African states have responded to the challenges of the post-Cold War international system mostly by collectively promoting subregional and continental-wide initiatives in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Admittedly, the existence of many violent conflicts in Africa, as well as their ‘domino’ effects at thesub-regional level, contributed significantly to the growing desire for collective security systems and conflict management mechanisms. The broadening of the role and functions of African regional organisations to include responsibility for peacebuilding and conflict management generally adds credence to the efficacy of regional integration. Many issues, however, present themselves in the engagement of RECs with the peacebuilding process in Africa. Although primarily set up to promote economic integration, Africa’s RECs have increasingly taken up a prominent role in conflict resolution and peace support operations, as evident in the recent peace processes in Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, Mali, Congo DRC, Sudan, and South Sudan, among others. In spite of the challenges they face, RECs are capable of playing important roles with regard to peace mediation, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.
Pan-Africanism was a vital force in the decolonisation and liberation struggles of the African continent. Today, some regional integration initiatives are part of the legacy of Pan-Africanism. Nevertheless, a retreat in Pan-Africanist consciousness justifies the on-going reform of the African Union and other related platforms for African regional integration, peace and development.
In June, Al-Bashir, Sudan's leader since 1989, was sworn in for another five years as president. Few if any experts had expected any other outcome of the 2015 election. But will the 71 year old ex-military leader, who is accused by the ICC of war crimes in Darfur, continue his initiatives for national dialogue and overcome the country's major economic and security hurdles?
Five thousand refugees leave Eritrea each month according to UNHCR, making it one of the world’s fastest-emptying countries. In this policy note, Redie Bereketeab, researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute, analyses the role and responsibility of the international community in the Eritrean migration crisis.
This paper seeks to examine the post-liberation state building endeavour in South Sudan. Two civil wars stretching over more than five decades in quest for self-determination resulted in the secession of South Sudan. A negotiated settlement formalised in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between the ruling National Congress Party and Sudan people's Liberation Movement in 2005 offered South Sudan the possibility to determine it destiny through popular plebiscite. When the plebiscite took place in January 2011, south Sudanese voted overwhelmingly for secession. On 9 July 2011 South Sudan was declared sovereign state that paved the way for the arduous process of state building. The nascent state was however born into serious problems. This article seeks to analyse the problems and enablement the nascent state encounters.
State-building refers to the processes undertaken by new states, while reconstitution refers to the rearrangement of an existing state following either secession or collapse. Somaliland and South Sudan are involved in process of state-building, while Sudan and Somalia are engaged in state reconstitution. Three distinctive models of state-building are taking place in the four countries. This Policy Note analyses the interlinked yet distinct process of state building.
The Greater Horn of Africa (GHA) is engulfed by three interrelated crises: various inter-state wars, civil wars, and inter-communal conflicts; an economic crisis manifested in widespread debilitating poverty, chronic food insecurity and famines; and environmental degradation that is ravaging the region. While it is apparent that the countries of the region are unlikely to be able to deal with the crises individually, there is consensus that their chances of doing so improve markedly with collective regional action. The contributors to this volume address the need for regional integration in the GHA. They identify those factors that can foster integration, such as the proper management of equitable citizenship rights, as well as examining those that impede it, including the region's largely ineffective integration scheme, IGAD, and explore how the former can be strengthened and the latter transformed; explain how regional integration can mitigate the conflicts; and examine how integration can help to energise the region's economy.
Two approaches have characterised analysis of the postcolonial state in Africa. One emphasises the territorial integrity of the postcolonial state, with inherited colonial borders being viewed as sacrosanct and state-centred rights being given primacy. The other questions the sacrosanctity of colonial borders and seeks to promote the primacy of people-centred rights. The increasing frequency in recent years of quests for self-determination and secession in Africa poses an existential challenge to the postcolonial state on that continent. This Policy Note addresses this emerging trend.
This paper analyses the notion of self-determination and secession by adopting acomparative perspective on two case studies, namely Somaliland and South Sudan. Somaliland declared its independence in 1991 following the collapse of the Somali state. Since then, Somaliland has been making relentless efforts to secure recognition from the international community. South Sudan successfully negotiated the right to exerciseself-determination, a right that was formalised in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). The people of South Sudan held a referendum and voted overwhelmingly for secession, with formal independence being achieved on 9 July 2011. International law may better qualify Somaliland for statehood than South Sudan for three reasons: (i) it was created by colonialism, (ii) it has already been recognised, albeit only for a few days, as an independent state in 1960, and (iii) it has proven to be stable, functional and relatively democratic. Yet Somaliland has failed to achieve international recognition. This paper interrogates this discrepancy. It concludes that the existence of a partner ready to accept the right of self-determination, and geostrategic concerns about security as well a seconomic and political interests, determine international recognition.