State Crisis, Conflicts and International Intervention in the Horn of Africa

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Introduction
The benchmarks distinguishing the Horn of Africa (HOA) are state crisis, conflicts and international interventions. A conflation of these variables has rendered the HOA the most conflict prone, unstable and underdeveloped region in the African continent. The dialectics of interconnectivity between these three dimensions of the HOA predicament that render the region the most deprived poses a legitimate question of whether the region will survive the coming decades. An analysis of the predicament of the HOA and a consequent dissecting of the contributing variables will immediately lead to the state. The state is the par excellence source of the predicament. The precarious nature of the state building in the HOA has given rise to chronic state crisis. State crisis in turn leads to festering conflicts. Stated differently state crisis and conflicts feed into each other.

Another variable that plays out in this nexus is international intervention. International interventions adversely affect both the state and conflict situation in the HOA. The origin of the state that generated the two publics: the urban public and rural public, delineated societies when the rural public was alienated from the post-colonial state. The limited penetration of the rural public by the state generated a situation where the publics were estranged. The alienation of the rural public ultimately inserted serious and lasting contradiction and fracture between the two publics affecting considerably governance system. Consequently today the state in the HOA is declared invariably as fragile, failed, collapsed, predatory, patrimonial, rent seeking, rogue, pariahs, etc. This state of condition gave rise to rampant conflicts in the HOA.

Apparently a host of factors stand behind the crisis of the state and the concomitant festering conflicts in the HOA. Among the factors that can be accounted for the state crisis and conflicts are international interventions that invariably pertain to colonialism, neocolonialism, Cold War superpower competition driven by strategic, economic, political and security interests. Recently also concern of global war on terror and anti-piracy off the coast of Somalia that brought virtually the entire world naval forces to the region have compounded to the host of factors. The project of state building which is the epicentre of the crisis of the state in the HOA is fundamentally a domestic process. As such external interventions adversely affect the state building process, which make the state precarious and susceptible to intra-state and inter-state conflicts. Other factors that add to the conflated predicaments of the HOA, that are not to be discussed here include issues of democratisation, socio-economic development, ethnicity and power sharing, environmental degradation, resource scarcity.

The aim of the paper is to explore the interrelation between state crisis, conflicts and international intervention in the Horn of Africa (HOA). To that end, the paper first examines
state crisis bedevilling the region, followed by analysis of international intervention. The third section discusses the rampant intra-state and inter-state conflicts ravaging the HOA.

State Crisis in the HOA
It has now become fashionable to describe the state in the HOA as dysfunctional and in a state of malfeasance. The literature portrays the state as in deep crisis (Mentan 2010). The state in the HOA is characterised by fragility, failure, collapse (Spears 2004, Menkhaus 2007). The state has also been described as rent seeking, criminal predating on its citizens. Most of all the state in HOA has been declared incapable of providing peace, security, development, democracy and decent livelihood (Ayoob 2001).

State crisis in the HOA is both caused by and at the same time constitutes the cause of the rampant conflicts in the region. Overall, the crisis of the state in the HOA is presumed to stem from partly the ontological origin of the state itself. The states in the HOA, perhaps with the exception of Ethiopia are colonial creation (Rubenson 1976, Markakis 1987, Tareke 1996, Zewde 2001). This colonial origin of the state arguably, in a number of ways, contributes to the crisis of the state. One of these ways pertains to the state-society relation (Callaghy 1984, Young 1994). The transplantation by the colonial state and importation by the post-colonial state of institutions, structures and practices alien to the indigenous context had indeed contributed to the alienation of the overwhelming rural population. The state was detached from its socio-economic, politico-cultural and historical settings that is, western institutions, structures and practices alienated the state from society. This has created two publics notably urban public and rural public (Ekeh 1975). The urban public was dominated by urban middle class, western oriented elite; while the rural public predominantly predicated on traditional, indigenous institutions, practices and authorities. The overwhelming rural population governed by time-tested traditional governance systems (Ekeh 1975, Herbest 2000). As a consequence the national state is perceived by the majority as functionally foreign, distant and of less importance to their daily life. This division between the post-colonial state and the society gave rise to profound crack and conflict in the state-society relation. The state is therefore deprived of highly needed popular legitimacy.

The emergence of the two publics had also a consequence in the governance system. It engendered division of governance in society, notably into formality and informality. While the urban public space was governed by formal institutions, mechanisms and authorities, the rural public space adhered to its traditional institutions and authorities that were relegated to informality by the colonial and post-colonial states (Mengisteab 2009, Englebert 2000). Further the emergence of the two publics had also an implication in state-society relation. This could be explained by the notions of emancipation and pacification (Callaghy 1984, Young 1994, Chabal and Daloz 1999).

Emancipation refers to state sovereignty. It indicates autonomy of the state from society. The state stands above societal groups. It heralds establishment of state hegemony. No societal groups are permitted or capable to challenge state authority. State hegemony, particularly in the legitimate use of the means of violence is indisputably established.

Pacification refers to society’s submission to state authority. The society voluntary and functionally surrenders to the state. Conversely, it also affirms ultimate societal control of
state. In its dialectical relations there should be channels and mechanisms through which society exercises checks and balances. Therefore ultimate power rests on society.

In addition to its historical colonial ontological origin that alienated it from its citizens, its inability to provide basic services has also deprived the state domestic legitimacy. Indeed most of the time the state is dependent on externality for its legitimacy. This one sided legitimacy, external without internal, constitute source of conflict (Lemay-Hebert 2009). The state is presupposed to provide certain fundamental services if it is to assume legitimacy from its citizens. The social contract theory enlists a number of services the state should provide in order to retain legitimacy. Social contract theory stems from the perception that modern nation states elicit their reason d’être from a contract entered between the state and society where, while the state is obligated to provide certain services, the society confers on the state legitimacy which provides legal foundation for its very existence (Lemay-Hebert 2009).

Some of the basic services the state is obligated to deliver are social services: education, health; economic: jobs, insurance, decent living standard; security: security from external aggression, life security, right to peace, human security; democracy: civic right, political rights. The provision of these and other services by the state cultivates the social, cultural, legal and political harmony in the state-society relations. Let alone adequately providing these social services, even some of the ideas of the social services seem to be alien to the state in the HOA.

Indeed, the HOA state displays palpable deficiency in all of these basic services. Therefore the populations have withdrawn their legitimacy from the state. Consequently the state seeks to exercise power through crude coercion. To exercise crude coercion the HOA state has to depend on the military and security forces. Anyone who captures security apparatus can exercise power. Thos who do not have access to security apparatus are then excluded from the state. This exclusion would compel them to look for alternative security apparatus. Instead of ballot box, security forces then assume the means of transfer of power. In a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual societies power domination may assume the form that one ethnic or religious or linguistic group capturing state power. This in turn many engender divisions within society and ultimately civil strives.

**International Intervention in the HOA**

International intervention by definition involves the removal of domestic affairs from the internal realm and locating them at the external realm. This would imply the dislocation of ownership of processes, mechanisms and outcomes. Development processes, security and political agendas and outcomes are orchestrated and decisively influenced in the external realm. The most visible international intervention in the Horn of Africa (HOA) came in the form of colonialism followed by Cold War politics and now also global war on terror and piracy.

Each of these international interventions had specific impact. Colonialism was of course absolute, with economic, political and cultural domination. Colonial intervention completely disrupted and distorted the historical development process, and particularly the state building process. The distorted state building process that was dislocated and placed in the external realm which alienated indigenous institutions, authorities and practices (First 1983, Davidson 1992, Mentan 2010) eventually led to rampant conflicts and insecurities in the HOA. Decolonisation was supposed to re instituted the internal realm by abolishing the external realm as the dominant one. Nonetheless Decolonisation gave way to world order of Cold War where
the HOA became the extreme playground for East-West ideologically motivated urge for world domination. The US and the Soviet Union alternated in supporting client regimes (Makinda 1982). In the immediate post-colonial period the Soviets backed client regimes in Somalia and Sudan, while the US backed the imperial regime in Ethiopia (Kebede 2010). Soon the superpowers shifted position, while the Soviets backed the military regime (a self-declared socialist) that replaced the imperial regime in Ethiopia, the US stood on side of the dictators of Gen Siad Barre of Somalia and Gen Ghaffar El Nimieri of Sudan (Woodward 2006, Cliffe 2004).

These opportunistic and self-serving superpower interventions further distorted the state building process. It also led to rampant conflicts. The suppressive client regimes became increasingly dictatorial and intolerant to any public demand of freedom, equality and justice. Protests were brutally crushed using the military arsenal put at their disposal by their superpower patrons. The brutal actions by the regimes against civilians and rebels further exacerbated the political, economic and security situation in the HOA. As the saying goes, ‘violence begets violence’, the number of liberation movements determined to remove the client regimes increased by the day. The region thus became the most conflict prone both in terms of the number of liberation movements opposing the client regimes, intensity of the wars, and external interventions. Combination of factors one of which was the demise of the Cold War produced regime changes particularly in Somalia and Ethiopia in 1991. The Somali state collapsed while in Ethiopia the liberation movements took power. The changes of regimes however did not lead to peace, stability and security in the HOA.

Following the September 11, 2001 attack on the United States a new development in the international intervention in the HOA occurred. The new development was the US global war on terror which targeted the HOA. Stateless Somalia was perceived as a fertile ground for Al Qaeda inspired terrorism against American interests in the region. To combat terrorism in lawless Somalia the US established anti-terrorist group: Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), comprising Somali warlords who were tormenting the Somali people (Menkhaus 2007, Möller 2008, Samatar 2008, Verhoeven 2009). The formation of the ARPCT was accompanied by targeted attacks against suspected Al Qaeda cells which also involved taking life of innocent people. Further, akin to Cold War era policies and practices the US backed illegitimate regimes and created division in the state of HOA between friends and non-friends that brought back the memory of international intervention of the Cold War era.

Since 2003 also the phenomenon of piracy has brought an additional element in the international intervention (Sörenson 2008). The war against piracy off the shores of Somalia brought, practically the whole world’s naval forces to the region. This militarisation of the region has serious implications to the process of state building, peace, stability, security and development of the region. The current heavy presence of international military forces in the region will not bring peace, stability and security.

**The Rampant Conflicts in the Horn of Africa**

Scholarly works on the Horn of Africa (HOA) testify to the fact that the region was subjected for the last fifty years to drawn out chronic and multifaceted intra-state and inter-state conflicts (Cliffe 2004, Woodward 2006, Tvedt 1993). These conflicts could duly be grouped into three categories: (i) state-society (intra-state, civil wars), and (ii) state-state (inter-state), (iii) society-society (communal strife). While state-society conflicts relate to civil wars
(communities with legitimate grievances challenge the state), state-state deals with conflicts between sovereign states (Zeleza 2008:6-7). The third type, society-society conflicts relate to communal strife (intra-communal and inter-communal, inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic, intra-and inter-clan). The common domain for all the conflicts is that the underlying source is the state, either as a source that is waging a war, or because it fails to prevent wars. A precarious state or state in crisis in the HOA has become source of conflicts and insecurity, and an attraction of external intervention.

The root causes of the rampant conflicts in the HOA as stated earlier are multiple. Since it would be impossible to account for all of them I will only mention some.

- Livelihood-based resources (land, water, grazing, pasture);
- Physical resources (mineral, fossil);
- Culture (ethnicity, language, religion);
- Political (power, inequality, domination, discrimination, marginalisation and alienation);
- External intervention (colonial, Cold War, regional, war on terror and piracy);
- Socio-economic (poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, draught, environmental degradation);
- Mode of life (peasantry, sedentary, pastoral, nomadic, highland, lowland);
- Dysfunctional governance practices (deficit of democracy, accountability, transparency, tyranny, dictatorship, sham and unrepresentative electoral practices, alienation and marginalisation of local indigenous institutions, authorities and practices).

It could be argued that combinations of some or all of these variables would explain the festering conflicts ravaging the HOA. For instance if we take the Darfur conflict we can discover that a combination of livelihood-based resource competition, culture, political, socio-economic and mode of life variables underlie the conflict. Factors such as culture, politics, external intervention, socio-economic, and dysfunctional governance practices would also explain the inter-state conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia that occurred in 1998.

Following I will examine the multiple intra-state conflicts ravaging the HOA. The next section will look into inter-state conflicts.

**Intra-state Conflicts**

Intra-state conflicts have become almost part of the daily life of people in the HOA. Indeed they define the socio-political life of peoples. The Sudan has been suffering of multifaceted intra-state (state-society) and society-society conflicts. Pervasive malpractices such as marginalisation, alienation, discrimination of peripheries by the centre drove Sudan in continuous intra-state conflicts since its independence in 1956 (Johnson 2003, Ahmed 2010, Deng 2010). The south-north conflict in Sudan reflected the characteristics of intra-state and society-society. It was of the nature of society-society category because it was between “African-Christian-animists” (South) and “Arab-Moslems” (north). It also displayed intra-state characteristics because the state was dominated by the “Arab-Moslem” northerners that in effect meant a state waging war against part of its society.

Already on the eve of its independence Sudan saw the outbreak of the first intra-state conflict. In 1955, a group of southern soldiers in the Sudanese army, from Torit, Equatoria, mutinied thereby marking the commencement of the first civil war in the Sudan (Ahmed 2010: 4, Barltrop 2011: 15). The Addis Ababa Accord that was signed between the southern rebels and
the Khartoum government in 1972 which gave the South an autonomous self-rule halted the intra-state conflict. Nevertheless, ten years later, in 1983, the South’s autonomy was abolished by the military leader of the day, Ghaffar al Nimeiri (Johnson 2003, Deng 2010). The South was divided against the wish of the people into three provinces. Sharia law was also declared, although the majority of southerners profess in Christianity or traditional beliefs. Both these factors triggered the second civil war which was brought to an end with the signing of the CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement) on January 9, 2005, between the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) (Ahmed 2008, Deng 2010, Baltrop 2011). The second round of the intra-state conflict lasted for 22 years. The central point of the CPA deals with referendum through which, at the end of six years interim period, the people of south Sudan will decide their future. Accordingly, on 9 January, 2011 the polling began which by end of the week-long voting time the people voted overwhelmingly for secession. On 9 July, 2011 South Sudan will emerge as newest state in Africa.

The conditions for the secessions of the South were indeed certainly laid down in the CPA. Though both parties promised to make unity attractive, they failed to show veritable efforts to realise it. The CPA was configured in a way that the ruling NCP and SPLM/A were permitted to represent their respective constituencies—the SPLM would represent the people of the south, while the rest of the population would be represented by the NCP. Therefore the idea of New Sudan would seem that it was rendered to be a negotiation tactic for the SPLM/A to achieve but also many believe the idea died with the death of Dr. John Garang the leader of the SPLM. The NCP was subjected to intensive pressures by the mediators to accept the secession. The mediators, particularly the US were convinced that the only solution to the South’s problem is secession. Accordingly, the complex problems of the Sudan were reduced to the north-south dichotomy. This led many to argue that the CPA was not as comprehensive as its name indicated (Baltrop 2011). One of the reasons why the South was treated differently was in addition to cultural and religious difference and the long struggle for freedom, the South was never properly integrated and the colonial and post-colonial state of Sudan facilitated the realisation of the notion of separate states. The British ruled the South as part of their East African colonies; they even had plans to join the south with Uganda (El Mahdi 1965, Jonson 2003, Deng 2010). This may have given reason for the perception of separate identity in the South. Further, pursuant to independence successive power holders in the north failed to address serious grievances and consequently deprivations that were felt by the people in the south grew immensely. Secession is presupposed to bring peace and security not only to those who seek it but also to those who are left behind. Yet, the secession of South Sudan faces daunting challenges such as border demarcation, wealth sharing, national debt, citizenship and repatriation that have huge impacts on both the north and south (Ahmed 2010). There are real dangers that these challenges may again drive the new states into inter-state conflicts.

The common perception is that the most serious problem Sudan has faced since independence is the question of south Sudan. Nonetheless, Sudan is beset of related intra-state conflicts in its northern, western and eastern regions (Ahmed 2010, Harir 1994). In the eastern part, the Beja people have been subjected to marginalisation, discrimination, suppression and underdevelopment by power holders at the centre, in Khartoum. Concomitantly, the Beja people, in their quest for an equal representation and participation, and in seeking their right place in post-colonial state they formed the Beja Congress in 1958 (Young 2007: 11). Since then the Beja Congress has been involved in political struggle that aimed at improving the plight of the Beja people that involved intermittent military confrontation. The Beja differ
from the people in the south because they are all Moslems and the racial difference is less sharp. The Beja Congress was subjected to banning by successive leaders in Khartoum (Ahmed and Manger 2009, Young 2007). In 1994 the intra-state conflict in east Sudan developed into a full-fledged war between the NCP and the Eastern Front. Two resistance movements, Beja Congress and the Rashaida Free Lions, united their forces in 2005 to set up the Eastern Front (Ahmed and Manger 2009: 8). The Eastern Front, as part of the NDA, fought the NCP government. Following the signing of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) in October 2006, the Beja Congress joined the government in Khartoum. Following their joining the Khartoum government, however, the Eastern Front as well as Beja Congress was split into several factions.

The sad story of Darfur emerged, when Sudan was trying to close one chapter of its bloody conflicts. In 2003 an insurgency broke out in the Darfur region, probably inspired by the struggle in the South. The NCP government responded harshly. Initially it used a militia force known as the Janjeweed. Eventually the Sudan Defence Forces were involved in the internecine war which turned Darfur into a living hell on the earth, according to many observers (Mamdani 2009). Several high profile negotiation initiatives to resolve the Darfur problem where the AU and UN got involved as brokers took place. Yet the intractability of the intra-state conflict that emanates partly from the uncompromising stance of the NCP government and partly due to the divided existence of the rebel movement put Sudan on the spotlight of countries that continue to suffer of intra-state conflicts. The main Darfur rebel movements are the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM). In spite of concerted efforts these groups have not so far been able to form a common front to face the NCP government that complicates the quest for durable solution to the conflict. They undertake separate negotiation processes with the government in various capital cities. The Abuja initiative and later the Doha process that replaced it are two mediation efforts undertaken to settle the Darfur intra-state conflict.

The forces opposing the NCP tried to morph into a united front. The DUP, UP; the SPLM/A; Beja Congress formed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in 1995. It was hoped that the secular NDA could be an alternative force to that of Islamic inspired NCP. This hope was dashed for a number of reasons. One of these reasons could be that the traditional parties, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and National Umma Party (NUP), have grown old thus incapable to meet the challenges Sudan faces. Further, second reason, the signing of the CPA between the SPLM/A and NCP, put into disarray the NDA, because the SPLM was no more active member in the struggle against the Khartoum government. Therefore in spite of several agreements: the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) and Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) (Ahmed 2008, Deng 2010), to settle the various intra-state conflicts, peace remains in short supply in the Sudan.

Ethiopia has also been equally to that of Sudan suffering of long drawn intra-state conflicts. The first serious intra-state conflict in Ethiopia could be traced to Ethiopia’s claim on the Italian colony of Eritrea. In 1952 Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia. The federation, however, was from the very outset subjected to systematic violations (Spears 2010: 46-7). The provisions of the federal arrangement were systematically dismantled provoking Eritrean enrages that ultimately led to an intra-state war in Ethiopia. The Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict is sometimes classified as inter-state conflict, because Eritrea is perceived as colonially created autonomous state (Mengisteab 2010). The annexation of Eritrea in 1962 by Ethiopia was the last straw in the final abolition of the federation thereby closing any door for peaceful
settlement of the intra-state conflict and in turn, ushering in a thirty years bloody war which was to be extinguished in 1991 with the fall of the military regime (Habte Selassie 1980, Gebre-Medhin 1989, Iyob 1995, Bereketebab 2007, Spears 2010). The war of liberation in Eritrea was later joined by ethnic movements representing ethnic groups such as the Oromos, the Somalis, and Tigrayans seeking to correct the political system that they saw as the source of their alienation, suppression and marginalisation. Non-ethnic groups primarily informed by leftist ideologies also joined on board the struggle (Berhe 2009, Zewde 2010).

On the eve of the fall of the monarchy, Ethiopia was permeated with political tensions. Pursuant to the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in February 1974 and its subsequent replacement by the Military Junta (commonly known as Dergue: committee in Amharic), the situation exploded and Ethiopia witnessed the proliferation of liberation movements. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) formed on 18 February 1975 (Berhe 2009: 38) seemed to lack a clear objective (Spears 2010: 64). Indeed the TPLF harboured twin objectives. In the early years of the struggle it upheld the idea of establishing a democratic republic of Tigray as expressed in the TPLF Manifesto of 1976 (Berhe 2009: 157-62). It was only when it became clear that the Dergue was on its way out that the TPLF began to assume an Ethiopian content and began to play a significant role in the creation of a multi-ethnic national coalition, notably the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) that was formed in 1989 (Spears 2010:74).

The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) formed in 1973 was another ethno-nationalist liberation movement that joined the struggle for systemic change in Ethiopia. The OLF was formed to advocate for the right of self-determination upto and including secession of the Oromo people (the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia) through what has become a culture in Ethiopia, liberation movement. In the hope of getting rid of the military dictatorship and to bring political change the OLF joined the EPRDF coalition. Pursuant to the fall of the Dergue in 1991 also the OLF became part of the EPRDF led transitional government. Nevertheless, the major ethnic group found itself playing a junior role that brought policy difference between the OLF and the dominant force in the coalition, the TPLF. Subsequently the OLF withdrew from the coalition and revisited the famous liberation struggle in 1992. Another ethno-nationalist movement, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), representing ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia, formed in 1984, also became part of the liberation movement in Ethiopia. Yet the ONLF was also compelled to take up armed struggle in order to bring about political change to the Ethiopian state or form separate ethnic Somali state.

The non-ethno-nationalist parties were derivatives of student movements inside as well as outside the country. The two major political parties were the Me’ison (All Ethiopia Socialist Movement) and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) (Zewde 2010: 8). Serious divisions between the Me’ison and EPRP, and civil society forces in general paved the way for the military to lead the popular uprising. First, using Me’ison the Dergue destroyed EPRP, and later turned its axe on Me’ison itself. Ironically the military establishment was dependent on the civilians to formulate their political programme (Zewde 2010) before turning against them. The Dergue regime wanted to make sure that any opposition from the radical Marxist parties was eliminated. Therefore devised mechanism by which it can use them one by one in order to eliminate them. The first to be used was the Me’ison to destroy the EPRP who commenced urban guerrilla tactics against the Dergue, accordingly the EPRP was defeated and dispersed. What remained of the EPRP joined the rural liberation struggle. In its establishment as a rural guerrilla movement the EPRP came to share a common space with the TPLF which plunged the two groups into clashes. Finally, in 1978, the TPLF banished the
EPRP to the Sudan. A breakaway faction of the EPRP was reconstituted into the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM) and returned to Ethiopia. The EPDM later joined the coalition that formed the EPRDF and pursuant to the fall of the Dergue became part of the new government (Berhe 2009).

It could be drawn a clear distinction between what was of concern to ethno-nationalist movements and supra-ethnic nationalist movements. Several of the ethno-nationalists in Ethiopia were concerned with the right of self-determination of their own people whether this will be translated into creation of separate state or not. Their predicament was how to alleviate marginalisation, alienation, and exclusion of their respective communities. This was perhaps that led to the introduction of ethnic federalism following the overthrow of the Dergue. The analysis of the supra-ethnic or multi-ethnic nationalist movements with regard to Ethiopia’s problems however focused on issues of democratisation, distribution of power and resources, and to a lesser extent on issues of nationalities (Zewde 2010, Spears 2010). There have also been tensions between these two political forces concerning the future of Ethiopia. This concern continued in the post-Dergue era too. Nonetheless, all the efforts and momentum brought change in the political landscape of Ethiopia.

The Ethiopian state was radically restructured, in a manner that reflected the nature of the political forces that participated in the struggle and history of the country. The victorious EPRDF, consisting of ethno-nationalist groups undertook a profound measure in reconstituting the Ethiopian state which hoped that it will bring peace and stability to the country. In 1992, the EPRDF organised a national conference where National Charter was endorsed which would guide the governance system of new Ethiopia. The chief provisions of the Charter dealt with state structures that were to be based on ethnic identity. The most controversial, Article 39 declared the right of nations, nationalities and people to self-determination up to and including secession. Initially the daring experiment was received with praise because it was perceived that it could end the enduring culture of conflict. Yet there were those who saw danger with the new experiment with regard to the unity of the Ethiopian state (Teshome and Zohrik 2008, Habtu 2003).

Although huge positive changes have taken place in Ethiopia, yet the culture of conflict has not given space for the culture of peace. Therefore it did not take long before old and new groups began to revisit the famous ‘national liberation struggle’. It was hoped that the fall of the Dergue regime will create new social contract in the relations of the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia, unfortunately another round of intra-state conflicts gripped the country. The politics of domination hindered the emergence of new social contract based on politics of rights. Probably leaving intact the old tainted image of the oldest state in sub-Saharan Africa where it was portrayed by some as ‘prison of nations’ (Gudina 2003, Berhe 2009, Spears 2010: 56). The new Charter that was supposed to constitute the legal basis of the emerging social contract in the relation of the various ethnic groups became source of tension and dispute. The new contract, in the body of ethnic federalism that was adopted by the ethno-nationalist movements: the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) faced legal, political and implementation obstacles. This failure compelled groups like the OLF, the ONLF, and other ethnic and supra-ethnic movements (e.g. EPPPP) to revisit the liberation struggle thereby reversing Ethiopia to the culture of intra-state wars.
Our third case in these narratives of intra-state conflicts pertains to Somalia. Somalia became independent on 1 July, 1960. British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland formed the post-colonial state of Somalia (Samatar and Samatar 2002, Elmi 2010, Ismail 2010). The Somali state, from the very outset of its independence, faced a host of problems that were to affect it by constituting source of intra-state and inter-state conflicts. One of the hosts of problems Somalia had to grapple with was the precarious integration of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. This was perhaps due to the separate colonial legacies (Lewis 2002, Spears 2010). The second factor could be attributed to clan-based division of post-colonial leaders and parties that led to the political chaos and tension in 1968 (Samatar and Somatar 2002). Taking advantage of political chaos of the election of 1969, Gen Siad Barre executed a military coup in October 1969 ending the fledgling political democracy. Finally, military dictatorship, Cold War interventions, geo-regional strategies, and clan politics brought the collapse of the Somali State in 1991 (Samatar and Samatar 2002, Lewis 2002, Woodward 2004, Möller 2008, Elmi 2010, Ismail 2010).

A mixture of a range of variables such as mobilisation, organisation and arming of clans that turned out to produce clan-based organisations the main of which were the Somali National Movement (SNM, Isaaq), Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF, Mijerteen), United Somali Congress (USC, Hawiye) led to downfall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 (Möller 2008: 102-3, Jhazbhay 2008:61). The unleashing of clan politics and clan-based wars demonstrated the intractability of the task to tame and configure politics into a national project in the post-Barre nation-state reconstruction. The division of Somalia as war loots between the victorious clan-based liberation movements: Somaliland dominated by Isaaq, Puntland dominated by Mijerteen and central and southern Somalia dominated by Hawiye heralded not only the end of Somalia but also turned the country into an epicentre of human tragedy. The expression of this tragedy became that, on one hand, the Somali society was plunged in a murderous intractable war, and on the other, Somalis are still crying loudly to keep alive the aspiration of building a prosperous, unified, peaceful and stable nation-state. In its disintegrated form, however, Somalia has posed challenges to mainstream political science because while the central and southern Somalia amidst the suffering of extremism and ‘Global War on Terror’ and as a consequence of regional and international interventions, Somali society maintains to function; the breakaway regions, particularly Somaliland, have established peaceful, stable and relatively democratic political system too.

The territory of Afar and Issa or the territory of French Somaliland, which tiny state of Djibouti was called, became independent in 1977. Djibouti comprises two major ethnic groups, the Issa Somalis and the Afars. Djibouti’s independence was also from the very outset blemished by intra-state conflict between the majority Somalis and minority Afars where civil war and low-intensity intra-state have been going on for decades. This intra-state conflict was induced by the sense of exclusion and discrimination felt by the minority Afars imposed upon them by the majority Issa who dominated state power. Nevertheless, amidst all this Djibouti is relatively speaking considered to be stable in a region where stability is a rare commodity.

The intra-state conflict was led by a front known as Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD). The FRUD launched armed insurgency in 1991 (Abdallah 2008: 276). Although the FRUD represented the Afar people in Djibouti had no secessionist agenda, it rather sought to create a political system where equality of ethnic groups is respected. A reconciliation process was initiated where a main faction of FRUD endorsed a power sharing agreement with the Issa dominated ruling People’s Rally for Progress (RPP) party on 26 December 1994. Nevertheless, as usual is the case, splinter group led by Ahmed Dini (Prime
Minister between 1977 and 1978) denounced the agreement, and low-intensity war continued. On 12 May, 2001, another peace was signed between this group and President Ismail Omar Guelleh which ended the decade-long intra-state war. Yet, a report by Agence France Press of May 2010 indicated that an intra-state conflict has erupted again. According to some sources reactivation of FRUD may be connected with the recent conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea.

The last nation in the region to gain its independence was Eritrea. This new nation has also been embroiled in intra-state conflicts. What complicates the Eritrean case is that it represented a classical example of aborted decolonisation process. When Italian rule was removed, instead of gaining its independence it was transferred to Ethiopian rule using mechanism of a UN sponsored federal decision (Habte Selassie 1989, Gebre-Medhin 1989, Iyob 1995). Ten years of deliberation on how to settle the case of the Italian territory resulted in forcibly tying Eritrea with Ethiopia (Pool 1979, Ellingson 1977). If properly implemented the federal arrangement could have worked. But because there was no genuine interest in respecting it and of its arbitrary abrogation by Ethiopia in 1962 the people of Eritrea had to wage a thirty-year war of independence that only ended in 1991 (Habte Selassie 1989, Iyob 1995). This history generated constellations of intra-state wars directed against the state of Ethiopia but also within the rank of the liberation movement.

The liberation movement had to fight two intra-state wars (civil wars) among themselves. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) fought two internecine wars. The first was between 1972-4 when the struggle was still young. The second took place between 1980-1 when the power balance shifted from the ELF to the EPLF and was halted only when the former was defeated. After independence also the various factions of the ELF vindictively pursued the intra-state conflict against the triumphant EPLF who dominated the post-liberation polity from the diaspora. The monopolisation of political, social and economic life by the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), engendered multiplication of groups, ready to embark on intra-state conflict. The eruption of the second Eritrea-Ethiopia war (1998-2000) further aggravated the intra-state conflict in Eritrea. An umbrella organisation known as Eritrea Democratic Alliance (EDA) consisting of sectarian and religious groups supported mainly by the Ethiopian government are trying to depose the government in Asmara.

Inter-state Conflicts
It has inexorably become clear that there is a direct connection between intra- and inter-state conflicts, that is there exists a spill-over of intra-state conflicts to inter-state conflicts. It is worth to note that in a comparative sense inter-state conflicts are less frequent than intra-state in the HOA, however (zeleza 2008, Goor ea al 1996). It is possible to trace inter-state conflicts in the HOA way back to the 1960s in which the festering intra-state conflicts could easily run across international political boundary. The logic of ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’ seemed to lure governments in the region into trying to export their domestic problems to the neighbouring country. The intra-state conflicts fostered habits of sneaking across the international political borders.

It could be noted that the mechanisms and mediators of spill over leading to inter-state conflicts take a variety of forms that make the task of detecting them very difficult. Some of these mechanisms and mediators include migration, poorly defined and contested borders, ethnic groups divided across international political borders, proxy wars, resources, identity-based conflicts, contested historical narratives and constructions. With concerns to proxy wars, for instance, both Sudan and Ethiopia has a history of hosting rebel groups from the
other country. Ethiopia accused Sudan of giving sanctuary to the Eritrean liberation fighters and other Ethiopian opposition groups. In order to pressure Sudan to stop supporting Eritreans and other Ethiopian opposition groups, Ethiopia also trained and armed Sudanese opposition rebels, particularly those from the south Sudan. This therefore pitched the two countries into intractable inter-state conflicts, albeit indirect (Cliffe 2004). No overt inter-state war has taken place between Ethiopia and Sudan. Nonetheless, due to long history of intra-state conflict they went through, the countries account for the longest history of inter-state proxy wars in the HOA. As earlier mentioned, while intra-state conflict in Sudan began in 1955 when southern units in the Sudanese army mutinied that of Ethiopia began with the launching of the Eritrean independence struggle in 1961.

Pan-Somali nationalism whose benchmark from the very outset of the emergence of the post-colonial republic of Somalia became uniting the ethnic Somali groups divided by colonial schemes brought the emergent state into clashes with its neighbour in the west. It was the British colonial authorities who in 1897 gave Somali territories in the western part of the country to Ethiopia (Spears 2010: 121). Since then the territory commonly known as the Ogaden has become a source of tensions and bloody wars between the two states. Therefore the whole post-colonial Somali-Ethiopian relation has been dictated by the dispute surrounding the future of ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia. The post-independence nationalist leaders of Somalia not only expressed strong ambitions to unite the five units of the Somali nation that were divided by colonialism but also they acted upon those ambitions that generated inter-state conflicts not only with Ethiopia but even with Kenya. Accordingly, Somalia went into major inter-state wars with Ethiopia, at least, in two occasions (Møller 2008, Kusow 2004, Lewis 2002). The first post-colonial inter-state war in the HOA occurred in 1964 between the emerging Somali state and the oldest and established state of Ethiopia. The largest in scale, duration and devastation, however, took place between 1977 and 1978 when Somalia invaded and swiftly occupied south-western Ethiopia (Makinda 1982). The invasion was only halted when a massive intervention by the Soviet and Cuban forces on the side of Ethiopia took place (Greenfield 1994: 108, Adam 1994: 118). The crushing defeat of Somalia in this inter-state war heralded the demise of the Siad Barre regime and final collapse of the Somali state which has not been able to recover from (Elmi 2010, Ismail 2010).

The last case of this analysis of inter-state conflicts in the HOA deals with the youngest nation-state in Africa, Eritrea. Eritrea had already been engaged in several inter-state conflicts with its neighbours. The post-liberation state of Eritrea was born in a highly volatile and conflictive region, which could explain to its political behaviour (ICG 2010). A seemingly border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia in their common borders led to a fully-blown two years war, 1998-2000 (Bereketeab 2009). The war was ended through internationally brokered peace agreement, and consequently the border dispute was resolved through the Permanent Court of Arbitration verdict that was announced on 13 April, 2002. Nonetheless, the ‘no war no peace’ statusesque continues depriving the two countries peace, stability and normalisation. Moreover, not only there is a real danger of returning to war, but also it has given rise to proxy wars further rendering the whole region amenable to festering intra-and inter-state conflicts. While in the externality dimension of proxy war, it is largely believe that Eritrea and Ethiopia have shifted their war to Somalia, in the internality dimension they are actively involved in supporting opposition groups to destabilise the other.

**Conclusion**

The paper set out to analyse the interlinks between state crisis, conflicts and international intervention in the Horn of Africa (HOA). It has argued that there is definite link between the
three variables. The assumption is that state crisis partly relates to the ontological origin of the state, its colonial origin. The colonial origin of the state coupled with pervasive leadership failure has thrown the state in the HOA into a deep crisis. A state in a crisis would not only be able to bring peace, stability, democracy and development, but also itself becomes source of conflict and insecurity, since it is a centre of attraction for groups vying for resources. The state in the HOA is the chief repository of resources. Anyone who controls the state controls national resources thus it receives extra-ordinary attention by would be political leaders. International intervention, whatever form it assumes, has also proven itself to be hazardous in the HOA.

Cold War politics where superpowers alternated in supporting client states had a double impact in the region. Its first impact was in distorting the process of state building. It became impossible to build enduring domestic state institutions. Indeed the state in HOA increasingly became dependent on external actors for its legitimacy, the outcome being a precarious state that is unable to provide basic services to its citizens. The second impact was in generating and perpetuating conflicts in the region. The pervasive and opportunist superpower involvement has contributed to rampant state-society (intra-state) conflicts as well as state-state (inter-state) conflicts.

The recent phenomenon of global war on terror and war against piracy off the shores of Somalia that has militarised the region has also added to the uncertainty, casting shadows on the HOA. This intervention divides state of the HOA into friends and non-friends with far-reaching consequences, reminiscent of the Cold War period. It not only arms certain states against other but also it has political, diplomatic and economic implication to those classified as non-friendly denying them external legitimacy. Further it also increases the overall sense of insecurity and vulnerability.

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