not discuss in detail the possible obstacles mentioned by Vittorini and Harris that most African leaders and top administrators are educated in the West, embracing and fully internalising Western patterns of thinking. This may constitute a great challenge for the capacity to develop the knowledge and independence required for Africans to chart an alternative development path. This problem is also alluded to in Derbe’s analysis of NEPAD in Chapter 2.

Ugwuanyi (Chapter 15) sets out to highlight the complexity in engaging Africa for development in its global demand and to articulate the need for an ideological re-birth of Africans for this purpose. Pointing to the diversity of factors that should be addressed for “a proper protection of African humanity”, factors that are partly political, partly psychological, partly economic, partly cultural, and partly related to racism, he asks himself: “What idea of globalisation will lead to the realisation of the African dream of harbouring a prosperous people in the world within the demands of modernity?”. The objective is to search for an ideology that can appropriate the gains of globalisation to an African advantage and pioneer and promote African unity by “reconnecting Pro-African minds (interpreted as all who are interested in African development) in its global demands”.

According to Ugwuanyi, the African response to globalisation should take a reconstructive approach, and his objective is to initiate this. The approach or ideology is termed glo-fricanisation, which believes in the need to reconfigure the idea of African unity around
“specific needs and interests through which even non-Africans can contribute to the African development and that it is by this reconfiguring that globalisation can be made to provide a relevant effect in African life”.

Ugwuanyi identifies two significant items that characterise globalisation: (i) a cultural dislocation of mankind by values constructed by certain items of modernity; and (ii) a relocation of this culture to a cultural centre (defined as a basis of evaluation and identity), which itself is defined by a universal network of human aspirations. In essence, this translates to what can be called global needs and desires, the response to and the provision of which amounts to globalisation. After outlining the different aspects of globalisation, Ugwuanyi addresses the question related to promises of globalisation in Africa. What are the specific gains that Africans stand to gain from globalisation? The first to be anticipated is that it should lead to full adoption and adaptation of African concerns as global concerns. The second implication is that African values and principles should be sought after and desired in the construction of global values. It should also be anticipated that globalisation should add considerable value to African labour and resources. There should also be a higher value attached to consumption, as much as to production, and to consumers as much as to producers.

In his proposal, Ugwuanyi states that African development needs should lead to a coalition of the world community. Thus Pan-Africanism has to expand to provide space for the inclusion of non-Africans since this will lead to a better response to African problems. The other implication is the need to subordinate the idea of Pan-Africanism to higher and worthier goals. There are at least two justifications for glo-Africanisation: first, the large African Diaspora means that what could be termed African problems can no longer be isolated to problems of continental Africans; and second, there are many non-Africans with a considerable level of empathy to the problems of African people, non-Africans who need to be encouraged to demonstrate this interest.

In the last contribution to the book (Chapter 16), Stephen Ellis introduces a controversial issue. As a matter of fact, most historians dealing with Africa’s history as well as other Africanists – and also journalists and public opinion leaders – use the colonial era as the watershed of historical periodisation. Africa’s long history is simply presented as having three periods: pre-colonial, colonial, and post-
colonial. Ellis questions the relevance of doing this and presents a mind shift that could enable the ‘decolonisation of the mind’ as far as Africa is concerned, not only for Africans themselves, but also for Africanists in former colonising countries. The position Ellis takes is controversial, as it might easily lead to a downplaying of the importance of the colonial era as just a ripple in the history of mankind. Particularly in countries like France, Portugal, and the UK it can strengthen sentiments downplaying the historical responsibility for the long-term impact of colonialism on Africa and on former colonies. If colonialism was only a ripple, and of little long-term effects, why bother about its moral heritage? The issue is to find a balance between reframing the periodisation of history and acknowledging the relative importance of the era in which colonial institutions influenced, often deeply, existing ‘African’ institutions. Probably it is high time to move away from the overwhelming importance of ‘1884’ and ‘1960’ and to find more meaningful markers of decisive change. But this should not result in downplaying the European (and later, also American) roles in Africa’s history during the last few centuries. It may open windows, however, for becoming less myopic.

Major issues and questions arise from the contributions to this book. Will the framing of the new multipolar world, as presented in Part II, and the new trends and tendencies in Africa, as spelled out in Part I, provide a space for global African engagement? What are the boundaries and alliances related to this space, and can they be used for negotiations that can promote African interests, values, and perspectives, as is particularly elaborated by Amoah and Ugwuanyi in Part III of the book? And then: what is ‘African’, and how should the scientific communities dealing with Africa reframe Africa’s history and place in the world? Indeed, Africa’s engagements with the world are currently being reshaped and revalued, and sometimes with breath-taking speed, but the political question behind this reshaping remains important: on whose terms? And with what impact for Africa’s prospects for improved well-being and self-determination.

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