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Introduction

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This book explores perspectives on intra-state and inter-state conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Comprising Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan, this is the most conflicted region in the African continent. The recent major expressions of these virulent conflicts are manifested in the second North–South civil war (1983–2005) in Sudan and the intra-state war in Darfur (Johnson 2003; Deng 2010; Barltrop 2011); as well as the inter-state Ethiopian–Eritrean war of 1998–2000, which devastated the region (Jacquin-Berdal and Plaut 2004). Since 9/11, the region also has become one of the theatres of the global war on terror, driven principally by factors related to the collapse of the Somali state and the emergence of al-Shabaab, and the escalation of piracy off the Somali coast.

The conflicts ravaging the region are underpinned by historical, socio-economic and environmental issues and can be classified into two categories: intra-state and inter-state. Furthermore, they have been compounded by intra-regional and international intervention. Ostensibly, such interventions have been driven by competing national interests and a multitude of factors – economic, political, security-related and strategic – linked to the war on terror and international alarm about piracy (Sörenson 2008; Zeleza 2008). International interventions, therefore, have contributed to the intractability of the conflicts and insecurity of the Horn (Cliffe 2004; Woodward 2006).

The strategic importance of its location has always attracted outside interest, notably the proximity of the Horn of Africa to the highly sensitive region of the Middle East, where two factors – oil and the Arab–Israeli conflict – interface. In addition, Bal el Mandeb and the Red Sea are the main shipping route for goods from the Middle East and the Far East to Europe and the Americas (Sörenson 2008: 8). The discovery of natural resources, highly coveted by transnational corporations and states alike, also makes the region of strategic interest to external actors, with the result that the global
war on terror and the recent explosion of piracy have seen naval forces converging off the coast of the Horn.

All these factors feed into the crisis of the state, which has become a characteristic of the region. Equally, the crisis of the state feeds into the conflicts and insecurities there. All these factors require more scientific and critical studies of the conflicts and their regional dynamics. This volume seeks to contribute to the provision of tools that scholars, policy makers and concerned actors need in their search of scientific and critical, context-sensitive studies, relevant and well-formulated policies and regional outlook, making concerted and rigorous efforts to find viable and durable solutions to these extensive and intractable conflicts and insecurities.

The intra- and inter-state conflicts besetting the Horn of Africa are intimately connected. Intra-state conflicts very easily spill across international boundaries triggering conflict between states, resulting in inter-state conflicts. Inter-state conflicts also tend to spawn national cleavages, that is to say intra-state conflicts. In recent decades inter-state conflicts have been steadily waning, while intra-state conflicts have increased (Goor et al. 1996, Fearon and Laitin 2003; Smith 2004; Zeleza 2008).

The contributors to this volume reflect on and analyse various dimensions and cases of intra-state and inter-state conflicts and security in the Horn of Africa. They examine a variety of aspects that exacerbate conflict situations. A focus on conflicts and security is the integrating theme. The problem of intra- and inter-state conflicts and security and how to promote peace, stability, security and development are addressed. This first chapter offers an overview of the chapters by focusing on the types and forms of the conflicts, and international intervention and politics of conflict resolution.

DEFINING INTRA-STATE AND INTER-STATE CONFLICTS

Conflict as a social phenomenon is widely perceived to be part of daily life (Axt et al. 2006: 19). Its manifestation, however, varies, contingent on a number of factors – contestation, the actors involved, duration, accessibility to conflict-sustaining technology, and so on. Concerning the origin of conflicts two approaches are provided (Axt et al. 2006): the subjective and the objective. While the objective approach traces the origin of conflict to the socio-political fabric and structure of society, the subjective approach attributes the origin of conflicts to the perceived incompatibility of goals and differences (Deutsch 1991). According to the latter
approach it is incompatible differences that engender conflict. Underlying this understanding is that in order for conflict to exist there should be position difference or interest opposition between groups over certain values (Axt et al. 2006: 6). What we are dealing with here, of course, is political conflict.

Conflicts are broadly categorized into two groups, the violent and the non-violent. More specifically, five types of conflicts are described: latent conflict, manifest conflict, crisis, severe crisis and war. The first two are assumed to be non-violent, the others are classified as engaging in violence (Axt et al. 2006). War is violent conflict. A further distinction is made between intra-state and inter-state conflicts: ‘inter-state wars, fought between two or more state members of the inter-state system; (2) civil wars, fought within the “metropole” of a member state of the system by forces of the regime against an insurgent group’ (Sarkees et al. 2003: 58). This definition rests on the political status of the combatants. If they are recognized members of the international state system, then the conflict is defined as inter-state, whereas if one of the combatants is not a recognized member of the international state system but is located within a recognized state, the conflict is defined as intra-state or civil. Concerning intra-state conflicts Sarkees et al. (2003: 59) note:

Intra-state wars are now those between or among two or more groups within the internationally recognized territory of the state. They include civil wars (involving the state government and a non-state actor) and inter-communal conflicts (involving two or more groups, none of which is the state government).

A further distinction is made in that intra-state conflict can be divided into strife to control the central government and strife over local issues, which may include secession (Sarkees et al. 2003: 59). Accordingly, ‘A civil war, therefore, is simply a war over the state itself. Either a new regime replaces an old regime or a new regime (and state) is created by secession. A war across states is something different. It is a war about the state’ (Hentz 2010: 91). Yet another distinction divides intra-state war into six types: secessionist, irredentist, wars of devolution, wars of regime change, wars of social banditry and armed inter-communal insurrections (Zeleza 2008: 6).

For the last 50 years the Horn of Africa has suffered protracted, chronic and complex intra- and inter-state conflicts (Cliffe 2004: 5).
These conflicts fall into three categories: state–society; state–state; and society–society. While state–society conflicts relate to civil wars (communities with legitimate grievances challenge the state), state–state are conflicts between sovereign states. The third type, society–society, concerns communal strife (intra-communal and inter-communal), under the shadow of the state. What all types of conflict have in common is that the underpinning source is the state. A fragile state or state in crisis in the Horn of Africa has become the source of conflicts and insecurity.

CAUSES OF CONFLICTS

It is no exaggeration to state that conflicts the world over are characterized by myriad causes. Further, they are embedded in the socio-economic, politico-cultural, historical, identity constructions and experiences of the societies, the societies’ relation with intra-regional and international actors; and local, national and regional configurations. This multiple context of causality shows that there is no single explanation to the conflicts in the Horn of Africa. To complicate matters, conflict causalities are categorized into root, proximate and tertiary causes.

Some of the commonly alluded to causes are: territory, ideology, religion, language, ethnicity, self-determination, access to resources, markets, dominance, equality and revenge (Singer 1996). In reference to inter-state conflict, Pfetsch and Rohloff (2000) identify nine items, which they call commodities, which historically constituted the cause of conflicts between states. These are: territory (border), secession, decolonization, autonomy, system (ideology), national power, regional predominance, international power and resources. Nonetheless, there seems to be a broad consensus among scholars that the classic cause of conflict is territory (Axt et al. 2006: 12). Relative deprivation theory (Gurr 1970) also attributes conflicts to a group’s expected or actual access to prosperity and power. Relative deprivation theory is closely connected to group entitlement theory (Horowitz 1985), which attributes conflicts to ethnic identification (Smith 2004: 5). Other theories that seek causes of conflicts include: poor economic conditions theory, repressive political system theory and environmental degradation theory (Smith 2004: 7). Injustice and marginalization theories locate the causes of conflict in social relations in which certain groups are subjected to grave injustices and chronic marginalization. People, therefore, engage in conflict not
only because they see it as just, but because they see no alternative to alleviate their plight.

The drivers of conflicts are internal as much as they are external as they entail international, regional, national and local actors and networks which are at the same time social, economic, political and military (Zeleza 2008: 15). It is noted that ‘We need to incorporate in our analyses the interplay of historical and contemporary processes, and the role played by the state, capital and civil society; material forces and popular discourses institutional conditions and symbolic constructs structure and reproduce conflicts’ (Zeleza 2008: 16).

The causes of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa are many. Here I will mention some of those most commonly referred to. These are:

- Livelihood-based resources (land, water, grazing, pasture).
- Culture (ethnicity, language, religion).
- Politics (power, inequality, domination, discrimination, marginalization and alienation).
- External intervention (colonial, Cold War, regional, the war on terror and piracy).
- Socio-economic (poverty, illiteracy, endemic health problems, unemployment, draught, environmental degradation).
- Lifestyle (peasantry, sedentary, pastoral, nomadic, highland, lowland).
- Dysfunctional governance practices (absence democracy, accountability, transparency; tyranny; dictatorship; sham and/or unrepresentative electoral practices; alienation and marginalization of local indigenous institutions and practices, state legitimacy deficiency).
- Underdevelopment (lack of industrialization, investment; agricultural, pastoral and agro-pastoral economy; primary goods export, pre-capitalist economic dominance).

Combinations of some or all of these explain the conflicts the Horn of Africa is experiencing. If we take the Darfur conflict as an example, we can easily see that a combination of livelihood-based resource competition, culture, political, socio-economic and lifestyle factors underpin it. The inter-state conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia (1998) also involves culture, politics, external intervention, socio-economics and dysfunctional governance practices.

In order to highlight and map the focal points of conflicts I will now examine intra-state conflicts. This will be followed by an examination of inter-state conflicts. It is also worthwhile to
note that structures, levels, objectives and agencies may influence the causes as well as the effects of conflicts. Local (community), national (intra-state) and international (inter-state) (McGinnis 1999) arenas are where the conflicts are played out. While local conflicts are often between identity-based groups and are driven by resources, national conflicts occur as contestants vie for state power. International conflicts take place between sovereign states and differ in their political, military, diplomatic and economic objectives and dynamics. They are also discernible by their practices and the war technology involved.

MAPPING INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

The Sudan suffers complex and multiple society–society and society–state conflicts. Marginalization, alienation and discrimination by the centre against the peripheries have plunged Sudan into a perpetual state of conflict since independence in 1956 (Johnson 2003; Ahmed 2010; Deng 2010). The North–South divide has the characteristics of both society–society and state–society conflicts. It is in the society–society category because it is between ‘African Christian animists’ (South) and ‘Arab Moslems’ (North). It also has a state–society dimension because the state is dominated by the ‘Arab Moslem’ community and that gives it the sense of a state waging war against a section of society.

The seeds of the first intra-state conflict in Sudan were sown on the eve of independence. The mutiny of a Southern unit of the Sudanese army in Torit, Equatoria on 18 August 1955 marked the onset of the first civil war in the Sudan (Ahmed 2010: 4). The war ended with the signing of the Addis Ababa Accord in 1972 which gave the South self-rule. This though was rescinded by the military leader Ghaffar al Nimeiri in 1983 (Johnson 2003; Deng 2010). The division of the South into three provinces, coupled with the introduction of shari’a law, sparked the second civil war, which ended after 22 years with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005 under strong external pressure (Ahmed 2008; Deng 2010; Barltrop 2011). The main provision of the Agreement allowed the people of the South, at the end of a six-year period, to decide their future in referendum. That took place on 9 January 2011. The outcome was that the South became an independent state on 9 July 2011.

The seeds of secession are embedded in the provisions of the CPA, which was designed so that the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) would represent the people of the South, while the rest of the population was left to the National Congress Party (NCP). Therefore, the idea of New Sudan was that it was orchestrated to serve as a negotiating position for the SPLM/A to achieve its objectives, though there are those who believe that John Garang (former leader of the Sudanese Liberation Army and first vice president of Sudan who was killed in a helicopter crash one month after taking office) was committed to the vision of New Sudan and that the idea died with him (Grawert 2010). The mediators, not least the United States, also seem to have accepted the notion of separate states. The problems of the Sudan were reduced to the North/South dichotomy in the CPA. It should be borne in mind that the South was never properly integrated and the colonial and post-colonial state of Sudan facilitated the realization of the notion of separate statehood. The British ruled the South as part of their East African colonies and they had plans to merge the South with Uganda (El Mahdi 1965; Johnson 2003; Deng 2010). Following independence successive power holders in the capital, Khartoum, made no serious attempt to integrate it in the emerging nation state. Nevertheless, the secession faced daunting challenges – border demarcation, wealth sharing, the national debt, citizenship and relocation (Ahmed 2010) – all of which seriously undermined the construction of the new state. This may plunge the Sudan into inter-state conflict.

The Sudan is also mired in intra-state conflicts in the eastern, western and northern parts of the country (Ahmed 2010: 4). In the east, the Beja people live with the reality of remaining at the margins of central power, which is located in Khartoum, power that has stubbornly proved to be discriminatory, exploitative and repressive. As an expression of their dissatisfaction with the emergent power arrangement, and in seeking their rightful place in the post-colonial state, they launched the Beja Congress in 1958 (Young 2007: 11). Since its formation the Beja Congress has intermittently engaged in the national political realm, advocating improvement of the plight of the Beja people from their alienation, marginalization, underdevelopment and neglect under northern Muslim-Arab elite domination. Successive leaders in Khartoum have periodically banned the Beja Congress, yet it keeps re-emerging (Young 2007; Ahmed and Manger 2009). By the early 1990s the conflict had developed into full-blown war between the NCP and the Eastern Front, the latter formed by two resistance movements, the Beja Congress and the Rashaida Free Lions, in 2005 (Ahmed and Manger 2009: 8). Until
the signing of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) following the Asmara Agreement in October 2006, the Beja Congress, with the help of SPLM/A, carried out several operations in eastern Sudan. The ESPA allowed the Eastern Front to join the Government of National Unity as a junior partner. Shortly after the signing of the ESPA, however, the Eastern Front disintegrated into four factions.

Darfur exploded in 2003 just as Sudan was closing one chapter of its bloody conflicts in the South. In response to rebel attacks the NCP unleashed a militia known as the Janjaweed whose systematic, concerted attacks laid waste to Darfur. The rebel movement in Darfur comprises the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM). Negotiations between the government and rebel groups to resolve the conflict were initiated. The Abuja Initiative, and later the Doha Process, are two mediation efforts to resolve the conflict. Opposition groups to the NCP have attempted on various occasions to form a united front. In 1995, through the Asmara Declaration, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Umma Party (UP), SPLM/A and Beja Congress formed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). Great hope was invested in the NDA to challenge the NCP. The signing of the CPA between the SPLM/A and NCP, however, put the NDA into disarray. In spite of several agreements – the CPA, ESPA and the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) – (Ahmed 2008, Deng 2010) peace eludes the Sudan.

Low-intensity conflicts against the North intermittently emerge in many other regions too. These include the Southern Blue Nile, South Kordofan and Nubia which complicates the picture. These conflicts gained momentum following the independence of the South in July 2011.

Ethiopia’s claim on the former Italian colony of Eritrea sowed the seeds of intra-state conflict in that country. The UN-sponsored federal arrangement which came into force in 1952 was from the outset subjected to systematic violations. Over its ten-year life-span, the provisions of the federal arrangement were dismantled, engendering serious political grievances that ultimately descended into intra-state war in Ethiopia. The Eritrea–Ethiopia conflict is sometimes classified as an inter-state conflict, since Eritrea is considered an autonomous state created by the former colonial power (Mengisteab 2010). The annexation of Eritrea in 1962 drove the final nail in the coffin and ignited the 30-year war which only ended in 1991 with the fall of the military regime (Habte Selassie 1980; Gebre-Medhin 1989; Iyob 1995; Bereketeab 2007). The
war of liberation in Eritrea was later joined by ethnic movements such as the Oromos, the Somalis and Tigrayans seeking to revise the political arrangement which they saw as the source of their alienation and marginalization. Non-ethnic groups poised to change the political system and informed by leftist ideologies also came on board (Berhe 2009; Zewde 2010).

On the eve of the fall of the monarchy political tensions in Ethiopia were high, but it was the deposing of Emperor Haile Selassie in February 1974 and his replacement by a military junta (commonly known as the Dergue, which means committee in Amharic) that set in motion the proliferation of liberation movements poised to transform the Ethiopian state. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), formed on 18 February 1975 (Berhe 2009: 38), had a confused objective. The TPLF entertained overtly or covertly the idea of establishing a democratic republic of Tigray. Towards the end of the Dergue’s rule, however, it played a dominant role in the creation of a multi-ethnic coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolution Democratic Front (EPRDF), which was formed in 1989. In the post-Dergue era the TPLF remained the dominant force in EPRDF-ruled Ethiopia.

Another ethno-national liberation that joined the struggle for the creation of a new Ethiopia was the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), founded in 1973. The OLF championed the right of self-determination up to and including secession of the Oromo people. The OLF joined the EPRDF coalition as a junior partner and participated in the EPRDF-led transitional government in 1991, but due to fundamental policy differences with the TPLF, it withdrew from the coalition in 1992. Since then it has been engaged in armed struggle. The other ethno-national movement is the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), which represents ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia; it was founded in 1984. Since then (with brief interruptions) it has been involved in armed struggle with the aim of separating the ethnic Somali people from the Ethiopian state.

The non-ethno-national movements were offshoots of the student movement inside as well as outside Ethiopia. The two major parties that crystallized from the student movement were the Me’ison (All Ethiopia Socialist Movement) and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) (Zewde 2010: 8). Bitter rivalry between the Me’ison and EPRP opened the way for the military to hijack the popular uprising. First, using Me’ison, the Dergue destroyed EPRP, and later turned against Me’ison itself. The rump of the EPRP joined the armed liberation movements. This brought
the EPRP into conflict with the TPLF. The TPLF defeated the EPRP and drove it into the Sudan in 1978. Later, a faction of the EPRP was reorganized as the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM) and returned to Ethiopia as an armed insurgent group. The EPDM entered the coalition that formed the EPRDF and subsequently joined the government (Berhe 2009).

While for the various ethno-nationalist movements Ethiopia’s predicament concerned marginalization, alienation and exclusion of ethnic communities, the analysis of the non-ethnic or multi-ethnic movements focused on democratization, power-sharing and resources, and to certain extent on the issues of nationalities (Zewde 2010). The cumulative efforts and momentum of all these movements changed the political landscape in 1991. The military regime was deposed and the liberation movements took state power. This opened the way for the radical restructuring of the state. The EPRDF convened a national conference in 1992 where a transitional National Charter by which the new Ethiopia was to be governed was agreed. The main provisions of the Charter covered the restructuring of the state on the basis of ethnic identity. Hence state reconfiguration took the form of ethnic-based federalism. At first this bold undertaking received immense praise and was perceived as offering a durable solution to the entrenched culture of conflict.

Nonetheless, there were many who warned that an ethnic-based federal state would lead to the disintegration of the Ethiopian state (Habtu 2003; Teshome and Zohrik 2008) and it did not take long before things began to go wrong. Although the downfall of the Dergue regime seemed to have paved the way for a new social contract in the relations between the various ethnic groups in Ethiopia, another round of intra-state conflict unravelled, thereby perpetuating the culture of war. It was hoped that the ethnic-based federal arrangement in Ethiopia would provide a lasting solution to fractious ethnic relations thereby changing the tainted image of Ethiopia, described by some as a ‘prison of nations’ (Gudina 2003; Berhe 2009). The Charter was endorsed by the main ethnic liberation movements that had ousted the Dergue and was signed by the movements representing the main ethnic groups: the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). However, the Charter soon ran into considerable legal, political and implementation obstacles. As a result the OLF felt compelled to withdraw in order to achieve their objectives. Subsequently, the ONLF, Ethiopian People’s
Patriotic Front (EPPF) and other supra-ethnic-based movements revisited the now well-known armed liberation struggle launching Ethiopia back into a series of intra-state wars.

Somalia gained independence on 1 July 1960. It comprised British Somaliland (today’s Somaliland) and Italian Somaliland, which were unified four days after British Somaliland was granted formal independence on 26 June 1960 (Samatar and Samatar 2002: 31). From the outset, however, Somalia was beset with tensions that led to both intra-state and inter-state conflicts. The integration of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland, perhaps due to their diverse colonial legacies, soon proved to be disadvantageous to the Somali state (Lewis 2002). The clan-based division of post-colonial leaders and parties culminated in political chaos and tension in 1968. Exploiting the chaos that accompanied the 1969 election, a coup headed by General Siad Barre, staged in October 1969, ended the brief era of multi-party civilian government with the imposition of a military junta. This, compounded by Cold War interventions, geo-regional and clan politics, precipitated the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 (Lewis 2002; Samatar and Samatar 2002; Möller 2008).

Mobilization and the arming of clans produced clan-based organizations such as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF, Mijerteen), the Somali National Movement (SNM, Isaaq) and the United Somali Congress (USC, Hawiye), which finally deposed the Siad Barre regime in 1991 (Jhazbhay 2008: 61; Möller 2008: 102–3). But their victory proved to be an impossible task to control and configure into a national project. The apportioning of Somalia as a reward to the rival movements pursuant to the fall of the regime produced the following entities: Somaliland, dominated by Isaaq; Puntland, dominated by Mijerteen; and central and southern Somalia, dominated by Hawiye. An inevitable consequence of all this is that Somali society is submerged in a seemingly intractable war. While central and southern Somalia are suffering from extremism and the ‘global war on terror’ as a consequence of regional and international interventions, the two breakaway regions, and particularly Somaliland, have established peaceful, stable and relatively democratic political systems.

The tiny territory of French Somaliland gained independence in 1977. The territory, which in 1967 was renamed Issa and Afar, was later named Djibouti. It comprises two major ethnic groups: the Issa Somalis and the Afars. Djibouti’s independence was marred by conflict between the majority Somalis and minority Afars and civil
war and low-intensity intra-state conflict have been going on for decades. The minority Afars feel excluded and discriminated against by the majority Issa and have mounted resistance. Nevertheless, Djibouti is, relatively speaking, considered stable in a region where stability is rare.

The Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), representing the Afar people, launched an armed insurgency in November 1991 (Abdallah 2008: 276). A main faction of FRUD signed a power-sharing accord with the ruling People’s Rally for Progress (PRP) on 26 December 1994. Nevertheless, a faction led by Ahmed Dini (Prime Minister, 1977–78) rejected the accord and continued a low-intensity war. The government signed a peace agreement with this group on 12 May 2001, thereby ending the decade-long intra-state war. Yet in 2010 the intra-state conflict again erupted (AFP, May 2010). Some associate this with the recent conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea.

The last nation to gain independence, Eritrea, is also embroiled in intra-state conflicts. Eritrea represents a classic example of an abortive decolonization process when it was transferred, through a UN-sponsored federal decision, from Italian colonial rule to Ethiopian rule after the former’s defeat in the Second World War (Gebre-Medhin 1989; Habte Selassie 1989; Iyob 1995). Ten years of deliberation on how to dispose of the ex-Italian territory culminated in the decision to tie Eritrea with Ethiopia through federation (Ellingson 1977; Pool 1979). This flawed federal arrangement was arbitrarily revoked in 1962 and this led to a 30-year independence struggle which finally came to an end in 1991 (Habte Selassie 1989; Iyob 1995).

During the liberation struggle, the liberation movement was engaged in two armed conflicts. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) fought each other in 1972–74 and again in 1980–81, with the ELF ultimately defeated. The various factions of the ELF continued their struggle against the EPLF from their diaspora. Following independence the various ELF factions continued their politics of resistance because they were not permitted to return to the country as an organized force. Since the outbreak of the second Ethiopia–Eritrea war, however, different groups, mainly based in Ethiopia, have been carrying out sporadic violent actions to depose the regime in Asmara.

The new state of South Sudan is already experiencing intra-state conflicts with some dissident officers challenging the Government of South Sudan (GoSS).
MAPPING INTER-STATE CONFLICTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

The history of inter-state conflicts in the Horn of Africa can be traced to the 1960s when intra-state conflicts entered the emerging polity of the countries. There seems to be a clear connection between intra-state and inter-state conflicts. Intra-state conflicts somehow find their way across international geo-political boundaries. In other words, they easily spill over into inter-state conflicts. The mechanisms of any spill-over assume a range of forms. Migration, border ethnic groups, poorly defined and contested boundaries and proxy wars are some of the factors that mediate these inter-state conflicts. In terms of proxy wars, for instance, both Sudan and Ethiopia have supported rebel groups in the other’s country. Sudan gave sanctuary to the Eritrean liberation fighters and other Ethiopian opposition groups; in tit-for-tat actions, Ethiopia supported Sudanese opposition groups which locked the two countries into inter-state conflicts (Cliffe 2004). Although it could not be said that Ethiopia and Sudan have descended into overt inter-state wars, they have experienced the longest history of inter-state proxy wars in the Horn of Africa due to their history of intra-state conflicts.

The relations between Somalia and Ethiopia have been characterized by conflicts, mainly due to the presence of the Somali ethnic population in Ethiopia. Post-independence nationalist leaders of Somalia have made clear their strong ambition to unite the five units of the Somali nation which were divided by colonialism. This set them on a collision course with both Kenya and Ethiopia. Hence Somalia went to war on two occasions (1964 and 1977) with Ethiopia (Lewis 2002; Kusow 2004; Möller 2008). The first inter-state war in the Horn of Africa therefore took place in 1964 between the new post-colonial Somali state and the oldest established state of Ethiopia. The largest in scale, duration and devastation, however, was fought in 1977–78 when the swift penetration and occupation of south-western Ethiopia by Somalia was only halted by massive Soviet and Cuban involvement (Adam 1994: 118; Greenfield 1994: 108). The crushing defeat of Somalia in this war was seen as the beginning of the collapse of the state of Somalia (Samatar 2004: 1136).

Eritrea has been involved in inter-state conflicts with all its neighbours. The post-liberation Eritrean state came into being in a highly volatile and conflicted region, which may explain its political behaviour (ICG 2010). A border skirmish between Eritrea and Ethiopia along their common borders led to outright war in
1998–2000 (Bereketeab 2009). Although the border dispute was settled by the Permanent Court of Arbitration verdict on 13 April 2002, peace and normalization remain as remote as ever. Therefore, not only is there a real danger of the prevailing no war/no peace situation easily turning into a hot war, but it has also given rise to proxy wars. While it is largely believed that Eritrea and Ethiopia have shifted their war to Somalia, internally they are actively engaged in supporting opposition groups to destabilize each other. The youngest nation state, South Sudan, which came into being in July 2011, faces serious challenges in its relations with the North. Another dimension of the proxy war in the Horn of Africa is often expressed in the form of geo-strategic, interest-driven interventions. Western powers in effect use other governments to promote their geo-strategic interests by pitching states against each other with devastating consequence for the region.

A FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITY ANALYSIS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

One of the implications of the conflicts relates to security. These intractable intra- and inter-state conflicts have rendered the region the most insecure place in the world. The notion of security has undergone a huge metamorphosis in recent years. It has come a long way from its classic meaning and definition, in the legacy of the Westphalia Convention, where it traditionally focused on the security and sovereignty of the state (Koponen 2010).

Security, for the current purpose, takes multidimensional forms: regional, national, human and environmental. The regional dimension refers to the security and well-being of the region as a whole. In this sense, the Horn of Africa, as an integrated security complex, stands to gain from collectively designing, deciding and implementing its own security architecture, grounded in free will, mutual interest and respect for other states and societies without manipulative, geo-strategic-driven foreign interventions. This is of current importance due to the intensity of the militarization and securitization of the region as a result of the global war on terror and piracy off the coasts of Somalia, which together adversely affect both intra- and inter-state conflicts.

National security concerns the integrity and stability of individual nation states. National security is in line with the classic definition of security of the state. Human security essentially means the individual’s right to life, liberty and livelihood. It also means freedom from want and fear; protection of democratic and human rights and promotion
of human development (Adekanye 1999: 107; Koponen 2010). Quite often individual rights are counterpoised against collective or state rights. Yet, these two rights are not inherently incompatible. Environmental security concerns maintaining a life-sustaining environment. The environment, as the life supporter par excellence, must be restored, maintained and sustained (Tvedt 1999). This is of great significance in the Horn of Africa, because for the last several decades the region has been characterized by droughts, soil erosion, desertification, deforestation and environmental degradation, leading to recurrent famine. Insecurities produced by environmental degradation, which relate to food insecurity, shortage of drinking water and shrinking of grazing and arable land, constitute great threat to life. In addition, they are increasingly becoming sources of conflicts. Tackling environmental insecurity will therefore contribute to peace, security and development.

In all these dimensions, security is a scarce commodity in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, these insecurities feed into intra- and inter-state conflicts, which add to the volatility and fragility of the state.

In light of all these, the challenge scholars and concerned others face is how to deal effectively with these complex problems. To date they have met without success. One of the reasons for this is to do with the tools we use in understanding and analysing the conflicts and insecurities in the Horn of Africa. The tools we have been employing have revealed a serious deficiency. This volume attempts to redress that.

INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION, CONFLICTS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The Horn of Africa has a long history of international intervention. Colonialism, the Cold War and more recently the war on terror and against piracy are some of the international interventions which have resulted in dire consequences for the stability, security and development of the region. The cumulative outcomes of these interventions are political divisions, economic distortions, protracted conflicts, environmental degradation and corrupt state-building.

The gravity of these problems has generated intense international involvement by peace brokers, well-wishers and other interested actors. Yet despite all their efforts to bring about peace, security, stability, democracy and development, no meaningful peace has been realized. The crucial question is, why not? A number of reasons
can be given. And one has to do with the methodology of conflict analysis and conflict resolution.

The methodology of conflict resolution and international mediation intervention put in place functionally and structurally has proved to be deficient in meeting the complex configurations and challenges the Horn of Africa is facing, notably its politicization. The politics of conflict resolution, as interpreted and acted on by international actors, places great emphasis on geo-strategic, security, political and economic interests. Consequently, local initiatives perceived to be at odds with global interests are either discouraged or actively opposed. Another shortcoming is the emphasis on dealing with one conflict at a time. The piecemeal, isolated approaches to the various conflicts thus seem to have brought at best partial success and at worst have been a complete failure. For instance, the single approach in Sudan which led to the signing of the CPA with the SPLM/A, the DPA reached with some Darfur rebels and the ESPA (Ahmed 2008: 1; 2010) signed with the Eastern Sudan Movement failed in bringing a comprehensive solution to the problems of that country. To begin with, the CPA signed between Khartoum and SPLM/A was not as comprehensive as it was portrayed. On the contrary, it was so narrow that it further marginalized the conflicts in eastern Sudan, Darfur, Nuba Mountain and Kordofan, a marginalization that only aggravated the situation (Barltrop 2011; ICG 2011).

Similarly, efforts to resolve inter-state conflicts in isolation have not borne fruit. Researchers, think tanks and research institutes have suggested that the international community should adopt a regional approach and mechanism of conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa if international intervention is going to have any bearing. One such effort might focus on the epicentre of the overall conflict configuration in the Horn of Africa – the Eritrea–Ethiopia conflict (ICG 2008; Reid 2009). For the quest for a lasting resolution to the Somali problem, the Djibouti–Eritrea conflict and internal problems within Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia would benefit greatly by addressing the Eritrea–Ethiopia conflict at the same time. Nonetheless, geo-strategic-driven expediency precludes pursuing a regional approach, which would necessarily mean putting pressure on states that are in alliance with the crusaders of the global war on terror.

The Horn of Africa is probably the region of Africa most burdened by external interventions. Successive external interventions, including colonialism, the Cold War, the war on terror and piracy,
have skewed the developmental, democratization, peace and security processes. A successful international intervention thus should focus on three dimensions: (1) it should put at the centre the concerned country’s situation and interest, not self-serving geo-political strategy and security interests; (2) it should pursue balanced and even-handed interventions; and (3) it has to develop an historicized and contextualized approach, that is to say, it needs to be sensitive to history and local situations. The selective enforcement of international laws and conventions and selective international interventions that characterize engagement in the Horn of Africa are part of the problem.

The strategy of demarcating the states in the region as moderates/extremists, friendly/hostile, which results frequently in isolation of some while favouring others, has far-reaching consequences in inter-state relations. While those labelled hostile are sanctioned harshly, those considered friendly are allowed to get away with serious breaches of international law and violation of human rights. This complicates relations, negotiations and peaceful resolutions of both intra- and inter-state conflicts. Rather than taming so-called unfriendly states, it turns them into pariahs. A skewed geo-strategic security and interest-oriented policy therefore produces failed states. It also highlights the distorted aspect of the methodology of the politics of conflict resolution and international intervention.

This would enable us to conclude that the interconnected conflicts and insecurities ravaging the region require holistic, multidisciplinary, multidimensional, regional approaches and mechanisms. It is this realization that motivated the Nordic Africa Institute to organize the workshop where scholars from the region and international scholars renowned for their work on the region met and deliberated on the complexity of the conflicts and insecurities and suggested ways of resolving them. Some of the papers that were presented at the workshop and others are presented in this volume.

THE THEME OF THE BOOK

The central theme the contributors address is conflicts – intra-state and inter-state conflicts. The authors broach the theme of conflicts and security from different angles. The primary coordinating theme is the interplay of intra- and inter-state conflicts. The second theme is the focus on the regional dimension and regional perspective. A third theme that runs through the chapters is the role of external
actors driven by geo-strategic security and other interests. A fourth theme the chapters interrogate is the role of leadership in the dynamics of the conflicts. Further issues of border demarcation, democratic deficit, the crisis of nation- and state-building, the role of traditional authorities and environmental degradation are analysed, with the aim of explaining the intractable nature of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa, and seeking possible and sustainable ways of resolving them.

The contributors highlight the factors, structures and forces that generate intra- and inter-state conflicts and the effects these have on the security, development and well-being of the region. What distinguishes this volume from others (other than being the only volume to appear in the last decade or so that analyses the interconnectedness of conflicts in the region) is its multidisciplinary, multidimensional, regional perspectives and approaches.

Each contributor deals with one or more issues and cases of intra- and inter-state conflicts and security in the Horn of Africa, and seeks to explore the challenges the region is facing. The book is arranged in three parts. Part I deals with the causes of conflicts, highlighting the complex and interlinked factors such as poverty, inequality, identity and the role of leadership. Part II analyses the dynamics of conflicts and seeks to address their nature. It analyses the conflicts in the Horn of Africa, their implication for regional security, border changes in Sudan, regional dynamics and the politics of violence. Part III is concerned with regional and international interventions. It examines the role external interventions play in intra- and inter-state conflicts and security, the role IGAD plays in regional relations and the phenomena of militias and piracy.

Each part has three chapters. These thematic chapters deal with specific aspects that implicitly or explicitly contribute to understanding and analyses of intra- and inter-state conflicts and insecurity in the Horn of Africa, their possible root causes, the actors involved and the role of local, regional and international actors. Together, the thematic chapters highlight the measures that need to be taken.

The contributors seek to establish an adequate framework for understanding the concepts of ‘conflict’, ‘war’, ‘security’, the nature of various actors, how intra-state conflicts feed into each other and the challenges posed by problems related to the durability and quality of peace agreements. They also take note of the problems of inherited and disputed borders, which split ethnic communities
among neighbouring countries and became a critical factor in intra- and inter-state conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

The contributors also discuss the transnational nature of the wars in the Horn of Africa, and the roles of the political leadership, traditional authorities, the state and civil society in promoting sustainable democracy, peace and development. The focus is turned to inter-communal conflicts over land, water and livestock, exploring the possible link between climate change, conflict and peace in the Horn; and international piracy off the coast of Somalia. International intervention in the pursuit of geo-strategic, security and economic interests is identified as one of the drivers of the conflicts in the region.

CONCLUSION

The complexity and interconnectedness of intra- and inter-state conflicts and the concomitant pervasive insecurity ravaging the region make the Horn of Africa the most conflict-ridden region in the African continent. This has rendered the task of building durable and meaningful peace and security in the region and beyond extremely difficult. At the root of these intra- and inter-state conflicts and insecurity is the crisis of the state. The precarious state-building process has rendered the state crisis-stricken. State crisis in turn gives rise to conflicts and insecurity.

Underpinning these bitter conflicts and insecurities are historical, socio-economic, domestic, intra-regional and international factors and underdevelopment. External interventions, driven by competing national, economic, political, security and strategic-linked interests connected to the war on terror and concern about piracy, render the conflicts intractable. In spite of the engagement of many local, national, regional and international actors in the attempt to mitigate the conflicts, so far no significant results have been achieved. The methodology of international intervention and the politics of conflict resolution, which stress global strategic, security, political and economic interests, has not only proved lacking, but has also skewed the process of state-, peace- and security-building. The piecemeal approach to conflict resolution quite often emanating from geo-strategic expediency is another factor that perpetuates conflict in the Horn of Africa. Interlinked conflicts and insecurities demand holistic, historicized, multidimensional and multidisciplinary analyses, regional approaches and mechanisms.
REFERENCES


